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The Fate of the Hostages Rode with a C-130 Descending out of the Night Sky with Its Lights Off

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The Fate of the Hostages Rode with a C-130 Descending out of the Night Sky with Its Lights Off The fate of the hostages rode with a C-130 descending out of the night sky with its lights off. Entebbe By John T. Correll ir France flight 139 woman and two Palestinian men—had Loss of radio contact and the change in originated in Tel Aviv no difficulty boarding with concealed course alerted Israel that the flight, with on Sunday morning, handguns and hand grenades. The aircraft, a large number of Israeli and Jewish pas- June 27, 1976, bound an Airbus 300, left Athens at 12:20 p.m. sengers, had been hijacked. The aircraft for Paris with an intermediate stop in Seven minutes out of Athens, the diverted to Benghazi, Libya, where it Athens. Airport security in Athens was German man forced his way onto refueled and took off again at 9:50 p.m. notoriouslyA lax. No one was on duty the flight deck while his companions One of the passengers, a woman, faked a at the metal detector, and the official took over the passenger cabins. They medical emergency and managed to talk checking carry-on luggage at the X-ray declared the hijacking to be on behalf her way off the airplane in Benghazi and machine was not watching the screen. of the Popular Front for the Liberation escape the hijackers. Four passengers from a connecting of Palestine and forced the pilot, Capt. The Airbus landed at Entebbe airport flight from Bahrain—a German man and Michel Bacos, to turn southward. in Uganda at 3:15 a.m. on Monday. On 62 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2010 Entebbe board, in addition to the four hijack- new terminal and runway were built demands, broadcast over Ugandan ers, were 243 passengers and the Air in the early 1970s. Ugandan soldiers radio. Unless 53 terrorists—40 of France crew of 12. At least six more pointed their guns at the passengers. them held by Israel and the others by terrorists joined the operation, coming It was soon obvious that Ugandan West Germany, Kenya, France, and from the Popular Front’s forward loca- President Idi Amin was not only sup- Switzerland—were freed by 2 p.m. tion in Mogadishu, Somalia, bringing porting the Popular Front operation but (Israeli time) on Thursday, the hostages more lethal weapons, including AK-47 also was an active participant in it. A would be executed. assault rifles. terrorist relief team took over guard- Israel had faced the seizure of At midday on Monday, the hostages ing the hostages while the original hostages before, and its policy was were moved from the airplane to the hijackers rested. to do everything possible to free them dilapidated old airport terminal, which It was not until 3:30 p.m. Tuesday through direct action, rather than give had been used as a warehouse since a that the Popular Front announced its in to demand for release of terrorists. AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2010 63 in the old terminal, where primitive The rescue teams had to pass conditions worsened as the plumbing the new terminal to reach the clogged and backed up. Idi Amin ar- old terminal, where the hos- tages were being held. rived by helicopter on Monday after- noon for the first of several visits. He told the hostages the crisis was Israel’s Staff map by Zaur Eylanbekov fault for not agreeing to demands of the hijackers. He insisted on being addressed as “His Excellency Field Marshal Doctor Idi Amin Dada.” Amin, who took power in a 1971 coup, gave the impression of being a strutting buffoon who decorated his uniform with medals and honors he awarded to himself, but he was deadly dangerous. Already, tens of thousands were dead in his purges and sweeps of repression. The Israelis, who con- ducted training for the Ugandan armed forces from 1963 to 1972, knew him well. He had fallen out with the Israelis and ejected them when they refused to help him attack Tanzania and Kenya. The terrorists collected passports and other documents and separated the Jewish passengers from the non- Jews. On Wednesday afternoon, they released 47 hostages, mostly French. Captain Bacos declined release so long as any of his passengers were detained, and at his urging, the Air France crew did likewise. That night, Israeli agents visited the freed hostages in France and gathered information about the situation in Entebbe. Another 101 hostages were released on Thursday morning, leaving only the 95 Israeli and Jewish passengers and the Air France crew in captivity. Getting There The Israeli Defense Forces could attempt a rescue, but unless they could land and take the old terminal by surprise, the hijackers would kill Several times in the past, however, woman who jumped up in panic and the hostages. The rescue force could terrorists had gotten what they wanted. was shot and killed. very well be lost as well. In the hijacking of an El Al airliner in By contrast, the attempt by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who 1968, the Israelis traded 15 terrorists special forces in 1974 to free 88 hos- had been IDF chief of staff during the for the hostages. In another instance, tages, mostly children, held by Pal- Six Day War in 1967, was reluctant they gave up 50 terrorists for two estinian terrorists at a school in the to mount a military operation, as was Israelis taken off a TWA airliner at Israeli town of Ma’alot was a disaster. his chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Mordechai Damascus. All of the terrorists were killed, but Gur. The main advocate of a military Results from military action in so were 22 children, with another 56 response was the defense minister, hostage situations had varied. In 1972, wounded. Shimon Peres, who was not a military terrorists captured a Sabena airliner, When the terrorists announced their man, having risen instead through landed in Tel Aviv, and demanded the demands in Entebbe, the Israeli Cabinet civilian government ranks. Maj. Gen. release of 317 Fedayeen “freedom came under intense pressure from the Benny Peled, commander of the Is- fighters.” families of the hostages, who wanted raeli Air Force, agreed with Peres on Israeli soldiers disguised as mechan- Israel to agree right away with the military action. ics killed two hijackers and wounded exchange. As deliberations continued, the a third in a 90-second assault. All Meanwhile in Entebbe, the hostages armed forces explored several ideas, 101 hostages were freed except for a were crowded into a confined space including a parachute drop into Lake 64 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2010 Victoria, adjacent to Entebbe, with Yoni Netanyahu was 30 years old when he led troops coming ashore in rubber boats. the raid on Entebbe. He Whatever was decided, the Israeli air was the only member force could get them there. The C-130 of the rescue team Hercules, called Karnaf, or “Rhinoc- killed in the successful rescue of more than eros,” in Israeli service, could reach 100 hostages. Entebbe without difficulty. When Israel had maintained a large presence in Uganda, the IAF used C-130s for regular supply runs. The problem, in addition to achiev- ing surprise, was refueling. After landing, the C-130s would have only enough fuel remaining to fly another one-and-a-half hours. There was a chance that Kenya might allow them to refuel in Nairobi on the way out, but more likely, the C-130s would have to rob fuel from the storage tanks at announced it would negotiate for the Shomron named Col. Ehud Barak, the Entebbe. release of the hostages. The terrorists highly experienced former commander From their time in Uganda, the set a new deadline for 2 p.m. on Sunday. of the Unit, to lead the assault on the Israelis had some knowledge of the Later that evening, the IDF came up old terminal with Yoni serving under fuel system at the airport. Furthermore, with its plan, devised with substantial him, but on Friday evening Adam sent the old terminal had been built by an inputs from Peled and Shomron, to Barak to Kenya to seek permission for Israeli construction firm, which still land a combined force at Entebbe for post-mission landing and refueling, had the blueprints and gave them to a surprise attack at night. The insertion so Netanyahu was in clear command. the government. Additional informa- force was pared down to four C-130s. Yoni and his assault force of 29 tion came from the intelligence agency The plan was called Operation Thun- would be on the first C-130. They Mossad, which rented a light airplane derbolt. Maj. Gen. Yekutiel Adam, would be wearing Ugandan Army in Nairobi, and faking an in-flight chief of operations and number two uniforms, but they had to reach the emergency, circled the Entebbe airport man in the IDF, would be the overall old terminal quickly, before the opera- taking pictures. commander. Shomron was appointed tion was discovered. The C-130 could Brig. Gen. Dan Shomron, head of ground commander. not get too close without being seen infantry and paratroop command, said or heard, so they had a considerable the big question was whether the IAF Yoni and the Unit distance to go after deplaning. could insert his force without alarming The central role in the assault fell The C-130 could carry three ve- the terrorists. “From the moment that to the special forces unit of the Is- hicles, which suggested a motorcade we will be on the ground in Entebbe, raeli Army, Sayeret Matkal, known that looked like something it wasn’t. we can carry it out easily,” he said.
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