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Israels Special Forces : Einheiten, Aufgaben Und Operationen Israels Special Forces : Einheiten, Aufgaben und Operationen Autor(en): Serr, Marcel Objekttyp: Article Zeitschrift: ASMZ : Sicherheit Schweiz : Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift Band (Jahr): 184 (2018) Heft 8 PDF erstellt am: 29.09.2021 Persistenter Link: http://doi.org/10.5169/seals-813200 Nutzungsbedingungen Die ETH-Bibliothek ist Anbieterin der digitalisierten Zeitschriften. Sie besitzt keine Urheberrechte an den Inhalten der Zeitschriften. Die Rechte liegen in der Regel bei den Herausgebern. Die auf der Plattform e-periodica veröffentlichten Dokumente stehen für nicht-kommerzielle Zwecke in Lehre und Forschung sowie für die private Nutzung frei zur Verfügung. Einzelne Dateien oder Ausdrucke aus diesem Angebot können zusammen mit diesen Nutzungsbedingungen und den korrekten Herkunftsbezeichnungen weitergegeben werden. Das Veröffentlichen von Bildern in Print- und Online-Publikationen ist nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber erlaubt. Die systematische Speicherung von Teilen des elektronischen Angebots auf anderen Servern bedarf ebenfalls des schriftlichen Einverständnisses der Rechteinhaber. Haftungsausschluss Alle Angaben erfolgen ohne Gewähr für Vollständigkeit oder Richtigkeit. Es wird keine Haftung übernommen für Schäden durch die Verwendung von Informationen aus diesem Online-Angebot oder durch das Fehlen von Informationen. Dies gilt auch für Inhalte Dritter, die über dieses Angebot zugänglich sind. Ein Dienst der ETH-Bibliothek ETH Zürich, Rämistrasse 101, 8092 Zürich, Schweiz, www.library.ethz.ch http://www.e-periodica.ch Sicherheitspolitik Israels Special Forces - Einheiten, Aufgaben und Operationen Die Spezialeinheiten sind die Speerspitze der Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Sie sind eng mit der Geschichte der israelischen Streitkräfte verbunden, ihr Operationsgebiet ist der gesamte Nahe Osten und ihre Missionen erregen zuweilen weltweite Aufmerksamkeit. Marcel Serr einen Hang zum Unkonventionellen und Unit 101 im Januar 1954 in die neu einem ausgeprägten Offensivdrang gegründete Eliteeinheit der Fallschirmjäger. In den Jahrzehnten vor der Gründung auszeichnet. Unit 101 ist der Prototyp der israelischen Israels (1948) kam es bereits zu gewaltsamen Spezialeinheit. Sie führte innovative Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den Der Prototyp israelischer Offensiv- und Infiltrationstaktiken ein und ist bis heute das israelischer zionistischen Siedlern und der arabischen Spezialeinheiten: Unit 101 Vorbild Bevölkerung im britischen Mandatsgebiet Kommando-Operationen. «Unit 101 wurde Palästina. In den 1930er Jahren weiteten Im August 1953 gründete Ariel Sharon zu einer Legende... Aus 1-0-1 ging eine sich die Spannungen zu einem regelrechten in direkter Anlehnung an die SNS die Gruppe von Kämpfern hervor, die die Bürgerkrieg aus. Zu dieser Zeit prägte berüchtigte Unit 101. Israels Führung gesamte Armee mit einem neuen Kampfgeist der britische Offizier Orde Wingate die betraute die erste Spezialeinheit der IDF inspirierte», urteilt der israelische spätere israelische Kriegsfiihrung nachhaltig mit riskanten Überfällen in den arabischen Sicherheitsexperte Michael Bar-Zohar. mit dem Aufbau der «Special Night Nachbarstaaten, die als Rückzugsraum Squads» (SNS) — einer jüdischen Spezial- der palästinensischen Terror- und Sayeret Matkal - die Späher einheit zur Aufklärung und verdeckten Guerillaorganisationen dienten. Sharon des Generalstabs Kriegsführung in arabischen Gebieten. und seine Kampfgefährten waren nicht Getreu der Prämisse «Angriff ist die beste zimperlich, sodass es bei den Operationen Sayeret Matkal steht unter administrativer Verteidigung» wurden nächtliche Uberfälle teilweise zu erheblichen zivilen Opfern Leitung des Militärgeheimdienstes tief in feindlichem Gebiet zum kam. Daher integrierte Israels Militär AMAN. Die Hauptaufgaben liegen in der Markenzeichen der SNS. Obgleich die Einheit Aufklärung und Einholung nachrichtendienstlicher nur etwa ein Jahr operierte, begannen Informationen hinter viele Schlüsselfiguren der IDF ihre Ehemalige Kämpfer von Israels berüchtigter feindlichen Linien. Ab den 1970er Jahren milirärische Karriere in den SNS (wie Unit 101 (hier 1955 als Teil des 890. kamen mit der Terrorbekämpfung und Moshe Dayan). Daher ist Wingates Erbe Fallschirmjäger-Bataillons). Ariel Sharon (2. v. I. Geiselbefreiung im Ausland neue Aufgabenbereiche bis heute wesentlicher Bestandteil stehend) ist Gründer der kontroversen hinzu. Die Einheit hat grossen israelischer Militärdoktrin, die sich durch Spezialeinheit. Moshe Dayan (mit der Augenklappe) Einfluss auf die Entwicklung des israelischen ist zu diesem Zeitpunkt Stabschef der IDF. Militärs, weil sie als Experimentierplattform für Infiltrations- und Kommandotaktiken sowie Tarn- und Antiterror- Kampftechniken dient. Grössere Bekanntheit erlangte die Einheit durch Operation Thunderbolt (1976). Dabei befreiten Sayeret-Einhei- ten unter dem Kommando von Yoni Netanyahu, Bruder von Israels derzeitigem Premierminister Benjamin Netanyahu, über 100 Geiseln aus dem 4000 km entfernten Entebbe Airport in Uganda. Tragischer Weise überschattete der Tod Yoni Netanyahus den Erfolg der Operation. die Anfangs war Einheit streng geheim. Bis heute dürfen die Mitglieder sich nicht öffentlich zu erkennen geben und tragen keine Abzeichen. Rekruten durchlaufen eine fast zweijährige Ausbildung mit dem Nahkampftechniken, ~ Schwerpunkt auf Bild: Wikipedis Navigation, Tarnung, Aufklä- 2 Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift 08/2018 Sicherheitspolitik Eine israelische Spezialeinheit beim AntiTerror-Training. Die Terrorbekämpfung nimmt bei allen IDF-Spezialeinheiten seit den 1970er Jahren eine dominierende Rolle ein. Bild: Cpl. Alexi Rosenfeld, IDFSpokesperson Unit rüber hinaus sind Egoz (Anti-Guerilla- Einheit), Rimon (Wüstenkampf) und Maglan (Fernaufklärung und Komman¬ dooperationen) in der Oz- Brigade organisiert. Die israelischen Spezial- einheiten geniessen ein hohes rung und Überlebenstraining in feindlichem Prestige innerhalb der Gebiet. IDF und haben Zugriff auf Sayeret-Matkal-Veteranen gelangen die fähigsten Rekruten. oftmals in einflussreiche Position im Militär Während die Spezialeinhei- und der Politik. Ehud Barak, Israels am ten anfangs so geheim sind, höchsten dekorierter Soldat, ist später zum dass die Kämpfer lediglich Generalstabschef und Ministerpräsident aufpersönliche Empfehlungen (1999—2001) aufgestiegen. Premierminister aufgenommen werden, Netanyahu ist ebenfalls Sayeret- stehen sie heute für freiwillige Veteran. Rekruten offen, die ein Das Kampftraining in urbanem Gelände sowie die mehrtägiges Auswahlverfahren Zusammenarbeit mit den Panzerverbänden und der Luftwaffe SEALs (Gibbush) durchlaufen Shayetet 13: Israels Navy spielen eine wichtige Rolle für die israelischen Spezialein- müssen. Im Gegensatz zu heiten. Bild: Staff Sgt. Alexi Rosenfeld, IDF Spokesperson's Unit Die Marineeinheit Shayetet 13 ist für vielen anderen Spezialein- Infiltration, Terrorbekämpfung, Sabotage, heiten der Welt rekrutieren maritime Aufklärung und Geiselbefreiung sollte sich dieser Problematik annehmen. sich die Angehörigen von Israels Special sowie die Übernahme feindlicher Schiffe Die erste Bewährungsprobe war der Forces zum Grossteil aus regulären zuständig. Die Einheit ist in Land-, See- Libanonkrieg 1982. Dabei gelanges Shaldag, Wehrdienstleistenden. und Luftoperationen geübt und hat in fast die syrischen Luftabwehrstellungen Seit den 1970er Jahren setzt Israel alle allen grösseren Militäroperationen Israels weitgehend zu neutralisieren. In den folgenden seine Spezialeinheiten zunehmend für teilgenommen. Im Jom-Kippur-Krieg Luftkämpfen gegen die syrische Operationen in der Terrorbekämpfung infiltrierten Kommandoeinheiten ägyptische Luftwaffe konnte die IAF einen atemberaubenden ein. Insbesondere gezielte Tötungen von Häfen und versenkten fünf ägyptische Erfolg verbuchen und über 80 Schlüsselakteuren sind ein Markenzeichen Kriegsschiffe. Anfang der 1980er Jahre syrische Kampfflugzeuge abschiessen. Mitte israelischer Terrorbekämpfung. Auch wurde die Einheit insbesondere im der 1990er Jahre entwickelte sich Shaldag wenn die operativen Anforderungen der Libanon und dem Kampf gegen die Hisbollah zu einer luftgestützten Allzweck-Spe- Missionen komplexer werden, bleiben eingesetzt. Typische Missionen dieser zialeinheit, die zunehmend auch Terrorbe- Israels Special Forces den Kernprinzipien Zeit sind das Abfangen von Versorgungs- kämpfungs- und Geiselbefreiungsoperationen von SNS und Unit 101 treu: offensive, schiffen der Terrororganisation, das Sprengen übernimmt. taktisch elegante und wagemutige Überfälle. von feindlichen Einrichtungen sowie Aller taktischen Klasse zum Trotz das Anbringen von Sprengfallen. Grössere Kommando-Brigade Oz können die Operationen von Spezialeinheiten Bekanntheit erreichte Shayetet 13 durch aber nur im Rahmen einer das Kapern von Schiffen, die während der Seit Dezember 2015 fasst die IDF durchdachten Strategie ihr volles Potenzial 2. Intifada (2000—2005) Waffen an die Kommando-Brigade Oz weitere Spezial- entfalten. «Spezialeinsätze sind wie Dunkings Palästinenser lieferten. einheiten zusammen. Darunter befindet während einem Basketball-Spiel: Sie sind sich Duvdevan, die in den palästinensischen schön anzuschauen, aber sie entscheiden Shaldag Gebieten operiert. Die Einheit ist nicht das Spiel», gibt der frühere insbesondere auf Undercover-Operatio- stellvertretende IDF-Stabschef Maj. Gen. Uzi 1976 gründet Sayeret-Matkal-Offizier nen spezialisiert und gehört zu den Mista Dayan zu bedenken. H Muki Betzer Shaldag als direkte operative aravim-Kräften (wörtlich: arabisiert), Lehre aus dem Jom-Kippur-Krieg (1973): deren Charakteristikum die Verkleidung als Die Israeli Air Force (IAF) hatte aufgrund Araber und verdeckte Operationen in Marcel Serr der sowjetischen Boden-Luft-Raketen der arabischen Gebieten ist. In der Ausbildung Magister Artium 10315 Berlin Ägypter erhebliche Verluste hinnehmen wird grosser Wert auf die müssen. Eine Aufklärung und frühzeitige Sprachausbildung sowie Unterricht in den Neutralisierung der Stellungen hätte arabischen und islamischen Traditionen Israel erhebliche Vorteile verschafft. Shaldag sowie typische Verhaltensweisen gelegt. Da¬ Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift 08/2018 3.
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