If Comes vs. Hizballah and Its Allies

Jeffrey White

Policy Focus #106 | September 2010

If War Comes Israel vs. Hizballah and Its Allies

Jeffrey White

Policy Focus #106 | September 2010 All rights reserved. Printed in the of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2010 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2010 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication Front cover: An Israeli gunner runs to reload an piece after it fired toward from a position near the Lebanese border in northern Israel, July 2006. (AP Photo/Pier Paolo Cito) Contents

About the Author. v

Acknowledgments...... vii

Executive Summary. ix

Introduction . 1

1. Rumors of War. 3

2. Israel’s War...... 6

3. Hizballah’s War...... 21

4. War beyond Israel and Hizballah. 31

5. Uncertainties and Consequences. 41

6. Conclusions...... 46

Tables

Table 1. Israeli Fighters, Strike Aircraft, and Attack . 6

Table 2. Lessons of 2006 for the IDF and Hizballah. 8

Table 3. Israeli Anti- and Missile Systems...... 10

Table 4. Notional Israeli Ground Order of Battle in a Future Lebanon Conflict...... 16

Table 5. Reported Hizballah and Missiles...... 19

Table 6. Reported Hizballah SAM Systems...... 21

Table 7. Reported Hizballah Antitank Weapons...... 21

Table 8. Notional Hizballah Weapons Deployment...... 24

Table 9. Syrian SSM Systems...... 28 Jeffrey White If War Comes

Table 10. Syrian Long-Range Artillery Rockets...... 29

Table 11. Syrian ATGMs ...... 29

Table 12. Order of Battle...... 30

Table 13. Artillery Rockets and Mortars ...... 34

Maps

Figure 1. Notional Operations against Hizballah ...... 15

Figure 2. Notional Israeli Offensive Operation in ...... 17

Figure 3. Selected Rocket and Missile Coverage of Israel from Potential Launch Areas in Lebanon...... 20

Figure 4. Notional Hizballah Offensive Operations in Northern Israel. 23

Figure 5. Notional Hizballah Defensive Concept. 25

iv Policy Focus #106 About the Author

Jeffrey White is a defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of the Levant, , and . A thirty-four-year veteran of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), he participated in DIA operational and policy planning and wrote extensively for senior defense officials, including the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. White’s work includes extensive analysis of the Gaza conflict, Hizballah, the Iraq , and the Ira- nian nuclear program. He is sought out as a commentator on these issues and has authored several Washington Institute publications, including Hamas in Combat: The Military Performance of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (2009, with Yoram Cohen), Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assess- ment (2006, with David Makovsky), and An Adaptive Insurgency: Confronting Adversary Networks in Iraq (2006).

n n n

The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy v

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank The Washington Institute’s senior staff for their many thought- ful comments, which added greatly to the quality and depth of the material presented. Special thanks are due to Andrew Tabler and Mike Eisenstadt, who served as the main and secondary readers, and to George Lopez, the manuscript’s editor.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy vii

Executive Summary

The past several months have seen much are largely conventional in structure and purpose, as is discussion of growing tensions between Israel and Hiz- the Syrian military. Israel has prepared its own conven- ballah, along with the group’s allies, and Iran. If war tional forces for this threat, including enhancements does in fact come to Israel’s northern border, it would in air, ground, and naval systems, command and con- bear little resemblance to the 2006 conflict in Lebanon. trol, intelligence, force readiness, active rocket/missile Instead, it would in all likelihood be a transformational, defense, and civil defense. Although the challenge of a even fateful, event for the region—certainly for Hizbal- war with Hizballah and its allies should not be under- lah and Lebanon, probably for Syria, and perhaps even estimated, the (IDF) are much for Iran. Israel and its regional standing would likely better prepared today than they were in 2006. undergo substantial alterations as well. In a conflict of the sort outlined here, Israel would This study offers not a prediction of war, but rather aim to fundamentally alter the military equation, a forecast of what it could look like. In all probability, with great consequences for the political situation. it would be a conflict, one fought over extensive Although this would probably not amount to “final areas of Lebanon, Israel, and probably Syria, featuring victory,” it would likely be decisive in the military- large military forces executing complex operations and operational sense. Israeli military strategy would resulting in substantial casualties (military and civil- center on the use of large-scale joint air, ground, and ian) as well as major infrastructure damage in all of the naval operations to rapidly eliminate Hizballah’s countries involved. Although the political-diplomatic rocket and missile forces, destroy its ground forces arena would be important, success on the battlefield in southern Lebanon, severely damage its command would be central to determining the outcome. and control systems, and destroy its infrastructure Given the high stakes, the fighting would be throughout Lebanon. intense and would likely escalate and expand. Israel Israel would probably attempt to prevent the con- and Hizballah would feel great pressure to win such flict from escalating into general war with Syria by a war, and that need would drive the hostilities to employing threats, mobilization, force deployments, a new level, likely pulling in Syria and pushing Iran and posturing. At the same time, however, it would to become involved as well. The conflict would be be ready for that contingency. Any Syrian forces and a severe test for decisionmakers and warfighters on infrastructure that supported Hizballah would likely both sides, and a challenge for key external actors, be targeted, and any Iranian elements supporting the especially the United States. group would be subject to attack as well. Meanwhile, A number of circumstances could ignite such a con- Israel would attempt to deter direct Iranian attacks on flict. One side may simply conclude that it is time to act its territory via warnings and preparation of strategic for one reason or another. War could also develop from strike assets, including air, missile, and naval forces. various incidents, such as violence along the Lebanese Hizballah’s preparations for a future war are border, in Gaza, or in the . Other activities intended to deter Israel, shift the military balance in could produce situations in which escalating tensions the group’s favor, and bolster its political objectives. and misperception of the other side’s intentions and/ Its recent activities represent serious planning for war, or actions lead to a conflict. and the cumulative effect of these activities has been to increase the group’s self-confidence and perhaps The Combatants erode Israeli deterrence. Hizballah was largely suc- The current threat to Israel is essentially a conventional cessful in prosecuting the 2006 war, and it aims to one—Hizballah’s rocket, missile, and antitank forces repeat that success in a future conflict.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ix Jeffrey White If War Comes

If a new war erupts, Hizballah’s military efforts ■■ Inflicting a defeat on Israel sufficient to create the would center on the following strategies: conditions for regaining the

■■ Offensively, to launch massive rocket/missile attacks In Iran, the regime could decide to take one or more of on military and targets with the intention of several steps, on an escalating scale of involvement: inflicting significant casualties and damage ■■ Providing more arms to Hizballah and Syria ■■ Defensively, to oppose Israeli air, ground, and naval operations inside Lebanon with aggressive action, ■■ Providing advisors, technicians, or light combat slowing any advances while inflicting as many casual- forces ties as possible and, at the same time, preserving its own forces ■■ Carrying out asymmetric attacks on Israeli interests (e.g., terrorist-type actions) The group would aim to continue operations as long as it saw itself in an advantageous position, allowing ■■ Engaging in regional troublemaking (e.g., raising it to inflict the most political, military, economic, and tensions in the Strait of Hormuz) social damage on Israel. For their part, Syria and Iran would at minimum pro- ■■ Conducting missile strikes on Israel vide communications, command, control, intelligence, and resupply assistance in an effort to keep Hizballah In the Palestinian arena, Hamas leaders would likely in the fight. Syrian air defense elements would oppose limit the group’s participation to token actions accom- “penetrations” of Syrian airspace and perhaps engage panied by supporting rhetoric. At the same time, Israeli aircraft over Lebanon, given the small opera- no one should be surprised if a new war in the north tional area involved and the proximity of to included a “Gaza excursion.” Hamas could decide to the combat zone. Beyond basic support (e.g., advice, enter the conflict in serious fashion, employing heavy arms, intelligence), Iran’s potential role is unclear. But rocket fire and long-range weapons. Alternatively, in a large-scale conflict, Tehran could decide to par- Israel could decide to finish the job begun with Opera- ticipate more directly by providing light infantry or tion Cast Lead in 2008–2009. in Lebanon, and perhaps missile and air defense forces within Syria. And both Damascus and Escalation and Uncertainty Tehran would likely feel pressure to increase their roles The war outlined here would present a dangerous sit- as the war escalated, due in part to their connections uation—various pressures and dynamics would push it with and commitments to Hizballah. toward escalation. The course of the fighting, the com- If Syria became directly involved in a conflict batants’ offensive strategies and doctrinal approaches, with Israel during a war in Lebanon, its goals would the depth of their preparations for war, their expecta- include: tion that the other side will use massive force, and the perceived advantages of preemption would all foster a ■■ Preserving the regime and its key assets (security, broader and more serious conflict. Some factors would military, economic) work to limit the hostilities, such as external political intervention, the prospect of overwhelming losses, or ■■ Preserving Hizballah’s position in Lebanon and its impending defeat. On balance, however, the pressures ability to threaten Israel to escalate would likely outweigh the control mecha- nisms, resulting in a rapidly intensifying war. A period of ■■ Reestablishing a Syrian military presence in Lebanon acute danger would emerge early, when the advantages x Policy Focus #106 Executive Summary Jeffrey White of gaining a step on the opponent would be most pro- the likely political, military, and economic costs, Israel nounced. Decisionmakers on all sides would be under would face serious consequences if it failed to demon- great pressure to act quickly in order to achieve their strably achieve its core objectives. goals and protect their assets and populations. In contrast, if Israel acted decisively, were willing To be sure, there are many uncertainties regarding a to pay the costs in casualties and damage, and enjoyed conflict of this nature and scope, such as the strength military success, then a new war could substantially of will of key leaders, the true nature of the Hizballah- weaken its opponents in the following ways: Syria-Iran military relationship, the effects of external intervention prior to combat, the war’s starting condi- ■■ Hizballah would be broken as a military factor in tions and subsequent rapidity, public attitudes toward Lebanon and weakened politically. the fighting, the potential use of chemical or biologi- cal weapons, and the role of chance. These and other ■■ The Syrian regime would be weakened by military uncertainties could influence the course of the war, defeat and the loss of important military and secu- lengthening or shortening it, broadening or narrowing rity assets. its scope, and increasing or decreasing its intensity. ■■ Iran’s activities in the region would be circumscribed by Outcomes the defeat of its allies; and if Tehran failed to aid them Uncertainties aside, the broad outlines discussed during the conflict, it would lose influence as well. above would likely hold in a future war: it would be a large-scale, intense conflict waged between Israel and ■■ Hamas (assuming it became involved directly) would some combination of Hizballah and its allies, fought lose its military power in Gaza and at least some of in and over Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, and lasting its political power. weeks. In the end, the following conditions would likely prevail: The U.S. Role Washington should be taking its own preparatory steps ■■ The IDF would be occupying some, perhaps substan- for potential war by developing concrete plans for tial, parts of Lebanon and potentially all of Gaza. action, both in advance of such a conflict and if hos- tilities occur. If war comes, the United States should ■■ Wherever the course and outcome of the war went not necessarily take immediate steps toward ending badly—defeats, significant civilian casualties, wide- it quickly. Several important objectives would be at spread destruction—there would be political crises. stake in such a scenario: breaking Hizballah’s military capabilities and reducing its political power; disabus- ■■ Several immediate requirements would emerge: ing Syria of the notion that it can act in Lebanon to dealing with dislocated , rebuilding and further its own interests without significant cost; and resupplying military forces, and repairing damaged removing the potent Hizballah proxy from Iran’s for- infrastructure. eign policy arsenal. Only successful IDF operations can achieve those goals. Accordingly, the United States This situation would require a great deal of time and should consider giving the IDF both the time and the serious political and economic investments before it political space it needs to carry out those objectives. could stabilize. Washington should also be prepared for associated In the long term, the sort of war outlined here could Iranian troublemaking in the . The United reshape the region’s political and military environment. States must demonstrate that it will use force if neces- It would certainly be Israel’s most serious war since sary, thwarting any attempt by Tehran to take advan- 1973, and one that the IDF would have to win. Given tage of the situation created by a Lebanon war.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy xi Jeffrey White If War Comes

Conclusion Whether hostilities will erupt soon or ever is uncer- even Iran. Where the war goes badly for either side, tain; both sides have good reason to avoid it. But if significant military and civilian casualties, disruption war does come once again to Israel’s northern border, of economic activity, and damage to infrastructure a renewed confrontation between Israel and Hizballah are probable. Although Israel will most likely prevail will not resemble their inconclusive 2006 encounter. in this scenario, victory for either side will carry sub- The new war will likely be wider in geographic scope stantial costs. And for the losing side, the consequences and more destructive, with high-intensity operations may well be fateful. As the war deterrent appears to from the beginning. The dynamics of the fighting will weaken, both Israel and Hizballah are preparing for a produce rapid escalation, possibly pulling in Syria and serious confrontation that neither can afford to lose.

xii Policy Focus #106 Introduction

The past several months have seen much equation. The circumstances would pressure the com- discussion of growing tensions between Israel and Hiz- batants to use more of their capabilities rather than ballah, along with the group’s allies, Syria and Iran. If hold them back for use in a future conflict. Although war does in fact come to Israel’s northern border, it the political-diplomatic arena would be important, would bear little resemblance to the 2006 conflict in success on the battlefield would be central to deter- Lebanon. Instead, it would in all likelihood be a trans- mining the outcome. formational, even fateful, event for the region—cer- There is substantial information and history to tainly for Hizballah and Lebanon, probably for Syria, shape our thinking about a future war. and perhaps even for Iran. Israel and its regional stand- This study draws on the publicly available state- ing would likely face substantial alterations as well. ments of the combatants’ political and military leaders, Much of the commentary on the situation has on the record of their weapons acquisitions over the focused on the tensions themselves and their prospects past few years, and on what is publicly known about for sparking armed conflict. But if another war does their military preparations, including developments in erupt, what might it actually look like? How would doctrine and training.1 Together, these sources provide it be fought? How might it expand or escalate? What strong indicators of a war’s potential shape. consequences would it hold? Of course, there are no As for history, there are two relatively recent bench- definitive answers to these questions—war is the most marks for judging each side’s potential performance. In uncertain of all human endeavors, and forecasting the 2006 war, Israel fought Hizballah alone in Leba- future conflicts is always risky. But given the growing non, and the conduct of both sides continues to influ- friction between longstanding enemies and the poten- ence opinions about their relative capabilities today. In tially dramatic regional ramifications of a new war, December 2008, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead thinking seriously about how such a conflict might to deal with rocket fire from Hamas. The latter conflict unfold is crucial. was revealing on two fronts: it indicated how the Israel To be clear, though, this study offers not a predic- Defense Forces (IDF) had incorporated the lessons of tion of war, but rather a forecast of what it could look the 2006 war, and it suggested some likely elements of like. It examines in some detail what would likely be future IDF actions, including scale of operations, use a major conflict—one fought over extensive areas of of firepower and maneuver, and integration of intelli- Lebanon, Israel, and probably Syria, featuring large mil- gence. It did not fully test the IDF, however, allowing itary forces executing complex operations and resulting Israel to hold back on the full range of its capabilities. in substantial casualties (military and civilian) as well Any new war in the north would be waged simulta- as major infrastructure damage. The potential com- neously on four levels: political, strategic, operational, batants’ preparations and current posture support this and tactical. This study deals primarily with the strate- forecast. Although neither Hizballah nor Israel was gic and operational levels, though it should be remem- ready for war in July 2006, they both seem prepared bered that success or failure at the other levels would for the next conflict. inevitably have a major effect on the outcome.2 Think- Certain conclusions follow from this large-war ing about a war in this way forces one to confront seri- scenario. Given the high stakes involved, the conflict ous issues that are sometimes lost in the broad sweep of would be intense and would likely escalate and expand. policy discussions and advocacy, including how (and This would not be a war fought to strengthen a nego- how well) the potential combatants have prepared for tiating position, reinforce a concept such as deter- war, what specifically they will fight for, and how they rence, or achieve a temporary change in the military will use military forces to achieve their goals.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1 Jeffrey White If War Comes

If it does come to pass, the next war will be some- need will drive the hostilities to a new intensity, likely thing different from the 2006 conflict and Operation pulling in Syria and pressuring Iran to become involved Cast Lead—larger in scope, more destructive, and with as well. It will be a severe test of the decisionmakers and serious potential for escalation to a regional level. Both warfighters on all sides, and a challenge for key external Israel and Hizballah will need to win this war, and that actors, especially the United States.

Notes 1. The study’s knowledge base comprises more than a thousand press reports, journal articles, interviews, and military assessments. Particu- larly important sources include: Hizballah’s English and websites; Hizballah-affiliated media; reporting from the military cor- respondents of , the Post, and Yediot Aharonot; and publications from the office of the Israel Defense Forces military spokesperson. Also important were studies and analyses from the Institute for National Security Studies at University and the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center in Gelilot, Israel. 2. For a discussion of the relationships between these levels of war, see Gen. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Mod- ern World (New York: Vintage, 2005), pp. 13–18.

2 Policy Focus #106 1 | Rumors of War

The increase in tensions between Israel and Hamas has been involved in similar activity, includ- Hizballah, and the group’s allies, since spring 2010 is ing warnings and threats to Israel and meetings with based on a combination of circumstances. Statements Iranian leaders. It was also implicated in the July 2010 discussing the possibility of war, its course, and its rocket attack on , Israel. The situation in Gaza has consequences began emanating from Hizballah, Syria, its own dynamics that raise concerns about another Iran, and Israel early in the year and took on added round of fighting there. Meanwhile, Israel has con- weight during the summer.1 The actors are not so much ducted a number of telling actions, including exercises threatening war as stating that they would respond to involving its Northern and Southern Commands, an attack. Such sentiments have been accompanied by rocket and missile defenses, and civil defense systems. threats of the dire consequences of starting another It has also issued chemical and biological protection war. For example, on February 16, 2010, Hizballah kits to a substantial portion of the civilian population. leader stated: In addition, Israeli leaders frequently warn of the seri- ous consequences of attacks on their territory. I’d like to say to the today: Not only if you attack Although some of this activity may just be whis- al-Dahiya, we will attack Tel Aviv, but if you attack tling in the dark, it has created an ominous backdrop ’s Rafiq al-Hariri Airport, we will attack Ben- for an inherently dangerous situation—a climate that Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv. If you attack our ports, we is conducive to war. Israel has worked hard to deter its will your ports. If you attack our oil refineries, we will shell your oil refineries. If you attack our factories, enemies, but war talk and arms shipments among Hiz- we will shell your factories. If you shell our electricity ballah, Syria, and Iran can undermine that deterrence, plants, we will shell your electricity plants.2 or Israel’s confidence in it.

In addition to rhetoric, various concrete actions have Context of War ratcheted up tensions and laid the groundwork for occur in a specific geographic, political, and mili- serious fighting. Partial mobilization and alerts have tary context. This context shapes the nature and direc- been reported in Syria and by Hizballah in Lebanon. tion of the conflict, if not its exact course. Considerable reporting has also highlighted Syria Geographically, the war postulated in this study and Iran’s transfer of new weapons to the group.3 The would be a broad conflict far exceeding the 2006 war most serious case has been Syria’s suspected transfer of between Israel and Hizballah. First, Hizballah’s pos- an undetermined number of Scud surface-to-surface session of long-range missiles and rockets would effec- missiles. Such reports have been bolstered by Israel’s tively extend the war throughout Israel. Second, Israel’s November 2009 interception of the vessel Francop, operations to destroy these long-range threats would found to be carrying a large Iranian arms shipment take it deep into Lebanon, in the air and on the ground. apparently bound for Hizballah via Syria. In addition, Third, if Damascus directly intervened in the war—as a series of meetings between the leaders of Hizballah, seems probable given the prevailing political and mili- Syria, and Iran—including a February 2010 summit tary dynamics—Syria too would become an arena of in Damascus—gives the impression of a kind of war combat. Iran could become directly involved as well, diplomacy involving coordination of military policy but because of its distance from Israel, any operations and planning.4 The serious clash between Lebanese over Iran or along its coast would be limited in scope army personnel and Israeli forces on August 3, 2010, and duration. Iranian forces or personnel could of added another element to the tensions. course join the fighting in Lebanon or Syria.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 3 Jeffrey White If War Comes

The overall theater of combat would cover some Finally, the military context has been dominated forty thousand square miles,5 divided into three sub- by continuing arms acquisitions, military preparations theaters: Lebanon, Israel, and Syria. The Lebanese (including training and exercise activity), a high state subtheater includes perhaps three compartments that of watchfulness and attention to changes in each party’s would see combat of some type: the region south of the military posture, and assertions of confidence if war Awali River, the Beqa Valley, and the rest of Lebanon. comes. For now, an uneasy level of mutual deterrence— Israel can be divided into two compartments: northern or at least lack of interest in war at this time—prevails, Israel, and central and southern Israel. Syria has three but this state of affairs is under continuous strain. compartments: from Damascus to the Lebanon bor- der, from the Golan Heights to Damascus, and the rest How War Comes of the country. A number of circumstances could ignite a conflict: The nature of combat in these compartments would vary. It would likely be most intense south of the Awali ■■ One side may calculate that it is time to act. and in the southern Beqa Valley (areas where would be pitted against Hizballah’s elab- ■■ Acquisition of new weapons or capabilities could orate defenses) and in northern Israel (which would change the military equation, either encouraging receive the brunt of Hizballah’s rocket and missile risk on the part of Hizballah and its allies or push- offensive). This does not mean that the other compart- ing Israel to preemptive action. Israel is especially ments would be free from major combat. Depending sensitive to changes in Hizballah’s air defense capa- on the intensity, duration, and degree of participation bility and in the accuracy and range of its missiles. by Syria and Iran, serious fighting could expand to For example, according to some reports, the group’s other compartments. acquisition of missiles from Syria nearly spurred an The broad political context for the current war threat Israeli strike on the supply operation in spring 2010.6 is dominated by several factors: Iran’s nuclear program and domestic unrest; Palestinian political paralysis and ■■ Hizballah continues to vow revenge on Israel for the the lack of movement toward negotiations with Israel; killing of former commander Imad Mughniyah. A the absence of Israel-Syria peace negotiations; and successful attack on Israel or Israeli interests would some tension in the U.S.-Israel political relationship. almost certainly produce a strong retaliatory strike The need to maintain a close relationship with Wash- against Hizballah in Lebanon. ington, not least of all on the Iranian nuclear issue, constrains Israeli decisionmaking about the developing ■■ Israel may decide to strike Iran’s nuclear program, threat from Hizballah and its allies. prompting Hizballah missile and rocket attacks on The political context has also been influenced by Israel. For political reasons, each side would likely what appears to be growing cooperation and coor- prefer that the other be the initiator, but that does dination among Hizballah, Syria, Iran, and, to some not rule out “war by choice.” extent, Hamas. The Lebanese government is being drawn into the issue through Hizballah’s political War could also develop from various incidents, such and military activity and Syria’s continued politi- as violence along the Lebanese border, in Gaza, or in cal role in the country. This tightening network of the West Bank. For example, the sudden onset of war relationships is evidenced by meetings and agree- in July 2006 resulted from Hizballah’s ill-considered ments among the key leaders (including the Decem- kidnapping of Israeli soldiers; neither side actually ber 2009 defense agreement between Syria and Iran) anticipated or sought war at that time. Similarly, Gaza as well as Hizballah’s strong presence within the slid into war in December 2008 as Hamas failed to Lebanese government. properly weigh the effects of renewing serious rocket

4 Policy Focus #106 Rumors of War Jeffrey White fire on southern Israel. Large-scale rioting or violence miscalculation. But its ability to communicate with in the West Bank could also pull in Palestinian ele- Iran and Hizballah is more limited. And even where ments based in Gaza and Lebanon. For example, the good channels exist, there is no guaranteeing that a beginning of this kind of process could be seen along message would be received as intended. the Gaza border in March 2010, where tensions rose In short, war could come in any number of ways. because of Palestinian rocket fire and Israeli counterac- These include a quick and unexpected eruption as in tions (though this particular flare-up did not go far). summer 2006, or a slower buildup as in Gaza at the Other activities could produce situations in which end of 2008. escalating tensions and misperception of the other side’s intentions and/or actions lead to a conflict. In Assessing the Combatants particular, exercises, reserve mobilization activity, and Going to war is a major undertaking and complex pro- periodic alerts could cause one side to overreact. In cess for any political entity. This paper addresses three May 2010, for example, Hizballah responded to Isra- major aspects of the process for each of the potential el’s large-scale “Turning Point 4” civil defense exercise major combatants: their preparations for war, their by placing its forces on alert, increasing its activity in probable strategy for war, and their likely operations the border area, and deploying additional personnel to during war. This approach necessarily leaves much the South. Operations not directly related to Lebanon unsaid, but the intention is to focus on issues central to could spark war as well, such as Israel’s 2007 any meaningful discussion regarding the conduct and on Syria’s nuclear facility near Dayr al-Zawr. Israel has consequences of a potential future war. The remain- a good diplomatic channel to Damascus for signaling ing chapters focus on each of the potential combatants its real intentions, thereby reducing the chances for separately, beginning with Israel.

Notes 1. See, for example, Media Research Institute (MEMRI), “At Damascus Summit, Ahmadinejad and Assad Attack U.S. and Israel; Ahmadinejad: Israel’s Elimination Is Near; Assad: The Resistance Is Winning,” February 26, 2010, http://www.memri.org/ report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4000.htm; MEMRI, “Iranian President Ahmadinejad Repeatedly Calls for Eliminating Israel,” February 25, 2010, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3997.htm; and Amos Harel, “Barak: IDF Has Its Eyes on All Threats, Near and Far,” Haaretz, April 13, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/news/barak-idf-has-its-eyes-on-all-threats-near-and-far-1.284183. 2. Middle East Media Research Institute, “Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah Threatens to Bring Down Buildings in Tel Aviv and Hit Ben-Gurion Airport in Future War,” February 17, 2010, http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2405.htm. 3. See, for example, Amnon Meranda, “Military Intelligence: Scuds Tip of Iceberg,” YnetNews.com, May 4, 2010, http://www. ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3884753,00.html. 4. See, for example, Middle East Media Research Institute, “Assad-Ahmadinejad-Nasrallah Summit Seen by Arab Resistance Media as ‘War Council’ in Anticipation of War Breaking Out ‘within a Few Months,’” March 5, 2010, http://www.memri.org/report/ en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4019.htm. 5. This excludes much of eastern Syria (which could see limited Israeli operations) and Iran. 6. Jerusalem Post, “Hizbullah Admits Receiving Syrian Scuds,” April 15, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article. aspx?id=173217.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 5 2 | Israel’s War

Preparations for War ■■ Upgrading older F-16s to the F-16I standard From the Israeli perspective, the poten- tial conflict discussed in this study would not be a bat- ■■ Continued development of unmanned aerial vehi- tle for “hearts and minds” or an “irregular war.” In other cles, including acquisition of the Eitan long-range/ words, if Israel goes to war against Hizballah, it would long-endurance drone not aim to win support from the Shiite population of southern Lebanon or the citizens of Damascus. The ■■ Extensive cooperative exercises between air and threat posed by Hizballah and its allies is essentially a ground forces conventional threat—the group’s rocket, missile, and antitank forces are largely conventional in structure ■■ Attaching air force officers to army brigade head- and purpose, as is the Syrian military. Accordingly, quarters to coordinate air support Israel has prepared its own conventional forces—air, ground, and naval—to combat this threat. These actions are aimed at preparing the IAF for the Since the 2006 conflict in Lebanon, Israel has made demands it would face in a new war: high-intensity major improvements in its ability to wage this kind of operations, precision strikes, extensive support to war. These include enhancements in air, ground, and ground operations, and operations under missile and naval systems, command and control, intelligence, rocket attack. The IAF demonstrated the first three force readiness, active rocket and , and of these capabilities during Cast Lead. In addition, its civil defense. Although the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) September 2007 strike against the Syrian nuclear facil- are not without their problems, the 2008–2009 Oper- ity, its reported interdiction of arms smuggling as dis- ation Cast Lead provided a glimpse of their enhanced tant as and the , and its reported long- capabilities. The challenge of a war with Hizballah and range mission rehearsals1 have allowed it to prepare for its allies should not be underestimated, but the IDF is operations deep within Syria and, if necessary, Iran. See much better prepared today than it was in 2006. table 1 for an inventory of IAF aircraft that would be of major importance in a future conflict.. Improvements in air force capabilities. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has carried out a number of activities to prepare for war. These include: Table 1. Israeli Fighters, Strike Aircraft, and Attack Helicopters ■■ Training for long-range flight operations (which has Total applications for potential missions deep inside Syria Type Squadrons Aircraft and Iran) F-15 variants 3 87 F-16 variants 9 327 ■■ Exercises simulating wartime operations, including AH-64 Apache 2 48 multifront and regional conflict attack helicopters AH-1 Cobra attack 1 33 ■■ Training for rapid airfield refueling and continuity helicopters of operations under combat conditions (e.g., missile/ Source: and Aram Nerguizian, The Arab-Israeli rocket attack) Military Balance: Conventional Realities and Asymmetric Challenges, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), p. 24. ■■ Airfield defense (e.g., against missile/rocket attacks)

6 Policy Focus #106 Israel’s War Jeffrey White

Improvements in ground force capabilities. A major ■■ Preparing for joint operations. Israeli forces rou- area of emphasis under the current IDF chief of staff, tinely exercise air-ground cooperation at brigade Lt. Gen. , has been improving the readi- levels and above. As mentioned earlier, air liaison ness of ground combat forces for large-scale operations officers have been established at the brigade level. on a complex battlefield. This has been a comprehensive Symbolically, senior IDF officers such as the chief of effort incorporating many of the lessons learned from staff and the head of Southern Command have been the 2006 war. (See table 2.) Specific measures include: featured in stories about flying with the IAF and emphasizing air-ground cooperation. In addition, ■■ Training and exercises for ground combat, at all the ability of the air force and ground forces to work levels. This includes the IDF General Headquarters, closely together on a complex battlefield was tested the Northern and Southern Commands, and the in Cast Lead and is a routine feature of security oper- divisions, brigades, and support units that would be ations along the Gaza border. expected to take part in a new war. As a senior IDF armor put it in March 2010, “We are training ■■ Specific training for combat in Hizballah-fortified like crazy, and we are as ready as ever.”2 For example, areas, including urban and tunnel combat. The IDF the 401st Armored Brigade, a unit that experienced has established a number of training areas for such difficulties during the Lebanon war, conducted three fighting, including simulated tunnel systems. Infan- brigade-level exercises in the period between that try forces routinely train in these areas, including conflict and Cast Lead. reserve formations. Units are also subjected to a rig- orous exercise program featuring sustained combat ■■ Enhancing the ability to maneuver and fight on a and movement under realistic conditions. In May complex battlefield, particularly against an enemy 2010, the Kfir Brigade, the IDF’s spe- employing large numbers of antitank missiles and cialists, conducted a brigade-level exercise of opera- countermobility measures (e.g., mines, improvised tions in a built-up area. Israel also plans to extend explosive devices). Preparations include extensive urban warfare training to armored units. combined-arms and joint exercises at all levels, intro- duction of enhanced communications, command, ■■ Focused and serious planning. As evidenced in the control, and intelligence (C3I) systems (i.e., the “dig- preparation for Cast Lead, the IDF is capable of serious ital battlefield”), and enhanced vehicle protection planning. Operational plans were developed and exer- and crew survivability measures. In 2006, the IDF’s cised well in advance of that conflict, and headquarters ability to conduct large-scale ground maneuver was and combat forces were well rehearsed for their roles.4 limited by a combination of training deficiencies, poor preparation, hasty planning, and Hizballah ■■ Improving combat spirit. This was noticeable dur- tactics and weapons. Since then, the IDF has worked ing Cast Lead (where Israeli ground forces were well to restore its ability to maneuver and fight on a large prepared, even eager, for fighting) and in the high scale in Lebanon. recruitment rates for combat units, especially the infantry.5 The IDF’s performance in Cast Lead fur- ■■ Preparing the reserve forces for combat, including ther boosted combat spirit. In addition, the IDF has mobilization exercises, field training exercises, and use of placed renewed emphasis on commanders “leading reserve elements in Operation Cast Lead. The readiness from the front” and acting aggressively in the pres- of these forces was a major problem in the 2006 war, but ence of enemy forces. their training and equipment has been enhanced since 2007, and their limited participation in Cast Lead pro- ■■ Preparing for large-scale logistics activities. vided an opportunity to test their progress.3 Operations on the scale outlined in this paper would

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 7 Table 2. Lessons of 2006 for the IDF and Hizballah

Israel’s Lessons Hizballah’s Lessons

Specific Issue Measure Taken Specific Issue Measure Taken

Persistent short-range Emphasis on rapid Vulnerability to air attack Acquisition of improved rocket threat ground operations in surface-to-air missiles; southern Lebanon to possible connection seize launch areas to Syrian air defense system

Antitank guided missile Protection measures for Vulnerability of key Increased inventory and threat armored vehicles and weapons systems (long- order of battle to reduce detailed “intelligence range rockets) the effects of attrition; preparation of the increased range to battlefield” expand the search area for IAF reconnaissance and strike assets

Conduct of large-scale Training and exercise Inaccuracy of rockets Acquisition of more- (operational-level) activity at general head- accurate missiles (Fateh- maneuver quarters, corps, division, 110) and increased and brigade levels; plan- rocket inventory for ning for major ground saturation fire operations

Hizballah use of towns/ Urban warfare training Sustaining high rate of Expanded inventory; villages as strong points and preparation rocket fire better preparation of (weapons, equipment, launch sites; multiple specialized forces) distributed stockpiles to reduce vulnerability

Hizballah obstacle Precise intelligence, Maintaining command Establishment of redun- systems and preparation for obstacle and control of forces dant communications countermobility breaching and road during combat and systems; preparation measures clearing in the face of Israeli for independent opera- efforts to sever/disrupt tions when communica- communication tions fail

Weaknesses in Emphasis on leadership Greater vulnerability Move more operations combat command and from the front and of forces operating in and forces to towns and aggressiveness aggressive behavior in the countryside versus villages battle (“combat spirit”) towns and villages

Reserve forces’ lack of Emphasis on training Vulnerability to deep IDF Air defense acquisitions; readiness reserves and bolstering heliborne and seaborne coastal defense their equipment and special operations preparations leadership

Civilian casualties and Training for urban Importance of Continued emphasis on collateral damage combat; rules of understanding Israeli collecting intelligence engagement; precision tactics, techniques, and and observing Israeli intelligence and procedures military activity in the weapons border area

Supply problems Emphasis on Recognition that Attempt to create supporting large high-profile successes conditions for similar operations logistically; (e.g., destroying successes in future refurbishment of helicopters and tanks; conflicts reserve equipment hitting ships) can affect stocks the course of IDF operations, especially if accompanied by casualties Israel’s War Jeffrey White

require a major logistical effort. The IDF would and analyzing tactical and targeting intelligence on have to support multiple divisions in combat at an the battlefield. And in June 2010, Israel added a new extended distance from peacetime bases and storage reconnaissance satellite to an already impressive con- facilities. Since the 2006 war, the IDF has increased stellation of space vehicles. Efforts have been made to the logistical capability of ground divisions, empha- improve intelligence support to ground operations as sized logistics operations in training and exercises, well—a weakness in the 2006 war. and introduced new technology. It is also training to This attention to intelligence was evident during operate under wartime conditions, including rocket/ Cast Lead, with the development of a deep target deck missile attacks on lines of communication. to support sustained , detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and real-time sup- Overall, the performance of IDF combat units during port to tactical commanders. A key element in Cast Cast Lead demonstrated to some degree the effectiveness Lead was the effective integration of intelligence at the of these and other readiness measures taken since 2006. tactical and operational levels by means of combined Improvements in naval capabilities. During the operations and intelligence cells. 2006 war, the Israeli nearly lost the Saar 5-class To be sure, combat in Lebanon would pose a different INS Hanit to a C-802 . The navy and greater intelligence challenge. The area that would has since addressed the issues that contributed to this need to be covered is larger, and enemy forces would be incident—essentially a failure to follow established more numerous. Syrian and Iranian involvement would operating procedures. It has also deployed an upgraded further tax Israel’s intelligence capabilities. Nevertheless, missile defense system on its combat equipment. the techniques demonstrated in Cast Lead would be During Cast Lead, the navy demonstrated its abil- largely applicable and important in the next war. ity to carry out the kinds of missions it would likely be Improvements in missile defense and civil defense. tasked with in a future war involving Hizballah and Syria. These missions included shore bombardment, Israel continues to enhance its missile and rocket coastal patrol and interdiction, and naval commando defense capabilities. The IDF is working toward a operations. Shore bombardment capabilities have been multilayer defense against the constellation of “high- improved via the acquisition and deployment of the trajectory” threats.6 This defense includes the missile system, which allows precision attacks antimissile system,7 improved Patriot surface-to-air from naval vessels. missile systems, and the system, which will reportedly begin limited operational deployment in Improvements in intelligence capabilities. Israel has November 2010.8 Antimissile and rocket defenses have placed a high priority on intelligence targeting of Leb- been exercised, including the Juniper Cobra IAF–U.S. anon since the 2006 war, collecting near-daily imagery European Command exercise in October–November over the country via manned and unmanned aircraft. 2009 and a computer simulation of the multilayered The IDF has improved its unmanned reconnaissance defense system in March 2010. (See table 3 for a list of capability with the addition of the previously men- Israel’s defense systems.) tioned Eitan long-range drone. A number of Israeli Passive defense capabilities are improving but still devel- human and technical intelligence operations inside oping. In 1992, the IDF created the Home Front Com- Lebanon have reportedly been discovered and dis- mand to oversee the wartime response to attacks inside mantled by Hizballah and Lebanese intelligence units. the Israeli civilian sector, or “rear area.” This command It is safe to assume that the IDF’s Unit 8200 routinely underwent a major test in the 2006 war and has been collects signals intelligence on Hizballah activity. The given greater emphasis and resources since then. Israel IDF has also given new emphasis to the Combat Intel- established the National Emergency Authority in 2007 to ligence Collection Corps, responsible for obtaining coordinate civilian and military civil defense measures.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 9 Jeffrey White If War Comes

In addition, the government conducts “Turning Israel’s Strategy Point” national civil defense exercises annually. The In war, military strategy supports political goals, and latest in this series—“Turning Point 4,” carried out in war aims are accomplished by deploying and employ- May 2010—simulated a major attack by Hizballah, ing forces effectively. Strategy determines which forces Syria, Iran, and Hamas, including strikes involving Syr- will be used (deployment) and how they will be used ian missiles with chemical warheads.9 (employment).10 Israel’s long experience with rocket attacks has Israel’s likely war aims in a conflict of the nature out- spurred it to develop a significant shelter program as lined here would be broader than simply trimming Hiz- well, providing some measure of protection for a sub- ballah’s military capabilities for a time (or “mowing the stantial percentage of the population. In February 2010, grass,” as some have put it) and reinforcing deterrence. the government began nationwide distribution of gas Those goals are too limited in the context of a large- masks, though the entire population cannot be covered scale conflict with potentially fateful consequences. due to budgetary limitations. Other major civil defense Instead, Israel has prepared for a major war, and it measures include deploying rocket attack warning sys- would have major war aims. The Israelis would seek to tems, coordinating emergency and medical services, and fundamentally alter the military equation, with great establishing emergency communication services. consequences for the political situation. Although this The IDF is also taking passive measures to protect its would probably not amount to “final victory,” it would key facilities during wartime, in recognition of the grow- likely be decisive in the military-operational sense.11 ing threat from accurate long-range missiles acquired by Goals. Israeli strategy in a future war is likely to have Hizballah and Syria. IAF bases have conducted exercises two primary components: countervalue and counter- simulating missile attacks, and preparations for operat- force. The objectives of the countervalue component ing under such conditions are being extended to ground would involve: force installations as well. The IDF has also begun dis- persing stockpiles of important war materials (e.g., weap- ■■ Compelling Hizballah to quit the war under terms ons, ammunition, spare parts, fuel) to reduce the threat favorable to Israel that rockets and missiles pose to its logistics system. ■■ Reducing Syria’s involvement in the conflict and its support to Hizballah

■■ Pressuring the Lebanese government and military to Table 3. Israeli Anti-Rocket and Missile Systems discontinue their relationship with Hizballah The countervalue component would probably involve Number of System Principal Target Batteries attacks on leadership, infrastructure, and economic targets associated with Hizballah. Examples include Patriot Surface-to-surface 8 missiles (SSMs) and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) facilities, as long-range rockets well as roads, bridges, airports, industries, and banks. Under the “,” Israel would use heavy Arrow II Long-range SSMs 2 firepower against civilian infrastructure associated Iron Dome Short-range rockets 2 projected* with Hizballah military operations. In an October * The United States has agreed to fund ten or more additional Iron 2008 interview, Israeli Northern Command chief Gadi Dome batteries. See Natasha Mozgovaya, “U.S. Congress Gives Obama Eisenkot stated, “What happened in the Dahiya quar- Okay to Fund Israel Rocket Defense,” Haaretz, May 21, 2010, http:// www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/u-s-congress-gives-obama- ter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from okay-to-fund-israel-rocket-defense-1.291339?trailingPath=2.169%2C2 .216%2C2.217%2C. which Israel is fired on…. We will apply disproportion- ate force on it and cause great damage and destruc- tion there. From our standpoint these are not civilian

10 Policy Focus #106 Israel’s War Jeffrey White villages. They are military bases.”12 IAF operations Military strategy. When assessing military strategy, against Hamas during Cast Lead are another indica- one must keep in mind the adage that “no plan sur- tor that Israel would attack Hizballah as a system with vives the test of battle.” Any strategy must be capable of leadership, infrastructure, and economic components, adapting to changing events, modifying aims and use not just as a military force.13 of forces as needed.16 Given Israeli statements regarding Hizballah’s role Israeli military strategy in a northern war would in the Lebanese government and Beirut’s accountabil- likely center on the use of large-scale joint air, ground, ity for the group’s actions, strikes on targets associated and naval operations to rapidly eliminate Hizballah’s with the Lebanese government could also be antici- rocket and missile forces, destroy its ground forces in pated. As Defense Minister has stated, southern Lebanon, severely damage its command and “We hold Lebanon responsible for any action by Hez- control systems, and destroy its infrastructure through- bollah against us. We do not plan to chase every rocket out Lebanon. Targets would include elements of the around the and the outskirts of villages.”14 Lebanese infrastructure that support Hizballah mili- The counterforce component of Israeli strategy tary activity, as well as any Lebanese army forces that would involve: join the fighting on Hizballah’s side. Syrian forces and infrastructure that support Hizballah would likely be ■■ Breaking Hizballah’s military capability to threat- attacked as well, unlike in 2006, when Damascus got en Israel away with extensive assistance to the group without ■■ Disrupting Syrian military support to Hizballah and, reprisal. Israel would likely attempt to prevent the if Damascus decided to become directly involved, conflict from escalating into general war with Syria by reducing the Syrian military threat to Israel15 employing threats, mobilization, force deployments, and posturing. At the same time, however, it would ■■ Changing the political equation in Lebanon and be ready for that contingency. In addition, any Ira- perhaps beyond by reducing Hizballah’s status as a nian elements supporting Hizballah would be subject military force and diminishing Syria and Iran’s abil- to attack, including air resupply flights to Damascus ity and/or willingness to support the group International Airport and other Syrian airfields. Israel In addition, the IDF would be prepared to act in Gaza would attempt to deter direct Iranian attacks on its ter- if Palestinian elements there attacked Israel. It would ritory via warnings and preparation of strategic strike also watch carefully for any signs of Iranian prepara- assets, including air, missile, and naval forces. tions to strike Israel directly, responding to any such A key element of Israel’s overall strategy would be attacks as they occurred. protection of the home front with active and passive measures, including missile/rocket and civil defense Time would be an important component in this measures. Effective efforts on this front would ease strategy—Israel would need the war to move quickly any decision to go to war, reduce casualties and dam- (see the “Short War–Big War” case study for the rea- age during the war, and give the government and IDF a sons behind this factor). It would need to suppress freer hand to prosecute operations to conclusion. rocket and missile attacks within days, not weeks. Israel has been building the forces and capabilities Ground force operations would need to proceed rap- needed to execute this strategy since 2006, and all ele- idly against Hizballah’s forces in the South. In short, ments have been exercised. Operation Cast Lead served Israel could not allow Hizballah to maintain a large to test the performance of units, doctrine, tactics, and number of rocket and missile launches over a period of equipment for a major war in the north. As a result, weeks, or to prevent Israeli ground forces from achiev- the IDF and Israel are much better prepared for large- ing their operational goals quickly. scale combat than they were in 2006.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 11 Jeffrey White If War Comes

Israel’s Operations Operation Cast Lead provided hints as to what such a conflict could look like, but as discussed previously, Military strategy is implemented via operations. The the different geography and enemies involved would operations likely to be conducted in a future war are lead to a different war for Israel. More forces would be laid out here in broad strokes; no attempt is made to committed in operations of greater intensity and scope, depict every possible operational variation or tactical with broader goals at stake. detail. Missile, air, ground, and other operations would be coordinated to achieve strategic military aims sup- Offensive Operations porting political objectives. Although it is convenient Air operations. A major feature of an air war in the to separate them for discussion’s sake, they would be north would be an intense and sustained air opera- integrated and mutually supportive in execution. tion against Hizballah’s long-range and mobile mis- The combatants’ operational concepts will largely siles and rockets. The IAF would seek to eliminate or determine how they fight the war, and wherever one significantly reduce the threats posed by these systems side achieves an important “operational gap,”17 it will as rapidly as possible. Given Hizballah’s possession of hold an advantage. In the 2006 war, Hizballah’s short- weapons with a range of up to 435 miles,20 this poten- range rocket capabilities represented an operational tially means operations deep within Lebanon, well into gap that the IDF could not close, and the course of the the northern Beqa Valley. (See fig. 1.) At the beginning next war may center on similar gaps. As IDF deputy of the 2006 war, the IAF was able to eliminate much chief of staff Benjamin Gantz stated in May 2010: of the long-range rocket threat very quickly. Given the Will we be able to stop the very last Katyusha? No. proliferation of such systems to Hizballah since then, Will we be able to stop the narrative that Nasral- however, neutralizing the current threat is likely to take lah will create? No. But once, in reality, we seri- longer and be less complete. ously degrade his capacity to launch, and once our As mentioned previously, Israel has made clear that achievements on the ground are clear and the other it holds the Lebanese government responsible for any side comes clamoring for a cease-fire, there will be no doubt about who is the victor and who is Hizballah attacks. Accordingly, the IAF would likely the vanquished.18 launch a second major air operation against Lebanese government and infrastructure targets used by Hiz- The IDF likely has several options for a conflict in the ballah (e.g., roads, telecommunications facilities). It north, some of them perhaps limited in scope, scale, would also attack Hizballah leadership facilities and and types of forces involved. As emphasized through- leaders when they can be found. out this paper, however, if such a war does erupt, Israel In addition, the IAF would attempt to interdict would most likely wage it on a large scale, employing a force movements and resupply efforts meant to aid full range of air, ground, and naval operations and pen- Hizballah. This would entail strikes on road choke- etrating well into Lebanon. As General Gantz stated in points, convoys, storage areas, and fuel depots, all of the same May 2010 interview: which would support efforts to suppress missile and rocket fire and facilitate major ground operations. The Next time, as in full war [author’s emphasis], we will maximize all our unique advantages to get to a deci- IAF would also provide close air support to ground sive situation where damage to the enemy continues forces, aiding the suppression of centers of resistance to intensify while damage to us continues to wane. and supporting deep operations by paratroop and spe- Once we pass that decisive point, we acquire for our- cial forces. The air force would not devote much, if any, selves protracted freedom of maneuver that will allow effort to striking short-range rocket systems in south- us to push on to victory.19 ern Lebanon, however. This threat would be dealt These operations would also likely extend into, or at with by ground forces, active defense systems, and civil least over, Syria during the course of the conflict. defense measures.

12 Policy Focus #106 Israel’s War Jeffrey White

The ‘Short War–Big War’ Conundrum

For Israel and the IDF, a war with Hizballah and its allies would present a difficult conundrum. On the one hand, Israel would need the war to move quickly for military, political, and economic reasons. Militarily, an extended campaign would allow for more attacks on Israel, increase the number of Israeli military and civilian casualties, and lend cre- dence to Hizballah’s offensive and defensive capabilities. It would also increase stress on the IDF’s material stocks and reserve system. Politically, a long war would allow for increased international pressure on Israel to end the con- flict short of its goals—pressure that could extend to any state supporting Israel as well. In addition, the longer the war lasted, the more damage and dislocation it would cause to the Israeli economy. In summary, Israel needs a short war to avoid or mitigate these problems. On the other hand, Israel will have to fight a “big” war if it intends to achieve anything significant against Hizbal- lah and its allies. War on the scale outlined in this study—even if waged primarily against Hizballah alone—is major war, not a raid or limited operation. It is military campaigning with operations lasting for weeks rather than days, not another Six Day War. If the conflict expanded and escalated—and if Syria became directly involved, as seems likely— its duration would be extended as well. Past conflicts suggest that Israel will have at least several weeks in which to conduct military operations relatively unimpeded, but probably not months. For the IDF to achieve its operational goals against Hizballah in the course of several (i.e., more than three) weeks seems like a reasonable prospect. But more time would be required for the IDF to deal with both Hizballah and Syria (and possibly Iran), and that would mean a long war.

Duration of Past Israeli Wars and Major Operations

Conflict Length of Major Operations

October 1973 war 20 days

Approximately three months (June–August 1982, including the “”)

Operation Defensive Shield (2002) 24 days

2006 Lebanon war 34 days

Operation Cast Lead (2008) 22 days

The implication of this conundrum is that if the IDF goes to war in Lebanon again, it will do so massively, pushing the tempo hard to achieve major operational results quickly. Rapid success in Lebanon could also serve to deter Syria and Iran from becoming directly involved, thus helping to keep the war short.

If Damascus decided to join the conflict, the IAF probably require reduction of the air effort over Leb- would establish air superiority over Lebanon and rel- anon. The most likely Syrian targets would include evant portions of Syria, conducting reconnaissance command and control systems, air defense systems, and strike missions as required. An escalating conflict missile/rocket forces, and infrastructure important with Syria would demand an increasing share of IAF to the leadership. If Syrian ground forces became attention, including intelligence efforts. This would involved in Lebanon or the Golan Heights, the IAF

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 13 Jeffrey White If War Comes

would target them as well. All in all, supporting a Major Israeli Operational Challenges general conflict in Lebanon and Syria would be a very demanding task for the IAF.21 Among the IDF’s most significant operational challenges in a future war would be: Ground operations. Israel would likely launch a major ground operation in southern Lebanon at the onset of ■■ Rapidly penetrating Hizballah’s defenses in southern a new war—specifically, a multidivision (three or more) Lebanon and advancing across the thrust intended to secure rocket launch zones in the ■■ Suppressing medium- and short-range rocket fire as South and destroy Hizballah ground forces there (See quickly as possible (contingent upon successful com- table 4.) How deep into Lebanon this operation would pletion of the item above) go is uncertain, but the Litani River is by no means the ■■ Rapidly locating and destroying long-range rocket and northern limit. Fully addressing the rocket/missile threat missile systems and dealing a decisive blow to Hizballah’s military capa- bilities would logically entail seizing Lebanese territory ■■ Limiting civilian casualties during air and ground to some depth and holding it for at least long enough to operations dig out Hizballah combat forces and infrastructure. ■■ Disrupting resupply of enemy forces in southern The IDF would certainly have to occupy the poten- Lebanon, whether from Syria or central and northern tial launch areas of Hizballah’s short- (6–40 km) and Lebanon medium-range (40–100 km) rocket systems. Most of If the conflict expanded to include direct Syrian involve- this territory would be in southern Lebanon below the ment, the IDF’s challenges would increase significantly Awali River on the line between Saida (), , to encompass: and Kawkaba. (See fig. 2.) Most of the related ground operational activity would be near or below the Litani ■■ Establishing air superiority over Syria and in the southern Beqa Valley. Overall, this is an area ■■ Suppressing Syrian air defenses of some 3,600 square kilometers. ■■ Conducting offensive air operations against Syrian tar- Within this area the IDF would also seek to destroy gets (both countervalue and counterforce) Hizballah combat forces and associated defensive posi- tions, C3I facilities, and weapons storage areas. Israeli ■■ Conducting air operations simultaneously over Leba- intelligence presumably has a good picture of the Hiz- non and Syria ballah military presence in southern Lebanon, but actu- ■■ Conducting major ground operations in the Golan ally rooting out this presence is not be a trivial task. As Heights area and Lebanon simultaneously for long-range rockets and missiles (i.e., greater than 100

If Tehran became involved directly, the IDF would have to km), destroying them would fall to the IAF and possibly be prepared to conduct long-range air operations against special operations units. Iran. Such efforts would divert intelligence and operational Major IDF ground forces would likely move into resources from the conflict with Hizballah and Syria. the Beqa Valley as well. This would increase the risk of The list above does not include everything the IDF contact with Syrian forces. In fact, the dynamics of the would have to do to wage war, only the major challenges fighting could pull Israeli forces even further north. it would face at the operational level. To bring the war to At minimum, paratroop and special forces operations a successful conclusion, the IDF would need to master would likely be carried out well north of the Litani in each of these challenges as they arose. If the IDF were order to destroy key Hizballah targets and forces and forced to confront Hizballah, Syria, and Iran at the same isolate the group’s personnel in the South. time, it would face a very serious challenge indeed. Ground operations would likely feature a rapid deep maneuver accompanied by insertion of airborne forces

14 Policy Focus #106 Israel’s War Jeffrey White

Map 1: Notional Israeli Air Force Operations against Hizballah infantry and airborne brigades, and corresponding SYRIA combat support and service support formations. Select Mediterranean reserve combat, combat support, and service support Sea units were mobilized for Cast Lead, giving the IDF the

Tripoli opportunity to test both the reserve mobilization system

Countervalue operations and the fitness of select reserve formations.

Naval operations. The Israel navy would provide sup- port to ground and air operations in Lebanon, including: LEBANON ■■ Interdiction of sea movement along the Lebanese coast Long-range missile Long-range rocket y and rocket hunting Beirut e hunting operations l l operations a ■■ V Interception of potential arms carriers

Anjar

a ■■ q Special operations against high-value coastal targets e B Awali R. Saida ■■ Gunfire missions against road traffic, rocket/missile- Weapons resupply interdiction operations associated targets, headquarters, and other facilities/ Nabatiyah

Litani R. targets near the coast Tyre SYRIA Khirbet Silim Ground support ■■ operations Prevention of sea-based attacks on Israel Bint Jbail Golan 0 20 Nahariyah Heights mile In the event that Syria entered the war, the navy would

ISRAEL © 2010 Washington Institute for Near East Policy likely extend similar operations to Syrian coastal areas.

Figure 1. Notional Israeli Air Force Lebanon Maps Special forces operations. The IDF has highly effec- Operations against Hizballah Washington Institute IMA - 1st proof tive and experienced special forces, and they would 08/03/2010 likely play a significant role in a future war.22 The prin- to isolate the battlefield. The IDF would also employ cipal objectives of these operations would be to: heavy firepower to destroy Hizballah centers of resis- ■■ tance, a feature of Cast Lead as enacted on Hamas. Destroy high-value targets, including leadership, missile Unlike in 2006, the operation would be intensive and units/facilities, and headquarters and control centers. coordinated to quickly achieve clear military objectives. ■■ Disrupt enemy operations. And the IDF would commit its best ground combat ■■ Create fear and uncertainty among enemy leadership elements—airborne, infantry, and armor—to the fight- and formations. ing, as it did in 2006 and 2008–2009. This would be perhaps Israel’s most important operation of the war. ■■ Divert enemy resources. The IDF would have to carry out these tasks while ■■ Collect intelligence. limiting civilian casualties. In the wake of Cast Lead, During the 2006 war, the IDF conducted more than it has taken measures such as including protection of twenty-five special operations within Lebanon.23 Given the civilians in its doctrine and sensitizing commanders more serious nature of a future war, the role of the special and soldiers to this requirement. forces would be expanded. And if Syria became involved, The IDF would also have to be prepared for Syrian special operations would likely be conducted there as well. ground intervention in Lebanon, and for the possibil- ity that the fighting would spread to the Golan Heights. These requirements, plus the necessity for three or more Defensive Operations divisions in Lebanon alone, would call for mobilization Defense would play a pivotal role in Israel’s conduct of of additional reserve forces: several armored divisions, a new war, requiring both passive and active defensive

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 15

TABLE 4. Notional Israeli Ground Order of Battle in a Future Lebanon Conflict

Unit* Type Status Operational Area Notes

Northern Headquarters Regular Northern Israel, Leba- Would be responsible for conduct of Territorial Command controlling multiple non, Golan Heights, a war in the north corps/divisions Syrian front

“The Northern Headquarters Regular Northern Command Would be responsible for ground Formation” (corps-level controlling operations in Lebanon headquarters)** multiple divisions

“ Division” (91st) Headquarters with Regular Lebanese border Would secure the border against multiple regular and Hizballah penetration into northern reserve brigades Israel and serve as the IDF’s offen- sive into southern Lebanon

162nd Armored Division Armor Regular Fought in Lebanon during 2006 war

36th Armored Division Armor Regular Golan Heights —

Up to three reserve Armor Regular Northern Command — armored divisions (366th, 319th, and one unidentified)

98th Paratroop Division Airborne Reserve Central Command Wartime headquarters

Golani Infantry Brigade Infantry Regular Northern Command High-quality infantry unit

35th Paratroop Brigade Airborne Regular Central Command High-quality airborne unit

551st “Spearhead Airborne Reserve — High-quality reserve Brigade” paratroop unit

Nahal Brigade Infantry Regular, — High-quality infantry unit Reserve

Givati Infantry Brigade Infantry Regular Southern Command High-quality unit

Alexandroni Infantry Reserve Northern Command High-quality reserve infantry unit Infantry Brigade

Kfir Infantry Brigade Infantry Regular Central Command Urban warfare specialty

Carmeli Infantry Brigade Infantry Reserve Northern Command Subordinate to 91st Division

Sayeret Matkal (General Reconnaissance and Regular As needed Elite special operations unit special- Staff Reconnaissance Unit) raiding izing in long-range operations

Sayeret Egoz (“Walnut”) Reconnaissance and Regular As needed Elite special operations unit associ- reconnaissance unit raiding ated with the Golani Infantry Brigade

Shayetet 13 naval Reconnaissance and Regular Primarily coastal Elite navy special warfare unit commandos raiding operations

Sayeret Yael (“Ibex”) spe- Engineer Regular As needed Elite combat engineering unit; used cial engineering unit for deep operations against infra- structure and fortified positions

Northern Artillery Reserve Northern Command — Command artillery formations

Various support units Combat intel, sup- — — — ply, transport, com- munications, etc.

* All unit designators and titles drawn from open source reporting. ** A second corps-level headquarters would likely be established in the event of direct Syrian involvement or a threat of conflict in the Golan Heights. Chapter Map 2: Notional Israeli O ensive Operations Jeffrey White in Southern Lebanon operations. These efforts would aim to reduce the effects Reinforced armored Awali R. division task force LEBANON of enemy offensive operations while providing time for Saida Jezzine IDF offensives to directly eliminate the threats. Their Heliborne force goals would include decreasing casualties, damage, and disruption throughout Israel, thereby tempering political Nabatiyah Kawkaba pressure on the government and military and permitting Litani smooth IDF mobilization and offensive efforts. R. a e S Tyre One of the tenets of Israeli military doctrine has n a e Khirbet been to fight wars on the enemy’s territory. Yet the n a Silim r Qiryat r development of a high-trajectory rocket and missile e t Shemona i d Bint Jbail threat by Hizballah and its allies has made this con- e M cept difficult to execute. In response to the attacks on northern Israel in 2006, the more recent rocket attacks Golan Nahariyah on southern Israel from Gaza, and the growing weight Heights of fire expected in a future war, the Israeli government has made defense a serious effort. ISRAEL Active defense. Hizballah was very successful in sus- taining high levels of rocket strikes on northern Israel 0 10 © 2010 The Washington mile in 2006, despite all Israeli countermeasures. Today, Institute for Near East Policy Israel’s principal active defense measure would involve FiGURE 2. Notional Israeli Offensive OperationLebanon Maps intercepting missiles with the Arrow and Patriot sys- in Southern Lebanon Washington Institute tems, and countering short-range rockets via the Iron IMA - 1st proof Dome system (assuming it is deployed in time). How people from areas under attack, as occurred 08/03/2010 in 2006. effective these systems would be under wartime condi- Nevertheless, many civilians, especially in northern tions is uncertain. Major variables include the extent of Israel, may have to ride out the most intense period of Syrian and Iranian involvement in missile attacks, the strikes in shelters. Strikes against central and southern effectiveness of IAF operations against long-range mis- Israel should be less intense, and warning systems would siles/rockets, and the speed with which IDF ground provide some opportunity to seek shelter even in the forces overrun launch areas. Active defense efforts event of a surprise attack, and even in most of northern would likely reduce the number of missiles and rock- Israel. Overall, the more warning Israel has regarding the ets landing in Israel, but some would inevitably get outbreak of hostilities, the more effective its civil defense through. The most likely scenario is that the- com measures will be. Advance warning could allow time for bined effect of IDF operations would take hold only issuing instructions to the civilian population, prepar- over time, but that the number of missiles and rockets ing shelters and medical response facilities, mobilizing launched and penetrating the defenses would decline reserve personnel, and activat- as the war goes on, as in Cast Lead.24 ing civil-military response mechanisms. Israel is substantially better postured to deal with Civil defense. Israel’s civil defense operations would missile/rocket attacks on the home front than it was aim to protect as much of the population and civilian in 2006. The combination of active and passive defen- infrastructure from attack as possible, and to mitigate sive measures and offensive air and ground operations the casualties and damage from missiles/rockets that do should reduce the potential casualties and damage hit. Israel is prepared for the movement of numerous inside Israel. At the same time, some damage (perhaps significant) is likely, especially early in the war.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 17 Jeffrey White If War Comes

Notes 1. See, for example, Ron Ben-Yishai, “ Replaced ,” YnetNews.com, July 27, 2010, http://www.ynetnews.com/ articles/0,7340,L-3926068,00.html. 2. Brig. Gen. Agay Yehezkel, quoted in “IDF Phasing Out Contentious Tank Shell in Wake of ,” , March 15, 2010, http:// www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1156318.html. 3. , “The Reserves Comeback,”Strategic Assessment (Institute for National Security Studies) 10, no. 4 (February 2008), http:// www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=1647. 4. The May 2010 Gaza flotilla incident has raised questions about the IDF planning process. The Eiland Commission report on the raid criticized the IDF for focusing too narrowly on one anticipated scenario for the confrontation and failing to prepare alternative courses of action if the situation did not develop as expected. (See Office of the IDF Spokesperson, “Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eiland Submits Conclusions of Military Examination Team Regarding Mavi Marmara,” weblog post, July 10, 2010, http://idfspokesperson.com/2010/07/12/maj-gen-res- eiland-submits-conclusions-of-military-examination-team-regarding-mavi-marmara-12-july-2010.) Nevertheless, the IDF views Hizballah as a serious military challenge, one substantially greater than that represented by Hamas, and has in all likelihood planned accordingly. 5. See, for example, Office of the IDF Spokesperson, “76% of Recruits Request Combat Positions,” press release, March 4, 2010, http:// dover.idf.il/IDF/English/News/today/10/03/0401.htm. 6. “High-trajectory” refers primarily to the missile and rocket systems that can be fired “over” Israeli defenses. With regard to Hizballah, these systems include the Fateh-110 and Scud guided missiles, long- and short-range artillery rockets, and 120-millimeter mortars. 7. The Arrow would presumably be effective against Hizballah Scuds. In November 2009, Israel indicated that it would significantly increase production of Arrow interceptor missiles. See Yaakov Katz, “Barak: IDF to Up Arrow Interceptor Production,” Jerusalem Post, November 17, 2009. 8. The “David’s Sling” system intended to counter the medium- and long-range rocket threats is several years in the future and is not consid- ered in this paper. 9. Yaakov Katz, “Massive Civil Defense Drill Planned for May,” Jerusalem Post, March 19, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article. aspx?id=171324. 10. Gen. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Vintage, 2005), p. 15. 11. Success in war is never final, but it can change the situation dramatically. In 1967, Israel’s victory fundamentally altered the region’s political and military framework, and the effects of its success on the battlefield still persist today. Success on that scale may or may not be possible today, but the kind of military power wielded by Israel and its enemies can still be used to achieve important, even strategic, goals. 12. Reuters, “Israel Warns Hizbullah War Would Invite Destruction,” Yediot Aharonot, October 3, 2008, http://www.ynet.co.il/english/ Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-3604893,00.html. 13. Questions remain as to how the Goldstone report—the UN’s judgment on the Gaza hostilities before and during Cast Lead—might affect future IDF operations. Israel has made some adjustments in tactical doctrine for operations in built-up areas (e.g., greater atten- tion to removing civilians from areas of combat; increased use of precision munitions), intended to reduce the threat to civilians in future conflicts. But in a war of the kind outlined here, one with potentially major consequences for the state of Israel, the Goldstone influence would probably not limit Israeli operations. 14. Quoted in Amnon Meranda, “Barak: Iran Not Existential Threat on Israel,” Yediot Aharonot, March 3, 2010, http://www.ynetnews.com/ articles/0,7340,L-3859501,00.html. 15. In a May 2010 interview, the IDF’s deputy chief of staff stated, “We don’t have an interest to initiate a conflict with Syria, but we have enough forces on our northern border to deal with both our neighbors that have the capacity to threaten us. If [Syria] chooses to use its capacity, we will know how to combat it.” Maj. Gen. Benjamin Gantz, interview in Defense News, May 31, 2010, http://www.defense- news.com/story.php?i=4649373. 16. Smith, The Utility of Force, p. 15. 17. For more on this term, see Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 325. 18. Gantz, Defense News. 19. Ibid. 20. Or 700 kilometers, the range of the Syrian Scud-D. 21. It is uncertain whether Israel would directly attack leadership targets in Syria during a conflict that fell short of all-out war. Although some observers in Israel have indicated that a new war would lead to the end of the regime in Damascus, this does not necessarily mean that regime change would be an Israeli objective, or that the IDF would conduct operations to bring about that result. Israel also has to be con- cerned that a direct threat to the Syrian regime could cause Damascus to use chemical or biological weapons against targets in Israel. 22. The term “special forces” as used here covers the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (), the IAF’s Shaldag unit, and the naval commando unit . Other elite formations of the territorial commands, the elite infantry and paratroop brigades, the combat engineers, and the Combat Intelligence Collection Corps would also likely be involved in these kinds of missions. For a fuller discussion of the Israeli special forces, see Yoaz Hendel, “IDF Special Units: Their Purpose and Operational Concept,” Strategic Assessment (Insti- tute for National Security Studies) 10, no. 2 (August 2007), http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=252. 23. Ibid. 24. As part of its Turning Point 4 civil defense exercise, Israel projected nearly 200 rockets and missiles fired from Syria (some with chemi- cal warheads) and landing in central Israel, and 200,000 people moving from the center of the country southward. Although this was an exercise scenario, it may suggest the scale of attack and some of the consequences Israel believes it faces. See Yaakov Katz and Herb Keinon, “Drill Simulates Missile Attack,” Jerusalem Post, May 24, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=176240.

18 Policy Focus #106 3 | Hizballah’s War

Preparations for War active defenses and its experience in dealing with Scud Hizballah’s preparations for a future war attacks during the 1991 . Nevertheless, posses- are intended to deter Israel and shift the military balance sion of Scuds likely boosts Hizballah’s confidence in its in the group’s favor while supporting its political objec- ability to strike deep within Israel, enhancing the group’s tives. Aided by Syria and Iran, Hizballah is engaged in a image as a powerful military force. Given their long significant and seemingly accelerated military buildup. range and large warhead, Scuds may also increase the Offensively, it has acquired surface-to-surface missiles psychological pressure on Israel’s civilian population. (SSMs) with longer range and greater accuracy than any During the 2006 war, Hizballah fired some 4,000 weapon it employed during the 2006 war. These new of its 13,000 or so artillery rockets into northern Israel, acquisitions include the M600/Fateh-1101 and, report- reaching as far south as on the Mediterranean edly, some variant of the Scud SSM.2 (See table 5 for a coast. Since then, the group has built its combined fuller list of the group’s rocket and missile inventory.) rocket and missile stocks to 40,000 or more of various The M600/Fateh-110 is important because of its types. It has both long-range missiles and rockets with range (more than 200 km) and accuracy (with a circular powerful warheads (Syrian-produced 302-mm and error probability of 100 m). It is a suitable weapon for 220-mm systems). Some of these also carry warheads attacking Israeli military facilities such as air bases, head- designed to increase casualties through enhanced frag- quarters, and intelligence collection centers. Hizballah mentation effects. may have as many as 200 of these missiles. Rockets, and now missiles, are Hizballah’s main The group’s acquisition of Scud missiles seems more offensive weapons, and their numbers and suspected important psychologically than militarily, given Israel’s variety would allow the group to sustain more attacks,

Table 5. Reported Hizballah Rockets and Missiles

Warhead System Type Range (km) Weight (kg) Supplier

Zelzal-2 Rocket 210 600 Iran

Nazeat Rocket 100–140 1300(6)/250(10) Iran

Fajr-3 Rocket 43 45 Iran

Fajr-5 Rocket 75 90 Iran

302 mm Rocket 75 100 Syria

220 mm Rocket 70 unknown Syria

122 mm Rocket 20–40 30 Iran/Syria

107 mm Rocket 6 unknown Iran/Syria

M600/Fateh-110 Missile 210–250 500 Iran/Syria

Scud variant Missile 300–700* 985 Syria

* Depending on variant: Scud-B, 300 km; Scud-C, 500 km; Syrian Scud-D, 700 km. The Scud system is not confirmed to be in Hizballah’s hands in Leba- non at present.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 19 Jeffrey White If War Comes

Map 3: Selected Rocket and Missile Coverage of Israel from Potential Launch Areas in Lebanon over a longer duration, to a greater depth, and with Baalbek the probability of more casualties and damage than Beirut y e l l in the 2006 war. In short, this capability allows Hiz- a V Anjar

a ballah to threaten both military and civilian targets q Mediterranean e Awali R. B throughout Israel. (See fig. 3.) Sea Unconfirmed reporting indicates that Syria is LEBANON Nabatiyah also providing Hizballah with surface-to-air missile Extended-range 122 mm Litani R. Grad rockets fired from SYRIA (SAM) systems, including the SA-2, SA-8, and pos- Khirbet Silim area Khirbet Silim sibly The Sa-24. (See table 6.) These Weapons Pose Bint Jbail Nahariyah Golan Varying degrees of threat to the Israeli Air Force Heights (IAF). The SA-2 does not fit well with Hizballah’s Sea of Galilee needs, but the SA-8 and SA-24 are far more formi- Haifa Tiberias dable systems. The SA-24 is man portable, easy to Fajr-5 and 302 mm artillery rockets fired from Nabatiyah area conceal, and effective against low-altitude targets, Hadera while the SA-8 is a highly mobile system with multi-

ple engagement capabilities, also designed to counter

J

aircraft at low altitudes. A lack of air defense capabil- o r

West d a

Tel Aviv n

R ity was a key Hizballah weakness in the 2006 war, so Bank . the group no doubt understands the importance of addressing this gap before going to war again. Jerusalem Hizballah also continues to acquire advanced anti- tank weapons from Iran and Syria. As in 2006, these Gaza weapons—including the AT-14 Kornet, AT-5 Konkurs, Strip AT-13 Metis-M, AT-4 Fagot, and RPG-29—would be key to defending against an Israeli ground operation in ISRAEL southern Lebanon (See table 7 for a fuller list of the Dimona group’s reported antitank weapons.)

M600 and Fateh-110 missiles fired In general, Damascus continues to serve as Hizbal- from Anjar area, or Scud-B fired lah’s arsenal; Syria’s extensive weapons stockpiles are from Baalbek area largely open to the group. Although the limits of this largesse are unclear, that may be more a question of Hizballah’s ability to integrate and employ weapons systems effectively rather than Syrian restraint. Tell- ingly, Damascus has not only provided the types of weapons most useful to Hizballah, it has also provided them in large numbers. For its part, Iran provides arms, training, and mili- Scud-C fired from south of Baalbek* tary personnel to Hizballah and has threatened to 0 20 mile Eilat intervene in any conflict between the group and Israel. *Scud-D (700 km range) covers all © 2010 Washington Institute for Near East Policy of Israel from northern Lebanon Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel report- edly serve key roles within Hizballah’s forces in Leba- FigURE 3. Selected Rocket and Missile Coverage non, and they would likely play an active combat role of Israel from Potential Launch Areas in Lebanon in a new war. Indeed, assistance from Syria and Iran is essential to Hizballah’s buildup; without it, the group

20 Policy Focus #106 Hizballah’s War Jeffrey White

Table 6. Reported Hizballah SAM Systems

Type Role Notes

SA-2 Medium/high altitude Old, complex strategic system, unlikely to be in Hizballah’s possession despite reports

SA-7 Low altitude, man portable Old, ineffective

SA-8 Low/medium altitude, highly mobile system, but still believed to be effective

SA-18/24 Low altitude, man portable Modern, effective against helicopters would not be a military factor outside Lebanon, and Hizballah has also been involved in the preparation much less of a factor inside. of areas north and south of the Litani River for offen- In order to be effective, Hizballah’s weapons must sive and defensive operations.4 According to one Israeli be integrated among the group’s forces through train- analyst, 160 villages and outlying areas south of the ing and exercises. Hizballah conducts training in Syria Litani have been prepared as launch areas for rockets for specialist troops (e.g., SAM, SSM, and antitank and as defensive strong points.5 guided missile units), and for commanders and staff in In addition, Hizballah reportedly increased its Syria and Iran. According to Israeli reports, the group recruitment efforts following the 2006 war and is now conducted significant military exercises in 2007–2008 believed to have more personnel available than it did focusing on the defense of southern Lebanon. These then.6 According to a July 2010 Israel Defense Forces efforts allowed Hizballah to test its “lessons learned” (IDF) intelligence assessment, Hizballah forces in from the 2006 war, its ability to move forces rapidly southern Lebanon number some 20,000 fighters and from the north to the South, and the combat capa- are organized into three “units” or “divisions.”7 Based bilities of its forces near the Israeli border. The subject on its intelligence collection efforts, Israel believes matter and sophistication of this activity resembled that one of these units has some 5,000 combatants that of a regular army.3 and controls 30,000 rockets and missiles.8 Each unit

Table 7. Reported Hizballah Antitank Weapons

System Range Penetration (mm) Guidance System

Kornet 5.6 km 1,100–1,200

Konkurs 75 m 800 Wire

Metis-M 80 m–1.5 km 460–850 Wire

Sagger 3 km 200 Wire

Fagot 70 m–2 km 400 Wire

Milan 400 m–2 km 352 Wire

TOW 600 m–3.7 km 760 Wire

RPG-29 460 m 750 Manual

RPG-7 500 m 330 Manual

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 21 Jeffrey White If War Comes or division has a number of subordinate elements that ■■ Compelling Israel to end the war under conditions control some fifteen villages each. Forces assigned favorable to its enemies to villages vary from 20 to 200 fighters, probably ■■ Increasing its own political role and capabili- depending on the size and/or location of the village ties within Lebanon and with respect to Israeli- and its importance to Hizballah’s operational plans. Palestinian issues Villages serve as weapons storage facilities, locations for command posts, and centers of resistance. IDF ■■ Demonstrating the effectiveness of the “resistance” intelligence indicates that many of these facilities are concept (“al-Muqawama”) as a means of dealing with located near schools and hospitals, and sometimes Israel and broadening its support base in Lebanon inside civilian homes.9 and beyond Hizballah’s sensitivity regarding its military pres- ■■ Creating the basis for a narrative of Hizballah vic- ence in the South has been reflected in a series of con- tory in the war frontations between residents of that region and UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) forces. Although The group would also have important defensive goals: some allege that these clashes are spontaneous popu- ■■ Preventing a deep Israeli incursion into southern lar responses to intrusive UNIFIL operations, they are Lebanon more likely Hizballah-instigated efforts aimed at curb- ■■ Preserving itself as a political and military force ing the UN force’s ability to conduct its mission. The IDF also believes that Hizballah is conduct- There may be tension between Hizballah’s offensive ing extensive intelligence operations against the IDF. and defensive goals. For example, the more extensive According to the commander of Israel’s 300th Infan- its strikes on Israel, the heavier Israel’s response is likely try Brigade, responsible for the western portion of the to be, and the greater the threat to the group’s military Lebanon border, “Every day they are collecting signifi- forces and domestic political position. cant intelligence on our forces along the border.”10 These activities are indicative of serious prepara- Military Strategy tions for war. Their cumulative effect has been to Once a new war began, Hizballah’s military efforts increase Hizballah’s self-confidence and perhaps would center on the following strategies: erode Israeli deterrence. The group was largely suc- ■■ Offensively, to launch massive rocket/missile attacks cessful in prosecuting the 2006 war, operating effec- on military and civilian targets with the intention of tively within the geographical, political, and military inflicting significant casualties and damage11 context at the time. It aims to repeat that success in a ■■ future war. Defensively, to oppose Israeli air, ground, and naval operations inside Lebanon with aggressive action, Hizballah’s Strategy slowing any advances while inflicting as many casual- ties as possible and, at the same time, preserving its Goals. Hizballah’s offensive goals in a war would likely own forces12 include: Both offensively and defensively, Hizballah would aim ■■ Weakening Israel politically, both at home and to continue operations as long as it saw itself in an advan- abroad, as in 2006 tageous position, allowing it to inflict the most political, ■■ Weakening the IDF’s confidence, combat spirit, military, economic, and social damage on Israel. This prestige, and deterrent capability approach is basically the same one Hizballah success- fully executed in 2006. A long war would place increas- ■■ Weakening Israeli society by inflicting casualties and ing diplomatic pressure on Israel and create an image of damage on civilians and infrastructure Israeli military ineffectiveness and futility. It would also

22 Policy Focus #106 Hizballah’s War Jeffrey White Map 4: Notional Hizballah O ensive Operations in Northern Israel allow Hizballah to claim that it was successfully stand- ing against Israel. In other words, this approach is the Possible raid Awali R. Saida exact opposite of Israel’s quick-war strategy. Short- and medium- range rocket re The weapons systems and forces available to Hizbal- lah are consistent with the execution of this strategy, 0 10 LEBANON and the group’s leaders have repeatedly expressed con- mile Nabatiyah Khiam fidence in their abilities.13 The group’s specific targets, Litani R. the timing of its strikes, and the conduct of its defen- a Tyre e sive operations would depend on the conflict’s initial S n Khirbet a circumstances and course, but the basic strategy would e Silim Qiryat Shemona n a r be to fight the war in the manner just described. r e t Bint Jbail i d e

M Hizballah’s Operations Baram Offensive operations. The principal offensive opera- Maalot Golan Nahariyah Heights tion would be a coordinated missile and rocket cam- Safed paign against military and civilian targets throughout ISRAEL Israel. Elements of this campaign would include: Sea of Galilee ■■ Attacks on Israeli population centers and civilian Haifa Tiberias infrastructure, principally by artillery rockets, with most of this effort aimed at northern Israel © 2010 Washington Institute for Near East Policy FigURE 4. Notional Hizballah Offensive ■■ Attacks on civilian targets deep in Israel, with the Operations in Northern Israel aim of bringing the war to the population as a whole, increasing pressure on the government to end the conflict, and demonstrating the IDF and govern- has. In the 2006 war, Hizballah showed evidence of ment’s inability to defend the population14 sophistication in its rocket attacks. According to one study, it was able to surge firing rates, concentrate fire ■■ Missile attacks on military installations, including on specific targets, and time firing to produce the most airfields, headquarters, logistics facilities, mobiliza- casualties.16 In a new war, short-range rockets would tion centers, and command and control centers be launched by combat units in the South, while the ■■ Attempts to saturate Israel’s active and passive medium- and long-range rockets and missiles would defenses with high volumes of fire via multiple sys- be launched by dedicated firing units. (See fig. 4.) Cur- tems and from multiple launch areas, including some rently, the IDF estimates that Hizballah could launch deep in Lebanon some 500–600 rockets per day against Israel.17 In addition, the group’s apparent acquisition of Scuds ■■ Sustaining high volumes of rocket fire (several hun- dred launches per day) for a long duration with a range greater than 300 kilometers will allow it to expand the area from which missiles can be fired, posing a ■■ Firing from deep within Lebanon greater challenge to IDF response efforts. (See table 8 for ■■ Potentially conducting special forces raids into a possible Hizballah launch concept in a future war.) And northern Israel to achieve victories and the group’s reported M600/Fateh-110 arsenal gives it the disrupt IDF operations15 accuracy needed for attacks on military installations. If Damascus became involved in the fighting, the like- Hizballah has the capacity to wage such a campaign lihood of attacks by missile and rocket forces deployed on its own given the types and numbers of weapons it from within Syria would grow. Syrian participation

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 23 Jeffrey White If War Comes would increase the weight of fire on targets deep within Defensive operations. Hizballah’s primary defensive Israel and the number of accurate missiles fired against operation would be of southern Lebanon against Israeli military installations, while also splitting Israel’s efforts forces attempting to penetrate deeply into the territory. to counter the attacks. Given the degree of coopera- This would perhaps be the group’s most important tion between Syria and Hizballah, this campaign would operation of the war. It would include: probably include coordinated targeting.18 ■■ Activating militia and local forces in the South As fighting progressed, Hizballah would need to resupply its rocket/missile forces and deal with losses ■■ Deploying additional regular and special forces to among those units. Its large inventory of weapons the South would reduce the need for immediate resupply from ■■ Using towns and villages as centers of resistance Syria. Pre-positioning rocket/missile stocks close to ■■ launch sites and firing units could limit the need for Activating ambush sites and laying mines along supply movement within Lebanon as well. But some important avenues of approach and lines of movement of weapons and launch elements would communication likely be required to sustain firing, replace combat ■■ Defending against deep operations by Israeli air- losses, and respond to the developing battle. This would borne and special forces entail using the Lebanese road system, especially in ■■ Conducting the defense in a way that inflicts maxi- the central and southern regions, making such efforts mum losses on the IDF potentially vulnerable to interdiction by the IAF and other Israeli forces. Hizballah would focus on defending the area south of None of these operations would be easy to execute the Litani and the southern Beqa Valley, viewing this in the face of determined and large-scale Israeli offen- area as its territory and natural defense zone. (See fig. sive operations. An inventory is neither an order of 5.) Where opportunities presented themselves, the battle nor a plan—Hizballah must have the requisite group would try to achieve local or tactical defeats of command, control, communications, and intelligence Israeli forces. Hizballah is also prepared to fight north (C3I), along with firing units that are well organized of the Litani, where it has been building infrastructure and sufficiently numerous, in order to conduct effec- for defensive operations. If it faced too much Israeli tive operations on the scale suggested here. It also pressure in the South, the group could fall back to this must have a coherent plan for coordinating its opera- line, but that would mean sacrificing important launch tions. One can assume that Syria and Iran have already areas, losing the ability to maintain a heavy volume of assisted Hizballah with such war planning. fire against targets in Israel, and abandoning a part of

Table 8. Notional Hizballah Weapons Deployment

Weapon Type Example Principal Deployment Area* Principal Target Area

Short range 107 mm rocket South of Litani Northern Israel

Medium range 220 mm rocket South of the Saida- Northern Israel Jezzine-Kawkaba line

Long range M600/Fateh-110 missile Depth of Lebanon Northern/central Israel

Very long range Scud missile Depth of Lebanon Central/southern Israel * Hizballah could choose to deploy longer-range systems further south in Lebanon in order to increase coverage and density of fire in central and southern Israel. This could expose the systems to greater risk, however.

24 Policy Focus #106 Hizballah’s War Jeffrey White

into the Syrian air defense system, their effectiveness Major Hizballah would potentially increase. This would be true even if Operational Challenges Syria only provided data from its air warning radars. Hizballah’s second supporting defensive opera- Like Israel, Hizballah would face several operational chal- lenges in a future war, such as: tion would involve protecting the Lebanese coast. During the 2006 war, the carried out ■■ Maintaining a coherent defense of southern Lebanon extensive coastal operations, including interdiction, ■■ Sustaining significant levels of rocket and missile fire gunfire support, special forces actions, and intelli- on Israel gence and surveillance activities. Hizballah had one ■■ Protecting its leadership and infrastructure great success against this activity when it (or its Ira- nian allies) hit the INS Hanit with a C-802 “” ■■ Maintaining resupply from Syria in an extended conflict coastal defense missile. In the next war, Hizbal- lah would likely attempt to present a more effective These challenges would become somewhat easier if defense of the coast, again deploying cruise missiles Syria joined the fighting directly. That would force Israel to divert resources, especially IAF assets, to deal with like the C-802. The intention would be to hamper Syria, reducing the pressure on Hizballah. Israeli operations, prevent or at least oppose special forces landings, and attempt to sink an Israeli vessel for psychological effect. Hizballah secretary-general Nassan Hasrallah has also stated that “the resistance” its population base. In either case, Hizballah would would attack shipping bound for “” if Israel attempt to slow the IDF’s advance on the ground while the Lebanese coast.19 inflicting blows that cause the maximum possible attri- Map 5: Notional Hizballah Defensive Concept tion and maintaining launch operations. As Israeli forces penetrated into the South, Hizballah special forces Forti ed locality Awali R. would likely attack high-value IDF targets in Lebanon, Unit operations Saida Jezzine area such as headquarters and logistics convoys. Hizballah LEBANON NORTHERN knows IDF forces would be coming to southern Leba- UNIT

a non and it plans to fight them there. e Nabatiyah S Khiam To support its main defensive operation, Hizballah n a Litani R. e n would conduct two supporting operations. First would a r r CENTRAL e Tyre t be an air defense operation deploying SAM elements i UNIT d WESTERN Khirbet e Silim to protect critical capabilities: leadership, C3I, key M UNIT Qiryat Shemona defensive positions, logistics activity, and long-range Naquora Bint Jbail rockets and missiles. Hizballah probably understands that it cannot defend all important assets, but that it could perhaps inflict losses, hamper IAF operations, Golan Nahariyah Heights and conduct “SAMbushes” for psychological effect. Safed Any IAF losses would be trumpeted as major successes, ISRAEL and captured or killed aircrew would be manipulated Sea of for psychological purposes and as bargaining chips. Galilee Haifa In fact, Hizballah’s mere possession of SAM systems 0 10 Tiberias increases the complexity of Israel’s planning and could © 2010 The Washington mile Institute for Near East Policy cause the IDF to divert strike assets to SAM suppres- sion missions. And if Hizballah’s air defenses are tied FigURE 5. Notional Hizballah DefensiveLebanon Concept Maps Washington Institute IMA - 1st proof 08/03/2010 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 25 Jeffrey White If War Comes

Regarding the (LAF), Hiz- ballah likely intends to involve them in the defense of Hizballah Variations the South. Although most LAF units would probably Although Hizballah would most likely fight along the seek to avoid combat or offer only token resistance, lines described in this chapter, it could also pursue some may become directly involved in the fighting. alternative strategies. For example, it could employ its Such involvement would be negligible from a combat forces and rocket/missile strikes in a manner intended to draw Israel into a deep and extended campaign in standpoint, but the political effects of Israeli forces Lebanon. This could allow it to inflict more casualties fighting the Lebanese army would be significant. If and damage on Israel, create more diplomatic pres- nothing else, it would validate Hizballah’s concept of sure on the Israeli government, and solidify Hizballah’s the “resistance” and the army uniting in the defense of image as the defender of Lebanon. The group might also attempt to turn a tactical event the Lebanese state. into a . In the 2006 war, for example, Hizballah’s military operations would be accom- Israel conducted a controversial strike against Hizbal- panied by a large-scale influence operation intended lah rocket launchers located near an apartment house to mobilize international pressure against Israel and in . Whatever its direct ramifications, the strike created enormous negative press coverage and greatly its supporters. The group would employ public diplo- reduced political support for Israel’s operations. In a macy and its extensive media apparatus to condemn new war, Hizballah would likely attempt to create an Israel, generate anti-Israel demonstrations, earn pub- incident capable of producing similar results. Although these variations are within the realm of lic expressions of support for Hizballah and Lebanon possibility, the first seems contrary to Hizballah’s basic from the international community, and delegitimize needs and objectives: to conduct a coherent defense Israel’s conduct of the war. of the South and continue heavy rocket and missile In addition, military cooperation between Hizballah fire into Israel. If IDF ground forces were operating deep within Lebanon, Hizballah would have difficulty and its allies is already evident, from the tactical to the portraying this outcome as a success. And if the group strategic level. During a new war, Syria and Iran would lost its launch areas in the South, it would have dif- at minimum provide C3I and resupply assistance in an ficulty sustaining heavy fire. As for the second varia- effort to keep Hizballah in the fight. The Syrian army tion, any Hizballah attempt to create a controversial incident would still depend on the IDF making an error. would initially be placed on alert, perhaps mobilizing Although that is certainly a possibility given the likely and deploying to wartime positions. This would be a intensity and complexity of the expected combat, it is risky move, however, because Israel would view it as not something that Hizballah can count on. highly provocative. At the least, Syrian air defense ele- ments would oppose “penetrations” of Syrian airspace potential role in a new war is unclear. But in a large and perhaps engage Israeli aircraft over Lebanon, given scale-conflict, Tehran could decide to participate more the small operational area involved and the proxim- directly. For example, it could provide regular combat ity of Damascus to the combat zone. Syria could also forces, light infantry, or special forces in Lebanon, and offer coastal defense assistance through means such as perhaps missile and air defense forces within Syria. its Sepal missile system and trained operators. And if Both Damascus and Tehran would likely feel pres- the war escalated, Syrian ground and air defense forces sure to increase their involvement as Hizballah’s war could enter Lebanon to support Hizballah’s defense or escalated. From essentially supportive activity such as prevent its collapse. intelligence and logistics assistance, each regime could Beyond basic support (e.g., providing intelligence, ultimately expand its role to direct involvement in the advice, arms, and some specialized combat forces), Iran’s fighting in and over Lebanon.

26 Policy Focus #106 Hizballah’s War Jeffrey White

Notes 1. The M600 is variously reported as a rocket and a missile, and two models of the weapon are likely in circulation. The missile version, with a guidance package, would pose the greater threat due to its increased accuracy. An M600 rocket fired to its maximum range of more than 200 kilometers would be very inaccurate, although it could carry a large 500-kilogram warhead. 2. It is not known whether these Scuds (reportedly provided by Syria; see chapter 1) are actually in Hizballah hands in Lebanon or held elsewhere. Also unknown is which type of Scud (B, C, or D) was provided. The type is important because it determines range and accu- racy. The D version would pose the most significant threat because it has the longest range and, potentially, the greatest accuracy. 3. Guy Aviad, “Hizbollah’s Force Buildup of 2006–2009: Foundation and Future Trends,” Military and Strategic Affairs (Institute for National Security Studies) 1, no. 3 (December 2009), p. 13, http://www.inss.org.il/programs.php?cat=56&incat=&read=480. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) did not report seeing any of this activity. See UN Security Council, Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), March 3, 2009, p. 7, at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=S/2009/119. 4. UNIFIL has not found any significant military forces or preparation in its area of operations, and the Hizballah “nature reserves” it has discovered were reportedly abandoned. Yet UNIFIL’s mandate prevents it from searching homes. (See UN Security Coun- cil, Twelfth Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006),February 26, 2010, p. 5, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/105.) UNIFIL did find Hizballah military presence and activity in the July 2009 Khirbet Silim incident (in which ammunition stored in a building in southern Lebanon detonated). (See UN Security Coun- cil, Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), November 2, 2009, p. 2, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2009/566.) 5. Alex Fishman, “Getting Ready for Hizballah,” YnetNews.com, May 15, 2010, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3889774,00. html. See also Aviad, “Hizbollah’s Force Buildup,” p. 15. 6. According to one estimate, Hizballah had 6,000–8,000 combatants in July 2006 (Aviad, p. 9). But a May 2010 estimate placed the group’s forces closer to 20,000 (Fishman, “Getting Ready”). 7. Office of the IDF Spokesperson, “Intelligence Maps: How Hizballah Uses Lebanese Villages as Military Bases,” weblog post, July 8, 2010, http://idfspokesperson.com/2010/07/08/intelligence-maps-how-hezbollah-uses-lebanese-villages-as-military-bases-7-july-2010. 8. Yaakov Katz, “IDF Reveals Hizballah Positions,” Jerusalem Post, July 7, 2010. 9. Ibid. 10. Office of the IDF Spokesperson, “Hizballah Uses Lebanese Villages as Military Bases,” press release, July 8, 2010, http://dover.idf.il/ IDF/English/News/today/10/07/0801.htm. 11. In his previously cited February 16, 2010, speech, Nasrallah appeared to outline a doctrine of regarding attacks on Israel—that is, if Israel attacks civilian infrastructure in Lebanon, Hizballah will attack civilian infrastructure in Israel. Theoreti- cally, Hizballah could attempt to execute this retaliatory strategy during a future war. More likely, however, is that the group intends to attack civilian targets in Israel from the outset. In fact, its weapons systems do not give it the option of doing otherwise, and a conflict limited to the military sphere would not serve the group’s interests. See “Sayyed Nasrallah: Nothing Will Be Safe in Israel from Our Rockets if You Bomb Us,” al-Manar television, February 16, 2010, http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails. aspx?id=124826&language=en. 12. Nasrallah outlined this strategy in a November 11, 2009, speech, stating, “Therefore, I say that we are ready. I say to Barak, Ashkenazi, Netanyahu, Obama, and the whole world, send as many (“Israeli”) brigades as you want, send even your whole army, we will destroy it in our mountains and valleys.” See Moqawama.org, “H. E. Sayyed Nasrallah: Send All Your Powers...Our Geography and Resistance Will Devour You!” http://english.moqawama.org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=9510&fid=11. 13. See, for example, Moqawama.org, “Sheikh Qaouk: The Resistance Was Able to Put an End to ‘Israel’s’ Barrage of Threats against Leba- non,” March 3, 2010, http://english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=10387&cid=258. 14. Nasrallah explicitly identified Israeli civilians and civilian infrastructure in central Israel as targets during his February 16, 2010, speech: “We have to know that the real concentration of Israelis stretches from south of Haifa to south of Tel Aviv, at a 15-kilometer deep line to the east. The bulk of residents are there, and so are oil refineries and factories and practically everything.” See Moqawama.org, “Sayyed Nasrallah: Nothing Will Be Safe.” 15. Any attempts to penetrate northern Israel and attack important military and symbolic civilian targets would aim to create psychologi- cal effects, including the appearance of a 360-degree front, an image of Israel invaded and vulnerable, and the idea that the battle is not being fought on Arab territory alone. Even a few attacks inside Israel would have significant political and psychological effects both for Israel and its opponents. Such actions would also draw IDF attention and potentially divert resources. 16. Rubin, “Hizballah’s Rocket Campaign against Northern Israel: A Preliminary Report,” Jerusalem Issue Brief (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) 6, no. 10 (August 31, 2006), http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief006-10.htm. 17. Office of the IDF Spokesperson, “Hizballah Uses Lebanese Villages.” 18. According to one report, Israel has defined Hizballah as “a division of the Syrian army.” SeeJerusalem Post, “Hizbullah a Division of Syr- ian Army,” April 18, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=173420. 19. YnetNews.com, “Nasrallah Threatens to Hit Ships,” , 2010, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3894246,00.html.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 27 4 | War beyond Israel and Hizballah

The most likely case is that a new war would situation, Damascus could feel compelled to directly center on hostilities between Israel and Hizballah,1 but intervene. All in all, a major war between Israel and as indicated in previous chapters, some degree of par- Hizballah would present the Syrian regime with ticipation by Syria and Iran is almost certain. In peace- major dilemmas. time, the prospect of direct Syrian and Iranian involve- ment may seem remote, but in the press of war and Preparations for War staring defeat in the face, Hizballah’s patrons may find Syria has made serious preparations for war with that the previously unthinkable can become necessary. Israel, and in some respects it is well equipped for The extent to which Damascus and Tehran would such a conflict. The regime has gradually focused its participate is unknowable beforehand. Even if they have efforts on a combination of offensive tools (primar- made firm commitments to join such a conflict, they ily missiles and rockets) and defensive equipment, could still renege when faced with the risks involved. especially antitank and surface-to-surface missiles At the same time, their relationship with Hizballah (SSMs).3 Iranian financial assistance has made this could create dynamics that pull them in directions in possible, allowing Syria to make crucial arms pur- which they would prefer not to go, forcing them—and chases despite its weak economy.4 perhaps other actors such as Hamas—to make very dif- In terms of offensive capabilities, Syria would rely on ficult decisions under the pressures of war. its missile and artillery rocket forces. Syrian SSMs are organized into launch brigades, generally by type (See If War Comes to Syria table 9.) These forces give Syria the ability to strike into Although Syria would most likely seek to avoid direct the full depth of Israel from positions deep in its own or serious conflict with the Israel Defense Forces territory, and to accurately target military facilities and (IDF), Israel may not allow it to remain on the side- key civilian infrastructure. In addition, some of these lines in a new war, particularly given its extensive weapons (e.g., the Scud variants) can be equipped with support to Hizballah. Syria’s commitments to Hiz- chemical warheads. ballah and concerns about its own defense could lead Syria’s long-range artillery rockets give it additional it into direct conflict as well.2 As mentioned previ- means of striking targets in Israel. The Syrian army has a ously, Israeli operations against resupply efforts from variety of rocket systems, including 220-millimeter, 302- Syria could lead to clashes with Syrian forces. And if millimeter, and 600-millimeter variants (see table 10). Hizballah appeared trapped in a worsening military Units operating the 220-millimeter and 302-millimeter

Table 9. Syrian SSM Systems

System Range (km) Warhead weight (kg) Accuracy (meters) Status

SS-21 Scarab 70–120 482 30–160 Confirmed

Scud-B 300 770–1,000 450 Confirmed

Scud-C 500–700 500–800 50–900 Confirmed

Scud-D 700–1,500 500–1000 50–190 Confirmed

M600/Fateh-110 500 500 100 Reported

28 Policy Focus #106 War beyond Israel and Hizballah Jeffrey White

much of a threat to the Israeli Air Force (IAF), it has TABLE 10. Syrian Long-Range Artillery Rockets modern MiG-29M/M2 fighter aircraft that could be used to defend Syrian airspace in a conflict. Warhead System Range (km) weight (kg) On the ground, antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) are key to Syria’s ability to counter Israel’s armored 220 mm 70 50 forces. The Syrian army has a wide range of modern 302 mm 100 175 Western and Russian systems and continues to con-

600 mm 250–300 500 tract for additional ones. (See table 11.) Beyond obtaining the weapons it needs, Syria is Frog-7 70 550 also preparing its forces for combat. Training for anti- tank operations and close combat, periodic alerts, and systems are organized in a long-range rocket brigade. Syria reserve mobilization drills are all aimed at getting the is believed to have hundreds of these artillery weapons, army ready for war should it come. (See table 12 for and they would be integrated into any firing plan against more on the Syrian order of battle.) targets in northern Israel.5 And the 600-millimeter sys- Syria has also embedded itself in a complex and tem could be used against targets throughout all but the only partially understood set of defense relation- extreme southern portions of Israel. ships with Iran, including a “supreme joint defense Defensively, Syria has concentrated on systems aimed commission.”7 Iranian and Syrian leaders openly pro- at offsetting Israel’s advantage in airpower and armor claim that their defense relationship is part of the operations. For its air defenses—traditionally based on “resistance” against Israel.8 Although the true extent aging Soviet systems—Damascus has acquired the more of any such arrangements would likely become clear modern SA-22 self-propelled short-range gun and mis- only after a war began, Syria probably expects some sile air defense systems. It has also contracted for the form of military assistance from Iran in the event of SA-X-17 medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) hostilities, even if only weapons resupply and diplo- system.6 Although the is not considered matic support.

TABLE 11. Syrian ATGMs

System Range (meters) Penetration (mm) Guidance System

AT-14 Kornet 100–5,500 1,100–1,200 Laser

AT-5 Konkurs 70–4,000 800 Wire

AT-10 Bastion 5,000 600 Laser

Metis-M 80–1,500 460–850 Wire

AT-3 Sagger 300 200 Wire

AT-4 Fagot 70–2,000 400 Wire

Milan 400–2,000 352 Wire

TOW 600–3,700 760 Wire

RPG-29 500 750 Manual

RPG-7 500 330 Manual

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 29 Jeffrey White If War Comes

Syria’s Strategy TABLE 12. Syrian Army Order of Battle Goals. If Syria became directly involved in conflict Unit Type Number with Israel during a war in Lebanon, its goals would include: Corps headquarters 3 Armored division 7 ■■ Preserving the regime and its key assets (security, military, economic) Mechanized division 3 Republican Guard 1 ■■ Preserving Hizballah’s position in Lebanon and abil- ity to threaten Israel Infantry/special forces 1 Total divisions 12 ■■ Reestablishing a Syrian military presence in Lebanon Independent brigades/groups 22 Source: Institute for National Security Studies, “Middle East Military ■■ Inflicting a defeat on Israel sufficient to create the Balance” database, section 17 on Syria, updated March 22, 2009, http:// conditions for regaining the Golan Heights www.inss.org.il/upload/%28FILE%291275907961.pdf.

Military strategy. Syria’s strategy would have the fol- lowing components: as part of a “negotiating by salvos” approach to avoid full war.9 ■■ Offensively, to use its rocket and missile forces against Israel, probably in coordination with Hiz- Defensive operations. Syria would have to carry out ballah’s offensive. Damascus is unlikely to order the two main defensive operations and a supporting one. use of chemical or biological weapons against targets The two main ones would be the air defense of Syria inside Israel except in the event of a clear threat to (employing its SAM assets and any air force elements regime survival. Battlefield use of chemical weapons it wished to risk) and the ground defense of the Golan is a possibility, especially in a defensive role, though front in the event Israel opened offensive operations it would raise the risk of escalation by Israel. there. The supporting operation would involve extend- ing its defense into Lebanon by deploying ground ■■ Defensively, to limit Israel’s air campaign over Syria forces into the Beqa Valley and providing air defense and possibly Lebanon; to stop any Israeli offensive coverage over some or all of Lebanon, especially the operations on the Golan Heights and, with Hizbal- Beqa. Operations in Lebanon would become increas- lah involvement, through the Beqa Valley; and to ingly likely if Damascus saw an Israeli ground threat assist Hizballah’s defensive operations in southern developing in the Beqa. Lebanon. Syria has the forces and weapons to support the strategy and operations outlined here. And publicly, Syrian execution of this strategy would support Hiz- at least, Damascus seems confident that it could imple- ballah’s intention to achieve a protracted conflict. ment its plans.10 Syria’s Operations If Iran Joined the War Offensive operations. Syria’s main offensive operation Iranian involvement in a future war would be based would involve missile and rocket attacks on targets on its connections and commitments to Hizballah in Israel. Which targets and how deep inside Israel to and Syria—entanglements that appear to be thicken- strike would depend on the conflict’s scope and inten- ing. Tehran provides Hizballah with arms, money, and sity. Damascus might attempt to limit attacks on Israel political support and is a partner in the “resistance”

30 Policy Focus #106 War beyond Israel and Hizballah Jeffrey White

Major Syrian Operational Challenges large forces suitable for expeditionary deployment, and Iran is a long way from Lebanon. Moving any forces to Direct involvement in a war between Israel and Hizballah the area of combat would require overflight approvals would pose major operational challenges to the Syrian and long sea lines of communication.14 Nevertheless, military. These include: Iran does have some capability for intervention and, if it is willing to take the risks, direct participation. ■■ Maintaining coherent air defense over key areas On an escalating scale of involvement, Iran could: (Damascus, the Golan, and the Lebanese border, as well as critical military, infrastructure, and industrial ■■ Provide more arms to Hizballah and Syria. targets in the rest of Syria) ■■ Provide advisors, technicians, or light combat forces. ■■ Maintaining coherent and sustained rocket/missile fire on Israeli targets while under attack ■■ Carry out asymmetric attacks on Israeli interests (e.g., terrorist-type actions). ■■ Deploying forces to the Lebanese border and/or into Lebanon ■■ Engage in regional troublemaking (e.g., raise ten- sions in the Strait of Hormuz). ■■ In the event of an Israeli offensive on the Golan, con- ducting ground operations both there and within Leba- ■■ Conduct missile strikes on Israel. non or on the Lebanese border Moving up this scale would of course increase the The Syrian military command—not known for its adapt- risk of direct conflict with Israel and a crisis with the ability to rapid changes on a complex battlefield—would United States. be severely stressed by these challenges. Preparations for War Within its limits, Iran has made preparations for a against Israel. Occasionally, it makes this commitment conflict with Israel. First, it has created missile forces, public, as in President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad’s Feb- based on the Shahab-3, capable of striking all of Israel. ruary 2010 statement that “the people of Iran will stand It is also working to increase the accuracy and terminal by the peoples of Lebanon” in the event of an Israeli effects of its systems, in addition to exercising its mis- attack,11 and Vice President Muhammad Reza Rahi- sile capabilities in four “Noble Prophet” exercises since mi’s April 2010 statement that Iran would back Syria 2006.15 By 2008, it had reportedly more than tripled “with all its strength.”12 According to IDF intelligence, its Shahab-3 arsenal from thirty to one hundred.16 Iran maintains oversight of Hizballah’s military opera- Tehran has also invested in air defense capabilities. tions through a senior Qods Force officer stationed in It acquired at least one modern Russian SAM system Beirut.13 In the event of war, and especially Hizballah in 2007—the short-range SA-15/Gauntlet—and has and Syrian reverses, Iran would have to balance its own displayed SAMs and radars allegedly produced on its basic security interests with whatever commitments it own.17 In 2009, it created a separate air defense force to has made. consolidate control of all such assets.18 In addition, Iran has bolstered its navy and coastal Practical limits of Iranian involvement. In addition to defense capabilities, allowing it to threaten shipping any policy constraints Iran may feel about participating in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.19 It has rou- in a war in Lebanon, it faces limitations imposed by its tinely exercised these capabilities, and although such own capabilities and geography. Tehran does not possess measures are not directly relevant to war with Israel,

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 31 Jeffrey White If War Comes they could serve as the basis for efforts to increase ten- To secure these goals, Iran would likely employ a mili- sions in the Persian Gulf region in support of Hizbal- tary strategy that centered on: lah and Syria. For asymmetric operations, Tehran would rely on ■■ Resupplying Hizballah as needed to help it remain its well-tested and widely deployed Qods Force, which in the fight23 has the capability to strike at Israeli interests beyond Israel.20 Iran has also used aggressive information oper- ■■ Providing technical expertise and intelligence to ations as part of its preparation for potential conflict Hizballah and Syria with Israel. These efforts include: ■■ Supporting Syria with arms, and probably with “vol- ■■ Projecting an image of strength through statements unteers” as well by senior officials (e.g., Vice President Rahimi’s “We will cut off Israel’s feet” threat in April 201021) ■■ Deterring Israel from launching direct attacks on Iran

■■ Publicly displaying solidarity with Hizballah and ■■ Possibly conducting a limited demonstration attack Syria (e.g., the February 2010 “dinner in Damascus”) on Israel

■■ Publicly displaying its arsenal (including phony Iran’s Operations weapons) in parades Under the scenario just outlined, Iran’s involvement in a war would primarily be a logistical operation. The regime ■■ Publicizing its military exercises would face difficulties in its resupply efforts due to both the distances involved and the likelihood of Israeli dis- These actions are intended to demonstrate that Iran ruptive efforts. is both capable of striking Israel and too powerful for Tehran would almost certainly advertise the fact other nations to attack, as Ahmadinezhad claimed in that Hizballah was employing Iranian weapons against April 2010.22 Israel, and it would resupply the group as needed. Offensively, however, it would have limited ability to Iran’s Strategy intervene. As mentioned earlier, it could use the Qods Iran’s current strategy for dealing with Israel may boil Force to conduct asymmetric attacks on Israeli inter- down to deterrence, but in the event of a major conflict ests, but this would raise the risk of retaliation. Regard- involving Hizballah and Syria, it would need to revise ing potential missile strikes against Israel, Tehran its approach. In such a scenario, Iran’s goals would be would probably hold that measure in reserve for deter- similar to Syria’s: rent and retaliatory purposes. Again, however, Tehran could choose direct involve- ■■ Preserve the regime and its key assets (security, mili- ment if Hizballah and/or Syria were on the verge of cat- tary, economic). astrophic defeat.24 In this case, it could opt for a demon- stration attack with a few missiles aimed at a prominent ■■ Preserve Hizballah’s essential political and military Israeli target in order to show that it was a participant in situation in Lebanon. the war. The likelihood of such a strike would be even greater if Tehran believed that Israel were losing the ■■ Preserve the regime of Basar al-Asad in Syria. war, since the Iranians would have less to fear in terms of Israeli retaliation. Such an action would be in keep- ■■ Contribute to (and receive credit for) a military ing with the regime’s emphasis on the psychological ele- defeat of Israel. ments of war.

32 Policy Focus #106 War beyond Israel and Hizballah Jeffrey White

Iran could also choose to threaten or interrupt the between the resistance movements of Palestine, and flow of oil through the Persian Gulf. This would be a between Syria, Lebanon, and the Islamic Republic of very risky action, however, raising the possibility of Iran. These attempts are destined for failure. We are in the same trench, confronting the enemy of our nation: international intervention and creating serious poten- Israel, and whoever stands behind Israel—America tial for a clash with Western naval forces in the region. and others.25 Defensively, Iran would be prepared for expansion and escalation of the war to include attacks on its ter- The group’s leadership also participates to some degree ritory by Israel and/or the United States. Accordingly, in the diplomatic activity surrounding Syria, Iran, and it would bring its air defense and naval forces to an Hizballah. All of this suggests that Hamas wants to advanced state of readiness and probably take measures be seen as a player in that crowd, which would make to secure its leadership and missile forces (e.g., disper- it more difficult for the group to stand aside during sal, moving to shelters). another war in the north. Iran has expressed confidence in its ability to fight Militarily, Hamas has increased its ability to par- Israel, either indirectly through Hizballah and Syria ticipate in another round of fighting with Israel. It has or directly. Whether or not this rhetoric is merely for acquired more and longer-range rockets than it had show remains to be seen. Although Tehran’s willing- before Cast Lead, giving it the capacity to strike more ness to honor its commitments is unclear, some Iranian deeply into Israel, at a higher rate of fire, and for a lon- involvement in a future war should be expected. ger duration. As a result, it could inflict more casualties and physical damage than it did during the last round. Gaza’s Role (See table 13 for more on Hamas’s arsenal.) Hamas has aligned itself with Hizballah and its allies at The group has also increased its ground combat least verbally, and the group remains beholden to Iran for capabilities. Integrating lessons from Cast Lead, Hamas financial and military support. Nevertheless, it is unclear has made command changes, increased training, deep- whether Hamas leaders would choose direct involve- ened its fortification system in Gaza, and acquired ment in such a dangerous conflict. And they no doubt additional antitank weapons (along with man-portable remember the lack of real support sent their way during SAMs, most likely). Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009. Therefore, If war came, the group would attempt to fight in a they would likely limit the group’s participation to token fashion similar to Hizballah: attack Israel with rockets actions such as firing (or permitting the firing of ) a few while defending against an IDF incursion into Gaza. It rockets into southern Israel, accompanied by support- would likely hope to take advantage of Israel’s resource ing rhetoric. Hamas might also use the opportunity to commitment in the north to avoid the full weight of attempt another kidnapping of IDF personnel. an IDF response. At the same time, no one should be surprised if a Hamas is not the only element in Gaza with the abil- new war in the north includes a “Gaza excursion.” ity to fire long-range rockets against Israel. Palestinian Hamas could decide to enter the conflict in a serious Islamic Jihad and other groups could initiate such fir- fashion, employing heavy rocket firing and long-range ing regardless of Hamas intentions. weapons. Alternatively, Israel could decide to finish the For its part, Israel would likely conduct an economy job begun with Cast Lead. of force operation against Hamas as it mounted its Currently, Hamas appears to be coordinating with main effort in the north. Specifically, the IDF’s Gaza Hizballah at least on the political level. On March 1, Division and mobilized reserves would be employed 2010, Hamas leader stated that to deter and contain Palestinian elements within Gaza, but Israel would likely avoid a major ground incursion some people are trying today to drive a wedge between until the situation in the north had been favorably the Arab and the Islamic resistance movements, resolved. This is not a certainty, however. The IDF was

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 33 Jeffrey White If War Comes

TABLE 13. Hamas Artillery Rockets and Mortars

System Type Range (km) Supplier

90 mm Qassam Unguided rocket 9 Produced in Gaza

107 mm Qassam Unguided rocket 8.5 Produced in Gaza

115 mm Qassam Unguided rocket 11–12 Produced in Gaza

122 mm Grad Unguided rocket 20 Iranian design/manufacture

122 mm extended-range Grad Unguided rocket 40 Iranian design/manufacture

Unidentified long-range rocket* Unguided rocket 60–70 —

81 mm Mortar 4.9 Iranian design/manufacture

120 mm mortar Mortar 6.2 Iranian design/manufacture * The exact designation of the longest-range rocket currently in the group’s possession is uncertain, but some reports indicate that it is the Iranian Fajr-5. built to fight a war against major Arab states, and it has scale IDF operations in Gaza, then security incidents very large capacities that have not been employed for would arise, but they would probably be contained at decades—if necessary, it could operate simultaneously low levels as in 2008–2009. The PA has little interest in the north and against Gaza. That would require in sacrificing its West Bank gains in an effort to save mobilization of additional forces and diversion of some Hamas, much less Hizballah. air, special forces, and intelligence assets. If, however, perceived that Israel was If Israel decided to invade Gaza, it would carry out losing the war, then the equation could change. In a major combined air and ground operation with naval that scenario, the PA leadership and security forces support. This would likely involve extensive ground would be more likely to permit or even tacitly sup- operations deep inside Gaza, including urban areas. port violence. The intent would be to comprehensively eliminate the Palestinian military structure there (especially Hamas’s Escalation and Control al-Qassam Brigades) and end Hamas political control. The war outlined here would present a dangerous situ- This could entail occupying parts of Gaza for an indefi- ation with clear potential to escalate into a broader nite period.26 and still more serious conflict. Various pressures and dynamics would push it toward escalation, though Expansion to Other Areas some factors would work to limit it. Large-scale war could also lead to security issues in In both the 2006 war and Cast Lead, decisions and the West Bank and Israeli Arab neighborhoods. Riots, events on and off the battlefield shaped the scope and demonstrations, sniping, and rock throwing are all intensity of the fighting. A similar effect would likely possible. Yet it should be pointed out that during Cast be seen in a new war. Israel, for example, would have Lead—which directly involved Palestinian interests— to decide on the limits of its air and ground opera- relatively few such disturbances or violent incidents tions in Lebanon, and on what to do if progress were were reported. Effective work by the Israeli police and not rapid enough or success not great enough. For its security services as well as Palestinian Authority (PA) part, Hizballah would have to respond to the course of forces prevented any serious situation from developing. the fighting. If it were losing, would the group attempt If a new war in the north was accompanied by large- to end or broaden the conflict? And the parties would

34 Policy Focus #106 War beyond Israel and Hizballah Jeffrey White face another set of decisions regarding Syria: Damas- Expectations have seemingly been established for cus would have to decide whether to enter the conflict how enemies and allies will act in wartime. As fighting and at what level, Israel would have to decide what to progresses, the combatants will be pressured to act on do about Syrian involvement, each government would these expectations. Hizballah, Syria, and Iran appear have to decide on a response to the initial clashes, and to be strong allies, and although their partnership may so on. In addition, Iran would face its own difficult not be on par with the pre– alliance sys- decisions regarding the extent of its involvement. Each tem, they might nevertheless find it difficult to renege of these and other key would provide on their commitments. Hizballah is also attempting to an opportunity for escalation or, less likely, a chance to wrap Lebanon’s government, people, and army into a limit or reduce the level of conflict. future conflict, in order to cast the war as being between War could begin on a small scale and then escalate, Lebanon and Israel, not simply Hizballah and Israel. or it could begin large and escalate still further. In fact, For its part, the IDF has created the expectation in the antagonists’ strategies have built-in potential to both Israel that it will not permit a repeat of the 2006 war expand (in terms of geography and combatants) and experience—that is, maladroit ground operations, a escalate (in terms of intensity and weaponry employed). civilian population under sustained bombardment, As discussed previously, both Israel and Hizballah and, in the end, an enemy boasting of victory. What have doctrinal approaches to war that support escala- Hizballah and its allies expect from Israel is rapid and tion. Israeli doctrine calls for decisive operations to large-scale operations intended to achieve major mili- bring about rapid defeat of the enemy’s forces, and for tary and political goals. This expectation would likely conducting battle on the enemy’s territory. Israel has press them to act aggressively rather than waiting for also made clear that it holds the Lebanese government Israeli blows to fall. responsible for Hizballah behavior, making Lebanese The possibility of preemptive action by either side is government entities and infrastructure potential targets. another potential escalation mechanism. Preemption It has already demonstrated that it will attack infrastruc- has clear benefits, not just at the beginning of a war but ture associated with its opponents in Lebanon and Gaza. also at the operational level during the fighting. The For its part, Hizballah has made clear that it is prepared preemptor would gain the initiative and set the war’s to strike civilian targets and infrastructure deep inside initial or subsequent conditions. For example, Israel Israel if Lebanese civilian infrastructure is attacked. If would gain a major advantage if it preemptively struck its actions during the 2006 war are any guide, it would Hizballah’s long-range missile and rocket capabilities, do so from the beginning of a new war. Furthermore, as it did in 2006. Alternatively, Hizballah would gain although some of Hizballah’s rocket and missile inven- an advantage if it used these weapons first, especially tory is accurate enough for targeting specific military against military targets that would be vital to Israel’s installations, most of its arms are area-fire weapons and conduct of the war (e.g., airfields). Similarly, if direct would inevitably fall on civilian areas. Syrian involvement seemed imminent, both Israel and Both sides also seem to be thinking about and pre- Damascus would gain the advantage by striking the paring for a major war rather than a limited one, seem- first blow. These and other potential advantages would ingly accepting this as the most likely scenario. They press the combatants to act aggressively. have each conducted exercises simulating major com- The military dynamics of the war would influence bat, while Hizballah and its allies have held numer- escalation as well. Success, failure, and military/civil- ous meetings and issued many statements suggesting ian losses could all pressure the combatants to inten- coordinated preparations and planning for another sify their efforts in order to force a positive outcome war. Although such measures do not produce war in of or justify the costs. And as mentioned previously, themselves, they do make a decision to go to war easier, even if the parties planned to carefully modulate their in addition to facilitating actions during wartime. actions and engage in intra-war signaling in order

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 35 Jeffrey White If War Comes to limit the fighting, such intentions could give way Similarly, some of the military developments that to escalation in the face of uncertainty and threat. might lead to escalation could have the opposite “Negotiating by salvos” seems feasible in the calm effect instead. Rapid success, early failure, or high prior to conflict but would be much more difficult rates of personnel and equipment attrition could once a war has begun. push one of the combatants to seek an early end to Political developments could also intensify the con- the conflict. For example, the need to preserve forces flict. Both internal politics and the requirements of to fight another day or reduce political losses within maintaining external relationships could create pressure Lebanon could cause Hizballah to look for a way out, to expand the conflict. For example, Hassan Nasrallah as it did in 2006. has established a kind of trinity in the defense of Leba- Perhaps the most important potential limiting fac- non: the Lebanese people, the resistance, and the Leba- tor would be external political intervention. Pressures nese army.27 Hizballah’s entanglement with the Lebanese from the United States, Europe, the , government, its efforts to identify itself with the coun- and others would likely come into play as the war try’s defense, and its involvement with the Lebanese army intensified and threatened to expand. All of the direct all suggest that a future war would draw in the Lebanese combatants would have to take this factor into account, state and society. Similarly, Syria and Iran would face and the longer the fighting persisted, the greater the political pressure to increase their involvement if the war pressure would become. were going against Hizballah.28 Syria would probably International reactions would be shaped to some consider any Israeli ground advance northward in the degree by the combatants’ very different timelines for Beqa Valley as a threat to Damascus, perhaps leading it war. As discussed previously, Israel’s desire for a rela- into a ground engagement with the IDF there. tively short but strategically decisive conflict would For its part, the Israeli government would likely necessitate intense and large-scale fighting from the face internal, public, and military pressure to end the beginning. War on this scale may come as a shock to threat quickly and decisively, as happened during Cast some of Israel’s supporters, and to countries and orga- Lead. These pressures would increase as Israeli casual- nizations under the spell of “proportionality.” ties increased, especially civilian losses. Hizballah and Israel’s opponents, however, would seek to prolong its allies intend to bring war to the Israeli population the war as long as they were not losing too badly. This as a whole, and at least initially, missiles and rockets would allow them to inflict the maximum political, would penetrate Israeli defenses in some numbers—in military, and economic damage on Israel and its sup- other words, internal pressures would likely arise very porters; deny Israel a clear victory; and wait for exter- quickly. The extent of this pressure would depend on nal pressures to bring the conflict to a halt. In other the speed and effectiveness of Israel’s offensive military words, their challenge would be to continue the war, operations and passive/active defense measures. but not for so long as to risk comprehensive defeat. Despite these substantial pressures toward escala- On balance, it seems likely that a new war would tion, some factors may work to limit a new conflict. intensify rapidly, with pressures to escalate outweigh- As mentioned previously, the close ties, shared inter- ing control mechanisms. A period of acute danger ests, and ideological affinity among Hizballah, Syria, would emerge early, when the advantages of gaining and Iran could give way to self-interest during war. a step on the opponent would be most pronounced. Both Damascus and Tehran may choose to limit their Decisionmakers on all sides would be under great pres- involvement in order to avoid the consequences of all- sure to act quickly in order to achieve their goals and out conflict with Israel. For example, even short of a protect their assets and populations. Serious miscalcu- direct existential threat from Israel, the Syrian regime lation would be a real possibility, even more so if the would have to be concerned about potentially serious war erupted as a result of an accident or unintended damage to its key military and security pillars. escalation from an isolated incident.

36 Policy Focus #106 War beyond Israel and Hizballah Jeffrey White

Notes 1. A variation on this scenario would include Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) involvement (even if only token) in defensive operations against Israeli forces. As mentioned in chapter 3, Hizballah appears eager to create the conditions that would lead to such confronta- tions. In this situation, IDF elements would inevitably engage the LAF, and the scale of these engagements would depend on the seri- ousness of the LAF’s efforts. Israel would probably accept token resistance without responding harshly. 2. The assessment that Damascus would attempt to stay out of direct war with Israel is based largely on a “rational actor” model of Syrian behavior. In essence, this view holds that self-preservation is the government’s highest goal, and that the regime would therefore not put itself at risk by going to war with Israel. Although this assessment is cogent, it tends to downplay the role of personality, ideology, emo- tion, uncertainty, and chance in judging how the would behave. 3. Yoav Stern, “Syria Looks to Lebanon War for Tips on Arming Hezbollah,” Haaretz, May 5, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/news/syria- looks-to-lebanon-war-for-tips-on-arming-hezbollah-1.275404. 4. Barak Ravid et al., “Israel Fears Syrian Army Moves May Signal Hezbollah Attack,” Haaretz, April 3, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/ news/israel-fears-syrian-army-moves-may-signal-hezbollah-attack-1.243250. 5. Ron Ben Yishai, “Syrian Rockets Aimed at Tel Aviv,” YnetNews.com, September 8, 2007, http://www.ynet.co.il/english/ articles/0,7340,L-3435543,00.html. 6. Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, “Annual Threat Assessment: Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,” March 10, 2009, p. 19, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/March/Maples%2003-10-09.pdf. 7. Fars News Agency, “Iran Views Defense Ties with Syria as Deterrent to Israel,” December 9, 2009, http://english.farsnews.com/ newstext.php?nn=8809181632. 8. News Agency, “Iran, Syria Sign Defence Agreement,” December 13, 2009, http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/ sidZAWYA20091213061319. 9. Some analysts argue that Syria and Israel could modulate their conduct of a war, signaling their intentions to limit fighting by the careful employment of weapons and forces. Whether such behavior would work amid the uncertainty and pressures of war is unclear at best. 10. See, for example, Roee Nahmias, “Syria: If Israelis Declare War, We’ll Hit Their Cities,” YnetNews.com, March 2, 2010, http://www. ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3843989,00.html. 11. Nasser Karimi, “Iran Vows to Stand by Hezbollah against Israel,” , February 18, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/ International/wireStory?id=9872644. 12. VOANews.com, “Iran Vows to Back Syria with All Its ‘Strength,’” April 30, 2010, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/middle- east/Iran-Vows-to-Back-Syria-With-All-Its-Strength-92509489.html. 13. Yaakov Katz, “IDF Names Top Iranian in Charge of Hizballah,” Jerusalem Post, July 8, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/ News/Article.aspx?id=180767. 14. The same limitations would also apply if Tehran attempted to resupply Hizballah and Syria with arms. Turkey’s improving relationship with Syria and Iran could provide greater opportunity for such activity in a war situation, however. 15. Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, “Iran’s Military Power,” statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 14, 2010, p. 23, http://foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/100414_FINAL%20DIA_SFR_to_SASC_Iran_Hearing_20100413.pdf. 16. Haaretz, “Israel Worried by Report Iran Has Tripled Its Missile Arsenal,” December 9, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/news/israel- worried-by-report-iran-has-tripled-its-missile-arsenal-1.285505. 17. Burgess, “Iran’s Military Power,” p. 8. 18. Ibid., p. 7. 19. Ibid., p. 8. 20. Ibid., p. 10. 21. Natasha Mozgovaya, “Iran: We’ll ‘Cut Off Israel’s Feet’ if It Attacks Syria,” Haaretz, April 30, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/news/ diplomacy-defense/iran-we-ll-cut-off-israel-s-feet-if-it-attacks-syria-1.287513. 22. Associated Press, “‘Iran’s Army Too Powerful to Attack,’” Jerusalem Post, April 18, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/ Article.aspx?ID=173422. 23. In a short war, resupplying Hizballah might not be a given the amount of weaponry that Iran and Syria have already provided. Politically, however, resupply would be a signal of Iranian commitment to the group and acceptance of the inherent risks. 24. There is no way to know in advance how this decision would be resolved within the Iranian government. The “rational actor” argument suggests that Tehran would not take regime-threatening action, but this ignores the role of ideology and personality. In all likelihood, certain voices within the decisionmaking structure would argue for attacking Israel in such a scenario. 25. Middle East Media Research Institute, “Iranian Leader Khamenei Meets with Heads of Palestinian Factions,” al-Alam television, March 1, 2010, http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/2407.htm. 26. The IDF has made contingency plans for reoccupying the territory. See Amir Buhbut, “The Program for an IDF Military Governor of ” (in Hebrew), , May 18, 2010, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/108/351.html?hp=1&loc=8&tmp=7943. 27. Nasrallah referred to this “trinity” several times during his May 25, 2010, speech on the anniversary of the “liberation of southern Leb- anon” (an Arabic transcript of his remarks is available at http://www.alintiqad.com/essaydetails.php?eid=32529&cid=75). See also Middle East Media Research Institute, “Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah Threatens to Bring Down Buildings in Tel Aviv and Hit Ben-Gurion Airport in Future War,” February 17, 2010, http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2405.htm. 28. Given the uncertainties involved, this paper largely refrains from predicting the likely outcome of a war. Yet Israel’s clear qualitative mili- tary edge, coupled with the high stakes, does give it a greater chance of success than its opponents in most scenarios. For more discussion of what Israeli battlefield success would mean for Hizballah and its allies, see the “Consequences” section of chapter 5.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 37 5 | Uncertainties and Consequences

Although the previous chapters have sought and evolution of operations, at least initially. A to be as clear as possible about the likely contours of a gradual buildup to war would likely result in opera- new war between Israel and Hizballah, many uncertain- tions unfolding differently than a sudden onset of ties remain regarding a conflict of this nature and scope: fighting precipitated by an isolated incident or pre- emptive attack. ■■ Strength of will for key leaders. How the various leaders will act at the moment of crisis is uncertain. ■■ The pace of events. How fast war develops could Some may act less decisively or coherently than push events in various directions. A slow-developing their peacetime statements would suggest. And conflict would allow more time for diplomacy and they would all face enormous and often-conflicting “signaling,” reducing uncertainty. A rapidly develop- internal and external pressures. Hizballah’s leader- ing conflict would have the opposite effect, creating ship would be in hiding and likely subject to attack more opportunity for miscalculation, misunderstand- if discovered by Israeli intelligence. Some leaders ing, and escalation. Whereas Hizballah would want may not have the strength of will required to man- the conflict to be slow as in 2006, Israel would seek a age these pressures. rapid war. As a result, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would likely attempt to maintain a high operational ■■ The real nature of the Hizballah-Syria-Iran mili- tempo in the air and on the ground from the start, tary relationship. This relationship is central to the in part to reduce the rocket and missile threat and question of whether a war between Israel and Hizbal- accomplish its goals before diplomatic intervention. lah would escalate into a general or regional conflict. Yet it remains poorly understood. Its strengths and ■■ The role of the unexpected. The capricious gods of limits are unknown and may only become clear in the war—blunder and chance—would inevitably have event of war. As indicated in previous chapters, an their say in any new conflict. Operations would equally good case could be made for two very differ- not unfold precisely (or, at times, even remotely) ent scenarios: either the parties will act in their own according to plan. The unanticipated would occur narrow self-interest, which would limit potential at all levels—political, strategic, operational, and escalation, or they will all act together as true allies, tactical. These surprises would shape the war and which would promote escalation and expansion. its outcome in unexpected ways. Consequently, the more-adaptable governments and militaries would ■■ External intervention prior to combat. Interven- be at an advantage. tion by outside actors may cause one of the parties to pull back from the brink of conflict or modify its ■■ Public attitudes toward military action. Public plans. The most obvious case would be U.S. interven- perceptions, especially in Israel and Lebanon, would tion to prevent or temper an Israeli operation, but influence the way the war was prosecuted, but to other states and the UN could also attempt to head what degree is uncertain. Depending on these atti- off or constrain a war. tudes, leaders on each side may feel more or less con- strained in their use of force. ■■ Starting conditions. Most of this paper deals with the major characteristics of war without regard to ■■ Crossing the chemical warfare line. Syria has a sig- how the conflict begins, but those inaugural cir- nificant chemical warfare capability that has tradi- cumstances would be important to the sequence tionally been viewed as a deterrent to prevent Israel

38 Policy Focus #106 Uncertainties and Consequences Jeffrey White

from attempting regime change. But in a large-scale ■■ With a whimper. The war simply peters out through conflict—especially one involving attacks on tar- exhaustion or military stalemate, and the combat- gets important to the regime—Damascus could ants tacitly agree to stop fighting. This would be a authorize the use of these weapons against targets in very messy outcome with substantial potential to Israel. Doing so would mean total war between the reignite, akin to the end of the 1973 and 2006 wars. two countries. ■■ An imposed solution. Outside forces compel or ■■ UNIFIL’s role. Currently, the UN Interim Force convince the parties to cease fire. This is another in Lebanon has some 12,000 troops in the South. potentially messy ending, leaving no one satisfied Their role during a conflict—whether to fight, and retaining a high degree of volatility. avoid involvement, or withdraw—could complicate ground operations by Israel and Hizballah. More- The stability of the postwar situation would depend over, Hizballah may choose to operate near UNIFIL on many factors, including the diplomatic activity that bases in the hope of creating an incident in which would follow the conclusion of hostilities. In 1973, for the IDF is perceived to be firing on UN forces. How example, skillful diplomacy transformed an unstable mil- such an incident actually evolved would depend itary situation into arrangements that still stand today. on IDF restraint and/or precision in fire, and how However the war ends, a few conditions would UNIFIL reacted to being set up by Hizballah. likely prevail:

These and other uncertainties would influence the ■■ The IDF would be occupying some, perhaps substan- course of the war, lengthening or shortening it, tial, parts of Lebanon and potentially all of Gaza. broadening or narrowing its scope, and increasing or decreasing its intensity. But the broad outlines dis- ■■ Wherever the course and outcome of the war went cussed throughout this study would likely hold: a badly—defeats, civilian casualties, destruction— large-scale, intense conflict waged between Israel and there would be political crises. Lebanon in particular some combination of Hizballah and its allies, fought would be destabilized. in and over Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, and lasting for weeks. ■■ Several immediate requirements would emerge: dealing with dislocated civilians, rebuilding and How the War Ends resupplying military forces, and repairing damaged All wars come to an end. One side or the other is infrastructure. defeated or attempts to escape defeat by suing for peace. Exhaustion overtakes the combatants. Peace is Even under the best of circumstances (e.g., the absence imposed. A future war in Lebanon could end by any of of renewed fighting), the postwar situation would these means, broadly defined as follows: require a great deal of time and serious political and economic investments before it could stabilize. ■■ With a bang. One side achieves its aims, or enough of them, and offers or imposes terms for ending the Consequences war. Such an unambiguous victory would be difficult If war does come, and if it approaches the scope and to achieve, especially as the war expanded to include scale outlined here, it would have significant long-term additional actors. Only Israel seems to have the mili- consequences, potentially reshaping the regional polit- tary capability needed for this kind of relatively deci- ical and military environment. Casualties and damage sive conclusion, which might look something like would be extensive—the hardest-hit areas would most the end of the 1967 war. likely be southern Lebanon and northern Israel, with

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 39 Jeffrey White If War Comes most of the civilian losses occurring there. But damage built for major conventional war, and if necessary it would be significant in other areas as well. will accept the losses required to achieve its aims. Direct Iranian attacks would increase Israeli casu- For Israel. This would certainly be Israel’s most serious alties and damage somewhat, but they would not add war since 1973, and one that the IDF would have to markedly to the weight of fire coming from Hizballah win. Given the likely political, military, and economic and Syria. Iran’s role in keeping Hizballah and Syria in costs, failure to achieve core objectives would have the the fight would be more consequential. most serious long-term consequences for Israel, as com- pared with the other potential combatants. If Israel For Hizballah and its allies. If Israel acted decisively, goes to war, it must be demonstrably successful. were willing to pay the costs in casualties and damage, Hizballah has the means to strike targets through- and enjoyed military success, then a new war could out Israel and has specifically stated that it would attack substantially weaken its opponents: civilian population centers. Although this would be no different in principle than the 2006 war, when the ■■ Hizballah would be broken as a military factor in group struck every civilian center in reach of its rock- Lebanon and weakened politically. ets, its capabilities have since grown. Given the weight of the attack Hizballah plans on conducting in a future ■■ The Syrian regime would be weakened by military war, Israel may face substantially greater civilian losses, defeat and the loss of important military and secu- damage, economic disruption, and population move- rity assets. ments than it did in 2006, even with the active and passive defense measures it has put in place since then.1 ■■ Iran’s activities in the region would be circumscribed by Indeed, much will depend on how effective these mea- the defeat of its allies, and if Tehran failed to aid them sures prove to be and, perhaps most important, the during the conflict, it would lose influence as well. speed with which Israel’s air and ground operations in Lebanon deal with the rocket and missile threat. ■■ Hamas (assuming it became involved directly) would A war that included direct Syrian involvement lose its military power in Gaza and at least some of would be even more serious. If Syria were to conduct its political power. missile attacks on Israel, civilian casualties and damage would increase. Accordingly, the civilian population’s Regardless of Israel’s level of success, southern Lebanon resilience would be one of the keys to Israel’s prospects and its towns and villages would be a major ground in this kind of war. The Israeli people would be hit, and combat zone in most any scenario, and therefore sub- they would have to ride out those attacks until IDF ject to significant destruction and high risk to any of offensive operations took effect. the population that remained in place once fighting On the military side, IDF losses were relatively began. Hizballah intends to fight from within the pop- light during the 2006 war and Operation Cast Lead.2 ulation, and the IDF intends to fight the group wher- Air and ground operations on the scale outlined here ever it is. would likely entail significantly greater losses. Israeli As for the rest of Lebanon, Israel would plan to con- ground forces would face the difficult task of operat- duct operations deep in the country and hold its gov- ing quickly in constricted terrain and built-up areas. ernment accountable for Hizballah actions. This por- Hizballah has prepared seriously for renewed war and tends significant destruction of government-associated would vigorously and skillfully defend against Israeli facilities and infrastructure. Hizballah facilities in the efforts in Lebanon. Beirut area and Beqa Valley would also be struck, as Israel’s battle losses would increase in the event of would lines of communication from these facilities to direct Syrian involvement. Nevertheless, the IDF is the South. In addition, Hizballah missile, rocket, air

40 Policy Focus #106 Uncertainties and Consequences Jeffrey White defense, and ground forces would be engaged wher- to Hamas credibility and legitimacy with the people ever they were found. If the group chose to fire missiles of Gaza . from the northern Beqa, then combat could extend well into northern Lebanon. For the United States. Washington should be taking Damage in Syria would depend on the extent of its own preparatory steps, developing concrete plans Syrian involvement. As such involvement expanded, for what it would do both in advance of such a war the country would be increasingly targeted by Israeli and if hostilities break out. Its prewar efforts should attacks. At the more serious end of the spectrum, not be limited to pressuring Israel into inaction while this could include strikes on Syrian leadership, gov- verbally chastising Hizballah, Syria, and Iran. Instead, ernment, economic, and infrastructure targets, the United States should focus on taking actions that in addition to extensive attacks on the military and back up its words. To date, nothing it has said or done security apparatus. has had any visible effect on Hizballah’s preparation Regarding direct fighting, Hizballah and Syria for war, nor on the Syrian and Iranian roles in that would suffer significant losses to any forces engaged buildup. Instead, the threat has continued to grow by Israel. Missile, long-range rocket, air defense, and to its current, very large proportions. Deterrence is ground forces defending against an Israeli incursion under increasing pressure, and permitting the threat would all suffer heavy attrition. to develop further will only make a resultant war even In addition to personnel and material losses, Hiz- larger, more intense, and more destructive. ballah’s myth of resistance and military power could be If war comes, Washington should not necessarily shattered, with the group exposed as unable to defend take immediate steps toward ending it quickly. That either Lebanon or itself. This could lead to a reordering is the natural reaction to conflict, based on the belief of the Lebanese political scene. that war is so terrible that it needs to be stopped above In Syria, the war could see the end of the current all. And yet changes must occur: Hizballah’s military regime, depending on the extent of its involvement and capabilities need to be broken and its political power how skillfully Damascus played its hand. Even if they reduced; Syria needs to be disabused of the notion could hold on to power in the face of a major defeat, that it can play violent games in Lebanon as a means of Bashar al-Asad and his cohorts would need all the skill furthering its own cynical interests without incurring and means of coercion at their disposal to weather such any significant cost; and Iran needs to see its Hizbal- an outcome. It is uncertain whether the Syrian people lah proxy militarily defeated and politically humbled. and military/security forces would accept humiliation at Only successful IDF operations can achieve those Israel’s hands as the price of adventurism in Lebanon. goals, and that may take some time. Accordingly, the Iran’s role and influence would probably be altered United States should consider giving the IDF that by war as well. Even if it retained a strong regional posi- time—no easy task. tion, it would likely still need time to rebuild its assets Washington must also look to the Iranian role in and reputation in Lebanon. Political upheaval in Syria such a conflict. Any Iranian troublemaking in the Per- could reduce or even end Iranian influence there and sian Gulf should be met with a forceful response. Iran sharply limit it within Lebanon. should understand that the United States will use mili- As for Hamas, the outcome mentioned at the tary power if necessary, thwarting any attempts to take beginning of this section would hold if the group advantage of the situation created by the war. became involved in this kind of war: in all likelihood, Washington will also face some difficult questions it would suffer loss of control over Gaza, the destruc- about its own role in the war. Would it provide dip- tion of its military arm, and the scattering of its Gaza- lomatic support to Israel, and if so, to what extent? based leadership. Failure to avoid a fateful conflict or Is it prepared to ensure freedom of the seas in the defend the population would probably spell an end face of potential Hizballah disruption of eastern

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 41 Jeffrey White If War Comes

Mediterranean shipping? Would it participate directly Finally, regardless of how the war is concluded, the in defending Israel against missile attacks? Would it United States would have a major role to play in the resupply critical Israeli weapons systems and muni- aftermath. In particular, it would be called on to help tions lost or expended in the fighting, and if so, how steady the situation politically and militarily in the quickly? The answers to these questions would have an near term, facilitate rebuilding efforts, and set condi- important influence on the course of the war. tions for long-term stability.

Notes 1. During the 2006 war, 53 Israeli civilians were killed, 250 severely wounded, and 2,000 lightly wounded. There was extensive damage to housing, and some damage to public utilities and industries. Some 250,000 people reportedly evacuated northern Israel. Economic activity was disrupted for the course of the war, and approximately one million people were required to stay in or near shelters. Uzi Rubin, “Hizballah’s Rocket Campaign against Northern Israel: A Preliminary Report,” Jerusalem Issue Brief (Jerusalem Center for Pub- lic Affairs) 6, no. 10 (August 31, 2006), http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief006-10.htm. 2. The IDF lost 119 soldiers in 2006 and 10 (4 by friendly fire) in Cast Lead.

42 Policy Focus #106 6 | Conclusions

In some ways, the current situation in the Israel- On the other side, Israel has also prepared seri- Lebanon arena echoes the pre–World War I period. We ously—its extensive military measures, combat exer- are witnessing a long buildup1 for war—including mas- cises, improvements in home-front defense, and expe- sive armament efforts, detailed military planning, and rience gained from Operation Cast Lead give it a alliance structures that increase pressure toward wide significantly enhanced ability to fight Hizballah and rather than limited conflict—with the sudden out- its allies while weathering their attacks. In all respects, break of large-scale hostilities as a potential outcome. the Israeli military is stronger, more capable, and more None of the contestants would likely welcome such ready than it was in July 2006, and it too seems confi- a war. Although they have prepared for it and would dent about its prospects. seek to exploit the military and political opportunities Whether or not war will erupt soon or ever is uncer- it presented, they seem to realize that such a conflict tain. Both sides have good reasons to avoid it, but would have fateful consequences for all of them. deterrence seems to be weakening, and the next war On one side, Hizballah has prepared seriously for will not look much like the inconclusive 2006 conflict. war and seems confident in its capabilities. Some of Rather, all signs point to it being wider in geographic this bravado may be due to its increasingly tight rela- scope and more destructive, with high-tempo opera- tionship with Syria and Iran. Indeed, Damascus would tions evident from the start. Finally, when one weighs likely become a combatant in the next war, and perhaps this study’s assessment of the combatants alongside Tehran as well. The extent of this participation is diffi- the situation’s numerous uncertainties, Israel would cult to foresee, but substantial involvement by either or most likely prevail in the kind of war envisioned here, both patrons should not come as a surprise. though not without substantial costs.

Notes 1. Or, in Laurence Lafore’s memorable description, “the long fuse.” See his book The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I, 2nd ed. (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1971).

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 43 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Board of Directors Michael Keston Daniel Mintz President Zachary Schreiber Martin J. Gross Fred Schwartz Merryl Tisch Chairman Gary Wexler Howard P. Berkowitz

Chairmen Emeriti Next Generation Leadership Council Fred S. Lafer Jill Abramson Michael Stein Anthony Beyer, cochair David Eigen Founding President and Chairman Emerita Daniel Eisenstadt Barbi Weinberg Jonathan S. Gilbert Adam Herz Senior Vice Presidents James Keston Bernard Leventhal Zachary Schreiber, cochair Peter Lowy Whitney Skibell James Schreiber Jonathan Torop

Vice Presidents Board of Advisors Charles Adler Benjamin Breslauer Warren Christopher Walter P. Stern Lawrence S. Eagleburger Max M. Kampelman Secretary Henry A. Kissinger Richard S. Abramson Samuel W. Lewis Treasurer Michael Mandelbaum Dimitri Sogoloff Robert C. McFarlane Martin Peretz Board Members Richard Perle Anthony Beyer James G. Roche Richard Borow George P. Shultz Robert Fromer R. James Woolsey Michael Gelman Mortimer Zuckerman Roger Hertog, emeritus Shelly Kassen

44 Policy Focus #106

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