If War Comes Israel Vs

If War Comes Israel vs. Hizballah and Its Allies Jeffrey White Policy Focus #106 | September 2010 If War Comes Israel vs. Hizballah and Its Allies Jeffrey White Policy Focus #106 | September 2010 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2010 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2010 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication Front cover: An Israeli gunner runs to reload an army artillery piece after it fired toward Lebanon from a position near the Lebanese border in northern Israel, July 2006. (AP Photo/Pier Paolo Cito) Contents About the Author . v Acknowledgments. vii Executive Summary . ix Introduction . 1 1. Rumors of War . 3 2. Israel’s War. 6 3. Hizballah’s War. 21 4. War beyond Israel and Hizballah . 31 5. Uncertainties and Consequences . 41 6. Conclusions. 46 Tables Table 1. Israeli Fighters, Strike Aircraft, and Attack Helicopters . 6 Table 2. Lessons of 2006 for the IDF and Hizballah . 8 Table 3. Israeli Anti-Rocket and Missile Systems. 10 Table 4. Notional Israeli Ground Order of Battle in a Future Lebanon Conflict. 16 Table 5. Reported Hizballah Rockets and Missiles. 19 Table 6. Reported Hizballah SAM Systems. 21 Table 7. Reported Hizballah Antitank Weapons. 21 Table 8. Notional Hizballah Weapons Deployment. 24 Table 9. Syrian SSM Systems. 28 Jeffrey White If War Comes Table 10. Syrian Long-Range Artillery Rockets. 29 Table 11. Syrian ATGMs . 29 Table 12. Syrian Army Order of Battle. 30 Table 13. Hamas Artillery Rockets and Mortars . 34 Maps Figure 1. Notional Israeli Air Force Operations against Hizballah . 15 Figure 2. Notional Israeli Offensive Operation in Southern Lebanon . 17 Figure 3. Selected Rocket and Missile Coverage of Israel from Potential Launch Areas in Lebanon. 20 Figure 4. Notional Hizballah Offensive Operations in Northern Israel . 23 Figure 5. Notional Hizballah Defensive Concept . 25 iv Policy Focus #106 About the Author Jeffrey White is a defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of the Levant, Iraq, and Iran. A thirty-four-year veteran of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), he participated in DIA operational and policy planning and wrote extensively for senior defense officials, including the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. White’s work includes extensive analysis of the Gaza conflict, Hizballah, the Iraq insurgency, and the Ira- nian nuclear program. He is sought out as a commentator on these issues and has authored several Washington Institute publications, including Hamas in Combat: The Military Performance of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (2009, with Yoram Cohen), Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assess- ment (2006, with David Makovsky), and An Adaptive Insurgency: Confronting Adversary Networks in Iraq (2006). n n n The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy v Acknowledgments THE AUTHOR WOULD LIKE TO THANK The Washington Institute’s senior staff for their many thought- ful comments, which added greatly to the quality and depth of the material presented. Special thanks are due to Andrew Tabler and Mike Eisenstadt, who served as the main and secondary readers, and to George Lopez, the manuscript’s editor. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy vii Executive Summary THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS have seen much are largely conventional in structure and purpose, as is discussion of growing tensions between Israel and Hiz- the Syrian military. Israel has prepared its own conven- ballah, along with the group’s allies, Syria and Iran. If war tional forces for this threat, including enhancements does in fact come to Israel’s northern border, it would in air, ground, and naval systems, command and con- bear little resemblance to the 2006 conflict in Lebanon. trol, intelligence, force readiness, active rocket/missile Instead, it would in all likelihood be a transformational, defense, and civil defense. Although the challenge of a even fateful, event for the region—certainly for Hizbal- war with Hizballah and its allies should not be under- lah and Lebanon, probably for Syria, and perhaps even estimated, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are much for Iran. Israel and its regional standing would likely better prepared today than they were in 2006. undergo substantial alterations as well. In a conflict of the sort outlined here, Israel would This study offers not a prediction of war, but rather aim to fundamentally alter the military equation, a forecast of what it could look like. In all probability, with great consequences for the political situation. it would be a major conflict, one fought over extensive Although this would probably not amount to “final areas of Lebanon, Israel, and probably Syria, featuring victory,” it would likely be decisive in the military- large military forces executing complex operations and operational sense. Israeli military strategy would resulting in substantial casualties (military and civil- center on the use of large-scale joint air, ground, and ian) as well as major infrastructure damage in all of the naval operations to rapidly eliminate Hizballah’s countries involved. Although the political-diplomatic rocket and missile forces, destroy its ground forces arena would be important, success on the battlefield in southern Lebanon, severely damage its command would be central to determining the outcome. and control systems, and destroy its infrastructure Given the high stakes, the fighting would be throughout Lebanon. intense and would likely escalate and expand. Israel Israel would probably attempt to prevent the con- and Hizballah would feel great pressure to win such flict from escalating into general war with Syria by a war, and that need would drive the hostilities to employing threats, mobilization, force deployments, a new level, likely pulling in Syria and pushing Iran and posturing. At the same time, however, it would to become involved as well. The conflict would be be ready for that contingency. Any Syrian forces and a severe test for decisionmakers and warfighters on infrastructure that supported Hizballah would likely both sides, and a challenge for key external actors, be targeted, and any Iranian elements supporting the especially the United States. group would be subject to attack as well. Meanwhile, A number of circumstances could ignite such a con- Israel would attempt to deter direct Iranian attacks on flict. One side may simply conclude that it is time to act its territory via warnings and preparation of strategic for one reason or another. War could also develop from strike assets, including air, missile, and naval forces. various incidents, such as violence along the Lebanese Hizballah’s preparations for a future war are border, in Gaza, or in the West Bank. Other activities intended to deter Israel, shift the military balance in could produce situations in which escalating tensions the group’s favor, and bolster its political objectives. and misperception of the other side’s intentions and/ Its recent activities represent serious planning for war, or actions lead to a conflict. and the cumulative effect of these activities has been to increase the group’s self-confidence and perhaps The Combatants erode Israeli deterrence. Hizballah was largely suc- The current threat to Israel is essentially a conventional cessful in prosecuting the 2006 war, and it aims to one—Hizballah’s rocket, missile, and antitank forces repeat that success in a future conflict. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ix Jeffrey White If War Comes If a new war erupts, Hizballah’s military efforts n Inflicting a defeat on Israel sufficient to create the would center on the following strategies: conditions for regaining the Golan Heights n Offensively, to launch massive rocket/missile attacks In Iran, the regime could decide to take one or more of on military and civilian targets with the intention of several steps, on an escalating scale of involvement: inflicting significant casualties and damage n Providing more arms to Hizballah and Syria n Defensively, to oppose Israeli air, ground, and naval operations inside Lebanon with aggressive action, n Providing advisors, technicians, or light combat slowing any advances while inflicting as many casual- forces ties as possible and, at the same time, preserving its own forces n Carrying out asymmetric attacks on Israeli interests (e.g., terrorist-type actions) The group would aim to continue operations as long as it saw itself in an advantageous position, allowing n Engaging in regional troublemaking (e.g., raising it to inflict the most political, military, economic, and tensions in the Strait of Hormuz) social damage on Israel. For their part, Syria and Iran would at minimum pro- n Conducting missile strikes on Israel vide communications, command, control, intelligence, and resupply assistance in an effort to keep Hizballah In the Palestinian arena, Hamas leaders would likely in the fight. Syrian air defense elements would oppose limit the group’s participation to token actions accom- “penetrations” of Syrian airspace and perhaps engage panied by supporting rhetoric. At the same time, Israeli aircraft over Lebanon, given the small opera- no one should be surprised if a new war in the north tional area involved and the proximity of Damascus to included a “Gaza excursion.” Hamas could decide to the combat zone.

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