Grassroots Peacebuilding: Cross-Border Cooperation in the Ferghana Valley CAP Fellows Paper 202, January 2018

Diana Mamatova is a young professional in the areas of with common histories, similar peacebuilding, development and program management, cultures, and nearly identical infrastructure, yet it is politically and policy research. She holds a Master of Arts in and linguistically divided. Since Political Science with a focus on Central Asian politics the 1990s, security dynamics in from the OSCE Academy in Bishkek (Kyrgyz Republic) the region have deteriorated. Disputes over land, road use, and a Masters of Letters in Peace and Conflict from water and irrigation, pastures, University of St. Andrews (United Kingdom). She worked trade, ethno-national identity, with international NGO ACTED during the post- and more continue to cause cross- humanitarian and development phases following the border incidents that sometimes escalate into conflicts. June 2010 inter-ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan, and more recently with the United Nations in Kyrgyzstan, In view of the imperative to where she managed a nationwide research project on secure peace, this policy paper gender issues and peacebuilding. looks at examples of cooperation between cross-border orders and border issues mal cross-border cooperation in communities and discusses how have enormous implica- Central Asia’s Ferghana Valley. these interactions can sustain Btions for peacebuilding. grassroots peacebuilding. It A bottom-up perspective is es- Referred to as the heart of argues that there are many pecially important, as people Central Asia and located at the examples of productive and on the ground are the best re- intersection of three Central meaningful cooperation between source for building and sustain- Asian countries, the Ferghana cross-border communities. This ing peace. Cross-border grass- Valley brings together Uzbeks, interaction responds to the needs roots peacebuilding practices Kyrgyz, and Tajiks. The overall of the people living around the have shown how state borders population of the Valley is nearly borders, builds trust between do not simply divide people into 12 million; it comprises almost cross-border communities, and territories, but in fact under- one-third of the total population consequently sustains peace on lie their everyday interactions. of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan the ground. Peacebuilding does not need to and close to one-quarter of the be imposed, but rather support- population of Uzbekistan.1 This Regrettably, the current policy ed by cross-border communal is a highly populated area, with approach of the region’s engagement to strengthen social an average population density of governments on border issues cohesion. This paper looks at around 360 persons per square and peacebuilding is to view grassroots peacebuilding through kilometer.2 The Ferghana Valley these everyday interactions and the example of formal and infor- brings together states and people practices through the lens of

CAP Fellows Paper 202 1 Map 1. Ferghana Valley

Source: “Osh and the Fergana Valley,” Geohistory, http://geohistory.today/osh-fergana-Valley/ security—and to respond with Grassroots peacebuilding assess the possibility of merging more border posts, more border could be even more effective if or dividing areas of Uzbekia, Kyr- officials, more checkpoints, and state policies were to support gyzia, and Turkmenia.3 Moscow more restrictions, thereby making grassroots efforts. This paper had to negotiate the borders with it more difficult to communicate first discusses the drivers of the Central Asian elites, unit- and collaborate across borders. cross-border tensions and ing national groups and dividing While securitization is part conflicts in the Ferghana Valley. what had been the vast region of of nation-building and state- It then revisits the current policy Turkestan in order to avoid the building processes, states should approach to border issues and consolidation of Muslim leaders. place greater emphasis on its peacebuilding and the limitations Local elites and ordinary people effects on ordinary people and thereof, before discussing alike petitioned Moscow to rule in balance border security with existing grassroots practices at their favor over contested cities, the everyday needs of border the borders that sustain peace. villages, and areas. Interesting- dwellers. Indeed, border dwellers Finally, the paper concludes with ly, territorial issues during those resist such “securitization” on policy recommendations. years generally had a low profile, the part of governments and find and the redrawing of administra- ways to continue their grassroots Drivers of Cross-Border tive boundaries did not have an cooperation, by means formal Tensions and Conflicts immediate effect on local popu- and informal. These interactions lations, since borders remained and collaborations at and across The Soviet Union drew the bor- more or less open, boundary lines the borders have secondary, ders of the Central Asian states were not enforced, and local in- yet important, benefits that are during the 1920s and 1930s. The stitutions were weak.4 conducive to building trust and process of administrative and na- facilitating peace at the grassroots tional delineation was complex, However, with the independence level. led by Lenin’s decision to autho- of the Central Asian states in 1991, rize maps of Turkestan and then territorial issues began to present

CAP Fellows Paper 202 2 challenges to cross-border com- weapons and result in casualties. ethnic or geographic spaces. To munities. The administrative bor- For example, between 2014 and wit, 8 enclaves and exclaves were ders of Soviet times became real, mid-2015, 16 incidents involved created in the Ferghana Valley: a fragmentation that led to “a the use of weapons, causing 16 four Uzbek and two Tajik en- painful and unpleasant lesson for casualties and leaving 12 people claves in Kyrgyzstan and two en- the local population.”5 In the two wounded.10 claves—one Tajik, one Kyrgyz—in decades between 1989 and 2009, Uzbekistan.11 some 20 dangerous conflicts took Various explanations have been place in the Valley.6 Of the report- proposed for the conflict dynam- Despite more than two decades of ed incidents between 2010 and ics at the borders in the Ferghana attempts to redefine the borders 2013, a total of 62 occurred on Valley. Yet most of the conflicts and resolve conflicts in the border the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border can be understood through the region, incidents and conflicts of and 102 on the Kyrgyzstan-Uz- prism of securitization of bor- varying intensity and scale con- bekistan border.7 Over the course ders, competition over resources, tinue to occur in the borderland. of 2014, the Kyrgyzstani author- and growing nationalism. As the newly independent states ities registered a total of 37 bor- attempted to establish borders der incidents in the region: 32 on Securitization of Borders in the Ferghana Valley in the the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border early 1990s, arguments evolved and 5 on the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbeki- Soviet maps were drawn and re- around two claims: first, claims stan border.8 In 2015, 10 border drawn in the 1920s, 1950s, and over disputed territories (linked incidents took place, all of which 1980s, resulting in varying border to the pre-Soviet history or the occurred on either the Kyrgyz- lines in the Ferghana Valley. The use of different Soviet-era maps); stan-Tajikistan border or the elite gave contested lands to one and second, claims regarding ac- Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border.9 country and then another. As a tual land use (linked to ethnicity Some smaller incidents presum- result of Soviet “divide-and-rule” or citizenship).12 ably went unrecorded by the au- policy, the borders were gener- thorities, hence the actual num- ally ill-defined and ill-suited to In more than 25 years of inde- ber of incidents may be higher. the on-the-ground realities of the pendence, the governments of Some incidents involve the use of territory, as they did not respect Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have

Map 2. Enclaves in the Ferghana Valley

Source: “Ferghana Valley Enclaves: Travel Advice,” Carava- nistan, https://caravanistan.com/border-crossings/fergha- na-valley-enclaves/. CAP Fellows Paper 202 3 managed to delimit only around most severe measures, efforts area of cultivated land is grow- 60 percent of their mutual bor- that would be redoubled follow- ing, and the comparative figures 18 der (519 km/322 miles out of ing the Andijon riots of 2005. between 1991 and 2006 are in- 978 km/608 miles); negotiations Tashkent suspended cross-bor- structive: in Uzbekistan, the area continue over the remaining 459 der bus routes; sealed the bor- of cultivated land expanded from km (285 miles).13 In total, the two ders; deployed more soldiers, around 15 percent of the total governments have held 27 bilat- border guards, customs officers, area to 40 percent; in Kyrgyzstan, eral meetings on border delimita- and special forces units; estab- from 40 percent to 50 percent; tion, including those on 58 con- lished new control posts; upgrad- and in Tajikistan, from 13 percent 22 tested sections, especially in the ed existing facilities; demolished to 26 percent. There are claims Isfara river valley.14 cross-border bridges; closed bor- on all sides that borders are being der crossings; and even scattered shifted back and forth in pursuit In the case of the Kyrgyzstan-Uz- landmines across areas of its of fertile agricultural land. bekistan border, the situation be- frontier bordering Tajikistan and 19 gan to change after Shavkat Mir- Kyrgyzstan. Since 2000, Central Agricultural lands also include ziyoyev, the new Uzbek president, Asian countries have continuous- rangeland or land used for graz- came to power in late 2016 and ly strengthened their emerging ing livestock. During the Sovi- started promoting open borders security discourse, a discourse fi- et period, states and collective and trade in the region. In fall nancially supported by the inter- farms used to sign special long- 2017, the two countries signed a national community in the name term lease agreements to allow 20 historic agreement covering 85 of the “global war on terror”. animals to graze in cross-border 23 percent of the border, at which pastures. After independence, time they set the goal of agree- Competition over Resources maintaining similarly close eco- ing on the remaining 15 percent nomic relations between border by the end of 2018.15 The mutu- Typically, border incidents and countries became more difficult. al border between Kyrgyzstan conflicts start because of disputes Indeed, pastures are a persistent and Uzbekistan is 1,378 km (856 impacting livelihoods. Agricul- cause of cross-border incidents. miles) long, with 1,170 km (727 ture and cattle breeding have been In 2014, for instance, an inci- miles) of agreed border lines and central to economic activity in the dent occurred over the pastures 208 km (129 miles) contested.16 Ferghana Valley for centuries and in Kok-Tash village on the Tajiki- are the primary source of many stan-Kyrgyzstan border. The bor- The unclear international bound- families’ livelihoods. Most of the der guards exchanged fire, lead- 24 aries in the Ferghana Valley conflicts in the region are caused ing to casualties. during the early 1990s kept bor- by competition over access to— der controls to a minimum. As and distribution of—two major The situation is exacerbated by 21 the political and economic trajec- resources: water and land. As additional problems, including tories of these countries began to such, the highest number of con- the degradation of pastures, the diverge, however, differentiated flicts and incidents often occur outbreak of epidemics among border policies started to emerge. during spring and fall, the former livestock, livestock theft, and The period between 1998 and period being when economic ac- the destruction of cultivated 2000, in particular, was consid- tivities and cross-border interac- land when livestock are herded 25 ered a border crisis: religious ex- tions of local communities at the through it. In 2013, the Kyr- tremists bombed Tashkent, and borderland begin and the latter gyzstani side reported the loss in 1999 the Islamic Movement of being when the agricultural sea- of 5-10 percent of its livestock Uzbekistan (IMU) invaded south- son is in full swing. while herding its cattle through ern Kyrgyzstan and neighboring Vorukh. The Tajikistani authori- regions in Tajikistan, prompting Ferghana Valley agriculture plays ties denied such claims, counter- tightened border controls.17 Yet an important role in the econo- ing with the contention that 150 it was Uzbekistan that took the mies of its constituent states. The of their own livestock had been

CAP Fellows Paper 202 4 stolen by the Kyrgyzstanis, and people, governed by a strong Overview of Current Policies also charging the Kyrgyzstani president and standing up to the and Effects of Border Mili- side with having damaged culti- insidious threats posed by its tarization vated land and crops during the neighbors.”31 Clashes between cattle crossings.26 Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh and its One of the major issues in post-in- environs in June 2010 brought dependence Ferghana Valley is Access to and distribution of wa- the issue of ethnicity to the fore. what replaces the older order of ter resources is yet another major Scholars argued variously that Soviet trans-border commonali- cause of cross-border conflicts. ethnic discord provoked the ty and interdependence, and how Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the events,32 that ethnic communities this order can sustain cross-bor- region’s major suppliers of water, mobilized in response to political der peace. States increase border a resource central to the econom- uncertainty,33 and that the events security and militarize the border ic development of the Valley.27 were the result of growing alien- in the name of nation-formation The Syr Darya, which originates ation between the Uzbek and and state-building without taking in Kyrgyzstan, is one of the major Kyrgyz communities, “which over into account the effects that these rivers serving the Aral Sea basin time developed a mutual antipa- policies have on ordinary people and is the key water source for the thy, and lacked a shared vision of at the borders. The current policy valley. Less than 15 percent of the the future.”34 approach taken by the authorities water of the Syr Darya is allocat- in the three countries in fact secu- ed to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan This is not to argue that ethnicity ritizes normal, genuine, everyday between them, while Uzbekistan per se drives conflict. Rather, eth- interactions and negotiations be- alone receives more than 50 per- nicity is politicized by politicians’ tween ordinary people. The mili- cent.28 During the Soviet period, nationalist rhetoric, the border tarization of borders results in in- the countries in the Valley shared regime, and the availability and creased tension, frustration, and in a highly integrated network of allocation of resources. For bor- resentment between the states large irrigation canals, water res- der communities, disputes are and ordinary people in border ervoirs, and other infrastructure. not purely “ethnic,” but griev- communities. It has a negative ef- With independence, by contrast, ances and accusations can easily fect on familiar economic practic- border communities have wit- be assigned to an ethnic group; es, personal relations and trans- nessed numerous low-level dis- “communities [come] to more port routes. This section looks at putes over access to water.29 readily affiliate with their ethnic some of Kyrgyzstan’s key policies groups and tend to stereotype the on border issues and peacebuild- Growing Nationalism opponent in increasingly ethnic ing, as well as discussing the ef- terms.”35 As a result, all the so- fects of border militarization on The Ferghana Valley has always cio-economic factors that cause grassroots interactions. been treated as a zone of social border incidents and conflicts diversity, pluralism and multiple feed the existing inter-ethnic ten- Current State Policies on identities coexisting side by side, sions in the valley. It is often the Border Issues and Peace- but today inhabitants of the three case that border conflict over the building states are oriented toward three use of water between Kyrgyz- and different—and distant—capital Tajik-identified villages, such as A number of major policy doc- centers.30 The countries’ politi- Ak-Sai and Vorukh, cause clash- uments recognize border and cal elites take every opportunity es between young men mobilized peacebuilding issues as key se- to bolster nationalism and em- along ethnic lines.36 In the long curity challenges. The National phasize ethnicity. Tashkent, for term, ethnic divisions associated Security Concept of the Kyrgyz example, in support of its border with border conflicts only rein- Republic38 highlights the poten- militarization, portrayed Uzbeki- force negative stereotypes and tial occurrence of inter-ethnic stan as “a united and prosperous cause the hardening of ethnic and conflicts, the existence of com- historic homeland of the Uzbek national identities.37 peting claims regarding borders

CAP Fellows Paper 202 5 and the use of water resources, Policies on Border Management zens’ residency in border areas; and the lack of border delimita- and introducing a ban on the sale tion with neighboring countries. There are a number of specific of land plots, houses, and other In response to border and peace- policies aimed at managing bor- objects located in border areas of building issues, the state seems der and related issues. In 2012, Kyrgyzstan to foreign individuals to offer various approaches: se- Kyrgyzstan developed its Nation- and legal entities, as well as state- curitization of borders, inter-eth- al Strategy for the Creation and less persons. nic unity and conflict prevention, Implementation of the Integrated and economic development of State Border Management Sys- Furthermore, special state struc- border territories. Several poli- tem for the period up to 2022,40 tures and commissions were cies also mention the importance identifying key challenges to bor- formed to work specifically on the of natural resource management der security, such as incomplete issue of border delimitation and and simplifying border crossings delimitation and demarcation of demarcation. The Department on for people, goods and services. borders and the exacerbation of Border Delimitation and Devel- water and energy problems in the opment of Border Territories un- The National Sustainable Devel- region. The Action Plan for this der the Government Office of the opment Strategy of the Kyrgyz Strategy calls for improving bor- Kyrgyz Republic43 coordinates Republic 2013–2017,39 the coun- der delimitation and demarca- the work of the relevant minis- try’s five-year development plan, tion; simplifying procedures for tries and state agencies, includ- highlights: transporting persons and goods ing the Interstate Commission across the border; developing on Border Delimitation and De- • Securitization of the borders, inter-state agreements on com- marcation. The Department also including completion of legal mon usage of summer pastures collects information on border delimitation of the national and territories used for animal issues, produces analysis, and or- borders with neighboring states crossings; and a list of other secu- ganizes expert groups to support and treating borders as an ritized action steps, such as build- the commission’s work. In addi- important element of “national ing a new border checkpoint. tion, a government commission security” and “protection from on border issues was formed to various destructive forces”; In addition, the Law on Confer- coordinate the work of state del- • Economic development of ring Special Status On Separate egations on the delimitation and border areas—the need to “create Frontier Territories of the Kyr- demarcation of state borders be- favorable conditions for the free gyz Republic and their Develop- tween the Kyrgyz Republic and movement of goods, services ment41 prioritizes the security neighboring states, as well as set- and labor” and “stimulate and socio-economic development tle border, water, and land issues economic development of border of border territories and calls for with Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors. The territories”; and the rational use of natural re- interstate commission on border • Promoting peacebuilding— sources in border areas. Based on delimitation and demarcation, it calls for “unity of the nation this Law, Kyrgyzstan developed for its part, was established to as a prerequisite for preserving the State Program on Security produce normative instructions statehood and successful and Socio-Economic Develop- on border demarcation, organize development,” “fighting ethnic ment of Certain Border Areas of inter-state meetings, delimit the intolerance,” and the “creation the Kyrgyz Republic with Special border, form and manage work- of a system of conflict prevention Status for 2013–2016 and Action ing groups on border demarca- with the involvement of state Plan,42 which calls for strength- tion, and submit protocols on agencies, local government ening control over illegal move- agreed borders and maps for ap- and civil society through the ment and grazing of animals from proval. establishment of consultative and neighboring states on the territo- advisory bodies.” ry of Kyrgyzstan; tightening the regime governing foreign citi-

CAP Fellows Paper 202 6 Peacebuilding Policies Peacebuilding Plan is currently Militarization of Borders being developed. and its Effects on Grassroots In addition to state policies on Interactions border issues, Kyrgyzstan also Overall, the current state policies has specific policies on peace- on border and peacebuilding is- The militarization of borders building. The Concept of Nation- sues are directed, by and large, has an enormous effect on daily al Unity and Inter-Ethnic Rela- toward greater securitization of life and cross-border interaction tions in the Kyrgyz Republic44 the borders. They call for more for many people in the Fergha- references border, land and water border posts, better security, na Valley. Since the establish- issues in the border areas and strengthening control over cross- ment of the new border regime, their effects on inter-ethnic rela- ings, tightening the residency communities have experienced a tions, highlighting the need for regime, etc. While securitizing constant “sense of danger” while the state to develop and adopt a the border is justified and nec- crossing the border, as the rules special program on the socio-eco- essary for any state, the question of engagement between officials nomic development of border is how this securitization is done and civilians remain uncertain territories. The Concept also calls and whether its effects on people and depend on unequal relations for establishing an effective ear- at the borders are considered. of power. Border officials often ly-warning system for conflicts While current policies identify use common areas on the bor- with a potential ethnic dimen- and address key strategic areas— der to generate revenues from 46 sion, and encourages the involve- such as socio-economic develop- the people crossing the border. ment of all social groups, public ment of the border territories, As a villager from Ak-Sai (on the organizations, ethno-cultural inter-ethnic unity and tolerance, Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border) unions, religious organizations, natural resource management, observed, “[The government] and territorial and social groups and the simplification of border started putting up all sorts of in the process of harmonizing in- crossings—they generally remain posts—customs posts and border ter-ethnic relations. broad and lack specific strategies. posts—and all those stop people The current policy approach, from living [vse meshaiut liu- 47 Following the June 2010 in- with its limited number of de- diam zhit’]…” ter-ethnic violence in southern tailed plans for achieving the an- Kyrgyzstan, the government re- nounced strategic outcomes, fails The militarization of borders quested that the UN respond with to recognize the important role has also meant enforcement of a plan to promote peace and trust that border dwellers could play in the border regime at community in the country. As a result, the peacebuilding outcomes, there- level. A Kyrgyzstani Uzbek esti- Peacebuilding Priorities Plan45 by limiting these communities’ mates, for instance, that Uzbeki- was developed by UN agencies, participation in decision-making stan demolished some 250 homes approved by the special Joint and grassroots peacebuilding. on the Uzbekistani side of Dostuk Steering Committee of the Kyrgyz Not only do current state policies (on the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Republic, and financed by the UN need further elaboration, but they border) in 2007, giving land and Peacebuilding Fund to the tune of also need to be revisited, as state small monetary compensation US$15 million. One of the Plan’s policies aimed at enforcing secu- to those who had to find a new key priorities is the reduction of ritized borders often negatively place to live. Despite some pop- local-level tensions through the affect people living around the ular resistance, the state—repre- promotion of dialogue between borders. They create obstacles to senting authority and order—was local authorities and the local continuing usual interactions and ultimately able to enforce its will. population on natural resource collaborations, and at times even Likewise, in 2010, Chek, another management. The relevant UN cause violence at the individual, village on the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyz- agencies had completed the im- family, or communal level. stan border, found itself facing up plementation of the specified to the state’s enforcement of the projects as of 2016; a second border regime. Owing to a border

CAP Fellows Paper 202 7 delimitation agreement between ghana Valley, which represents Some local communities were the authorities of the two coun- the most densely populated po- able to resist the enforcement of tries, a “wire border” was put on tential market in the region. border militarization. Residents the land where bulldozers had de- Small-scale trade is especially key of the Uzbek village of Sharhabad, molished houses.48 Communities, for neighboring regions of Kyr- a border community located with- families, and livelihoods were di- gyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbeki- in the Soh enclave in Kyrgyzstan, vided. stan, where it sustains thousands prevented Kyrgyz guards from es- of people.53 Experts argue that tablishing a mobile checkpoint in Since Uzbekistan introduced a there is local demand for deeper 2003.60 Initially, the post was re- visa regime for citizens of Tajik- economic cooperation,54 some- moved only temporarily, but the istan, Tajikistani students travel- thing that cannot be developed locals continued to express their ing from Khujand (in Tajikistan) without “economic and human opposition. Negotiations with to Osh (in Kyrgyzstan) require bridges between constituent na- state officials took place, angry visas to pass through the Sokh tional zones of the Valley.”55 crowds threw stones at the bor- enclave, which is administered der guards, and the checkpoint by Uzbekistan. As such, students The militarized border regime was ultimately removed. prefer to take the longer, rocky, has also affected the cultural and uncomfortable back road links between trans-boundary Other border dwellers have found than experience delays, face hu- family networks.56 To take the creative ways to resist the new miliation, and give bribes while example of Chek village, which rules imposed by border regimes crossing the border without vi- is situated between the Jalala- and overcome the challenges sas.49 Sevara, a student, explained bad and Andijon regions on the posed. In Chek village, when the how the militarization of borders Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border, Uzbek authorities prohibited affected her experience of -driv marriage with someone from border crossings by car, the lo- ing from Khujand to Osh for her the other side of the border was cal population used donkey carts, studies.50 She complained that common for generations.57 Some parked their cars on one side of whereas before 1997 she took one border villages had family mem- the border and walked the re- bus and spent eight hours on the bers in both countries and with maining distance, or built tempo- road, since 2000—with the new mixed citizenships; at different rary bridges and passes.61 Report- border posts and changes to the points in their lives, residents edly, local communities know visa regime—it takes her thirteen lived and worked on both sides every checkpoint and unofficial hours on five different buses. of the border.58 Often, however, route, allowing them to maximize people were unable to visit each their profits as traders or their ef- The militarization of borders has other or attend funerals and mar- ficiency as travelers, whether by also meant a sharp reduction in riages across the border. An eth- cutting wires or bribing border cross-border transit and trade, nically Tajik man, who was born officials. That said, border dwell- creating inconveniences and eco- and lived in a Tajik-majority vil- ers seek to continue their usu- nomic hardships for the area’s lage in the Uzbek SSR but moved al interaction and cooperation inhabitants.51 According to an In- to Dushanbe, to study and work, across borders; as such, they tend ternational Crisis Group report, always wanted to be buried in his to resist or avoid the securitized since independence and new re- ancestral land. After his death, a regime rather than attempting to strictions at the borders, the vol- group of his relatives carried the exploit it to their advantage. ume of trade has decreased, as corpse along the 120-mile road, the local population has found but the guards did not allow them Cross-Border Interactions itself harassed and humiliated by to enter Uzbekistan.59 From a le- at the Grassroots Level That border guards at customs posts.52 gal standpoint, this was simple Sustain Peace Throughout the centuries, trade adherence to the law, but cultur- has been vital to the prosperity ally it was unacceptable. Cross-border interaction between and economic security of the Fer- community members is unavoid-

CAP Fellows Paper 202 8 able. Border dwellers cope with are complicated. For example, still cross the borders informally the effects of securitization and Uzbek authorities from Andijon to carry out maintenance work on find ways to continue their every- province report that cross-bor- water facilities. They avoid cross- day interaction at the grassroots der maintenance with Kyrgyzstan ing the border at official border level through formal and infor- would require a joint agreement posts, where they would be ar- mal practices. This cooperation on the need for maintenance, de- rested by border guards.66 There is meaningful and productive for tails of all persons and vehicles to are also examples of informal ar- people living in the borderlands, cross the border, and a number of rangements regarding water dis- as it meets their everyday needs official letters requesting permis- tribution. Tajikistan and Kyrgyz- and sustains their lives. Most im- sion from different Kyrgyzstani stan signed an agreement on the portantly, this cooperation has authorities, not to mention com- issue in the 1980s, but Wegerich secondary benefits that are con- pliance with the more stringent et al. indicated that it had still not ducive to building trust between regulations imposed by Uzbeki- been implemented as of 2009.67 cross-border communities, there- stan.63 Nevertheless, water officials in by facilitating and sustaining the cross-border provinces dis- peace on the ground. Examples Cross-border water management cuss water distribution from of cross-border cooperation are is even more complicated when common sources over the phone evident in two major areas: re- it comes to regulating conflicts every week.68 There are also still source-based interaction, such as related to border dwellers’ com- cases where pump stations and water, irrigation canals, and pas- parative access to—and share other water management infra- turelands; and economic activi- of—water. Water management structure are located in one coun- ties at the border, such as trade. policies across the border focus try but are the property of anoth- on technical matters and lack er. Resource-Based Cross-Bor- guidance on conflict manage- der Interactions ment and resolution. A review of Another example of cooperation treaties covering 123 small trans- between cross-border communi- Water and Irrigation Canals boundary tributaries in the Syr ties relates to the common use of Darya Basin concluded, among water. The Isfara River, for exam- Cross-border water management other findings, that most of these ple, divides and unites communi- is rather complicated as Kyrgyz- treaties were narrowly focused on ties on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border.69 stan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan “hard,” or technical, issues such Myrza-Patcha village, located in have taken somewhat different as water allocation (98 treaties) the administrative district of the approaches to the issue. Kyrgyz- or operation and maintenance city of Isfana (in Batken region, stan was the first in the region (15 treaties) rather than “soft” or Kyrgyzstan), is not included into to establish Water User Associa- peripheral issues such as conflict the hydrographic zone admin- tions for the operation and main- resolution mechanisms.64 istered by the city Water User tenance of irrigation systems at Association and instead relies the local level in a more decen- Yet there are examples of com- on water from the Isfana River. tralized manner. Tajikistan also munity-based water management This river is also the major source established Water User Associa- practices at the border. Indeed, of water for people living in the tions, but under the authority of some argue that cooperation on Navruz mahallah (neighbor- State Water Institutions. Howev- water issues occurs more at dis- hood) of neighboring Korgoncho er, due to different institutional trict and provincial level than it village, Tajikistan. The Isfara Riv- models, the two states have yet to does at national level.65 Wegerich er does not have any water intake harmonize their approach to wa- et al. discuss the case of Syrdarya- structures; in the event of a mud- ter management.62 In addition, Sokh Basin Irrigation System Ad- slide, residents of both cross-bor- administrative procedures on ministration, noting that despite der communities organize ashar issues like cross-border mainte- the securitization of the Uzbeki- (collective labor) and clean the nance of irrigation infrastructure stan-Kyrgyzstan border, workers

CAP Fellows Paper 202 9 river bed communally. Kyrgyzstan.72 With the collapse of eral agreement on pasture lease the Soviet Union and the adop- has been pending since 2008.77 Cross-border communities also tion of various policies by the This leaves Tajikistani farmers cooperate when it comes to main- Central Asian states, joint pasture in a state of uncertainty and the taining shared irrigation canals, use became a challenge. Kyrgyzstani government without which often start in one country the economic benefits to be had and end in another. The canal in A new Law on Pastures in Kyr- from renting out pastures. Samarkandek village (in the Bat- gyzstan advanced the develop- ken region) channels its water ment of decentralized and com- In response to the legal grid- downstream to villages across munity-based management of lock and in light of their mutual the border in Tajikistan. Local agro-pastoral resources with pas- needs, cross-border communities residents from the two coun- ture users’ associations.73 Howev- continue their historical interac- tries share this canal and rely on er, community-level participation tion and cooperation on common its water. In spring, landslides has not yet matured: the local pasture use via informal mecha- regularly trap the water in Sa- population does not represent nisms. There are different levels markandek and impede it from their interests through formally of established cooperation: in- flowing downstream. When this established democratic mecha- formal arrangements on the use happens, border communities nisms, and sees the pasture users’ of pastures are made between cooperate to address the common associations as agencies that con- shepherds, between the relevant problem.70 trol the use of resources, impose pasture committees on both sides taxes, and exclude some people of the border, or between Kyrgyz- Finally, local dwellers cooperate from decision-making.74 In Ta- stani and Tajikistani heads of vil- across borders over the use of the jikistan, meanwhile, pastures are lages or local governments.78 This community canal system. In her not recognized as a distinct land trans-border practice is visible anthropological studies, Reeves type; land tenure falls under the today between Soghd and Bat- highlights the importance of the management of local authorities ken: livestock owned by Soghd canal system and its flaws as a and Local State Forest Manage- shepherds is grazed in Kyrgyz- marker of social relationships at ment Enterprises, with an option stan for a service fee.79 Another the borders.71 The so-called aryk for herders to hold a rent agree- example is the case of Chorkuh (ditch) network is a communi- ment with the government or village in Tajikistan, which does ty-based means of regulating wa- inherit user rights.75 As a result, not have its own pastures, com- ter flow and its distribution be- states employ different mecha- pelling Tajikistani famers to graze tween upstream and downstream nisms of power distribution be- their livestock in the Karavshin communities. For instance, a tween national and local author- and Kashambish pastures in Kyr- villager from Gaz, in Kyrgyzstan, ities and assign different roles in gyzstan.80 To avoid dealing with knows that he/she drinks the the pasture management process border guards, livestock is some- same water as an inhabitant of the to community residents or mem- times also taken to Kyrgyzstani downstream village of Hushiar, bers of the pasture committee. pastures through the gardens on across the border in Uzbekistan. the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan bor- All this resource-based interde- According to the Land Code of the der.81 Some residents of border pendence maintains cooperation Kyrgyz Republic, foreigners can- communities claim that livestock between cross-border communi- not legally acquire land plots.76 from Tajikistan is grazed infor- ty members. All pasturelands belong to the mally on Kyrgyzstani pastures as Kyrgyz Republic and renting out though it were livestock raised in Pastures land is illegal. For Tajik herders Kyrgyzstan.82 to be able to use Kyrgyz pastures, During the Soviet era, it was cus- both governments need to sign an A similar example of coopera- tomary for livestock from Tajiki- inter-state agreement on leasing tion on joint pastures use can be stan to graze in the mountains of pasturelands. An important bilat-

CAP Fellows Paper 202 10 found between residents of Myr- underdevelopment of road net- There are several similar informal za-Patcha village in Kyrgyzstan works. These markets are a source crossing points at different points and the Navruz mahallah (neigh- of income and (at times) the only along the border in the Ferghana borhood) in Tajikistan.83 Resi- way to sustain their lives.85 Per- Valley; some of them even have dents of the Tajikistani village haps unsurprisingly, then, trad- names. The bottom line is, as Mo- do not have pastures attached to ers are among the most interest- hammed noted, that both traders their territory, hence they graze ed parties in maintaining peace and border officials are interest- their cattle in the pastures of after the conflicts in the Fergha- ed in maintaining harmony. In Myrza-Patcha. It is not entire- na Valley.86 The scale of informal a legal sense, this practice is in- ly clear who on the Kyrgyzstani trade and crossings demonstrates formal, yet it is ethically justified side creates grazing opportuni- a high degree of cooperation and because it sustains families and ties for Tajikistani shepherds and the need for a more porous border officials at the border. receives payment for this. People regime in the Ferghana Valley. in the communities are aware Local traders avoid customs du- Megoran relates another story of that this is informal but recognize ties and customs fees and choose an informal border crossing with the need and see it as a common illegal trade opportunities. goods to trade, this one from Chek practice between border dwellers. village on the Kyrgyzstan-Uz- In addition, since it is more con- Trade bekistan border. One family al- venient to water the livestock on lows traders and smugglers to the Tajikistani side of the border, Local border communities find pass through their yard in order it is informally agreed that this ways around borders as they to bypass the official crossing occurs there. These informal joint trade for a living. Reeves recounts point nearby. A Kyrgyzstani cus- arrangements are often discussed the case of Mohammed, an ethnic toms officer once took Megoran in the mosque located in Myr- Kyrgyz and a resident of Uzbeki- to this yard to drink and eat with za-Patcha, which is attended by stan, who works in Batken’s small Uzbekistani customs and border individuals from both countries. daily market.87 He buys up to 300 officers. He observed how border As one resident of Kyrgyzstan kg (660 lbs) of goods—including officials peacefully “cooperated” explained, “Elders from Navruz chocolates, white sugar, sweets, with that family and those who come to us asking for permis- macaroni, oil and tea, among oth- passed through during that time, sion for their cows to graze with er items—in the Ferghana city ba- shaking their hands and receiving ours.”84 zaar in Uzbekistan and sells them a fee. This prompted Megoran to in this local bazaar in Kyrgyzstan. ask whether this should be con- Economic Activities The crossing usually takes place sidered corruption, resistance on via chernyi vkhod (an informal the part of the local population, While the problems of develop- parallel crossing point), where a lack of patriotism on the part ing economies are acute—be they commodities are handed over of those state officials who take weak governance and corrup- through a house located right on bribes, or cooperation based on tion, shadow economy activities, the border, while the trader goes “contextual moral judgments or the drug trade—and need to through the official border cross- about what is the norm, and what be addressed via different mea- ing, giving the customs officers movements it is reasonable to fa- sures, informal economic activ- a cigarette or two as he passes cilitate, albeit illegally.”88 ities between ordinary people in in order to maintain friendly re- Similarly, border dwellers use border communities are small- lations with them, then meets other innovative informal border scale and of a different nature. his goods on the other side. The crossings, such as water canals For cross-border traders and homeowner who allows commer- on the border, to transport their agricultural producers, markets cial goods to go through his house goods for trade. Uzbekistani res- across the border are often the also collects a fee, and many say idents often go to the Kara-Suu only place to buy and sell goods that customs officers and border bazaar in Kyrgyzstan to buy food, in their remote areas, given the guards receive part of that fee.

CAP Fellows Paper 202 11 commodities, and clothing. Ka- Apricot Production people cooperate, which facili- ra-Suu, where the market is lo- tate peace. On the whole, border cated, is not only one of the larger Not only do border dwellers trade dwellers cooperate to respond to commercial areas in the Fergha- across the borders, but they also their everyday needs, such as ac- na Valley, but was also histori- cooperate and rely on each oth- cess to water or the need for a free cally a major trading point on the er, as in the case of apricot pro- flow of people, goods, and services Silk Road. The market is made duction, processing, and export. across the borders. This enables up of thousands of stallholders Batken region is known for its them to get on with their daily and brings together traders from apricot gardens and farming. A lives despite government-lev- across the region, local produce, number of Kyrgyz families in this el securitization. Often, border and Chinese imports. Back in border area grow apricots. Ta- dwellers cooperate because their 2003, a “bridge of friendship” jiks, on the other hand, engage in needs are interdependent: they across the Shahrihan-san canal in apricot processing and distribute use the same water sources, share Kara-Suu on the Kyrgyzstan-Uz- the fruit to foreign markets. It is infrastructure, or are mutually bekistan border was dismantled, common for Tajiks to buy ripe benefited by joint use of pastures. threatening many communities apricots from Kyrgyz farmers; This day-to-day, need-based, and that were dependent on it for at times, they even unofficial- often interdependent cooperation their livelihoods. In response, an ly “rent” Kyrgyz lands to grow at and across borders has second- ethnic Uzbek living on the Kyr- apricots.91 Sometimes they sell it ary benefits that are conducive to gyzstan bank of the canal offers as “Kyrgyz-grown” produce and building trust between communi- an “inflatable tire-ferry” across smuggle it back through Kyrgyz- ty members, improving relation- the 12-meter (40-ft) wide canal, stan to markets in Kazakhstan ships, and building cross-border transporting goods and around and Russia. networks, thereby facilitating and 100 people per day.89 sustaining peace on the ground. A similar story of cooperation in Megoran also provides an exam- the apricot business is described Conclusion ple of small-scale trade through by Reeves, who introduces us to an unofficial border crossing on Kanysh-Ai, an apricot-grower in In this paper, I demonstrate how an unmarked border between Gaz village, Upper Sokh Valley, existing examples of cross-border Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.90 El- Kyrgyzstan.92 For Kanysh-Ai, cooperation facilitate and sustain mira, a resident of a bordering as for many others in the Sokh peace at the grassroots level. De- village in Batken region, regularly Valley, apricots are the primary spite militarization of the borders goes to the Tajikistani side to pur- source of domestic income. Once and securitization of commu- chase cheap household goods to the apricots are washed, dried nity interactions, border dwell- sell in the market on the Kyrgyz- for a couple of days, and sorted, ers find ways to continue their stani side. There are many people Tajiks, who often dominate the usual grassroots practices and who, like Elmira, smuggle small commercial apricot market, come cooperate in both formal and in- amounts of produce and goods from the district center of Isfara formal ways. This cooperation is across the border while avoiding to purchase the fruit. Uzbeks, in evident in the examples of water the customs regime. Numerous turn, travel to the border bazaar management and maintenance other cases of illegal smuggling in Hushiar to buy the apricot pits, of shared irrigation structures, by small-scale traders have been which they fry and salt to sell at grazing practices for the cattle observed in the Dostuk area near the local market. and joint pasture use, and small- Osh on the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbeki- scale trade and border crossings stan border: men on bicycles To summarize, beneath this through informal border posts. It smuggling salt from Uzbekistan grassroots-level cooperation—be is through these collaborative ef- to Kyrgyzstan, or women smug- it over water and irrigation, pas- forts that local actors build trust gling aluminum. tures, trade, or apricot produc- at and across borders, which, tion—lie common reasons why

CAP Fellows Paper 202 12 of shared irrigation structures, problems surrounding an issue itate border crossings for people, grazing practices for the cattle should be integrated into the goods and services; and promot- and joint pasture use, and small- eventual practices and policies. ing participatory decision-mak- scale trade and border crossings This should inform local practic- ing at the grassroots level. These through informal border posts. It es and policies, which should in recommendations aim to inform is through these collaborative ef- turn complement regional and relevant state actors at the na- forts that local actors build trust national frameworks, with the tional and local levels, as well as at and across borders, which, ultimate aim of being reflected at the donor community and devel- in turn, is conducive to building the inter-governmental level. opment actors. peace. This is not to romanticize and justify informal practices, but Unfortunately, there is always the 1. Scaling up examples of coop- rather to highlight the challeng- potential for violent conflict due eration es that border communities face to major drivers of current border on a daily basis when the border incidents. In order to limit this as Ø Conduct field research in the works not for the people but for much as possible, existing peace- Ferghana Valley to iden- the state. Thus, the current poli- building approaches must be re- tify and analyze cases of cy approach to border issues and visited. Most importantly, the cross-border cooperation peacebuilding taken by the states existing potential of grassroots Ø Design evidence-based pro- in the Ferghana Valley should be solutions must be tapped. The na- grams; invest in piloting and revisited. ture of cross-border tensions and scaling up positive examples incidents and the inevitability of of cooperation There is an evident need for the interaction between community states to move toward greater members in the Ferghana Val- 2. Simplifying border crossings interdependence and policy ap- ley provide the most compelling for people, goods and ser- proaches that balance border se- argument for border dwellers’ vices curity with the needs of people participation in peacebuilding living in border areas. There is efforts. Peace can be sustained Ø Collect data and evidence a substantial mismatch between when grassroots actors contin- on the challenges the border what the state enforces on bor- ue cross-border cooperation and regime presents to border der management and peacebuild- when borders are made for the communities ing efforts and what community benefit of citizens, families, and Ø Draft a strategy on a special members living in cross-border communities across the borders. regime for border commu- areas want (and strive to accom- nities in order to ease the plish). Certainly, the solution lies Recommendations crossing of people, goods and in recognizing the importance of services people living in the border re- This policy paper argues that gions, their needs and interests. peacebuilding in the border areas 3. Engaging border communi- This will not be possible without of the Ferghana Valley should be ties in decision-making strengthening overall good gov- sustained through a comprehen- ernance practices and improving sive, people-centric approach— Ø Include representatives of linkages between states and citi- not only by the state, but at sub- cross-border communities in zens. state level, with participation by the existing decision-making local actors and communities in structures (eg. a Working The efforts of all stakeholders the borderlands and investment Group on the Inter-State should begin at the grassroots in their needs. The policy recom- Committee on Border Delim- level, in a cooperative and partici- mendations are three-fold and itation and Demarcation) patory manner. Decision-making essentially promote multiplying Ø Develop mechanisms for should engage all relevant stake- the effects of existing coopera- public participation on bor holders; feedback on the major tion; taking initial steps to facil-

CAP Fellows Paper 202 13 der and peacebuilding issues at ment. 19 Ibid; Abashin et al., “Soviet the local government level 11 Borthakur, “An Analysis of the Rule.” Conflict,” 338. 20 Megoran, “Rethinking the Notes 12 Christine Bichsel, Conflict Study,” 464-481. Transformation in Central Asia: 21 Ibid. 1 Frederick Starr, ed., Ferghana Irrigation Disputes in the Fer- 22 Matveeva, “Divided We Fall;” Valley: The Heart of Central ghana Valley (New York: Rout- Kholiqi and Rahimov, “Disput- Asia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, ledge, 2009), 113. able Territories;” Borthakur, “An 2011), ix. 13 Matveeva, “Divided We Fall,” Analysis of the Conflict.” 2 Anchita Borthakur, “An Analysis 10 23 Zokirov and Umarov, “Eco- of the Conflict in the Ferghana 14 Abdulkhaloq Kholigi and Nabi- nomic Development in the Fer- Valley,” Asian Affairs 48, no. 2 jon Rahimov, “Disputable Terri- ghana Valley,” 232. (2017): 335. tories as Hotbeds of Tension on 24 Christine Bichsel, Kholna- 3 Sergey Abashin, Kamoludin Ab- the Border: Political Problems of zar Mukhabbatov, and Lenzi dullaev, Ravshan Abdullaev, and International Relations; Glob- Sherfedinov, “Land, Water, and Arslan Koichiev, “Soviet Rule al and Regional Development” Ecology,” in Ferghana Valley: and the Delineation of Borders in (2015), 188-96, http://bit. The Heart of Central Asia, ed. the Ferghana Valley, 1917–1930,” ly/2Drpte8. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: in Ferghana Valley: The Heart 15 Alisher Kurmanov, chairman M.E. Sharpe, 2011), 255. of Central Asia, ed. Frederick of the Senate of the Oliy Majlis of 25 The Editors, “Mutual Distrust Starr (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, the Republic of Uzbekistan, stat- Feeds Tensions on Kyrgyz- 2011), 94-118. ed as much in his speech at the stan-Uzbekistan Border,” World 4 Ibid. CACI/AFPC Forum on Capitol Politics Review, April 6, 2016, 5 Anara Tabyshalieva, “Central Hill, “Uzbekistan in Transition: accessed October 20, 2017, Asia: Imaginary and Real Bor- Action Strategy for Reforms,” http://bit.ly/2mHnWsV. ders,” The Central Asia–Cauca- Washington, DC, October 17, 26Asel Murzakulova and Irene sus Analyst (2001), http://bit. 2017. Mestre, “Natural Resource Man- ly/2rqpTQo. 16 “Atambaev podpishet solidnyi agement Dynamics in Border 6 Baktybek Beshimov, Pulat paket dokumentov vo vremia Communities of Kyrgyzstan and Shozimov, and Murat Bakhady- vizita v Uzbekistan,” K-News, Tajikistan,” Mountain Societies rov, “A New Phase in the History October 5, 2017, accessed Octo- Research Institute, University of of the Ferghana Valley, 1992– ber 25, 2017, http://bit.ly/2B- Central Asia, April 2016, http:// 2008,” in Ferghana Valley: The jzuIv. bit.ly/2n0U9wJ. Heart of Central Asia, ed. Fred- 17 Nick Megoran, “Rethinking the 27 Matveeva, “Divided We Fall,” erick Starr (Armonk, NY: M.E. Study of International Bound- 10 Sharpe, 2011), 224. aries: A Biography of the Kyr- 28 International Crisis Group, 7 Anna Matveeva, “Divided We gyzstan-Uzbekistan Boundary,” “Central Asia: Border Disputes Fall…Or Rise? Tajikistan-Kyr- Annals of the Association of and Conflict Potential,” ICG gyzstan Border Dilemma,” American Geographers 102, no. Asia Report 33 (2002), accessed Cambridge Journal of Eurasian 2 (2012): 464-81, doi:10.1080/0 October 20, 2017, http://bit. Studies (2017): 10, http://bit. 0045608.2011.595969. ly/2n0n1Eo. ly/2n03vIe. 18 Sayidfozil Zokirov and Kho- 29 Bichsel, Conflict Transforma- 8 Data from the Kyrgyzstan Bor- jamahmad Umarov, “Economic tion, 21. der Troops Information Depart- Development in the Ferghana 30 International Crisis Group, ment. Valley Since 1991,” in Ferghana “Central Asia: Border Disputes 9 Matveeva, “Divided We Fall,” Valley: The Heart of Central and Conflict Potential.” 10 Asia, ed. Frederick Starr (Ar- 31 Starr, Ferghana Valley, 395. 10 Data from the Kyrgyzstan Bor- monk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2011), 32 Megoran, “Rethinking the der Troops Information Depart- 239.

CAP Fellows Paper 202 14 Study,” 464-481 opment of Border Territories 60 Reeves, Border Work. 33 Scott Radnitz, “Competing under the Government Office of 61 Megoran, Nationalism in Cen- Narratives and Violence in the Kyrgyz Republic. tral Asia, 168. Southern Kyrgyzstan,” Kyrgyz- 45 Concept of Strengthening 62 Ibid, 164. stan Recovery and Reformation Unity of People and Inter-Ethnic 63 Murzakulova and Mestre, Policy Perspectives, PONARS Relations in the Kyrgyz Republic, “Natural Resource Manage- Eurasia Policy Memo (2010), 2013. ment.” http://bit.ly/2n1RhPr. 46 Peacebuilding Priorities Plan 64 Kai Wegerich, Jusipbek Ka- 34 Erica Marat, “Nations in Tran- for the Kyrgyz Republic. zbekov, Firdavs Kabilov, and sit 2011: Kyrgyzstan,” Freedom 47 Reeves, Border Work, 141-172. Nozilakhon Mukhamedova, House, http://bit.ly/2n0lhuZ. 48 Reeves, Border Work, 47. “Meso-Level Cooperation on 35 Anna Matveeva, Igor Savin, 49 Nick Megoran, Nationalism Transboundary Tributaries and and Bahrom Faizullaev, “Kyr- in Central Asia (Pittsburgh, PA: Infrastructure in the Ferghana gyzstan: Tragedy in the South,” University of Pittsburgh Press, Valley,” International Journal of Ethnopolitics Papers 17 (April 2017), 179. Water Resources Development 2012), http://bit.ly/2n0UFLe. 50 Reeves, Border Work, 148. 28, no. 3 (2012): 525-43, doi:10.1 36 Matveeva, “Divided We Fall.” 51 Megoran, Nationalism in Cen- 080/07900627.2012.684314. 37 Madeleine Reeves, Border tral Asia, 154. 65 Bunyod Holmatov, Jonathan Work: Spatial Lives of the State 52 Megoran, “Rethinking the Lautze, and Jusipbek Kazbekov, in Rural Central Asia (Ithaca, Study,” 464-81. “Tributary-Level Transbound- NY: Cornell University Press, 53 International Crisis Group, ary Water Law in the Syr Darya: 2014), 59. “Central Asia: Border Disputes Overlooked Stories of Practical 38 International Crisis Group, and Conflict Potential.” Water Cooperation,” Interna- “Central Asia: Border Disputes 54 World Bank, 2007. Quoted in tional Environmental Agree- and Conflict Potential.” Bartlomiej Kaminski et al., “‘As- ments: Politics, Law and Eco- 39 National Security Concept of iaregio’: An Institutional Model nomics 16 (2016): 873-907, doi: the Kyrgyz Republic, 2001. to Deepen Integration in Central 10.1007/s10784-015-9308-3. 40 National Sustainable Devel- Asia’s Border Regions,” Global 66 Stephen Lam, “Cooperation opment Strategy of the Kyrgyz Journal of Emerging Market in the Ferghana Valley Border- Republic, 2013–2017. Economies 2, no. 3 (2010): 347- lands: Habitus, Affinity, Net- 41 National Strategy for the Cre- 60. works, Conditions” (PhD diss., ation and Implementation of the 55 Bartlomiej Kaminski, Matin Kings College London, 2008), Integrated State Border Man- Kholmatov, Saumya Mitra, and http://bit.ly/2mXhmiy. agement System of the Kyrgyz Gaël Raballand, “”Asiaregio”: 67 Wegerich et al., “Meso-Level Republic for the Period up to An Institutional Model to Deep- Cooperation.” 2022 and Action Plan, 2012. en Integration in Central Asia’s 68 Wegerich et al., “Meso-Level 42 Law on Conferring Special Sta- Border Regions,” Global Journal Cooperation.” tus on Separate Frontier Territo- of Emerging Market Economies 69 Wegerich et al., “Meso-Level ries of the Kyrgyz Republic and 2, no. 3 (2010): 347-60. Cooperation.” their Development. 56 S. Frederick Starr, “Conclu- 70 Murzakulova and Mestre, 43 Action Plan for State Program sion,” in Ferghana Valley: The “Natural Resource Manage- on Security and Socio-Economic Heart of Central Asia, ed. S. ment.” Cited in Elizabeth Dusik Development of Certain Border Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: and Mayya Nurmamedova, Areas of the Kyrgyz Republic M.E. Sharpe, 2011). “Inter-State Cooperation and with Special Status for 2013– 57 Megoran, Nationalism in Cen- Joint Planning and Management 2016. tral Asia, 157. of Transboundary River Basins— 44 Statute on Department of 58 Ibid, 144. The Example of the Isfara River Border Delimitation and Devel- 59 Ibid, 157. Basin,” Policy Brief 02/2015,

CAP Fellows Paper 202 15 doi:10.2312/5.4.2015.002e. polgeo.2006.05.005. 71 Anonymous interlocutor who 83 Anonymous interlocutor who works in the development sector works in the development sector on the Kyrgyzstan side of the on the Kyrgyzstan side of the border. Phone conversation with border. Phone conversation with the author, May 2017. the author May 2017. 72 Reeves, Border Work, 107. 84 Murzakulova and Mestre, 73 Irene Mestre, Aliya Ibraimova, “Natural Resource Manage- and Bilimbek Azhibekov, “Con- ment.” flicts over Pasture Resources 85 Murzakulova and Mestre, in the Kyrgyz Republic,” CAMP “Natural Resource Manage- Alatoo Public Foundation, June ment,” 30, based on their in- 2013, https://goo.gl/LxsFU1. terview with a local resident of 74 Jyldyz Shigaeva et al., “Decen- Myrza-Patcha. tralizing Governance of Agropas- 86 Kaminski et al., “‘Asiaregio’.” toral Systems in Kyrgyzstan: An 87 Matveeva, “Divided We Fall,” Assessment of Recent Pasture 10. Reforms,” Mountain Research 88 Reeves, Border Work, 155. and Development, February 89 Megoran, Nationalism in Cen- 2016, doi:10.1659/MRD-JOUR- tral Asia, 171. NAL-D-15-00023.1 90 Reeves, Border Work. 75 Shigaeva et al., “Decentralizing 91 Megoran, “For Ethnography in Governance.” Political Geography.” 76 Murzakulova and Mestre, 92 Anonymous interlocutor who “Natural Resource Manage- works in the development sector ment.” on the Kyrgyzstan side of the 77 Bichsel, Conflict Transforma- border. Phone conversation with tion. the author, May 2017. 78 Matveeva, “Divided We Fall.” 93 Reeves, Border Work, 105-7. Cited in “Kyrgyzstan zhdet ot Tadzhikistana variant po rast- senkam i kolichestvu skota,” Avesta, May 11, 2015, http://bit. ly/2G8efwX. 79 Murzakulova and Mestre, “Natural Resource Manage- ment.” 80 Murzakulova and Mestre, “Natural Resource Manage- ment.” 81 Matveeva, “Divided We Fall,” 10. 82 Nick Megoran, “For Ethnog- raphy in Political Geography: Experiencing and Re-Imagining Ferghana Valley Boundary Clo- sures,” Political Geography 25 (2006): 622-640, doi:10.1016/j.

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