United Nations University Centre for Policy Research What Works in UN Resident Coordinator-led Conflict Prevention: Lessons from the Field June 2018

Kyrgyzstan 2010-17

Josie Lianna Kaye*

This case study is part of a broader research project, carried out by the UNU Centre for Policy Research (UNU- CPR) with the support of the UK Mission to the United Nations, on the role of UN Resident Coordinators in Conflict Prevention. The project aimed to extract lessons from case studies of Resident Coordinator-supported preventive action in nine countries (Bolivia 2000-09; Colombia 2012-16; Guinea 2009-15; Guyana 2003- 15; Kenya 2008-17; Kyrgyzstan 2010-17; Malawi, 2011-17; Nepal 2007-15; and Tunisia 2011-17). All case studies, and the resulting policy paper synthesizing lessons and findings can be accessed at cpr.unu.edu.

© 2018 United Nations University. All Rights Reserved. ISBN: 978-92-808-9089-1 Kyrgyzstan 2

Introduction clashes, despite the main task of international organizations being to react to such problems”.13 And yet, contrary to these In June 2010, Kyrgyzstan experienced its worst crisis since claims, the UN took meaningful action to respond to the its declaration of independence in 1991. What began as a escalating crisis behind the scenes in 2010, and, from 2011 fist-fight between Kyrgyz and Uzbek youth quickly escalated onwards, played an important role in preventing a recurrence into large-scale ethnic violence, which spread from Osh of conflict and in accompanying Kyrgyzstan on its pivotal to Jalalabad, Bazar-Korgon, and other towns and cities in peacebuilding initiatives. southern Kyrgyzstan.1 These initial clashes were marked by inter-ethnic confrontations, violence and killings. Fuelled On 24th November 2017, President Sooronbai Jeenbekov was by fast-spreading rumours of murders, atrocities and sexual inaugurated as Kyrgyzstan’s fifth President, marking the first violence, Kyrgyz ‘gangs’ – outraged by the killings and violence transfer of power from one democratically elected president – then descended on Uzbek neighbourhoods.2 Human to another14 – a sign of how far the country has come since Rights Watch concluded these attacks followed a consistent the tumultuous events seven years prior. This case study pattern:3 individuals in camouflage uniforms on armoured seeks to elucidate what role the UN Resident Coordinator military vehicles entered Uzbek neighbourhoods, removing (RC) specifically and UN Country Team (UNCT) more broadly the makeshift barricades that residents had erected; armed played in this transition, and what steps the RC took to help men then followed, shooting and chasing away remaining prevent the onset, escalation, continuation and/or recurrence residents, clearing the way for looters.4 Security forces either of conflict and instability in Kyrgyzstan at a period in the failed to intervene, or appeared to ‘take sides’, focusing their country’s trajectory when a collapse of the PG, for example, resources on “addressing the danger presented by Uzbeks, could have easily triggered a very different outcome. What but not by Kyrgyz.”5 Throughout 11-15 June, mass killings, strategies did the RC pursue in order to position the UNCT as rape and destruction took place in at least fourteen areas of a trusted – and long-term – partner during turbulent times? the city of Osh and in four other towns. The violence resulted in the death of at least 470 people – with around 2,244 Following a brief overview of the underlying conflict risk seriously injured6 – and the displacement of 400,000 people, factors and medium-term political dynamics, this case of whom 75,000 fled temporarily to Uzbekistan.7 study will argue that the RC played a critical role in 2010 in responding to the crisis and that, shortcomings of the UN’s The crisis took place against the backdrop of extensive apprich notwithstanding, his swift actions contributed to a political turmoil that begun earlier that year: large protests prevention of an escalation of the crisis. The RC then went against rising energy prices and elite-level corruption took on to support Kyrgyzstan in the development of a medium- place in the city of Talas in February 2010, spreading to to long-term peacebuilding approach, through access to Bishkek on April 10, where riot police fired live ammunition resources from the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) – creating entry- into the crowd, killing 86 protestors.8 Two days later, President points for addressing issues which have long been considered Bakiyev fled the capital9 and a provisional government ‘too political’ or even ‘taboo’, including the marginalisation of (PG), headed by former foreign minister, Roza Otunbayeva, minorities, relationships between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, took power. Tensions began to rise during this period of cross-border relations with Tajikistan, and preventing violent uncertainty as a result of ethnically-charged narratives, often extremism. instigated by nationalists, extremists and criminal groups. An independent investigation into the June violence – the 1. Country Context Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC), chaired by Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen10 – unequivocally tied the events in Osh to the Underlying conflict risk factors “under-representation of ethnic Uzbeks in public life and the rising force of ethno-nationalism” and the “power vacuum” A landlocked mountainous state, Kyrgyzstan gained following Bakiyev’s departure.11 Framing the violence in Osh independence after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. as “crimes against humanity”, the KIC also blamed the PG While market-based economic reforms and the semblance for having failed to foresee the violence and to develop a of inclusive politics won Kyrgyzstan relatively swift branding contingency plan to contain it.12 The report, perceived by the amongst the international community as an “island of PG as biased, was largely rejected, and Kiljunen was declared democracy”15, post-independence stability was short-lived. “persona non grata.” Indeed, rather than a single episode of conflict, the crisis in June 2010 was part of a cycle of violence and instability The KIC report inadvertently created a confrontation that had lasted more than two decades, including in Uzgen between the international community and the Government in 1990, Batken in 1999-2000, Aksy in 2002 and Jalalabad in of Kyrgyzstan at the very time when they needed to be 2005,16 often accompanied by significant political upheaval. working in concert towards the shared goals of peace and stability. Just as the UN was rallying behind the report and Under Askar Akayev’s rule as Kyrgyzstan’s first president, its recommendations, the Government used its response political elites largely subverted attempts to reform the to the KIC to underscore the fact that “it had not received political system and co-opted economic reforms. His time any assistance from the international community during the in office was characterised by endemic levels of bribery and Kyrgyzstan 3

corruption, and a progressive de-legitimization of the regime. it should be noted that Russians do not experience their Repressive politics began to dominate the political landscape minority status in the same manner as the Uzbeks. Despite in the early 2000s: when Akayev refused to step down at the efforts to unite citizens around the Kyrgyz language and other end of his second term, “prominent opposition leaders were potential symbols of national unity, such steps – especially jailed, the President’s relatives began acquiring control over post-2010 – have only served to entrench divisions, and to major media outlets, and protests intensified.”17 Kyrgyzstan’s heighten awareness of the low socio-political representation stability began to unravel when, in response to parliamentary of minorities. Uzbeks especially, who are often labelled as elections perceived as fraudulent, civil unrest began to take having been the aggressors in the 2010 ethnic conflict,26 have hold. During the so-called ‘Tulip Revolution’ that followed been systematically marginalised from power. Lack of trust, in 2005, Akayev was finally forced from power, and fled the particularly between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities, country. therefore, has contributed to social divisions and segregation, exacerbated by the absence of a formal reconciliation His successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, hailing from the Jalalabad process. region in the country’s south (unlike Akayev who was a Northerner),18 tipped the balance in favour of a different set From a geo-political perspective, Kyrgyzstan is wedged of ‘clients’ but remained otherwise true to the precedent between China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. set by his predecessor. Corruption, nepotism and bribery Together with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan is the source of the continued and these new power dynamics intensified ethnic majority of the region’s water resources, via high mountain competition between the southern Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.19 glaciers - scarce resources that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Whereas Akayev had a slight orientation towards “a civic especially depend upon. From a regional perspective, mode of nationhood”20 – albeit a cover for predatory politics water management is a consistent source of tension and – which saw ethnic Uzbeks represented in local authorities plans to build hydro-electric damns provoke frequent in southern Kyrgyzstan, Bakiyev quickly replaced them with protests from neighbours, and often lead to threats to cut southern Kyrgyz ‘allies’. This change in the ethnic ‘make- off supplies of both natural gas and water.27 These dynamics up’ of the political landscape of Southern Kyrgyzstan led are compounded by ongoing territorial disputes which to a deterioration of inter-ethnic relations and the build-up also lead to occasional cross-border skirmishes of varying of resentment and fear, which can be directly tied to the intensity. Despite these tensions, it should be noted that violence that later erupted in Osh.21 Consequently, when a Uzbekistan played an instrumental role in stopping the 2010 second revolution brought down Bakiyev’s Government in violence from escalating;28 it could easily have exploited the April 2010, many southern Kyrgyz rightfully feared they may situation to its own advantage but, instead, provided vital lose their newly acquired privileged position22 in whatever humanitarian assistance to refugees, and condemned cross- power constellation would emerge as a result of the PG. border ‘revenge raids’, which could well have triggered an inter-state conflict.29 Underpinning these episodes of violence and political instability were pervasive economic, social and geo-political Kyrgyzstan is also situated along the so-called ‘northern drug conflict drivers, of both a national and regional nature. The trafficking’ route, and Osh has been described as the region’s rapid privatisation of the agricultural sector – traditionally at “drug capital”.30 Drugs being ‘trafficked’ from Afghanistan the core of the Kyrgyz economy – in line with the free market to both Russia and Europe pass through Tajikistan, before reform programmes of the 1990s, has been particularly arriving in Osh and then onto Bishkek before being smuggled damaging for Kyrgyzstan. The move “dismembered the large through Kazakhstan to Russia. Drug trafficking is facilitated collective farms and at the same time destroyed the vital by the extensive porous border with Tajikistan, and fuelled support services that they provided.”23 High unemployment by criminal gangs – tied intimately to high levels of poverty, in the countryside has led to increasing levels of rural to urban unemployment, and the relative ease with which vulnerable (and foreign) migration where, upon arrival, the majority fail to people can be recruited into the ‘business’.31 A UNODC find jobs; historically speaking, Uzbeks have also dominated report in 2012, furthermore, noted that drug trafficking the business sector in the Ferghana Valley for generations, and organized crime were sources of conflict in Kyrgyzstan, which has accentuated a sense of resentment among many and that the “inter-ethnic clashes that occurred in southern ethnic Kyrgyz. Significant progress in poverty reduction from Kyrgyzstan in 2010 have been used by ethnic Kyrgyz criminal 2000 onwards threatened to be undone by the 2008 financial groups to assume predominance over ethnic Uzbek criminal crisis, which led to a decline in GDP of around 10% from 2008 groups and to control the drug routes through this part of to 2010.24 As of 2018, 38% of the population still lived under Kyrgyzstan.”32 the poverty line. Medium term political dynamics affecting conflict risk Kyrgyzstan has struggled to develop a cohesive national identity since its separation from the USSR. According to Only a fortnight after the June 2010 clashes, the PG the 2009 census data, the Kyrgyz are the country’s largest held a referendum to approve a new constitution, which ethnic group (70.9%), followed by Uzbeks (14.3%), Russians established, for the first time, a parliamentary system and (6.2%), and a wide range of other minorities,25 although led to Roza Otunbayeva assuming the Presidency – a first Kyrgyzstan 4

for a woman in Central Asia. Despite the ongoing instability mainly on poverty alleviation and social services; democratic at the time, the OSCE and other international bodies gave governance; and, HIV/AIDS. The UNDAF highlights the a positive assessment of these democratic processes.33 “continuing closed character of institutions of governance Interviews with local counterparts, however, suggested that and pervasive corruption” as well as the marginalisation of the “overwhelming majority of the voters did not understand both women and minorities as important issues, but none what they were agreeing to, but were giving their assent of these or any other factors are identified as conflict risks. in the hope that it would bring stability to the country.”34 According to one interviewee, the RC Office (RCO) at this Nonetheless, the referendum and the new constitution time, quite simply was in “development mode”.41 brought the required legitimacy for the PG to proceed, and allowed for parliamentary elections in October 2010, While conflict prevention may not have been a priority for the followed by presidential and local council elections in 2011 RC or UNCT, it was not ignored entirely. UNDP undertook and 2012 respectively. During the 2010 election, a political relatively extensive work in this area, providing technical party with a nationalist – rather than ethnically-based – support to a government-led ‘Peace and Development agenda got the plurality of votes, and formed an opposition Analysis’ in early 2010. This process, envisioned as an extension to the coalition government. In theory, these developments of the then-UNDP Conflict-related Development Analysis created a conducive environment for the implementation (CDA) tool,42 was designed to establish a “common picture of the constitution, but this was undermined by continued of the conflict prevention priorities in Kyrgyzstan”43, thereby infighting and jockeying for positions among political elites, laying the foundations for the development of a national which created tensions. Overall, the period continued to be conflict prevention strategy. The Peace and Development marked by human rights violations. Analysis process established a National Steering Board and Oblast Advisory Committees, put in place to both “legitimize President Atambaev, who succeeded Otunbayeva in the process and moreover address the priorities identified in December 2011, managed to contain ethnic tensions and the process.”44 ushered in a period of peacebuilding, enabling Kyrgyzstan to come ‘back from the brink.’ In doing so, he built on his In principle, this was a promising approach for identifying predecessor’s achievements during her short presidency, conflict drivers. In practice, however, the process fell short of including the creation of new institutions. Violence subsided its objectives: tensions between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, during Atambaev’s term in office, even if resentment and the endemic marginalization of Uzbeks from political and remained and antagonisms continued to fester. However, economic processes did not emerge as a priority. There are after six years in office, Atambaev left a “legacy of stalled multiple reasons for this: some believe there was reluctance reforms [and] an economy still struggling to attract outside to speak about this sensitive issue in the context of a investment.”35 Incoming President Sooronbai Jeenbekov government-led, national process; the Oblast-level platforms has promised to “create a state where human rights are were also considered too ‘political’; and, the facilitators respected, on democratic principles”36, but this remains a of the process were Kyrgyz, presumably leaving Uzbeks work in progress.37 uncomfortable raising the issue. And, despite the significant time and effort invested by UNDP and partners in establishing The ongoing marginalisation of minorities – and the the platform/network on conflict prevention, it seems it was resentment and conflict it breeds – has also created fertile not ‘activated’ as a conflict prevention mechanism during the recruiting ground for both criminal and extremist groups. period of April-June 2010 when inter-ethnic relations were Movements such as the Islamist Jihad Union, the Islamic deteriorating – despite clear signs that violence could be Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Hizb ut-Tahir have expected. During the relatively protracted crisis from April long been a cause for concern – to varying degrees - most to June 2010 “why didn’t we, as the UN, appeal to these notably in the Ferghana Valley area, and increasingly in the platforms to ask for advice?”45 one UN interviewee asked. The Andijan and Namagan provinces of Uzbekistan.38 A 2016 ICG Peace and Development Advisor (PDA) who was leading the report on Islamic radicalization tied treatment by the state and process at the time was also not invited to UNCT meetings,46 ongoing feelings of injustice as a result of the events of June underscoring the manner in which conflict prevention was 2010 as key drivers of radicalisation in the region.39 While the a UNDP-led but not UNCT-wide initiative it needed to be, link between extremism and poverty is weak at best, a recent undermining the potential for early warning signs to be study for the UN found that a majority of those associated translated into early action. with extremist groups were of Uzbek ethnicity,40 underscoring the relationship between radicalisation and marginalisation. While these local networks were not activated, reports and interviews of those involved at the time47 indicate that UN 2. RC-Supported Prevention Initiatives staff were instrumental in communicating to UN headquarters their alarm about the increasing tensions on the ground: Historical role and perception of UNCT “From the very early days of the constitutional crisis, UN staff kept the office of the SG appraised of the escalating violence Conflict prevention was not a priority for the RC or UNCT and the South-North divisions in the country.”48 According prior to the June 2010 crisis. The 2005-10 UNDAF focused to one report,49 Lynn Pascoe, the then-Under-Secretary- Kyrgyzstan 5

General for Political Affairs, urged Secretary-General Ban had strong knowledge of both the UN and the international Ki-moon to offer interim President Otunbayeva assistance system he could bring to bear. The conflict evidently had in coordinating regional responses. Subsequently, in April humanitarian, development and political dimensions 2010, Ban “dispatched veteran Central Asia diplomat Jan and wearing both the hats of Resident and Humanitarian Kubiš, head of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, Coordinator he had a responsibility to respond to each of as Special Envoy to assess the situation and scope for the them. While UNRCCA was leading on the most urgent reestablishment of legitimate political authority.”50 political elements of the crisis, RC Walker was focusing on the UNCT’s response, including measures to ensure safety and During this time, in close consultation with Kubiš, Special security of UN staff on the ground. Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Miroslav Jenča, who headed the UN Regional Center for Preventive In the immediate aftermath of the June violence, RC Walker Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) at the time, undertook relied upon his own extensive knowledge of the country and, efforts to provide good offices and facilitate dialogue while he consulted extensively with the UNCT, many of the among the political actors in Kyrgyzstan. These efforts were heads of agencies were relatively new and, consequently, supported by the RC and UNCT, and coordinated with both less acquainted with the country context. He also depended the OSCE and EU Special Representative for Central Asia, significantly on his Senior Policy Advisor, a national staff Pierre Morel, in the form of a coordination mechanism known member who had been working in the RCO for many years. as ‘The Troika.’51 The Troika conducted five joint missions to While a great source of knowledge and contacts, the advisor the country between 2010 and 2011, and helped facilitate had previously served as a Kyrgyz government official – which the relatively peaceful departure of the former President came with both advantages and disadvantages in terms of in April 2010.52 At the request of SRSG Jenča, the UN his vantage points and contacts with a diversity of individuals. Department of Political Affairs (DPA) also deployed a Senior Reconciliation Advisor through its Mediation Support Unit The RC, however, initially drew less upon the advice of the to promote dialogue and reconciliation,53 along with other UNRCCA National Political Officer deployed to Bishkek. experts of DPA’s Standby Team of Mediation Experts and UNRCCA had explicitly requested that this officer be part UNRCCA deployed a National Political Officer to Bishkek in of the UNCT, advising on prevention-related issues. Joining August 2010 to backstop its efforts on the ground, as well as in August 2010, directly after the outbreak of violence, the to provide support to the RC/UNCT.54 staff person in question – who had no prior UN experience – received no on-boarding, no training and no orientation, Despite these ‘behind the scenes’ efforts, the violence in June was excluded from UNCT meetings, denied a working ultimately ended without any significant involvement by the area, obliged to rent his own office space in the city, and UN.55 However, timely, coordinated and concerted support operated largely as an ‘outsider’ for the first 8-12 months of proved helpful during this period. Jenča, for example, his posting.59 His efforts to undertake political analysis were provided the PG with advice on minimizing political violence further frustrated by limited information-sharing on the part of and human rights violations; as a Troika ‘member’, he was the PDA (who, due to his complex Terms of Reference, served also well-positioned to coordinate efforts with the EU and more as a resource person for UNDP than for the UNCT)60, the OSCE both during and after the crisis.56 And, following just as his efforts to share political analysis were impeded a request of the Kyrgyz Interim Government, the Electoral by a perception of ‘competition’ between the UNCT and Assistance Division (EAD) of the DPA, in coordination UNRCCA – a dynamic that arose, to a certain extent, during with UNDP, deployed several international advisors and the UN response to the crisis over the summer, undermining an EAD desk officer to provide support, both for the June the effectiveness of UN efforts. constitutional referendum and October parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan. Unlike the OSCE and the EU, the These dynamics, however, did not prevent the RC from UN was perceived to represent the entire ‘international seeking opportunities for the UN presence on the ground community’ (including governments from the region, and to engage in peacebuilding efforts. An important opening Russia), and was therefore able to play a more prominent for the RC’s engagement appeared when, in recognition of role in these events.57 During this time, the SRSG provided the risk of repeated violence, interim President Otunbayeva critical support to the RC on how to coordinate UN efforts requested the UN in the summer of 2010 to assist with with respects to the PG. reconstruction and reconciliation in Osh and Jalalabad cities and oblasts, referring specifically to the implementation of RC-led situation analysis, strategy and coordination “political measures on strengthening stability and peace, promotion of the economic development and creation of When the crisis erupted in the Spring of 2010, Resident employment, improvement of administrative management Coordinator Neal Walker58 had already been in-country on the local level, restoration of houses, medical and for almost five years, and had a wealth of country-specific cultural institutions, schools as well as infrastructure – roads, knowledge and contacts he could draw upon. He had telecommunication system, electricity lines and substations, previously held other senior positions in both UNDP and water supply facilities.”61 the Organization of American States (OAS), and therefore Kyrgyzstan 6

Being able to respond to this request in a positive and Uzbek. Kyrgyz communities were angered by an international meaningful manner required the fast availability of resurces. response that reached them significantly later than those they In this context, Walker efficiently drew upon the UN’s perceived as being the instigators of the violence in the first Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), one of the few UN mechanisms place66 – generating significant resentment, both towards the that allows for quick access to funds to underpin RC-led Uzbeks and towards the UN. prevention efforts on the ground. Building on Walker’s prior contacts with the Fund, and in consultation with the PBF’s After these missteps, attributable at least in part due to the Chief and the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding immense pressure the RC and UNCT were under in the midst of Support – as early as October 2010 – the UNCT was able to the June violence, there was evidence of significant ‘learning’ access USD 3 million through the Fund’s Immediate Response on the part of UNCT as it began to incrementally shift into Facility (IRF). The Fund’s investments supported projects conflict prevention ‘mode’ with the elaboration of IRF2. This related to youth reconciliation (led by UNDP, UNICEF and was facilitated by an increasing receptiveness – initially on UNHCR); women’s empowerment (led by UNIFEM/UN the part of RC Walker and then on the part of the RC a.i. – to Women); and, water management and conflict resolution (led receive inputs from the UNRCCA officer who, as a result of his by FAO and WFP). persistent efforts to gain the trust of the RC, was eventually invited to provide the UNCT with regular political briefings. In June 2011, in response to an official request from the The PDA was also brought further into the UNCT ‘fore’ and, government together with the acting RC (Walker had left to a certain although insufficient degree, out of his UNDP- his position in early 2011), Secretary-General Ban declared focused role. Overcoming their initial reluctance to work Kyrgyzstan eligible to access additional funding from the PBF, together, the UNRCCA officer and the PDA eventually ‘joined and an additional package of US$ 7 million was approved forces’ and cooperated well on their shared tasks, including (known as IRF 2) for a set of six different peacebuilding the elaboration of IRF2. Indeed, the evaluation notes that projects related to administration of justice and building IRF2 (instigated under the leadership of Walker in March 2011, “infrastructures for peace.” By all accounts, funds were elaborated after his departure and approved in June 2011, released and the projects implemented in a speedy manner, just before the arrival of the new RC), “illustrates a better leading to a meaningful prevention impact on the ground. understanding of the causes of the conflict and willingness to An evaluation of the IRF packages (1 and 2) conducted in allocate resources and encourage the government to engage 201262 found that the engagements: helped “create stability in deeper structural reforms.”67 Most importantly, it was and a sense of normalcy”; reduced critical drivers of conflict – underpinned by a collective conflict analysis undertaken at especially those related to youth; built important capacity with the UNCT level. The diminishing tensions and the emergence youth and women’s organizations, and within government from the immediate humanitarian crisis also gave the UNCT ministries; and, “assisted communities’ re-engagement in more time and space to dedicate to assessment, planning, independent, self-sustaining economic activities.”63 Most government engagement and broader consultation. importantly, the evaluation found that “momentum [was] created to address some of the key structural causes of When Alexander Avanessov assumed his position as Resident conflict, namely those groups excluded from political and Coordinator in July 2011, the UNCT had begun ‘transitioning’ economic spheres in Kyrgyzstan.”64 into a prevention posture, but much work remained to be done. He focused significant attention on integrating the That said, according to a number of observers, these projects UNRCCA political officer into the work of the RCO, reorienting likely fell short of their full potential as an opportunity was the PDA’s TORs towards a UNCT-wide role, and further missed to ground them in a broader conflict prevention strengthening relationships with UNRCCA and UNHQ.68 He strategy embedded in a solid conflict analysis. Indeed, no also encouraged UNCT members to work outside of their systematic conflict analysis had been undertaken to guide mandated ‘siloes’, steering them to work collectively on the work in the immediate aftermath of conflict and the peacebuilding issues. Pushing towards a unified approach, conflict analyses that did exist were outdated and insufficient: he also strongly discouraged individual UNCT entities for example, the UNDP Conflict and Development Analysis, from approaching the Government independently of one initiated in 2007, did not take into account (the manipulation another, especially on joint projects which related to conflict of) “ethnicity as a contributing factor to instability”65, and was prevention.69 not fully finalised until 2011 – after the release of funds for IRF1. This fundamental gap in analysis was compounded by A Russian national with solid understanding of the country the absence of a risk analysis, which may have highlighted the context, relevant language skills and extensive regional dangers of being insensitive, for example, to the ethnic profile knowledge, Avanessov was also well positioned to building of staff, which proved to be a significant challenge during relationships with different layers of Government and other project implementation. In the absence of a systematic conflict stakeholders, in which he invested significant effort during assessment, the IRF1 was designed and implemented on the his first year in office, laying the groundwork for subsequent basis of a humanitarian needs assessment, and therefore UN peacebuilding engagements.70 There were four key, pre- – in line with humanitarian principles – first targeted the existing entry points which facilitated his work during these communities most affected by the violence, who were largely first few months, and which were partly owed to the UN’s Kyrgyzstan 7

longer-term track record and relationships of trust that had Based upon this decision and working closely with the been built over the years: first, the willingness on the part of Government, the RC then set about putting the ‘wheels in local authorities in Osh and Jalalabad, and other areas deeply motion’ for the elaboration of Kyrgyzstan’s first Peacebuilding affected by the conflict, to work with the UN on peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP). Having learnt the lessons of IRF1 and in issues; second, the political will on the part of the President’s line with the principles of conflict-sensitive programming, office to explore how best it could collaborate with the UN; the development of the PPP was underpinned by extensive third, the strong desire on the part of non-governmental analysis and comparative insights. A context analysis – called organizations to work with the UN across humanitarian, “Peacebuilding Needs and Priorities Assessment” – was development and peacebuilding issues; and, fourth, the fact undertaken in the Spring of 2013 to ensure the PPP and related that the UNCT had internalized the lessons from its initial projects responded to conflict dynamics and peacebuilding experiences of working with the PBF. challenges. Led by the RC with support from the Swiss- based NGO PeaceNexus, which has been a key partner for RC Avanessov then set about implementing a medium- to the UN in Kyrgyzstan (see ‘resources’ section below for more long-term strategy, working closely with SRSG Jenča and information), the elaboration of the needs assessment was Secretary-General Ban, to elaborate a peacebuilding and highly participatory – involving national counterparts, civil prevention-oriented approach underpinned, once more, by society and other development partners. PBF support. While ultimately effective, the strategy was initially met with some degree of resistance on several fronts. The findings of the needs assessment were, furthermore, One of the initial challenges was the need to overcome the informed by a UN Technical Expert Group in Kyrgyzstan Government’s desire to focus on immediate humanitarian and that brought subject experts of various agencies together development needs; as underscored by Avanessov, “it took to inform the UNCT’s engagement in the PBF process,75 some work to help them take a longer-term, more strategic and benefitted from close collaboration with the UNRCCA. perspective.”71 The Government was also concerned that To avoid duplication, the analysis was also informed by an accepting PBF funding would mean Kyrgyzstan would be extensive mapping of the activities of other entities, including perceived as a ‘crisis country’ in need of being on the agenda the EU, World Bank, OSCE, etc. which all provided information of the NY-based Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which on their long-term plans and strategies. Furthermore, the was widely perceived among UN member states as a forum UN’s Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) in New York, tending to failed states. Avanessov dedicated significant which manages the PBF, put the RCO and members of the efforts to explain that the mandate of the PBF allowed it to JSC Secretariat in touch with key actors involved in the PBF provide funding to countries not experiencing violent conflict process in Nepal, which allowed useful sharing of relevant and that acceptance of such funds would not indicate that experience, informing the design of the PPP in Kyrgyzstan. the country was in crisis, but rather that it was averting it.72 PBSO also funded trainings of key UNCT staff in areas such Furthermore, a linguistic misunderstanding almost entirely as conflict assessment and conflict sensitivity, which improved undid efforts to elaborate a peacebuilding package when the their skills to design and implement the PPP. Government was made to understand that ‘infrastructures for peace’ – a term used to express a set of formal and As a result of the work of the UNCT and the JSC – and facilitated informal domestic institutions elaborated to prevent conflict by the RC – three key priorities were elaborated on the basis and promote peace – would not lead to the establishment of the needs assessment, and formed the centrepiece of the of much needed roads, bridges, communication and sewage PPP: (1) implementation of critical laws, policies, and reforms systems as the President had expected.73 to improve the rule of law, access to justice and human rights; (2) the establishment of local self-government bodies to These challenges were ultimately overcome with a combination reduce local tensions; and, (3) development of policies and of dialogue, advocacy and sometimes persuasion, facilitated initiatives that promote a common civic identity, multilingual by the relationship of trust established between the RC and education and respect for diversity and minority rights.76 the highest echelons of Government. Consequently, in the According to many UNCT members active during this period, fall of 2012, Secretary-General Ban supported the request by the PPP was “fully owned by the Government and responded the President for further assistance from the UN to address fully to their needs,”77 although the ownership, according longer-term peacebuilding priorities, including assistance in to UN staff involved at the time, seems to have been more the areas of rule of law and human rights, mechanisms for genuinely felt with respect to development issues than those promoting dialogue at national and community levels, and related to human rights. implementation of a policy aiming at enhancing national unity and inter-ethnic relations. Fulfilling a UN requirement to The task now remained to develop appropriate projects access funding under the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility that would adequately address the identified priorities. (PRF) of the PBF, the President established an inclusive Joint That exercise was complicated by the fact that many UNCT Steering Committee (JSC) – involving all key stakeholders – members saw the promise of PBF funding as a convenient to provide strategic guidance to plan further peacebuilding way of compensating for looming budget and staff cuts, with interventions.74 several agencies inclined to simply rebrand pre-exisiting programmes as peacebuilding, a practice facilitated by the Kyrgyzstan 8

very broad understanding at the UN of what peacebuilding implemented by local non-government partners. While entails. As a result, more projects were proposed than could this contributed to increased capacity for local NGOs, a be accepted under the PPP, and for which PBF funding more effective strategy would have strengthened both the was available. The RC, therefore, proposed, and the UNCT institutions of government and the relationship between agreed, that projects would be selected through a competitive government entities and local partners. This would have process, an approach first piloted in Nepal and encouraged required more capacities and significantly more time than by PBF’s donors; each project, moreover, could have no more was accorded by the PBF timeframes. As outlined by one than two or three participating entities. interviewee, “the UNCT was tasked through the PBF to deliver specific outcomes, not to build the capacity of In theory, putting in place a competitive process seemed the government to deliver such outcomes”83 – another like a good practice and it was enacted in a transparent and unfortunate missed opportunity. rigorous manner. Projects were assessed according to criteria jointly decided upon by the UNCT; project proposals were Despite, or perhaps because of these structural assessed first by the UN Technical Experts Group, then by the problems, efforts were made on the part of the RC during JSC and an independent expert, Dan Smith (former chair of the implementation to ensure coordination with national and PBF advisory group), was deployed to help review projects. international development actors in-country. The JSC itself A representative from the President’s Office was – thanks to was highly collaborative, involving the Government, the RC, the efforts of the RC – closely involved throughout both the the UNCT, and key partners such as the OSCE and the EU, formulation of the PPP and the selection process. In light of and civil society actors. With the RC representing the UNCT, the inevitably competitive dynamics that emerged, the RC a Development Partners Coordination Council was convened also established a relatively innovative (in the context of PBF- once a month, and every three months it met with the Prime funded projects) ‘independent evaluation committee’, made Minister for a dialogue on development aid;84 a National up of representatives from other international organisations Coordination Council on cooperation with development who were requested to assess the projects critically against partners also took place, chaired by the Prime Minister and the pre-established list of criteria and their individual merits. co-chaired by the RC (with USAID as alternate co-chair).85 An aid platform registering all ongoing development projects in That said, while the logic of the competitive process was the country was also developed. And, quite exceptionally, the “sound”78 – and in some respects, creative – and led to the World Bank representative became a full-fledged member of selection of projects which were, on their individual merits, the UNCT in 2015, “an unequivocal recognition of the high well-designed and in line with the priorities identified by regard for and the added-value of the work of the UNCT”86, the PPP,79 the result was, according to several UN officials, and undoubtedly a step in the right direction to ensure better “a bit of a mess.”80 Indeed, the 10 projects eventually coordination between these two UN System entities. approved by the JSC had little relationship to one another, missed vital opportunities to be catalytic, and prevented the These measures went some way to addressing the challenges ‘whole from being more than the sum of its parts.’ According associated with the PPP project design which could – to some to the evaluation of the PPP,81 since the projects had been degree – be ‘ironed out’ during the course of implementation, developed independently of one another, this process also but the competitive UNCT dynamics unleashed by the contributed to: the duplication of project-level indicators process were longer-lasting,87 somewhat undermining the each measuring their objectives within a PPP outcome but RC’s efforts to foster collaborative and participatory methods none measuring the impact of the PPP overall; a lack of of working. These efforts suffered further from the fact that coordination within site selection, “reducing possible strategic the UNCT was without a PDA for more than two years as a synergies among projects” and a duplication of similar result of predominantly bureaucratic hurdles, at a critical time activities from different projects in the same municipalities; in the PPP lifespan and Kyrgyzstan’s peacebuilding trajectory duplication of implementing partners contracted for similar – leaving the UNCT without a key prevention asset. activities; concomitant high levels of administration costs across multiple agencies; and lack of a clear, and shared Its shortcomings notwithstanding, there are indications that understanding amongst implementing partners regarding the PPP made a contribution to conflict prevention: there was overarching PPP objectives. As underscored by one UNCT a significant increase in the number of disputes addressed member, “in the end, we had a lot of interventions in a lot by local institutions; the reported number of violent disputes of different places, but not many places where we had many declined significantly; there were small increases in the interventions; we were not aligned, we weren’t integrated… reported trust and social equity in local-level state bodies; it simply wasn’t one initiative, but many, under the banner of youth and women’s mobilization increased; and, perhaps the PPP.”82 most importantly, there was a “significant increase in percentage of respondents who reported positive changes to The ‘disconnect’ between the PPP as a government-owned ethnic relations compared to the baseline.”88 The evaluation strategy and as a UN-designed project led to other missed of the PPP praised in particular the “creation of networks [and] opportunities. The majority of PPP projects by-passed the collaborative spaces at the national level” that facilitated Government since they were guided by the UNCT and further work on and funding of peacebuilding work, including Kyrgyzstan 9

at the local level.89 And, according to the evaluation, the cooperation between security providers and communities; most cited effects of individual projects “pertained to the improving community infrastructure and natural resource spontaneous adoption of certain activities of practice by other management; increasing levels of inter-ethnic tolerance and local government authorities in areas beyond the target areas understanding amongst youth; women’s active involvement of a project and without PPP funding support”90 – indicating in design and implementation of cross-border initiatives; the positive ‘spill-over’ effects of PBF support. conflict monitoring; and, community dialogue platforms.93

In 2016, on the basis of recommendations from the PPP Working in cross-border areas is an extremely sensitive evaluation and as a result of extensive efforts by Avanessov, the undertaking, especially when it concerns issues related to UNCT and government embarked on a second PPP process, scarce natural resources (such as arable land and water), this time focused on preventing violent extremism (dicussed and potentially controversial infrastructure projects. These below in greater detail) and a more collaborative process sensitivities were compounded by the ongoing absence of guided by the principle of ‘a coalition of the most willing.’91 border demarcation/delimitation, and a history of tensions The second PPP process also overlapped with a highly and border violence between communities and border innovotive PBF-funded project on cross-border cooperation guards; in this context, “local conflicts can easily escalate for sustainable peace and development (also discussed up to higher levels of violence and lead to deterioration in below in greater detail). When Mr. Avanessov completed his the political climate between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.”94 time as RC in mid-2017, the UNCT was flooded by letters of Consequently, both governments were initially reluctant to appreciation for his efforts and many staff lamented the ‘loss’ engage in a project of this nature, fearing it would require of a highly capable diplomat and leader. compromises on political issues they were not willing or prepared to negotiate on and/or create the perception of a Avanessov’s successor, Mr. Ozonnia Ojielo, who took on his willingness to concede sovereignty to international entities.95 role as RC at the beginning of 2018 and who looks back at 30 years of experience in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, Gaining the support of both governments required concerted is by all accounts off to an excellent start, with interviewees efforts on the part of the UN and high levels of patience. expressing appreciation so far for his collaborative, non- The RCs on both sides of the border undertook extensive hierarchical and inclusive style.92 This is all the more consultations with national officials to explain the rationale encouraging as Mr. Ojielo will be facing a challenging and benefits of the project, using trust built up over previous agenda that includes, inter alia, advancing novel Preventing years. These efforts were assisted by the efforts of the Violent Extremism (PVE) programing, promoting inter-ethnic UNRCCA, which used regional platforms as opportunities reconciliation, supporting the resolution of remaining border to lobby for the initiative. Similarly, representatives of the issues and promoting regional cooperation and economic relevant funds and agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, FAO development in the Ferghana Valley. and UN-Women) at Headquarters also leveraged their relationships with the Permanent Missions of both countries Specific interventions and initiatives to underscore the advantages of the project.96 The two RCs were also instrumental in getting all involved agencies In the case of Kyrgyzstan there were numerous initiatives, and programmes to agree to work together on a relatively projects and programmes launched by individual UN complex project. Much of the difficult and time-consuming agencies, in particular UNDP, aimed at addressing specific behind-the-scenes ‘leg-work’ was conducted by the two conflict drivers or advancing specific prevention objectives. PDAs, working in unison to develop a project document with This section, however, will only look at those initiatives and scope, substance and terminology that was acceptable to two approaches in which the RC had a significant role and/or RCs, ten agencies, and – most importantly – two governments which were jointly carried out in an interagency context, that with tense relations and a history of violence between them. alsohold particularly valuable lessons for RCs elsewhere. A task which involved, amongst other things, addressing hundreds of comments provided by both governments on a ‘Cross border cooperation for sustainable peace and devel- 40-page project document.97 opment’ Once these initial challenges and associated delays were The Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace overcome, the project showed promising results. According and Development (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) project was to the first evaluation of the project, for example, “the project launched in 2015, funded by PBF and the Swiss Agency has contributed quite significantly to reducing tensions for Development and Cooperation. Constituting the first over water resources, as well as issues related to border- cross-border initiative funded by PBF – which traditionally crossing rules, and attitudes towards the ‘other’ have been provides financing to national endeavours – the project positively impacted.”98 The project successfully established a brought together two RCs, two PDAs, and two UNCT community-based conflict monitoring system (‘TRACTION’), configurations from both sides of the border. With a price tag the findings of which were discussed regularly with local of close to US$6 million, the project was designed to address authorities and leaders from both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in conflict drivers in unstable border areas by: strengthening order to agree on joint responses. And the establishment of Kyrgyzstan 10

small-scale natural resource management initiatives helped which, combined with the unresolved root causes and reduce tensions and facilitate border-crossing, with a key grievances related to the 2010 unrest, all contributed to the lesson being that “tensions were far more likely to be reduced charged political atmosphere and elevated risks of election- by ensuring communities’ independent access to resources related violence.103 rather than encouraging shared use.”99 The RC was quick to use his relationship of trust established The project was an instructive learning experience for the with the government and – after extensive discussions with UN, paving the way for similar initiatives to learn from the the Prime Minister’s office – the Government accepted to work strengths and weaknesses of the project. Many challenges with the UN to address the issue through an inter-ministerial were encountered which, with greater planning and careful working group.104 Working closely with the National Institute management, could be avoided in subsequent phases of the of Strategic Studies (NISS), which sits under the Prime projects, or similar projects in other contexts. One of the most Minister’s Office – and in close partnership with PeaceNexus important lessons – underscored by interviewees and learned – an electoral risk management (ERM) tool was developed to exercises – concerned the issue of ‘mirroring’: the RCs, PDAs monitor the various risks associated with the elections. and UNCT entities involved adopted a mirroring approach designed to ensure coherence and balance between the work The electoral risk management tool was elaborated on the on either side of the border. Due to “different peacebuilding basis of 10 risk factors which were tracked using interactive opportunities, entry points and governance structures”100 this maps able to assess the intensity of the risk factor, and how approach was not always appropriate and undermined efforts the risk factors evolved over time in different districts. Field to ensure strategies were in line with the context – including monitors reported data to UNDP-trained NISS research the particularities of the national focal points, culture, and offices who managed the database which was used to inform sensitivities which needed to be taken into account when the ERM tool, and then coordinator compiled the analysis designing and implementing the project. and reported to the governmental bodies and the office of the President.105 The findings were discussed in closed Electoral risk management tool roundtables with representatives of the government ministries and other relevant state institutions. Then appropriate actions Following extensive discussions among political parties, civil were taken to reduce tensions.106 This early warning system society and state institutions, several amendments to the has been institutionalised by the NISS and is still operational electoral legal framework were made between 2011 and today, demonstrating the sustainability of initiatives which are 2015. In May 2013, a Presidential Decree “On Measures on the given strong government ownership from the outset. Improvement of the Electoral System of the Kyrgyz Republic”, mandated a massive introduction of innovative technologies Preventing violent extremism (PVE) as a measures of increasing the credibility of elections; the decree, for example, envisioned biometric voter registration, It is estimated that approximately 3,000 people from Central electronic voter identification, electronic voting and results Asia have joined radical groups that are fighting in Syria and management, etc.101 These changes, so close to the elections, Iraq, and many of those are reported to be from Kyrgyzstan.107 led UNDP, in its electoral risk assessment, to raise concerns Violent extremism in the country is tied to weak governance that the election might be contested or trust in the process and rule of law, human rights violations, endemic political and diminished: the new biometric voter registration system was economic marginalisation of certain populations, and religious used for the first time; the required electoral deposit for fragmentation. Despite mounting evidence in recent years political parties (returned upon receiving more than 5 per that extremism and radicalisation is a challenge that must be cent of votes) was raised 10 times (from around US$ 7,000 to addressed, the Government of Kyrgyzstan has – until very US$ 70,000), potentially preventing certain candidates from recently – demonstrated little interest in addressing the issue competing; and there was a new requirement that only voters head on. Only in 2016 did it begin to elaborate a counter- who register with biometric data (photo and fingerprints) terrorism programme and, as with many such programmes would be able to vote, rejecting other forms of ID that which are often based on law enforcement measures, there had been used in the past.102 These changes, according to were concerns raised that such initiatives may exacerbate UNDP’s risk assessment, had contributed to increased levels rather than help address the issue. of distrust in state-society relations and of negative attitudes towards the electoral process; there were concerns related to Capitalizing on an expression of interest by the PBF to the disenfranchisement of Uzbeks. continue its support to Kyrgyzstan, and encouraged by the recommendation of the final PPP evaluation in 2017 to catalyse Given the results of the risk assessment, the RC was concerned government support for PVE, the RC played an instrumental that these dynamics could undermine progress made on role behind the scenes in encouraging the Government building relationships of trust, both horizontally and vertically not only to accept the need to address extremism and within society, and fostering stability. More specifically, the radicalisation, but also to develop a preventive response to rushed introduction of new technologies elevated public it. When the Secretary-General’s UN Plan of Action on PVE expectations of ICT as a panacea for improving confidence was launched in 2016, the RC was able to leverage this global Kyrgyzstan 11

plan to encourage the Government to consider the benefits remained vacant for two years from 2015-16). It should of taking a preventive and transparent approach to PVE, also be noted that due to a complicated TOR, the PDA sensitizing it along the way to the risk of mano dura (iron- was originally not part of the RCO (but sat within UNDP); fist) counter-terrorism policies being counter-productive and however, following a PDA assessment mission in June exacerbating the problem. 2015, it was recommended to move the PDA to sit under the RCO. Further staff assets were provided by PBSO in the As a result of these efforts, a new PPP was approved in form of five PBF missions, including to: provide guidance December 2017 as part of a new PBF package, with a on M&E processes to improve the PPP results framework; budget of US$8,000,000 (the total value of the project develop an M&E plan; provide inputs on agencies’ project is US$20,138,000 and funding is being sought amongst proposals; and, surge support to establish the JSC Secretariat other international partners). The PPP, elaborated in close prior to approving the overall PRF funds – which was vital consultation with the Government, and featuring a strong for the successful completion of the PBF PRF process. The component on institutional strengthening, will focus on Secretariat itself also received US$ 850,000 from the PRF four key areas: inclusive governance and justice system for funding to ensure project oversight, promote partnerships, preventing violent extremism; support to the prevention of build the capacities of national counterparts, and ensure radicalization to violence in prisons and probation settings; completion of the PPP; PBF Secretariat support also came and, communities resilient to violent ideologies. The with additional human resources: an overall coordinator, two “ultimate purpose” of the project is aimed at “curbing the M&E specialists, and a gender specialist. UNV supported two number of Kyrgyz citizens leaving for Syria or other countries of those. In addition, funds were granted for monitoring/data as Foreign Terrorist Fighters as well as reducing the number of collection exercises, which helped encourage cooperative extremism and terrorist cases overall through a strengthened oversight as well as substantively improve the interventions state partnership with the public in general and religious to support prevention.111 communities in particular.”108 The RC was also good at drawing on external assets, for While this second PPP demonstrates widespread concern instance by building on a partnership with the Swiss based about the vulnerability of Central Asia to violent extremism, NGO PeaceNexus, pointing to the importance of RCs looking there is some unease within the UNCT that PVE is “eclipsing” beyond capacities within the UN system. However, questions other, equally important issues. While the first PPP made some arise whether the increase in RCO capacity is sustainable impressive peacebuilding gains, the challenges it sought to given that the post-crisis period has now passed and there address are far from being resolved. As underscored by one may be an incremental shift back into ‘development mode;. UNCT member, “PVE is an important issue, but it is not the However, the RC was able to raise significant new funds by only one”.109 The UNCT, therefore, under the leadership of successfully positioning the UNCT to undertake work on its new RC has an important opportunity to either address PVE, capitalizing on growing international interest in the PVE outstanding peacebuilding issues collectively outside of the space, raising significant donors funds( US$8 billion as part of PPP process, or to use the PPP work on PVE as entry-points to a PBF package, and an additional $12 billion is being sought address other related challenges, not least since many drivers from bilateral partners). of conflict and drivers of PVE overlap and intertwine with one another. It will, however, be vital to ensure that donor interest 3. Overall Contribution of RC and UNCT to Prevention in PVE does not divert the attention of the RC/UNCT from other pressing issues. The RC has made an important contribution to Kyrgyzstan’s peacebuilding trajectory. A credible argument can be made Resourcing that the initial phase of post-crisis response led by RC Walker helped stabilise the country and mitigate a potential Resources available to the RC increased significantly following escalation of the conflict, in particular by attending to the the June 2010 crisis, which drew the eyes of the world – needs of youth. However, the initial set of peacebuilding including UNHQ and donors – towards Kyrgyzstan. The RC projects following the crisis also generated resentment was able to draw on a total of US$10 million for activities among Kyrgyz communities, which might have been avoided covering the transition until the elections in November 2011 had they been embedded in a proper conflict analysis and and, in September 2013, PBF approved a further $15.1 a more conflict-sensitive approach. However, there is an million as part of the PPP. Since then, PBF has also provided argument to be made that this outcome was unavoidable: an additional $1.6 million for work on Gender Responsive the Government insisted that the ethnic Uzbeks were the Peacebuilding (in 2014) and $3 million for the cross-border perpetrators, but they were also the primary victims and the project with Tajikistan in 2015.110 ones most in need of aid.112

PBF funding and UN-wide support also allowed the RC to The second phase of RC-led prevention efforts, under the double the size of the RCO compared to pre-crisis levels, auspices of RC Avanessov, successfully leveraged entry- including staff focused on conflict prevention, such as points with the Government that helped foster at least the UNRCCA officer, and a PDA (a post that unfortunately six years of support from PBF for conflict prevention and Kyrgyzstan 12

peacebuilding endeavours, arguably helping bring about a programme design and implementation, leading to more reduction in ethnic tensions and mitigation of other conflict efficient use of resources and less duplication in terms of drivers. As the UNCT now embarks on its second PPP, with programming, and programme monitoring and evaluation. its new RC, Ozonnia Ojielo, significant efforts will need to be Where competive processes are established among the made to balance the interests of donors in addressing PVE UNCT to select projects financed through pooled funding, with the need to address the equally important, outstanding RCs should devote special care to mitigate the risk of ‘business’ from the previous PPP – including the ongoing competitive dynamics undermining “one-UN” approaches. marginalisation of ethnic communities from political and economic life, and key regional relationships that can be Building trust with the government can create important leveraged for mutual political and economic gains. entry-points for RC-led prevention: In Kyrgyzstan, the relationship of trust that RC Avanessov managed to build 4. Lessons, Good Practices and Recommendations with the highest echeleons of the Kyrgyz Government, including the President, created important entry-points for RCs should place inclusiveness and early warning at the RC-led peacebuilding initiatives, by leading the government center of their prevention agenda: The case of Kyrgyzstan to explicitly request support even in sensitive areas such as confirms the importance of horizontal inequality and deep- conflict prevention that might previously have been no-go seated exclusion (in this case of an ethnic group). The UN’s zones for the UN in the light of domestic sovereignty concerns. development-as-usual stance of the UNCT prior to the June Of course, the success of this approach in Kyrgyzstan does 2010 violence confirms the tendency of RCs and UNCTs to not belie the fact that the imperative of building trust with downplay – at least until a major crisis breaks out – the issue the host government needs to be at times balanced with the of exclusion out of concern of offending the Government. imperative of standing up to the government in cases where This case study also highlights the importance, in settings government actions or policies are responsible for increasing affected by horizontal inequality, for RCs and UNCTs to show conflict risk or human rights abuses. There is no template greater sensitivity to the UN’s own ethnic staff profile, which guidance on how to walk that tightrope and in any given often mirrors the exclusion prevalent in the host country. case, requires judgement.

RCs should ensure that peacebuilding programmes and In light of the limited prevention capacities at his/her projects are embedded in conflict analysis: In Kyrgyzstan disposal, RCs should ensure full use of and cooperation the funds for the first IRF1 were acquired rapidly and the among all staff dedicated to prevention and fully integrate projects implemented with equal speed, undoubtedly spurred them into the RCO and UNCT deliberations: In Kyrgyzstan, by the dynamics of being in the midst of the emergency. prevention assets at the disposal of the RC and UNCT, such While understandable, the absence of even a basic conflict as the PDA and a seconded political officer deployed from analysis to underpin the initial set of peacebuilding projects UNRCCA, could have been earlier and better incorporated arguably reduced the impact. A proper conflict analysis at into the deliberations of the RCO and UNCT. The subsequent the outset of the crisis might also have ensured a greater full integration of these assets into the work of the RCO, sensitivity to conflict dynamics in the context of humanitarian strengthened the RC’s ability to become a driver of UNCT- aid programming. wide prevention and peacebuilding initiatives. Indeed, PDAs and political officers are critical resources for the RC and to Effective RC-led prevention requires ready access to funding reach their full potential, should be empowered by the RC for peacebuilding projects, with the PBF in particular and positioned as UNCT-wide assets if they are to be effective constituting a critical resource: Kyrgyzstan confirms the at supporting the RC in his/her prevention goals. importance of the PBF as one of the few sources that RCs can draw upon to fund, on short notice, peacebuilding initiatives Given the centrality of the PDA role, it is important to that other, more risk-averse donors, would shun. In Kyrgystan, ensure that RCOs are not deprived of these assets for the RC’s effective use of the PBF has highlighted the ability of extended periods of time during critical peacebuilding PBF to provide funds in relatively short timeframes, as well as periods: In Kyrgyzstan, the RC’s preacebuilding role was the importance of building up relationships over time. Good temporarily weakened by the two-year period during which relationships between the RC and the government enabled the PDA position was vacant in 2015-16. Indeed, this arguably him to overcome the initial resistance of the President to affected the quality of programmes and the RCO’s ability accept such funding, which was fuelled by concerns it would to fundraise as the majority of RCs rely on such resources stigmatize Kyrgyzstan as a conflict country. precisely for these purposes. When gaps are unavoidable, intermediary solutions for ‘temporary PDA-like’ assignments Pooled funding, such as that available through the PBF, is should be explored to avoid PDA-vacuums. a key tool for the RC to foster inter-agency cooperation around prevention objectives: Pooled funding effectively RCs are most effective in ensuring ‘whole of UNCT’ helps ‘pull’ agencies out of their siloed mandates into responses – including on conflict prevention – when they more collaborative ways of programming. Pooled funding encourage, as much as feasible and realistic, ‘single-point’ is also likely to encourage common approaches to analysis, dialogue with the Government in the context of multi- Kyrgyzstan 13

agency programmes, especially on sensitive topics. The approach of RC Avanessov of having a ‘single point’ dialogue (on issues related to the PPP) with the Government rather than agencies independently contacting the Government helped ensure greater coherence and overcome siloes, thus maximising the chances of the prevention/peacebuilding strategy succeeding.

Given the increasing relevance and popularity of PVE- related issues amongst donors, RCs must find ways to balance and/or leverage PVE work to address other equally important peacebuilding issues: In Kyrgyzstan, the RC was able to optimise his close relationships with the government to encourage a preventive approach to violent extremism; the concerns of some UNCT members, however, that PVE is only one of many issues that needs to be addressed should not be easily dismissed. Given that many of the drivers of violent extremism and conflict overlap, there may be opportunities to address all concerns but this must be done in a highly strategic manner.

In countries suffering from chronic instability in border areas, RCs can play an important role in driving cross- border prevention projects: The joint regional project with Tajikistan shows the potential of RCs – when partnering with RCs in neighbouring countries – to drive the establishment of projects targeting cross-border drivers of instability. The Kyrgyzstan case shows that the success of such projects requires sound planning, support from other UNCT members as well as UNHQ, and proactive efforts on the part of both the RC and the PDA, as well as high degrees of persistence. Kyrgyzstan 14

Endnotes

Cover Image: Flickr/ Evgeni Zotov. Osh, Kyrgyzstan. 8 August 2010. Osh after riots in 2010. “I was there one and half month after riots. Most of city was in normal condition. But many buildings - cafes, shops, private houses - along main roads were burned and destroyed. It happened because marauders used trucks to carry robbed goods and could move only on enough space. Almost all the ruins I saw belonged to Uzbeks. People of burned houses lived in tents presented by UN and they were also given some food by UN. There was no any help from government.” * This paper is based on secondary resources (listed in the bibliography) and 14 interviews with RCs, PDAs and other RCO staff, other UNCT staff, national interlocutors of RC/UNCT Tunisia, and, UNHQ staff. The lead writer/researcher would like to sincerely thanks all those who participated in this process, either in interviews or in the course of subsequent reviews of the paper, and a special thanks are due to RC Alexander Avanessov for participating in multiple interviews, and for providing comments on the draft. The author bears sole responsibility for any mistakes or omissions in this report, and the views expressed in this report are not necessarily shared by all the individuals who interviewed or reviewed the report. 1 It should be noted that the ‘facts’ about the events of 10-15 June are highly controversial and contested. This brief summary is based on a combination of UN reports, reports by Human Rights Watch and the work of the Helsinki Committee, which was commissioned to conduct an independent enquiry, as detailed shortly. 2 Human Right Watch notes that it is important to recognise that, during this violence, many ethnic Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Russians “saved the lives of their friends and neighbours of other ethnicities while the attacks were under way”, in “Where is the justice? Interethnic Violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan and its Aftermath.” Human Rights Watch. 2010, p.7. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Logvinenko, I. ‘Conflict and Violence in Kyrgyzstan’, Case study for United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, World Bank, Washington, DC. (2017), p.1. 7 “Kyrgyzstan Revised and Extended Flash Appeal.” Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. End Report June 2010-June 2011, p.1. By 28 June, 2010, almost all refugees had returned to Kyrgyzstan. 8 Logvinenko, I. 2017 p.1. 9 First to the Jalal Abab region and then to Belarus, where he remains in exile. 10 A Finnish parliamentarian and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Special Representative for Central Asia at the time. 11 “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010.” Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission. 3 May 2011. 12 Ibid. 13 Matveeva, Anna. “Kyrgyzstan: Balancing on the verge of stability.” EUCAM, No. 19, July 2011, p.5. 14 Tynan, Deidre. “Kyrgyzstan’s milestone election.” International Crisis Group (ICG). 10 October 2017. 15 “Peacebuilding needs and priorities assessment in the Kyygyz republic.” United Nations Country Team. Final report, July 2013. 16 Akiner, Shirin. “Kyrgyzstan 2010-2011: from conflict to fragile stability.” University of London, Вестник РУДН, серия Международные отношения, No.1, 2012. 17 Logvinenko, I. 2017, p.2. 18 Ibid. 19 Rezvani, Babak. “Understanding and explaining the Kyrgyz-Uzbek interethnic conflict in Southern Kyrgyzstan.” Anthropology of the Middle East, Vol. 8, No. 2, Winter 2013, p.68. 20 Ibid, P.76. 21 Ibid, P.68. 22 Hanks, Reuel R. “Crisis in Kyrgyzstan: Conundrums of ethnic conflict, national identity and state cohesion.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2011, pp.180-184. 23 Akiner, S. 2012, p.6. 24 Logvinenko, I. 2017, p.7. 25 Dungans (1.1%), Uyghurs (1.1%), Tajiks (0.9%), Kazakhs (0.7%) and Ukrainians (0.4%), amongst others. “Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan.” CIA World Factbook. 2018, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kg.html. 26 “Youth as agents of peace and stability in Kyrgyzstan.” 2016. 27 Hanks, R R. 2011, p.178. 28 Uzbekistan deployed troops during the crisis but they did not cross the border. This created fear about a possible invasion and may have contributed to diminishing the violence, whereas an outright invasion would have certainly increased it. 29 Akiner, S. 2012, p.8. 30 “Central Asia’s ‘Drug Capital’ fights to stem tide of narcotics.” RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty. January 2013. 31 “Drugs trade ravaging restive Kyrgyz city.” BBC News. 22 October 2010, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11599977. 32 “Opiate flows through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia, A Threat Assessment.” United Nations Office of Drugs and Kyrgyzstan 15

Crime. May 2012. 33 Akiner, S. 2012, p. 9. 34 Ibid. 35 “Kyrgyzstan: A Lucky President Prepares to leave office.” Eurasianet. 21 November 2017. 36 “Сооронбай Жээнбеков: Я борюсь не с оппонентами, а с олигархами, которые хотят влиять на выбор народа.” Turmush. 29 September 2017, www.turmush.kg/ru/news:1407508. 37 “Letter to President of Kyrgyzstan Sooronbai Jeenbekov.” Human Rights Watch. 20 December 2017. 38 Pozun, Brian, United Nations official, comments provided on draft, March 2018. 39 “Kyrgyzstan: State Fragility and Radicalisation.” International Crisis Group. Briefing No. 83, 3 October 2016. 40 Matveeva, Anna. “Religious radicalisation leading to violent extremism in Kyrgyzstan, Report on situation analysis and country context including stakeholder capacity assessment for the UN Peacebuilding Fund in Kyrgyzstan.” June 2016, p.16. 41 Phone interview with United Nations Official. December 2017. 42 Now referred to as the UN-wide, Conflict and Development Analysis tool. 43 Andersson, Karin and Peter Reed. “Results, lessons learned recommendations tools, from the Peace and Development Analysis process in Kyrgyzstan.” July/August 2010. 44 Ibid. 45 Phone interview with United Nations Official. December 2017. 46 Phone interview with United Nations Official. December 2017. 47 Logvinenko, I. 2017, p.5. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 “United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy (UNRCCA)/Kyrgyzstan Case Study.” UNRCCA. April-October 2010, p.1. 51 Ibid. 52 Jenča, Miroslav. “The concept of preventive diplomacy and its application by the United Nations in Central Asia.” Security and Human Rights, Vol. 24, No.2, 2013, p. 191. 53 Ibid, p.189. 54 A political officer was deployed to Bishkek from UNRCCA regional headquarters in Ashgabat in May-June 2010 to provide reporting from the field. Further reinforcement was given by another Russian-speaking political officer deployed in Bishkek from MONUSCO in July-August 2010. 55 “United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy (UNRCCA)/Kyrgyzstan Case Study.” 2010, p.1. and p.3. 56 Jenča, M. 2013. p.191. 57 Ibid, p.4. 58 Mr. Neal Walker was unfortunately not available for interview. 59 Phone interview with United Nations Official. December 2017. 60 Phone interview with United Nations Official. December 2017. 61 “Overview of the projects implemented by the UN System in Kyrgyzstan 2010-2012, Funded through the UN Peacebuilding Fund.” Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). 62 Zapach, Marla and Gulana Ibraeva. “Immediate Response Facility (IRF1), Final evaluation, Kyrgyzstan.” UN Peacebuilding Fund – Immediate Response Facility (IRF). 10 May-30 June 2012. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid, p.5 65 Ibid, p.9. 66 Ibid, p.6. 67 Ibid, p.33. 68 Phone interviews with Mr. Alexander Avanessov. 22 November and 14 December 2017. 69 Ibid. 70 Phone interview with United Nations Official. December 2017. 71 Phone interviews with Mr. Alexander Avanessov. 22 November and 14 December 2017. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 “Kyrgyzstan: Participatory multi-stakeholder process to develop a Peacebuilding Priority Plan and portfolio of projects for its implementation.” UN document. 75 Ibid. 76 “Peacebuilding Fund Priority Plan (PPP) for Kyrgyzstan.” United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. 13 September 2013. 77 Phone interviews with UN Officials. November and December 2017. Kyrgyzstan 16

78 Jantzi, Terrence et al. “Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Kyrgyzstan.” The Konterra Group. Final Report. June 2017, p. xi. 79 An alternative process would have involved gathering the UNCT members together to decide collectively on the projects that would best meet the priorities identified, then to collectively decide which agencies and how those agencies were best placed to design and implement such projects. This would have had less negative effects on both UNCT dynamics, implementation and, ultimately, the results. 80 Phone interviews with UN Officials. November and December 2017. 81 Jantzi, T et al. June 2017. 82 Phone interview with UN Official. November 2017. 83 Phone interview with UN Official. December 2017. 84 “Report of the joint field visit of the Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF, UN-Women and WFP to the Kyrgyz Republic.” United Nations. 2-7 May 2016. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Phone interview with UN Official. November 2017. 88 Jantzi, Terrence et al. “Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Kyrgyzstan.” The Konterra Group. Briefing on preliminary findings and next steps. May 2017. 89 Jantzi, T et al. June 2017, p. vi. 90 Ibid. 91 Phone interview with UN Official. November 2017. 92 Phone interviews with UN Officials. January 2017. 93 Protsyk, Oleh. “Working on conflict prevention across state boundaries: experiences and lessons from Kyrgyz-Tajik border area.” Lessons Learned, with contributions from Akyn Bakirov, Artur Bukalaev, Zumrat Normatova, Naoki Nihei, Ulan Shabynov, Gulshod Sharipova, Sarvarboi Turdiboev, Erkina Urazbaeva, August 2017. 94 Weijer, Frauke de. “Review of PBF cross-border cooperation for sustainable peace and development, in the border area of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.” PeaceNexus Foundation,. November 2017, p.4. 95 Protsyk, O. 2017, p.5-6. 96 Ibid. 97 Protsyk, O. 2017, p.6. 98 Weijer. 2017, p.1. 99 Ibid., page 13. 100 Ibid, p.2. 101 Inputs received on case study, UN Official. 15 March 2017. 102 “Collection and analysis of electoral data in Kyrgyzstan.” UNDP. Powerpoint presentation, ERM Tool. 103 Inputs received on case study, UN Official. 15 March 2017. 104 Phone Interviews with UN Officials. November and December 2017. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 “Peacebuilding Priority Plan.” United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office/Peacebuilding Fund (PBSO/PBF). December 2017. 108 Letter from Oscar Fernandez-Taranco to Ms. Yukie Mukuo, United Nations. December 2017. 109 Phone interview with UN Official. November 2017. 110 “UN PBF in the Kyrgyz Republic Kyrgyzstan Overview.” United Nations in the Kyrgyz Republic. February 2015, kg.one. un.org/content/unct/kyrgyzstan/en/home/we/unpbf/. 111 Pellizzeri, Alessandra, Comments provided on draft, March 2018. 112 Pozun, Brian, Comments provided on draft, March 2018.