United Nations University Centre for Policy Research What Works in UN Resident Coordinator-led Conflict Prevention: Lessons from the Field June 2018 Kyrgyzstan 2010-17 Josie Lianna Kaye* This case study is part of a broader research project, carried out by the UNU Centre for Policy Research (UNU- CPR) with the support of the UK Mission to the United Nations, on the role of UN Resident Coordinators in Conflict Prevention. The project aimed to extract lessons from case studies of Resident Coordinator-supported preventive action in nine countries (Bolivia 2000-09; Colombia 2012-16; Guinea 2009-15; Guyana 2003- 15; Kenya 2008-17; Kyrgyzstan 2010-17; Malawi, 2011-17; Nepal 2007-15; and Tunisia 2011-17). All case studies, and the resulting policy paper synthesizing lessons and findings can be accessed at cpr.unu.edu. © 2018 United Nations University. All Rights Reserved. ISBN: 978-92-808-9089-1 Kyrgyzstan 2 Introduction clashes, despite the main task of international organizations being to react to such problems”.13 And yet, contrary to these In June 2010, Kyrgyzstan experienced its worst crisis since claims, the UN took meaningful action to respond to the its declaration of independence in 1991. What began as a escalating crisis behind the scenes in 2010, and, from 2011 fist-fight between Kyrgyz and Uzbek youth quickly escalated onwards, played an important role in preventing a recurrence into large-scale ethnic violence, which spread from Osh of conflict and in accompanying Kyrgyzstan on its pivotal to Jalalabad, Bazar-Korgon, and other towns and cities in peacebuilding initiatives. southern Kyrgyzstan.1 These initial clashes were marked by inter-ethnic confrontations, violence and killings. Fuelled On 24th November 2017, President Sooronbai Jeenbekov was by fast-spreading rumours of murders, atrocities and sexual inaugurated as Kyrgyzstan’s fifth President, marking the first violence, Kyrgyz ‘gangs’ – outraged by the killings and violence transfer of power from one democratically elected president – then descended on Uzbek neighbourhoods.2 Human to another14 – a sign of how far the country has come since Rights Watch concluded these attacks followed a consistent the tumultuous events seven years prior. This case study pattern:3 individuals in camouflage uniforms on armoured seeks to elucidate what role the UN Resident Coordinator military vehicles entered Uzbek neighbourhoods, removing (RC) specifically and UN Country Team (UNCT) more broadly the makeshift barricades that residents had erected; armed played in this transition, and what steps the RC took to help men then followed, shooting and chasing away remaining prevent the onset, escalation, continuation and/or recurrence residents, clearing the way for looters.4 Security forces either of conflict and instability in Kyrgyzstan at a period in the failed to intervene, or appeared to ‘take sides’, focusing their country’s trajectory when a collapse of the PG, for example, resources on “addressing the danger presented by Uzbeks, could have easily triggered a very different outcome. What but not by Kyrgyz.”5 Throughout 11-15 June, mass killings, strategies did the RC pursue in order to position the UNCT as rape and destruction took place in at least fourteen areas of a trusted – and long-term – partner during turbulent times? the city of Osh and in four other towns. The violence resulted in the death of at least 470 people – with around 2,244 Following a brief overview of the underlying conflict risk seriously injured6 – and the displacement of 400,000 people, factors and medium-term political dynamics, this case of whom 75,000 fled temporarily to Uzbekistan.7 study will argue that the RC played a critical role in 2010 in responding to the crisis and that, shortcomings of the UN’s The crisis took place against the backdrop of extensive apprich notwithstanding, his swift actions contributed to a political turmoil that begun earlier that year: large protests prevention of an escalation of the crisis. The RC then went against rising energy prices and elite-level corruption took on to support Kyrgyzstan in the development of a medium- place in the city of Talas in February 2010, spreading to to long-term peacebuilding approach, through access to Bishkek on April 10, where riot police fired live ammunition resources from the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) – creating entry- into the crowd, killing 86 protestors.8 Two days later, President points for addressing issues which have long been considered Bakiyev fled the capital9 and a provisional government ‘too political’ or even ‘taboo’, including the marginalisation of (PG), headed by former foreign minister, Roza Otunbayeva, minorities, relationships between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, took power. Tensions began to rise during this period of cross-border relations with Tajikistan, and preventing violent uncertainty as a result of ethnically-charged narratives, often extremism. instigated by nationalists, extremists and criminal groups. An independent investigation into the June violence – the 1. Country Context Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC), chaired by Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen10 – unequivocally tied the events in Osh to the Underlying conflict risk factors “under-representation of ethnic Uzbeks in public life and the rising force of ethno-nationalism” and the “power vacuum” A landlocked mountainous state, Kyrgyzstan gained following Bakiyev’s departure.11 Framing the violence in Osh independence after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. as “crimes against humanity”, the KIC also blamed the PG While market-based economic reforms and the semblance for having failed to foresee the violence and to develop a of inclusive politics won Kyrgyzstan relatively swift branding contingency plan to contain it.12 The report, perceived by the amongst the international community as an “island of PG as biased, was largely rejected, and Kiljunen was declared democracy”15, post-independence stability was short-lived. “persona non grata.” Indeed, rather than a single episode of conflict, the crisis in June 2010 was part of a cycle of violence and instability The KIC report inadvertently created a confrontation that had lasted more than two decades, including in Uzgen between the international community and the Government in 1990, Batken in 1999-2000, Aksy in 2002 and Jalalabad in of Kyrgyzstan at the very time when they needed to be 2005,16 often accompanied by significant political upheaval. working in concert towards the shared goals of peace and stability. Just as the UN was rallying behind the report and Under Askar Akayev’s rule as Kyrgyzstan’s first president, its recommendations, the Government used its response political elites largely subverted attempts to reform the to the KIC to underscore the fact that “it had not received political system and co-opted economic reforms. His time any assistance from the international community during the in office was characterised by endemic levels of bribery and Kyrgyzstan 3 corruption, and a progressive de-legitimization of the regime. it should be noted that Russians do not experience their Repressive politics began to dominate the political landscape minority status in the same manner as the Uzbeks. Despite in the early 2000s: when Akayev refused to step down at the efforts to unite citizens around the Kyrgyz language and other end of his second term, “prominent opposition leaders were potential symbols of national unity, such steps – especially jailed, the President’s relatives began acquiring control over post-2010 – have only served to entrench divisions, and to major media outlets, and protests intensified.”17 Kyrgyzstan’s heighten awareness of the low socio-political representation stability began to unravel when, in response to parliamentary of minorities. Uzbeks especially, who are often labelled as elections perceived as fraudulent, civil unrest began to take having been the aggressors in the 2010 ethnic conflict,26 have hold. During the so-called ‘Tulip Revolution’ that followed been systematically marginalised from power. Lack of trust, in 2005, Akayev was finally forced from power, and fled the particularly between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities, country. therefore, has contributed to social divisions and segregation, exacerbated by the absence of a formal reconciliation His successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, hailing from the Jalalabad process. region in the country’s south (unlike Akayev who was a Northerner),18 tipped the balance in favour of a different set From a geo-political perspective, Kyrgyzstan is wedged of ‘clients’ but remained otherwise true to the precedent between China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. set by his predecessor. Corruption, nepotism and bribery Together with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan is the source of the continued and these new power dynamics intensified ethnic majority of the region’s water resources, via high mountain competition between the southern Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.19 glaciers - scarce resources that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Whereas Akayev had a slight orientation towards “a civic especially depend upon. From a regional perspective, mode of nationhood”20 – albeit a cover for predatory politics water management is a consistent source of tension and – which saw ethnic Uzbeks represented in local authorities plans to build hydro-electric damns provoke frequent in southern Kyrgyzstan, Bakiyev quickly replaced them with protests from neighbours, and often lead to threats to cut southern Kyrgyz ‘allies’. This change in the ethnic ‘make- off supplies of both natural