The Shanghai Municipal Council and the Arrest of Communists, 1927-1937

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Colonialism and compromise : the Shanghai Municipal Council and the arrest of communists, 1927-1937

Kwok Fai, Peter LAW

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COLONIALISM AND COMPROMISE: THE SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL AND THE ARREST OF COMMUNISTS, 1927-1937

LAW KWOK FAI PETER

MPHIL

LINGNAN UNIVERSITY

2015

COLONIALISM AND COMPROMISE: THE SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL AND THE ARREST OF COMMUNISTS, 1927-1937

by LAW Kwok Fai Peter

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy in History

LINGNAN UNIVERSITY

2015

ABSTRACT

Colonialism and compromise: The Shanghai Municipal Council and the arrest of communists, 1927-1937

LAW Kwok Fai Peter

Master of Philosophy

Pressured by the Chinese authorities and the Foreign Office, the Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to compromise with the Nationalist government on the issue of the arrest of communists in the Settlement between 1927 and 1937. Planning for a gradual retreat in the face of fervid Chinese nationalism, the British government had no choice but to ask the Shanghai Municipal Council to satisfy the demands of the Chinese. Meanwhile, confronted with the communist assassinations and open assaults, the law and order in the International Settlement was under serious threat if the Shanghai Municipal Council refused to cooperate with the Nationalists. My research is a study of the cooperation between the Chinese authorities and the Shanghai Municipal Police in arresting communists. The judicial autonomy of the Settlement authorities was severely weakened following the use of three legal processes involved in the treatments of communists, namely, arrest, extradition and reformatory measures. This topic has a policy implication. As one of the greatest colonial powers, Britain used to exercise great influence around the world. Britain and her white settlers strive for the survival of their informal empire in China at the expense of sacrificing their judicial autonomy. My thesis offers a new conceptualisation and periodisation of British decolonisation in East Asia.

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..…………………………………………………...... iii-iv

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION..…………………………………………………...…...…. 1

2. THE KUOMINTANG, CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND THE SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS, 1927-1937………………….…………….…23 Nationalist and communist activities in Shanghai The future of the Shanghai International Settlement Legal reforms of the International Mixed Court

3. ARREST………………………………………………………………...……53 Complex legal procedures Security crises and the Red Brigade A trustworthy partnership

4. EXTRADITION……………………………………………………………...86 Non-residents Bona fide residents The jurisdiction of the Settlement

5. REFORMATORIES……………………………………………………...…111 Reformatories in republican China Dilemma of the Shanghai Municipal Council The destination was Soochow Degeneracy of humanitarian treatment

6. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………...…144

Appendix 1. MAP OF THE SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT IN THE 1935..…………………………………………………………………………...149 2. CORE MEMBERS OF THE SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL IN THE EARLY 1940s………………………………………………………………….150 3. SCENE NEAR LOUZA POLICE STATION 老閘巡捕房 IN NANKING

ROAD AFTER THE MAY THIRTIETH MOVEMENT IN 1925…………….151 4. RESERVE UNIT (RIOT SQUAD) OF THE SMP AND THEIR “RED MARIAS”……………………………………………………………………...152 5. TRIAL IN THE SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL MIXED COURT IN THE LATE 19th CENTURY OR EARLY 20th CENTURY………………………...153 6. PORTRAIT OF CHIEF DETECTIVE INSPECTOR PAT GIVENS…………..154 7. A WARRANT SAMPLE OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST SPECIAL AREA IN SHANGHAI……………………………………………..155 8. FIGURES SHOWING EXTRADITION OF COMMUNISTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT TO CHINESE TERRITORY BETWEEN 13/4/27 AND 23-6-27………………………………………...………………..156 9. FIGURES SHOWING EXTRADITION OF COMMUNISTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT TO CHINESE TERRITORY BETWEEN 23/8/27 AND 21-2-28……………………………………………...…………..158 10. NEWSPAPER CUTTING SHOWING OPPOSITION OF CONSULAR DEPUTY IN A CASE INVOLVED A RESIDENT OF THE SETTLEMENT IN THE LATE 1920s……………………………………………………………...160 11. PORTRAIT OF HILAIRE NOULENS (ALSO KNOWN AS JAKOB RUDNIK) AND HIS WIFE IN CHINESE JAIL IN 1937………………………………...161 12. CONDITIONS INSIDE THE SOOCHOW REFORMATORY………………..162

BIBLIOGRAPHY ……………………..…………………………………………..163

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to the following people who have provided their support to me over the last two years.

The first group of people that I want to thank is those who gave me academic advice and guidance. Professor Robert Bickers facilitated my research to a large extent by indicating to me the locations of many important primary materials stored at archives in Shanghai and Britain. My two supervisors Professor Mark Hampton and Professor Poon Shuk-wah 潘淑華 not only assisted me in structuring my thesis, but also suggested to me lots of useful secondary literature related to the history of the British Empire and the Republic of China. Dr. Sun Huei-min 孫慧敏 provided me with an important interpretation on the context of the warrant system of the

Shanghai Special District Court. Mr. James Fellows and Mr. Simon Case, who were my classmates at Lingnan University, always gave me a helping hand by proofreading my written work and teaching me correct usages of English.

Those who provided me with logistical and administrative support also deserve my compliments here. I want to express my appreciation to archivists Mr. Chao

Chia-Hsuan 趙嘉璿 and Mr. Chang Chi-Hou 張起厚, who tried his very best to find out relevant primary materials for me, although the archive catalogue was incomplete and quite erroneous. Miss Kong Yuk Chui 江玉翠, who helped me to duplicate hundreds of images in the Shanghai Library, also deserves my compliment.

I also want to say thank you to those who received me during my field trips outside

Hong Kong last year. Mr. Kuo Shao-Chi 郭紹箕 and his family were very generous to accommodate me in their home when I was conducting my research in Taipei.

Miss Zhao Meiqing 趙美慶, Miss Wu Xiaoye 吳曉燁, Miss Vivian Huang 黃薇 and

Miss Li Ting 李婷 were very kind in showing me around many colonial legacies in the former International Settlement and the former French Concession in Shanghai. iii

Mr. Soong Kao-Chu 宋高祖 was very helpful to look for an apartment with low rental price for me in Great Britain. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude to Miss Yim Yau-wun 嚴柔媛 who helped me to duplicate several copies of my revised thesis when I was in the United Kingdom.

Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge my family and friends who gave me emotional support throughout my two-year postgraduate study at Lingnan. They not only tried to understand my adversity as a busy postgraduate student, but they have also encouraged me to overcome hurdles when I was conducting this research. I also thank the mighty God for blessing my study at Lingnan University, praising him for his graces and mercies on me in my life. I look forward to conducting new research projects in the future.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“…I am not a criminal. The only thing that the law has against me is that I have other views of government and so my offence is nothing other than political. On this offence if the government of this country should sentence me to death I can have nothing to say in the matter. I admit that I am a communist and I do not fear if the outcome is death for me.”1 Jiang Cinan 蔣次南, the 3rd accused

This thesis tells the story of the weakened judicial independence of the Shanghai

International Settlement during the inter-war period. By doing so, I offer a broader concept in studying the British decolonisation in the Far East. It challenges prevailing understandings that decolonisation is defined based on the transfer of sovereignty by examining the loss of the British judicial autonomy in China. I attempt to discuss the role of the British imperial presence in modern China by studying interplay between the Chinese Communist Party, the Kuomintang, the

Shanghai Municipal Police and the British diplomatic bodies in the Shanghai

International Settlement during the early twentieth century. The arrest of communists and its aftermath is the focus in my research. I will demonstrate two major directions in this thesis. Not only will I argue that British imperial strategies in China were changed following the strengthening of the Kuomintang, but I will also suggest that the British decolonisation in East Asia was started in the mid-1920s.

The first argument raised in this thesis is about the readjustments of the British imperialism in China. As John Darwin observes in his book The Empire Project,

British ruling strategies depended on realities and local circumstances in different colonies although the British world-system still operated throughout the empire.

1 “Extract of proceedings in Shanghai Special District Court for 17th October, 1932” in Case against Chien Tou Seu, ref. D4131, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 (electronic resources), records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Record Group 263, Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, a part of Cengage Learning, 2010 1

Instead of imposing any single policy on all dependent territories, politicians at

Whitehall had to manage the empire based on local factors found in different colonies such as religion, ethnicity, and regional interests.2 In other words, the British government could just implement policies according to local circumstances in different part of the Empire. Similarly, Edmund Fung and Robert Bickers illustrate explicitly on how Britain responded to the challenge of the rising Chinese nationalism in the Inter-war period. Edumnd Fung argues that the British Foreign Office anticipated the gradual transfer of power from Britain to China provided that the

Kuomintang government could maintain a stable trading environment to foreign commercial firms.3 He also states that the British diplomatic bodies were making a lot of financial concessions to the Chinese government in the 1920s concerning the issue of the treaty revision.4 In his work Britain in China, Bickers highlights localisation policies adopted by the British government between the 1920s and 1940s. More influential Chinese were appointed in senior positions of the Shanghai Municipal

Council, its police force, British enterprises and even church organisations.5 British merchants also attempted to establish good relations with Kuomintang officials as well as Chinese merchants.6 In short, the above authors try to examine the shift of British policies in response to local conditions, especially looking at socio-economic changes in the Republican China.

What this thesis contributes to the academic arena is to discuss the relinquishment of

2 John Darwin, The empire project: the rise and fall of the British world-system, 1830-1970 (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3 3 Edmund S.K. Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat : Britain's South China policy, 1924-1931 (Hong Kong : Oxford University Press, 1991), 172-173 4 Edmund Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), 242 5 British firms hired more Chinese employees. Foreign staffs were even requested to learn Chinese. See Robert Bickers, Britain in China: community, culture and colonialism 1900-1949, (Manchester : New York : Manchester University Press, 1999), 158-210 6 Swire offered Song Ziwen 30 percent share of the China Navigation Company in 1935. See Robert Bickers, Britain in China, 171-182 2

the legal autonomy of the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force. I argue that

British foreign policies towards the Nationalist government had largely been redrafted by the 1920s, changing from legal controls to the economic dominance in Shanghai.

Meanwhile, British expatriates in the early twentieth century Shanghai were abandoned by the British metropole in a legal context. The judicial procedure employed by the Shanghai Municipal Police and its Kuomintang counterparts in handling communists is used as an example to illustrate how the loss of the judicial independence and the policing power of the Shanghai International Settlement connected to the readjustment of British imperial policies in the Far East. In fact, the judiciary autonomy of the Settlement was of utmost importance in reflecting the power and the sovereignty of the Shanghai Municipal Police and British expatriates.

Three legal processes including arrest, extradition and reformatory, which were involved in handling communist suspects found in the International Settlement, could show how the Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to compromise with the

Chinese authorities regarding the treatment of communists. With a view to suppressing communism effectively, the Kuomintang demanded the Shanghai

Municipal Police for simplification of arrest procedures when arresting communists hiding in the Settlement. Later, the Chinese authorities furthered requested the

Shanghai Municipal Council to extradite important communist convicts immediately and to hand over communist prisoners to the Soochow reformatory. The above demands violated legal procedures of the Settlement. Therefore, the Shanghai

Municipal Council’s permission in respond to the Kuomintang’s requests demonstrated the transfer of legal power in Shanghai from the British authorities to the

Chinese government.

Meanwhile, surrendering the legal power of Britain in Shanghai to China

unavoidably led to conflict of interests between British settlers in Shanghai and policy-makers in London. Indeed, it was true that British expatriates in Shanghai shared the same Britishness with their kith and kin in Britain. In Empire and globalization, Magee and Thompson study how cultural and ethnical influences affected the integration of the global economy under the British dominance from the mid-19th century to the eve of the First World War. The authors believe that cultural significances provided private initiatives for white settlers to trade with each other in the British Empire.7 Therefore, the unpopularity of communism in Britain mentioned by Andrew Thorpe may also spread to other communities of white settlers in the

Empire during the inter-war years.8

Contradictions between different British interest groups were attributed to the nature of the informal empire. As Jurgen Osterhammel observes, the informal empire survived with the presence of political and business institutions whereas the formal empire was under direct control from the British colonial authorities.9 In the case of the British informal empire in China, the Chinese sovereignty was still respected to a certain extent as Chinese territories were not formally annexed by Britain except

Hong Kong. China was still entitled with the rights to retain its own currency and army, to draft its foreign policies, and to receive recognitions from other countries.10

Instead of managed by the Colonial Office, Shanghai and other treaty ports in China had been governed by municipal governments managed by British expatriates under the protection of the extraterritoriality since 1854. Given that these municipal

7 Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and globalization: networks of people, goods and capital in the British world, c.1850-1914 (Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010) 8 Andrew Thorpe, The Failure of political extremism in inter-war Britain (Exeter : Dept. of History and Archaeology, University of Exeter, 1989), 2-4 9 Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel, Imperialism and after: continuities and discontinuities (London: German Historical Institute, 1986), 299, 307 10 Ibid, 290 4

governments were self-subsidised and only dealt with affairs relating to western interest, treaty ports in China cost little financial burden to Britain.11 In Shanghai, the British concession was amalgamated with other foreign concessions to form the

Shanghai International Settlement in the mid-19th century. [Appendix 1 shows the map of Shanghai in the 1930s.] Subsequently, the Shanghai Municipal Council was found as the local government of the International Settlement. [Please refer to appendix 2]

Yet, this Council, which was dominated by British members, was only responsible to the interests of its multi-national taxpayers in the Settlement.12 Moreover, foreign settlers in Shanghai even had their own armed forces to defend themselves. Founded in

1850s, the Shanghai Municipal Police and the Shanghai Volunteer Corps maintained the law and order inside the settlement.13 As a result, British subjects in China enjoyed a very large degree of freedom. They could establish their own business companies and missionary stations almost without any restrictions in Shanghai. Therefore, the role of the British government in Shanghai was very limited. The British government could provide diplomatic and military protection for their fellow subjects only if it received requests from the Council.14 Therefore, municipal governments controlled by white settlers in the informal empire had different considerations and calculation compared to the British metropole.

Consequently, the relinquishment of the legal autonomy in Shanghai aroused antagonism between the British government and British settlers in Shanghai. As John

Darwin states, it is a mistake to think that Whitehall policy-makers imposed the same imperial policy on different dependent territories because of “variable costs and

11 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British imperialism, 1688-2000 (New York: Longman, 2002), 363 12 Ibid, 168-169 13 Ibid, 166 14 Robert Bickers, Britain in China, 3 5

benefits for different sections of British society”.15 In fact, the British government prepared for a gradual retreat from Shanghai in the 1920s. The two main concerns that the British Foreign Office had were to prevent anti-British antagonism and to retain the British economic influence in Shanghai.16 Facing the rise the Kuomintang government, British officials realised that it was no longer possible to preserve the

Shanghai Settlement by force.17 But they refused to completely repudiate the extraterritoriality and would not return the Shanghai Settlement to China immediately. This was because British officials and entrepreneurs worried that the progress of legal and political reforms implemented by the Kuomintang was still far from meeting the Anglo-Saxon standard, causing unfavourable conditions for British investments in China.18 Yet, the British Foreign Office recognised that if it did nothing to please the Chinese public and the Kuomintang, anti-British strikes and demonstrations could lead to further suspension of trades and heavy casualties.

Therefore, as Edmund Fung argues, the British government adopted the policy of

“combining conciliation with firmness” in Shanghai before returning the Settlement to China.19 Whitehall policy-makers not only dispatched troops to defend Shanghai, but it also gradually made political and legal concessions. By doing so, the British authorities hoped that the Nationalist government could stop agitating any anti-British activities in China and protected British economic interests in Shanghai.

With the support of British merchants, the British Foreign Office began to intervene in the administration of the Settlement by pressuring the Shanghai Municipal Council

15 John Darwin, The empire project, 14 16 Edmund Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat, 5 17 Ibid, 7 18 G.W. Swire, The Possibilities of the Shanghai Negotiations, 14th April, 1932, Avon Papers, 3; “Enclosure No.II in H.M Minister’s despatch to F.O of 7th June, 1929”, FO676/316, British Foreign Office papers, 2 19 Edmund Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat, 10 6

to carry out various reforms alleviating anti-British feelings in Shanghai.20 In the case of handling communists in the Shanghai Settlement, the British authorities were sympathetic to the Kuomintang in suppressing communist activities in China not only because of their hatred of communist disturbances, but also because of their fear about the rise of the Kuomintang. This thesis shows how the British Foreign Office intervened in the extradition of communist suspects who were also Chinese residents protected by the Shanghai Municipal Council, and illustrates in what ways Britain implemented Chinese penal regulations in the jails inside the Settlement. Hence,

Britain abandoned British expatriates by sacrificing the legal independence of the

International Settlement.

However, British settlers in Shanghai found it difficult to relinquish their legal autonomy. As a part of colonial policing networks, the Shanghai Municipal Police exchanged intelligence about the movements of notable communists with other

British military and police authorities. With a view to maintaining the law and order, the Shanghai Municipal Police were even trustworthy partners of the Chinese intelligence authorities in suppressing communist activities and anti-foreign demonstrations. Under the command of the Special Branch chief T.P. Givens, the

Shanghai Municipal Police established a mutual understanding with Chinese agents when arresting communists. Violations of settlement judicial procedures and legal practices were very common to make arrests more effective and efficient. As

Georgina Sinclair argues, British laws and legal procedures were inapplicable in colonies.21 Compared with their kith and kin in the British metropole, colonial police officers in the empire experienced a different policing context because they served

20 Robert Bicker, Britain in China,116-117 21 Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line: colonial policing and the imperial endgame, 1945-80 (Manchester; New York : Manchester University Press, 2006), 5 7

the sovereign state rather than colonial subjects.22 Therefore, colonial policemen tended not to abide by regular legal procedures since the survival of the British imperial interest was more important.23 But the idea of imperial policing suggested by Georgina Sinclair cannot directly be applied in the context of the British informal empire in Shanghai. It was true that police forces could decide how to execute arrest orders. Yet, it was necessary, if not essential, for police officers to seek instructions from the higher authorities of the Settlement when they received requests from China concerning political issues such as extradition and reformatory. Therefore, only by studying the disappointments of British settlers can we truly realise the decline of the

British imperial presence in Shanghai.

After spending years living in Britain, many foreign settlers shared similar legal spirits and policing ideas with their kith and kin at home.24 Coherence of judicial values possessed by British expatriates echoes Gary B. Magee and Andrew S.

Thompson’s idea concerning the pan-imperial and cultural unity among British migrants overseas.25 In fact, the British policing developed along the line of

Anglo-Saxon tradition that “the law reflected the will of the people, which every free man had an obligation to uphold” and differed from the Roman beliefs emphasised

22 Ibid, 2 23 Ibid, 7 24 Dr. Kiebtner, former adviser to Jiang Jieshi, stated that the institutional differences of the police systems between the two foreign concessions and China caused conflicts between the Chinese authorities and the International Settlement. The Shanghai Municipal Police arrested the communists based on evidence, whereas the Chinese policemen could apprehend someone based on reasonable suspicions." See “Interview with Dr. Von Kiebtner" in Shanghai Gonggong Zujie Gongbujuzongbanchu Youguan Jingwuchu Guanyu Kelaina Boshi Fabiao Guanyu Guomindang Zhengfu He Jiang Jieshi Dui Shanghaizujie Taidu De Tanhua De Baogao (1929-1930) [上海公共租界工部局總辦處有關工部局警務處關於克萊納博士發表關於國民黨政府和蔣介石對上海租界態度的談話的報告 (1929-1930)] [Report made by the Shanghai Municipal Police concerning Dr. Kiebtner on the attitude of the Nationalist Government and Jiang Jieshi towards in the International Settlement] in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930, ref.: U1-6-22, 30th December, 1929 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive), 1-3 25 Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and globalization : networks of people, goods and capital in the British world, c.1850-1914, (Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010) 8

on controlling social stability by a “centralised force”.26 With the progress of democracy in Britain, the police system in the metropole had to further reform itself in order to recognise the evolution of civil citizenship in the 19th century.27 Indeed,

British expatriates in Shanghai were entrenched in the above judicial perception.

Many British settlers, including Municipal Advocates, the Council Secretary, and even some senior police officers were keen to uphold the British traditional legal system in the settlement. They blamed the Shanghai Municipal Police and the

Kuomintang for subverting formal legal procedures and practices in handling the communists under the jurisdiction of the settlement. In their perspectives, violation of legal procedures not only caused injustice on the accused, but it also challenged the judicial integrity of the International Settlement. As a consequence, British expatriates were discontented that their legal autonomy was weakened by the British

Foreign Office and the Kuomintang.

In addition, British pressure groups also worked against their home government.

Antoinette Burton stresses that socio-political debates in Britain were framed by imperial issues. Pressure groups drew upon imperial matters in order to urge their home government to reform. Burton argues that primary intentions of domestic campaigners were to ‘evaluate the successes and failures of Anglo-Saxon values and

“colonial” projects’.28 Similarly, Andrew Thompson discusses how pressure groups and the media in Britain drew the parliament’s attention to the empire in the 19th and

20th century.29 This thesis illustrates how the Howard League for Penal Reform and

26 Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line: colonial policing and the imperial endgame, 1945-80 (Manchester; New York : Manchester University Press, 2006), 4 27 Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line: colonial policing and the imperial endgame, 1945-80 (Manchester; New York : Manchester University Press, 2006), 5 28 Antoinette Burton, Empire in question: reading, writing, and teaching British imperialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 264 29 Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: the empire in British politics, c. 1880-1932 (Harlow, England ; New York : Longman, 2000) 9

the League Against Imperialism and for National Independence highlighted the limitations of the British and the Settlement authorities when dealing with the extradition and the imprisonment of communist suspects. To conclude, British settlers in Shanghai were abandoned by the British government as they could no longer enjoy their legal autonomy in the International Settlement.

The second issue that I attempt to renegotiate is concerning the periodisation of the

British decolonisation. I argue that the 1920 decade was the beginning of the British decolonisation in Asia. Prevailing understandings on the term decolonisation mainly refers to the change of flags in colonies. Different national flags replaced the Union

Jack, flying at different government offices. In accordance of John Darwin, the final stage of the British decolonisation only took place when Britain transferred its political sovereignty back to its colonial subjects in the post-war era. Failing to exercise effective political control on the Empire, the British imperial presence eventually came to an end in the 1950s and the 1960s.30 Apart from Darwin, many scholars also put their focus on the post-war period when studying the topic about the western decolonisation. Ronald Hyam in his book Britain’s Declining Empire attributes the inevitability for the collapse of the British Empire to several post-war factors such as rising nationalism in colonies and the Cold War.31 Similarly, John

Springhall suggests that nationalism and international pressure led to the downfall of the western imperialism after 1945.32

Yet, I am inclined to show my agreement with Robert Bickers who suggests that the origins of the British decolonisation should be traced back to the inter-war period,

30 John Darwin, Britain and decolonisation : the retreat from empire in the post-war world (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1988), 6 31 Ronald Hyam, Britain's declining empire: the road to decolonisation, 1918-1968, (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006) 32 John Springhall, Decolonization since 1945: the collapse of European overseas empires , (Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York : Palgrave, 2001) 10

especially in the late 1920s.33 Apart from its political definition, decolonisation can also be understood in a cultural point of view. According to “Rethinking

Decolonization”, A. G. Hopkins highlights that white dominions only obtained full independence from Britain when they abolished their socio-economic connections to their Kith and Kin in Britain after the Second World War. During the inter-war period, white dominions became politically autonomous after agreements were signed between themselves and Britain in the 1920s. However, white dominions still economically and culturally linked to the British metropole.34 Thus, Hopkins argues that such status was not a complete independence for these dominions. Instead, the actual decolonisation found in white dominions has only begun since the 1960s, when British cultures connecting Britain and its dominions became less significant.

Not only were white settlers deprived of British citizenships, but their courts also stopped appealing to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.35 The British monarchy had only symbolic meaning towards white dominions. Consequently, the

British decolonisation in white dominions was fully accomplished when white settlers finally relinquished their cultural concept of Britishness and developed their own national identities.36

Likewise, the forfeit of the British judicial independence in the Shanghai

Settlement signified the beginning of the British decolonisation in the early 20th century China. Since the rise of the Nationalist government in the late 1920s, white settlers in Shanghai had been deprived of their own jurisdiction to handle communists found in the Settlement. With a view to eliminating political rivalries of the Kuomintang, the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police forces had to

33 Robert Bickers, Britain in China, 18 34 A. G. Hopkins, "Rethinking Decolonization" in Past and Present, August 2008 (Vol. 200, No. 1), 218 35 Ibid, 229 36 Ibid, 235 11

relinquish their British legal values when dealing with sensitive cases relating to communism. The Settlement Police started to ignore warrants details stated by the court to arrest communists. More importantly, the Council not only extradited its own residents engaging in communists activities to the Chinese authorities, but it also handed over its “repented” and “non-repented” prisoners to the Soochow reformatory. Therefore, these actions violated British legal and policing values which respected the will of the people, the rule of law, and the humanitarianism.37 As a result, the failure of British settlers to uphold their judiciary values unavoidably signified partial disappearance of Britishness, resulting in the British decolonisation in a legal context.

British imperial policing in Shanghai

The imperial policing also forms an indispensable part relating to the British imperialism. I argue that collaboration with a foreign country was one of the ways for police forces in different colonies to maintain social stabilities during the British decolonisation. Many historians study how imperial police forces reacted when the

British supremacy was challenged by colonial subjects. In accordance with Charles

Jeffries, the imperial policing was mixed with military component when existence of colonial regimes was under threat. The semi-military model of the Royal Irish

Constabulary in Ireland was widely used to suppress disturbances and wars threatening the British imperial presence in the inter-war period.38 When the Second

World War was over, Britain even invested more resources in policing its empire where independence movements prevailed. In Policing and decolonisation, David

Anderson and David Killingray state that the Colonial Office began to centralise

37 Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line, 4-5; William Forsythe, The reform of prisoners, 1830-1900 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 8-13 38 Charles Jeffries, The colonial police (London: M. Parrish, 1952), 32 12

police forces overseas, carrying out institutional reforms to strengthen its control towards colonial policemen.39 Meanwhile, the police authorities also set up special branches to collect intelligence, working with Security Services (MI5) in the United

Kingdom to suppress anti-British activities.40 Similarly, Georgina Sinclair argues that the power of colonial police forces rose rapidly during post-war period. With a view to protecting the imperial presence in the face of high-tide nationalism, colonial police officers obtained more autonomy in developing intelligence and military precaution measures.41 Hence, the above authors mainly concentrate on studying uses of force and the intelligence gathering of the colonial police during the British decolonisation in post-war period.

Alternatively, I suggest that the collaboration between the Shanghai Municipal

Police and the Kuomintang was another way to suppress communism in the British

Empire. Instead of the Shanghai Municipal Police, the Kuomintang had become the real authority enjoying the “escalation” of police power in the settlement since the

1920s. Facing the pressure from the Chinese authorities, the Shanghai Municipal

Council reluctantly violated legal procedures. However, the Shanghai Municipal

Police were very keen to facilitate arrests of communists. Indeed, the Shanghai

Municipal Police shared lots of similarities with its counterparts in other British dependent territories. Composed of approximately 6,200 police officers and clerical supernumeraries from China, Japan, India, and western countries, the Settlement

Police was under the command of the Shanghai Municipal Council dominated by the

British. Senior ranks were predominately filled by the Europeans.42 These policemen

39 David Anderson and David Killingray, Policing and decolonisation: politics, nationalism and the Police, 1917-65 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 5-6 40 Ibid, 17 41 Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line : colonial policing and the imperial endgame, 1945-80 (Manchester ; New York : Manchester University Press, 2006), 7 42 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports 1st January- 30th June, 1933, 15th June, 1933, 13

also shared similar anti-communist sentiments with other British imperial police forces overseas.43 Thus, arresting communists was necessary in order to protect

British interests in Shanghai.

Yet, the Shanghai Municipal Police took a more active initiative to suppress communist activities in the Settlement compared to their bosses in the Council. As

David Anderson and David Killingray note, police forces not only had to defend interests of propertied classes, but they also had to maintain social stabilities.44 The

Kuomintang regime had persecuted communists in China since the death of Dr. Sun

Zhongshan in 1925. The actions that illustrate the Kuomintang’s determination in eliminating communists were its military campaigns encircling and exterminating communist troops 剿匪 led by Mao Zedong 毛澤東 and Zhude 朱德 in rural areas during the early 1930s.45 In urban area, under the commands of the Nationalist government and the Green Gang leader Du Yuesheng 杜月笙, gangsters based in the

French concession passed through the International Settlement and eventually purged all communist societies in Zhabei 閘北 area in early 1927.46 The Shanghai

International Settlement, which enjoyed a status of political neutrality, became a refuge for communists to hide. As a consequence, communist activities had become one of the festering problems in Shanghai since the mid 1920s. Many strikes and demonstrations agitated by communist members created disturbances in the

International Settlement. S. A. Smith illustrates the efforts of communists in agitating ref.: U1-1-1168, (unpublished materials stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive), 179 43 Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and globalization : networks of people, goods and capital in the British world, c.1850-1914 (Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010); Stuart Ward, “The end of empire and the fate of Britishness” in Helen Brocklehurst and Robert Philips ed., History Nationhood and the Question of Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 245 44 David Anderson and David Killingray, Policing the empire: government, authority, and control, 1830-1940 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 6 45 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The rise of modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 557-563 46 Brian G. Martin, The Shanghai Green Gang: politics and organized crime, 1919-1937 (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1996), 106 14

the mass to openly revolt against warlords and the colonial authorities in the early

1920s. He also discusses the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party in creating disturbances in the May Thirtieth incident and armed uprisings against warlords in

Shanghai.47 In her work Underground, Patricia Stranahan further argues that changing communist strategies in Shanghai were a result of political persecutions by the Kuomintang. Communists began to abandon original Marxist idea advocated by the Commintern, ingratiating themselves with other patriotic organisations to establish united fronts in Shanghai against the Kuomintang and imperialists.48 Worse still, the massacres of some communist traitors’ family by the Red Brigade even exposed significant security crisis in two foreign concessions, creating embarrassments and challenges to the foreign police authorities in the early1930s.49

With a view to safeguarding the law and order in the settlements, both the

Shanghai Municipal Police and the French Concession Police decided to ally with the Kuomintang to arrest communists at all cost.50 The settlement authorities not only exchanged confidential intelligence with the Chinese authorities, but they also allowed Chinese agents to join Settlement policemen in conducting raids on communist bases. More importantly, the Shanghai Municipal Police even violated legal procedures when arresting communists even though such practice contradicted to the will of the Council in defending the legal integrity of the Settlement. During arrests, police officers ignored the content stated in warrants and sometimes even apprehended suspects without first applying for warrants from the court. Therefore,

47 S.A.Smith, A road is made: Communism in Shanghai, 1920-1927 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 5-7 48 Patricia Stranahan, Underground: the Shanghai Communist Party and the politics of survival, 1927-1937 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 5 49 The massacre of Gu Shunzhang 顧順章’s family in 1931 was an important turning point facilitating the cooperation between the Chinese and Settlement authorities in suppressing communism in Shanghai. See Frederic Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, 155-160 50 Ibid 15

the collaboration between the Shanghai Municipal Police and the Kuomintang in arresting communists could benefit both the Settlement and the Chinese authorities in maintaining social stabilities in Shanghai.

The Kuomintang and the strengthening of China

Apart from looking at the British perspective, this thesis also has an implication on the history of modern China. I argue that the rise of republican China in the late

1920s appeared in the form of diplomatic interventions, dominating municipal administrations and the legal structure of the Shanghai International Settlement. After the completion of the northern expedition by General Jiang Jieshi 蔣介石 in 1927, the

Nanjing government pushed hard to modernise China with a view to repealing the extraterritoriality. Shanghai was one of test points for the Nationalist government to modernise the country. In the existing literature about the history of republican China, historians mainly concentrate on how the Kuomintang attempted to strengthen the whole country through increasing its control in societies internally.

The Kuomintang consolidated its political power in Shanghai by establishing its city government. Christian Henriot illustrates the modernisation of municipal administrations in the Kuomintang controlled Shanghai in 1920s and 1930s.51 In

"Designing China's urban future", Kerrie L. MacPherson shows how the Greater

Shanghai Plan 大上海計劃 had been advocated since the 1910s. A modern urban planning was an evidence to show China’s determination in restructuring the country and counteracting foreign influences in Shanghai.52 Only by creating a modernised

Chinese municipality could justify the ability of the Chinese government to recover the Shanghai International Settlement and the French Concessions in the future.

51 Christian Henriot, Noel Castelino trans., Shanghai, 1927-1937: municipal power, locality, and modernization (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1993), 1-2 52 Kerrie L. MacPherson, "Designing China's urban future: The Greater Shanghai Plan, 1927–1937", Planning Perspectives, volume 5, issue 1, 1990, 47 16

Meanwhile, the Kuomintang also attempted to infiltrate its influence into foreign concessions through an informal way. In The Shanghai Green Gang states that the

Chinese authorities inwardly allied with a triad society called the Shanghai Green

Gang 上海青幫, controlling labour class people in two foreign concessions.

The Nationalist government also tightened its control in socio-economic aspects.

Economically, the Kuomintang exerted its influence in the financial sector of the country. Zheng Huixin 鄭會欣 examines the Kuomintang’s attempt to modernise the economy of China by carrying out fiscal reforms, clearing debts and seeking for foreign assistances.53 Parks Coble studied how the Nationalist government decided to emasculate the political power of the Chinese capitalists and to develop the modernisation of economic sectors in Shanghai under its supervision.54 On the other hand, the Chinese authorities imposed social regulations on the public based on western models. Penal reform was one of the ways to modernise China. In his book

Crime, punishment, Frank Dikötter discusses the evolution of the Chinese penal system from the late Qing period to the end of the republican era. In particular, he studies significances of changing cultural and social customs of prisons in modern

China. The establishment of the reformatories and the restructuring of prisons were reformative means used by the Nanjing government to re-educate its fellow countrymen who were always regarded as uncivilised in the eyes of westerners.55

The Chinese judiciary and policing system also experienced reforms when Jiang

Jieshi rose to power. As Frederic Wakeman observes in Policing Shanghai, the

53 Zheng, Huixin 鄭會欣，Gaige Yu Kunyou: Sanshi Niandai Guominzhengfu de Changshi 《改革與困擾: 三十年代國民政府的嘗試》 Reform and disturbance: the attempt of the Nationalist Government in the 1930s (Hong Kong 香港: Hong Kong Educational Publishing Company 香港敎育圖書公司，1998). 54 Parks M. Coble, The Shanghai capitalists and the Nationalist government, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986), 3 55 Frank Dikötter, Crime, punishment and the prison in modern China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2002), 2, 219-220, 280 17

Nationalist government attempted to reform the Chinese police system in Shanghai by learning from western legal models.56 But he also attributes the failure of the modernisation of the social institution in Shanghai to the “lamentable durability of governmentalised autocracy” under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi.57 Yao Yuan examines legal mechanisms of the Shanghai Provisional Court and the Shanghai

Special District Court under the control of the Kuomintang, showing the gradual cancellation of western judicial privileges in the Shanghai International Settlement.58

Instead of studying the internal strengthening of republican China, this thesis attempts to examine in what ways the Kuomintang used diplomatic means to elevate the international reputation of the Republic of China and to achieve its political motives in the 1920s and 1930s. The International Settlement was under threat if the

Shanghai Municipal Council refused to cooperate with the Chinese authorities. The

Kuomintang could utilise anti-foreign sentiments to their advantage in coercing the

Settlement authorities and even demanding for immediate relinquishment of the extraterritoriality possessed by foreign expatriates. Pressured by the British Foreign

Office, the Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to compromise with the

Nationalist government concerning arrests of communists in the Settlement between

1927 and 1937. As a result, warlord Wu Peifu 吳佩孚 of Zhili clique 直系 and later the Nationalist government successfully pressured Britain and other western powers to review the agreements of the unequal treaties accepted by the Qing Court.

Diplomats from western countries eventually signed two rendition agreements with

China in 1926 and 1930 relating to the repudiation of some western legal privileges

56 Frederic Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), xvi 57 Ibid, xvi-xvii 58 Yao Yuan 姚遠，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研究》 (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s press 上海人民出版社, 2011), 37-58, 70-107 18

in Shanghai. Not only did the Shanghai International Settlement have to gradually return the Shanghai Mixed Court to China, but it abided also by the Chinese law codes and relevant prison regulations. Indeed, this could externally raise the reputation of China in the international stage. More importantly, this diplomatic victory also provided the Kuomintang with legitimacy to suppress its political rivalries through implementing Chinese law codes in foreign concessions and controlling the Settlement courts.

As a result, the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force were forced to satisfy the political motives of the Kuomintang regime at the expense of their judicial autonomy and British legal values. The Settlement authorities were enthusiastic in arresting communists not only because communists had detrimental effects on

British commercial interests in Shanghai, but also because they were political rivalries of the Kuomintang. Therefore, although the British Foreign Office didn't physically return the settlement to the Nationalist government, its compromise concerning the transformation of the settlement court under predominant influence of the Chinese government would unavoidably serve the Kuomintang's desire in eliminating its political counterparts. The following chapters show the Shanghai

Municipal Police arresting people based on the Chinese criminal codes 中華民國刑

法, extraditing communist suspects to the Chinese authorities in accordance with the decision made by Chinese judges, and handing over communist prisoners to

Soochow reformatory according to the regulations governing reformatories 反省院

條例. It was true that the Kuomintang was able to recover its judicial power from

Britain and successfully accomplished its political intentions in foreign concessions through diplomatic means. Hence, diplomacy took an important role in suppressing communist activities in the International Settlement during the Nanjing decade.

This thesis is divided into two parts. Chapter 2 gives an overview of complex political conditions in Shanghai and the changing Sino-British relations in the early

20th century. I discuss how the paralysation of foreign trade by Chinese nationalism altered the attitude of the British Foreign Office towards the future of Shanghai. Then,

I address in what ways the Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to compromise with China concerning the transformation of the judicial system in the settlement under the pressure of the British metropole. The judicial reconstruction in foreign concessions in the late 1920s was the backdrop for arrests of communists. The second part of this thesis illustrates legal procedures concerning apprehensions of communists and its aftermath. In Chapter 3, the increasing internal violence in the International

Settlement compelled the Shanghai Municipal Police to cooperate with the Chinese authorities to apprehend communists by ignoring details stated in court warrants.

Arrests were almost carried out based on mere suspicions of the Chinese intelligence officers. Chapter 4 reveals the surrender of the International Settlement’s jurisdiction power to China in cases about communist extraditions. The Shanghai Municipal

Council was deprived of its legal capacity to defend its Chinese residents and its own judicial authority in the settlement. The role of the British diplomatic bodies in extradition cases are also examined here. Chapter 5 explores that the Shanghai

Municipal Gaol functioned in line with Chinese prison regulations not only by allowing Kuomintang delegates to examine prisoners’ thoughts, but also by sending their convicts to the Soochow reformatory 蘇州反省院 established for reshaping ideologies of political offenders. British penal values emphasising humanitarian treatments were therefore abandoned.

The steady release of sources in the Shanghai Municipal Archive 上海市檔案館 allows me to explore further for this sensitive topic. Some of the internal

correspondences between the council secretary, senior officers of the police force and the municipal advocate allowed me to understand their original judicial values and political motives in response to Chinese requests. Police daily reports and intelligence reports also provided me with an overview about arrest processes and individual judgments made by the settlement court. Special Branch files available in National

Archives and Records Administration of the United States also facilitate my research.

The annual reports of the Shanghai Municipal Council found in the special collection department of the University of Hong Kong provided me with basic information regarding structures of municipal institutions and criminal figures in the Settlement.

Memoirs of communists convicts can be found in the Shanghai Library 上海圖書館, describing contrasts between being imprisoned in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol and being incarcerated in the Soochow Reformatory.

Materials stored in the United Kingdom were useful in realising the mentalities of

British diplomats. Foreign Office papers kept in the National Archives at Kew and in

Adam Matthew online database illustrate actions and considerations of the British government towards the treaty revision and some individual cases of communist arrests in the International Settlement. The Cadbury Research Library of the

University of Birmingham has a good collection of Chamberlain family papers, of which Austen Chamberlain’s private papers revealed the determination of Whitehall policy-makers and British businessmen to retain British economic interests in

Shanghai at the expense of some privileges.

Last but not least, the Ministry of Justice of the Bureau of Investigation 法務部調

查局 in Taiwan (the Republic of China) keeps some memoirs and reports of those

Chinese intelligence officers involved in apprehending communists during their collaborations with the Shanghai Municipal Police in the 1920s and 1930s. Their

testimonies can illustrate how increasing communist assassinations in the settlement had forced the municipal police to cooperate with the Chinese authorities without any hesitations by early 1930s. Insistence of the Settlement Police on formal legal procedures before the occurrence of the security crisis could be shown in these memoirs as well. There were miscellaneous telegrams and dispatches written between

Jiang Jieshi and his subordinates showing details of different individual communist cases in the Academia Historica 國史館 and the Kuomintang Archive 中國國民黨

黨史館 in Taibei 臺北.

To conclude, this thesis examines how Britain and her white settlers strive for the survival of their interests in China through sacrificing their judicial autonomy in

Shanghai. It is hoped that this thesis can provide new conceptualisation and periodisation of British decolonisation in East Asia.

CHAPTER 2

THE KUOMINTANG, CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND

THE SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS, 1927-1937

“The more gradually the changes are made and the more willingly reforms are introduced, the more secure will be the interests of the settlement and the better its relations with the Chinese authorities.”59

Sir Austen Chamberlain (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

In spite of the fact that the Chinese formed a large population and contributed a large sum of revenue to the British concessions, the Shanghai Municipal Council mainly concerned foreign interests and ignored ordinary Chinese people. Neither did

Chinese children enjoy educational opportunities in the Settlement, nor were Chinese workers protected by any industrial ordinances. More importantly, the 1920 decade made a drastic change in socio-political conditions in China and threatened the survival of the British informal empire. Despite the establishment of the Republic of

China in 1912, continuous diplomatic defeats and internal political fragmentations led to instabilities and anti-foreign sentiments in China since the late 1910s. An array of incidents such as the Japanese succession on the German sphere of influence in

Shandong and the bloodshed between different warlords further aroused the awareness of Chinese citizens about the safety of their own country. With a view to saving their motherland, Chinese intellectuals introduced many western thoughts to modernise their country during the May Fourth Movement in 1919.60 Communism, which was regarded as one of “remedies” to cure wounds of China, was advocated

59 Sir Austen Chamberlain, “Foreign Office Confidential Print copy of telegram no. 17 dated 16th May 1929 from Austen Chamberlain at the Foreign Office in London to British Consul General Garstin in Shanghai”, FO405/261 in Robert L. Jarman, Shanghai political & economic reports, , 1842-1943 (Slough : Archive Editions, 2008),volume 16, 345 60 Jürgen Osterhammel, China, Wm.Roger Louis ed., The Oxford history of the British Empire, volume IV (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1998-1999), 646 23

by some pioneers such as Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀, Li Dachao 李大釗. They were motivated by the success of the October Revolution in Russia in 1917.61 Thus, the

Chinese Communist Party was found in a context of strong national sentiment in

1921 and became one of main characters appearing in this thesis.

Triggered by the municipal police’s suppressions on Chinese civilians on May thirtieth [Please refer to appendix 3], the fervid Chinese nationalism caused disturbances in the Shanghai international settlement. Consequently, a shooting incident ended up with huge casualties. Strikes, boycotts and even assassinations occurred frequently in 1925 and 1926. Western enterprises in China became chief targets attacked by the Chinese. When Jiang Jishi rose to power in China, he even promised to Chinese merchants that he was going to “restore the Settlement within three years”. Worse still, communists even made good use of the Chinese nationalism to initiate more mass demonstrations and even murdering cases. Therefore, during the 1920s and 1930s, the turmoil in Shanghai not only paralysed British-invested factories and companies, but it also created anxieties and strains among British communities.62 Meanwhile, after the completion of the Northern Expedition in 1927, the warlord era ended and China was unified by Jiang Jieshi. The Nationalist government therefore could concentrate its effort in abolishing foreign concessions recognised by the former Qing Court. Such circumstances marked the shift of British foreign policies in China.

Confronted with unfavourable circumstances, the British Foreign Office planned for readjustments of imperial policies in China. In 1929, the Secretary of Foreign

Affairs Austen Chamberlain instructed his colleagues that “The more gradually the

61 S.A. Smith, A road is made, 9-11 62 “Letter written from Austen Chamberlain to Hilton Young, 3rd August, 1927”, ref.: AC54/502, Austen Chamberlain Papers (Birmingham: unpublished private papers stored in Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham). 24

changes are made and the more willingly reforms are introduced, the more secure will be the interests of the settlement and the better its relations with the Chinese authorities.”63 Apparently, Austen Chamberlain believed that the Sino-British relations and foreign interests in China could only be secured by introducing gradual reforms and changes in the Settlement. As a result, the Shanghai Municipal Council not only drastically raised the number of Chinese members in the Council, but it also implemented the Chinese criminal codes and procedures in the Settlement in the late

1920s. The British Foreign Office even compromised with the Nationalist government to cancel the companion of the Consular deputy in the Court afterwards.

Therefore, the Settlement could not openly oppose decisions made by Chinese judges who were appointed by the Chinese government later on. Further to the above concessions, the Chinese authorities even wanted the Settlement to provide more convenience and concession in dealing with arrests of communists and its aftermath.

In the existing literature, scholars have been pushing hard to investigate the internal turmoil in China during the 1920s and inter-war British foreign policies in the Far East. Nevertheless, rarely do they connect the above two aspects in the context of the Shanghai International Settlement. Concerning Nationalist and communist activities in Shanghai, Stranahan and Smith attempt to explain general communist strategies and tactics in counteracting the Kuomintang and the Settlement authorities. Making good use of the fervid Chinese nationalism, Chinese communists in Shanghai initiated mass demonstrations, strikes and even assassinations in order to paralyse the Settlement.64 Wang Fuqun studies tactics adopted by the Kuomintang

63 Sir Austen Chamberlain, “Foreign Office Confidential Print copy of telegram no. 17 dated 16th May 1929 from Austen Chamberlain at the Foreign Office in London to British Consul General Garstin in Shanghai”, FO405/261 in Robert L. Jarman, Shanghai political & economic reports, , 1842-1943, volume 16, 345 64 S.A.Smith, A road is made: Communism in Shanghai, 1920-1927 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 5-7; Patricia Stranahan, Underground: the Shanghai Communist Party and the politics 25

agents to counteract communist underground activities.65 The strengthening of the

Kuomintang in Shanghai is also well-noted by other scholars. Parks Coble demonstrates how the Nationalist government emasculated the political power of

Chinese capitalists and fostered the modernisation of economic sector in Shanghai.66

Christian Henriot depicts that the transformation of municipal administrations in

Kuomintang controlled Shanghai was under the surveillance of the Settlement authorities in the 1920s and 1930s.67 Frederic Wakeman also illustrates the

Nationalists government’s attempt to reform the police force in Shanghai based on western models.68 However, the above authors never reveal to what extent these patriotic activities, either led by the Kuomintang or communists, affected British diplomatic policies in China.

Another field that scholars have paid much attention is about British foreign policies in the Far East during the inter-war period. Peter Lowe mentions the British declining power in the Far East forced Britain to give much concession to the

Nationalist government.69 Whilst studying British diplomacy in Southern China,

Edumnd Fung suggests that the British Foreign Office anticipated the gradual transfer of power from Britain to China in the 1920s provided that the Kuomintang government could maintain a stable trading environment to foreign firms.70

Nevertheless, neither Peter Lowe nor Edumnd Fung illustrates how Chamberlain’s of survival, 1927-1937 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 5 64 Ibid, 107-121 65 Wang Fuqun (王福羣),《中共早期特務工作之硏究, 1928-1934》 (Taibei: unpublished master thesis, National Chengchi University, 1978), 103-124 66 Parks M. Coble, The Shanghai capitalists and the Nationalist government, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986), 3 67 Christian Henriot, Noel Castelino trans., Shanghai, 1927-1937: municipal power, locality, and modernization (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1993), 1-2 68 Frederic Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), xvi 69 Peter Lowe, Britain in the Far East: a survey from 1819 to the present (London: Longman, 1981), 130-133 70 Edmund S.K. Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat : Britain's South China policy, 1924-1931 (Hong Kong : Oxford University Press, 1991), 172-173 26

conciliatory attitude influenced the governance of the Shanghai Municipal Council.

Although Robert Self briefly mentions the conciliatory attitude of Chamberlain concerning the treaty revision issue of the international settlement, he does not explain Chamberlain’s goal and methods behind the scene.71 Meanwhile, Antony

Best also shows how the spread of communism in the Far East aroused great attention of British intelligence departments apart from the Japanese expansion in

China.72 But again, Shanghai is not the focus of Antony Best. Nicholas R. Clifford shows how Westerners in Shanghai survived in the face of the Chinese revolution in the 1920s.73 Yet, how the British authorities dealt with arrests of communists in the

International Settlement is still not explored.

Reforms that the Shanghai Municipal Council adopted in the face of the fervid

Chinese nationalism have been largely neglected in the academic arena. Yao Yuan examines gradual cancellations of western judicial privileges in the Settlement legal framework. The Shanghai Provisional Court and the Shanghai Special District Court were used as her examples.74 Besides, Robert Bickers illustrates how British settlers gradually surrendered their powers to the Chinese since the 1920s. Nevertheless,

Bickers primarily studies the localisation of British commercial and religious institutions in China instead of the transformation of political and legal aspects.75

Yet, how did concessions made by the British authorities favour the Kuomintang to arrest Chinese communists?

71 Robert C. Self, The Austen Chamberlain diary letters: the correspondence of Sir Austen Chamberlain with his sisters Hilda and Ida, 1916-1937 (London ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1995), 303 72 Antony Best, British intelligence and the Japanese challenge in Asia, 1914-1941 (Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 5 73 Nicholas R. Clifford, Spoilt children of empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese revolution of the 1920s (Middlebury, T.: University Press of New England, 1991), 249-256 74 Yao Yuan [姚遠]，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研究》 (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s press 上海人民出版社, 2011), 37-58, 70-107 75 Robert Bickers, Britain in China : community, culture and colonialism 1900-1949 (Manchester ; New York : Manchester University Press, 1999), 117 27

In my opinion, it was necessary, if not essential that the British government had to allow the Chinese influence to penetrate into the Shanghai International Settlement in the 1920s. Thus, I elaborate further on the argument raised by Robert Bickers who emphasises the role of the British Foreign Office in seizing the British settlers’ power in Shanghai after the 1920s. There is no doubt that the British Empire in China survived at the expense of British settlers’ interests.76 Chapter two reveals the goals of Whitehall policy makers and methods involved in its formation. An overview about the background of politics in Shanghai and the Sino-British relations in the early 20th century is shown here. I first discuss how the Chinese nationalism paralysed foreign trades in Shanghai. The second section demonstrates the attitude of the British Foreign Office in handling the turmoil in Shanghai. Lastly, the final section addresses in what ways the Shanghai Municipal Council made political and judicial concessions to the Chinese public resulting from the pressure given by

Britain.

Nationalist and communist activities in Shanghai

Located in the mouth of the Yangtze River, Shanghai had great significance for

British entrepreneurs in the 19th and the 20th century. Several examples can illustrate the above statement. Shanghai had an import figure of 548,607,889 Hk. Taels and an export figure of 362,220,148 Hk. Taels in 1928.77 There were twenty-three shipping companies in Shanghai, seven of which were British companies.78 Therefore,

Shanghai contributed a lot for British settlers to earn substantial amount of income in

China.

76 Ibid, 15-16 77 R. Calder Marshall, “Enclosure 2 in No. 72, The future of Shanghai, statement prepared by the British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, for the Hon. Mr. Justice Feetham”, number FO405/266 no.72 (1930:F4872/78/10) in Robert L. Jarman, Shanghai political & economic reports, 1842-1943: British government records from the international city, (Slough: Archive Editions, 2008), volume 16, 653 78 Ibid, 655 28

Nevertheless, the prosperity of British trade was seriously threatened by the intensification of anti-foreign sentiments in China. The seeds of Chinese nationalism had already been sowed in China before the early 20th century. According to

Madeline Hsu, many Chinese reformers began to publish revolutionary and reformist journal articles and Qiaokan (僑刊, magazines for overseas Chinese) in the late Qing era to advocate western educations, the idea of self-government (自治) and western reforms in existing government bodies.79 The Ningbo vernacular (寧波白話報), for instance, was circulated by Shanghai native place associations which aimed to establish a modern China.80 Worse still, the First World War further stirred up national sentiments in China. More Chinese people became anti-foreign not only because of the national self-determination principle advocated by Woodrow Wilson, but also because of the Japanese succession to the German sphere of influence in the

Shandong province.81 Under these circumstances, the May Thirtieth Incident, which caused heavy casualties for Chinese protestors near the Louza Police station in

Shanghai, further aroused the antagonism between Chinese and foreign communities in China. Chinese editors in Shanghai strongly condemned the Shanghai Municipal

Council in newspapers and refused to publish the municipal news.82

Subsequently, stimulated by the above factors, nationalist activities in China were more organised than before. Frequent strikes initiated by different labour societies not only disturbed the municipality but also interrupted trades in Shanghai.83

Electricity in the city was cut off as a result of strikes agitated by Chinese employees

79 Madeline Hsu, Dreaming of Gold, dreaming of home: Transnationalism and Migration between United States and South China, 1882-1943 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 128-133. 80 Ibid, 128-129 81 P. A. Reynolds, British Foreign Policy in the Inter-War Years (London: Longmans, Green and Co.), 3-4 ; Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, The rise of modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 494-495 82 Shanghai Municipal Council, Report for the year 1925 and budget for the year 1926 (Shanghai: Printed by F. & C. Walsh, 1926), 50 83 Edmund S.K. Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat, 6 29

of the electricity department.84 Apart from British mills and factories in Shanghai,

British shipping companies also suffered serious deficit during strikes. Not only were loading and unloading procedures suspended, but maintenance works for British freighters also came to a halt. Thus, import and export of British cargos in Shanghai were terminated. Costs for storing goods also increased.85 The British Foreign

Office was even told that under such condition, “substantial orders for Manchester and Bradford goods have been given to German firms.”86 Apart from writing communist slogans on the walls in the public area,87 communists were keen to agitate workers to participate in labour strikes by disseminating inflammatory pamphlets everywhere in the Settlement. Daung Ling Sung and Yu Ts Yu, who were employees of the Oriental Cotton Mill, 36 Yangtszepoo Road, were apprehended for posting inflammatory handbills in premises of that factory.88

Another means adopted by the Chinese public went against foreign expatriates in

China was to boycott western commodities. Perhaps the 1925 annual report of the

Council can describe how tense the situation was at that time.

Chinese dealers were warned that British and Japanese goods found in their shops would be liable to confiscation and shipping companies were notified that coolies would refuse to handle boycotted goods. These decrees were enforced by parties of students who examined goods in stores and at wharves and railway stations.89

84 Shanghai Municipal Council, Report for the year 1925 and budget for the year 1926 (Shanghai: Printed by F. & C. Walsh, 1926), 49 85 Department of Overseas trade, “Enclosure 2 in No. 1, Memorandum”, number FO371/10948 (1925:F4325/194/10) in Robert L. Jarman, Shanghai political & economic reports, 1842-1943, volume 14, 235-236 86 Ibid, 238 87 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Report 1st-31st January, 1932,25th January, 1932 and 17th May, 1935, Ref.: U1-1-1179, 302 88 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Report, 1st October – 31st December, 1926, 23rd November, 1926, ref.: U1-1-1152, 111 89 Shanghai Municipal Council, Report for the year 1925 and budget for the year 1926 (Shanghai: Printed by F. & C. Walsh, 1926), 49 30

The British American Tobacco Company, whose stocks was seized and sealed up by

Chinese mobs, experienced at least 40% loss for their total business amount in

1925.90 The deterioration of British economic interests was largely attributed to hysterical nationalist activities in Shanghai during the 1920s.

Worse still, intimidations on foreigners also paralysed business activities. In 1925,

59 foreigners and 25 Chinese were attacked by protesters in the form of murders, robbery, kidnappings, assaults and threatening letters. Sailors of British ships were even singled out for persecution.91 Agents of British sugar companies were even intimidated by Chinese students and were forced to pay fines to the Chinese authorities.92 With a view to eliminating party traitors and nationalist agents, the red brigade of the Chinese Communist Party had been established before the 1930s.

Ironically, some innocent civilians in the Settlement were even accidentally killed by the Red brigade.93 Therefore, the safety of foreigners was under serious threat.

As a result, trades and investments in Shanghai were seriously disturbed by the fervid Chinese nationalism. Foreigner merchants, especially British businessmen, suffered heavy economic loss. Thus, consequences of the Chinese nationalism on foreign trades triggered the British authorities and the municipal council to readjust their policies in China and Shanghai respectively.

90 Department of Overseas trade, “Enclosure 2 in No. 1, Memorandum”, number FO371/10948 (1925:F4325/194/10) in Robert L. Jarman, Shanghai political & economic reports, 1842-1943, volume 14, 237 91 Shanghai Municipal Council, Report for the year 1925 and budget for the year 1926 (Shanghai: Printed by F. & C. Walsh, 1926), 50 92 Department of Overseas trade, “Enclosure 2 in No. 1, Memorandum”, number FO371/10948 (1925:F4325/194/10) in Robert L. Jarman, Shanghai political & economic reports, 1842-1943, volume 14, 237 93 On 27th September, 1934, two Red brigade members openly shot a suspected communist traitors Xiong Guohua (熊國華) in the ward of Lester Chinese Hospital (仁濟醫院). During their escape, the accused opened fire to the municipal police, killing two of them. One of the pedestrians was succumbed to death by stray bullets. Totally, the assassinations caused six casualties, with four killed and two injured. Red brigade made good their escape afterwards. 〈消滅共匪紅隊案之經驗簡述〉，《有關顧順章等破案經過》; Shen Pao《申報》，27th-28th September, 1934 31

The future of the Shanghai International Settlement

The future of the International Settlement had become more unpredictable and worrying since the late 1920s. After defeating different warlords, the Kuomintang under Jiang Jieshi’s leadership eventually completed the northern expedition

北伐 and eventually unified China under a single regime. The event that signified the rise of China was the Kuomintang’s recovery on the Hankou 漢口 concession.

Confronted with massive Chinese demonstrators and Kuomintang supporters, Royal

Marines soldiers were forced to evacuate British subjects in Hankou and returned this British concession to the Nationalists in February 1927.94 Meanwhile, the strengthening of the Kuomintang regime was also evidenced in the Nanjing incident

南京事件 happened in March 1927. Whilst entering the city of Nanjing, some soldiers of the Northern expeditionary force 國民革命軍 participated in looting activities, resulting in some causalities of western subjects.95 However, it was infeasible, if not impossible, for the imperial powers to solve this dispute by force similar to what they did in the case of the Boxer Uprising twenty-seven years earlier.

Eventually, foreign powers including Britain did not impose any sanctions on China in order not to further stir up Chinese hostilities on westerners.96 Financial compensation made by the Kuomintang government to the foreign powers was a symbol showing the Republic of China earned recognitions from countries overseas.

Undoubtedly, the advance of the Nationalist government in Shanghai also pressured the British authorities. With a view to exerting its dominant influence in

Shanghai, the Nationalist government not only set up yellow unions among the

94 Robert Bickers, Britain in China, 15-16 95 Ibid, 107 96 “Letter written from Austen Chamberlain to Miles Lampson”, 11th April, 1927, ref.: AC54/316, Austen Chamberlain’s paper 32

labour classes,97 but it also politically emasculated Chinese capitalists in Shanghai.98

Furthermore, Chinese representatives in the Municipal Council were also closely connected with the Kuomintang authorities.99 Concerning the issue of the extraterritoriality, the Chinese government attempted to abolish the unequal treaties signed between the Qing government and the foreign powers.100 Jiang Jieshi even promised Chinese merchants in 1927 that he would restore foreign concessions in three years.101 The control over the Settlement Court in Shanghai, which symbolised the national sovereignty, was anxiously wanted by the Nationalist government.102

More importantly, the use of military force was no longer applicable in suppressing disturbances in China since the late 1920s. Unifying China successfully by a well-trained armed force, Jiang Jieshi emphasised that the new-established

Nationalists government would not be frightened by any kinds of violence.

If foreign powers continued to point their guns towards China, such action will fail to protect lives and property of western settlers and it will also be harmful on foreign interests. China nowadays is utterly different with herself in the 19th century. The National Revolutionary Army 國民革命軍 will not only protect foreign subjects, but they will not be afraid of any violence and demonstrations. Therefore, it is unnecessary for other countries to dispatch their

97 The Bolsheviks disseminated pamphlet to different factory workers, urging them to overthrow Yellow Labour unions and assuring them of the support of the Chinese Communist Party. See Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Report, 1st January-31st January, ref.: U1-1-1179, 7th January, 1932, 55-56 98 Parks M. Coble, The Shanghai capitalists and the Nationalist government, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, Mass. : Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986), 3 99 “Dispatch written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain”, 7th June, 1929, ref.: FO 676/316, British Foreign Office papers, (London: unpublished documents stored in the National Archive, Kew), 6 100 Jiang Jieshi, [Shilue Gaoben, January to March, 1927]事略稿本-民國十六年一至三月 [Chronological events of Jiang Jieshi collections.], ref.: 002-060100-00001-085, 31st January, 1927, (documents stored in the collection of Jiangjieshi of the National Archive). 101 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Report, 1st July-30th September, 1927, 28-29; “Dispatch written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain”, 7th June, 1929, ref.: FO 676/316, British Foreign Office papers,2-3 102 “Dispatch written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain”, 7th June, 1929, ref.: FO 676/316, British Foreign Office papers, 12-13 33

troops in China.103

Not only were Chinese armies been strengthened by 1927, but western powers also lacked a consensus in providing additional military reinforcements in defending

Shanghai because of various reasons.104 Meanwhile, after experiencing the nightmare of the First World War in the mid-1910s, the British public was weary of wars in general. Therefore, neither external nor internal factors favoured Britain to engage in any war theatres.105 Knowing the impossibility to protect British interests in China, the Service Ministries in Britain even informed the Secretary for foreign

Affairs Austen Chamberlain that “…the forces required for defence may be larger than we had supposed… what we have either available or capable of being readily made available is not more than enough for Shanghai and Tianjin.”106 As a result, in spite of the fact that Britain eventually dispatched troops to Shanghai in early 1927,

Austen Chamberlain and the British Ambassador to China Miles Lampson understood that they could not alleviate anti-British sentiments solely relying on military presence. It was because the Shanghai International Settlement and other

British concessions in China were indeed indefensible.

Furthermore, the spread of communism in the Far East also aroused anxiety of the

British government whose economic interests were deeply rooted in China. The

British authorities believed that Russia “never ceased their efforts to destroy

103 Jiang Jieshi, 事略稿本- 民國十六年一至三月, ref.: 002-060100-00001-085, 31st January, 1927, (documents stored in the collection of Jiangjieshi of the National Archive). 104 “Our great difficulty, of course, is that we cannot count on hearty cooperation from any other Power. France in China is a mere facade sheltering in her concessions more foreign interests than Frenchmen. Italy hardly counts. Japan’s policy is difficult to understand. The Government at Tokio seems still to think that the Chinese will distinguish between Japan and Great Britain and while attacking us, will leave the Japanese in peace and the State Department at Washington remains without a policy and is evidently terribly afraid of the reactions on American opinion of any charge that it is embarking on an entangling alliance.” See “letter written from Austen Chamberlain to Miles Lampson”, 11th April, 1927, AC54/316, Austen Chamberlain paper 105 Edmund S.K. Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat, 7 106 “Letter written from Austen Chamberlain to Miles Lampson”, 11th April, 1927, ref.: AC54/310, Austen Chamberlain’s paper 34

organised society in all civilised countries, first of all and most of all in the British

Empire itself.”107 Antony best even argues that the existence of the Comintern temporarily diverted Britain’s attention from her concern on the Japanese aggression.108 Whilst showing his opinion to his colleague, the Lord President of the

Council Arthur Balfour even believed that the Soviets would not only intervene in the Chinese politics by expelling other foreign powers, but it would also utilised its influence in China to stir up insurgencies in the East Indies controlled by Britain and the Netherlands.109 In addition, British diplomats also worried about the intrusion of communism in British India and Afghanistan due to their geographical proximity to

China.110 Meanwhile, in his dispatch written to the British Foreign Office in 1930, the British Consul in Shanghai J.F. Brenan reported that communist outposts near

Yangtse River would create disturbances in industrial and strategic centres located in

Hankou and Shanghai. According to the intelligence, well-trained and armed Red

Partisan detachments were attached to different major cities, waiting for instructions from Moscow to instigate mass upheavals in China.111 Threatened by communist activities, the British authorities in China had to check the expansion of communist activities by all means. As a consequence, Britain was keen to express her sympathy to the Kuomintang regime which was anti-communist in nature.112 Only by cooperating with the Kuomintang regime could the British authorities effectively alleviate anti-foreign sentiments and could repress the spread of communism in Asia.

Indeed, the British informal empire in China was on the brink of expulsion and

107 “Letter written from Lord President of the Council Arthur Balfour to Austen Chamberlain”, ref. AC54/38, 4th February, 1927, Austen Chamberlain’s paper, 4 108 Antony Best, British intelligence and the Japanese challenge in Asia, 5 109 “Letter written from Lord President of the Council Arthur Balfour to Austen Chamberlain”, ref. AC54/38, 4th February, 1927, Austen Chamberlain’s paper, 5 110 Edmund S.K. Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat, 9 111 “Dispatch written from Consul-General in Shanghai J.F. Brenan to British Minister Miles Lampson in Peiping”, FO676/58, British Foreign Office papers, 2 112 Edmund S.K. Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat, 9 35

extinction. Nevertheless, surrendering the entire Settlement and the privilege of the extraterritoriality to the Kuomintang at once was unwise according to Whitehall policy-makers. The British authorities and even King George V recognised that it was necessary, if not compulsory, to protect and retain the British sphere of influence in Shanghai where enormous British commercial interests was located.113 Compared to Hong Kong and other British treaty ports in China, Shanghai alone contributed

£151.53 million out of £200 million of the total British interests in China in 1929.

British settlers in Shanghai had also obtained approximately 90% of the land owned by foreigners between 1901 and 1902. The Butterfield & Swire and the Jardine

Matheson were even the two main companies dominating coastal trades in

Shanghai.114 Whilst explaining policies of the British Foreign Office in China to his colleague Ramsay MacDonald, Chamberlain even stressed that he could not tolerate the expulsion of the British presence in Shanghai and Canton if negotiation failed.115

Moreover, the British government and commercial firms had positive projections towards the future of China where massive and vigorous improvements in different aspects were shown, in terms of the education, the literature, medal supports, athletics and the commerce.116 Despite the communist intrusion in the Far East, J. F.

Brenan firmly believed that China would get rid of communism. Being proud of their own cultures and civilisation, the Chinese would not be utterly assimilated by communism since “the principles of Marx are foreign to the Chinese conception of things.”117 Firmly believing that China was the largest underdeveloped market in the

113 “Letter written from Private Secretary to the Sovereign Arthur Bigge to Austen Chamberlain”, 14th January, 1927, ref.: AC54/180, Austen Chamberlain’s paper, 1 114 Edmund Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, 4 115 “Letter written from Austen Chamberlain to Ramsay MacDonald”, 17th January, 1927, ref.: AC54/386, Austen Chamberlain’s paper 116 “Dispatch written from Consul-General in Shanghai J.F. Brenan to British Minister Miles Lampson in Peiping”, FO676/58, British Foreign Office papers, 10 117 Ibid, 9 36

world, the British authorities were encouraged to retain their interests in China where economic growths were anticipated.118 An increasing demand of foreign goods was evidenced by looking at revenue figures. Even though China was on the brink of wars in the late 1920s and the early 1930s, customs authorities received increasing revenue figures of foreign import returns, rising from 4,120,701 Taels in 1929 to

4,283,344 Taels in 1930.119 The expected prosperity of Shanghai was heavily emphasised by Brenan in his report to Lampson. With a view to keeping away from the Sino-Japanese hostility, many wealthy classes would seek for refugee with their capitals in the International Settlement where protection was secured by foreign powers.120 Therefore, Brenan believed that once the order was restored, “there would be a boom in trade as Shanghai had never known in its previous history.”121

Therefore, Britain had to be very cautious in relinquishing her privileges in China.

While illustrating his opinion towards the prospect of China in his report, K. Lung, staff of the Perrin’s Limited in Shanghai, urged the British government to treasure opportunities to trade with China which was considered by him as the next world market.122 Lung even believed that it was worthwhile for Britain to declare war on

Japan for the sake of protecting British interests in China and other parts of the

British Empire.

I believe that even a war with Japan would be preferable to letting Japan take all the India markets, squeezing England out in Australia, in South Africa, in the Dutch Colonies and dominate China!123

118 Edmund Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, 5 119 “Dispatch written from Consul-General in Shanghai J.F. Brenan to British Minister Miles Lampson in Peiping”, FO676/58, British Foreign Office papers, 10 120 Ibid, 11 121 Ibid 122 Report sent from Perrin’s (China) Limited, Shanghai to Perrin’s Limited, London, 14th March, 1933, ref.08, Avon Papers, (Birmingham: unpublished private papers stored in Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham), 2 123 Report sent from Perrin’s (China) Limited, Shanghai to Perrin’s Limited, London, 14th March, 37

As a result, given that Shanghai was of paramount importance to Britain, the British

Foreign Office would therefore asked the Shanghai Municipal Council to provide more concessions to the Chinese and to develop municipal administrations in response to growing demands of the Chinese society in Shanghai.124

Apart from having tremendous interests and positive projections in Shanghai, the

British government was also afraid of the nature of the Chinese legal system. British settlers never believed that the Republic of China shared similar liberal values and autonomous judicial frameworks with the western world. Not only were they dubious on the neutrality and the objectivity of the Chinese legal system, but they also had no confidence on the autocratic rule of the Kuomintang based on the Continental

European model. In spite of the Chinese government’s endeavour to modernise law codes, the judicial system in republican China still failed to provide independent and impartial judgements to British settlers who believed in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition.125 A manager of an engineering firm also opposed dispensing with the extraterritoriality as the abolition of German extraterritoriality in China during World

War One was an alert to the British. He also argued the Chinese courts would first protect Chinese interests provided that there were disputes between Chinese buyers and British firms.126 Apart from judicial frameworks, British settlers also had no confidence on the type of municipal government practiced by the Chinese authorities.

Imitating the Continental European model, the Chinese Municipality in Shanghai was far from independent and democratic compared to the Anglo-Saxon model

1933, ref.08, Avon Papers, 2 124 “Dispatch written from Consul-General in Shanghai J.F. Brenan to British Minister Miles Lampson in Peiping”, FO676/58, British Foreign Office papers, 11 125 G.W. Swire, The Possibilities of the Shanghai Negotiations, 14th April, 1932, Avon Papers, 3 126 A manager of an engineering firm, “Report on situation in China”, 9th May, 1932, ref. 5308, Avon Papers, 4 38

which comprised an elected council with legislative and financial controls only.127

Knowing about difficulties in implementing the Anglo-Saxon model in China,

Lampson believed that the success of the Chinese political transformation not only required foreign leadership and control, but it would also take years to accomplish.128

It was impossible for Britain to accept the repudiation of extraterritoriality at once.

Therefore, British diplomats and merchants insisted on the transfer of political power to China gradually depending on China’s reform progress.

As pointed out by Lampson and Chamberlain, peace and amity, which were the primary concerns of British merchants, were prerequisites for trade in China.129

Therefore, two main principles adopted by the British government in the late 1920s were to support a Chinese run-government in Shanghai with foreign involvements and to transfer power to the Chinese gradually. It was anticipated by Lampson that a municipality of Greater Shanghai would be entitled to govern the International

Settlement, the French Concession, the harbour and the Chinese districts “under a

Chinese municipal administration with some form of adequate foreign participation in municipal affairs so far as they concern foreign interest.”130 Furthermore,

Lampson also reassured the need for the gradual sinification of the municipal council and other governmental bodies. At the same time the Chinese were educated in western theories and practices of a municipal government which would not be

127 “Dispatch written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain”, 7th June, 1929, ref.: FO 676/316, British Foreign Office papers, 25-26 128 “Enclosure No.II in H.M Minister’s despatch to F.O of 7th June, 1929”, FO676/316, British Foreign Office papers, 2 129 “Letter written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain”, 6th February, 1927, ref.: AC54/311, Austen Chamberlain’s paper “ Letter written from Austen Chamberlain to Miles Lampson”, 11th April, 1927, ref.: AC54/316 Austen Chamberlain’s paper 130 Dispatch written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain, 7th June, 1929, ref.: FO 676/316, British Foreign Office papers, (London: unpublished documents stored in the National Archive, Kew), 2 39

harmful to foreign interests.131 Subsequently, Miles Lampson concluded that his task in China was to strive for a balance between protecting British vested interests and the satisfaction of legitimate Chinese national aspiration. Yet Lampson also emphasised that the hysterical Chinese could not get all concessions at once. Thus, only by transferring power gradually could secure the safety of British economic interests in China.132 With a view to facilitating Lampson’s negotiation with the

Chinese authorities, Chamberlain was also pushing hard to seek for the support from the British parliament at home.133

Therefore, the British government employed the strategy with both “reason and force” in Shanghai for the sake of saving the empire in the face of the fervid Chinese nationalism.134 The scenario in Shanghai in the mid-1920s echoed the condition in southern China. As Edmund Fung argues in his book The Diplomacy of Imperial

Retreat, Whitehall politicians adopted the policy of “combining conciliation with firmness”, alleviating the Chinese nationalism while protecting British life and properties at the same time.135 Even before the Kuomintang rose to power, Britain began to readjust its foreign policies in China in the mid-1920s. Whilst stationing adequate amount of troops to some treaty ports for self-defence, the British diplomatic authorities in China initiated negotiations with regional Chinese authorities about the issue of the treaty revision.136 More concessions were even made by the British government after the Kuomintang’s completion of the northern expedition in 1928. With the exception of the extraterritoriality, the British Foreign

131 Ibid, 3-4 132 “Letter written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain”, 9th March, 1927, ref.: AC54/313, Austen Chamberlain’s paper 133 “Letter written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain”, 16th March, 1927, ref.: AC54/314, Austen Chamberlain’s paper 134 “Letter written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain”, 16th April, 1927, ref.: AC54/317, Austen Chamberlain’s paper, 7 135 Edmund Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, 10 136 Ibid 242 40

Office was willing to surrender an array of economic and diplomatic privileges to the

Kuomintang government, relinquishing tariff and taxation, the customs administration, the service of China’s debt and leased territories.137 Therefore, the reforms that the Shanghai Municipal Council carried out were in line with readjustments of British diplomatic policies in different part of China during the mid-1920s.

As a result, forcible measures were employed only to protect British interests in case of any emergencies and disturbances in Shanghai. Composed of approximately

16,000 servicemen from Britain and India, the Shanghai Defence Force was dispatched to Shanghai for a self-defence purpose.138 Lampson never intended to see many British soldiers “kicking their heels in Shanghai” unless their presence was really necessary.139 Chamberlain was even anxious and dubious that the British

Consul in Shanghai Sidney Barton would instruct British soldiers to suppress

Chinese demonstrations which were not a policy of His Majesty’s Government.140 In the worst scenario, the British government prepared for evacuating all British inhabitants and properties in China, including Lampson himself.141 When conditions

137 Ibid, 175 138 Letter written from Austen Chamberlain to Ramsay MacDonald, 17th January, 1927, ref.: AC54/386, Austen Chamberlain’s paper; …having thus satisfied legitimate Chinese aspirations and reached a new agreement of the Settlement, we should be prepared, with full justification, to take our stand on it and maintain it, if necessary by force. See “dispatch written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain”, 7th June, 1929, ref.: FO 676/316, British Foreign Office papers, 5; Lu fangshang (呂芳上)，Beifa Shiqi Yingguo Zengbing Shanghai Yu Duihua Waijiao de Yanbian〈北伐時期英國增兵上海與對華外交的演變〉[England's Reinforcement of Shanghai during the Northern Expedition and the evolution of its China Policy]，(Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jikan)《中央研究院近代史研究所集刊》Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica，volume 27（June, 1997），223 139 “Letter written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain”, 6th February, 1927, ref.: AC54/311, Austen Chamberlain’s paper 140 “Letter written from Austen Chamberlain to Miles Lampson”, 16th March, 1927, ref.: AC54/314, Austen Chamberlain’s paper 141 “Letter written from Austen Chamberlain to Miles Lampson”, 4th April, 1927, ref.: AC54/315, Austen Chamberlain’s paper; “Letter written from Private Secretary to the Sovereign Arthur Bigge to Austen Chamberlain”, 14th January, 1927, ref.: AC54/180, Austen Chamberlain’s paper,1-2 41

became more stable and negotiations were effective in China, the Cabinet began to pressure Chamberlain to reduce the number of troops in August 1927.142 Later,

Chamberlain eventually agreed with the Secretary of State for War Laming

Worthington-Evans that it was unnecessary for the British military authorities to keep a massive number of soldiers in China in 1929.143 Obviously, British military presence in Shanghai in the late 1920s was mainly defensive in nature and was different from British troops employed to invade Beijing during the Boxer uprising in 1900.

Conversely, Lampson and Chamberlain agreed to start liberal and peaceful negotiations with the Chinese authorities with regard to the issue of the treaty revision. Before the Kuomintang controlled the entire country effectively,

Chamberlain had authorised Lampson to initiate negotiations with the Nationalist regime concerning the future of Shanghai in 1927.144 Recognising foreign privileges in China as a kind of political servitude, Lampson agreed that the extraterritoriality and all other treaty questions should be abolished gradually.145 Regarding the retention of Shanghai as a commercial centre, Frederick Whyte advocated to secure a stable socio-political environment for British economic interests at the expense of sacrificing some political power. He held a view that the British authorities in

Shanghai should prepare other opportunities for greater Chinese involvements in the municipal administrations in the future.146 In fact, Lampson understood that an array

142 “Letter written from Austen Chamberlain to Miles Lampson”, 3rd August, 1927, ref.: ref.: AC54/325, Austen Chamberlain’s paper; Lu fangshang (呂芳上)，Beifa Shiqi Yingguo Zengbing Shanghai Yu Duihua Waijiao de Yanbian， 223-224 143 “Letter written from Austen Chamberlain to Laming Worthington-Evans”, 14th January, 1929, ref.: AC55/515, Austen Chamberlain’s paper 144 “Letter written from Austen Chamberlain to Miles Lampson”, 11th January, 1927, ref.: AC54/310, Austen Chamberlain’s paper 145 Letter written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain”, 11th January, 1927, ref.: AC54/309, Austen Chamberlain’s paper 146 “Dispatch written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain”, 7th June, 1929, ref.: FO 676/316, British Foreign Office papers, (London: unpublished documents stored in the National Archive, Kew), 42

of political and judiciary issues originating from the extraterritoriality might further agitate the Sino-British hostility in Shanghai.147 Though the British authorities were ready to relinquish some of their privileges, it didn’t mean a total submission to the

Chinese. Provided that the safety of British interests was guaranteed, the British government was willing to reach different agreements with the Chinese authorities about the gradual abolishment of certain degree of foreign rights in Shanghai.148

Unquestionably, the British only gave up relatively insignificant privileges at the very beginning. The more stable and reformed China was, the more concessions the

British would made.149 As a result, the British Foreign office pressured the Shanghai

Municipal Council to meet Chinese demands by carrying out internal reforms in the

Settlement. In the following section, I will examine significances of the reconstruction of the judicial institutions in Shanghai which would favour the

Shanghai Municipal Police and the Kuomintang authorities to arrest and extradite the communists in the future.

Legal reforms of the International Mixed Court

Confronted with unfavourable circumstances which seriously disturbed trades and investments in China, the British Foreign Office planned to alleviate the

Sino-British hostility by gradually transferring power back to the Chinese.

Apparently, British officials believed that the Sino-British relations and foreign interests in China could only be secured by introducing gradual reforms and changes in the Settlement. Politically, the British Foreign Office pressured the Shanghai

Municipal Council to include more Chinese members in municipal managements in

23-24 147 Ibid, 4 148 Ibid, 5 149 Edmund Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, 8 43

the mid-1920s as mentioned by Robert Bickers.150 British merchants echoed the

British government’s decision by showing their supports to the Chinese in the

Ratepayer Annual Meeting.151 Thus, the Settlement authorities first reached a consensus with the Chinese in 1926 to allow three Chinese councillors to join the council.152 Five years later, the Shanghai Municipal Council even agreed to add two more places for the Chinese in the council, making five Chinese councillors in total.153 Undoubtedly, appointing pro-Kuomintang Chinese members in the council was the first step for the Nationalist government to penetrate its influence into the

Settlement in the following decade.

Yet, compared to political reforms, judicial reconstructions was of utmost importance leading to the incarceration, the extradition and the reformation of communists. With regard to legal frameworks in the International Settlement, both the British and the Chinese authorities had undergone an endless process in discussing the shift of judicial power by the mid-1920s. In fact, before the

Kuomintang regime rose to power in 1927, the Shanghai Municipal Council and the

British diplomatic authorities negotiated with Sun Chuanfang 孫傳芳’s warlord government about the repudiation of the extraterritoriality. This was a consequence

150 Robert Bickers, Britain in China, 131-137 151 At the same time, the Foreign Office not only firmly recognized Chinese nationalism, but it was also impatient to see the on the council’s progress in solving the dispute between British and Chinese in Shanghai. Foreign office could not understand why did the issue of the Chinese representation in the council “remain DORMANT during last 5 months”. In order to speed up the negotiation progress, the Foreign Office even allowed the Chinese government to appoint immediately at least two members of council. But the Foreign Office was cautious, it only allowed limited amount of Chinese to join the council. See Foreign Office, “Telegram no. 98 dated 17th March 1926 from the Foreign Office in London to Sir Ronald Macleay at the British Legation in Peking”, FO371/11665 in Robert L. Jarman, Shanghai political & economic reports, 1842-1943, volume 14, 460; “Parliamentary Question and its answer in the British House of Commons on 28th April 1926”, number FO371/11685 (1926: F1784/1223/10 in Robert L. Jarman, Shanghai political & economic reports, 1842-1943, volume 14, 481 152 Shanghai Municipal Council, Report for the year 1928 and budget for the year 1929 (Shanghai: Printed by F. & C. Walsh, 1929), 1 153 Shanghai Municipal Council, Report for the year 1930 and budget for the year 1931, (Shanghai: Printed by F. & C. Walsh, 1931), 16-21 44

of the fervid Chinese nationalism caused by the May Thirtieth incident in 1925.154

The International Mixed Court 會審公廨, which was dominated by westerners since its establishment in 1869, was renamed as the Shanghai Provisional Court 上海臨時

法院 after the Rendition Agreement became effective in 1927, attaining a foremost step in returning part of legal authorities to China. With the exception of cases which involved the right of consular jurisdiction, all civil and criminal cases in the

International Settlement would be tried in the Provisional Court and its successive institution.155 After the expiry of the first agreement in 1930, the Nationalist government and other western diplomatic bodies reached a consensus to renew the agreement. Not only was the Provisional Court reshuffled into the Shanghai No.1

Special District Court 上海第一特區地方法院, but the Jiangsu High Court No.2 branch 江蘇高等法院第二分院 was also established inside the Settlement in 1930 to deal with appeal cases. Aide from the International Settlement, the French concession also reached an agreement with China with regard to the transfer of judicial power at the same time. The Shanghai No.2 Special District Court 上海第二

特區地方法院 and the Jiangsu High Court No.3 branch 江蘇高等法院第三分院 were founded to deal with first trials and appeal cases respectively. From then on, judicial systems of two foreign concessions almost run in line with that of China by

1930s.156

During the transformation of Settlement’s legal frameworks in the 1920 and the

1930 decade, the Nationalist government exerted its profound influence in judicial

154 He Shizhen 何世楨，〈記上海公共租界臨時法院〉[My memory of the Shanghai Provisionak Court]，Lu, jianxin 陸堅心、WanYan Shaoyuan 完顔紹元，Ershi Shiji Shasnghai Wenshi Ziliao Wenku Shi《20 世紀上海文史資料文庫 10》[20th Century Shanghai Literature archive] (Shanghai： Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe, 1999), 74 155 Article 1 (i), “consular committee’s revision of modified Chinese proposal of July 2, 1926”, in Foreign Office files for China [electronic resource], ref.: FO371/11686, Marlborough, England : Adam Matthew, 2009, 3 156 Shi, Meiding 史梅定 ed., Shanghai Zujiezhi《上海租界志》[The history of the Shanghai International Settlement] (Shanghai：Shanghai Academy of Social Science, 2001), 286-293 45

institutions of the International Settlement. Thanks to Yao Yuan’s effort, we can understand the increasing dominance of the Kuomintang regime in the settlement court through studying the evolution of the International Mixed Court.157 In the following paragraph, I examine how thee reorganisation of the settlement court fit into the context of the arrest of communists.

Concerning the application of legal systems, Chinese law codes and procedures of gradually replaced those of the former Mixed Court. Firmly believing that implementing Chinese legal regulations in foreign concessions was indisputable,

Lampson even thought that applying Chinese laws in British courts in China would be an excellent way to initiate the revision of the unequal treaties.158 Although the

Shanghai Provisional Court began to enforce Chinese legal law codes drafted by Sun

Chuanfang’s warlord government in the Settlement, established rules of procedures of the former Mixed Court 會審公廨訴訟慣例 and terms of the rendition agreement were also taken into consideration.159 By the 1930s, the Shanghai No.1

Special District Court only executed the civil and criminal codes of the Republic of

China 中華民國民法、中華民國刑法 and their associated legal procedures 中華民

國民事訴訟法、中華民國刑事訴訟法 in accordance with the agreement made

157 Yao Yuan [姚遠]，Shanghai Gongong Zujie Tequfayuan Yanjiu《上海公共租界特區法院研究》 A study of the Shanghai Special District Court，78-82 158 “Letter written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain”, 23rd February, 1927, ref.: AC54/312, Austen Chamberlain’s paper, 8; “Letter written from Miles Lampson to Austen Chamberlain, 9th March, 1927”, ref.: AC54/313, Austen Chamberlain’s paper 159 The Land Regulations and Bye-Laws of the International Settlement (洋涇濱設官章程及附則) were the foundation behind the established rules of procedure of the former Mixed Court. See [Limitation of legal control]〈司法管轄的限制〉，Wu Chuanyi 吳圳義，[Shanghai Zujie Wenti]《上海租界問題》The problem of the Shanghai International Settlement，(Taipei: Zhengzhong bookstore [正中書局], 1981), 175; Article 1 (ii), “consular committee’s revision of modified Chinese proposal of July 2, 1926”, in Foreign Office files for China, ref.: FO371/11686, 14；[Temporary regulations concerning the recovery of the Shanghai Mixed Court]〈收回上海公共租界會審公暫行章程〉，Wu, Chuanyi 吳圳義，[Shanghai Zujie Wenti]《上海租界問題》The problem of the Shanghai International Settlement (Taipei: Zhengzhong bookstore [正中書局], 1981), 258; Yao Yuan 姚遠，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研究》，52 46

between the British and the Chinese authorities.160 Besides, jails inside the

Settlement had to run in line with Chinese prison regulations. The Shanghai Special

District Court had an authority to decide whether convicts in the Settlement should be incarcerated in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol or other Chinese prisons outside foreign concessions.161 The following chapters in this thesis show that the

Nationalist regime fully availed itself of the Chinese criminal codes and procedures to arrest, to extradite and even to convert communist members living in the

International Settlement.

Moreover, the Kuomintang authorities had absolute controls over appointments of important personnel of the Settlement Court. Taking advantage of the internal turmoil in China during the 1911 Revolution, consular bodies took over the management of the International Mixed Court and privately assigned approved Chinese candidates as magistrates.162 Nevertheless, the practice of appointing judicial personnel underwent tremendous change after the May Thirtieth incident. According to the rendition agreement signed in 1926, the Chinese government reserved a right to appoint a president 庭長 and judges 推事 of the Provisional Court, as well as judges of the

Court of Appeal 上訴庭推事.163 After 1930, the renewed agreement even empowered the Chinese authorities to designate their candidates for the position of a

160 Article 2, “Agreement relating to the Chinese Courts in the International Settlement at Shanghai”, in Foreign Office files for China, 17th February, 1930, ref.: FO676/317;〈上海公共租界特區法院協定全文〉，Wu, Chuanyi 吳圳義，[Shanghai Zujie Wenti]《上海租界問題》The problem of the Shanghai International Settlement (Taipei: Zhengzhong bookstore [正中書局], 1981), 263-264 161 Article 7, “Agreement relating to the Chinese Courts in the International Settlement at Shanghai”, in Foreign Office files for China, 17th February, 1930, ref.: FO676/317;〈上海公共租界特區法院協定全文〉，Wu, Chuanyi 吳圳義，[Shanghai Zujie Wenti]《上海租界問題》The problem of the Shanghai International Settlement (Taipei: Zhengzhong bookstore [正中書局], 1981), 265; Yao Yuan [姚遠]，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研究》，81 162 (The problem of legal control) 〈司法管轄問題〉，Wu, Chuanyi 吳圳義，[Shanghai Zujie Wenti] 《上海租界問題》The problem of the Shanghai International Settlement (Taipei: Zhengzhong bookstore [正中書局], 1981), 175 163 Article 1 (vii), “consular committee’s revision of modified Chinese proposal of July 2, 1926”, in Foreign Office files for China, ref.: FO371/11686, 4，Yao Yuan 姚遠，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研究》，49-50 47

registrar 書記官長 which was in charge of financial and administrative works of the court.164 As a result, trials and the administrations of the Settlement court were under heavy surveillance of the Chinese government. Appointed by the Nationalist regime, magistrates in the Settlement were subject to the influence of the

Kuomintang authorities. No wonder why many western settlers never believed

Chinese judicial system was competent to provide independent and unbiased judgements.165 As shown in later sections, the political inclination of the court was particularly obvious when communists were tried by pro-Kuomintang magistrates.

Most importantly, the practice of consular representatives sitting jointly in the court 會審 and watching proceedings 觀審 were completely terminated by 1930.

The existence of consular personnel in the court could be traced back to the time when the International Mixed Court was established in 1869. [Please refer to appendix 5] Provided that cases were consisted of disputes between westerners and

Chinese, consular bodies would send their representatives to try Chinese magistrates appointed by the Qing government. Owing to the discontinuance of the Qing

Dynasty after 1911, consular deputies even interfered in cases concerning purely

Chinese interests.166 In spite of the fact that the rendition agreement in 1926 limited consular personnel’s involvement in different cases in specific circumstances,167

164 Yao Yuan 姚遠，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研究》，81 165 G.W. Swire, The Possibilities of the Shanghai Negotiations, 14th April, 1932, Avon paper, 3 166 (The problem of legal control) 〈司法管轄問題〉，Wu, Chuanyi 吳圳義，[Shanghai Zujie Wenti] 《上海租界問題》The problem of the Shanghai International Settlement (Taipei: Zhengzhong bookstore [正中書局], 1981), 175 167 “(iii) In criminal cases which directly affect the peace and order of the International Settlement, including contraventions of the Land Regulations and Bye laws of the International Settlement, and in all criminal cases in which the accused is in the employ of a foreigner having extra-territorial rights, the senior consul may appoint a deputy to sit with the judge to watch the proceeding. (v) In cases in which a foreigner having extra-territorial rights or the Shanghai Municipal Council is the plaintiff in a civil action, and in criminal cases in which a foreigner having extra-territorial rights is the complainant, the consul of the nationality concerned or the senior consul may send an official to sit jointly with the judge in accordance with the treaties.” See Article 1, “consular committee’s revision of modified Chinese proposal of July 2, 1926”, in Foreign Office files for China, ref.: FO371/11686, 48

consular deputies still exerted enormous influence in decisions made by the court in many important and controversial cases.168 With a view to expressing their disagreements with judges appointed by the Chinese government, consular officials and their deputies could even record his objections.169 The authority of the president and magistrates were therefore severely undermined by the presence of consular personnel. Eventually, the repudiation of consular officials’ presence in the court allowed Chinese magistrates to be exempt from foreign interference.170 Thus, the

Kuomintang successfully overcame this hurdle in order to implement its instructions in the International Settlement.

In accordance with Lampson’s idea, the adequate retention of western influence was still necessary for the sake of protecting foreign interests in the Settlement.

Although the Chinese government recovered most of its legal power in the settlement court, the issue concerning the execution of court orders still revealed the remaining western dominance in the settlement judiciary. Indeed, it was true that procurators

檢察官 employed by the Chinese government were authorised to carry out prosecution procedures by virtue of articles from 103 to 186 of the Chinese Criminal

Code after 1930. Nevertheless, the prosecution power of Chinese procurators was inapplicable to cases which were processed by the Shanghai Municipal Police or

3-4; [Temporary regulations concerning the recovery of the Shanghai Mixed Court]〈收回上海公共租界會審公暫行章程〉， Wu Chuanyi 吳圳義，[Shanghai Zujie Wenti]《上海租界問題》The problem of the Shanghai International Settlement，(Taipei: Zhengzhong bookstore [正中書局], 1981), 258 168 He Shizhen 何世楨，[My memory of the Shanghai Provisional Court]〈記上海公共租界臨時法院〉，Lu jianxin 陸堅心、WanYan Shaoyuan 完顔紹元，[Ershi Shiji Shasnghai Wenshi Ziliao Wenku Shi]《20 世紀上海文史資料文庫 10》[20th Century Shanghai Literature archive]，(Shanghai：Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe, 1999), 74 169 See Article 1 (iii), “consular committee’s revision of modified Chinese proposal of July 2, 1926”, in Foreign Office files for China, ref.: FO371/11686, 3 170 Article 3, “Agreement relating to the Chinese Courts in the International Settlement at Shanghai”, in Foreign Office files for China, 17th February, 1930, ref.: FO676/317; (Rendition agreement of the Shanghai Special District Court)〈上海公共租界特區法院協定全文〉，Wu, Chuanyi 吳圳義， [Shanghai Zujie Wenti]《上海租界問題》The problem of the Shanghai International Settlement (Taipei: Zhengzhong bookstore [正中書局], 1981), 264; Yao Yuan [姚遠]，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研究》，79 49

were within the jurisdiction of the Settlement Court.171 Therefore, the preservation of municipal police’s prosecution power could possibly safeguard interests of foreign settlers in the Settlement. Yet, the municipal police were almost cooperative with the

Chinese authorities in dealing with arrests and the extradition of communists in the

International Settlement.

It was of paramount importance that the reorganisations of the Settlement judiciary since the mid-1920s had significant impact on arrests of communists coordinated by the Chinese and the Settlement authorities. The neutrality and the impartiality of the court in the Settlement were infringed in consequence of the Kuomintang’s interference. The implementation of Chinese law codes and procedures in the

Settlement allowed the Chinese authorities to handle communist suspects in accordance with inhumane regulations and the political indoctrination. Not only did the Chinese criminal code 中華民國刑法 authorise enforcement officers to arrest any suspects involved in any kinds of activities against the internal security of the republic 危害民國, but the regulation governing the reformatories 反省院條例 also forced non-repentant political offenders to relocate from the Settlement jail to the Chinese reformatories. Next, China’s appointments of judicial personnel also obstructed the judicial independence of the settlement court. Whilst dealing with political cases, Chinese magistrates favoured the Chinese government by extraditing communists found in the Settlement to the Kuomintang authorities. Blamed for his failure to secure the successful extradition in a communist case, a president of the court was even dismissed by Jiang Jieshi.172 Last but not least, the cancellation of

171 Article 5, “Agreement relating to the Chinese Courts in the International Settlement at Shanghai”, in Foreign Office files for China, 17th February, 1930, ref.: FO676/317; [Rendition agreement of the Shangai Special District Court]〈上海公共租界特區法院協定全文〉，Wu Chuanyi 吳圳義，[Shanghai Zujie Wenti]《上海租界問題》The problem of the Shanghai International Settlement，(Taipei: Zhengzhong bookstore [正中書局], 1981), 264 172 "…judicial independence and freedom from military was interrupted by the summary dismissal of 50

consular personnel’s involvement in judicial cases allowed Chinese influence to penetrate fluently into the settlement court. The following chapters show hardly could the municipal police refuse to carry on court orders except for cases consisted of foreign interests. Thus, the above political and judicial reforms made by the

Settlement authorities formed the backdrop for arresting communists.

In the nutshell, the situation of the Shanghai Municipal Council and the British

Foreign office in the 1920s could fit into the context stated by John Darwin in his book The Empire Project. London had to readjust its diplomatic policies based on local circumstances. Before the 1920s, the British government had no interest to intervene in the politics of the International Settlement and granted autonomy to

British subjects in China. When the Chinese nationalism became more fervid, the

British government began to seize back the power from British communities because the existence of its informal empire in China was in danger.

Eventually, no wonder British economic interests in China survived at the expense of the political and judicial power of the Settlement. British settlers, including the council staff and the municipal police were forced to accept such reality. The appointments of new Chinese councillors who had close connections with the

Kuomintang first weakened western influence inside the council. More importantly, the implementation of Chinese legal codes and prison regulations in the International

Settlement not only prevented the Shanghai Municipal Council from protecting its own Chinese residents in arrests and the extradition procedure, but it also forced the

the president on October 9th at the instance of General Pai Chung-hai for refusing to hand over to the military without enquiry a number of alleged “Communists” residents of the settlement. Consular bodies are unanimous in considering that it is impossible to acquiesce in action which threatens to disrupt the court and place the settlement under martial law…" See “The working of the Shanghai Provisional Court” in Telegram no. 1504 dated 21st October 1927 from Sir Miles Lampson at the British Legation in Peking to the Foreign Office in London, number FO371/12419 (1927:F8210/25/10) in Robert Jarman, Shanghai political & economic reports, 1842-1943: British government records from the international city, volume 15, 608. 51

municipal gaol to transfer its political offenders to a Chinese reformatory in Soochow.

Worse still, the Kuomintang regime even pressured the Settlement authorities to provide convenience for arresting and extraditing communist convicts by violating formal legal procedures. The following three chapters reveal how British expatriates became faithful allies in eliminating communists not only because of their anti-Bolshevik beliefs, but also because of their fear about the strengthening of the

Kuomintang government supported by the extreme Chinese nationalism.

CHAPTER 3

ARREST

“‘In case of bookshop selling anti-government books, no charge should be preferred against the shop proprietor or manager unless the Police can prove that the accused knowingly and intentionally propagates doctrines contrary to People’s Three Principles. Failure to examine books by the proprietor or manager before the same is offered for sale is not sufficient to constitute an offence.’ In executing warrants issued by the Shanghai Special District Court at the instance of the Chinese authorities, it will not be necessary to observe the terms of the above advice.”173

T.P. Givens, Officer i/c Special Branch, Shanghai Municipal Police

The first episode that illustrated readjustments of British imperial policies in

Shanghai was arrests of communists. Before going into details of arrests, we have to understand the context of the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force in the face of communist intrusion. In what ways did the idea of Britishness affect the perception of the Settlement authorities on communists? Racially, Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson regarded British settlers overseas as the kith and kin of the

British in the United Kingdom. The broad sense of “Britishness” facilitated the construction of social networks as it provided a sense of pan-imperial and cultural unity among British migrants in different colonies.174 The principle of

“Ethnic-British Sameness” raised by Stuart Ward also suggests that white settler community residing or working in the empire shared same ties of blood and culture.175 Thence that British expatriates in Shanghai adopted similar attitude with

173 T.P. Givens, Officer i/c Special Branch, Prosecutions of the bookstores selling anti-government literature", file no. D.1692, in "Raid on Kwung Long Bookstore, 18 Chekiang Road, re sale of communistic books. Accountant Lee Soh Ming arrested", ref. D4224, 22nd October, 1932, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 174 Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and globalization : networks of people, goods and capital in the British world, c.1850-1914 (Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010) 175 Stuart Ward, “The end of empire and the fate of Britishness” in Helen Brocklehurst and Robert Philips ed., History Nationhood and the Question of Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 53

their kith and kin at home towards communists was reasonable. In spite of the fact that spreading communist ideas was largely tolerated in the metropole, communism was never prevalent in British societies. Andrew Thorpe explains reasons for the unpopularity of communism in Britain during the inter-war years in his book. Not only did communists scare capitalists by advocating the idea of ‘social democracy’, but Britain also recovered fairly from the First World War compared with other belligerent states.176 Interests of workers and trade unions were also represented by the British Labour Party which was the forerunner of labour movements.

Subsequently, the British Communist Party never won supports from the British public. As an ally of communists who shared some similar social values, the Labour

Party even alienated communists in the election in the 1920s.177 Throughout the inter-war period, there were only three Members of Parliament from the British

Communist Party since its establishment in 1920.

Moreover, the internal development of communism in Britain threatened survival of British interests in the world. John Callaghan and Ben Harker describe many communist activities inside and outside Britain in their co-edited book.178 In fact, many British communists even provided assistance for colonial subjects exploited by westerners throughout the British Empire.179 As one of historians studying communism in Britain, East Wind’s author Buchanan argues that China itself was a fascination in the views of British leftists although backwardness was the prevailing

245 176 Thomas Linehan, Communism in Britain, 1920-39: from the cradle to the grave (Manchester ; New York : Manchester University Press, 2007), 5; John Callaghan and Ben Harker, British communism: a documentary history (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 2011), 2; Andrew Thorpe, The Failure of political extremism in inter-war Britain (Exeter : Dept. of History and Archaeology, University of Exeter, 1989), 2-4 177 Andrew Thorpe, The Failure of political extremism in inter-war Britain (Exeter : Dept. of History and Archaeology, University of Exeter, 1989), 2-8 178 John Callaghan and Ben Harker, British communism: a documentary history (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 2011) 179 British communist delegates such as Ben Bradley and Philip Spratt were sent to form labour union organisations in the British Raj. See ibid, 3 54

perception on China in the 1920s.180 Thus, such idea aroused sympathy among leftists in the western world and motivated many communists to help China in the

20th century. Undeniably, British communists tried their best to pressure the British government to adopt lenient policies towards China. In the 1920s, with a view to preventing invasion from taking place in China, the “Hands off China” movement successfully forced the government to put the Shanghai Defence Force in a purely defensive role for protecting British nationals in China. It was not until the 1960s that

British leftists withdrew their supports. It was because they finally understood that the People’s Republic of China was an autocratic regime as shown in different political movements.181 Recently released KV2 series files in the National Archive disclose how British intelligence departments such as the MI5 spared no effort to keep many European communist notables under heavy surveillance in response to the amalgamation between communism and nationalism in British colonies overseas.182

Therefore, Britain closely monitored movements of many notable communists, providing the intelligence to police and the intelligence authorities throughout the

British Empire.

Furthermore, the nature of colonial police forces in the British Empire also contributed to arrests of communists. In an imperial context, not only did policemen pay more attention to the interest of the sovereign state, but political cases were always connected to criminal levels.183 This was particularly true when British expatriates were eager to establish their authorities in colonies or sphere of influence

180 For instance, Bertrand Russell emphasized the superiority and self-sufficiency of the Chinese civilization while Joseph Needham admired about Chinese peasants’ struggle. Thus, these leftist intellectuals spread the idea to their comrades that China, which was a civilized and peaceable country, was under the exploitation of the brutal western imperialists. 181 Tom Buchanan, East wind: China and the British left, 1925-1976 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 182 Ibid, 12 183 Ibid, 2 55

at the beginning of colonisation.184 Georgina Sinclair argues in her work At the end of the line that the escalation of the colonial police power revived again during the post-war decolonisation period. With the intensification of the violence in independent movements, colonial police forces obtained greater power in developing intelligence and counter-insurgency units for the sake of the empire’s survival.185

Sinclair even described policing the declining empire as a kind of “dirty war” compared to “the English style of policing by consent.”186 Georgina mainly focuses on military and intelligence aspects to justify her argument which shows the expansion of the colonial police power. However, she places little emphasis on the relationship between the judicial system and the police power. It was true that the

British informal empire in China was at risk because of the spread of communism.

Antony Best illustrates British intelligence departments were preoccupied by the expansion of communism in the Far East during the 1920s.187

As part of imperial policing networks, the Shanghai Municipal Police also took a negative view towards communism. The International Settlement therefore began to apprehend communists interrupting the social stability in Shanghai since the mid-1920s. For example, those communists or agitators who stirred up labour strikes and distributed inflammatory pamphlets to civilians at the Settlement would be taken to custody, waiting for trials in the Mixed Court.188 Besides, informed by different foreign consulates, the municipal police had also kept an eye on movements of

184 Ibid, 2 185 Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line, 7 186 Ibid 187 Antony Best, British intelligence and the Japanese challenge in Asia, 1914-1941 (Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 5 188 Daung Ling Sung and Yu Ts Yu, who were employees of the Oriental Cotton Mill, 36 Yangtszepoo Road, were apprehended for posting inflammatory handbills on the premises of that factory. Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Report, 1st October – 31st December, 1926, 23rd November, 1926, ref.: U1-1-1152, p. 111; For arrest due to writing communist slogans, Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Report 1st-31st January, 1932,25th January, 1932 and 17th May, 1935, Ref.: U1-1-1179, p. 302; For raiding of business and printing premises, please refers to Ref.: U1-1-1179, p. 336; For preventing demonstration, please refer to Ref.: U1-1-1180, p.216-7 56

different western communist agents in Shanghai.189 Indeed, a sophisticated intelligence network was built between the municipal police, French concession police, foreign embassies,190 and even colonial police forces overseas.191 Equipped with heavy weapons and armoured vehicles, the Reserve Unit, which was described by Leroy Thompson as the first Special Weapons and Tactics team (SWAT) in the world, was also founded to suppress mass demonstrations, strikes and disturbances in the settlement.192 [Please refer to appendix 4] Meanwhile, with the hope to pacify the fervid Chinese nationalism after the outbreak of the May Thirtieth incident in

1925, the Shanghai International Settlement, foreign consulates and Sun Chuanfang’s

Jiangsu provincial government jointly signed the Mixed Court Agreement in 1926.193

189 At the request of the Japanese Consular Police, Municipal Police apprehended one Alexander Bok, alias Bok Oon Kyi, Japanese subject, on a charge of a communist. Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Report, 1st April – 30th June, 1928, 3rd May, 1928, ref.: U1-1-1158, p. 33; Japanese consulate issued a warrant to SMP to arrest Japanese communist, see Shanghai Municipal Police, Police intelligence report, 13th March, 1933 190 The Shanghai Municipal Police transferred the intelligence given by Dutch consulate to the French police, urging the latter to be aware of the movement of several Indonesian communists in China. See“Despatch written from T.V. Givens to Saint-Oyauts”in Shanghai Fazujie Gongdongju Jingwuchu Guanyu Helan Zhuhuzonglingshiguan Tongzhi Fazujiebufang Yinnialimindeng Siwei Gongchandang yuan Yidi Xiamen Huodong [上海法租界公董局警務處關於荷蘭駐滬總領事館通知法租界捕房印尼阿利敏等四位共產黨員已抵廈門活動] [Consulate general of the Netherlands informting the police force of the French Concession concerning the arrival of four Indonesian communists in Amoy] in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930, Ref.: U38-2-51 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive); “Japanese communist activity in Shanghai. Louw Hwe-Touw, father of Louw Hap-Ie alias "Java" informer. Tan Malacca Josef Hassan Darsano, Louw Hwe-Touw”, ref. D4511 in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944; British embassy also made enquiries to Shanghai Municipal Police concerning the communist activities in Shanghai. See “letter written from T.V. Givens of the Special Branch to H.N. Steptoe of British Consulate General in Shanghai”, in "The Comintern and the United Front Campaign"in "Communist propaganda - work of Youth Communist International (Comosol)", ref: D6479, 12th April, 1935, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 191 The Hong Kong Police force requested the Shanghai Municipal Police to provide information on a Russian suspect called Victor Strijevsky “Confidential desptach sent from the inspector general of the Hong Kong Police Force to the Shanghai Municipal Police, C.I.D.41 in 1520/31, 20th September, 1933”, in “communist pamphlets found at the main entrance of foreign YMCA, July 26/27, 1932”, ref. D3902, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 192 Sub-machine guns and the famous “Red Maria” armoured car were deployed in many operations in dispersing the crowds. See Leroy Thompson, The world's first SWAT team: W.E. Fairbairn and the Shanghai Municipal Police Reserve Unit (Barnsley: Frontline, 2012) 193 He Shizhen 何世楨，“Ji Shanghai Gonggongzujie Linshifayuan”〈記上海公共租界臨時法院〉 [The story of Shanghai Provisional Court]，in Ershi Shiji Shanghai Wenshi Ziliao Wenku 《20 世紀上海文史資料文庫》[Literary and historical archive of 20th century Shanghai]，(Shanghai[上海]： Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe [上海書店出版社] [Shanghai People’s press], 1999), 74 57

Subsequently, the implementation of Chinese legal codes and procedures in the

International Settlement established the legitimacy for the Nationalist Government to request the Settlement for assistance when arresting communists later.194 However, it is worth noticing to discuss how the mentality and procedures of the Shanghai

Municipal Police varied in apprehending communists after the arrival of the

Nationalists who were extremely anti-communist.

In spite of their endeavours to restore the history of the Shanghai Mixed Court in the existing literature, scholars have neglected methods and procedures employed by the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force in tackling the issue of arresting communists in Shanghai. The attitude of the British and the Settlement authorities on the nationalism and the communism in Shanghai has been attached with greater weight by different scholars. Robert Bickers argues that British settlers in Shanghai were forced to compromise with the Chinese in various respects under the pressure from the British Foreign Office since the late 1920s.195 Nevertheless, focusing mainly on the localisation of British commercial and religious sectors in China,

Bickers places less emphasis on the transformation of political and legal activities in foreign concessions between 1927 and 1937”.196 Thus, the execution of police power of the Shanghai Municipal Police during the rise of Jiang Jieshi remains unexplored. Leroy Thompson makes a good attempt to study reactions of the

194 “All laws, including laws of procedure, and ordinances applicable at the present time in other Chinese courts as well as those that may be duly enacted and promulgated in the future shall be applicable in the Provisional Court, due account being taken of the terms of the present agreement and of such established rules of procedure of the Mixed Court as shall be hereafter agreed upon”. See “Provisional agreement for the rendition of the Shanghai Mixed Court, 31st August, 1926”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 3, (Jul., 1927), 113 195 Robert Bickers, Britain in China,117 196 Chapter five of Britain in China exclusively used British merchants and missionaries as examples for explaining the decline of British imperialism after the 1920s. Indeed, Bickers not only mentioned the internal reform of the police force, but he also illustrated the judicial concession given by the municipal council in the case of the provisional court in the late 1920s. However, Bickers never studied the power of the municipal police in the context of a strengthened Nationalist Party after the completion of the Northern Expedition. See Robert Bickers, Britain in China, 135 58

municipal police in dealing with mass demonstrations under the turmoil attributed to different political movements. Indeed, police riot squads were deployed to suppress mass demonstrations and strikes agitated by communists.197 Yet Thompson’s book merely depicts the municipal police’s strategic planning and utilisation of weapons on crowd controls. How to curb down the sources of unrest through legal procedures is still unexamined.198

In addition, the perspective of the Nationalist regime in arrests was also unexplored. Frederic Wakeman attributes the failure of the modernisation of bureaucracy and institution in Shanghai to the “lamentable durability of governmentalised autocracy” under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi.199 Although

Frederic Wakeman illustrated the collaboration between the municipal police, French police and Chinese intelligence agents in arresting communists, he mainly intends to use this example to explain the stagnancy of regular police works in Chinese territories and radical rightist ideologies possessed by Jiang’s officers.200

Nonetheless, criminal procedures employed by the municipal police in handling communist arrests were not included in his chapter about the reds.

Strategies and tactics employed by the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai during the 1920s and 1930s are well-noted by S.A. Smith and Patricia Stranahan. The former focused on the united front period when the Nationalists were still an ally of communists, whereas the latter studied the decade after the split between the

Kuomintang and the reds in 1927. Smith highlights efforts of communists in

197 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Report, 1st July-31st December, 1935, 1st August, 1935, ref.: U1-1-1173, (Shanghai: unpublished documents stored in the Shanghai Municipal Archive) p. 31, 181; Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Report, 1st -31st January, 1932, 11th November, 1932, ref.: U1-1-1179, 89-93 198 Leroy Thompson, The world's first SWAT team: W.E. Fairbairn and the Shanghai Municipal Police Reserve Unit (Barnsley : Frontline, 2012). 199 Frederic Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937 xvi-xvii 200 Ibid, 133 59

mobilising the mass to openly revolt against warlords and westerners. The leading role of the communist party in agitating disturbances in the May Thirtieth incident in the International Settlement and armed uprisings against warlord are examined by

Smith.201 Yet, what happened after 1927 is utterly omitted by the author.

Conceivably, Stranahan further explores the changing patterns of communist activities in Shanghai during the Nanjing decade. Driven underground in response to political suppressions, Shanghai communists began to abandon pure Marxist idea taught by the Commintern, and ingratiated themselves with other patriotic organisations to fight against the Kuomintang and imperialists.202 In spite of the fact that Stranahan reveals the alliance of the Chinese and the Settlement police in apprehending communists since the early 1930s, she does not explain judicial mechanisms executed by the municipal police behind the scenes.203

By looking at a legal perspective, Yao Yuan investigates the institution of the

Settlement judicial system and the ambivalence between the Chinese authorities and legal departments of the Settlement in the Shanghai Special District Court. Citing arrests of communists as one of her examples, Yao mainly focuses on the extradition to illustrate the political calculation of the municipal police. The process of the apprehension and the issue of arrest warrants are not found in her book.204 Most importantly, Yao’s inability to consult court proceeding documents and special branch files of the municipal police becomes a major weakness of her book. Studying the Chinese criminal justice, Klaus Mühlhahn argues that the evolution of legal regulations in China was based on changing social conditions in the country. During

201 S.A.Smith, A road is made: Communism in Shanghai, 1920-1927 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 5-7 202 Patricia Stranahan, Underground: the Shanghai Communist Party and the politics of survival, 1927-1937 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 5 203 Ibid, 107-121 204 Yao Yuan 姚遠，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研究》 (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s press [上海人民出版社], 2011) 60

wars and revolutions between the 1920s and 1940s, regular legal procedures and standards in China were replaced by “the politicisation and the brutalisation of the criminal justice”.205 Nevertheless, Mühlhahn neither discusses whether his argument is still valid in the context of the Shanghai International Settlement, nor investigates if the settlement police force was influenced by the autocracy of the Chinese authorities.

Not only was the foreign presence in Shanghai threatened by the fervid Chinese nationalism, but it was also endangered by communist assassination incidents in the

Settlement during the early 1930s. The argument of this chapter is to reveal readjustments of British imperial policies in Shanghai throughout the late 1920s and

1930s by making legal concessions in arresting communists. I also argue that the

Shanghai Municipal Police had to rely on the strengthened Nationalist government to suppress communist activities for the the International Settlement’s survival. The loose and simplified criminal procedures were employed by the Shanghai Municipal

Police during arrests of communists. Aside from using formal legal channels, the

Settlement police also utilised illegal channels to cope with the Nationalists in apprehensions. In addition to their failure to execute warrants accordingly, the municipal police even arrested some communist suspects without acquiring formal approvals from the Shanghai Special District Court. The violation of criminal procedures signified the diminishing authority of the municipal police in the judicial system of the Settlement and paved the way for further concessions shown in chapters about the extradition and the reformatories. Yet, the municipal advocate and some of senior police officers still attempted to maintain the judicial independence of the International Settlement by reasserting the need to carry out any actions in the

205 Klaus Mühlhahn, Criminal justice in China : a history (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 4, 11 61

light of the legal procedure. This chapter also analyses the ambivalence between the front-line police constables and the council staff about the issue of arresting communists. The infringement of the legal autonomy in foreign concession was eventually inevitable when the law and order of the Settlement was threatened by the communist intrusion.

Complex legal procedures

Since the northern expedition was almost completed in April 1927, the Shanghai

Municipal Council recognised the legitimacy of the Kuomintang in ruling over

China.206 Frightened by an immediate communist invasion after General Sun

Chuanfang in Shanghai was defeated in March 1927, the chairman of the municipal council Stirling Fessenden decided to cooperate with the Kuomintang to suppress communist activities in Shanghai. He allowed the Shanghai Green Gang, which was affiliated with the Kuomintang, to pass through the International Settlement and eventually to purge all communist bodies in Zhabei 閘北 according to instructions given by the Kuomintang.207 According to Stranahan, the Settlement authorities even provided the Kuomintang with the intelligence to shut down communist bodies in Chinese territories.208 This incident was later known as the “Shanghai massacre of

1927”上海清黨.

From the above paragraph, it seems that the settlement authorities facilitated suppressions of communist activities in Chinese territory when Jiang Jieshi first came to power in 1927. However, the attitude of the municipal police was utterly opposite when the Chinese government requested the Settlement to provide more assistance to apprehend communists in the Settlement. Meanwhile, in spite of the

206 Brian G. Martin, The Shanghai Green Gang: politics and organized crime, 1919-1937 (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1996), 106 207 Ibid, 105-106; John B. Powell, My twenty-five years in China (New York: Macmillan, 1945), 158-159 208 Patricia Stranahan, Underground, 11 62

promulgation of modern Chinese criminal codes and procedures in Shanghai in 1928, the Chinese authorities did not enforce them strictly.209 Therefore, it was not surprising that there were different expectations for the Chinese and Settlement authorities in arresting political criminals living in the International Settlement. It was undoubted that complex legal procedures of the Settlement would intensify the confrontations between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities during arrests of communists.

The first legal controversy was the acquisition of arrest warrants from the court in the Settlement. Although the Chinese intelligence and police agents had been allowed to take part in arrests since the mid-1920s, they still had to acquire warrants issued by judicial authorities before reporting to police stations in the Settlement.

Before the arrival of the Nationalists, warrants had become a significant part of legal frameworks in apprehensions. According to “the Rules of procedure 1914 and

1919 of the International Mixed Court in Shanghai”, the municipal police were the prosecution authority and were entitled to apply to the court for a warrant of arrest against people violating decrees.210 During an arrest, police officers were even requested to show a warrant to an accused.211 Arrests without warrants could only be accepted by the court if cases involved flagrant delictors 現行犯 who were

“pursued by cries of any person”, or “possessed dangerous weapons and important properties.”212 Likewise, the Chinese criminal procedures promulgated in 1928 also stated that an arrest should be made with a warrant against an accused who was

209 Klaus Mühlhahn, Criminal justice in China, 11 210 Anatol Kotenev, Shanghai: its mixed court and council: materials relating to the history of the Shanghai Municipal Council and the history, practice and statistics of the International Mixed Court, Chinese modern law and Shanghai municipal land regulations and bye-laws governing the life in the settlement. (Shanghai : North-China Daily News & Herald, 1925), 370 211 Ibid, 325 212 Ibid 63

“strongly suspected of having committed an offence”.213 A warrant must also be presented to an accused during an arrest.214 However, a flagrante delictor who owned destructive weapons or stolen property, or was committing a crime at the scene, could be legally arrested by policemen without any warrants.215 Indeed, before the 1930s, it was true that the municipal police sometimes apprehended communists without warrants provided that flagrant delictors were involved in crimes. Loo Yih Noong 羅亦農, a communist leader agitating many strikes in the

Settlement, was arrested by the municipal police merely based on a report of a female called Shih Hwa in April 1928.216 Communists conducting meeting in the

Settlement were also apprehended by policemen without presenting any warrants.217

On 9th August 1927, representatives of the Nationalist Military Headquarter and the municipal police raided 910A East Yuhang Road which was the residence of an armed communist. The wanted man was missing but plenty of pistols, ammunition and hatchets were seized in his room. Nine men found on the premise were arrested pending on a warrant for their extradition.218

213 Article 76: Where an accused is strongly suspected of having committed an offence, and where any one of the following circumstances exists, he may be arrested with a warrant without first being served with a summons: 1) Where he has no fixed domicile or residence; 2) Where he has absconded or it is apprehended that he may abscond; 3) Where it is apprehended that he may destroy, forge or alter evidence, or conspire with a co-offender or witness. 4) Where he has committed an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment, or the minimum principal punishment is imprisonment for not less than five years. (This statement was supplemented in 1935) See The code of criminal procedure of the Republic of China and the court agreement relating to the Chinese courts in the international settlement of Shanghai, China (Shanghai : Municipal Council, 1935), 24 214 Ibid, article 145, 42 215 Ibid, article 88 and 131, 27, 38-39 216 Report on Communist Activities made by R.W. Yorke, 19th April, 1928 in “Arrest of 7 communists on May 5, 1927”, ref. I.O. 7804, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 217 Representatives of the Woosung Shanghai Gendarmerie requested the assistance of the Police in raiding a biscuit shop at No.316 Ferry Road which is believed to be a communist meeting place. The premises were searched and 12 male Chinese were arrested. See Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Report, 1st April – 30th June, 1928, 15th June, 1928, ref.: U1-1-1158, p. 76 218 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports 1st July-30th September, 1927, ref.: U1-1-1155, 10th August, 1927, 139-140 64

Therefore, theoretically, in most of criminal cases, the Settlement and the Chinese police authorities should obtain warrants issued by the court before apprehending anyone. This arrangement should also be applicable to communist suspects who were sued for “against the internal security of the state” 內亂罪219 unless they were classified as flagrant delictors. However, since the promulgation of the law, the

Chinese authorities did not enforce their criminal procedures accordingly when handling political offenders. After the strengthening of the Kuomintang, many communists were often arrested, imprisoned and even executed by the Chinese military authorities without undergoing any regular legal processes in any formal legal institutions. Arrested by members of “the Committee to Eradicate Communists” in Shanghai, a young female communist was taken to a military headquarter for trial.

She was eventually executed by the order of General Yang Hu.220 The lack of formal legal procedures in the context of handling communist cases coincides with

Mühlhahn’s argument. It was because formal legal structures in China were replaced by “politicisation and brutalisation of criminal justice” during wars and revolutions.221

Aside from the judicial differentiation, the antagonism between the Settlement and the Chinese authorities was also attributed to the nature of different police models. Dr.

Von Kiebtner, who was an ex-adviser employed by Jiang Jieshi to train Chinese police officers, was interviewed by the Municipal Police in December 1929.

He analysed disparities between the municipal police and the Chinese police

219 Chinese and Settlement authorities usually charged the communists by the Offences against the Internal Security of the State since the latter were regarded as “committing an overt act with intent to shatter the national structure or seizing any part of the national territory”. See The Chinese criminal code and special criminal and administrative laws , article 100-102 (Shanghai : Municipal Council, 1935) 220 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports 1st July – 30th September 1927, 19th July, 1927, ref.: U1-1-1155, 603 221 Klaus Mühlhahn, Criminal justice in China, 11 65

authorities when apprehending criminals. According to his observation and experience, Dr. Kiebtner believed that it was necessary for Settlement policemen to obtain sufficient evidence and authority before arresting anyone. He explained his idea to the municipal police by comparing different police systems in various countries.

…the police system in the French Concession and the Settlement are contrary to police systems in China and in Germany, from which latter country China has copied, any of her police methods, in so far that the Police of the French Concession and the Settlement have no power to punish, whereas the police in Chinese controlled territory have power to arrest and detain a man indefinitely on mere suspicion, irrespective of whether a complaint has been made in a charge laid against the prisoner.222

Dr. Von Kiebtner further illustrated that the Chinese authorities even regarded the detention methods employed by Settlement policemen in Shanghai as “a manifestation of weakness.”223 Indeed, the British judicial system actually did not favour arrest without warrants in the 1930s, provided that an accused was not a flagrant delictor. Ho Chi Minh 胡志明, one of the founders of the Vietnam

Communist Party, was apprehended by the Hong Kong Police Force in 1930. In accordance with the decision made by the Privy Council in London, the detention of

Ho was illegal due to the absence of a warrant. Eventually, Ho was acquitted of the charge against him. Ho was even allowed to travel outside Hong Kong.224 Despite

222 "Interview with Dr. Von Kiebtner" in Shanghai Gonggong Zujie Gongbujuzongbanchu Youguan Jingwuchu Guanyu Kelaina Boshi Fabiao Guanyu Guomindang Zhengfu He Jiang Jieshi Dui Shanghaizujie Taidu De Tanhua De Baogao (1929-1930) [上海公共租界工部局總辦處有關工部局警務處關於克萊納博士發表關於國民黨政府和蔣介石對上海租界態度的談話的報告 (1929-1930)] [Report made by the Shanghai Municipal Police concerning Dr. Kiebtner on the attitude of the Nationalist Government and Jiang Jieshi towards in the International Settlement] in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930, ref.: U1-6-22, 30th December, 1929 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive), 1-3 223 Ibid 224 "Who were the famous persons in Victoria Prison?" in 66

the fact that the Hong Kong Police shared similar political interests with the Chinese authorities and the Shanghai Municipal Police, the British judicial system, which was free from political control, still emphasised on the importance of fair trials for everyone regardless of their political affiliations.

As a result, the International Settlement could hardly show any “sympathy” to the

Chinese authorities when the Kuomintang came to power. It was necessary for

Chinese agents to apply for warrants from the Provisional Court before apprehending communists in the Settlement. Such principle of arrest was confirmed after the municipal police officers at the Hongkew Station assisted the Chinese authorities to arrest Tsho Meu Teong in 1124 San Siu Li, Broadway on 5th July, 1927, by virtue of a warrant issued by General Pai Chung Hai. Tsho Meu Teong not only failed to match the person stated in the warrant, but his books found at the premise also contained nothing about communism. Therefore, the Commissioner of Police Edward Barrett recommended to the municipal council that “in future dispatch warrants of this description (issued from the Chinese authority) be dealt with only after reference to the Provisional Court from whom a warrant must be obtained setting forth the name and charge against the accused.”225 Thus, the municipal police would promise the

Chinese authorities to initiate any arrest only after the Chinese had applied for warrants from the Provisional Court at the Settlement. On 16th July, 1927, the

Dalbank in 29 Szechuen Road was raided and sealed by Settlement policemen who received a dispatch warrant endorsed by the Provisional Court warrant from the

Chinese authorities.” The warrant indicated that this bank was assisting http://www.hkmemory.org/central-police/text/prison-q5-eng.php, accessed on 28th April, 2015 225 “Arrest of Hu Cheh-chiao, alleged communist & Chinese dispatch warrants- Commissioner of Police (1927), 5th July, 1927” in [The problem about the extradition of communists, 1927-1928] Shanghai Gonggonzujiezongbanchu Guanyu Gongchandangyuan De Yindu Wenti 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於共產黨員的引渡問題 (1927-1928) in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930, ref.: U1-3-3313, (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive). 67

communists.226 Even requests of banning the reactionary literature in the Settlement must be first sent to the Provisional Court.227 Subsequently, orders would be issued from the court to the municipal police in order to make prohibitions become effective.228 On the other hand, apprehension requisitions would be rejected if the

Chinese failed to present warrants issued by the Settlement Court. On 7th September,

1927, the Nationalist East Front Military Headquarter requested assistance from the settlement to arrest a communist suspect called Chou Pao-yuen. As they did not obtain a warrant from the Provisional Court and failed to show any descriptions, their requisition was eventually rejected.229

In addition, the municipal police would only abide by details stated in warrants.

Indeed, the Chinese Criminal Procedures stated that before an apprehension began, a warrant should be issued specifying clearly about the information of the accused such as his / her full name, sex, residence, facts of the case and reasons for an arrest.230 [Please refer to appendix 7] According to the Kuomintang intelligence chief Xu Enceng 徐恩曾, Settlement policemen would refuse to cooperate with his men provided that details of the accused was inaccurate.231 Before requesting for assistance, Chinese agents had to state clearly in a warrant about the personal

226 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports 1st July – 30th September, 1927, ref.: U1-1-1155, 17-18th July, 1927, 59 227“Dispatch written from Chinese Foreign Office Jiangsu branch to Shanghai Provisional Court”in Shanghai Gonggongzujie Qudi Wodang Shubao Kanwu Chubanshe He Shuju Deng Xunling (er) 上海公共租界臨時法院取締我黨書報,刊物,出版社和書局等訓令(二) Sealing order issued by the Shanghai Municipal Council on communist books, literature, publisher and bookstore (2), 1928-1929, in Secretariat Files of the Shanghai Municipal Council, ref.: Q179-1-10, (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive), 18-22 228 “Despatch written from Shanghai Provisional Court to the Commissioner of Police”, ibid, 88-96, 305-307 229 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports 1st July – 30th September, 1927, ref.: U1-1-1155, 8th September, 1927, 251 230 Article 77, The code of criminal procedure of the Republic of China and the court agreement relating to the Chinese courts in the international settlement of Shanghai, China (Shanghai : Municipal Council, 1935), 24-25 231 Xu Enceng 徐恩曾，Wo He Gongdang Zhandou De Huiyi 《我和共黨戰鬥的回憶》 My memory concerning my struggle with the communists，ref: 276/3777, (Taipei: unpublished materials stored in Bureau of Investigation, Ministry of Justice, Republic of China, 1953), 189 68

particulars of an accused such as his / her age, appearance, address and even room number. Even though an accused immediately jumped to another flat next to the reported location, the municipal police would not continue their search. This strict and inflexible practice was still in used occasionally in the 1930s when the relationship between the Settlement and the Chinese authorities was improved.232

While reporting to General Jiang Jieshi, the chief of the Public Safety Bureau Wang

Zhenxing 黃振興 admitted that although the municipal police were willing to provide assistance to arrest communists living in the Settlement, formalities and procedures for these arrests were still onerous.233

Subsequently, Chinese intelligence departments were less efficient in carrying out their arrests due to judicial barriers set by the Settlement. This eventually intensified the hostility between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities. As a consequence, complex legal procedures led to illegal arrests of Chinese military and intelligence officers. On 10th August, 1927, a few nationalist soldiers attempted to take a communist suspect called Hung Tai-nyeu into custody without noticing Settlement policemen. The Senior Consul’s Deputy not only protested for the extradition decision, but he also criticised these Chinese soldiers for kidnapping Hung. It was because the arrest was conducted without a proper warrant.234 Again, on 24th

October, 1927, six Chinese detectives arrested three alleged communists near the

North Szechuen Road and took them to Military Headquarter without noticing the

232 Pohuo Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhijuan Zhi Jingyan Jianshu〈破獲中共中央政治局案之經驗簡述〉[The case of shutting down the Central Political Bureau] in Youguan Gu Shunzhang Deng Poan Jingguo《有關顧順章等破案經過》[The process for arresting Gu Shunzhang]，ref: 276/7435, (Taipei: unpublished materials stored in Bureau of Investigation, Ministry of Justice, Republic of China). 233 “Telegram sent from Wang Zhenxing and Lengxin to Jiang Jishi”, in Zhongzhong Bufa Zuixing Yi 《種種不法罪行（一）》 Different kinds of crime (1), telegram no. 8069, ref: 002-090300-00017-014, 17th January, 1929 (Taipei: unpublished materials stored in the Jiang Jieshi section, National Archive, Republic of China) 234 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports, 1st July-30th September, 1927, ref: U1-1-1155, 10th August, 1927, 139-140 69

municipal police.235 Apart from apprehending Chinese suspects, the Nationalist government even illegally arrested British subjects such as Hong Kong Chinese and

British Indians in the International Settlement without informing the municipal police. The Chinese government did not release these innocent people until the

British embassy interfered in these cases.236

Likewise, never did the Kuomintang cooperate with the municipal police when arresting Indian seditionists who advocated the independence of British India.237

Since the Chinese authorities refused to provide assistance to arrestiIndian nationalists, the municipal police illegally apprehended Indian suspects in Chinese controlled territory without informing Chinese policemen.238 This illegal arrest even aroused strong discontent and criticisms among Indian communities in Shanghai on the Chinese government in 1930.239

In short, the Shanghai Municipal Police’s desire to maintain the judicial autonomy of the International Settlement caused inefficiency for arresting communists wanted by the Chinese government. The antagonism between the International Settlement

235 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports 1st October-31st December, 1927, ref: U1-1-1156, 25th October, 1927, 83 236 Hong Kong Chinese Chen Hui-ping 陳惠屏, Chen Tz Liang 陳子良, Chen Tsu-mou 陳祖謀 and Britisih Indian Rumjahn, Fuja Singh were apprehended by the Chapei police without informing the Shanghai Municipal Police in 1928. British Foreign Office papers, F 671/538, (London: Unpublished papers stored in the National Archive at Kew) 237 It was suspected that the Nationalist government was hostile towards western imperialism in China at the beginning. According to Wakemen, the municipal police were informed that the Nationalists’ Northern Expedition Army still comprised foreign communist agents who promoted communism in China as a result of the First United Front in 1927. See Frederic Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, 145 238 The municipal police and British intelligence officers used other criminal instead of political offence to arrest these Indians. Chinese rowdies were sent to fight with the wanted Indians in the Chinese territory. The latter were apprehended for “disorderly and drunken conduct or carrying unlicensed weapons”. And the municipal police eventually extradited them to the Settlement for trial. See Frederic Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, 145, 371 and China Weekly Review (Shanghai: Millard Publishing House, 1923-1950), 10 January, 1931, 212-213 239 Letter written sent from chairman of Eastern Oppression League [東方被壓迫民族聯合會] Bishan Singh to Kuomintang party headquarter, Hu Gonggongzujie Bufang Mengbi Hushi Gonganju Chaobu Yindutongmenghuian 《戶(滬)公共租界捕房朦蔽滬市公安局抄捕印度同盟會案》 The failure of the Shanghai International Settlement to inform Shanghai Public Safety Bureau，政治檔案 political files, ref: 1/50, 31st May, 1930 (Taipei: unpublished materials stored in the Kuomintang Party Archive, Republic of China) 70

and the Nationalist government would continue until the early 1930s when the

Shanghai Municipal Police gradually realised that the safety of the Settlement was seriously threatened by communist assassination cases in Shanghai.

Security crises and the Red Brigade

The early 1930s were a watershed that illustrates how the policy of the

International Settlement was changed when arresting communists. In accordance with Stranahan, the shifting attitude of the municipal police could partly be explained by the increasing communist propagation on foreign troops in the 1930s.240 Some police constables of the municipal police even engaged in communist activities.241

Besides, since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the new united front policy employed by communists to ally with patriotic organisations in Shanghai further worsened the turmoil.242 It seems that purifying law enforcement officers and eliminating the source of contamination became more important for the Shanghai

Municipal Police.

Nevertheless, I suggest that the survival of the Settlement and the imperial presence strengthened the determination of the municipal police to remove communists. Confronted with a mixture of the nationalism and the communism in

China, British expatriates could no longer maintain their existence by themselves alone. The inability of the municipal police to deal with communist assassination incidents in the Settlement inevitably forced itself to cooperate with the Chinese authorities wholeheartedly when apprehending communists. Indeed, such view is

240 Patricia Stranahan, Underground, 107 241 Gonggongzujie Daibu Dapi Gongchandang 《公共租界逮捕大批共產黨》Arrest of massive amount of communist in the International Settlement in 吳稚輝檔案 [File of Wu Zhihui], ref: 00816, 25th April, 1933 (Taipei: unpublished materials stored in the Kuomintang Party Archive, Republic of China) 242 Frederic Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, 156-157 71

recognised by Fredrick Wakeman who stresses that the Settlement was more willing to provide its “entire help and collaboration in the campaign against the Chinese

Communist Party” because of British settlers’ intention to check communist advance in the city.243 As a result, the deadlock between the Settlement and the Chinese authorities to arrest communists was solved in the early 1930s because the internal security of the Settlement was severely threatened by communist murder cases.

Indeed, Nationalist agents and traitors of the communist party were the targets of the red brigade. Nevertheless, it was undeniable that punishing communist traitors and Chinese agents not only led to massacres of their families, but it also unintentionally brought heavy casualties to civilians living in foreign concessions.

Therefore, foreign concessions became more unstable.

Murder was a common method employed by the red brigade to kill their targets.

Gu Shunzhang 顧順章, who was once the head of the communist red brigade, was arrested by the Chinese authorities in Hankou in 1931. The Nationalist government soon made good use of the intelligence provided by Gu to shut down communist bases throughout the country.244 With a view to taking revenge on behalf of their comrades, the red brigade interned the Gu’s family living in the International

Settlement soon after Gu’s surrender. Eventually, Zhou Enlai 周恩來, the future premier of the People’s Republic of China, ordered his subordinates to strangulate almost all family members and some friends of Gu and buried their corpses underground.245 Knowing that Gu’s family and friends were assassinated, the

243 Ibid, 145, 160 244 Xu Enceng 徐恩曾，Wo He Gongdang Zhandou De Huiyi 《我和共黨戰鬥的回憶》My memory concerning my struggle with the communists, 158-159 245 Wang Sicheng 王思誠，Zhou fei Enlai Dalousha Zhenbanji〈周匪恩來大謀殺偵辦記〉[The record for investigating the murder ordered by Zhou Enlai]，[Jinri Dalu]《今日大陸》[Mainland China today]，20th July, 1954 (Taipei: unpublished materials stored in Bureau of Investigation, Ministry of Justice, Republic of China), 73 72

Chinese intelligence departments contacted the municipal police and French police for excavating bodies buried in foreign concessions in late November 1931.246

According to the police daily report, at least seven corpses were unearthed at depths up to about 8 feet at 91-A Sinza Road 新閘路 of the International Settlement within three days.247 Propagated by media and press in Shanghai and overseas, this assassination incident not only caused humiliations on the Shanghai Municipal

Council, but they also challenged the ability of Settlement policemen in maintaining the law and order in the Settlements.248 When visiting Gu Shunzhang and Chinese intelligence departments in Nanjing after this assassination incident, officers of two

Settlement police forces were informed more about details of communists meetings, murders and kidnappings in foreign concessions. Feeling shameful and ignorant,

Settlement policemen promised to try their best to cooperate with the Chinese government to arrest communists in the future.249

The red brigade was also convicted of assaulting people in the public. Taking revenge for their comrades, red brigade members killed some Chinese intelligence

246 The police forces of the two settlements, who believed that law and order in the foreign concessions was stable and peaceful, originally refused to allow the Chinese for excavating the bodies. Excavation could eventually initiate after the Chinese authorities showing more evidence to the Settlement police. Eventually, nearly 40 corpses were found before the Settlement authorities brought the excavation work to a halt. See Wang Sicheng 王思誠，Zhou fei Enlai Dalousha Zhenbanji〈周匪恩來大謀殺偵辦記〉[The record for investigating the murder ordered by Zhou Enlai]，[Jinri Dalu] 《今日大陸》[Mainland China today], 74; Xu Enceng 徐恩曾，Wo He Gongdang Zhandou De Huiyi 《我和共黨戰鬥的回憶》My memory concerning my struggle with the communists,166 247 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports 1st July-31st December, ref.: U1-1-1165, 27th -29th November, 1931, 174- 176; There were similar findings in 6 Wuting Road of the International Settlement and 33 and 37 of Ai Dang Li, Rue Prosper Patis of the French concession. See Wang Sicheng 王思誠，Zhou fei Enlai Dalousha Zhenbanji〈周匪恩來大謀殺偵辦記〉[The record for investigating the murder ordered by Zhou Enlai]，Jinri Dalu《今日大陸》Mainland China today, 73 248 Shen Pao《申報》，27th-28th November, 1931；Xu Enceng 徐恩曾，Wo He Gongdang Zhandou De Huiyi 《我和共黨戰鬥的回憶》 My memory concerning my struggle with the communists,166 249 Wang Sicheng 王思誠，Zhou fei Enlai DaMousha Zhenbanji〈周匪恩來大謀殺偵辦記〉[The record for investigating the murder ordered by Zhou Enlai]，Jinri Dalu《今日大陸》Mainland China today, 75; Wo He Gongdang Zhandou De Huiyi 《我和共黨戰鬥的回憶》 My memory concerning my struggle of the communists, 166 73

agents on the street in the Settlement and Chinese territory in the early 1930s.250

Worse still, civilians and policemen of the Settlement were sometimes killed accidentally. On 27th September, 1934, two red brigade members openly shot a communist traitor Xiong Guohua 熊國華 inside a ward of Lester Chinese Hospital

仁濟醫院. During their escapes, red brigade members shot policemen, killing two of them. One of pedestrians was killed by stray bullets. Totally, this assassination incident caused six casualties, of which four people were killed and two people were injured. The Red brigade escaped successfully afterwards.251 Frightened by the assassination of Xiong, the public and policemen took cover behind any objects on the street. The atmosphere in foreign concessions became tense. Feeling unable to solve the problem alone, Settlement policemen urgently asked the Chinese Public

Safety Bureau for assistance to arrest communist fugitives.252

To conclude, increasing number of assassination cases forced the municipal police to reinforce their cooperation with the Chinese government to suppress communist activities in Shanghai. The Settlement authorities understood that communist disturbances occurred in foreign concessions and Chinese territory were inevitably inter-related with each other. Settlement policemen had to ally with the Nationalist government to encounter the rising communist threat. In consequence, the municipal

250 Chinese intelligence officers Lei Dafu (雷達夫), Ma Shaowu (馬紹武), Huang Yonghua (黃永華) were shot by the red brigade in 11th April, 1933 28th June, 1933 26th August, 1933 respectively. See[Xiaomie Gongfei Hongduian Zhi Jingyanjianshu]〈消滅共匪紅隊案之經驗簡述〉[The experience in eliminating the red brigade of the communist party] in Youguan Gu Shunzhang Deng Poan Jingguo《有關顧順章等破案經過》The process for arresting Gu Shunzhang; Wo He Gongdang Zhandou De Huiyi 《我和共黨戰鬥的回憶》My memory concerning my struggle of the communists, 179; Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence reports, 1st-30th June, 1933, ref: U1-1-1196, 28th June, 1933, 216 251 Xiaomie Gongfei Hongduian Zhi Jingyanjianshu〈消滅共匪紅隊案之經驗簡述〉[The experience in eliminating the red brigade of the communist party] in Youguan Gu Shunzhang Deng Poan Jingguo 《有關顧順章等破案經過》The process for arresting Gu Shunzhang; Shen Pao《申報》，27th-28th September, 1934 252 Xiaomie Gongfei Hongduian Zhi Jingyanjianshu〈消滅共匪紅隊案之經驗簡述〉[The experience in eliminating the red brigade of the communist party] in Youguan Gu Shunzhang Deng Poan Jingguo 《有關顧順章等破案經過》The process for arresting Gu Shunzhang 74

police were more willing to give their helping hands to the Chinese government to apprehend communists in the 1930s, even though they had to violate legal procedures.

A trustworthy partnership

The communist threat helped to strengthen the relationship between foreign concessions and the Kuomintang government in the early 1930s. The Shanghai

Municipal Police would cooperate with the Chinese authorities to apprehend communists by all means. Indeed, it was true that many policemen in different stations were mobilised to spot any possible political offences in their districts. In

April 1931, deputy commissioners Springfield (Divisions) and Aiers (Crime and

Special Branches) requested their detective colleagues in all districts to fully cooperate with Special Branch officers in cases of any arrests relating to political offenders. According to instructions, policemen should categorise political offences as criminal cases. District detectives not only had to take part in arrests, but they were also asked to prepare crime diaries and other legal documents for trials.253 It was obvious that more police departments were involved in handling political offences, extending from the Special Branch to all police stations. Concerning judicial proceedings of arrests, not only did Settlement policemen employ formal ways to arrest communists, but they also occasionally violated criminal procedures in order to make arrests become more effective and efficient. The collaborative relationship between the Settlement and the Chinese authorities was only forced to terminate after Japanese invasion in Shanghai in 1937.

By virtue of the Chinese criminal procedures, the municipal police were

253 “Memo from D.C.’s (Divisions) and (Crime & Special Branches)” in “Memo issued by D.C. (Div.) and D.C. (Cr. & Sp. Br.) re cooperation between stations and Special Branch re raids etc. made in connection with political offenses” in ref. D8/11, 10th April, 1931, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 75

authorised to arrest flagrant delictors without obtaining any warrant. On 22nd

September, 1932, the Shanghai Public Security Bureau provided the intelligence to the special branch of the municipal police about a communist meeting. Detective sergeant Moore and his two colleagues from the Special Branch were instructed to proceed directly to the premise located in Penang Road without asking police stations nearby for assistance. No legal dispatches were mentioned in the police report. Even Sergeant Moore himself admitted that “this procedure was adopted in view of the urgency of the call.”254 Eventually, nine communist suspects at the meeting were arrested on the scene and escorted to Pootoo Road Police station.255

Meanwhile, the municipal police and Chinese intelligence departments responded quickly to some assassination cases without applying for warrants from the

Settlement court. After Xiong Guohua and several police and civilians were shot by the red brigade on 26th September, 1934, a memorandum was immediately signed between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities concerning the arrest of red brigade members. The memorandum stated that the Chinese Public Security Bureau not only would get these communist criminals extradited, but it would also coordinate all actions in this arrest operation against the red brigade.256 Eventually, the red brigade leader Kwang Wei-an 鄺惠安 and other ten convicts were arrested.

Plenty of weapons were seized in two foreign concessions.257 Again, the court was

254 Detective Sergeant Moore, “Raid made on premises situated at 32 Chien Shing Faung, Penang Road, by members of the Special Branch on September, 22, 1932”, in “Copies of crime diaries - cases arising out of raids or arrests”, ref. D4056, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944; Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1st-30th September, 1932 , ref.: U1-1-1187, 23rd September, 1932, 226 255 Detective Sergeant Moore, “Raid made on premises situated at 32 Chien Shing Faung, Penang Road, by members of the Special Branch on September, 22, 1932”, in “Copies of crime diaries - cases arising out of raids or arrests” 256 Xiaomie Gongfei Hongduian Zhi Jingyanjianshu〈消滅共匪紅隊案之經驗簡述〉The experience in eliminating the red brigade of the communist party in Youguan Gu Shunzhang Deng Poan Jingguo 《有關顧順章等破案經過》The process for arresting Gu Shunzhang 257 27 pistols, 26 magazines, 2 bombs, 1003 rounds of ammunition, 1 dagger, 1 steel vest and a quantity of communistic literature were seized. Several of the pistols seized have been identified as 76

uninformed about this arrest until the Chinese authorities applied for the extradition of offenders.258 The law and order were restored following the extradition of these criminals to the Kuomintang.259 There were more examples showing that the municipal police shut down communist meetings and assassination corps merely based on the information provided by the Chinese authorities in the Police

Intelligence Reports.260

Moreover, arrests with court warrants continued to be practiced by the municipal police. Provided that warrants were issued by the Settlement Court at the request of the Chinese authorities, communists would be taken into custody regardless of their ranks and identities. Tsiang Khe Zung 蔣開成, whose name appeared in the court warrant possessed by the Chinese Public Service Bureau, was arrested by the municipal police on 27th March, 1934.261 The accused was suspected to be a communist because his name was found in a name list possessed by a communist prisoner arrested by the Chinese authorities. Also, influential communists could not avoid being arrested if their personal particulars matched the details stated in warrants. The case against the Kiangsu Provisional Committee 江蘇省中央政治局 of the Chinese Communist Party on 26th June, 1934 was a good example as stated in the evaluation report of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics in Taipei. Three

having been used in a number of cases of murder in the Settlement and three pistols definitely as being those used in the Lester Hospital triple murder case. See Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports 1st July-31st December, 1934, ref: U1-1-1171, 28th September, 1934, 94 258 Xiaomie Gongfei Hongduian Zhi Jingyanjianshu〈消滅共匪紅隊案之經驗簡述〉The experience in eliminating the red brigade of the communist party in Youguan Gu Shunzhang Deng Poan Jingguo 《有關顧順章等破案經過》The process for arresting Gu Shunzhang 259 Xiaomie Gongfei Hongduian Zhi Jingyanjianshu〈消滅共匪紅隊案之經驗簡述〉The experience in eliminating the red brigade of the communist party in Youguan Gu Shunzhang Deng Poan Jingguo 《有關顧順章等破案經過》The process for arresting Gu Shunzhang 260 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, ref.: U1-1-1185, 12th July, 1932, 98; ref.: U1-1-1188, 24th October, 1932, 169-170; ref.: U1-1-1188, 25th October, 1932, 183-184; ref: U1-1-1203, 8th November, 1933, 76 261 “Shanghai Municipal Police Arrest Report”, in “Execution of search warrant No. 1848 and warrant of arrest No. 1846 issued by Judge Feng at the request of the Public Safety Bureau”, ref. D5762, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 77

hours before the arrest, Chinese intelligence agents Pan Zhe 潘哲, Chen Shuping 陳

叔平 and You Dingyi 游定一 provided accurate the address and other relevant materials of communist suspects to the Settlement in order to apply for arrest a warrant 簽辦排票.262 The Shanghai Municipal Police would initiate this arrest after receiving a warrant from the court. Although Chinese intelligence agents were still doubtful of the willingness of the municipal police to cooperate at first, apprehensions were eventually carried out in Chengtu and Gordon Roads Districts successfully.263 The secretary general Li Zhusheng 李竹聲, the chief of organisation department Yang Tiansheng 楊天生, the president of All-China Federation of Trade

Unions Yuan Jiayong 袁家鏞 and at least other ten communists were taken into custody. Plenty of documents and radio appliances were seized. Names of communist suspects matched with details written in arrest warrants. All of them were finally handed over to the Chinese authorities.264 Since the collapse of the Kiangsu

Provisional Committee and especially Li Zhusheng’s surrender in June 1934, no major communist headquarters were re-established due to heavy surveillance of the

Settlement and the Chinese authorities. From then on, communists could only survive in Shanghai through taking part in patriotic campaigns against imperialism.265

262 Pohuo Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhijuan Zhi Jingyan Jianshu〈破獲中共中央政治局案之經驗簡述〉The case of shutting down the Central Political Bureau in Youguan Gu Shunzhang Deng Poan Jingguo《有關顧順章等破案經過》The process for arresting Gu Shunzhang 263 Pohuo Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhijuan Zhi Jingyan Jianshu〈破獲中共中央政治局案之經驗簡述〉[The case of shutting down the Central Political Bureau] in Youguan Gu Shunzhang Deng Poan Jingguo《有關顧順章等破案經過》The process for arresting Gu Shunzhang; Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1st June-30th June, 1934, ref: U1-1-1208, 27th June, 1934, 165 264 Pohuo Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhijuan Zhi Jingyan Jianshu〈破獲中共中央政治局案之經驗簡述〉The case of shutting down the Central Political Bureau in Youguan Gu Shunzhang Deng Poan Jingguo《有關顧順章等破案經過》The process for arresting Gu Shunzhang 265 Zhonggong Shanghai Shiwei Zuzhibu 中共上海市委組織部 Organisation department of Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai，The history of the organization of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai: 1920.8-1987.10《中國共產黨上海市組織史資料：1920.8-1987.10》(Shanghai: Shanghai 78

Yet, there were limitations if law enforcement officers solely relying on details of warrants during apprehensions. In some conditions, the municipal police failed to execute warrants because a person stated in a warrant was absent. On 31st March,

1932, a reactionary called Doo Tien I’h 杜天一 was wanted by the Public Safety

Bureau. Armed with court warrants no. 4106 and 4107, the municipal police and representatives of the Public Safety Bureau raided Burlington Hotel at 305 Bubbling

Well Road. However, before the arrival of the policemen, Doo had had left his room in the previous evening.266 Knowing that the arrest was in vain, the municipal police had to return the search warrant to the Court.267 Worse still, hardly could policemen confirm the identity of the accused in accordance with the information stated in the warrant. This was because the accused may intentionally provide false information to policemen. After experiencing a failure to arrest a communist, detective sergeant

Moore illustrated the difficulty of executing the warrant.

… for apart from the name or names contained thereon we have no means of identifying the wanted persons. There is nothing to prevent a wanted man giving a false name and we have no means at our disposal to disprove his words for invariably the Public Safety Bureau detectives know nothing of the person wanted and less of his habitual address.268

Renmin Chubanshe 上海人民出版社 Shanghai People’s press, 1991), 157-160; Pohuo Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhijuan Zhi Jingyan Jianshu〈破獲中共中央政治局案之經驗簡述〉[The case of shutting down the Central Political Bureau] in Youguan Gu Shunzhang Deng Poan Jingguo《有關顧順章等破案經過》The process for arresting Gu Shunzhang; Detective Inspector Kuh Pao-hwa, "The Comintern and the United Front Campaign" in "Communist propaganda - work of Youth Communist International (Comosol)", ref: D6479, 11th April, 1935, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 266 Detective Sergeant Golder, “Shanghai Municipal Police Arrest Report”, in “Assistance to the Public Safety Bureau. Execution of search warrant No. 4107. Room in Burlington Hotel occupied by Dod Tien Yih”, ref. D3534, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 267 P.A., Crime to C.I. White (Shanghai Special District Court), “Execution of Search Warrant No. 4107”, file no. 4107, Ibid 268 Detective Sergeant Moore, “Shanghai Special District Court warrant No. 4202 to arrest Zau Hoong Hoong for being Communist”, ref: D3578, 25th April, 1932, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 79

As shown from the above source, neither could the municipal police nor the Public

Security Bureau verify a statement made by an accused because of the lack of evidence. Therefore, it could be inferred that the failure of apprehensions caused by judicial restrictions led to Settlement policemen’s violation in legal procedures when arresting communists in the future.

Given that the formal apprehension method could not make arrests become effective, the municipal police decided to carry out arrests through ignoring details of warrants. Although Yao Yuan argues that there were serious legal confrontations between the Chinese government and the International Settlement after the establishment of the Shanghai Special District Court in the early 1930s, Yuan never analyses the antagonism between senior officials of the municipal council and their police force.269 The first example that illustrates the rejection of the court order was to execute an expired warrant against a communist printing work called Dah Dong

大同印刷局 in September 1931. Issued by the court on 22nd August, 1931, the warrant was only valid for a short period of time. However, failing to implement the warrant at once, the Special Branch not only refused to return the unused warrant to the court, but they even deferred the arrest to more than two weeks later.

Subsequently, nine people were arrested. Plenty of reactionary literature was seized.270 Noticing the violation of legal procedures, deputy commissioner (crime) not only doubted the legitimacy of the search held by the Special Branch with an expired warrant, but he also reemphasised to his colleagues that “the first duty of any officers who has a warrant to execute is to ascertain its contents to act in accordance

269 Yao Yuan [姚遠]，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研究》 (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s press 上海人民出版社, 2011), 184-187 270 “B” Division, Bubbling Well Police Station, “Crime Diary, 7th September, 1931” in “Report - arrest of Lieu Ping and eight others on Sept. 7, 1931, in the Dah Doong Printing Shop No. F.A. 612 Yu Yuen Road. Copy of court proceedings - sheet No. 6 Re Mr. T. S. Lea appeared for the police”, ref: D2754, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 80

with”.271 Nevertheless, detective inspector J.W. Prince defended their violation by explaining that his men and the Chinese officers had to “keep the place under surveillance until an opportune time availed.” He also attributed the delay to the late response of the Chinese authorities.272 Eventually, two of the accused were extradited to the Chinese authorities.273

Aside from executing an expired warrant, the Special Branch also arrested people whose names did not appear in warrants. Acting on the authority of search warrants issued at the instance of the Public Security Bureau, the Special Branch attempted to find a communist called Tsiang Na Soong 蔣耐松, and “the person in charge of the

Four Combined Bookstore 四合書局” at Foochow Road in late January 1931. It was suspected that Tsiang Na Soong was seeking refuge inside the abovementioned book shop. After their arrival, the policemen were told that the manager was absent. As a result, Special Branch officers arrested a shop assistant called Er Lai-zoong 歐來崇, who was temporarily in charge of the bookstore.274 Yet, even the assistant municipal advocate Mr. Paul Y. Ru 汝保彝 who worked for the Shanghai Municipal Council condemned the Chinese authorities and the municipal police. It was because they apprehended an innocent shopkeeper with a warrant without stating the name of the actual person they wanted. According to Mr. Ru, arresting people with a nameless warrant was actually contrary to the Chinese criminal procedures.275 In fact, this was not the only incident for the Special Branch to go against the advice made by the

271 Deputy Commissioner (Crime), “(C.&S.B.) Office Notes”, ibid; Deputy Commissioner (Crime), “Execution of warrants”, ibid 272 C.D.I. J.W. Prince, “Execution of warrants”, ibid 273 “Communist propaganda- result of court proceedings”9th September, 1931, ibid 274 Detective Sergeant I. Montgomery, "Report on execution of Shanghai Special District Court Warrant No. 1611 at 518 Foochow Road", "Prosecution of bookstores re sale of communist books", ref: D1939, 5th February, 1931, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 275 “Tracking down reds in Shanghai: Objection made to the methods of Chinese authorities” in the “Shanghai Times”, 4th February, 1931 ibid; Article 77, The code of criminal procedure of the Republic of China and the court agreement relating to the Chinese courts in the international settlement of Shanghai, China (Shanghai : Municipal Council, 1935), 24-25 81

municipal advocate concerning arrests of communists. The municipal advocate King

S. Kum requested the municipal police should never prosecute any bookstore managers selling the reactionary literature unless policemen could prove that

“offenders” knowingly and intentionally propagated doctrines opposite to the

People’s Three Principles. Mr. Kum further illustrated that “failure to examine books by the manager before the same is offered for sale is not sufficient to constitute an offence.”276 Ironically, in response to Mr. Kum’s suggestion, the Chief of Special

Branch T.P. Givens [Please refer to appendix 6] ordered his men to ignore the above advice, on the condition that they were executing warrants issued by the Shanghai

Special District Court at the instance of the Chinese authorities.277 Apparently, although the Special Branch had to violate the legal procedures, they was willing to provide their assistance to the Chinese government when arresting communists.

Apart from bookstore assistants, the Special Branch also employed similar methods to arrest well-known communist leaders. Chen Tou Seu 陳獨秀, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, was wanted by the Chinese government.

Possessed with the court warrant against Zai Zau-san and “ten other associated people”, the Shanghai Municipal Police and the Public Safety Bureau arrested Zai

Siau-san 謝少珊 and his four comrades at 210 Tshung Yang Li, East Yuhang Road, on 15th October, 1932.278 During interrogation, Zai Siau-san not only betrayed his comrades by telling the policemen residential addresses of other communists in the

Settlement, but he was also willing to report the confidential information to General

276 T.P. Givens, Officer i/c Special Branch, Prosecutions of the bookstores selling anti-government literature", file no. D.1692, in "Raid on Kwung Long Bookstore, 18 Chekiang Road, re sale of communistic books. Accountant Lee Soh Ming arrested", ref. D4224, 22nd October, 1932, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 277 Ibid 278 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence reports, 1st October-30th October, 1932, ref: U1-1-1188, 17th October, 1932, 117-120; "D" division, Kashing Road Police Station, Shanghai Municipal Police Crime Diary, Case against Chien Tou Seu, ref: D4131, 16th October, 1932, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 82

Jiang Jieshi in person.279 As a result, on 16th and 17th October, the municipal police, the Chinese authorities and French policemen jointly raided four more places located in two foreign concessions and arrested six more communists, including Chen Tou

Seu. However, these convicts were rejected to employ any lawyers for their defences.

Some accused protested emphatically to the court concerning the unjust legal procedure of the arrest. The 7th accused Wong Siau-tsung 王曉普 showed his strong remonstrance to the judge:

There is no warrant for my arrest. The police arrested me on the off chance that I may have been also concerned in the case against the other accused and I have not been given the chance to protect myself. I now speak in order that I may be afforded that opportunity. There is no warrant issued for my arrest.280

The judge not only failed to raise any concrete charges against the accused with flimsy evidence, but he also acquiesced the municipal police to apprehend people based on a warrant only stating the name of Zai Siau-san. Eventually, the Shanghai

Special District Court agreed to extradite all eleven accused to the Chinese authorities, in spite of the fact that it had the authority to try this case in the

Settlement. In order to thank for the efforts made by the municipal police, General

Jiang Jieshi decided to reward the Settlement authorities by providing special bonus to the Settlement through the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

Eighteen policemen and clerks, fourteen of which belonged to the Special Branch, shared a total of four thousand dollars.281

279“Telegram sent from Wu Xingya (吳醒亞) to Jiang Jishi”, in Yiban Ziliao-Minguo Ershiyinian (qi)] 一般資料-民國二十一年(七)[Ordinary information-1932(7), telegram no. 11211, ref: 002-080200-00059-133, 16th October, 1932 (Taipei: unpublished materials stored in the Jiang Jieshi collection of the National Archive, Republic of China). 280 “Extract of proceedings in Shanghai Special District Court for 17th October, 1932” in Case against Chien Tou Seu, ref. D4131, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 281 “Arrest of Chen Tou-seu and other important communists- Work of Staff of Special Branch”, 13th 83

Last but not least, the municipal police sometimes even apprehended communists without applying for any warrants. The municipal police received a phone call from the Chinese authority on 17th July, 1932. Knowing that Hyui Se Kung 徐錫根 was an important offender wanted by the Nanjing government, a Special Branch policeman and his two colleagues of the Louza Police Station immediately joined representatives of the Public Safety Bureau who were waiting outside Room 5 of the

Tsing Soo Lodging House at Hupeh Road..282 Subsequently, Hyui Se Kung and his comrade Hu Tung Sheng 胡同聲 were taken into custody during the raid. Not until the arrest was over did the municipal police advise the Public Security Bureau to procure a warrant from the Court on 18th July. They were handed over to the Chinese authorities afterwards.283 Another example was shown in the arrest of a communist agent called Wong Kyung San 王金山 for distributing the reactionary literature on

9th August, 1932.284 Two Public Service Bureau policemen visited the West

Hongkew Station at 5.50am and requested Settlement policemen at the station to provide assistance to arrest Wong. When challenged for their failure to present a warrant from the court, these Chinese police officers emphasised that detective inspector Ross of the Special Branch “waived the matter” and asked them to carry on the arrest without a warrant.285 Eventually, Wong was apprehended in the room

November, 1932, ibid; “Telegram sent from Wu Tiecheng (吳鐵城) to Jiang Jishi”, in Yiban Ziliao-Minguo Ershiyinian (ba) 一般資料-民國二十一年(八) Ordinary information-1932(8), telegram no. 11731, ref: 002-080200-00060-060, 20th October, 1932 (Taipei: unpublished materials stored in the Jiang Jieshi collection of the National Archive, Republic of China) 282 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1st-31st July, 1932, ref: U1-1-1185, 16th July, 1932, 145 283 "A" division, Louza Police Station, "Assistance to Shanghai Bureau of Public Safety" and “Extract of proceedings in Shanghai Special District Court for 18th July, 1932”, Case against Hyui Se Kung alias Wong Pao Ding and Hu Tung Sheng charged with propagating Communism, ref: D3858, 17th July, 1932, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 284 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1st-30th August, 1932, ref: U1-1-1186, 9th August, 1932, 64 285 D.P.S. Warman of West Hongkew Station, "Case against Wong Chin San alias Wong Tsung Wo, suspected communist at 104 Tan Oen Li, Tong Dong Ka Loong 9th August, 1932", “Case against Wong Chin San charged with propagating Communism” , ref: D3929, 9th August, 1932, Shanghai 84

located at East Dong Ka Loong. The extradition of Wong to the Chinese territory was permitted by the Settlement Court on 12th August, 1932.286

In conclusion, it is hoped that this chapter can provide contributions to the academic arena in the following two directions. I argue that the increasing cooperation between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities after the surrender of

Gu Shunzhang was in the form of illegal arrests. Not only did Settlement policemen actively initiate more raids on different communist bases, but they also made arrests become more effective and efficient by ignoring the legal authority of the Settlement

Court. The simplified arrest procedure would favour both the Kuomintang and foreign concessions to consolidate their power in Shanghai.

The second offering that this chapter furnishes is to discuss the role of imperial policing in the early 20th century. In this chapter, I suggest that the municipal police themselves had to actively participate in suppressing communist activities with the

Chinese authorities for the sake of the Settlement’s survival. Also, I argue that readjustments of the British imperial policies in China were not uninterrupted in the process. The determination of municipal advocates and some senior police officers in defending the criminal procedure depicted their attempts to maintain their values and privilege in China. It took some time for British settlers to adapt to changing circumstances in China in the 1920s.

This chapter about arrest reveals the beginning of British readjustments in China and paves the way for illustrating treatments of communists in the forms of the extradition and the reformatory.

Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 286 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1st-30th August, 1932, ref: U1-1-1186, 13th August, 1932, 100 85

CHAPTER 4

EXTRADITION

“… as they [Shanghai Municipal Police] are conducting the prosecution in a case in which the Chinese authorities are directly interested, the British authorities are not in a position to intervene… if we were to become a party to the arrangement proposed we may, in the absence of any satisfactory guarantee to the contrary, find ourselves accused, in the Soviet press and elsewhere, of an attempt to defeat the ends of justice and making Chinese national interests subservient to our own narrower interests.”287 J.P. Brenan (The British Consul in Shanghai)

This chapter emphasises the weakened judicial autonomy of the Settlement when the Shanghai Municipal Police was requested to extradite different people to the

Chinese authorities. Although communists arrested in the settlement would be tried in the Shanghai Provisional Court, the Kuomintang authorities always insisted the settlement policemen to hand over communist convicts to them. By doing so, the

Kuomintang hoped to suppress communist activities effectively. Nevertheless, extradition requests unavoidably infringed the legal independence of the

International Settlement which was protected by the extraterritoriality. In the existing literature, the extradition of criminals in Shanghai during the republican era has largely been ignored. Most literature mainly focuses on the alliance between the

Settlement and the Chinese authorities to suppress communist and reactionary activities. Frederic Wakeman and Patricia Stranahan suggest that there was an increasing cooperation between different police forces in Shanghai after the Gu

Shunzhang affair.288 But never do they discuss mechanisms for arrest and extradition procedures in detail. Perhaps Yao Yuan is the only one attempted to analyse how the extradition procedure worked in the Shanghai Special District Court after 1930.

287 “Letter written from J.P. Brenan to Miles Lampson, 30th July, 1931” in “Trial of foreign communists, Noulens and Mrs. Motte in Shanghai” FO371/15514 (F:4974/4579/10), Foreign Office files for China [electronic resource], (Marlborough : Adam Matthew, 2009). 288 Frederic Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, 155-160; Patricia Stranahan, Underground, 107-108 86

Indeed, many foreign judicial privileges were cancelled when the British and the

Chinese authorities signed the second rendition agreement. However, the Shanghai

Municipal Police still preserved the prosecution power in the Settlement Court. As

Yao notes, the Shanghai Municipal Police was still in its position to defend foreign interests in the Settlement. With a view to protecting its limited legal authority, the municipal police would use the reason of insufficient prima facie to reject extradition requests in some communist cases, such as Chen Rongxi 陳榮喜 in 1930. When the municipal police believed that someone like Deng Yanda 鄧演達 threatened the security of the Settlement, they were very happy to hand over him to the Chinese authorities despite lack of evidence.289 However, Yao mainly relies on memoirs written by a former municipal advocate and legal reports published by the Council.

In her research, she never makes good use of any official dispatches and private correspondences written between British diplomatic officials, the secretary of

Shanghai Municipal Council, municipal advocates and senior police officers, let alone court proceedings records and crime diaries in the SMP Special branch files.

She largely ignores the fact that the Settlement authorities were deprived of their extradition power by the late 1920s. After reading the British Foreign Office files, the

Secretariat files of the Shanghai Municipal Council and the SMP Special Branch files,

I argue that the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force relinquished their judicial autonomy to extradite non-residents and bona-fide residents as a result of diplomatic pressure from Britain and China in the late 1920s.

Non-residents

Due to the neutrality of the International Settlement, many Chinese convicts fled to the Settlement for protection after committing crimes in Chinese territory.

289 Yao Yuan 姚遠，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court 《上海公共租界特區法院研究》 (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s press 上海人民出版社, 2011), 193-195 87

Regarding non-residents as outsiders of the Settlement, the Shanghai Municipal

Police never cared about their safety. After confirming that any criminals were associated with cases in Chinese territory, the Shanghai Municipal Police would extradite these convicts to the Chinese authorities. This practice was also applicable to communists seeking refuge in the Settlement.290 Nevertheless, according to Police

Advocate Mr. R.T. Bryan, non-residents had to be tried in the settlement court before being handed over to the Chinese authorities. Some evidence was required when applying for extradition.291 Hsia Jen-chang was one of examples illustrating how the extradition procedure worked in a non-resident context. Being a close follower of a

Hankow communist leader called Chen Yien-nien, Hsia was arrested by the Shanghai

Municipal Police in July 1927 based on the request of the Chinese authorities. The suspect failed to prove his residential address in the Settlement after his arrest. The policemen proved that Hsia was a paymaster supporting communist activities in

Shanghai because $3,8000 cash was discovered in his canvas bag.292 Therefore, the court ordered the settlement authority to hand over Hsia and his money to the

Chinese Special Military Court. General Yang Hu decided to execute Hsia in the

Lunghua jail 龍華監獄 on 19th July, 1927.293 Apparently, the Shanghai Municipal

Police would not oppose any extradition requests for non-residents if the Chinese authorities could present some evidence in the settlement court.

290 “Suggest re charges in rendition agreement” in Chinese courts in the settlement and French Concession, 1929, ref. I.O. 7245 in Central Intelligence Agency, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944, Record Group 263 [microform], (Wilmington, Del. : Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984), 10 291 “Letter written by R.T. Bryan, Jr to S.L. Burdett on 1st November, 1928” in “Arrest of alleged communist: Non-handing over to Chinese Authorities without proper despatch warrants” in 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於共產黨員的引渡問題, 1927-1928 The problem of extraditing communists, 1927-1928, ref.: U1-3-3313, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive). 292 The North-China herald and market report, 9th July, 1927, 49, 74, (Shanghai: North-China Herald, 1850-1951); Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports, 1st July-30th September, 1927, 32, 66 293 The North-China herald and market report, 9th July, 1927, 74; Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports, 1st July-30th September, 1927, 66 88

Extraditing non-residents was not uncommon in Shanghai throughout the late

1920s. Whilst preparing for a report of criminal condition in the Settlement, commissioner of police E.I.M. Barret showed the figure of extradited communists to the chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council. Seventy-two suspected

Communists were handed over to the Chinese Authorities between 13th April, 1927 and 21st February, 1928.294 [Please refer to appendix 8 and 9] This could reflect the generosity of the municipal police to extradite communist suspects to the Chinese government.

Nevertheless, feeling anxious to eliminate communists, the Chinese government was not satisfied with existing extradition arrangements regulated by the

International Settlement. The Chinese authorities suggested that when extraditing communist criminals who were not residents of the Settlement, extradition request should be exempt from any trials.295 Apparently, the judicial autonomy of the

Settlement would have been damaged if the Settlement Police accepted this demand.

After considering the pros and cons of the proposal raised by the Chinese authorities, the Shanghai Municipal Police showed its consent to them.

Commissioner E.I.M. Barret understood that rejecting Chinese requests would hinder the cooperation between Chinese and Settlement policemen in Shanghai. He was afraid that the Chinese authorities would retaliate against the municipal police by prolonging the process for extraditing criminals wanted by the municipal police. In his opinion, only by providing a reciprocal arrangement could the municipal police

294 “Letter written by E.I.M. Barret to the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 29th February, 1928” in communist activities in Settlement in Shanghai Municipal Council, 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於共產黨活動：牛蘭案, 1928-1932 Communist activities: The case of Noulen, ref.: U1-3-3434, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive) 295“Letter written by E.I.M. Barret to Acting Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council on 21st November, 1928”in 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於共產黨員的引渡問題, 1927-1928, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 89

obtained necessary assistance from its Chinese counterparts in the future.296 It was his hope that the Chinese authorities could also provide effective assistance when the municipal police requested the extradition of some gangsters fled to Chinese territory.297 Indeed, the Chinese authorities also played a significant role in maintaining the law and order in the Settlement. According to Barret, 116 criminals were extradited from Chinese territory to the Settlement between May and November in 1928.298 Therefore, the municipal police certainly could not lose such an important ally when policing the International Settlement.

More importantly, the British imperial presence would have been threatened if the settlement failed to settle the discontent of the Chinese authorities about their extradition requests. E.I.M. Barret warned the Shanghai Municipal Council about the outcome for refusing extradition demands raised by the Chinese authorities. Not only would the International Settlement be regarded as “a base for the dissemination of communist propaganda”, but the Nationalist government might also be encouraged to accelerate its diplomatic process for abolishing extraterritorial rights.299 In fact, there were no exaggerations for the assumption made by Commissioner E.I.M. Barret.

According to the political intelligence report printed in July 1927, reliable intelligence disclosed that the Nationalist government had a strong determination to regain its control in two foreign concessions in Shanghai. During a meeting in the

General Chamber of Commerce, General Jiang Jieshi told Chinese merchants that he would not only carry out reforms in Chinese territory, but he would also attempt to

296 Ibid 297 Letter written by acting commissioner of police to Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council on 16th July, 1929” in 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於共產黨員的引渡問題, 1927-1928, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 298 “Letter written by E.I.M. Barret to Acting Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council on 28th November, 1928”, ibid 299“Letter written by E.I.M. Barret to Acting Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council on 21st November, 1928”, ibid 90

restore the Shanghai International Settlement within three years.300 Therefore, failing to extraditing the non-residents to the Chinese would possibly cause adverse effects on foreign interests in Shanghai.

Subsequently, Commissioner E.I.M. Barret drafted a proposal to the Shanghai

Municipal Council showing how compromises would be made in response to the

Chinese authorities’ request. He recommended that the Commissioner of Police should be entitled to extradite any political offenders who were not living in the

Settlement for more than six months. On this occasion, it was not essential for a suspected communist to undergo a long legal process which would delay his / her extradition to the Chinese authorities.301 Believing that the Commissioner of Police should never have such “privilege”, the Police Prosecuting Solicitor R.T. Bryan emphatically opposed to this proposal.302 Yet, Commissioner E.I.M. Barret’s resolution was eventually accepted. The Shanghai Municipal Police could extradite communist suspects who were not residents of the Settlement to the Kuomintang authorities without undergoing any legal process. In 1931, the new Commissioner of

Police R.M.J. Martin even authorised divisional officers and Special Branch officers to handle extradition cases of communists in the Settlement since 1931.303

The case of Tsang Ong Lai and Au Sai Ts in April 1933 illustrated how Barret’s proposal was implemented. Informed by other communist convicts arrested earlier,

300 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports, 1st July-30th September, 1927, 28-29 301“Letter written by E.I.M. Barret to Acting Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council on 21st November, 1928”in 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於共產黨員的引渡問題, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 302 “Chinese courts in the settlement and French Concession, 1929” , Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944, (Wilmington, Del. : Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984), 9 303 “When a communist is arrested… the occurrence will be reported without delay to the Special Branch. In the event of any doubt as to subsequent procedure the matter will be referred to the Divisional Officer or to the Officer i/c Special Branch.” See Letter written from Commissioner of Police R.M.J. Martin to officers i/c Police Stations, 27th March, 1931, in Assistance to SPSB to arrest two suspected Communists. Tsang Ong Lai, Au Sai Ts., ref.: D4745 in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944, (Wilmington, Del. : Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984) 91

the Public Security Bureau requested the municipal police to extradite Tsang Ong Lai and Au Sai Ts who were associated in communist activities in Chinese territory.304

Living in the settlement for less than one year, both Tsang and Au failed to prove their residential addresses in the Settlement.305 During interrogation, although both suspects denied involving in any communist cases, they admitted that they knew one of communist convicts called Hong Tuh Sung. Hong was apprehended by the

Chinese authorities previously. Persuaded by this evidence, senior police officers of the B division extradited these two suspects to the Public Safety Bureau without undergoing any legal procedures.306 In the face of the Chinese nationalism, the judicial autonomy of the Settlement was infringed as the municipal police had to meet the Kuomintang’s demands in extraditing non-residents without undergoing formal legal procedures. However, this was not the only example to reveal the failure of the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force in defending their legal independence.

Bona fide residents

After the completion of the northern expedition, surrenders of other warlords provided an opportunity for Jiang Jieshi to concentrate his efforts to suppress communist activities. Many communists in Chinese territory in Shanghai were killed in the famous “Shanghai massacre of 1927” which was initiated by Jiang. Yet, this did not mean the end of the spread of communism in Shanghai. The Kuomintang attempted to eliminate the remaining of communists seeking refuges in foreign concessions. In February 1928, the Commissioner of Foreign affairs for Kiangsu Quo

Tai-chi sent a letter to the International Settlement, warning the Council about the

304 Extract from Pootoo Road Daily Report of 8.4.33, ibid 305 Ibid 306 Report of Shanghai Municipal Police, 8th April, 1933, ibid 92

intrusion of communists in the International Settlement.

…having no way of executing their projects in Chinese territory where strict precaution is taken, they (communists) are posting slogans and conducting a counter propaganda campaign in the Settlement... there is a likelihood of the public order being menaced.307

The Kuomintang hoped that the Shanghai Municipal Council and consular bodies could take necessary measures to suppress the spread of communism in the

International Settlement. Subsequently, the Chinese authorities even urged the municipal police to extradite their bona fide residents who were suspected of engaging in communist activities in Chinese territory. After receiving a request from the Chinese military authorities, the Commissioner of Police sought instructions from the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council to decide whether it was legitimate to hand over a well-known resident to the Kuomintang.308 Nevertheless, such request inevitably violated the law in the Settlement because “only under the most exceptional circumstances would the council permit any resident in the Settlement to be handed over directly to the Chinese authorities”.309 Moreover, these residents must be taken before the Provisional Court. Only a strong prima facie case would the court consider to extradite residents to the Chinese authorities.310 The police advocate Mr. Bryan even suspected that the Kuomintang had some “ulterior motives”

307 “Letter written by Quo Tai-chi, commissioner of Foreign affairs for Kiangsu to Senior Consul of Shanghai, 9th February, 1928” 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於共產黨活動：牛蘭案, 1928-1932, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 308“Letter written by E.I.M. Barret to E.S. Fessenden, Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council on 16th November, 1928”in 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於共產黨員的引渡問題 1927-1928, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 309“Letter written by E.I.M. Barret to E.S. Fessenden, Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council on 16th November, 1928”in 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於共產黨員的引渡問題 1927-1928, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 310 Ibid. 93

to request the extradition of their residents.311 Abiding by legal practices of the

Settlement, the municipal police therefore refused the request raised by the Chinese garrison commander.

As a matter of fact, bona fide residents had long enjoyed the judicial protection in since the Shanghai International Settlement was established. They were always considered by the Court as a very important factor. Therefore, they were given special privileges to be tried by the Mixed Court. According to the legal tradition of the Settlement, a great difference was found in extraditing bona fide residents and non-residents. When asking for the extradition of non residents, the Chinese authorities just had to provide “some evidence” to support the charge. On the contrary, handing over bona-fide residents required a substantial prima facie case.312

Apparently, it was extremely difficult to demand the extradition of the bona-fide residents who were well-protected by the judiciary system of the Settlement.

The failure to settle the extradition of bona-fide residents unavoidably caused endless quarrels between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities as reflected in the court proceedings. In August 1927, a 53 year-old Chinese Pawnbroker called Ong

Tah Yuen, who had lived in the Settlement for over 32 years, was put in a trial in the

Shanghai Provisional Court by a Chinese soldier. [Please refer to appendix 10] The

Provisional Court ordered the Shanghai Municipal Police to hand over Ong to the

Chinese government because evidence showed that Ong knew a famous communist called Cheu Chien.313 Considering that the evidence was insufficient to reveal the

311 “Suggest re charges in rendition agreement” in Chinese courts in the settlement and French Concession, 1929, ref. I.O. 7245 in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944, (Wilmington, Del. : Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984), 10 312 “Suggest re charges in rendition agreement” in Chinese courts in the settlement and French Concession, 1929, ref. I.O. 7245 in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944, (Wilmington, Del. : Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984), 10 313“Letter written by General Yang Hu re Hung Tai-Nyeu on 13th August, 1927” in Police Daily Reports, 1st July-30th September, 1927, 151-152 94

connection between the accused and any communistic affiliations, the consular deputy emphatically opposed to the Judge’s decision.314

Therefore, similar conflicts continued to take place in the Provisional Court between 1927 and 1929. In spite of Chinese representatives’ endeavours to prove linkages between plenty of residents and communist activities in Chinese territory, the Shanghai Municipal Police and the consular deputies still refused to extradite bona fide residents to the Chinese authorities. Indeed, whether the prima facie evidence was sufficient to allow extradition depended on the interpretation of the consular deputies. Meanwhile, the Provisional Court was subject to the influence of the Chinese government after 1926 as a result of the rise the Chinese nationalism.

Indeed, according to Tahirih Lee, Chinese merchants and officials wanted to put the settlement court under their control but at the same time “retained its western-style procedures and its freedom to enforce local laws and customs”.315 In 1927, their wish came true when the Provisional Court formally replaced the International

Mixed Court. Magistrates in the court were appointed by the Kuomintang government. It was true that judges failing to accomplish “missions” of the higher

Chinese authorities would be punished by the Chinese government. The Provisional

Court president Lu Xingyuan 盧興源 was dismissed on 9th October 1927 because of his failure to hand over a number of alleged “communist” residents in the Settlement to General Bai Chongxi 白崇禧. Knowing that the judicial independence of the

Provisional Court was seriously infringed as reflected in this dismissal, the consular bodies unanimously complained to the Chinese government. This could show how

314 The North-China herald and market report, 13th August, 1927, 276; Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports, 1st July-30th September, 1927, 139-140 315 Tahirih V. Lee, Law and local autonomy at the International Mixed Court of Shanghai, (Ph.D. Thesis: Yale University, 1990) 95

tense the condition was as a result of the controversy of extradition.316 Neither

Settlement policemen nor the Chinese authorities were willing to give way to each other. Deadlock remained between these two parties.

Perhaps sometimes it was the fault of the Chinese authorities for abusing the extradition procedures in order to suppress reactionaries in Shanghai. However I argue that political factors were main obstacles hindering the extradition of bona fide residents. Firstly, it was the obligation of the Shanghai Municipal Council to offer protections to its bona fide residents as they were usually taxpayers of the Shanghai

International Settlement. During the visit of the British Minister to China Sir Mile

Lampson in 1929, the former chairman of the council Mr. Fessenden explained to

Lampson concerning the issue of protecting residents of the Settlement.

…the Chinese residents in the settlement were entitled, in return for the payment of municipal rates and taxes, to the fullest measure of protection the municipal authorities were able to afford them, that if they did not receive this protection they would be liable to be “bled white” by their own authorities, and that in that case property values in the settlement would slump disastrously. 317

Therefore, in the council’s perspective, residents who contributed to the economic prosperity of the International Settlement should deserve the protection from the

International Settlement regardless of their nationalities and races.

More importantly, the principle of political neutrality had long been upheld by the

316 “The working of the Shanghai Provisional Court” in Telegram no. 1504 dated 21st October 1927 from Sir Miles Lampson at the British Legation in Peking to the Foreign Office in London, number FO371/12419 (1927:F8210/25/10) in Robert Jarman, Shanghai political & economic reports, 1842-1943: British government records from the international city, volume 15, 608. 317 “Report on the visit to Shanghai of Sir Miles Lampson” in Foreign Office Confidential Print copy of despatch dated 5th June 1929 from Sir Miles Lampson at the British Legation in Peking to Sir Austen Chamberlain at the Foreign Office in London, number FO405/262 no. 60 (1929:F3591/1148/10) in Robert Jarman, Shanghai political & economic reports, 1842-1943: British government records from the international city, volume 16, 350 96

Mixed Court since the establishment of the Shanghai International Settlement. On

19th August, 1927, when the Chinese military authorities requested the extradition of nine Chinese residents of the Settlement on suspicion of engaging in communist activities, consular deputy Stevens declined their demand. He emphasised that the political neutrality of the Settlement should never be submitted to Chinese military factions.318

Actually, the Mixed Court and the consular bodies had had a tradition in not taking sides when dealing with political cases before 1927. As A. M. Kotenev pointed out in his book Shanghai: Its mixed court and council in 1925, “it [the Mixed Court]’s jurisdiction was localised strictly to a Treaty territory, which in its very substance was neutral as a portion of land set aside for the residence of foreign merchants, peaceful traders, but not politicians and belligerents.”319 Even though there was sufficient prima facie evidence, the Settlement still did not have to “warrant the unconditional surrender of the accused to the native authorities.”320 The case of

Wong Tsz-ting in October 1913 could illustrate the importance of the neutrality stated by the consular deputies. Wong was wanted by the Chinese government because he was suspected of agitating disturbances against the Republic of China.

Knowing that Wong was a bona fide resident of the settlement, magistrates of the

Mixed Court transferred this case to the consular bodies because such political accusation was outside the jurisdiction of the Court.321 Instead of authorising

318 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports, 1st July-30th September, 1927, 176 319 Anatol M. Kotenev, Shanghai: its mixed court and council: materials relating to the history of the Shanghai Municipal Council and the history, practice and statistics of the International Mixed Court, Chinese modern law and Shanghai municipal land regulations and bye-laws governing the life in the settlement (Shanghai : North-China Daily News & Herald, 1925), 239-240 320 Ibid, 240 321 Ibid, 241 97

extradition, the consular body eventually expelled this political offender outside the

Settlement.322

In fact, Shanghai was not the only British concession receiving extradition requests from the Kuomintang authorities after the completion of the Northern

Expedition. As early as in late 1927, the British Commissioner of Weihaiwei 威海衛

Reginald Johnston 莊士敦 was urged by the Chinese authorities in Shandong 山東 to provide assistance to arrest and to extradite ten Chinese communist suspects to

Chinese officials.323 Similar to the response of the Shanghai Municipal Council,

Reginald Johnston was sceptical towards the Kuomintang’s requests not only because Chinese prosecution authorities failed to present convincing evidence, but also because the ruthless and barbaric Chinese government “obeyed no law” in their governance. As a responsible government, the British authorities in Weihaiwei refused to hand over any of their temporary or permanent residents on suspicion of engaging in communist activities to the Kuomintang in order not to create any innocent cases.324 However, how to settle the discontent of the Chinese authorities was also one of major concerns of Reginald Johnston. Eventually, with a view to proving that Weihaiwei was not a reactionary base against the Kuomintang, Reginald

Johnston decided to banish any people wanted by the Chinese government, provided that evidence was shown.325 Therefore, British officials in Weihaiwei actually shared similar neutral perspective with the International Settlement in Shanghai concerning

322 Ibid 323 Gao Fenghe 高鳳和， Shandong Donghaidao Daoyun Jian Waijiaobu Yantaij Jiaosheyuangongshu Gaofenghe Zhi Dayingguo Zhu Weihaiwei Banshidachen Zhuang Gonghan〈山東東海道道尹兼外交部烟台交涉員公署高鳳和致大英國駐威海衛辦事大臣莊公函〉 Letter written from a Chinese official in Shandong to British authority in Weihaiwei, ref.: 221, 3rd December, 1927 in “Extradition of Communists from Weihaiwei”, FO228/3908, (London: Unpublished papers stored in the National Archive at Kew) 324 Dispatch written from Commissioner of Weihaiwei Reginald Johnston to Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies William Ormsby-Gore, 17th December, 1927, ibid 325 Dispatch written from Commissioner of Weihaiwei Reginald Johnston to Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies William Ormsby-Gore, 5th January, 1928, ibid 98

the extraditions of political offenders when the Kuomintang first rose to power in

1927. The British concession in Weihaiwei was finally returned to China in 1930, allowing the Kuomintang to control over the entire Shandong province.

Until June 1929, the International Settlement still firmly kept their commitments towards their bona-fide residents and upheld their principle of political neutrality in

China. Then, who could make a change on the policy of the Settlement authorities?

In the face of the diplomatic pressure from the Nationalist government, the British

Foreign Office understood that its foreign policies in China must be changed.

Interfering in municipal administrations of the Shanghai Settlement was needed although British officials recognised insecure sentiments among British communities in Shanghai. The Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain reminded his colleagues about the need to make diplomatic concession for China.326 As mentioned in chapter

2, the settlement court had undergone significant transformations even before the

Kuomintang rose to power. In 1930, not only were magistrates and important administrative personnel in the courts appointed by the Nationalist government,327 but interventions of the consular representatives were also cancelled in the court.328

The settlement court inevitably gave judgments favouring the interest of the

Nationalist government when handling political cases. On the other hand, the

Shanghai Municipal Council and the diplomatic bodies could not openly oppose

326 Sir Austen Chamberlain, “Foreign Office Confidential Print copy of telegram no. 17 dated 16th May 1929 from Austen Chamberlain at the Foreign Office in London to British Consul General Garstin in Shanghai”, number FO405/261 no.122 (1929:F2345/1148/10) in Robert Jarman, Shanghai political & economic reports, 1842-1943, volume 16, 345 327 Article 1 (vii), “consular committee’s revision of modified Chinese proposal of July 2, 1926”, in Foreign Office files for China, ref.: FO371/11686, p. 4，Yao Yuan 姚遠，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研究》，49-50，81 328 Article 3, “Agreement relating to the Chinese Courts in the International Settlement at Shanghai”, in Foreign Office files in China, 17th February, 1930, ref.: FO676/317; Rendition Agreement of the Shanghai Special District Court 〈上海公共租界特區法院協定全文〉，Wu Chuanyi 吳圳義， Shanghai Zujie Wenti《上海租界問題》The problem of the Shanghai International Settlement (Taipei: Zhengzhong bookstore 正中書局, 1981), 264; Yao Yuan 姚遠，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研究》，79 99

decisions made by the court. Despite its reluctance, the council theoretically had to follow the orders given by the court to hand over communists to China.

Apart from revising the legal system of the Settlement, the British Foreign Office even sent its officials to pressure British expatriates in Shanghai. The British

Minister to China Sir Miles Lampson visited Shanghai in May 1929. With a view to preventing the intensification of anti-foreign sentiments, Lampson persuaded the chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council H.E. Arnhold, and the police advocate

Mr. Bryan to abandon their stubbornness in protecting Chinese residents.

…it had never been the policy of His Majesty’s Government that Chinese residents in the Settlement should be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of their own authorities, and that in our view the paramount consideration in the problem of the provisional court was the maintenance of law and order in the Settlement by the municipal authorities, which did not prima facie appear to include the protection of Chinese residents against the operation of Chinese courts.329

Finally, they reached an agreement. It was unnecessary for the Shanghai Municipal

Council to protect their residents against the orders of the Shanghai Provisional

Court, provided that these orders were given following due legal process and not by external administrative action.330

in China by pleasing the Chinese at the expense of the judicial autonomy of the

International Settlement. The extradition of Settlement residents in the 1930s echoes what Robert Bickers argues concerning the British government’s nationalisation of

329 Sir M. Lampson, “Foreign Office Confidential Print copy of dispatch dated 5th June 1929 from Sir Miles Lampson at the British Legation in Peking to Sir Austen Chamberlain at the Foreign Office in London”, number FO405/262 no.60 (1929:F3591/1148/10), ibid, 349-350 330 Ibid 100

Sino-British relations between the late 1920s and the early 1940s.331 There is no doubt that the Settlement authorities were abandoned by the British Foreign Office.

Weakened judicial power of British expatriates also connects to the argument raised by Edumnd Fung. He believes that Whitehall policy-makers had prepared for gradual transfer of power from Britain to China. By doing so, Britain wanted to maintain a stable political condition in China, allowing British commercial interest to growth in the inter-war period.332

Without supports from the British Foreign Office, the council had to hand over its

Chinese residents to the Chinese authorities if the Kuomintang could provide enough evidence to support the charges. Holding the despatch warrant issued by the

Shanghai Special District Court, the Soongwu Military Headquarters asked for the extradition of Wong I’h Bae living at 93 Annam Road in the Settlement in April 1931.

During the arrest, the municipal police and the Chinese authorities failed to find

Wong when they reached the above address. Instead, Lee Sau Chi, who claimed himself as a translator of a bookstore and resided in the Settlement for 1.5 year, was discovered in the premises. Plenty of communist literature was seized in his premise.333 He was then taken to the court for trial afterwards. Military officers of the Soongwu command not only showed a testimony of a communist convict called

Zoh Tsing Ih, but they also presented a telegram sent from Hunan 湖南 proving that

Lee was the chairman of the Hunan Soviet Communist.334 The police advocate Mr.

Kum had no objection to hand over the accused based on evidence provided by the

331 Robert Bickers, Britain in China, 115 332 Edmund S.K. Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat : Britain's South China policy, 1924-1931 (Hong Kong : Oxford University Press, 1991), 172-173 333 According to the definition of Commissioner Barret (resided in the Settlement more than six months), he should be classified as a bona fide resident. 334 “Extract of proceedings in Shanghai Special District Court for Saturday, 2nd May, 1931” in Arrest of Lee Sau Chi on a charge of propagating communism and his extradition, ref. D. 2316 in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 101

Chinese authorities. Finally, Lee Sau Chi was extradited to the Chinese authorities on

4th May, 1931.335

In short, the Shanghai Municipal Council not only lost its judicial autonomy in protecting their Chinese residents, but it was also deprived of its principle of political neutrality which was established in the mid-19th century.

The jurisdiction of the Settlement

Undoubtedly, jurisdiction was the most crucial component guaranteed in the extraterritoriality which protected foreign interests in China. The police advocate Mr.

Bryan pinpointed that “A crime committed in the International Settlement is triable in the Provisional Court only unless the complainant is a French citizen.”336 The judicial independence in the Settlement was still secured after the Rendition

Agreement was signed between Britain and China in 1926. Clause 1, section 1 of the

Rendition Agreement stated that “with the exceptional of cases which in accordance with the treaties involve the right of Consular jurisdiction, all civil and criminal cases in the Settlement shall be dealt with by the said Provisional Court.”337

Before experiencing the diplomatic pressure from Britain, the Shanghai Municipal

Council stood firm to uphold the court’s jurisdiction limit for cases created in the

Settlement. The Settlement authorities even ignored the extradition requests from the

Chinese authority. In September 1928, 23 students and agitators were arrested by the municipal police because they distributed inflammatory, rebellious and communistic pamphlets on the street. Chinese Garrison Commanders asked for the extradition of these Chinese. The Provisional Court, which was under the influence of the Chinese

335 Ibid 336 “Suggest re charges in rendition agreement” in Chinese courts in the settlement and French Concession, 1929, ref. I.O. 7245, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944, 10 337 The North-China herald and market report, 19th February, 1927. 102

authorities, allowed the extradition.338 However, the police advocate Mr. Bryan regarded this extradition order as void and invalid because the court had no right, and power to order defendants to be handed over to China provided that this crime was committed inside the Settlement.339 The consular deputy Stevens also emphasised that the Provisional Court in the Settlement shared equal status with other courts in

Chinese territory.340 Therefore, on 6th September, 1928, Commissioner of Police Mr.

Barret not only refused to extradite the suspects to the Chinese Authorities, but also demanded the Provisional Court to try this case.341

Sometimes, even Chinese magistrates working for the Nationalist government also upheld the legitimacy of the Provisional Court to execute its legal authority in the

International Settlement. They thought some of the Kuomintang’s extradition requests were unreasonable. On 9th December 1928, 28 people were arrested at 877

Peking Road in the International Settlement because their premises contained plenty of posters and pamphlets which were anti-capitalists, anti-government and communist in nature.342 Jiang Jieshi informed the provisional court that these convicts were important communists and had to be extradited to the Chinese authorities.343 However, the Public Safety Bureau failed to present any evidence

338“Letter written by Prosecuting solicitor E.T. Bryan to Commissioner of Police E.I.M. Barret on 5th September, 1928”in 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於共產黨員的引渡問題 1927-1928, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 339 Ibid 340 Letter written by Commissioner of Police E.T. Barret to Acting Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Police on 7th September, 1928, ibid 341 Letter written by Commissioner of Police E.T. Barret to President of Shanghai Provisional Court Dr. S.C. Ho on 6th September, 1928, ibid 342 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Reports 1st July-30th December, 1928, 10th December, 1928, ref: U1-1-1159, 164 343 Telegram sent from military department of the Nationalist government (國民政府參軍處) to the Shanghai Provisional Court, 6th February, ref: 6589, in Shanghai Gonggong Zujie Linshifayuan Wei Gonganju Yaoqiu Tijie Huangqing Deng Ershibaming fanrenDiyijuan 1929, 上海公共租界臨時法院為公安局要求提解黃清等二十八名犯人第一卷(1929) Request of the Public Safety Bureau in extraditing 28 convicts from the Shanghai Provisional Court, volume one, ref.: Q179-1-19 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive) 103

showing that these convicts were associated with any crimes in Chinese territory.344

Not only did the Shanghai Municipal Police and the consular deputies oppose the extradition request,345 but the judge of the appeal court He Shizhen 何世楨 also explicitly showed his disagreement to the Chinese authorities. With a view to defending the spirit of the judicial independence of the Settlement court and the reputation of the Chinese government, He Shizhen believed that the Shanghai

Provisional Court, which was entitled by the Chinese government to handle cases inside the settlement, was in its position to try this case which had no connections with any crimes in Chinese territory.346 The consular deputy S.L. Burdett also showed his consent to He Shizhen.347 Eventually, all convicts were released except one person called Wang qing 王清.

Nevertheless, such impregnable principle was challenged when people wanted by the Chinese authorities were significant to the intelligence of communist activities in

China. The case of Mr. and Mrs. Noulens was a good example to illustrate the judicial infringement of the Shanghai Municipal Council. Mr. and Mrs. Noulens, who resided in the settlement for fifteen months, were arrested by the Shanghai Municipal

Police according to the intelligence provided by the police force in Singapore in 1931.

[Please refer to appendix 11]

344 He Shizhen 何世楨，“電覆總司令蔣陳述共黨二十八名一案經過情形”Reporting to Jiang Jieshi concerning the cases of 28 communist convicts, 5th February, 1929, ref: 126, ibid, 3 345 He Shizhen 何世楨，“代電呈蔣主席為移解二十八名共黨一案未能執行由”Explaining to Jiang Jieshi concerning the failure to extradite 28 communist convicts, 7th February, 1929, ref: 129, ibid, 14 346 He Shizhen 何世楨，“電覆總司令蔣陳述共黨二十八名一案經過情形”Reporting to Jiang Jieshi concerning the cases of 28 communist convicts, 5th February, 1929, ref: 126, ibid, 3; He Shizhen 何世楨，“代電呈蔣主席為移解二十八名共黨一案未能執行由”Explaining to Jiang Jieshi concerning the failure to extradite 28 communist convicts 7th February, 1929, ref: 129, ibid, 12; He Shizhen 何世楨， My memory of the Shanghai Provisional Court〈記上海公共租界臨時法院〉，Lu jianxin 陸堅心、 WanYan Shaoyuan 完顔紹元，Ershi Shiji Shasnghai Wenshi Ziliao Wenku Shi《20 世紀上海文史資料文庫 10》20th century Shanghai literature archive，(Shanghai：Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe, 1999), 80 347 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Report 1st January-30th June, 1929, 6th January, 1929, ref: U1-1-1160, 6 104

Indeed, it was undeniable that Mr. Noulens not only communicated with different communists in China, but he was also connected with communists overseas. Plenty of confidential communist documents were discovered in his apartments. Maps indicating locations of communist army and nationalist army in China, illustrations on the internal structure of workmen’s factories in Shanghai, correspondence written between red unions and the Far Eastern Head Office of the communist party were also found in his personal belongings. Based on testimonies made by surrendered communists, the Chinese Garrison authorities believed that Noulens sent communists to reinforce the red army in Kiangsi and remitted money to support local communist activities in different part of China. He also rented several apartments for unknown purposes.348 Understanding the importance of Noulens with the Chinese Communist

Party, the Chinese authorities requested the extradition of this couple and prepared to put them under trial at a Chinese military court. This couple was charged of

“infringing the safety of the Republic of China”. The Shanghai Special District Court allowed the extradition request but the accused were still taken into custody in the

Settlement, pending on the verification of their nationalities.

Although Noulen had a close connection with Chinese communists, it was debatable to hand over him and his wife to the Chinese authority. Apparently, the accused committed their crimes in the Settlement without directly visiting Chinese territory in person. Dr. Wilhlem, who was the lawyer of the couple, challenged the validity of the extradition order because his clients never went to China’s inland provinces. “How could they have committed aggressions in the Kiangsi and other provinces?”349 Besides, the Kiangsu 2nd Branch High Court was entitled to deal with

348 “Verbatim report of Special District Court Proceeding [2nd hearing], 8th August, 1931” in 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於共產黨活動：牛蘭案, 1928-1932, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 349 “Extract of China times, 9th September, 1931” in ibid 105

the cases created in the Settlement by virtue of article 2 of the new Provisional Court

Agreement.350 The municipal police not only insisted that the case of Noulens was within the jurisdiction of the International Settlement and but it also urged the

Kiangsu 2nd Branch High Court to deny the request made by the Chinese Garrison authorities.351

Meanwhile, the arrest of Noulen and his wife became a hot topic in the British metropole. In accordance with Antoinette Burton and Andrew Thompson, pressure groups in Britain always urged the government to carry out reforms by drawing upon imperial matters from the Empire.352 After Noulen and his wife were extradited, the

British authorities still received complains and suggestions from pressure groups.

The League Against Imperialism and for National Independence asked the British government to exert its influence to the Shanghai Municipal Council. It hoped that the council could guarantee a fair trial in this case and assured the safety of these two

Europeans.353 The Howard League for Penal Reform and the Independent Labour

Party also approached the Foreign Office and the Foreign Secretary John Simon concerning the treatment of Noulen in Chinese jail.354

Nevertheless, the British consular bodies were not sympathised towards

Noulens couple. They were afraid that British intervention in this case would be utilised by communist presses to vilify the British imperial presence and to stir up anti-British sentiments among the Chinese. The British consul in Shanghai J.F.

350 “Letter written from Dr. O. Fischer to Chairman of Shanghai Municipal Council, 19th July, 1931” in ibid. 351 Ibid 352 Antoinette Burton, Empire in question, 264; Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain 353 Letter written from the League Against Imperialism to Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary Sir Walford Selby, 9th November, 1931 in “Trial of foreign communists, Noulens and Mrs. Motte in Shanghai” FO371/15514 (F:4974/4579/10), Foreign Office files for China [electronic resource], (Marlborough : Adam Matthew, 2009) 354 Letter written from the League Against Imperialism to Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary Sir Walford Selby, 26th November, 1931, ibid 106

Brenan explained why the British consulate in Shanghai did not give a helping hand to Mr. Noulen and his wife.

… as they [the Shanghai Municipal Police] are conducting the prosecution in a case in which the Chinese authorities are directly interested, the British authorities are not in a position to intervene… if we were to become a party to the arrangement proposed we may, in the absence of any satisfactory guarantee to the contrary, find ourselves accused, in the Soviet press and elsewhere, of an attempt to defeat the ends of justice and making Chinese national interests subservient to our own narrower interests.355

Sir Miles Lampson also showed his agreement and appreciation to Brenan who might have prevented the British authorities from suffering another diplomatic crisis.356

Without supports from the British diplomatic bodies, the attitude of the

Shanghai Municipal Police was changed concerning the extradition of Noulen couple.

After proving that Noulen and his wife were not nationals from any foreign powers, the Shanghai Municipal Police agreed to hand over both of them to the Chinese authorities on 12th August, 1931.357 The police advocate Mr. Kum, who used to emphasise that Kiangsu High Court 2nd Branch should have the right to hear this case of Noulens, completely changed his standpoint and gave his countenance to this extradition order.

It is true that during the hearings, I maintained that the Kiangsu High

355 Letter written from J.P. Brenan to Miles Lampson, 30th July, 1931” in “Trial of foreign communists, Noulens and Mrs. Motte in Shanghai, ibid 356 “Minutes written by Miles Lampson” in “Trial of foreign communists, Noulens and Mrs. Motte in Shanghai, 3rd August, 1931” FO371/15514 (F:4974/4579/10), ibid 357 “Letter written from Deputy Commissioner of Police to Acting Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 14th August, 1931” in 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於共產黨活動：牛蘭案, 1928-1932, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 107

Court, second branch, did have jurisdiction over the Noulens case, and that the case should be tried here, but as Noulens’ criminal activities extended to many provinces in China, other Chinese courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the case also... A prima facie case against the accused was established to the satisfaction of the Court and the Council.358

Commissioner of Police F.W. Gerrard even refused to provide protections to

Noulen and his wife who resided in the Settlement for 1.5 year. He denied Noulen

Couple’s citizenship in the Settlement.359 Thus, the Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to give up their insistence in defending the jurisdiction of the International

Settlement even though the crime was committed inside the Settlement. The British authorities considered that the impact of anti-British sentiment would be far more important than the judicial autonomy of the Settlement. Therefore, British expatriates were again abandoned by British diplomats.

To conclude, the British informal presence in Shanghai survived at the expense of the judicial independence of the Shanghai Municipal Council. Indeed, the Shanghai

Municipal Police still possessed the prosecution power in order to protect foreign interests in the Settlement. Prosecutors appointed by the Chinese government could not intervene in the cases which were handled by the municipal police.360 As Yao

Yuan suggests, the Settlement authorities would refuse to hand over some suspected communists to China if the Kuomintang authorities failed to provide “sufficient”

358 “The Noulens were not permanent residents of the Settlement, but were merely using it as a base for their operations in China… I see no reason from the police point of view why any action should be taken by the council to have them bought back to the jurisdiction of the Special Court.” See Letter written from Acting Municipal Advocate Mr. Kum to Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council J. R. Jones, 26th July, 1932 in ibid 359 “Letter written from Commissioner of Police F.W. Gerrard to Acting Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 21st July, 1932” in ibid 360 Article 5, “Agreement relating to the Chinese Courts in the International Settlement at Shanghai”, in Foreign Office files for China, 17th February, 1930, ref.: FO676/317; Rendition Agreement of the Shanghai Special District Court〈上海公共租界特區法院協定全文〉，Wu Chuanyi 吳圳義，Shanghai Zujie Wenti《上海租界問題》The problem of the Shanghai International Settlement，(Taipei: Zhengzhong bookstore, 1981), 264 108

evidence.361 Ru Baoyi 汝葆彝, a former municipal advocate working for the

Shanghai Municipal Council, even pointed out that the settlement authorities could reject any extradition request as they reserved the right to define whether the Chinese authorities provided sufficient prima facie.362 Only by extraditing communists based on adequate evidence could the Council retain its legal authority in the settlement.363

Given the massive amount of cases recorded in the Special Branch Files, it is true that this chapter cannot completely examine how many extradition cases relating to communist activities were rejected because of insufficient evidence.

Yet, what this research has shown is that the era representing absolute judicial dominance of the Shanghai Municipal Council was gone. In the face of the fervid

Chinese nationalism, the Council first authorised its police force to hand over suspects who were non-residents to the Chinese authorities without undergoing any trials in 1928. Before the intervention of the British diplomatic bodies in late 1929, the Shanghai Municipal Council could reject any extradition requests relating to residents or cases in the Settlement, regardless of the sufficiency of evidence provided by the Chinese authorities. However, the British Foreign Office not only abolished the intervention of the consular deputies in the court, but it also warned the council not to provide protections to their Chinese residents on suspicion of engaging in any criminal activities in Chinese territory. Last but not least, the jurisdiction of the Settlement was no longer protected by Britain as reflected in the case of Noulen couple. Committing no crimes in China’s inland provinces, Noulen was wanted by

361 Yao Yuan 姚遠，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研究》，195 362 Ru Baoyi 汝葆彝，My memory of the Shanghai International Settlement〈上海公共租界點滴回憶〉， Lu jianxin 陸堅心、WanYan Shaoyuan 完顔紹元，Ershi Shiji Shasnghai Wenshi Ziliao Wenku Shi《20 世紀上海文史資料文庫 10》20th Century Shanghai Literature archive (Shanghai：Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe, 1999), 4 363 Yao Yuan 姚遠，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研究》，195 109

the Kuomintang because he was of paramount importance to the Chinese Communist

Party. The extradition of these communists not only caused no harms to British interests in Shanghai, but they could also alleviate the tense relationship between

Britain, the Shanghai International Settlement, the Kuomintang government and the

Chinese public. The extradition of communists shown in this chapter reveals that the judicial neutrality and autonomy of the International Settlement was weakened. It was because the council had to hand over communists to the Kuomintang which would torture its political opponents in the future. It was apparent that the Shanghai

Municipal Council and its police force had become part of police networks of the

Nationalist government by the late 1920s. Therefore, I argue that British imperial policies in Shanghai were readjusted at the expense of the judicial autonomy of the

International Settlement in the 1920s and 1930s.

110

CHAPTER 5

REFORMATORIES

“We feel that the Regulations governing Houses of Reflection do not come with the category of good laws. They also seem to be unfair, and to practically deprive Chinese citizens of the right of free thought and speech.”364

R.J. Ryan (The Municipal Advocate)

The completion of arrest and extradition procedures doesn’t mean the end of the story. Reformatories were another channel disclosing the cooperation between the

Shanghai Municipal Police and the Chinese authorities when handling political cases.

In fact, although the Chinese government captured many communists extradited by the Settlement authorities, the “appetite” of the Nationalist government was still voracious. Thus, in the 1930 decade, communist convicts who served or were serving their sentences in the Ward Road Gaol became next targets wanted by Chinese officials. But the ambition of the Chinese authorities to acquire communist prisoners in the Ward Road Gaol would unquestionably undermine the neutrality of the

Shanghai International Settlement.

In fact, due to the lack of sources, there are just a few scholars studying detail of reformatories in China. In the existing literature, only the research conducted by

Klaus Mühlhahn and Frank Dikötter can provide us with brief glances on the history of reformatories during the republican era. Mühlhahn discusses reformatories in a legal context. Criminal justice was closely connected with the development of

364 “Dispatch written from R.J. Ryan (Municipal Advocate) to J. R. Jones (Secretary General), 1st February, 1933”, in Shanghai Gonggong Zujie Gongbuju Zongbanchu Guanyu Jiangsugaodengfayuan Dierfenyuan XIngqi Yiman de Gongchandangyuan de Chuli 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於江蘇高等法院第二分院刑期已滿的共產黨員的處理 Shanghai Municipal Council’s decision concerning the treatment of anti-revolutionary prisoners who would be released on expiry of their term of sentence under the jurisdiction of 2nd Branch Kiangsu High Court, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930, ref.: U1-3-4309 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive).

111

Chinese society in terms of law codes, courts and penal system. Thus, the assimilation of legal institutions in response to changing social circumstances was his main focus. He argues that the reformatories were found in order to deal with the consequences made in wars and revolutions.365 Focusing in a narrower sense,

Dikötter emphasises the evolution of Chinese penal systems from the Qing Dynasty to the end of the republican era. In particular, he studies the significance of changing cultural and social customs of prisons in modern China. With a view to repealing the extraterritoriality, the establishment of reformatories and the restructure of prisons, were reformative means employed by the Nanjing government to re-educate its fellow countrymen who were always regarded as barbarous and uncivilised in the eyes of westerners.366 However, neither Mühlhahn nor Dikötter discusses the case of reformatories in the context of the Sino-British relations. They also did not mention relocations of political prisoners from the Shanghai International Settlement to

Chinese reformatories. They neglect the fact that the Shanghai Municipal Council’s recognition on Chinese reformatories was actually a trade-off between the survival of the western economic dominance in China and the strengthening of the Nanjing government.

This chapter not only discusses the loss of judicial autonomy of the municipal police, but also depicts the decay of humanitarian ideas emphasised in the penal system of the Settlement. Although there is no evidence showing Britain’s intervention in the municipal council, the positive attitude of the British authorities on the formation of Chinese reformatories should not be neglected. I argue that sending political convicts imprisoned in the municipal gaol to Chinese reformatories

365 Klaus Mühlhahn, Criminal justice in China : a history (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 4 366Frank Dikötter, Crime, punishment and the prison in modern China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2002), 2, 219-220, 280 112

in the 1930s shows readjustments of British imperial policies in China. It was because the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force could no longer uphold its legal authority in the International Settlement.

Reformatories in republican China

According to Klaus Mühlhahn, Chinese criminal justice in the 1930s and 1940s was severely infringed by consequences of wars and revolutions. Political departments not only overrode judicial institutions but also intervened in legal procedures. Military and secret services began to imprison political offenders in different detention centres, bypassing formal legal procedures.367 Indeed, after the success of the northern expedition in 1928, the Kuomintang not only attempted to eliminate communists militarily, but it also tried to transform thoughts of captured communists. There was no doubt that correcting social misbehaviour of convicts was one of aims for setting up reformatories.368 However, transforming ideas possessed by political prisoners was more important for reformatory staff.369 Subsequently, the

Regulation Governing Reformatory 反省院條例 was promulgated by the Chinese government on 2nd December, 1929.370 The Chinese authorities regarded the following “anti-revolutionaries” had to be imprisoned in reformatories.

1. Those completed half of their sentence for the crime of “Anti-revolution” and felt repented. 2. Those finished their sentence but did not feel regret for their faults against the 1911 revolution. 3. Those were imprisoned by the Court under one year’s

367 Klaus Mühlhahn, Criminal justice in China, 11 368 Frank Dikötter, Crime, punishment and the prison in modern China, 280 369 Klaus Mühlhahn, Criminal justice in China, 131 370 “Regulations governing reformatories (Fanxingyuan tiaoli)” in Gazette of Transportation, (Jiaotong gongbao), vol. 99 (Nanjing: Department of Transportation of the National Government, 1929), 18-20. URL http://0-www.cnbksy.cn.hkbulib.hkbu.edu.hk/shlib_tsdc/searchResultDetails.do?basedataId=3707122 0&needFr=false&incFt=true (Accessed at 01:30am on 26th September, 2014) 113

sentence concerning the crime of “Anti-revolution”. 4. Those were subject to the regulations for repenting communists, article no. 8 5. Those sentenced by Nationalist Party Headquarters371

A sentence for each term was six months. The maximum confinement period was

five years. Prior to the end of each term, prisoners would be assessed by the Board

of Review. The Board, which was composed of Nationalist party representatives

(The word “Tangpu” 黨部 was used by the municipal council to describe party

representatives of the Nationalist Party. “Tangpu” will be used hereafter), judges of

the High Court and presidents of reformatories, reserved the rights to decide

whether a prisoner should be released based on his / her reforming progress.372 No

matter political convicts repented or not, it was possible for them to transfer from

detention centres or prisons to reformatories where political indoctrination was

provided. More importantly, judging in accordance with their own logic and

preference, the Nationalist Party reserved final rights to decide who should be sent

to the reformatories and lengths of the confinement period. Although the

reformatories were theoretically controlled by judicial institutions, party

headquarters and military agents were the main authorities operating these

reformatories.373

Since the late 1920s, the Nationalist government had set up plenty of

reformatories throughout the country. Including the Metropolitan Reformatory in

Nanjing established in March 1937, there were at least twelve reformatories built in

different provincial capitals controlled by the Chinese government.374 Scales of

371 Ibid, 15-16 372 Ibid, 16; Frank Dikötter, Crime, punishment and the prison in modern China, 284 373 Klaus Mühlhahn, Criminal justice in China : a history (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 131-132 374 Provincial capitals like Fujian, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangsu, Hubei, Henan, Shanxi, Shandong, Sichuan, Guangdong and Hebei also followed the order of the Nationalist Government to set up 114

reformatories varied and depended on actual conditions of different locations. A

reformatory in a city like Suzhou 蘇州, for example, was very small. There was

only 259 prisoners who were divided into six groups in 1935.375 Locating near the

headquarter of the Chinese Communist Party in the Jiangxi province 江西省, the

Kiukiang reformatory 九江反省院 kept about 13,000 ex-communists in January

1935.376 The establishment of reformatories in different provinces could disclose

the determination of the Nationalist Party to suppress communism in China by

transforming thoughts of ex-communists.

Apart from providing vocational training similar to what other prisons provided,

Chinese reformatories mainly implanted pro-Kuomintang political beliefs to their

prisoners. The Three Principles of the People 三民主義, civic education, evils of

communism, and national history were subjects taught in reformatories.377 It was

mandatory for prisoners to attend lectures and seminars provided by reformatory

instructors. Clearly, the Nationalist Party was keen on completely removing

communist ideas kept by political offenders. Its next targets were communist

convicts imprisoned in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol managed by the Shanghai

Municipal Police.

Dilemma of the Shanghai Municipal Council

In Chinese controlled territory in Shanghai, the local party branch followed the orders of the Nationalist Party not only by accepting surrenders of communists, but also by reforming them in different prisons. Composed of party, military and judicial reformatories for incarcerating political prisoners. See “Nanking Political Prisoners Now Housed in New Home”, the Shanghai Times, 1st March, 1937 in “Reforming of Political Offenders. Regulations Governing the surrender of communists, ref. D4797, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 375 Frank Dikötter, Crime, punishment and the prison in modern China, 283 376 Letter written from British Consul General A.P. Blunt in Nanking to British Minister Alexander Cadogan, Reformatory for Communist bandits at Kiukiang, 30th January, 1935, Foreign Office papers, F 2179/19/10, Foreign Office files for China (Marlborough: Adam Matthew, 2009) 377 Frank Dikötter, Crime, punishment and the prison in modern China, 282 115

representatives, the “Surrendered communists investigation committee” 上海市共黨

自首案件審查委員會 and the “Shanghai Committee to Examine Cases of

Surrendered Communists” were formed to process surrender applications of ex-communists in Shanghai in September and in November 1934 respectively.378

Acting in accordance with the Regulations Governing Reformatory,379 the above authorities would examine repentant communists carefully in a case by case basis.

Six months after their establishment, these authorities received 120 applications.

After approved by the Kuomintang, ex-communists would be sent to reformatories.

Upon the completion of their sentences, communist convicts would receive certificates proving their repentance to join the Communist Party.380

In addition, the Nationalist Party in Shanghai also engaged in educational missions.

In May 1936, the Committee for re-educating political prisoners in Shanghai 上海政

治犯教誨委員會 was established to re-educate communist convicts imprisoned in different prisons controlled by the Chinese authorities in Shanghai.381 Members of

378 Woosung-Shanghai garrison Commanders Headquarters, Shanghai City Government, Bureau of Public Safety, as well as local Judicial Authorities sent their representatives to form this committee. The above intuitions were under the control of the Nationalist government. See Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1st September -30th September, 1934, ref.: U1-1-1211, (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive), 14th September, 1934, 86. and Shanghai Jianyu (Shanghai Prison),“Gongchandangren Zishou Banfa”(共產黨人自首法) Regulation concerning the surrender of the communist in Shanghai Jiangsu Dier Jianyufenjian Guanyu Zhengzhifan Shixiang (1935-1936) 上海江蘇第二監獄分監關於政治犯事項 (1935-1936) Aspects concerning the political offenders in the Shanghai Jiangsu No.2 prison branch, ref.: Q177-5-39, July, 1935, 5-7 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive) Chang Ying Tseng (張瀛曾), Huang Wah (黃華), Tao Pah Chuen (陶百川), Chap Tseng Tang (趙銓鏜), Chow Tser (周秋), Yeu Ding Ih (邱定一) were members in this committee. See Detective Inspector Kuh Pao-hwa, “Personnel forming the Surrendered communists Investigation Committee to commence functioning on September 15, 1934”, Shanghai Municipal Police Report, 15th September, 1934 in “Reforming of Political Offenders. Regulations Governing the surrender of communists, ref. D4797, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 379 “Regulations governing reformatories (Fanxingyuan tiaoli)” in Gazette of Transportation Jiaotong gongbao, 16 380 The Shanghai Committee to Examine Cases of Surrendered Communists issued 80 certificates to the repented communists since its establishment in November 1934 to May 1935.“Committee to examine cases of surrendered communists (Afternoon translation)” in “Reforming of Political Offenders. Regulations Governing the surrender of communists, ref. D4797, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 381 This committee was composed of University Professors like Yuan Yi Yu, local party 116

this committee visited Chinese prisons and gave lectures to communist convicts about the Three Principles of the People. By doing so, they hoped they could remould the thoughts of political offenders”.382

In short, the Nationalist Party in Shanghai faithfully followed instructions of the

Nanjing government. It attempted to transform the thoughts of political offenders.

Communist convicts incarcerated in the municipal were also affected by this policy promulgated by the Nanjing Government.

Political prisoners including communist convicts in the Settlement were imprisoned in the Ward Road Gaol in the 1920s and the 1930s. The Gaol branch of the Shanghai Municipal Police was responsible for the management of all prisons controlled by the Shanghai Municipal Council. In 1931, there were approximately

486 wardens to supervise 7552 prisoners in the Ward Road Gaol and Amoy Road.383

Among these prisoners, only a small number of them were categorised as political prisoners. According to the record of a French police report, there were 243 political offenders incarnated in Chinese prisons and gaols of the two foreign concessions in

1936, 42 of which were imprisoned inside the Ward Road Gaol of the International

Settlement.384

Subsequently, the Settlement court requested the Shanghai Municipal Council to representatives like Tung Ying Pai (童行白) and officials of local educational bureau like Chiang Wen Pao (姜文寶), see “Organization at Shanghai of the “Committee for re-educating political prisoners, Appendix I. List of members of the committee for reeducating political prisoners in Shanghai, Translation of French Police Report dated June 2, 1936”, ibid. 382 “Appendix II, Rules governing the committee for re-education of political prisoners in Shanghai” and “The admonition of Political Offenders (Translation from Min Po)”, ibid. 383 Shanghai Municipal Council, Report for the year 1932 and budget for the year 1933 (Shanghai: Printed by F. & C. Walsh, 1929) [Microfilm copy stored in the libraries of the University of Hong Kong], 119-120 384 The following were the number of distributions of political offenders in Shanghai. Zao Wu King (Nantao, under Chinese control): 190; North Chekiang Road (under Chinese control): 4; Rue Massenet prison (French prison): 7; Ward Road Gaol: 42. (under the control of the Shanghai Municipal Council) Ward Road Gaol was the second largest prison in Shanghai for incarnating political offenders. See “Organization at Shanghai of the “Committee for re-educating political prisoners, Appendix I. List of members of the committee for reeducating political prisoners in Shanghai, Translation of French Police Report dated June 2, 1936”, ibid 117

hand over the “anti-revolutionary” political prisoners in accordance with section two, article five of the Reformatory regulation.385 These prisoners were almost released on expiry of their terms of sentence and failed to show any repentance.386 Indeed, it was very unusual that prisoners completing their terms of imprisonment had to be confined again in other penal institutions. Nevertheless, the Nationalist Party insisted that imprisoning these convicts in reformatories was necessary. Fearing the rising influence of communist prisoners after finishing their sentence, the Chinese authorities wanted to purify the thoughts of these political convicts before their release.387 Thus, from the Chinese government’s perspective, sending these convicts to reformatories was for the sake of its national security.

Yet, the council’s response was very negative at the beginning. In his reply to the acting municipal advocate and the Commissioner of Police, J. R. Jones, the secretary of the council, strongly rejected the request of the Chinese authorities.

It is obvious that the Council cannot dispose of prisoners except according to the sentence of the court…The Council cannot give instructions in accordance with the [2nd Branch Kiangsu High Court] President’s request.388

Undoubtedly, the council was in a dilemma for handing over its political prisoners in the Settlement. Indeed, the judicial autonomy of the Settlement would have been

385 “Regulations governing reformatories (Fanxingyuan tiaoli)” in Gazette of Transportation, (Jiaotong gongbao), 16 386 “Translation of dispatch No. 3629 to [Shanghai Municipal] council from 2nd Branch of Kiangsu High Court, 2nd December, 1932” in Shanghai Gonggong Zujie Gongbuju Zongbanchu Guanyu Jiangsugaodengfayuan Dierfenyuan Xingqi Yiman de Gongchandangyuan de Chuli 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於江蘇高等法院第二分院刑期已滿的共產黨員的處理, 1932-1933 Shanghai Municipal Council’s decision concerning the treatment of anti-revolutionary prisoners who would be released on expiry of their term of sentence under the jurisdiction of 2nd Branch Kiangsu High Court, ref.: U1-3-4309, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive) 387 Ibid 388 “Dispatch written from J. R. Jones (Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council) to King S. Kum (Acting Municipal Advocate), 12th December, 1932”, ibid 118

infringed if the council made this promise for China. But if the council refused to make a concession, it would have faced the diplomatic pressure from the Chinese government.

Nevertheless, no reformatories were particularly established for remoulding peoples’ thoughts in the penal system of the Settlement at that time. The Ward Road

Gaol and the Amoy Road Gaol were the only two prisons incarnating adult convicts in the Settlement. Although there was a reformatory administered by the municipal police, it was only used to imprison juvenile males and was not run along the line of

Chinese reformatories.389 So, the council could not dispose of communist convicts to reformatories in Chinese territory which were not a part of penal institutions in the

Settlement.

More importantly, J. R. Jones strongly emphasised the significance of the legal autonomy in the Settlement. He explained to the Commissioner of Police about the impossibility to satisfy Chinese demand by saying that “it is obviously wrong for the

Council to hand over a prisoner upon his release for examination by Tangpu or anyone else…”390 Traditionally, the legal authority of the Court was supreme and independent when the International Settlement was established. Before the disbandment of the Mixed Court in 1927, the jurisdiction of the Court was implemented according to the rules of 1869.391 The Sub-prefect was entitled to adjudicate all civil and criminal cases involving Chinese subjects. He had the right to

389 Shanghai Municipal Council, Report for the year 1932 and budget for the year 1933, 119-120 390 “Dispatch written from J. R. Jones (Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council) to Frederick Gerrard (Commissioner of Police), 12th December, 1932”, 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於江蘇高等法院第二分院刑期已滿的共產黨員的處理, 1932-1933 in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 391 A.M. Kotenev, Shanghai: its mixed court and council: material relating to the history of the Shanghai Municipal Council and the history, practice and statistics of the International Mixed Court (Taipei, Taiwan: Ch'eng-wen Pub. Co.], 1968), 289 119

examine, to detain and even to punish Chinese convicts.392 Although Chinese Court had replaced the Mixed Court by the early 1930s, the council still denied that the judgment of a Sub-Prefect could be interfered and dominated by representatives of the Nationalist Party. Even though the court could summon witnesses and experts,393

Tangpu could hardly be distinguished as either one of them. It was because personal mentalities were subjective and private. Therefore, the Kuomintang’s request on sending communist convicts in the Settlement to Chinese reformatory was rejected by the council which attempted to defend the legal independence of the Settlement.

However, it seems that the British government was unsympathetic about handing over communist prisoners to Chinese reformatories. In the early 1930s, the British

Foreign Office was well informed about the news concerning the establishment of reformatories in China. The British Consul General in Nanjing, for example, notified the British Minister to China Alexander Cadogan that more than 13,000 red bandits, who received military, vocational, and ideological training, were “converting into loyal Chinese citizens” in the Jiujiang reformatory in November 1933.394 After finishing his visit in Southern China in September 1935, a British military attaché called Lieutenant Colonel Lovat Fraser wrote a report concerning the intelligence of the Chinese civil war to the British Embassy in Beijing. In his first sentence of comments about the reformatory, he heavily criticised communists for bringing

“appalling economic conditions” in China to “a very great extent”.395 British investments in China were inevitably disturbed by these communists who agitated

392 Ibid, 71-72 393 Ibid, 332-333 394 “Letter written from British Consul General A.P. Blunt in Nanking to British Minister Alexander Cadogan”, Reformatory for Communist bandits at Kiukiang, 30th January, 1935, Foreign Office papers, F 2179/19/10, Foreign Office files for China (Marlborough: Adam Matthew, 2009), 66-71 395 Lovat Fraser, Report on tour in South China, 1st August, 1935 in “Military Attache’s tour of South China, 20th September, 1935”, Foreign Office papers, F 6037/103/10, Foreign Office files for China (Marlborough: Adam Matthew, 2009), 30 120

thousands of strikes, demonstrations and riots in different treaty ports. Communists were thus enemies of the British and the Chinese governments. Perhaps, the mentality of the British authorities towards reformatories can be realised by analysing the opinion of Fraser on the Jiujiang reformatory.

This Reformatory is undoubtedly doing good work, but the class of people with which it has to deal makes progress extremely slow and problematical. The ultimate success of the undertaking will rest in the hands of the Provincial officials, and the treatment that they made out to the prisoners on their return to their home.396

Clearly, this British Officer fully recognised and supported the Nationalist party’s transformation works on communist prisoner of wars. His report implied that British officers agreed with Jiang Jieshi’s actions in suppressing communism in the Republic of China. Fraser further pointed out that the accomplishment of this project relied on capabilities of local officials in reformatories. Therefore, communist disturbances on

British investments in China could explain why the British authorities did not interfere in the treatments of communist prisoners in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol and in the Soochow reformatory.

Diplomatically, the British government had already limited the penal power of the

International settlement since the signing of the second rendition agreement in 1930.

According to Article VII of the agreement:

All prisoners now serving sentences in the prisons attached to the Chinese court now functioning in the International Settlement and those sentenced by the Courts established under the present agreement shall serve their sentences either in such prisons in the Settlement or in Chinese prisons outside the Settlement… The prisons in the Settlement shall be operated, as far as practicable, in conformity with Chinese

396 Ibid, 30-31 121

prison regulations and shall be subject to inspection by officers appointed by the Chinese judicial authorities.397

With the approval from the British Foreign Office, jails in the Settlement had been amalgamated to the Chinese penal system since 1930. Chinese prisoners were even allowed to finish their sentences either in the municipal gaol or in Chinese prisons.

Tsu Kyi Sing, a prisoner incarcerated in the Settlement, requested successfully to complete the rest of his sentence in the Jiangsu No.2 prison in Chinese territory during the early 1930s.398 Although Frank Dikötter argues that some Chinese prison regulations in the Settlement were not practically and strictly enforced, he ignores the fact that the Settlement faithfully practiced the Regulations for Governing

Reformatories in the Settlement.

Thus, the Shanghai Municipal Gaol in the Settlement began to connect with

Chinese reformatories in the early 1930s. As the department which was responsible to imprison political convicts, the Shanghai Municipal Police concurred with the implementation of the Regulations of Governing Reformatories in the Municipal

Gaol. According to Extra-Commissioner of Police R. M. J. Martin, there would be

“no objection offered by this department (Gaol branch) to the President’s proposal”.399 The acting municipal advocate King S. Kum not only recognised the standpoint of the municipal police, but he also suggested that “I can see no objection

397 Article VII, Agreement relating to the Chinese Courts in the International Settlement at Shanghai, 17th February, 1930 in “Shanghai Provisional Court Agreement”, British Foreign Office papers, F 676/317 (London: Unpublished papers stored in the National Archive at Kew) 398 “Dispatch written from R.J. Ryan (Municipal Advocate) to J. R. Jones (Secretary General), 21st December, 1932”, Shanghai Municipal Council, Shanghai Municipal Council’s decision concerning the treatment of anti-revolutionary prisoners who would be released on expiry of their term of sentence under the jurisdiction of 2nd Branch Kiangsu High Court, ref.: U1-3-4309 in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 399 “Dispatch written from R. M. J. Martin (Extra Commissioner of Police) to King S. Kum (Acting Municipal Advocate) 24th November, 1932”, Shanghai Municipal Council, Shanghai Municipal Council’s decision concerning the treatment of anti-revolutionary prisoners who would be released on expiry of their term of sentence under the jurisdiction of 2nd Branch Kiangsu High Court, ref.: U1-3-4309, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 122

to the Court’s sending offenders to the reformatory at Soochow”.400 He fully agreed that once political convicts in the municipal gaol were due for release, they should be examined in the Court. If the Court believed that these convicts were not truly repented, they would be sent to the Soochow reformatory.401 Mr. Kum even persuaded the council secretary who thought China’s request was unreasonable to carry out the instructions stated in the Rendition Agreement.

… the Regulations Governing Reformatories are applicable to the Chinese Courts in the Settlement by virtue of the Rendition Agreement. Since there is no such form of Reformatory in the Settlement, the Court by virtue of Article VII of the Rendition Agreement, has power to order a prisoner to serve his sentence outside of the Settlement.402

Therefore, the independence of the penal system of the Settlement was infringed by the Chinese authorities.

With regard to the judicial autonomy of the Court, Mr. Kum did not think that the involvement of Kuomintang representatives in legal proceedings was an infringement. He only regarded these Tangpu members as “experts conducting an investigation for the Court.” The final power to dispose of the prisoner, in his opinion, is vested in the Court.403 Another municipal advocate R. J. Ryan also emphasised that reformatory regulations did not violate the Land Regulations and by laws because Tangpu members only provided testimonies and consultations for judges without interfering judgments of the Court.404 Nevertheless, it was undeniable that opinions of Tangpu members were actually decisive and significant to affect the

400 “Dispatch written from King S. Kum (Acting Municipal Advocate) to R. M. J. Martin (Extra Commissioner of Police) 29th November, 1932”, ibid. 401 Ibid 402 “Dispatch written from King S. Kum (Acting Municipal Advocate) to J. R. Jones (Secretary General), 21st December, 1932”, ibid. 403 Ibid. 404 “Dispatch written from R.J. Ryan (Municipal Advocate) to J. R. Jones (Secretary General), 1st February, 1933”, Ibid. 123

thoughts of magistrates. Even Mr. Kum admitted that “it is practically impossible for gaol staff to make any observation as to whether a political prisoner is liable to commit such an offense (communism) again after he is released.”405 Thus, law enforcement officers in the Settlement had no objective ways to distinguish the mentalities of political prisoners. Even though judgments were theoretically decided by the Court, the role of Tangpu members was still very important to influence judges. The neutrality and the judicial autonomy of the Court in the Settlement were therefore damaged by the Chinese government.

The destination was Soochow

As a result, the Municipal Gaol began to hand over different communist prisoners to the Chinese Reformatory in Soochow in early 1933.406 Non-repented political offenders who were due for release were urgently wanted by the Nationalist Party. In fact, prisons under Chinese administration in Shanghai also invited Tangpu to evaluate the mentalities of their prisoners when they were due for release.407 Zhang

Junhua 張俊華 and Zhao Yinghua 趙映華, who were political offenders imprisoned in the Shanghai Jiangsu High Court No.2 Prison, were classified as

“repentant” and were released after examined by Tangpu.408 Similarly, as one of

405 “Dispatch written from King S. Kum (Acting Municipal Advocate) to R. M. J. Martin (Extra Commissioner of Police) 29th November, 1932”, ibid. 406 Though the records of the Soochow reformatory were inaccessible due to political sensitivity, we can still understand how the Municipal Council cooperated with the Chinese authorities by utilizing some Chinese prison records in the Republican era and memoirs written by some former communist convicts incarcerated in both Municipal Gaol and Soochow reformatory. 407 Shanghai Jianyu (Shanghai Prison),“Order of the Shanghai Jiangsu High Court No.3 Branch” Shanghai Jiangsu Gaodeng Fayuan Disan Fenyuan Xunling (上海監獄高等法院第三分院訓令) in Shanghai Difang Fayuan Disan Kanshousuo Yijie Suzhoufanxingyuanjuan (1935-1938) 上海地方法院第三看守所移解蘇州反省院卷 (1935-1938) (Document about the transfer of prisoners of Shanghai District Court No.3 detention centre), ref.: Q177-3-86, 322-325, (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive). 408 Shanghai Jianyu (Shanghai Prison),“Release of Zhang Junhua and Zhao Yinghua who are due for release”令張俊華趙映華兩名執行期滿後即予開釋由 Ling Zhang Junhua Zhao Yinghua Liangming Zhixing Qimanhou Jiyu Kaishiyou], in Shanghai Jiangsu Dier Jianyufenjian Guanyu Zhengzhifan Shixiang (1935-1936) 上海江蘇第二監獄分監關於政治犯事項 (1935-1936) Aspects concerning the political offenders in the Shanghai Jiangsu No.2 prison branch, ref.: Q177-5-39, July, 124

components of the Chinese penal system, the Ward Road Gaol in the International

Settlement also invited Tangpu to examine its communist prisoners before their releases. According to a study of the Shanghai Academy of Social Science, at least four communist convicts were transferred from the municipal gaol to the Soochow reformatory due to their insistence on their communist convictions.409

Cao Diqiu 曹荻秋, who was a communist prisoner in the municipal gaol and later the mayor of Shanghai after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, was an example showing how the Regulation for Governing Chinese Reformatory worked in the Settlement during the 1930s. He was arrested on 17th March, 1932 by the municipal police during a raid in a communist base located at 385 Changping

Road and 370 Changping Road.410 A large quantity of stamps, documents and communist literature such as pamphlets commemorating the anniversary of the Paris

Commune were discovered in this base. Bearing the charge of propagating communism, Cao and his two comrades were later sentenced to five-year imprisonments in the municipal gaol by the Kiangsu High Court.411 Prior to the completion of his sentence in April 1937, Cao was firstly transferred from the municipal gaol to a detention centre of the Chinese Court in the Settlement. Then, an agent was sent from the Kuomintang to examine his thought. Comments of the

Chinese authority on Cao after an interview were as follows:

1935, 14-17 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive) 409 Mai Linhua 麥林華 ed., Shanghai jianyu zhi 《上海監獄志》History of Shanghai prison (Shanghai: Shanghai she hui ke xue yuan chu ban she 上海社會科學院, 2003), 215 410 Cao Diqiu used a fake name called Zhang Yunqing (張雲卿) to bluff the police officers who arrested him. See Huhua 胡華 ed., Zhonggong Dangshi Renwuzhuan 《中共黨史人物傳》 Biographies of the Chinese Communist, vol. 13, (Xi'an 西安: Shaanxi ren min chu ban she : Shaanxi sheng xin hua shu dian fa xing, 陜西人民出版社 Shanxi people's publisher 1980-1992), 326 and Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1st March-31st March, 1932, ref.: U1-1-1181, (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive), 18th March, 1934, 291 411 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1st March-31st March, 1932, 14th May, 1934, 146-147 125

His attitude was fair; however, he refused to confess his faults committed in the past. He did not have any expressions after our persuasion. At last, he just promised not to engage in political activities.412

When writing a biography for her husband, Cao’s wife Shi Bin 石斌, showed her compliment to Cao, praising his loyalty towards the Communist Party.

After finishing his five-year sentence, Diqiu did not think that he committed any crimes. He then united all communist convicts to struggle with his enemies after the Kuomintang imprisoned him again in the Soochow reformatory.413

Eventually, due to his insistence on his communist faith, Cao was handed over from the Settlement Gaol to the Soochow reformatory on 26th April,

1937. Clearly, the Nationalist Party took an important role in affecting the judgment of the Court in this case. This incident also shows that the municipal police faithfully executed the decision made by Tangpu members.

Another person spotted by the Chinese authorities was Zhou Lipo 周立波 who was a proof-reader in a factory.414 Later, He was also a famous leftist writer in the

People’s Republic of China. Posting anti-government handbills outside the Universal

Printing Shop at No. 650 Sinza Road, Zhou was arrested by the municipal police on

6th February, 1932. Plenty of communist literature was also discovered by detectives

412 See Huhua ed., Zhonggong Dangshi Renwuzhuan, vol. 13, 328 413 Zhong gong Shanghai Shi wei dang shi zheng ren wei yuan hui 中共上海市委黨史徵集委員會編] [The committee for collecting materials for party history in Shanghai ed., Shanghai dang shi zi liao tong xun 《上海黨史資料通訊》 Periodicals for the history of the Communist Party in Shanghai, vol.3 (Shanghai: Zhong gong Shanghai Shi wei dang shi zheng ren wei yuan hui, 1986), 25 414 Lipo was his pen-name. His original given name was Shaoyi. In the record of the Shanghai Muncipal Police, the English translation of Zhao Shaoyi was Tseu Zau Nyi. See Huhua 胡華 ed., Zhonggong Dangshi Renwuzhuan 《中共黨史人物傳》Biographies of the Chinese Communist, vol. 27, (Xi'an 西安: Shaanxi ren min chu ban she : Shaanxi sheng xin hua shu dian fa xing, 陜西人民出版社 Shanxi people's publisher 1980-1992), 237 126

in his premise.415 On 25th April 1932, Zhou was prosecuted by the Settlement authorities with the charge of “propagating communism”. He was eventually sentenced to the municipal gaol for two years and six months. A one-year deduction of sentence was granted to Zhou during an amnesty afterwards.416 Prior to his release in December, 1933, the municipal gaol invited Tangpu members to examine

Zhou about his thoughts. Facing strong persuasion from Tangpu, Zhou Lipo still firmly refused to confess to Chinese officers concerning his former involvements in communist activities.417 He was then sent to the Soochow Reformatory for another seven months’ imprisonment.

As the Special Branch files show, Zhang Yunqing 張雲卿 was apprehended because of his membership of the Left Wing Cultural League 中國左翼作家聯盟 on

17th March, 1932. He was inspected by Tangpu members in the 2nd Branch Kiangsu

High Court in 1937.418 After being incarcerated in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol for five years, Zhang was classified by Kuomintang representatives as a non-repented person. In April 1937, judges of the Shanghai Special District Court and the

Shanghai Municipal Police were informed by the Kuomintang that Zhang had to be sent to the Soochow Reformatory for re-education.419 In short, the implementation of reformatory regulations was an infringement on the penal system in the Settlement.

415 Ibid, 240. Also, see Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1st February-28th February, 1932, ref.: U1-1-1180 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive), 8th February, 1932 416 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1st April-30th April, 1932, ref.: U1-1-1182 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive), 26th April, 1932, 329 417 Hu Guangfan, Li Huasheng, “Zhou Lipo Zhuanlue (A brief history of Zhou Lipo) [周立波傳略]”in Xinwenxue Shiliao (New literary and historical materials) 《新文學史料》, vol.1 (Beijing: Renmin Wenxue Chubanshe (People’s literature publisher) [人民文學出版社], 1982) 418 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1932, 1st March-31st March,1932, 18th March, 1932, ref.: U1-1-1181, 291 419 Note written from Detective Senior Inspector to “B” division of the Gordon Road Station, ref: O.O.L. 12/32.5, 19th April, 1937, in “Arrest of members "Left Cultural Ass'n of China," communist organization wanted by Chinese authorities”, ref. D3388, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944; Notes written from Detective Senior Inspector to “B” division of the Gordon Road Station, ref: O.O.L. 12/32.7, 30th April, 1937, ibid 127

More importantly, Tangpu members’ influence over judgments of the Court inevitably destroyed the judicial autonomy of the International Settlement.

Apart from transferring non-repented communist convicts, the council also assisted the Chinese authorities to transfer repentant political offenders to the

Soochow Reformatory. According to the Regulations for Governing the Reformatory, any repentant political convicts who had served half of their sentences (later one third was also accepted), were welcome to continue their sentences in Chinese reformatories.420 Indeed, prisons in Chinese territory had already implemented this law code after its promulgation. Zhou Jinhai 周金海, who finished one third of his sentence in the No.2 Prison in Shanghai, was applauded by Chinese wardens as kind and repentant. He was then recommended by the prison to continue his sentence in the Soochow reformatory in February 1936.421

Again, the Shanghai Municipal Council, which was tied by the rendition agreement, also implemented reformatory regulations in Settlement jails. Working in line with Chinese regulations, wardens of the municipal gaol encouraged political prisoners to move to the Soochow reformatory. Xu Jianlou 徐建樓, who had been incarcerated in the Ward Road Gaol for more than one year in spring 1937, depicted how wardens worked side by side with the Chinese government.

The Gaol authority announced a decision made by the Nationalist Party to us. Any political convicts, who had served half or one third of

420 “Regulations governing reformatories (Fanxingyuan tiaoli)” in Gazette of Transportation, (Jiaotong gongbao), 16 421 Shanghai Jianyu (Shanghai Prison),“Report about transferring Zhou Jinhai to Soochow Reformatory” 呈報危害民國囚犯周金海等合乎反省院條例擬轉送江蘇反省院 Chenbao Weihai Minguo Qiufan Zhou Jinhai Deng Hehu Fanxingyuantiaoli Yi Zhuansong Jiangsufanxingyuan, in Shanghai Difang Fayuan Disan Kanshousuo Yijie Suzhoufanxingyuanjuan (1935-1938) 上海地方法院第三看守所移解蘇州反省院卷 (1935-1938) (Document about the transfer of prisoners of Shanghai District Court No.3 detention centre), in Secretariat Files of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930, ref.: Q177-3-86, 261-266 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive) 128

their sentences, were eligible to continue their sentences in Chinese reformatories.422

Ultimately, three to four communists submitted their applications to the municipal gaol.423

Again, Tangpu interfered in the administration of the municipal gaol as they had the power to decide which convicts were repentant. All prisoners who applied for relocation in Chinese reformatories must be examined by Tangpu. Only confessed prisoners would be sent to the reformatory. Liu Jun 劉俊, who was a political prisoner in the Ward Road Gaol in 1936, could prove about this issue.424

Undoubtedly, such practice would attract attentions of communist prisoners. It was because they would be released after six months’ imprisonments in a reformatory. It was really good news for some of these communist convicts who felt desperate after being imprisoned for a long time. Yao Jianai 姚家礽, who wrote slogans on walls and distributed plenty of communist literature at the Yulin road in November 1935, was sentenced to a three-year imprisonment in the Ward Road Gaol.425 According to

Yao, a deputy governor of the gaol and some wardens announced to political prisoners in spring 1937 that if they were willing to go to Chinese reformatories, they

422 Xu Jianlou (徐建樓), “Xilao Douzheng Jishi (西牢鬥爭紀實) [The record about struggle inside the Ward Road Gaol]” in Shanghaishiwei Qingyunshi Yanjiushi 上海市委靑運史硏究室 Shanghai municipal research institute for youth revolution, Shanghai Qingyunshi Ziliao 《上海青運史資料》 (Periodicals for Shanghai youth revolution), vol.3 (Shanghai: Gong qing tuan Shanghai Shi wei qing yun shi yan jiu shi, 1984), 22 423 Ibid 424 Liu Jun 劉俊, “Guanyu Zai Shanghai Tilanqiao Jianyu Zhong Douzheng Shenghuo De Pianduan Huiyi” My memory concerning the struggle inside the Ward Road Gaol in Shanghai 關於在上海提籃橋監獄中鬥爭生活的片段回憶 in Dangshi Ziliao Congkan 《黨史資料叢刊》 Periodicals for the information of the Communist Party history, vol.3 (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 55 425 Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1st November-28th November, 1935, ref.: U1-1-1225 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive), 4th and 19th November, 1935, 8 and 61 129

would be released earlier than they expected.426 Eventually, although the majority of prisoners ignored these officers, two communists still wanted to move to Chinese reformatories.427

Zhang Zongshun 張宗順, who was also a member of the Left Wing Cultural

League, adopted a totally different attitude compared with his comrade Zhang

Yunqing mentioned earlier. Showing his confession to the Kuomintang authority, he made a personal request that he was willing to receive re-education in a Chinese reformatory.428

Apart from relocating its own prisoners to Chinese reformatories, the Shanghai

Municipal Police also provided escorts for transferring political offenders from other

Chinese prisons in the Settlement to the Shanghai railway station. These offenders would be sent to the Soochow reformatory based on requests made by the Chinese authorities. The Chinese No. 2 Prison recommended Lin Ziming 林子明, Chen

Cihang 陳慈航 and Zhuming 朱明 to continue their sentences in Chinese reformatories outside the Settlement in July 1935.429 This was because these three prisoners were willing to confess all their “sins”. Relocating these prisoners from

Shanghai to Soochow definitely required the assistance from the Settlement

426 Yao Jianai 姚家礽, “Huiyi Zai Shanghai Yingzujie Tilanqiao Jianyu Zhong De Shenghuo He Douzheng” Reviewing my life and struggle in the Ward Road Gaol of the Shanghai International Settlement 回憶在上海英租界提籃橋監獄中的生活和鬥爭] in Dangshi Ziliao Congkan 《黨史資料叢刊》Periodicals for the information of the Communist Party history, vol.3 (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 51 427 Ibid 428 Note written from Detective Senior Inspector to “B” division of the Gordon Road Station, ref: O.O.L. 12/32.4, 16th May, 1936 in “Arrest of members "Left Cultural Ass'n of China," communist organization wanted by Chinese authorities”, ref. D3388, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 429 Shanghai Jianyu (Shanghai Prison),“Chenwei Chensong Hefu Fanxingtiaoli Renfan Linziming Deng Sanming Qingce Yisong Fanxingyuan Fanxing” 呈為呈送合符反省條例人犯林子明等三名清冊移送反省院反省 Application for relocating prisoners who conformed the regulations governing Chinese reformatory to the reformatory in Shanghai Difang Fayuan Disan Kanshousuo Yijie Suzhoufanxingyuanjuan (1935-1938) 上海地方法院第三看守所移解蘇州反省院卷 (1935-1938) Document about the transfer of prisoners of Shanghai District Court No.3 detention centre) in Secretariat Files of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930, ref.: Q177-3-86, p. 1, 2, 5 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive) 130

authorities in Shanghai. Inevitably, Chinese wardens and these three prisoners needed to pass through the Foreign Concessions, the International Settlement and the

Zhapei area controlled by the Chinese government. Before the relocation took place, the Chinese No.2 prison contacted the Shanghai Municipal Police for escorting these prisoners.

On 3rd August at 8am, we will escort Messrs. Lin Zimu to the Soochow Reformatory. Before that, a police wagon is going to pass through Boulevard de Montigny (敏體尼蔭路, located in French Concession) and Xizang Road (西藏路, located in the International Settlement), before getting on a train at the Zhabei Railway Station. Please asked your police officers to allow us to pass through the Settlement and provided any assistance to them if needed.430

Subsequently, not only did the French Concession Police borrow a police wagon for transporting these wardens and prisoners, but the Shanghai Municipal Police and the

Public Safety Bureau also provided escorts to these Chinese personnel to pass through the International Settlement and Chinese territory.431

In short, the Shanghai Municipal Gaol became a part of the penal system of the

Chinese government. The interference of Tangpu members and the collaboration of wardens in the Ward Road Gaol revealed the weakened judicial power of the

Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force. It was because they lost their rights to release their political prisoners incarcerated in the Settlement. Moreover, the municipal police even helped to escort convicts of Chinese prisons to the railway station when they were on their way to the Soochow Reformatory. Therefore, the

430 Shanghai Jianyu (Shanghai Prison),“Request on allowing Chinese Wardens and prisoners to pass through the International Settlement ” 函知解犯三名赴蘇經過公共租界請巡捕放行由 in Shanghai Difang Fayuan Disan Kanshousuo Yijie Suzhoufanxingyuanjuan (1935-1938) 上海地方法院第三看守所移解蘇州反省院卷 (1935-1938) Document about the transfer of prisoners of Shanghai District Court No.3 detention centre, in Secretariat Files of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930, ref.: Q177-3-86, 13-14 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive) 431 Ibid, 9-22 131

municipal police and its prison were under the control of the Chinese authorities to a large extent. Legal autonomy in the Settlement was severely infringed.

Degeneracy of humanitarian treatment

Civilising the Chinese was one of the missions behind the theory of the White

Men’s burden when the British started to rule over their colonial subjects.432 The penitentiary institution was an example illustrating the magnificence of the British civilisation.433 A British Mixed Court Assessor even bragged the Council’s administration on prisons was “in the interests of civilisation so that China might learn that punishment can be effectual without the employment of barbarous methods which are in vogue throughout the Empire.”434

Indeed, perspectives on western penal systems had experienced drastic changes since the late 18th century. Due to humanitarian ideas proposed by Enlightenment philosophers, prisoners were regarded as components of a society. Therefore, they deserved humane treatments in prisons. Subsequently, reforming penal systems in different countries symbolised a sense of modernity to wipe out savageness and backwardness.435 As William Forsythe observes, the drastic change of British penal system in the 19th century was attributed to the contribution of the evangelicals and the associationists. Both of them agreed that there should be alternatives to rectify faults made by prisoners other than physical punishments. The evangelicals emphasised that “the value of every human being” should be in line with God’s commandments whereas the associationists suggested providing rewards and encouragements to prisoners.436 As a result, the management of penitentiaries in the

432 David M. Anderson and David Killingray, Policing the empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press., 1991), 10 433 Frank Dikötter, Crime, punishment and the prison in modern China, 308 434 Ibid 435 Ibid, 4-5 436 William Forsythe, The reform of prisoners, 1830-1900 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 8-13 132

United Kingdom had already undergone tremendous reforms and modifications since the 19th century. Likewise, British expatriates were committed to enlighten the

Chinese by reforming the penitentiary in different British concessions.

Since the British occupied China in the mid-19th century, a series of “China Ports

Prison Regulations” had become effective in different treaty ports and British territories in China. The Ward Road Gaol, which was located in the Shanghai

International Settlement influenced by British settlers, abided by the “Shanghai

Prison Regulation” drafted by the British Foreign Office. All British prisoners benefited from this prison regulation.437 Even though Chinese prisoners were not under the protection of this regulation, a British pressure group in the 1930s also showed its concern on the treatment of Chinese prisoners in the municipal gaol. After inspecting the Ward Road Gaol, Miss Margery Fry, who was the secretary of the

Howard League for Penal Reform, wrote a long evaluation report to the British

Foreign Office criticising the management of the municipal gaol when incarcerating

Chinese prisoners. Miss Fry was concerned about the physical and mental conditions of the Chinese in the municipal gaol.438 The Howard League for Penal Reform, which was a London-based pressure group, demanded the British government to reform penal systems and to modify criminal codes. In accordance with Andrew

Thompson, pressure groups in Britain were influential to affect imperial policies of the British government.439 Sharing similar language and culture, British citizens at

437 “Dispatch written from Sir Miles Lampson to Lord Cushendun, ” in Regulations issued under China Orders in Council, in Foreign Office papers, F7050/7050/10, 27th December, 1928, Foreign Office files for China (Marlborough: Adam Matthew, 2009), 358 438 Miss Fry heavily criticised the management of the Shanghai Municipal Gaol. She not only highlighted the crowdedness inside the gaol, but also highlighted the insufficiency of the recreational and educational services. See Margery Fry, “Notes on the Chinese prison in the Shanghai Settlement ” in Conditions in the Chinese prison in the Shanghai Settlement, in Foreign Office papers, F1967/1967/10, 10th April, 1934, Foreign Office files for China (Marlborough: Adam Matthew, 2009), 230-234 439 Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: the empire in British politics, c. 1880-1932 (Harlow, England ; New York : Longman, 2000), 9-11 133

home had the same Britishness and close connections with British settlers overseas.

Therefore, the British at home had initiatives to involve in the decision-making process of imperial policies. Thus, Miss Fry’s comments could pressure the British

Foreign Office and the Shanghai Municipal Council to improve the administration of prisons in the International Settlement.

Although sometimes conditions were disgusting in the Ward Road gaol,, the municipal council still provided humanitarian services to prisoners physically and spiritually. When lots of prisoners suffered from serious diseases, the Commission of

Public Health suggested building a prison hospital to cure patients in the gaol.440

While some medical officers attributed the cause of health problems in the prison to the insufficiency of food and nutrients, the council was then advised to provide maize, sorghum and even cod-liver oil in the diets of prisoners.441

More importantly, the ideas and thoughts of prisoners in the Settlement were well respected. Even though the council prepared educational trainings for the juvenile males incarcerated in the municipal reformatory, these youngsters could still decide whether to join or not. Whilst responding to Miss Margery Fry’s criticisms, the chairman of the council Harry Arnold even considered to employ specially-trained teachers and to widen curricula assisted by the Education department.442 Thus, not only were the wills of prisoners respected, but syllabi were also diverse and broad.

Reading was also permitted with little restrictions. According to the Shanghai

Prison Regulations, British prisoners not only could read books prepared by the

440 There were many diseases such as beriberi and pulmonary tuberculosis endangering the health of the prisoners inside the Municipal Gaol. In 1920, 65 percent of long-term prisoners suffered from pulmonary tuberculosis. Frank Dikötter, Crime, punishment and the prison in modern China, 316 441 Ibid 317 442 “Dispatch written from H. E. Arnhold, Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council to Sir John Brenan, Consul General of Shanghai, 11th December, 1934” in Conditions in the Chinese Prison in Shanghai International Settlement, in Foreign Office papers, F744/744/10, 4th February, 1935, Foreign Office files for China (Marlborough: Adam Matthew, 2009), 203 134

Council in the gaol library, but they were also allowed to request somebody to buy different literature such as books and newspapers for them to read in prisons. Apart from religious and language works such as the Bible and Anglo-Chinese dictionaries, political offenders in the municipal gaol were even allowed to read political, philosophical and socialist literature.

…We asked the Gaol authority to buy some books for us. Most of the books we wanted were the masterpieces of Marxism, such as the Anti-Dühring, the Critique of the Gotha programme, the Dialectical materialism, Shen Zhiyuan 沈志遠’s political economy, Li Da 李達’sMaterialist Dialectics, Ai Siqi 艾思奇’s Public Philosophy. The warden who bought these books for us was ignorant of these books. He just thought these works were relevant to history, economic studies and philosophy. When everybody in the prison saw these “spiritual food”, they not only felt excited, but also decided to study hard.443

According to Liu Jun, communist convicts were also allowed to form study groups to learn political, cultural and Chinese revolutionary theories. Some communists even gave lectures on sensitive topics such as “The nature and missions of Chinese revolutions”, “Political economy” and “Materialist Dialectics”.444 Political interventions on the thoughts of prisoners were minimal. Undoubtedly, criminals in the Settlement were deprived of their personal freedoms due to their violations on the law and order. Yet, their dignities and self-esteems were well-respected in the

Shanghai Municipal Gaol.

Ironically, the Shanghai Municipal Council which was largely influenced by

443 Xu Jianlou, “Xilao Douzheng Jishi The record about the struggle in the Ward Road Gaol” in 《上海青運史資料》, vol.3, 1984, 21 444 Liu Jun, “Guanyu Zai Shanghai Tilanqiao Jianyu Zhong Douzheng Shenghuo De Pianduan Huiyi” (My memory concerning the struggle inside the Ward Road Gaol in Shanghai) in 《黨史資料叢刊》, vol.3, 1983, 57 135

western penal reforms had to send its communist prisoners to the Soochow

Reformatory where inhumane treatments were found. [Please refer to appendix 12]

In fact, even the municipal advocate R.J. Ryan also expressed his disagreement and denial in handing over prisoners to a Chinese reformatory.

We feel that the Regulations governing Houses of Reflection (the establishment of reformatories) do not come with the category of good laws. They also seem to be unfair, and to practically deprive Chinese citizens of the right of free thought and speech.445

Paradoxically, some prisoners in the Soochow reformatory praised and thanked for the efforts of their instructors for freeing themselves from the communist

“contamination”. A prisoner claimed himself became healthier because “the training in this reformatory made him feel relaxed, pleased and gratified”.446 He further pointed out that the Soochow reformatory enabled him to discover his absolute faith and to foresee a brighter future.447

Indeed, the above narratives were only an incomplete picture of the story. Behind the scenes, prisoners in the Soochow reformatory experienced lots of inhumane treatments which could hardly be found in the municipal gaol. Memoirs of prisoner and annual reports of some Chinese reformatories can justify that there were no exaggerations for Mr. Ryan’s statement in describing the negative nature of the

Regulations Governing Chinese reformatory.

445 “Dispatch written from R.J. Ryan (Municipal Advocate) to J. R. Jones (Secretary General), 1st February, 1933”, in Shanghai Municipal Council, [Shanghai Municipal Council’s decision concerning the treatment of anti-revolutionary prisoners who would be released on expiry of their term of sentence under the jurisdiction of 2nd Branch Kiangsu High Court], in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 446 Jiangsu Fanxingyuan Banyuekan 《江蘇反省院半月刊》 (Soochow Reformatory semimonthly)， Vol. 2, No.6 (Jiangsu：Soochow Reformatory editorial board, Jiangsu Fanxingyuan Bianjiweiyuanhui 江蘇反省院編輯委員會, 1935), 173 447 Ibid 136

Similar to the municipal gaol, Chinese reformatories also provided prisoners with education opportunities. However, not only were their lectures mandatory, but curriculum of these lectures had an implication to remould the political ideologies of prisoners. In the Soochow reformatory, prisoners would be requested to attend different lectures based on their educational levels. The reformatory offered eleven courses across a wide range of disciplines such as craftsmanship, commence, physical education. Five of which such as “Doctrine of Dr. Sun”, “Three Principles of the People”, “political science”, “framework for establishing the state” and

“Military lecture” were related to politics.448 Sharing similar curriculum content, the

Shanxi reformatory 山西反省院 could give us a glance at objectives of their lectures in its annual report. Apart from teaching prisoners basic vocational and technical skills, instructors of the reformatory attempted to implant the ideologies of the Kuomintang to political offenders. “The evil of communism”, “reverence for Dr.

Sun Yat Sin”, “the goal of the Chinese revolution” and “the circumstance of the international relations” were lecture topics favouring the perspective of the

Kuomintang.449 Six out of twenty-one hours per week were spent to teach the above ideas in the reformatory in 1933.450 One of the convicts incarcerated in the Soochow

Reformatory even depicted the lesson about “Three Principles of the People” as a course teaching people to become “obedient and loyal slaves”.451 As a consequence, political offenders had no alternative ways to express their political ideas. They had

448 Xu Jingzong 徐景宗, Jiangsu Fanxingyuan 江蘇反省院 (Soochow Reformatory) in Liangyou 《良友》 The companion pictorial, No.102 (Shanghai: Liangyou Tushu Gongsi 良友圖書公司 Companion publisher company limited , 1935), 11-13 449 Shanxi Fanxingyuan Gaikuang 《山西反省院概況》 (Overview of the Shanxi Reformatory) (Shanxi: Shanxi Fanxingyuan 山西反省院 Shanxi Reformatory, 1933), 12-13 450 Ibid, 12-13 451 Lin Lan 林嵐, Yige Baogui de Jiaoxun Fanxingyuan de Shenghuo Saomiao 一個寶貴的教訓"反省院"的生活素描 A valuable lesson: the portrait of the life inside the reformatory (Soochow) in Shelian Mengbao 《社聯盟報》Newspaper of social union, No. 26-27, ref.: D2-0-2020-32 (Shanghai: unpublished documents stored in the Shanghai Municipal Archive, 1935), 33 137

to accept the ideas written in the “Three Principles of the People”.

Teaching materials were also carefully selected in different courses. Due to the political natures of the courses, reformatory staff used Kuomintang official’s written works as their textbooks. “The Three Principles of People” 三民主義 and the

“National Reconstruction” 建國方略 written by Dr. Sun Zhongshan was the main references for prisoners to study in the lesson about party ideology.452 Moreover, correspondences written between the Nationalist government, the Kuomintang Party and different provincial government departments were even selected as the main references in Chinese language classes of the Shanxi reformatory.453 Also, although reformatories provided different kinds of magazines and books for prisoners to read, literature about Kuomintang ideologies formed the majority of books in the library.454 Thus, prisoners were subject to political assimilation in reformatories because they could only read literature published by the Kuomintang.

As the main ideology upheld by the Kuomintang and the Nationalist government, the Three Principles of the People was drafted during the 1911 revolution. It was the first slogans advocated by anti-Qing revolutionaries and later it became the fundamental “creed” of the Kuomintang. There were three components inside this political doctrine. Nationalism (民族 Minzu) meant Chinese people, including other ethnic minorities, should be free from foreign interference. Secondly, citizens in

China deserved democracy (民權 Miquan) to exert their influence in public policies of their own country. Lastly, “people’s livelihood” (民生 Minsheng) represented the idea of equalisation of land ownership based on a fair taxation system.455 The above

452《山西反省院概況》, 13 453 Ibid, 14 454 Ibid, 17 455 Encyclopæ dia Britannica Online, s. v. "Three Principles of the People," accessed on 29th June, 2015, http://academic.eb.com/EBchecked/topic/593881/Three-Principles-of-the-People. 138

doctrines indicated that the Three Principles of the People was not necessarily anti-communist. Dr. Sun Zhongshan even allied with the Chinese Communist Party to fight against warlords in the early 1920s. It was Jiang Jieshi who added his personal anti-communist sentiment into the Three Principles of the People in order to accomplish his plan to eliminate communist activities.

Not only did the syllabi and the reading materials of the lectures imply political meanings, but the themes of the extra-curricular activities were also problematic.

Apart from regular lectures, different reformatories also organised debates, symposiums and seminars.456 Most of the topics for these activities were politically oriented. For example, the debate topics in the Shanxi Reformatory in 1933 included

“Freedom of thought”, “Students should not interfere in politics” and “the urgent need for China to promulgate a constitution”. Preconceptions favouring the rule of the Nationalist Party were also disclosed in subjects of different symposiums.

Prisoners not only discussed the ways to unify China and to accomplish party rule, but they also needed to talk about the reasons for the inapplicability of class struggle in China.457 Thus, the Chinese authorities intentionally designed pro-Kuomintang curriculum for their students in reformatories. By remoulding the thoughts of prisoners, Chinese reformatories attempted to remove their anti-government sentiments towards the Kuomintang.

Subsequently, assessments followed afterwards. Apart from taking monthly tests and quizzes,458 prisoners were also required to submit homework regularly concerning political issues. Prior to exam periods, prisoners had to submit articles showing how they felt repentant about their previous involvements in communist

456 Xu Jingzong, 江蘇反省院 in《良友》, No.102 , 11-13 457 《山西反省院概況》, 15-16 458 Ibid, 14. And See Lin Lan, 一個寶貴的教訓"反省院"的生活素描 in 《社聯盟報》, No. 26-27, ref.: D2-0-2020-32, 33 139

activities. The Shanxi reformatory also asked their prisoners to write book reviews based on written works published by the Kuomintang authorities.459 According to the minute of the education committee in 1933, political offenders were required to write book reviews on “A brief history of Premier Sun” 總理傳略, “The Military ethics of soldiers” 軍人精神教育 and “The provisional constitution of the Republic of China” 中華民國臨時訓政約法.460 Yuan Yelie 袁也烈, who was once a political prisoner in a reformatory, still remembered “The Philosophy of Life” 唯生

論 written by a famous Kuomintang member Chen Lifu 陳立夫 was also inside the list of the assigned literature in the Soochow Reformatory.461 The prisoners were given one month only to finish writing their reviews. Instructors would mark and comment on their works at the end of each month.462

Moreover, individual interviews were also held to examine prisoners. Meeting prisoners in person, reformatory staff would observe the behaviours of their prisoners.

Proper “guidance” would be given to prisoners if their thoughts failed to match with the standard of the Nationalist government.463 Clandestinely, some prisoners even worked as collaborators of reformatories behind the scenes. These collaborators acquired the intelligence from other prisoners. Reformatory instructors were therefore well-informed about the mentalities and the political points of view of different prisoners. They could even know whether a prisoner was truly repented.464

By experiencing the above assessments, political prisoners were trained to

459 《山西反省院概況》, 17 460 Ibid, 19 461 Huhua 胡華 ed., Zhonggong Dangshi Renwuzhuan 《中共黨史人物傳》Biographies of the Chinese Communist, vol. 25, (Xi'an 西安: Shaanxi ren min chu ban she: Shaanxi sheng xin hua shu dian fa xing 陜西人民出版社 Shanxi people's publisher 1980-1992), 273 462 《山西反省院概況》, 19 463 Ibid, 15. Also see Lin Lan, 一個寶貴的教訓"反省院"的生活素描 in《社聯盟報》,No. 26-27, ref.: D2-0-2020-32, 33 464 Lin Lan, 一個寶貴的教訓"反省院"的生活素描《社聯盟報》, No. 26-27, ref.: D2-0-2020-32, 34 140

abandon their own idea and thoughts. They were forced by reformatories to recognise the legitimacy of the Kuomintang to rule over China. These communist prisoners were deprived of their rights to think, to analyse and to express. After the completion of their sentences in reformatories, there were no guarantees that they would be released. Communists would only be set free when reformatory instructors believed that they were truly repented. Indeed, only very few people could leave reformatories after they finished their sentence. A witness in the Soochow reformatory even described that being incarnated in the reformatory was actually a kind of “life imprisonment”.465 The power to discharge political offenders was solely rested on the reformatory instructors. Whether these communists truly repented or not, they all experienced different levels of mental tortures during their detentions in Chinese reformatories. It was indeed ironic that the Shanghai Municipal

Council and its police force, which adopted western humanitarian treatments in their prisons, allowed their communist prisoners to endure spiritual exploitations in

Chinese reformatories.

Although the municipal advocate Mr. Ryan was sympathetic to the communist prisoners incarcerated in the Soochow reformatory, he still urged the Shanghai

Municipal Council to implement the rendition agreement accordingly. He thought that the Chinese authorities would only have been satisfied if the council was willing to implement reformatory regulations in the settlement.

They are Chinese law, however, as such should be enforced in the Settlement. If the council should refuse to cooperate with the Court to the extent above outline, we feel that it would be impinging upon the Rendition Agreement. You will agree, we believe, the Council should do its utmost to uphold the agreement so that it can more easily persuade

465 Ibid, 33 141

the Chinese to carry out their part of its provisions.466

Eventually, most of the communist prisoners in Chinese reformatories were not released until a compromise was made between the Nationalist Party and the

Communist Party during the outbreak of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War in August 1937.

This was because both parties recognised the need to concentrate their resources to fight against the Japanese in China.467

To conclude, the British imperial presence in Shanghai during the 1930s suffered a significant setback. First of all, the judicial independence and neutrality of the

Settlement were infringed again because the municipal gaol became a part of the

Chinese penal system. Inside the Settlement, there was never a penal institution established for remoulding the thoughts of prisoners. Before the rise of the

Kuomintang in 1927, detention was used as the only means to punish communists agitating strikes and demonstrations in the Settlement. Therefore, interference from

Tangpu members damaged the judicial independence of the International Settlement.

Moreover, the tolerance of the municipal council on inhumane treatments of the

Soochow reformatory also violated western penal traditions. Inside the municipal gaol, adult prisoners and juvenile males were well-respected physically and mentally.

Even political offenders were permitted to read and learn with loose restrictions.

Nevertheless, political indoctrinations in Chinese reformatories contradicted to humanitarian ideas advocated by many westerners. The tolerance of the Shanghai

Municipal Council on this issue was a compromise in response to the rise of the

466 “Dispatch written from R.J. Ryan (Municipal Advocate) to J. R. Jones (Secretary General), 1st February, 1933”, in Shanghai Municipal Council, [Shanghai Municipal Council’s decision concerning the treatment of anti-revolutionary prisoners who would be released on expiry of their term of sentence under the jurisdiction of 2nd Branch Kiangsu High Court] in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 467 Huhua 胡華 ed., Zhonggong Dangshi Renwuzhuan 《中共黨史人物傳》Biographies of the Chinese Communist, vol. 13 (Xi'an 西安: Shaanxi ren min chu ban she : Shaanxi sheng xin hua shu dian fa xing, 陜西人民出版社 Shanxi people's publisher, 1980-1992), 329 142

Kuomintang in China.

Last but not least, the role of the British Foreign Office was also remarkable in this incident. Although there was no evidence showing direct British interventions in the issue on reformatory, the rendition agreement and the positive comment made by the

British military officer on the Jiujiang reformatory demonstrated the recognition of the British government on the Regulations Governing Reformatory.

This chapter showed how the British government readjusted its imperial policies in

China by integrating Settlement jails into a part of the Chinese prison system. As a result, Britain’s economic interests could survive at the expense of the judicial and penal independence of the Settlement in the 1930s.

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The main theme of this thesis is to reveal readjustments of British imperial policies in Shanghai between 1920s and the 1930s. In order to retain its economic influence in China, Britain had to pacify the Kuomintang through withdrawing its protections from British expatriates in Shanghai. The legal autonomy of the Settlement was largely infringed. Therefore, I argue that decolonisation took place in Shanghai during the inter-war period. It was because British settlers could no longer exercise their western legal values in Shanghai. Consequently, British legal supremacy in

China almost came to an end.

Indeed, there was no doubt that the Shanghai Municipal Police had become “a trustworthy ally” of the Nationalist government by 1927 not only by participating in arrests, but also by sacrificing their legal authority in the forms of prosecution, extradition, and penal power. Similar to what Georgina Sinclair observes in other colonial police forces during the post-war period, most of the frontline officers of the municipal police were very collaborative with the Chinese government to apprehend communists. This was because their main obligation was to retain the existence of foreign interests in the Settlement. As the intelligence department of the Shanghai

Municipal Police, the Special Branch coordinated arrests between their colleagues and the Chinese authorities, targeting communists hiding inside the Settlement.

During many arrests, both the Settlement and Chinese authorities violated the

Chinese criminal procedures as many of the arrest orders were executed based on suspicions and provisional requests from the Chinese intelligence departments.

Details stated in court warrants were largely ignored. Perhaps, some police officers in the settlement may believe that only by violating formal legal procedures could they

144

suppressed communist disturbances effectively. Yet, this did not mean that the municipal police obtained greater power in policing Shanghai. Instead, the

Kuomintang was the authority in deciding who should be arrested and what actions should be carried out according to its interpretation on different communists.

However, British settlers outside the police network felt frustrated to go against unreasonable demands raised by the Chinese. They were very helpless when they knew the British Foreign Office did not stand by them in the issues on extradition and reformatory. Attempting to uphold the legal procedures of the Settlement, British expatriates in Shanghai failed to secure diplomatic supports from the British authorities. In fact, the British diplomatic bodies had begun to revise the judicial regulations of the International Settlement with the Kuomintang since 1927.

Subsequently, British expatriates were deprived of many legal privileges in the

Settlement court. In 1929, knowing that the council tried to protect their Chinese bona fide residents on suspicion of joining communist activities, British officials pushed hard to persuade council to relinquish its protections offered to these Chinese in order not to offend the Kuomintang. The British Minister to China Sir Miles

Lampson even visited Shanghai and explained Britain’s policies to the Chairman of the council. The Shanghai Municipal Council therefore had to extradite any people to

China if there was sufficient evidence found. Later, Lampson and his colleagues decided not to interfere in the case of the Noulen couple even though it was within jurisdiction of the Settlement court. Moreover, the link established between the

Shanghai Municipal Gaol and the Soochow Reformatory also contradicted to the humanitarian values possessed by the council and British pressure groups. Political indoctrinations imposed on prisoners in the Soochow reformatory were utterly unacceptable in the eyes of many westerners. Interference of Kuomintang party

145

members in deciding who should be sent to the reformatory also damaged the judicial independence of the Settlement. However, the municipal council still had to follow the rules stated in the Chinese prison regulation due to the fact that the settlement abided by the rendition agreement signed between Britain and China in

1930. British expatriates in the council had been abandoned by their sovereign state by the late 1920s. Thence, readjustments of British imperial policies in China could explain why the Council faithfully implemented the unreasonable instructions given by the Kuomintang in communist cases in spite of their reluctances.

I also argue that the periodisation of the British decolonisation could be dated back to the 1920s. China’s infringement on the judicial independence of the Shanghai

International Settlement was an important and vigorous case study to compensate the limitations of Bickers’ argument. It is because this case showed the intrusion of

Chinese influence was not only in commercial and evangelical sectors, but also in judicial system of the Settlement. Even in a political level, the Kuomintang’s influence was not just restricted to those Chinese members appointed in the Shanghai

Municipal Council. The Chinese government also affected the treatments of their political enemies seeking refuge in the Settlement. The Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to extradite its convicts to the Kuomintang and to transfer its prisoners to

Chinese reformatories. The tolerance of the Council and its police force on the infringement of the judicial independence in the Settlement was actually far beyond the aim of the municipal police for maintaining internal security in the Settlement.

Most importantly, they accepted such fate accompli mainly because they had to satisfy the political incentives of the Kuomintang government. Thence, the

International Settlement inevitably became a part of policing networks of the

Nationalist government in China during the Nanjing decade. Political offenders

146

incarcerated in the municipal gaol were either encouraged or forced to continue their sentences in the Soochow Reformatory. They experienced several years of sufferings by intensive political indoctrinations. Worse still, people regarded by the

Kuomintang as important communist convicts would be immediately extradited from the municipal police to the Chinese authorities. Many of them were eventually executed by different organisations affiliated with the Kuomintang. Also, it was sometimes extremely difficult to prove whether people were engaged in “communist activities” because membership was always personal, private and subjective. Having no ideas in whether suspects threatened “the internal safety of the Republic of China”, the Shanghai Municipal Police could only follow the comments and evidence provided by the Chinese authorities in many cases. Assisted by the Shanghai

Municipal Police, the Kuomintang was able to effectively suppress the spread of communism not only in Chinese territory, but also in the International Settlement.

It was not until in 1937 that the cooperation between the Settlement and Chinese authorities terminated when Jiang Jieshi was forced to ally with the Chinese

Communist Party as a result of the Xian incident 西安事變 and the Japanese invasion in China. The Kuomintang began to release communists imprisoned in

Chinese reformatories by mid-1937. Later, Chinese territory in Shanghai was even occupied by Japanese troops after Kuomintang’s defeat in the Battle of Shanghai in

November 1937. The collaboration between the Settlement and the Chinese authorities to arrest communists in Shanghai eventually came to a halt. Besieged by

Japanese forces for four years, two foreign concessions in Shanghai were also annexed by Japan in December 1941 when the Pacific finally broke out.

The elimination of communist activities in Shanghai would pave the way for consolidating the Kuomintang’s power. In my opinion, the loss of the judicial

147

autonomy in the Settlement was as important as the transfer of political sovereignty from Britain to its colonial subjects during the post-war era. Therefore, it is hoped that my research can contribute to the academia by suggesting that the beginning of the British decolonisation in Asia is dated back to the 1920s in Shanghai.

148

APPENDIX 1

MAP OF THE SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT IN THE 1935468

468 http://maps.bpl.org/id/m8780, accessed on 31st July, 2015 149

APPENDIX 2

CORE MEMBERS OF THE SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL IN THE EARLY 1940s469

469 Robert Bickers, Britain in China, 160 150

APPENDIX 3

SCENE NEAR LOUZA POLICE STATION 老閘巡捕房 IN NANKING ROAD AFTER THE MAY THIRTIETH MOVEMENT IN 1925470

470https://sikhsinshanghai.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/adelaide-chronicle-1925.jpg?w=656&h=436 , accessed on 31st August, 2015 151

APPENDIX 4

RESERVE UNIT (RIOT SQUAD) OF THE SMP AND THEIR “RED MARIAS”471

471https://scontent.xx.fbcdn.net/hphotos-xpf1/v/t1.0-9/1896732_788265961217416_56534409297666 77593_n.jpg?oh=780643d3f5195ed23f6d1f0be54ef540&oe=564E20D7, accessed on 31st July, 2015 152

APPENDIX 5

TRIAL IN THE SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL MIXED COURT IN THE LATE 19th CENTURY OR EARLY 20th CENTURY472

472 Note a consular deputy sits next to the Chinese judge in the court proceeding. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/28/International_Mixed_Court_at_Shangh ai7.jpg/800px-International_Mixed_Court_at_Shanghai7.jpg , accessed on 31st August, 2015 153

APPENDIX 6

PORTRAIT OF CHIEF DETECTIVE INSPECTOR PAT GIVENS473

473 http://robertbickers.net/2015/02/17/what-shall-we-call-chiang-kai-shek, accessed on 31st July, 2015 154

APPENDIX 7

A WARRANT SAMPLE OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST SPECIAL AREA IN SHANGHAI474

474 Warrant No. 1300 issued by Judge Feng at the request of the Shanghai Public Safety Bureau 6th February, 1934 in “Return For Cancellation Of Warrants Nos. 1300 And 1301”, ref. D5675, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 155

APPENDIX 8

FIGURES SHOWING EXTRADITION OF COMMUNISTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT TO CHINESE TERRITORY BETWEEN13/4/27 AND 23-6-27 475

Date Arrests Charge How Dealt With 13-4-27 1 Intimidation 40 days imprisonment 14-4-27 1 Inciting to strike & 5 months imprisonment threatening to murder 11-4-27 1 Selling communist Cautioned 12-4-27 newspaper 28-4-27 1 Distributing Handed over to Chinese inflammatory handbills Authorities 29-4-27 11 Suspected Communists Do 30-4-27 6 Do Do 8-5-27 3 Do Do 10-5-27 2 Do Do 13-5-27 3 Do Do 25-5-27 1 Do Do 25-5-27 1 Intimidation 6 months impri. 13-6-27 6 Suspected communists Handed over to Chinese Authorities 23-6-27 5 Do Do 24-6-27 6 Do Do 8-7-27 4 Do To be released on Ching Hwa Shing Shoe makers Shop signing bond 14-7-27 19-7-27 1 Do Handed over to Chinese Authorities 20-7-27 23-7-27 2 Do Do 27-7-27 4 Do Do 28-7-27 2 Do Do 4-8-27 1 Do Do

475 “Letter written by E.I.M. Barret to the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 29th February, 1928” in communist activities in Settlement in Shanghai Municipal Council, 上海公共租界工部局總辦處關於共產黨活動：牛蘭案, 1928-1932 Communist activities: The case of Noulen, ref.: U1-3-3434, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive). 156

10-8-27 10 Do 9 dismissed owing to lack of evidence. 1 to be detained for 6 months at the deer of Hope. 10-8-27 1 Do Accused to be released of personal bond for good behaviour 21-8-27 1 Distributing 10 months impri. communistic handbills 23-6-27 5 Posting communistic 18 months each, posters 22-10-27

157

APPENDIX 9

FIGURES SHOWING EXTRADITION OF COMMUNISTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT TO CHINESE TERRITORY BETWEEN 23/8/27 AND 21-2-28476

Date Arrests Charge How Dealt With 23-8-27 1 Possession of 10 months’ Communistic literature imprisonment, 22-12-27 5-9-27 3 Printing of 9 months’ Communistic literature imprisonment, 25-11-27 13-10-27 1 Possession of Handed over to Chinese Communistic literature Authorities 8-11-27 2 Posting of Communist 4 years and 6 months Posters each 22-11-27 2 Possession of 1st one year & 4 months, Communistic literature 2nd dismissed 24-11-27 3 Intimidation 14 months each 23-11-27 1 Possession of 6 months, 6-12-27 Communistic literature 27-11-27 2 Intimidation 14 months each 6-12-27 4 Do 2 fined $30 or 30 days impt., 2 fined $20 or 20 days impt. 19-12-27 2 Do 3 months each or $100 22-12-27 1 Intimation & inciting to 7.5 years, 17-1-28 murder 23-12-27 1 Intimidation & 5.5 years. 17-1-28 distributing pamphlets 6-1-28 2 Intimidation Withdrawn 6-1-28 1 Distributing Handbills Fined $10 or 10 days impt. 7-1-27 1 Intimidation Fined $20 or 20 days impt. 12-1-28 2 Do Cautioned and released 11-1-28 2 Do Fined $20 each

476 Ibid 158

13-1-28 2 Do 4 months each 20-2-28 1 Do Dismissed 17-2-28 12 Suspected Communists Handed over to Garrison Commander for trail 20-2-28 2 Do Do 21-2-28 3 Do Do

159

APPENDIX 10

NEWSPAPER CUTTING SHOWING OPPOSITION OF CONSULAR DEPUTY IN A CASE INVOLVED A RESIDENT OF THE SETTLEMENT IN THE LATE 1920s477

477 The North-China herald and market report, 13th August, 1927, 276 160

APPENDIX 11

PORTRAIT OF HILAIRE NOULENS (ALSO KNOWN AS JAKOB RUDNIK) AND HIS WIFE IN CHINESE JAIL IN 1937478

478 https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2a/Jakob_Rudnik_and_his_wife.jpg , , accessed on 31st August, 2015 161

APPENDIX 12

CONDITIONS INSIDE THE SOOCHOW REFORMATORY479

479 Xu Jingzong 徐景宗, Jiangsu Fanxingyuan 江蘇反省院 (Soochow Reformatory) in Liangyou 《良友》 The companion pictorial, No.102 (Shanghai: Liangyou Tushu Gongsi 良友圖書公司 Companion publisher company limited , 1935), 11 162

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Books: Anderson, David and Killingray, David, Policing and decolonisation: politics, nationalism and the Police, 1917-65 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992) Anderson, David and Killingray, David, Policing the empire: government, authority, and control, 1830-1940 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991) Bailkin, Jordanna, The afterlife of empire (Berkeley: Global, Area, and International Archive, University of California Press, 2012). Best, Antony, British intelligence and the Japanese challenge in Asia, 1914-1941 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). Bickers, Robert, Britain in China: community, culture and colonialism 1900-1949 (Manchester: New York: Manchester University Press, 1999). Bickers, Robert, Empire made me: an Englishman adrift in Shanghai (London: Penguin, 2004). Boyce, George, Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775-1997 (Basingstoke: Macmillan ; New York : St. Martin's Press, 1999). Brocklehurst, Helen and Philips, Robert ed., History Nationhood and the Question of Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). Buchanan, Tom, East wind: China and the British left, 1925-1976 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Burton, Antoinette, Empire in question: reading, writing, and teaching British 166

imperialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011). Cain, P.J. and Hopkins, A.G., British imperialism, 1688-2000 (New York: Longman, 2002) Callaghan, John and Harker, Ben, British communism: a documentary history (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 2011). Clayton, David, Imperialism revisited: political and economic relations between Britain and China, 1950-54 (Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York : St. Martin's Press, 1997). Clifford, Nicholas, Spoilt children of empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese revolution of the 1920s (Middlebury, T.: University Press of New England, 1991). Coble, Parks, The Shanghai capitalists and the Nationalist government, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986). Darwin, John, Britain and decolonisation: the retreat from empire in the post-war world (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1988). Darwin, John, The empire project: the rise and fall of the British world-system, 1830-1970 (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009). Dikötter, Frank, Crime, punishment and the prison in modern China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2002). Forman, Ross, China and the Victorian imagination: empires entwined (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Fung, Edmund S.K., The diplomacy of imperial retreat: Britain's South China policy, 1924-1931 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991). Henriot, Christian, Castelino, Noel trans., Shanghai, 1927-1937: municipal power, locality, and modernization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Hillemann, Ulrike, Asian empire and British knowledge: China and the networks of British imperial expansion (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Hsu, Madeline, Dreaming of Gold, dreaming of home: Transnationalism and Migration between United States and South China, 1882-1943, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). Hsü, Immanuel C.Y., The rise of modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Huhua 胡華 ed., Zhonggong Dangshi Renwuzhuan 《中共黨史人物傳》 Biographies of the Chinese Communist, vol. 13, (Xi'an 西安: Shaanxi ren min chu ban she : Shaanxi sheng xin hua shu dian fa xing, 陜西人民出版社 Shanxi people's publisher 1980-1992). Hyam, Ronald, Britain's declining empire: the road to decolonisation, 1918-1968, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Jeffries, Charles, The colonial police (London: M. Parrish, 1952). Ladds, Catherine, Empire careers: working for the Chinese customs service, 1854-1949 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013). Levine, Philippa, Prostitution, race, and politics: policing venereal disease in the British Empire (New York; London: Routledge, 2003). Linehan, Thomas, Communism in Britain, 1920-39: from the cradle to the grave (Manchester; New York : Manchester University Press, 2007). Louis, Wm. Roger ed., The Oxford history of the British Empire, volume IV (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998-1999). Lowe, Peter, Britain in the Far East: a survey from 1819 to the present (London: Longman, 1981). 167

Magee, Gary and Thompson, Andrew, Empire and globalization: networks of people, goods and capital in the British world, c.1850-1914 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Mai, Linhua 麥林華 ed., Shanghai jianyu zhi 《上海監獄志》 History of Shanghai prison (Shanghai: Shanghai she hui ke xue yuan chu ban she 上海社會科學院, 2003). Martin, Brian, The Shanghai Green Gang: politics and organized crime, 1919-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). Mommsen, Wolfgang and Osterhammel, Jurgen, Imperialism and after: continuities and discontinuities (London: German Historical Institute, 1986). Mühlhahn, Klaus, Criminal justice in China: a history (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). Porter, Bernard, The absent-minded imperialists: empire, society, and culture in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Reynolds, P, British Foreign Policy in the Inter-War Years (London: Longmans, Green and Co.). Self, Robert, The Austen Chamberlain diary letters: the correspondence of Sir Austen Chamberlain with his sisters Hilda and Ida, 1916-1937 (London; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Shi, Meiding 史梅定 ed., Shanghai Zujiezhi《上海租界志》The history of the Shanghai International Settlement (Shanghai：Shanghai Academy of Social Science, 2001). Sinclair, Georgina, At the end of the line: colonial policing and the imperial endgame, 1945-80 (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2006). Smith, S., A road is made: Communism in Shanghai, 1920-1927 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000). Springhall, John, Decolonization since 1945: the collapse of European overseas empires (Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York : Palgrave, 2001). Stephens, Thomas, Order and discipline in China: the Shanghai Mixed Court, 1911-27 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992). Stranahan, Patricia, Underground: the Shanghai Communist Party and the politics of survival, 1927-1937 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998). Sun, Huimin 孫慧敏， Zhidu Yizhi: Minchu Shanghai Zhongguo de Lusi (1927-1937)《制度移植：民初上海的中國律師 (1912-1937)》Institutional transplantation: Chinese lawyers in the Republican China (Taipei: Institute of modern history, Academia Sinica 中央硏究院近代史硏究所, 2012). Thompson, Andrew, Imperial Britain: the empire in British politics, c. 1880-1932 (Harlow, England ; New York : Longman, 2000). Thompson, Leroy, The world's first SWAT team: W.E. Fairbairn and the Shanghai Municipal Police Reserve Unit (Barnsley: Frontline, 2012). Thorpe, Andrew, The Failure of political extremism in inter-war Britain (Exeter: Dept. of History and Archaeology, University of Exeter, 1989). Wakeman, Frederic, Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). Yao, Yuan 姚遠，Shanghai Gonggongzujie Tequfayuan Yanjiu《上海公共租界特區法院研究》A study of the Shanghai Special District Court (Shanghai: Shanghai People's press 上海人民出版社, 2011). Zhang, Bin 張彬，Shanghai Yingzujie Xunbufang Zhidu jiqi Yunzuo Yanjiu, 168

1854-1863 《上海英租界巡捕房制度及其運作研究 (1854-1863)》 A study of the police system in the British settlement in Shanghai (Shanghai：[People's press] 上海人民出版社, 2013). Zheng, Huixin 鄭會欣，Gaige Yu Kunyou: Sanshi Niandai Guominzhengfu de Changshi 《改革與困擾: 三十年代國民政府的嘗試》 Reform and disturbance: the attempt of the Nationalist Government in the 1930s (Hong Kong 香港: Hong Kong Educational Publishing Company 香港敎育圖書公司，1998).

Journal articles: Bickers, Robert, “Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community in Shanghai 1843-1937” in Past and Present, no. 159, (May, 1998). Hopkins, A., "Rethinking Decolonization" in Past and Present, August 2008 (Vol. 200, No. 1). Jiangsu Fanxingyuan Banyuekan 《江蘇反省院半月刊》 (Soochow Reformatory semimonthly)，Vol. 2, No.6 (Jiangsu：Soochow Reformatory editorial board, Jiangsu Fanxingyuan Bianjiweiyuanhui 江蘇反省院編輯委員會, 1935). Lu, fangshang 呂芳上，Beifa Shiqi Yingguo Zengbing Shanghai Yu Duihua Waijiao de Yanbian 〈北伐時期英國增兵上海與對華外交的演變〉 (England's Reinforcement of Shanghai during the Northern Expedition and the evolution of its China Policy)，Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jikan《中央研究院近代史研究所集刊》Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica，volume 27（June, 1997）. MacPherson, Kerrie, "Designing China's urban future: The Greater Shanghai Plan, 1927–1937", Planning Perspectives, volume 5, issue 1, 1990. Poon, Shuk-Wah, “Dogs and British Colonialism: The Contested Ban on Eating Dogs in Colonial Hong Kong” in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 42, Iss. 2, (London : F. Cass 2014). Provisional agreement for the rendition of the Shanghai Mixed Court, 31st August, 1926, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 3, (Jul., 1927). Wang, Sicheng 王思誠，Zhou fei Enlai Dalousha Zhenbanji〈周匪恩來大謀殺偵辦記〉The record for investigating the murder ordered by Zhou Enlai，Jinri Dalu 《今日大陸》Mainland China today，20th July, 1954 (Taipei: unpublished materials stored in Bureau of Investigation, Ministry of Justice, Republic of China). Xinwenxue Shiliao (New literary and historical materials) 《新文學史料》, vol.1 (Beijing: Renmin Wenxue Chubanshe 人民文學出版社, 1982). Xu Jingzong 徐景宗, Jiangsu Fanxingyuan 江蘇反省院 (Soochow Reformatory) in Liangyou 《良友》 The companion pictorial, No.102 (Shanghai: Liangyou Tushu Gongsi 良友圖書公司 Companion publisher company limited, 1935).

Dissertations: Lee, Tahirih V., Law and local autonomy at the International Mixed Court of Shanghai, (Ph.D. Thesis: Yale University, 1990). Wang, Fuqun 王福羣, Zhonggong Zaiqi Tequ Gongzuo Zhi Yanjiu《中共早期特務工作之硏究, 1928-1934》A study of communist intelligence activities in China, 1932-1934 (Taipei: unpublished master thesis, National Chengchi University 國 169

立政治大學, 1978).

Newspapers: China Weekly Review. Shen Pao《申報》. The North-China herald and market report.

Website: "Who were the famous persons in Victoria Prison?" in http://www.hkmemory.org/central-police/text/prison-q5-eng.php, accessed on 28th April, 2015 Encyclopæ dia Britannica Online, s. v. "Three Principles of the People," accessed 29thJune,2015,http://academic.eb.com/EBchecked/topic/593881/Three-Principles -of-the-People, accessed on 28th April, 2015

170