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2017 Surveillance Law Comparison Guide 2017

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2017 Surveillance Law Comparison Guide 2017 2017 Surveillance Law Comparison Guide 2017 Baker McKenzie’s Global Surveillance Survey 2017 ©2017 Baker & McKenzie All rights reserved. This publication is copyrighted. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study or research permitted under applicable copyright legislation, no part may be reproduced or transmitted by any process or means without the prior permission of the editors. The material in this guide is of the nature of general comment only. It is not offered as legal advice on any specific issue or matter and should not be taken as such. Readers should refrain from acting on the basis of any discussion contained in this publication without obtaining specific legal advice on the particular facts and circumstances at issue. While the authors have made every effort to provide accurate and up to date information on laws and regulations, these matters are continuously subject to change. Furthermore, the application of these laws depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each situation, and therefore readers should consult their attorney before taking any action. Baker & McKenzie International is a Swiss Verein with member law firms around the world. In accordance with the common terminology used in professional service organizations, reference to a “partner” means a person who is a partner, or equivalent, in such a law firm. Similarly, reference to an “office” means an office of any such law firm. This may qualify as “Attorney Advertising” requiring notice in some jurisdictions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Baker McKenzie’s Global Surveillance Survey Baker McKenzie’s 2017 Global Surveillance Survey One year ago, in April 2016, Baker McKenzie published its first global surveillance survey - with overview heat maps and detailed questions and answers for 39 jurisdictions worldwide. A year later, the basic picture has not dramatically changed: Most countries are conducting surveillance and espionage to protect their national security - while at the same time opposing surveillance and espionage by other countries. But, some details have changed since details regarding the U.S. NSA program were leaked in 2013: Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and a few other European jurisdictions have updated their surveillance, data residency and retention laws in the interest of increased national security - while the United States have enacted additional privacy protections and gradually scaled back their surveillance programs. Recall that in 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) raised the question of whether the level of data protection in the US is adequate and equivalent to the European Economic Area (EEA). The CJEU did not answer this question in its judgment of 6 October 2015, but noted concerns regarding reports of indiscriminate mass surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA) 1 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States. Since then, the EU Commission and the U.S. Department of Commerce agreed on a new “EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Program,” which is accompanied by assurances by a number of U.S. government authorities regarding privacy protections relating to surveillance programs.2 At the same time, other institutions in the EU and scholars started to analyze the state of surveillance laws in individual jurisdictions within the EEA and elsewhere. They uniformly found comparisons difficult, as actual practices of intelligence authorities are cloaked in secrecy 1 CJEU C-362/14 Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner), 6.10.2015, #31. 2 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacy- decision_en.pdf Baker McKenzie | i and laws are complex and fragmented in this area. 3 Due to constitutional limitations on the EU’s jurisdiction to legislate matters of national security, the legal situation in the EEA member states is not very uniform. For example, in some EEA member states, senior police or military officers can issue search warrants.4 EU institutions have called for improvements in the U.S. as well as in the EEA. 5 Companies around the world are confronted with questions on how to comply with different jurisdictions’ laws and data access requests. Users and providers of cloud services, Software-as-a-Service and other services have to factor in government surveillance and data access practices of different countries into their business and location plans. With our surveillance law survey and heat map, we intend to contribute a global overview with broad jurisdictional scope to the discussion and corporate planning processes. See our heat maps here: 3 Cate/Dempsey/Rubinstein, Systematic government access to private-sector data, 2 International Data Privacy Law, 215 (2012); Schwartz, Systematic government access to private-sector data in Germany, 2 International Data Privacy Law, 289 (2012); Brown, Government access to private-sector data in the United Kingdom, 2 International Data Privacy Law, 230 (2012). Freiwald/ Métille, Reforming Surveillance Law: the Swiss Model, 28 Berkeley Tech. L. J., 1261 (2013). 4 See Study of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU: Mapping Member States’ legal frameworks (2015), http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/surveillance-intelligence-services”: A comparison between US and EU data protection legislation for law enforcement purposes, www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536459/IPOL_STU(2015)536459 _EN.pdf. 5 See studies cited in footnote 38 ii | Baker McKenzie Baker McKenzie’s Global Surveillance Survey Of course, the situation regarding individual data access requests and responses is more nuanced than a comparative overview survey can address. Therefore, companies cannot rely on our overview as legal advice regarding a particular situation and have to continue to assess their own individual situation based on the pertinent facts and circumstances. Please contact us with any questions or suggestions. Baker McKenzie | iii Baker McKenzie’s Global Data Security Leadership Team Brian Hengesbaugh (Chicago) +1 312 861 3077 [email protected] Lothar Determann (Palo Alto) +1 650 856 5533 [email protected] Patrick Fair (Sydney) +61 2 8922 5534 [email protected] Paul Forbes (Sydney) +61 2 8922 5346 [email protected] Francesca Gaudino (Milan) +39 02 76231 452 [email protected] Theo Ling (Toronto) +1 416 865 6954 [email protected] Carolina Pardo (Bogota) +571 634 1559 [email protected] Michael Stoker (Chicago) +1 312 861 2870 [email protected] iv | Baker McKenzie Baker McKenzie’s Global Surveillance Survey Contributing Lawyers Argentina Tel.: +43 1 2 42 50 278 marisa.schlacher Guillermo Cervio @bakermckenzie.com Buenos Aires Tel: +54 11 4310 2223 Brazil guillermo.cervio @bakermckenzie.com Flavia Rebello Sao Paulo Roberto Grané Tel: +55 11 3048 6851 Buenos Aires [email protected] Tel: +54 11 4310 2214 roberto.grane Gabriela Paiva-Morette @bakermckenzie.com Sao Paulo Tel: +55 11 3048 6785 Australia gabriela.paiva-morette @trenchrossi.com Patrick Fair Sydney Canada Tel: +61 2 8922 5534 [email protected] Theodore Ling Toronto Adrian Lawrence Tel: +416 865 6954 Sydney theodore.ling Tel: +61 2 8922 5204 @bakermckenzie.com adrian.lawrence @bakermckenzie.com Jonathan Tam Toronto Ju Young Lee Tel: +416 865 2324 Sydney jonathan.tam Tel: +61 2 8922 5260 @bakermckenzie.com [email protected] Chile Austria Diego Ferrada Lukas Feiler Santiago Vienna Tel: +56 22 367 7087 Tel: +43 1 24250 450 diego.ferrada [email protected] @bakermckenzie.com Marisa Schlacher Antonio Ortuzar, Jr. Vienna Santiago Baker McKenzie | v Tel: +56 22 367 7078 Milena Hoffmanova antonio.ortuzar.jr Prague @bakermckenzie.com Tel: +420 236 045 001 milena.hoffmanova China (PRC) @bakermckenzie.com Howard Wu Denmark Shanghai Tel: +86 21 6105 8538 Tina Brøgger Sørensen [email protected] Copenhagen Tel: +45 38 77 44 08 Chris Jiang [email protected] Shanghai Tel: +86 21 6105 5910 Daiga Grunte-Sonne [email protected] Copenhagen Tel: +45 38 77 41 18 Colombia [email protected] Carolina Pardo Finland Bogota Tel: +57 1 634 1559 Samuli Simojoki carolina.pardo Helsinki @bakermckenzie.com Tel: +358 20 713 3500 mobile +358 40 571 3303 Sandra Castillo [email protected] Bogota Tel: +57 1 634 1530 Susanna Niittymaa sandra.castillo Helsinki @bakermckenzie.com Tel: + 358 20 713 3298 [email protected] Daniela Cala Bogota France Tel: +57 1 634 1500 daniela.cala Denise Lebeau-Marianna @bakermckenzie.com Paris Tel: +33 1 44 17 53 33 Czech Republic denise.lebeau-marianna @bakermckenzie.com Jiri Cermak Prague Magalie Dansac Le Clerc Tel: +420 236 045 001 Paris [email protected] Tel: +33 1 44 17 59 82 magalie.dansacleclerc @bakermckenzie.com vi | Baker McKenzie Baker McKenzie’s Global Surveillance Survey Hugo Roy Hungary Paris Tel: +33144176560 Ines K. Radmilovic [email protected] Budapest Tel: +36 1 302 3330 Germany ines.radmilovic @bakermckenzie.com Joachim Scherer Frankfurt Adam Liber Tel: +49 69 2 99 08 189 Budapest joachim.scherer Tel: +36 1 302 3330 @bakermckenzie.com [email protected] Caroline Heinickel Janos Puskas Frankfurt Budapest Tel: +49 69 2 99 08 416 Tel: +36 1 302 3330 caroline.heinickel janos.puskas @bakermckenzie.com @bakermckenzie.com Andreas Neumann India Frankfurt Tel: +49 69
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