DOCSLIB.ORG

Surveillance by Intelligence Services: Services: Intelligence by Surveillance

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

FREEDOMS FRA Surveillance by intelligence services – Volume II: field perspectives and legal update II: field perspectives – Volume services intelligence by Surveillance Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU Volume II: field perspectives and legal update This report addresses matters related to the respect for private and family life (Article 7), the protection of personal data (Article 8) and the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial (Article 47) falling under Titles II ‘Freedoms’ and VI ‘Justice’ of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you). Photo (cover & inside): © Shutterstock More information on the European Union is available on the internet (http://europa.eu). Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2017 FRA – print: ISBN 978-92-9491-766-9 doi:10.2811/15232 TK-04-17-696-EN-C FRA – web: ISBN 978-92-9491-765-2 doi:10.2811/792946 TK-04-17-696-EN-N © European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights copyright, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders. Printed by Imprimerie Centrale in Luxembourg Neither the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights nor any person acting on behalf of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights is responsible for the use that might be made of the following information. Printed on process chlorine-free recycled paper (PCF) Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU Volume II: field perspectives and legal update Foreword Intelligence services perform vital work, and the growing threats of terrorism, cyber-attacks and sophisticated criminal networks have rendered more urgent their efforts to protect our security. Technological advancements have also made their work more complex, and the transnational nature of today’s threats has made it ever more challenging. But intelligence work to counter these threats, particularly large-scale surveillance, can also interfere with fundamental rights, especially privacy and data protection. As this report underscores, effective oversight and remedies can help minimise the risk of such interference. The report is the second publication addressing a European Parliament request for in-depth research on the impact of surveillance on fundamental rights. It updates FRA’s 2015 legal analysis on the topic and supplements that analysis with field-based insights gained from extensive interviews with diverse experts in intelligence and related fields, including its oversight. With technological advances constantly introducing both new threats and new ways to fight those threats, legislators have been kept busy. Many of the legislative changes enacted since 2015 have increased transparency. But legal frameworks remain diverse and, according to some interviewees, too complex and imprecise. Moreover, while safeguards have in some cases been strengthened, room for improvement remains – particularly in the context of international intelligence cooperation. Similarly, remedies are available where individuals’ rights have been infringed, but remain inherently limited. Clarifying the applicable legal requirements, introducing solid safeguards and giving teeth to remedies would all help ensure that intelligence work is conducted in a rights-compliant manner. This, in turn, would reinforce the credibility of the information obtained by intelligence services – bolstering trust amongst the public, encouraging effective cooperation, and – ultimately – strengthening national security. We are extremely grateful to the key partners and individual experts who took the time to participate in our interviews, providing invaluable real-life perspectives on the continuing effort to protect fundamental rights and national security. Michael O’Flaherty Director 3 Country codes Country code Country AT Austria BE Belgium BG Bulgaria CY Cyprus CZ Czech Republic DE Germany DK Denmark EE Estonia EL Greece ES Spain FI Finland FR France HR Croatia HU Hungary IE Ireland IT Italy LT Lithuania LU Luxembourg LV Latvia MT Malta NL Netherlands PL Poland PT Portugal RO Romania SE Sweden SK Slovakia SI Slovenia UK United Kingdom 4 Acronyms and abbreviations Acronym/ Name English translation abbreviation General Intelligence and Security Service AIVD Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (the Netherlands) BND Bundesnachrichtendienst Federal Intelligence Service (Germany) BNDG Bundesnachrichtendienst Gesetz Law on the Federal Intelligence Service (Germany) CIVD German Federal Intelligence Service CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union Commission nationale de contrôle des services de National Commission of Control of the CNCTR renseignement Intelligence Techniques (France) Commission nationale de l’informatique et des CNIL French Data Protection Authority libertés Parliamentary Committee for the Intelligence Comitato parlamentare per la sicurezza della COPASIR and Security Services and for State Secret Repubblica Control (Italy) De Commissie van Toezicht op de Inlichtingen- en Oversight Committee for the Intelligence and CTIVD Veiligheidsdiensten Security Services (the Netherlands) DGSE Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure General Directorate for External Security (France) DPA Data Protection Authority ECHR European Convention on Human Rights ECtHR European Court of Human Rights FDN French Data Network GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters GDPR General Data Protection Regulation General Intelligence and Security Service GISS (Belgium) Interception of Communications Commissioners IOCCO Office IPA Investigatory Powers Act IPC Investigatory Powers Commissioner IPT Investigatory Powers Tribunal ISC Internet Systems Consortium NCND Neither confirm nor deny OCAM Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis PKGr Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremium Parliamentary Control Panel (Germany) PKGrG Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremium Gesetz Parliamentary Control Panel Act (Germany) PNR Passenger Name Records Priority preliminary ruling on the issue of QPC Question prioritaire de constitutionnalité constitutionality (France) RIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 SIGINT Signals Intelligence SIN Commission on Security and Integrity Protection SIS Secret Intelligence Service Statens Inspektion för The State Inspection for Defence Intelligence SIUN försvarsunderrättelseverksamheten Operations (Sweden) SSEUR Signals Intelligence Seniors Europe TET Tilsynet med Efterretningstjenesterne Danish Intelligence Oversight Board 5 Contents FOREWORD ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 9 FRA OPINIONS ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11 INTRODUCTION ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 17 PART I: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLIGENCE ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 25 1 Intelligence services in the EU-28: a diverse landscape ..................................................................................... 27 2 Surveillance measures in the digital age .............................................................................................................. 29 3 Interference with the right to respect for private life ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33 4 Surveillance “in accordance with the law” ............................................................................................................ 37 5 Legality in case of international intelligence cooperation ................................................................................. 49 6 Surveillance for a legitimate aim: need for ‘national security’ definition(s) ................................................... 53 PART II: ACCOUNTABILITY ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 55 7 An imperative: control from within ....................................................................................................................... 59 8 Oversight framework of intelligence services ...................................................................................................... 63 9 Features of oversight bodies ................................................................................................................................... 73 10 Stages of intelligence service oversight ............................................................................................................... 93 11 Oversight of international intelligence
Recommended publications
  • T H E N E T D E L U S Io N E V G E N Y M O R O Zo V

    T H E N E T D E L U S Io N E V G E N Y M O R O Zo V

    2/C PMS (BLACK + 809) SOFT-TOUCH MATTE LAMINATION + SPOT GLOSS THE NET DELUSION EVGENY MOROZOV POLITICS/TECHNOLOGY $27.95/$35.50 CAN “ Evgeny Morozov is wonderfully knowledgeable about the Internet—he seems “THE REVOLUTION WILL BE TWITTERED!” to have studied every use of it, or every political use, in every country in the declared journalist Andrew Sullivan after world (and to have read all the posts). And he is wonderfully sophisticated and protests erupted in Iran in June 2009. Yet for tough-minded about politics. This is a rare combination, and it makes for a all the talk about the democratizing power powerful argument against the latest versions of technological romanticism. of the Internet, regimes in Iran and China His book should be required reading for every political activist who hopes to are as stable and repressive as ever. In fact, ALEXANDER KRSTEVSKI ALEXANDER change the world on the Internet.” —MICHAEL WALZER, Institute for authoritarian governments are effectively Advanced Study, Princeton using the Internet to suppress free speech, EVGENY MOROZOV hone their surveillance techniques, dissem- is a contributing editor to Foreign Policy “ Evgeny Morozov has produced a rich survey of recent history that reminds us inate cutting-edge propaganda, and pacify and Boston Review and a Schwartz Fellow that everybody wants connectivity but also varying degrees of control over their populations with digital entertain- at the New American Foundation. Morozov content, and that connectivity on its own is a very poor predictor of political ment. Could the recent Western obsession is currently also a visiting scholar at Stan- pluralism...
  • Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

    Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

    Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Cm 8715 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty October 2013 Cm 8715 £21.25 © Crown copyright 2013 You may re-use this information (excluding logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit http://www. nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ or e-mail: [email protected]. Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us [email protected] You can download this publication from our website at https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications ISBN: 9780101871525 Printed in the UK by The Stationery Office Limited on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ID 2593608 10/13 33233 19585 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum. Contents Home Secretary Foreword 5 Executive Summary 7 Introduction 13 Our Strategic Response 25 PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and 27 organised crime PREVENT: Preventing people from engaging 45 in serious and organised crime PROTECT: Increasing protection against 53 serious and organised crime PREPARE: Reducing the impact of serious and 65 organised crime Annex A: Accountability, governance and funding 71 Annex B: Departmental roles and responsibilities for 73 tackling serious and organised crime 4 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Home Secretary Foreword 5 Home Secretary Foreword The Relentless Disruption of Organised Criminals Serious and organised crime is a threat to our national security and costs the UK more than £24 billion a year.
  • Can Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence Be Considered More Open Government Than Accountability?

    Can Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence Be Considered More Open Government Than Accountability?

    CAN PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE BE CONSIDERED MORE OPEN GOVERNMENT THAN ACCOUNTABILITY? Stephen Barber ABSTRACT The nature of openness in government continues to be explored by academics and pub- lic managers alike while accountability is a fact of life for all public services. One of the last bastions of ‘closed government’ relates to the ‘secret’ security and intelligence ser- vices. But even here there have been significant steps towards openness over more than two decades. In Britain the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of Parliament is the statutory body charged with scrutinising the agencies and since 2013 is more ac- countable itself to Westminster. This was highlighted by the first open evidence sessions involving the heads of the agencies which coincided with the unofficial disclosure of secret information by way of the so-called ‘WikiLeaks world’. This article examines scrutiny as a route to openness. It makes the distinction between accountability and open government and argues that the ‘trusted’ status of the ISC in comparison to the more independent Parliamentary Select Committees weakens its ability to hold govern- ment to account but, combined with the claim to privileged information and the acqui- escence of the agencies, makes its existence much more aligned to the idea of open gov- ernment Keywords - Westminster Select Committees, Intelligence and Security Committee, MI5 and MI6, scrutiny of public agencies. INTRODUCTION When the three heads of Britain’s security and intelligence services, Sir Iain Lobban (Director of GCHQ), Andrew Parker (Director General of MI5) and Sir John Sawers (Chief of MI6), appeared in Westminster on 7 November 2013, a new marker was set for open government.
  • Inside Russia's Intelligence Agencies

    Inside Russia's Intelligence Agencies

    EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN BRIEF POLICY RELATIONS ecfr.eu PUTIN’S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA’S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES Mark Galeotti For his birthday in 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin was treated to an exhibition of faux Greek friezes showing SUMMARY him in the guise of Hercules. In one, he was slaying the • Russia’s intelligence agencies are engaged in an “hydra of sanctions”.1 active and aggressive campaign in support of the Kremlin’s wider geopolitical agenda. The image of the hydra – a voracious and vicious multi- headed beast, guided by a single mind, and which grows • As well as espionage, Moscow’s “special services” new heads as soon as one is lopped off – crops up frequently conduct active measures aimed at subverting in discussions of Russia’s intelligence and security services. and destabilising European governments, Murdered dissident Alexander Litvinenko and his co-author operations in support of Russian economic Yuri Felshtinsky wrote of the way “the old KGB, like some interests, and attacks on political enemies. multi-headed hydra, split into four new structures” after 1991.2 More recently, a British counterintelligence officer • Moscow has developed an array of overlapping described Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) as and competitive security and spy services. The a hydra because of the way that, for every plot foiled or aim is to encourage risk-taking and multiple operative expelled, more quickly appear. sources, but it also leads to turf wars and a tendency to play to Kremlin prejudices. The West finds itself in a new “hot peace” in which many consider Russia not just as an irritant or challenge, but • While much useful intelligence is collected, as an outright threat.
  • Report Legal Research Assistance That Can Make a Builds

    Report Legal Research Assistance That Can Make a Builds

    EUROPEAN DIGITAL RIGHTS A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF BIOMETRIC MASS SURVEILLANCE PRACTICES IN GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS, AND POLAND By Luca Montag, Rory Mcleod, Lara De Mets, Meghan Gauld, Fraser Rodger, and Mateusz Pełka EDRi - EUROPEAN DIGITAL RIGHTS 2 INDEX About the Edinburgh 1.4.5 ‘Biometric-Ready’ International Justice Cameras 38 Initiative (EIJI) 5 1.4.5.1 The right to dignity 38 Introductory Note 6 1.4.5.2 Structural List of Abbreviations 9 Discrimination 39 1.4.5.3 Proportionality 40 Key Terms 10 2. Fingerprints on Personal Foreword from European Identity Cards 42 Digital Rights (EDRi) 12 2.1 Analysis 43 Introduction to Germany 2.1.1 Human rights country study from EDRi 15 concerns 43 Germany 17 2.1.2 Consent 44 1 Facial Recognition 19 2.1.3 Access Extension 44 1.1 Local Government 19 3. Online Age and Identity 1.1.1 Case Study – ‘Verification’ 46 Cologne 20 3.1 Analysis 47 1.2 Federal Government 22 4. COVID-19 Responses 49 1.3 Biometric Technology 4.1 Analysis 50 Providers in Germany 23 4.2 The Convenience 1.3.1 Hardware 23 of Control 51 1.3.2 Software 25 5. Conclusion 53 1.4 Legal Analysis 31 Introduction to the Netherlands 1.4.1 German Law 31 country study from EDRi 55 1.4.1.1 Scope 31 The Netherlands 57 1.4.1.2 Necessity 33 1. Deployments by Public 1.4.2 EU Law 34 Entities 60 1.4.3 European 1.1. Dutch police and law Convention on enforcement authorities 61 Human Rights 37 1.1.1 CATCH Facial 1.4.4 International Recognition Human Rights Law 37 Surveillance Technology 61 1.1.1.1 CATCH - Legal Analysis 64 EDRi - EUROPEAN DIGITAL RIGHTS 3 1.1.2.
  • The Right to Privacy and the Future of Mass Surveillance’

    The Right to Privacy and the Future of Mass Surveillance’

    ‘The Right to Privacy and the Future of Mass Surveillance’ ABSTRACT This article considers the feasibility of the adoption by the Council of Europe Member States of a multilateral binding treaty, called the Intelligence Codex (the Codex), aimed at regulating the working methods of state intelligence agencies. The Codex is the result of deep concerns about mass surveillance practices conducted by the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA) and the United Kingdom Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The article explores the reasons for such a treaty. To that end, it identifies the discriminatory nature of the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s domestic legislation, pursuant to which foreign cyber surveillance programmes are operated, which reinforces the need to broaden the scope of extraterritorial application of the human rights treaties. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the US and UK foreign mass surveillance se practices interferes with the right to privacy of communications and cannot be justified under Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR. As mass surveillance seems set to continue unabated, the article supports the calls from the Council of Europe to ban cyber espionage and mass untargeted cyber surveillance. The response to the proposal of a legally binding Intelligence Codexhard law solution to mass surveillance problem from the 47 Council of Europe governments has been so far muted, however a soft law option may be a viable way forward. Key Words: privacy, cyber surveillance, non-discrimination, Intelligence Codex, soft law. Introduction Peacetime espionage is by no means a new phenomenon in international relations.1 It has always been a prevalent method of gathering intelligence from afar, including through electronic means.2 However, foreign cyber surveillance on the scale revealed by Edward Snowden performed by the United States National Security Agency (NSA), the United Kingdom Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and their Five Eyes partners3 1 Geoffrey B.
  • Mass Surveillance

    Mass Surveillance

    Thematic factsheet1 Update: July 2018 MASS SURVEILLANCE The highly complex forms of terrorism require States to take effective measures to defend themselves, including mass monitoring of communications. Unlike “targeted” surveillance (covert collection of conversations, telecommunications and metadata by technical means – “bugging”), “strategic” surveillance (or mass surveillance) does not necessarily start with a suspicion against a particular person or persons. It has a proactive element, aimed at identifying a danger rather than investigating a known threat. Herein lay both the value it can have for security operations, and the risks it can pose for individual rights. Nevertheless, Member States do not have unlimited powers in this area. Mass surveillance of citizens is tolerable under the Convention only if it is strictly necessary for safeguarding democratic institutions. Taking into account considerable potential to infringe fundamental rights to privacy and to freedom of expression enshrined by the Convention, Member States must ensure that the development of surveillance methods resulting in mass data collection is accompanied by the simultaneous development of legal safeguards securing respect for citizens’ human rights. According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, it would be counter to governments’ efforts to keep terrorism at bay if the terrorist threat were substituted with a perceived threat of unfettered executive power intruding into citizens’ private lives. It is of the utmost importance that the domestic legislation authorizing far-reaching surveillance techniques and prerogatives provides for adequate and sufficient safeguards in order to minimize the risks for the freedom of expression and the right to privacy which the “indiscriminate capturing of vast amounts of communications” enables.
  • Action Plan Against Terrorism

    Action Plan Against Terrorism

    PREMIER MINISTRE ACTION PLAN AGAINST TERRORISM LutterEurope Menace Entraver Victimes Protéger Jihadisme Cribler r TechnologiesLutter ée Cr er Résilience Terroriste Menace Cribler tt tés aitre Réprimer Résilience Cibles nn Armes Co ili Lu r Comprendre Menace Identifier ée Europe Cibles ComprendreTechnologies aitre Armes nn Explosifs LutterCréer Cr Identifier Co Protéger Identifier Terroriste Entraver Cibles Victimes Coordonner Renforcer Europe Réprimer Réprimer Armes Vulnérab Protéger Contrôler Europe er Cibles r tt ée Créer Victimes Cibles Cr Résilience Réprimer Cibles Technologies ContrôlerLu ArmeCréer s Entraver Entraver er Victimes Victimes tés Cibles Protéger tt ili Europe Lu Menace Identifier Explosifs CriblerCoordonner Comprendre Europe Créer Cibles RadicalisationMenace erroristeenace Vulnérab TerroristeCibles Armes T M 13 July 2018 « Jihadism has not weakened over the last twenty or more years, it has simply moved to new places and taken on new forms. Responses to the threat it poses require mobilisation of all public policies: intelligence, security, justice and diplomacy. It is the State as a whole, and, in addition, all the national community’s living resources – its local authorities, political forces, enterprises and youth – which must mobilise around these challenges. » (Strategic Review of Defence and National Security. 2017). ACTION PLAN AGAINST TERRORISM Contents FRANCE’S SECURITY STRATEGY: TACKLING TERRORISM TOGETHER 5 1 Since 2016, France has continued to face up to a high terrorist threat 7 2 The action plan against
  • Summary of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, Practice, Remedies, and Oversight

    Summary of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, Practice, Remedies, and Oversight

    ___________________________ SUMMARY OF U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE LAW, PRACTICE, REMEDIES, AND OVERSIGHT ASHLEY GORSKI AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION AUGUST 30, 2018 _________________________________ TABLE OF CONTENTS QUALIFICATIONS AS AN EXPERT ............................................................................................. iii INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1 I. U.S. Surveillance Law and Practice ................................................................................... 2 A. Legal Framework ......................................................................................................... 3 1. Presidential Power to Conduct Foreign Intelligence Surveillance ....................... 3 2. The Expansion of U.S. Government Surveillance .................................................. 4 B. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ..................................................... 5 1. Traditional FISA: Individual Orders ..................................................................... 6 2. Bulk Searches Under Traditional FISA ................................................................. 7 C. Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ........................................... 8 D. How The U.S. Government Uses Section 702 in Practice ......................................... 12 1. Data Collection: PRISM and Upstream Surveillance ........................................
  • Ashley Deeks*

    Ashley Deeks*

    ARTICLE An International Legal Framework for Surveillance ASHLEY DEEKS* Edward Snowden’s leaks laid bare the scope and breadth of the electronic surveillance that the U.S. National Security Agency and its foreign counterparts conduct. Suddenly, foreign surveillance is understood as personal and pervasive, capturing the communications not only of foreign leaders but also of private citizens. Yet to the chagrin of many state leaders, academics, and foreign citizens, international law has had little to say about foreign surveillance. Until recently, no court, treaty body, or government had suggested that international law, including basic privacy protections in human rights treaties, applied to purely foreign intelligence collection. This is now changing: Several UN bodies, judicial tribunals, U.S. corporations, and individuals subject to foreign surveillance are pressuring states to bring that surveillance under tighter legal control. This Article tackles three key, interrelated puzzles associated with this sudden transformation. First, it explores why international law has had so little to say about how, when, and where governments may spy on other states’ nationals. Second, it draws on international relations theory to argue that the development of new international norms regarding surveillance is both likely and essential. Third, it identifies six process-driven norms that states can and should adopt to ensure meaningful privacy restrictions on international surveillance without unduly harming their legitimate national security interests. These norms, which include limits on the use of collected data, periodic reviews of surveillance authorizations, and active oversight by neutral bodies, will increase the transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of foreign surveillance. This procedural approach challenges the limited emerging scholarship on surveillance, which urges states to apply existing — but vague and contested — substantive human rights norms to complicated, clandestine practices.
  • Wd 3 - 3000 - 016/17

    Wd 3 - 3000 - 016/17

    Wissenschaftliche Dienste Ausarbeitung Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste in ausgewählten Staaten Aktualisierung der Ausarbeitung WF III G - 12/06 vom 23. Januar 2006 © 2017 Deutscher Bundestag WD 3 - 3000 - 016/17 Wissenschaftliche Dienste Ausarbeitung Seite 2 WD 3 - 3000 - 016/17 Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste in ausgewählten Staaten Aktualisierung der Ausarbeitung WF III G - 12/06 vom 23. Januar 2006 Aktenzeichen: WD 3 - 3000 - 016/17 Abschluss der Arbeit: 12. Mai 2017 Fachbereich: WD 3: Verfassung und Verwaltung Die Wissenschaftlichen Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages unterstützen die Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages bei ihrer mandatsbezogenen Tätigkeit. Ihre Arbeiten geben nicht die Auffassung des Deutschen Bundestages, eines seiner Organe oder der Bundestagsverwaltung wieder. Vielmehr liegen sie in der fachlichen Verantwortung der Verfasserinnen und Verfasser sowie der Fachbereichsleitung. Arbeiten der Wissenschaftlichen Dienste geben nur den zum Zeitpunkt der Erstellung des Textes aktuellen Stand wieder und stellen eine individuelle Auftragsarbeit für einen Abgeordneten des Bundestages dar. Die Arbeiten können der Geheimschutzordnung des Bundestages unterliegende, geschützte oder andere nicht zur Veröffentlichung geeignete Informationen enthalten. Eine beabsichtigte Weitergabe oder Veröffentlichung ist vorab dem jeweiligen Fachbereich anzuzeigen und nur mit Angabe der Quelle zulässig. Der Fachbereich berät über die dabei zu berücksichtigenden Fragen. Wissenschaftliche Dienste Ausarbeitung Seite 3 WD 3 - 3000 - 016/17 Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Einleitung 5 2. Dänemark 6 2.1. Überblick über die Nachrichtendienste 6 2.2. Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste 6 2.2.1. Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste 6 2.2.2. Gremium für die Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste 7 3. Frankreich 7 3.1. Überblick über die Nachrichtendienste 7 3.1.1. Dienst des Innenministeriums 8 3.1.2.
  • General Assembly Distr.: General 1 February 2021

    General Assembly Distr.: General 1 February 2021

    United Nations A/HRC/46/37/Add.2 General Assembly Distr.: General 1 February 2021 Original: English Human Rights Council Forty-sixth session 22 February–19 March 2021 Agenda item 3 Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development Visit to France Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, Joseph A. Cannataci*, ** Summary The Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, Joseph A. Cannataci, carried out an official visit to France from 13 to 17 November 2017. In the present report, he highlights concerns about the emergency laws and recommends that French law be reformed further to entrench the oversight powers of the National Commission for the Control of Intelligence Techniques and to bring the safeguards and remedies applicable to foreign intelligence in line with those required for domestic intelligence. * The summary of the report is being circulated in all official languages. The report itself, which is annexed to the summary, is being circulated in the language of submission and French only. ** The present report was submitted after the deadline in order to reflect the most recent information. GE.21-01269(E) A/HRC/46/37/Add.2 Annex Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, Joseph A. Cannataci, on his visit to France I. Introduction 1. The present report was finalized towards the end of 2020, after an evaluation of the preliminary results of the meetings held during the visit to France from 13 to 17 November 2017 and after having cross-checked those preliminary results against follow-up research and developments to date.