Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

Cm 8715 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty

October 2013

Cm 8715 £21.25 © Crown copyright 2013 You may re-use this information (excluding logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit http://www. nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ or e-mail: [email protected]. Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us [email protected] You can download this publication from our website at https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications ISBN: 9780101871525 Printed in the UK by The Stationery Office Limited on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ID 2593608 10/13 33233 19585 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum. Contents

Home Secretary Foreword 5

Executive Summary 7

Introduction 13

Our Strategic Response 25

PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and 27 organised crime

PREVENT: Preventing people from engaging 45 in serious and organised crime

PROTECT: Increasing protection against 53 serious and organised crime

PREPARE: Reducing the impact of serious and 65 organised crime

Annex A: Accountability, governance and funding 71

Annex B: Departmental roles and responsibilities for 73 tackling serious and organised crime 4 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Home Secretary Foreword 5

Home Secretary Foreword

The Relentless Disruption of Organised Criminals

Serious and organised crime is a threat to our national security and costs the UK more than £24 billion a year. But for too long, too many serious and organised criminals have been able to remain one step ahead and out of law enforcement’s reach.

A new response is needed. Our new strategy is built on the successful framework we use to counter terrorism. It sets out how we will take action at every opportunity to prevent people getting involved in serious and organised crime; to strengthen our protection against and responses to it; and, most importantly, to pursue the criminals behind it, prosecuting them and disrupting their activities.

Strong partnerships are at its heart. This is a cross-government strategy, not just a Home Office strategy. Just as we have for counter-terrorism, we will work with our partners in government and law enforcement to turn the full force of the state against those behind the most serious crime.

Our new strategy, together with the creation of the National Crime Agency, will target national and international serious and organised crime. Simultaneously, our reforms to policing – removing targets and increasing accountability through police and crime commissioners – will strengthen the response at a local level.

Anyone involved in any form of organised crime should hear a very clear message from this strategy: we will do everything at our disposal to disrupt and prosecute them.

Theresa May 66 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Executive Summary 7

Executive Summary

1.1 This is a new strategy to deal with Our approach the challenges we face from serious and organised crime. It is published to coincide 1.5 The aim of this strategy is to with the launch of the new National Crime substantially reduce the level of serious and Agency (NCA) and reflects changes to the organised crime affecting the UK and its threats we face and the lessons we have interests. The strategy uses the framework learned from our previous work. we have developed for our counter-terrorist 1.2 Organised crime includes drug work and has four components: prosecuting trafficking, human trafficking, and organised and disrupting people engaged in serious illegal immigration, high value fraud and other and organised crime (Pursue); preventing financial crimes, counterfeiting, organised people from engaging in this activity (Prevent); acquisitive crime and cyber crime. The increasing protection against serious and strategy also deals with serious crime which organised crime (Protect); and reducing the demands a national coordinated response, impact of this criminality where it takes place notably other fraud and child sexual (Prepare). exploitation. 1.6 The strategy lists strategic objectives 1.3 Organised crime is a threat to our under each of the four areas of work. Tactical national security. It costs the United Kingdom operational objectives (e.g. priority crime at least £24 billion each year, leads to loss of groups) will be set by the NCA with law life and can deprive people of their security enforcement agency counterparts. and prosperity. Crime groups intimidate 1.7 Our immediate priority is the work and corrupt and have a corrosive impact on set out under Pursue to prosecute and some communities. Cyber crime undermines relentlessly disrupt organised criminals and confidence in our communications reduce the threat they pose. technology and online economy. Organised immigration crime threatens the security of 1.8 Like other threats to our national our borders. We regard human trafficking security, serious and organised crime requires as a pernicious form of modern slavery. a response across the whole of government, Financial crime can undermine the integrity and close collaboration with the public, the and stability of our financial markets and private sector and with many other countries. institutions. 1.4 Overseas, organised crime undermines good governance and the stability of countries of strategic importance to our national security. Organised crime groups overseas can facilitate or engage in terrorism. 8 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Executive Summary 9 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

The NCA will develop an authoritative intelligence picture of Establish strong, effective and collaborative organisations organised crime and work with the police and others to lead, Develop our capabilities coordinate and support our response. New local organised crime partnership boards will provide support to local policing Attack criminal finances on all aspects of this strategy. New NCA and law enforcement capabilities will be developed to deal with developments in Ensure that effective legal powers are available organised crime, notably the move online. We will legislate on aspects of organised crime. We will increase work against ursue Internationally, improve our own capabilities and our foreign national offenders and refocus the NCA’s international cooperation with others network to deal with all crime types. Prosecute and disrupt people engaged in serious and organised criminality Reduce threat Raise awareness of the reality and consequences We will have a new preventative programme including more and better education and communications about organised Intervene to stop people being drawn into different types of crime, local coordination with existing work on troubled serious and organised crime families and gangs, and wider use of interventions (e.g. Serious Crime Prevention Orders). We want to work more closely with Develop techniques to deter people from continuing in the regulators of professions whose members may, wittingly or serious and organised criminality not, facilitate organised crime activity. We will promote effective lifetime offender management as a framework for revent Establish an effective offender management framework to both Pursue and Prevent and involving the NCA, regional support work on Pursue and Prevent police units and police forces. Aim

Prevent people from engaging in serious and organised crime Reduce level of serious and Protect our borders We have changed roles and responsibilities at the border and on immigration enforcement. We are building new border organised Protect national and local government capabilities. We will increase work to cut fraud against government and in particular local government procurement. crime Improve protective security in the private sector We will share more threat reporting with at risk parts of the private sector notably on fraud and cyber crimes. Protect people at risk of becoming victims We will provide more information to the public on these issues Improve our anti-corruption systems and also on child sexual exploitation. We will work to restrict rotect circulation of illegal child abuse images. We are revising Strengthen systems for establishing identity responsibilities for the investigation and reporting of corruption. Reduce Increase protection against serious and organised crime vulnerabilty

We will continue to develop emergency service interoperability to better deal with terrorism and other crimes. We will establish Ensure major serious and organised crime incidents are a new unit to coordinate our national response to major cyber brought to a rapid and effective resolution attacks including cyber crime. Ensure communities, victims and witnesses affected by A theme in this strategy is to provide support to communities serious and organised crime have the support which they need affected by organised crime. This is part of all the four main areas of our work. Specific new initiatives are also planned to repare support victims and witnesses.

Reduce the impact of this criminality where it takes place 10 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

PUR SUE Wales. We want to see much more sharing of capabilities between the separate police 1.9 We are building organisations with new networks which deal with organised crime roles and responsibilities to deal with serious and terrorism. This will improve our work in and organised crime. They will have new both areas. capabilities. We want to see more cross- 1.14 We will amend existing legislation to government collaboration at every level. We seek to create new powers to seize criminal are also making changes to our legislation assets. We will also take measures to better to make our powers more effective. We are tackle people who support and benefit from reshaping our international work to reflect the participating in serious and organised crime. changes in the threats we face. We will legislate to deal with the challenge of 1.10 The NCA will formally begin work modern slavery. in October 2013. It will develop and bring 1.15 We will restructure our overseas crime together intelligence on all types of serious fighting network to deal with all the crime and organised crime, prioritise crime groups types which now fall to the NCA, including according to the threats they present and, child sexual exploitation and cyber. Through in conjunction with the police, then lead, the extension of the Nexus programme we coordinate and support our operational will increase disruption of the significant response. amount of organised crime conducted 1.11 Police forces will continue to conduct by foreign nationals in this country. We most law enforcement work on serious and will continue to build the capacity of third organised crime. They should be supported countries where organised crime impacts by new local organised crime partnership directly on our own security. boards, including local authorities and agencies to ensure all available information PR E V E N T and powers are used against this threat. We believe that police and crime commissioners 1.16 We will create a programme to stop should play a leading role in identifying and people beginning or continuing to engage in establishing the appropriate body. These local serious and organised crime. This is Prevent. partnerships will be informed by new serious It needs to be coordinated with and draw and organised crime local profiles and should lessons from our Prevent work on counter­ also play an important role in Prevent, Protect terrorism. and Prepare. 1.17 We will sponsor and create new 1.12 We will continue to build police education and communications programmes Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs) in to raise awareness of the reality of serious England and Wales. These units also need to and organised crime, the damage it causes be supported by better data sharing between and the consequences for offenders and government departments and agencies. We their families. We will publicise the identities will expand the existing Government Agency of people convicted of serious and organised Intelligence Network (GAIN) for this purpose. crime and our successes in seizing their assets. 1.13 Developments in organised crime, 1.18 We will use existing programmes notably the emergence of cyber crime, mean (notably programmes for Troubled Families that we need to continue to improve NCA and and Ending Gang and Youth Violence) to police capabilities. Funding has been made prevent serious and organised crime. available for this purpose, within England and Executive Summary 11

1.19 We want to see wider use by the We have already introduced a Cyber Security NCA and others of Serious Crime Prevention Information Sharing Partnership (CISP) to Orders (SCPOs) and Travel Restriction Orders enable public/private sharing of information and ‘cease and desist’ notices to better about cyber threats. deter people already engaging in serious and 1.25 The NCA will continue a major organised crime. education programme to protect potential 1.20 We will have an effective offender victims from child exploitation. We are now management programme for tracking serious working on new initiatives to reduce the and organised criminals into and beyond availability of illegal images of child abuse prison, ensuring the effective management of circulating online. the threat they pose. We believe this can have 1.26 Bribery and corruption are tools of a significant impact on recidivism. serious and organised crime. We intend to introduce new systems for reporting PROTECT corruption and the NCA will lead and coordinate work to investigate corruption in 1.21 Evidence shows that improving the UK. The Home Office will now coordinate physical protection against serious and domestic policy in this area. organised crime can very significantly deter 1.27 Serious and organised crime also and reduce its impact. depends on identity theft and the use of false 1.22 Secure borders are vital to work identities. We need to do more to protect on organised crime. We have reorganised identities and share data about false identities responsibilities at the border, with the new in the UK and beyond. Border Force and the NCA’s Border Policing Command. Major capability programmes are PREPARE under way. 1.23 There has been success in cutting 1.28 Although we can do much to reduce fraud against the public sector but we the threat and our vulnerability, serious and need to do more. We want to see more organised crime will happen. We need to collaboration between law enforcement ensure that we can deal with it and support and local authorities to contain the risk that people who are most affected. serious and organised crime might benefit 1.29 Significant improvements have been from local authority procurement. made in building generic capabilities to 1.24 Containing fraud and cyber attacks respond to civil emergencies and we have a against the private sector requires public and good continuing programme to improve the private sector collaboration. The new Counter interoperability of the emergency services. In Fraud Checking Service in the Cabinet Office order to improve the way the UK responds will bring together known fraud data from the to major cyber attacks, a new national public and private sectors to enable better Computer Emergency Response Team protection against known fraudsters. The (CERT-UK) will be established in 2014. NCA will share information with the private 1.3 0 Crime creates victims and witnesses. sector about developing threats. We are Communities are also affected. Supporting making further changes to procedures for communities is a theme in this strategy and reporting fraud to the Action Fraud service. we want to see harm to communities taken 12 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

into account in the sentencing of people engaged in serious and organised crime. 1.31 A new Victim’s Code will be published in late 2013 which sets out the support to which victims are entitled. We are also developing new arrangements to support witnesses with a new Witness Charter and a new UK Protected Persons Service which will overhaul current witness protection arrangements.

Conclusion

1.32 This strategy is intended to deal with a threat to our national security. It is complex and wide-ranging. Many agencies and departments are involved (roles and responsibilities are set out in Annex B) alongside and in support of the NCA and the police. We intend to track implementation of this strategy very closely: we will publish an annual report on our progress. Introduction 13

Introduction

2.1 The 2010 National Security Strategy1 response, notably many aspects of fraud identified organised crime and, in particular, and child sexual exploitation. Our aim is to large scale cyber crime as serious risks to substantially reduce the level of serious and our national security. The Strategic Defence organised crime affecting the UK and its and Security Review (published alongside the interests. National Security Strategy) stated that dealing 2.3 Whilst national security is a reserved with the most harmful organised crime matter, crime and policing matters are groups affecting the UK is a national security devolved and the responsibility of the Scottish requirement2. The Home Secretary’s Strategic 3 Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly. Policing Requirement lists organised crime We intend to continue collaborating closely and cyber crime as national threats which with all the devolved administrations chief constables and police and crime against organised crime. We believe that commissioners are required to address. implementation of this strategy is consistent 2.2 This strategy for dealing with serious with the approach to organised crime in and organised crime is issued to coincide Scotland and Northern Ireland4. With regard with the creation of the NCA. It reflects to the legislative competence of the National significant changes in organised crime, Assembly for Wales, organised crime and the lessons we have learned from work to policing are non-devolved subjects. However, date (and our recent experience of counter­ health, education and local government in terrorism) and the new capabilities, and roles Wales are subjects devolved to the National and responsibilities of organisations working Assembly. We will ensure close cooperation on this threat. This strategy also sets out our with the Welsh Government in implementing response to serious crime, which may not aspects of the strategy where there are always be ‘organised’ but requires a national interdependencies between devolved and non-devolved elements. 1 HM Government (2010) A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy https://www.gov. 2.4 This strategy is the product of uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/61936/national-security-strategy.pdf extensive consultation with law enforcement, 2 HM Government (2010) Securing Britain in an Age of the intelligence agencies, local authorities, the Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review private sector and academia. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic­ defence-and-security-review-securing-britain-in-an-age-of­ uncertainty 3 HM Government (2012) Strategic Policing Requirement https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 4 Scottish Government (2009) – Letting Our Communities attachment_data/file/117445/strategic-policing-requirement. Flourish http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/ pdf. The Strategic Policing Requirement empowers and Doc/274127/0081989.pdf; Northern Ireland – Organised enables police and crime commissioners to hold their chief Crime Task Force (2011) Northern Ireland Organised Crime constable to account for the totality of their policing – both Strategy January 2012 http://www.dojni.gov.uk/index/media­ local and national centre/northern-ireland-organised-crime-strategy-.pdf 14 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

Characteristics of serious and organised America, the Balkans, Turkey and China) are crime also resident and operating in this country. 2.5 There is no legal definition of organised Through sophisticated use of the internet, crime in England and Wales. For the cyber criminals can commit crimes against purposes of this strategy, organised crime UK businesses, citizens and government from is serious crime planned, coordinated and anywhere in the world. conducted by people working together on a 2.9 Organised crime groups will continue continuing basis. Their motivation is often, but to exploit areas of global instability and not always, financial gain. conflict. They will be able to operate globally 2.6 Organised crime is characterised by in ungoverned and poorly-regulated spaces, violence or the threat of violence and by the often exploiting the distinctions between use of bribery and corruption: organised jurisdictions and the corruption within them. criminals very often depend on the assistance They will undermine fragile states, societies, of corrupt, complicit or negligent professionals, and governments. notably lawyers, accountants and bankers. 2.10 All these aspects of serious and Organised crime also uses sophisticated organised crime inform our response and are technology to conduct operations, maintain reflected in the programme outlined here. security and evade justice. The scale and impact of serious and 2.7 We make a distinction between organised crime organised crime groups and urban street 2.11 Law enforcement agencies estimate gangs (which are the subject of a related that there are around 5,500 active organised 5 government report ). The differences are crime groups operating against the UK, primarily about the level of criminality, comprising about 37,000 people6. Their organisation, planning and control. But criminal activity is concentrated in, but not there are connections between gangs and confined to, London and the South East, the organised crime: urban gang members may North West and the West Midlands. engage in street drug dealing on behalf of organised criminals and some gangs aspire 2.12 Organised crime groups are to and may become organised crime groups responsible for: the trafficking of drugs, in their own right. Areas of high gang activity people and firearms, organised illegal in the UK tend to be areas where organised immigration, large-scale and high-volume criminals are most active. fraud and other financial crimes, counterfeit goods (including medicines), organised 2.8 Organised crime in this and other acquisitive crime and cyber crime. countries recognises neither national borders nor national interests. Many organised 2.13 A Home Office study, published to crime groups in this country maintain links coincide with this strategy, estimates that to counterparts overseas to conduct their the social and economic costs of organised crime in this country are at least £24 billion operations. A significant proportion of serious 7 and organised crime involves the movement a year . There were just under 1,500 drug of people, goods and money across the UK’s 6 Derived from a law enforcement-led process known as border. But overseas groups (e.g. from Latin Organised Crime Group Mapping 7 Home Office (2013) Understanding Organised Crime: Estimating the scale and the social and economic costs 5 Home Office (2011) Ending Gang and Youth Violence https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/understanding­ https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ organised-crime-estimating-the-scale-and-the-social-and­ attachment_data/file/97861/gang-violence-summary.pdf economic-costs Introduction 15

Cost of Organised Crime This illustration shows the estimated social and economic costs of different types of organised crime. While costs do vary across the different crime types, differences in how the various estimates were calculated means they are not directly comparable.

Cost of Organised Crime ! This illustration shows the estimated social and economic costs of different types of organised crime. While costs do vary across the different crime types, differences in how the various estimates were calculated means they are not directly comparable. related deaths in England and Wales alone in estimated to cost the Exchequer £5 billion a 20128. year. 2.14 Crime groups can intimidate and 2.16 The United Nations Office for Drugs corrupt and deprive some people of their and Crime (UNODC) estimates that the annual security, prosperity and even identity. They turnover of transnational organised crime can also have a corrosive impact on the groups and networks is $870 billion9. The most fabric and cohesion of communities. The significant and sophisticated of these networks abuse and exploitation of children can have a now operate in the manner which was lifelong and devastating impact on victims. previously the preserve of nation states or large 2.15 Cyber crime can undermine corporations. They have access to vast illicit confidence in the integrity of our wealth, recruit specialist personnel and seek to communications technology and in the wield state-like commercial and political power. sensitive systems which are essential to 2.17 Serious and organised crime can have governance and our economy. Organised a destabilising impact on the governance immigration crime challenges the security of of countries of strategic importance to our our border, and human trafficking is in effect national security including our Overseas a form of modern slavery. Financial crime Territories. Drugs and weapons trafficking can jeopardise the integrity of our financial undermine the rule of law. Bribery and markets and institutions. Organised criminal corruption compromise effective decision­ attacks on the UK’s tax and duty systems are 9 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2011) Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and 8 Office for National Statistics (2013) Deaths related to drug other Transnational Organised Crimes www.unodc.org/ poisoning in England and Wales, www.ons.gov.uk/ons/ documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_ dcp171778_320841.pdf flows_ 2011_web.pdf 16 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

making. Global cyber crime can undermine drug-related deaths in 201215. The social and disrupt online! systems which are and economic costs of organised illegal essential to the UK’s economy and prosperity. drugs supply in the UK are estimated to be 16 2.18 In some cases organised crime £10.7 billion per year . engages in or indirectly facilitates terrorist Illegal drugs activity: about 50% of the international drug trafficking groups of interest to the US Department of Justice are associated with terrorist organisations10. 2.19 Like the UK, other countries (such as the United States and Australia11) judge that organised crime poses a risk to their national security. Organised crime types in the UK 2.20 This section of our strategy provides a short introductory overview of the main organised criminal activities in the UK and identifies its costs and consequences: from 2.22 Illegal drugs cause serious damage the consultation which preceded this strategy to UK communities through drug-related it was clear that the scope of organised crime violence, anti-social behaviour, acquisitive is not always understood. crime and knife and firearms offences. 2.21 Over half of the organised crime Between a third and a half of all acquisitive groups operating against the UK are crime is drug-related. involved in drug-related crime; a significant 2.23 We estimate that between 18 tonnes proportion are also involved in violent crime12. and 23 tonnes of heroin and 25 tonnes and Although illegal drug use is falling13 the UK’s 30 tonnes of cocaine are imported annually illegal drugs market, which is controlled into the UK17. by organised crime, is still worth about 14 2.24 95% of the heroin on UK streets £3.7 billion a year and led to over 2000 originates from Afghanistan. UK-based organised crime groups involved in heroin 10 US Government (2011) Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 15 Detailed Breakdown: England and Wales – 1,469 deaths: files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_ Office for National Statistics (2013) Deaths related to drug July_2011.pdf poisoning in England and Wales, 2012 http://www.ons.gov. 11 Australian Government (2013) National Security Strategy; lists uk/ons/dcp171778_320841.pdf, Scotland – 581 deaths: serious organised crime as one of seven key national security National Records of Scotland (2013) Drug-related deaths risks http://www.dpmc.gov.au/national_security/docs/ in Scotland in 2012 http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/files2/ national_security_strategy.pdf stats/drug-related-deaths/2012/drugs-related-deaths-2012. 12 Organised Crime Group Mapping data pdf, Northern Ireland – 75 deaths: Northern Ireland Statistics 13 Home Office (2013) Drug Misuse: Findings from the 2012/13 and Research Agency (2013) Alcohol and Drug Deaths http:// Crime Survey for England and Wales www.nisra.gov.uk/demography/default.asp30.htm www.gov.uk/government/publications/drug-misuse-findings­ 16 Home Office (2013) Understanding Organised Crime: from-the-2012-to-2013-csew Estimating the scale and the social and economic costs. 14 Home Office (2013) Understanding Organised Crime: This includes costs associated with drug-related acquisitive Estimating the scale and the social and economic costs offending as well as health care. https://www.gov.uk / https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/understanding­ government/publications/understanding-organised-crime­ organised-crime-estimating-the-scale-and-the-social-and­ estimating-the-scale-and-the-social-and-economic-costs economic-costs 17 SOCA – www.soca.gov.uk/threats/drugs Introduction 17

trafficking, and distribution within the Illegal firearms UK, often have strong ethnic and familial associations with South Asia. Turkish groups have always been important; Balkan organised crime networks are now much more prominent. 2.25 Cocaine consumed in the UK comes from Peru, Colombia and Bolivia. Most crosses the Atlantic in containerised freight, although some is concealed in general cargo, yachts and fishing vessels. West Africa has become a significant transit region for cocaine destined for the European and UK markets along with the Caribbean, 2.29 Offences involving the use of a firearm the Netherlands, Belgium and the Iberian make up a small proportion (around 0.2%) Peninsula. British organised criminals of all police recorded crime in England and dominate the supply and distribution of Wales and there has been a decline in the cocaine within the UK. number of recorded crimes involving firearms for eight consecutive years18. Data from 2.26 Cannabis is still the most widely used 19 illegal drug in the UK and is a large lucrative Scotland is comparable . Firearms-related homicides are comparatively low compared market for organised criminals. While most with similar countries20. cannabis in the UK is imported, over 90 tonnes of ‘skunk’ cannabis is produced 2.30 The majority of criminally-linked domestically in the UK each year. Criminals shooting incidents in the UK are conducted use income generated from cannabis by urban street gangs, often in connection trafficking to fund a range of other criminal with armed robberies and drug distribution. activities, including the purchase of heroin But organised crime groups in the UK and cocaine. have ready access to illegal firearms, when 2.27 The UK drugs market is diversifying required. Intelligence and ballistic information with an increase in the number of new indicates that trading in and hiring of illegal psychoactive substances (NPS) primarily weapons is common and individual firearms imported from China and India. The most have been used by different criminal groups, common is mephedrone. in different parts of the country. 2.28 Like other crime types, illegal drugs 2.31 Most of the illegal firearms used by UK- supply is moving online to websites intended based criminals are original lethal-purpose to evade law enforcement action. At present, handguns imported illegally from the USA use of the internet to purchase drugs seems and Europe. Firearms, their components low, but responding to the likely future 18 Office for National Statistics (2013) Focus on Violent Crime challenge of drugs online is a feature of this and Sexual Offences 2011/12 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/ rel/crime-stats/crime-statistics/focus-on-violent-crime/stb­ strategy. focus-on--violent-crime-and-sexual-offences-2011-12.html 19 Recorded crime offences involving firearms, Scotland, 2011­ 12 – December 2012 data 20 Based on Home Office comparisons of murder rates, where England and Wales has a rate of 1 per 100,000 and the USA has 6 per 100,000 18 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

and ammunition are also acquired from a private sectors, and the state. To date we variety of legitimate sources within the UK, have identified almost 1,400 organised crime including the military, firearm/antique fairs and groups who commit economic crime; many registered firearms dealers. are involved in other serious and organised 2.32 Reactivated and converted firearms crime. are common. Some are converted overseas 2.35 Organised criminals conduct insurance before being trafficked to the UK (such as and mortgage fraud and fraud against the Baikal handguns converted in Lithuania). global banking system. They are engaged Others are converted here. in intellectual property crime, including the 2.33 Weapons, their parts and ammunition supply of counterfeit medicines and electrical can now be bought online, like drugs. goods. We believe that a small number of organised crime groups are also involved in Fraud and financial crime market abuse in this country. 2.36 Organised crime also aims to defraud the public directly. Ticketing and mass- marketing fraud are common; there is a growing threat from pension liberation frauds where people are deceived into cashing in their pensions early, sometimes into a false trading fund. 2.37 Fraud is increasingly conducted online. Of the frauds reported to Action Fraud22 in 2012, 40% were committed online, with criminals taking advantage of the vulnerabilities of online services and the people who use them. Cyber-enabled crime allows crime on a significant scale: a single ’phishing‘ email (an email where the sender purports to be a trustworthy entity to secure financial or other details) can be used to target very large numbers of people, often by criminals either based overseas or making use of overseas IT infrastructure. 2.38 Fraud against the public sector costs about £20 billion each year of which the majority is against the tax system. The latest estimates are that about £5 billion of the 2.34 Fraud is estimated to cost the UK annual UK ‘tax gap’ (the gap between tax £50 billion each year and at least £8.9 billion owed and tax collected) is due to organised of this is due to organised crime21. Fraud is conducted against individuals, the public and 22 Action Fraud is the UK’s national fraud and internet crime 21 National Fraud Authority (2013) Annual Fraud Indicator www. reporting centre; it provides a central point of contact for gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ information about fraud and financially motivated internet data/file/206552/nfa-annual-fraud-indicator-2013.pdf crime. www.actionfraud.police.uk/ Introduction 19

crime23. VAT fraud associated with tobacco criminals. UK organised crime groups also and alcohol has become more sophisticated use specialist money launderers, some and multinational and frequently cyber- overseas, who manage laundering for multiple enabled. VAT missing-trader intra-community criminal enterprises active across various illicit fraud (MTIC) involves complex trading in activities. a range of goods to evade VAT or make Child sexual exploitation fraudulent repayment claims. Some MTIC fraudsters start dealing in small but high value goods (such as electronics), and then move into ‘non-tangible’ commodities, including carbon credits. Money laundering 2.39 Most organised crime aims to make money which then needs to be moved and laundered to hide its origins. Because it is covert, and often complex, it is difficult to assess the scale of money laundered in and through this country. But the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) estimated 2.42 In 2012/13 almost 800 children that in excess of £1 billion a year is laundered were safeguarded or protected as result of through money service businesses (MSBs) activity by the Child Exploitation and Online and informal value transfer systems24 alone. Protection Centre25 (CEOP); the Office of the 2.40 Illicit profits are often laundered Children’s Commissioner identified 2,409 victims of child sexual exploitation by gangs through cash-rich overt businesses, which 26 very often operate on the high street and and groups . Research by the NSPCC typically include nail bars, food and licensed indicated that about 5% of children in the UK suffer contact sexual abuse at some point premises, companies offering security 27 services, taxi firms and car washes. These during their childhood . But most areas of outlets may be run by crime groups from this child sexual exploitation and abuse suffer country or overseas. Money is sometimes from under-reporting by victims and often physically transferred outside the UK using inconsistent reporting in the criminal justice not only MSBs but also front companies and process: it is difficult to accurately identify offshore services. the size of the UK offending and victim populations. 2.41 Complicit, negligent or unwitting professionals in the financial, accountancy 25 Radford, L., Corral, S., Bradley, C., Fisher, H., Bassett, C., and legal professions in the UK facilitate Howat, N. and Collishaw, S. (2011) Child abuse and neglect in the UK today. www.nspcc.org.uk/Inform/research/findings/ money laundering on behalf of organised child_abuse_neglect_research_PDF_wdf84181.pdf 26 23 HM Revenue and Customs (2012) Delivering our Vision: CEOP Annual Review 2012-2013 & Centre Plan 2013­ Business Plan 2012-15 www.hmrc.gov.uk/about/2012­ 2014 http://www.ceop.police.uk/Documents/ceopdocs/ business-plan.pdf AnnualReviewCentrePlan2013.pdf 24 Informal value transfer systems are based on a global 27 The Office of the Children’s Commissioner’s Inquiry into network of often unregistered and ‘informal’ bankers, Child Sexual Exploitation in Gangs and Groups. Berlowitz, typically serving ethnic or expatriate communities and S., Firmin, C., Edwards, G., Gulyurtlu, S. (2012) I thought I businesses. An example is ‘hawala’. They exist for legitimate was the only one. The only one in the world: Interim Report and cultural remittance purposes but can be exploited by www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/content/publications/ organised criminals to facilitate money laundering. content_636 20 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

2.43 Child sexual abuse and exploitation and industry is an important part of this remains a largely solitary crime and, where strategy. group offending occurs, it shares few of the Organised immigration crime and human characteristics traditionally associated with trafficking organised crime. The offending is, however, often extremely serious and complex. The 2.45 Organised crime groups are involved majority of child sexual exploitation and abuse in the smuggling of people into this country, offenders are motivated by sexual gratification in the abuse of legal means of entry (e.g. with a much smaller number motivated by marriage), and in human trafficking (the financial or other gain. movement of people for profit, including sexual exploitation, forced labour, criminal 2.44 Child abuse is very often an online exploitation and domestic servitude). The and multinational activity using sophisticated majority of illegal migrants will rely on the technology and techniques to evade law services of organised crime groups at some enforcement attention. The internet (including point in their journey or during their time in the the so-called ‘hidden internet’ which UK. facilitates a sense of a ‘safe’ community of offenders) facilitates the proliferation of 2.46 The true scale of human trafficking is indecent images of children. Work to tackle unknown. It is a crime which is largely hidden this between government, law enforcement from the public eye. In 2012, 1,186 potential Introduction 21

victims of human trafficking were referred to to another in response to supply and the National Referral Mechanism (NRM)28, an demand. UK-based organised crime groups increase of 25% on 2011. The most common have become involved in metal theft (as the source countries for potential victims referred price of some metals has risen) and in the to 2012 in the NRM were Nigeria, Vietnam, theft, transportation and distribution of high- Albania, Romania and China. Current value goods and antiquities such as Chinese reporting indicates Nigeria and Albania are jade and rhino horn. Organised criminals are key threat areas for sexual exploitation; increasingly targeting smartphones. Poland, Romania and other central/eastern 2.51 Vehicle crime offences in the UK European countries for labour exploitation have fallen in recent years, but the value of and Vietnam for child trafficking. A number vehicles stolen by organised criminals is still of cases have been identified involving child estimated to be at least £330 million a year. victims from Vietnam working in cannabis We believe the social and economic costs factories. of this criminality to the UK are at least £920 2.47 People are often deceived or tricked million a year30. into a trafficking situation through false 2.52 Recent Home Office research indicates promises of a better life or the offer of work. that the scale and social and economic costs Others are sold to their traffickers, sometimes associated with the theft of construction by family members. Debt bondage is a tactic and agricultural equipment and distraction used by organised crime groups to maintain burglary (where vulnerable people are usually control over a trafficking victim. targeted) are now considerably greater than 2.48 We estimate the social and economic the theft of cash and valuables in transit31, costs associated with known organised traditional types of organised crime. immigration crime and human trafficking at Cyber crime just over £1 billion29. The actual total costs are 2.53 In the past few years there has been likely to be much higher. a rapid expansion in the development 2.49 Some criminals involved in immigration and adoption of new communications crime act alone while others form extensive technologies which continue to transform global networks. The most sophisticated government, business and the ways in which criminal groups offer complete facilitation we interact with each other. Some 80% of packages including accommodation, homes in the UK now have internet access; transportation and false documentation. 40% of adults have a smartphone; and online Cooperation between immigration crime retail spending accounts for around 10% of all groups is common. retail spend each month in Great Britain32.

Organised acquisitive crime 30 Home Office (2013) Understanding Organised Crime: 2.50 Market forces shape organised crime; Estimating the scale and the social and economic costs https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/understanding­ groups shift their focus from one commodity organised-crime-estimating-the-scale-and-the-social-and­ economic-costs 28 The NRM is part of the UK Human Trafficking Centre 31 Home Office (2013) Understanding Organised Crime: (UKHTC) and identifies and facilitates support for victims of Estimating the scale and the social and economic costs human trafficking https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/understanding­ 29 Home Office (2013) Understanding Organised Crime: organised-crime-estimating-the-scale-and-the-social-and­ Estimating the scale and the social and economic costs economic-costs https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/understanding­ 32 Office for National Statistics (July 2013), Online Retail Sales organised-crime-estimating-the-scale-and-the-social-and­ www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/rsi/retail-sales/july-2013/stb-rsi­ economic-costs july-2013.html#tab-Internet-Sales 22 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

!

and services created for, or products derived from, cyber crime attacks33. 2.57 We know that almost a third (31%) of adult internet users reported experiencing a computer virus to the 2011/12 Crime Survey for England and Wales34. This is a useful indicator of the extent of online malware but it is not an indicator of the level of cyber- dependent crime. It does not take account of whether the victim was specifically targeted or whether the virus had an effect on their computer or was blocked by anti-virus 2.54 Cyber crime describes two distinct, software. The proportion of adult internet but closely related, criminal activities: cyber- users that reported unauthorised access to dependent crimes, and cyber-enabled or use of personal data (hacking) increased crimes. In this strategy, we use ‘cyber from 2% in 2006-7 to 7% in 2011-12. The crime’ when we are referring to both types: Commercial Victimisation Survey found otherwise we distinguish between them. there were 180,000 incidents of online crime • Cyber-dependent crimes can only be against four major business sectors in 2012; committed using computers, computer 75% of these were virus-related35. networks or other forms of information 2.58 On cyber-enabled crimes, 3% of communication technology (ICT). They adult internet users reported having ‘lost include the creation and spread of money’ online in the 2011/12 Crime Survey malware for financial gain, hacking to for England and Wales. The banking and steal important personal or industry data payments industry, which collates data on and denial of service attacks to cause fraud losses, reported an estimated cost reputational damage. of cyber-enabled card-not-present fraud to • Cyber-enabled crimes (such as fraud, the banks of £140.2 million in 2012; in the the purchasing of illegal drugs and child same year cyber-enabled banking fraud was sexual exploitation) can be conducted on estimated at £39.6 million36. Other sources or offline, but online may take place at also report an increase in the number of unprecedented scale and speed. phishing attacks, i.e. emails that attempt to get users to relinquish personal information 2.55 People who commit cyber crime for fraudulent purposes. The Oxford Internet against UK business and the public often Institute found that there had been a steady operate from overseas, taking advantage of increase in reported phishing attacks among the UK’s high use of the internet and online internet users, from 12% in 2005 to 22% payment systems, as well as weak legislation and law enforcement action in some other 33 Holt, T. J. (2012) Exploring the Social Organization and jurisdictions. Structure of Stolen Data Markets, Proceedings of the 4th Annual Illicit Networks Workshop 2.56 Many cyber criminals do not operate 34 Crime Survey for England and Wales 2011/12 as part of a traditional, hierarchical organised 35 ONS (2012) Commercial Victimisation Survey” https://www. gov.uk/government/publications/crime-against-businesses­ crime group but through a global marketplace headline-findings-from-the-2012-commercial-victimisation­ where they buy and sell the technical tools sur vey--2 36 Financial Fraud Action website (2013) http://www. financialfraudaction.org.uk/ Introduction 23

in 201137. The Office for National Statistics 2.59 As the UK Cyber Security Strategy38 (2010) reported that 3% of adult internet users noted, an accurate estimate of the scale and in the UK had experienced financial loss cost of cyber crime will probably never be from the disclosure of personal data to fake established, but it is clear that both the costs and websites or fraudulent messages. the threat are substantial. Based on the limited evidence available the costs of cyber crime in the UK are likely to be at least several billions of pounds each year. A new external working group is being set up by the Home Office to improve the data quality; the data which we have is published alongside this strategy39.

Distribution of organised crime groupsDistribution of organised crime groups across the UK (June 2013)* across the UK (June 2013)*

This map illustrates, by local police force This maparea, illustrates, the approximate by local policedistribution force of area, theorganised approximate crime distribution groups being of organisedinvestigated crime groups and/or being disrupted by the investigatedpolice and/orand other disrupted agencies by theas of June Low police and other agencies as of June Low 2013. It is a useful illustration of the 2013. Itscale is a usefuland geographic illustration spreadof the of scale andorganised geographic crime spread groups of but it does not organisedindicate crime the groups level of but threat it does that not groups indicatepose the levelwithin of police threat force that groupsareas. pose within police force areas. High High

Distribution of Distributionorganised of crime organisedgroups crime across police groupsforce across boundaries police force boundaries

* Information provided by UK police and law enforcement agencies, collated by the NCA. Policing in Scotland and Northern Ireland is devolved. * Information Information provided byprovided UK police by Police and law Scotland enforcement shows agencies, a higher distribution collated by ofthe organised NCA. Policing crime ingroups Scotland in the and west Northern of the Irelandcountry is reflected devolved. in the map above. Information provided by Police Scotland shows a higher distribution of organised crime groups in the west of the country reflected in the map above. 38 HM Government (2011) The UK Cyber Security Strategy (November 2011): www.gov.uk /government/publications/ cyber-security-strategy 39 Home Office (2013) Cyber Crime: A Review of the Evidence: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-crime-a­ 37 Dutton, W.H. and Blank, G. (2011) Oxford Internet Survey review-of-the-evidence 24 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Our Strategic Response 25

Our Strategic Response

3.1 The aim of this strategy is to with local authorities, the private sector and substantially reduce the level of organised communities. Organised crime also requires crime in this country and the level of serious an international response with close allies and crime that requires a national response multilateral organisations. (notably fraud and child sexual exploitation). 3.3 This strategy uses a framework which The strategy develops themes from its was first developed for our counter-terrorism predecessor, Local to Global (2011), but strategy, CONTEST. It has four main areas of takes account of changes in organised activity: prosecuting and disrupting people crime and the new roles and responsibilities engaged in serious and organised criminality for organisations which are responsible for (Pursue); preventing people from engaging dealing with it. in this activity (Prevent); increasing protection 3.2 Organised crime requires a response against organised crime (Protect); and across the whole of government and beyond. reducing the impact of serious and organised It is not just a matter for the police and NCA. crime where it takes place (Prepare). Many other departments need to be involved,

Pursue: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and organised crime Reduce Threat Prevent: Reduce Preventing people from engaging in serious Level and organised crime of Serious And Organised Protect: Crime Increasing protection against serious and organised crime Reduce Vulnerability Prepare: Reducing the impact of serious and organised crime

26 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

3.4 Actions we take under Pursue and through the NCA and police and are not Prevent are intended to reduce the hostile covered in this strategy. threats we face. Actions taken under Protect 3.8 Our immediate priorities are the and Prepare are intended to reduce our strategic objectives set out under Pursue. vulnerability. Together these actions will cut We need to reduce the threat from organised serious and organised crime and reduce the crime, by more prosecution of offenders risks we face from it. and the relentless disruption of their criminal 3.5 We believe the CONTEST model will activity. That will mean organisations dealing enable us to develop a more comprehensive with serious and organised crime working in approach to serious and organised crime a different way with different capabilities and than ever before. Separating prevention new powers. (intended to deal with potential or actual 3.9 In common with CONTEST we will offenders) from protection (intended to publish an annual report on the progress of reduce the vulnerability of the state, private this work. sector and people in the UK) will give more coherence to both areas of work. Having 3.10 Annex A explains the governance of an area of work devoted to preparation or the strategy and Annex B explains the roles contingency planning (planning for organised and responsibilities of the departments and crime which does take place) will enable us agencies concerned. to provide better support to victims and to communities affected by persistent organised criminality. It will also help ensure we have in place measures to deal with cyber attacks by criminal groups. 3.6 The application of this comprehensive framework to serious and organised crime will in some areas differ significantly from its application to terrorism. These are different threats. Preventing terrorism, for example, requires different techniques and resources from preventing organised crime. Protecting against a terrorist attack is a different challenge from protecting against an organised crime. But applied in different ways, the common framework will also enable us to much better identify common features to our work against organised crime and counter-terrorism and develop closer coordination between the two. 3.7 This strategy sets out strategic objectives for each of the four main areas of work and provides details on supporting programmes. Tactical operational objectives (e.g. priority crime groups) will be determined PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and organised crime 27

PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and organised crime

Success in PURSUE will mean that: • At home, relentless disruption of serious and organised crime and the prosecution of those responsible reduces the threats we face • Overseas, better international collaboration drawing on wider resources more effectively disrupts global organised crime Our objectives will be to:

i. Establish strong organisations and effective collaboration to lead work against serious and organised crime ii. Develop our capabilities to detect, investigate, prosecute and disrupt serious and organised crime iii. Attack criminal finances by making it harder to move, hide and use the proceeds of crime iv. Ensure that effective legal powers are available and are used to deal with the threat from serious and organised crime v. Internationally, improve our own capabilities and our cooperation with others to better tackle organised crime networks i. Establish strong organisations and how they will collaborate with the police and effective collaboration to and other departments. lead work against serious and National organised crime 4.2 The new National Crime Agency (NCA), 4 .1 Ensuring that effective organisations established by the Crime and Courts Act are in place at national, regional and local 201340, will lead our work against serious and levels, and at the UK border, is the first step in organised crime. It will develop a single transforming our overall response to serious authoritative intelligence picture of serious and organised crime. This section sets out and organised crime in the UK, assuming for the new organisations which have been established, their roles and responsibilities, 40 HM Government (2013) Crime and Courts Act http://www. legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/22/contents/enacted 28 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

these issues the role that the Joint Terrorism 4.5 The new NCA Economic Crime Analysis Centre (JTAC) has successfully Command (ECC) will work on financial performed for the terrorist threat. It will then crime with the City of London Police (which coordinate the law enforcement response, will remain the lead police force for fraud). ensuring that action against criminals and The City of London Police will assume organised criminal groups is prioritised responsibility for creating a stronger end according to the threat they present. The to end system between the Action Fraud NCA will lead some operations and support reporting system and the National Fraud others. It will coordinate the relentless Intelligence Bureau (see 6.20). disruption of major organised crime groups 4.6 The ECC will also work with the and their arrest and prosecution. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which now protects and regulates the UK financial services industry and alongside HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), which will remain the lead agency for tackling fiscal fraud. 4.7 The National Cyber Crime Unit (NCCU) of the NCA will lead on the law enforcement investigation of cyber crime as we have 4.3 The success of the NCA depends on defined it in the introduction to this strategy the closest collaboration with the police and (see 2.54). It will aim to identify and prosecute other law enforcement agencies, notably the people engaged in cyber attacks in this major metropolitan police forces in England country. It will also support investigations into and Wales (Metropolitan Police Service, West cyber-enabled crimes, providing technical Midlands Police, Greater Manchester Police, support where that is necessary. Merseyside Police and West Yorkshire Police), Police Scotland and the Police Service of 4.8 The NCA has a UK-wide remit to fight Northern Ireland (PSNI), and with the security serious and organised crime. But policing is and intelligence agencies. The basis of these devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In relationships must be the sharing of intelligence Northern Ireland the activities of the NCA are and operational capabilities to pursue common restricted to reserved and excepted matters41. and agreed priorities. We regard coordination 4.9 The NCA Director General will be on counter-terrorism as a model in this respect. directly accountable to the Home Secretary 4.4 The NCA will comprise four operational who will determine the strategic priorities for commands responsible for organised crime, the Agency. The Director General has full economic crime, borders and international control over the NCA’s operational activities. work, and child exploitation and online The Agency will publish an annual plan and a protection. It will have a new National Cyber report on its performance. Crime Unit. The NCA will also have a unit to coordinate investigations into the most serious corruption cases in the UK. At the core of the NCA will be a new multi-agency intelligence hub which will draw intelligence together on 41 The Northern Ireland Executive did not take forward legislative all these issues, and inform tasking and the consent for the NCA in Northern Ireland. As a result, Part 1 allocation of operational resources. of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, which creates the NCA, is subject to Schedule 24 to the Act, which sets out those sections which do not apply to Northern Ireland. Ibid. PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and organised crime 29

Regional crime, police intelligence assets and other specialist police units will continue to be vital 4 .10 We are making further changes to the and, in numerical terms, police resources regional response to serious and organised will continue to outnumber significantly crime in England and Wales. those of the NCA and ROCUs. The NCA will inform, coordinate, lead and support but 4 .11 There are currently nine police the relationship with police forces must at all Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs) in times be close and collaborative. England and Wales which provide capability to investigate serious and organised crime 4 .14 Chief constables and police and crime across police force boundaries. Chief commissioners will need to assure constables, supported by police and crime themselves that sufficient capabilities are commissioners, are leading a programme to available at regional and force level to increase ROCU capabilities, specifically in the respond to the threat, risk and harm posed areas of intelligence collection and analysis, by serious and organised crime in their force asset recovery, fraud, cyber crime, prison areas, in accordance with the terms of the intelligence and the provision of witness Strategic Policing Requirement42. protection. The Home Office is investing additional funding in these capabilities and we expect significant change by the end of 2014. ROCUs will work alongside 18 regional NCA offices. Wherever possible, we expect them to be co-located. 4 .12 The ROCUs also have an important leadership role in facilitating information- sharing across agencies and departments about serious and organised crime. Each ROCU will have a Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) coordinator at both a strategic and tactical level. The core 4 .15 Arrangements for dealing with serious membership of the GAIN includes the police, and organised crime across police forces national law enforcement agencies and other vary. But there are many good examples agencies such as Trading Standards and the of local police force units, supported by Environment Agency. Central government specialist force assets and, prior to the NCA, departments will ensure that representatives by SOCA, having the lead responsibility for from agencies they are responsible for and ownership of the response to specific local which have an investigative remit will take an organised crime groups. Some police forces active part in the network. are ensuring that all organised crime groups resident in, or having an impact on their force area, will have a named local responsible Local officer. Wherever possible, we believe, this should be standard practice. 4 .13 Most of the work against serious and organised criminals in this country will 42 Home Office (2012) Strategic Policing Requirement https:// continue to be conducted by police forces. www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ Police teams responsible for organised attachment_data/file/117445/strategic-policing-requirement. pdf 30 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

Operation Cobweb (Merseyside): this operation demonstrates how a local police unit can target an organised crime group for which it is responsible. A Neighbourhood Inspector regularly deployed Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) to addresses linked to local organised crime to gather intelligence about individuals and vehicles. While patrolling one address, a PCSO submitted intelligence about a vehicle which was later stopped and found to contain illegal drugs and money. The subsequent arrest of a principal crime group member led to a multi-million pound international money laundering investigation and ultimately to the disruption of a violent and established organised crime group that had operated untouched for years.

4 .16 Local action against serious and (e.g. Community Safety Partnerships or organised crime must draw on the information Gang Management Units). We believe and powers of many agencies and that police and crime commissioners departments. There are already innovative should play a leading role in identifying and and productive local partnerships providing establishing the appropriate body; it should police forces with support to deal with have representatives from the police, local organised crime (e.g. Operation Challenger authorities, education, health and social care, in Manchester which was established and immigration enforcement. The effect following the murder of two police officers must be to bring the full range of powers to in 2012). These partnerships are essential bear locally against serious and organised to the success of this strategy and should crime. become standard practice. They will be 4 .18 Partnerships will need a common supported by and coordinated with the NCA. understanding of the threat. Reflecting Local partnerships should also play a further learning from counter-terrorism (notably important role in Prevent, Protect and Prepare. the development of what are known as 4 .17 The precise structure for local multi- Counter Terrorism Local Profiles), we want agency partnerships to deal with serious police forces and the NCA to develop and and organised crime will vary across the share local profiles of serious and organised country. In some areas it may be best to crime. They should describe local serious adapt an existing group for this purpose and organised criminal activity and criminal PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and organised crime 31

markets, associated front companies and police counter-terrorist assets at the border related community issues. on crime work when resources and priorities permit. The UK border 4.22 Home Office Immigration Enforcement delivers the national investigative response 4.19 A significant proportion of serious and to those who break immigration laws. It organised crime involves the movement of prosecutes organised immigration crime and people, goods and money across the UK’s uses immigration powers against foreign border. Criminals look continuously to exploit nationals who commit crime. This is a key potential vulnerabilities in our border security capability which we wish to develop further arrangements. The border also provides an (see 4.67-4.71). opportunity for law enforcement to intervene 4.23 We are streamlining tasking at the against and disrupt serious and organised border as well as improving how intelligence crime. is collected and shared across the agencies. 4.20 The Border Policing Command (BPC) We will create Joint Border Intelligence Units of the NCA will lead work against serious (comprising NCA, Border Force and Special and organised crime at the border, including Branch) for this purpose. organised immigration crime and human trafficking. The NCA will be responsible ii. Develop our capabilities to for compiling a new classified Border Risk Assessment (covering all threats) and control detect, investigate, prosecute and strategy which for the first time will inform disrupt serious and organised and coordinate all joint law enforcement crime operational activity. 4.21 The NCA will work closely with the 4.24 Building capabilities is essential if Border Force which is responsible for we are to make an impact on serious and detecting threats and seizing illicit goods, organised crime: organisational change and checking immigration status, searching new roles and responsibilities will not on baggage, vehicles and cargo for illicit goods their own be enough. Most of the capabilities or illegal immigrants, patrolling the UK we need will be in the NCA and policing. In coastline and searching vessels. Border some areas, such as cyber crime, economic Force has an important intelligence gathering crime and child sexual exploitation, specific function. The BPC will also be able to task capabilities are needed if we are to keep pace with constantly-evolving threats. 4.25 The NCA has over 40 operational capabilities across a range of areas. The Home Secretary’s strategic priorities for the NCA specifically include developing technical and human capabilities to enable a step change in our impact on serious and organised crime. 4.26 The Strategic Policing Requirement, issued by the Home Secretary, sets out 32 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

details of what the police need to be capable and improve the capability to identify and of doing to tackle national threats – which safeguard victims. include organised crime and dealing with a 4.32 Cyber crime investigations involve large-scale cyber incident. Police and crime the examination of new criminal online tools commissioners must hold chief constables (e.g. malware) and require continuously to account for having, or having access to, a improving digital forensic analysis techniques, range of capabilities identified as essential for for example to deal with the increased tackling these national threats. use of encryption and anonymisation to 4.27 Not all the capabilities which will be hide real-world identities. The government needed can be considered here. Investigating has committed £860 million over five financial crime and operating internationally years through the National Cyber Security are dealt with in more detail elsewhere (see Programme, which includes building up 4.45 and 4.61 respectively). these capabilities in law enforcement. Further 4.28 Police forces in England and Wales funding in 2013/14 will be used to develop and all national law enforcement agencies new intelligence and operational capabilities will determine how best to deploy their for the National Cyber Crime Unit, establish capabilities against serious and organised cyber crime hubs in all ROCUs and deliver crime, led by intelligence and prioritised to cyber crime training to 5,000 police officers best reduce the threat. For the first time, by 2015. this will involve the consistent application of Data analysis 43 the National Intelligence Model to inform 4.33 The collection and analysis of bulk priorities and deployment. data are essential to the investigation and Intelligence and investigation disruption of serious and organised crime. 4.29 Many of the new capabilities required Much of this data is derived from government by the NCA and policing (and indeed departments but some comes from the by other agencies) relate to the ability to private sector. The NCA will put in place collect intelligence about and investigate bulk data processing capabilities which can crimes planned or committed online and, in fuse data obtained lawfully from multiple particular, cyber crime. sources on multiple themes, including economic crime, cyber crime and child sexual 4.30 The NCA will need to develop exploitation. capabilities to better collect, analyse and exploit internet-based communications. This Firearms will require new technology, infrastructure, 4.34 Firearms are a feature of organised significant new skills and business change. crime. We have some good existing 44 4.31 Some aspects of cyber crime, notably capabilities to track and identify their use . child sexual exploitation, require specific We want to develop more capability to disrupt new capabilities. A new national database illegal importation and online procurement of child abuse images will enable the rapid and identify other sources of supply. We identification of online images of sexual need to develop counter-measures for the exploitation to support evidence-gathering imminent risk that 3D printing will facilitate the manufacture of weapons or parts of weapons. We can see a further role for the 43 The National Intelligence Model (NIM) is an intelligence led process to inform deployment decisions at a local, regional and national level. 44 http://www.nabis.police.uk/home.asp PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and organised crime 33

EU in setting standards for deactivation of develop further our early warning systems to weapons so they are rendered permanently identify new psychoactive substances and harmless. when necessary, ban them quickly. Disruption Coordination and communications 4.38 The NCA will put in place a new system to manage all investigations, operations and projects throughout their life cycle. It will cover all NCA-led and supported operations and will mean that activity is better planned, authorised, prioritised and tracked. The NCA will develop a tool to provide live management information on the status of officer availability, workloads, skills and duties. 4.39 This work will be supported by a new national secure communications infrastructure which will connect the police, ROCUs, NCA and other national law enforcement agencies and enable the real-time flow of intelligence, information and operational briefing. The NCA and ROCUs are building additional capability to receive and share intelligence from sensitive sources through a network of accredited confidential units. People skills 4.40 NCA officers will have the ability to conduct investigations across all its responsibilities. Compared to precursor agencies, a greater proportion of NCA 4.35 Relentless disruption of organised officers will be ‘triple warranted’, holding the crime and organised criminals by all available powers of a police constable, immigration means – not just prosecution – is a key officer and customs officer to arrest, search, theme in this strategy. Successful disruption seize, require information and recover criminal depends on local police ownership of crime assets. The NCA will develop rewarding groups and better local coordination. career paths for officers in emerging 4.36 But disruption capabilities are not specialist fields such as cyber forensics and always obvious. The NCA will develop a digital analysis. It will second its officers to new national disruptions manual providing partner agencies to ensure that they have guidance, based on the best collective the broadest range of skills and experience knowledge of law enforcement and other possible and partner agency officers will be partners, on tools and tactics to disrupt seconded into the NCA. serious and organised crime. 4.41 The Agency will recruit volunteer 4.37 Particular crime types call for some officers known as ‘NCA Specials’. They particular responses. For example, we will will bring a range of specialist skills not 34 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

traditionally found in law enforcement iii. Attack criminal finances by agencies. Some may be financial and technology experts. Subject to suitability tests, making it harder to move, hide NCA Specials may be designated with the and use the proceeds of crime powers of a police constable in England and Wales. Recovering the proceeds of crime 4.42 Border organisations will develop a 4.45 We are currently using powers under shared accredited training and continuous the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA)46 to professional development programme for recover over £150 million of criminal profits intelligence officers. each year and to deny criminals access to even larger amounts (£500 million in 2012/13). Convergence: counter-terrorism and But these sums are still small when organised crime compared to the scale and cost of serious 4.43 Over the next few years we need to and organised crime to the UK economy. develop closer collaboration and sharing of capabilities between the police and agency networks that work on counter-terrorism and organised crime45. Having a common strategic framework will help. Many capability requirements are similar. In some areas targets do overlap (i.e. people connected with organised crime are facilitating terrorism). There are particular areas where greater collaboration is needed, including at the border (where much has been achieved), in prisons, and on technical issues, protective security, financial crime and money 4.46 POCA is under sustained legal laundering. challenge from criminals who are constantly 4.44 We also want to see the co-location seeking new ways to avoid its reach and of regional police units which deal with frustrate asset recovery. We need to continue organised crime and counter-terrorism to improve the asset recovery system by: wherever possible, and their co-location with • amending our powers; NCA regional offices. • ensuring enforcement of court orders; • better recovery of assets hidden overseas; and • implementation of new money laundering regulations.

46 HM Government (2002), The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) POCA enables law enforcement agencies to seize 45 HM Government (2010) Securing Britain in an Age of cash, to confiscate profits through the criminal courts Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review following a conviction, to use the civil courts to recover https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic­ assets even where there has been no conviction, and to defence-and-security-review-securing-britain-in-an-age-of­ use tax powers to pursue criminal proceeds http://www. uncertainty legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/contents PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and organised crime 35

Effective powers • removing the requirement for criminals to 4.47 Criminals are exploiting POCA sign a consent form before assets can proceedings to delay the asset recovery be realised so as to reduce delays to the process, for example by not attending proceedings; and court for the confiscation hearing after the • reducing the opportunities for criminals to conviction; third party claims are also used to avoid confiscation orders by introducing reduce the amount of money that is available travel restrictions and tightening bail for recovery. POCA allows for a default prison restrictions. sentence where criminals refuse to pay a 4.50 HMRC has used tax interventions (and confiscation order, but criminals may serve other powers) to attack the finances of and the sentence and still refuse to pay, knowing prosecute criminals involved in drugs, human that the option of prison can only be used trafficking and a range of other crime types. once. HMRC will double the size of its Criminal 4.48 The Home Office will legislate to Taxes Unit by 2015. close these and other loopholes as soon Enforcement of court orders as Parliamentary time allows by ensuring courts have the powers they need to compel 4.51 Robust powers are only as effective attendance at confiscation hearings; ensuring as their enforcement. Under this government, that criminal assets cannot be hidden with there has been a renewed focus on spouses, associates or other third parties; enforcement and record levels of financial and by substantially strengthening the prison penalties are being collected, but there sentences for failing to pay confiscation remains a significant gap between the orders so as to prevent offenders from confiscation orders that are made and those choosing to serve prison sentences rather that are collected, which varies between than pay confiscation orders. £80m and £170m each year. There is a range of reasons for this, including where the 4.49 We will aim to strengthen other areas individual has died, been deported or where of POCA by: criminals have gone to extraordinary lengths • enabling assets to be frozen more quickly to hide the proceeds of their crimes by and earlier in investigations; transferring funds abroad or disguising them • simplifying the process for low-value with friends and family. Cracking down on confiscation orders so that these cases those who do not pay is an absolute priority. can be heard more quickly and cheaply 4.52 To close this gap: in the Magistrates’ Courts rather than the • HM Courts and Tribunal Service, the Crown Court; CPS and NCA will use their powers in • significantly reducing the time that concentrated enforcement activity against the courts can give offenders to pay outstanding confiscation orders; these confiscation orders, including rapid agencies will work together to maximise confiscation of cash held in bank accounts; the assets removed from serious and • extending the investigative powers in organised criminals. Those who do not POCA so that they are available to trace pay can go to prison; assets once the confiscation order is • the Home Office and Ministry of Justice made (at the moment those powers fall will explore how private sector forensic away once the order is made); accountancy skills can be brought into 36 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

the end-to-end asset recovery process Task Force (FATF), are intended to ensure so that the maximum profits are identified, controls and procedures are in place to pursued and recovered; and counter the risk of money laundering and • the Home Office and Ministry of Justice terrorist financing across a number of sectors. will draw on the success of the Fraud, EU and UK legislation reflect these standards Error and Debt Taskforce to apply to by placing anti-money laundering (AML) confiscation orders the successful obligations on businesses to prevent misuse techniques used to reduce benefit of the financial system. and tax fraud. This includes the use 4.56 In October 2012, following a of behavioural insight techniques on government review, amendments to the targeted communication to late payers47 AML regulations came into force to reduce and advanced data mining to cross­ the regulatory burden and make the overall check information from across different supervisory regime more robust, effective government departments. and proportionate. HMRC, for example, Recovery of hidden assets overseas was given powers regarding the regulation of money service businesses (MSBs) which 4.53 Criminal assets moved overseas can have already been used to good effect. be hard to reach. We depend on mutual legal The amendments added an information assistance from other countries to enforce sharing gateway for all AML supervisors, orders on our behalf, and these orders may allowing them to share information among not be given priority. Some countries are themselves in the context of their AML duties, witting or unwitting safe havens for criminal which means information and intelligence on assets. specific threats and details of those involved 4.54 Agreement has been reached with in or supporting money laundering can be Spain to facilitate the recovery of assets and shared across sectors. make Spain a more hostile place for UK 4.57 AML regulations have been tested by criminals. The Home Office has negotiated the development of new payment products asset-sharing agreements with other and methods such as pre-paid cards and countries, including China and the United virtual currencies (such as Bitcoin) which Arab Emirates, to encourage them to enforce can be used to launder proceeds of crime, our orders. Levels of assets recovered from fund illegal activities and where there is no overseas against confiscation orders are low obligation to report transactions to regulators. but improving. The Home Office will work The Home Office and HM Treasury will with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office review how current arrangements can be (FCO) and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) strengthened to address new payment to sign further asset-sharing agreements with products and methods. We will also other key countries including Romania, South consider if new developments in currency Africa and Ghana. transfer should be brought within the remit Anti-money laundering (AML) regulations of regulators, how to identify when such transactions enter and leave the regulated 4.55 International standards, agreed by the sector, and how to bring new products and 36 member states of the Financial Action virtual currencies more easily within the reach of POCA. This will be supported by 47 One pilot by HMRC using targeted text messages to previous HM Treasury and the Home Office work late payers of tax produced a 5% improvement in payment of tax. with law enforcement and the public and PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and organised crime 37

private sectors to produce a National Risk Assessment (NRA) on money laundering which will identify threats and vulnerabilities and share information to help tackle risks. iv. Ensure that effective legal powers are available and are used to deal with the threat from serious and organised crime

4.58 The law makes available a broad set of powers to prosecute and punish individuals for committing any of the criminal offences that could be considered as serious or organised crime. In the light of experience and the evolving nature of the threat, we believe that, beyond changes to POCA (see 4.47-4.49) there are further legislative gaps 4.60 We will bring forward proposals to: which need to be filled. • better tackle people who actively support, 4.59 We have already taken action to: and benefit from, participating in organised

48 crime, learning from legislation that is already • create new powers to break down 51 barriers to information sharing between being used elsewhere in the world ; law enforcement agencies; • improve our response to human • support a Private Members’ Bill, now trafficking. We will publish a draft Modern enacted, to tackle social housing fraud by Slavery Bill later this year for pre-legislative creating new criminal offences of unlawful scrutiny and will consider measures sub-letting and new powers to recover to: strengthen the law enforcement the profits49; and response to increase investigations, prosecutions and convictions; increase • increase to life imprisonment the maximum the penalities for those who are convicted sentence for the illegal importation of of a trafficking offence; and restrict the firearms and introduce a new offence activities of those who are convicted of a of possession of illegal firearms for sale human trafficking offence to prevent them or transfer (also subject to a maximum from participating in further trafficking penalty of life imprisonment)50. related activity; • ensure that the police and the CEOP Command within the NCA, have the powers they need to tackle indecent 48 Crime and Courts Act 2013 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/2013/22/contents/enacted images of children on the internet; 49 Prevention of Social Housing Fraud Act 2013 http://www. legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/3/contents/enacted 51 UNODC (2004) Legislative Guide for the United Nations 50 HM Government (2013) Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Policing Bill http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/ Protocols thereto http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/ cbill/2013-2014/0093/cbill_2013-20140093_en_1.htm CTOC/legislative-guide.html , para 48 38 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

• create new powers to seize and detain 4.62 But the links between organised crime chemical substances suspected of being here and countries overseas are changing. used as cutting agents for illegal drugs, This is partly a function of evolving crime to drive up the cost and risk for organised types. Cyber criminals, drugs trafficking criminals; networks, people engaged in child sexual • amend the Computer Misuse Act 1990 exploitation and crime groups responsible to update existing offences to cover for human trafficking operations all have a importing tools for cyber crime (such different international profile. International as data or programmes designed for work on organised crime is becoming more unlawfully accessing a computer system); complex: we need to deal with more crime and types in more countries, some of which have immature law enforcement capabilities • deliver the UK’s G8 commitment and legislation. Capacity building, across to improve the transparency of the government and in coordination with other ownership and control of companies, states, is essential. making it harder to conceal criminal activity, including organised crime, behind 4.63 On organised crime, in common with company structures52. The UK committed counter-terrorism, as we share intelligence, to require companies to obtain and hold conduct joint operations and build capacity accurate and current information on their in other states we must uphold human rights beneficial ownership and to a central at all times. Like SOCA, the NCA will follow registry of information of companies’ the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance beneficial ownership, maintained by (Human Rights) guidance published by Companies House53. the government in 2011. This provides officials and law enforcement officers with clear guidance to help identify and mitigate v. Internationally, improve our own potential human rights risks. capabilities and our cooperation Effective international representation with others to better tackle 4.64 To date, our international organised organised crime networks crime response has been led by the SOCA liaison officer network. The network has 4.61 Organised crime is international. Crime had considerable success and in 2012/13 groups in this country make connections it facilitated the seizure of over 60 tonnes of overseas to facilitate criminal activity. Groups cocaine and nearly 5 tonnes of heroin and the based overseas very often operate here. arrest of 1,500 people. The SOCA network Cyber criminals can target victims in this will become part of the NCA Border Policing country from anywhere around the world. Command (see 4.20). 4.65 The NCA liaison officer network will deal with all the crime types for which the 52 G8 (2013); G8 Action Plan Principles to Prevent the Misuse of NCA is responsible. We will develop a revised Companies and Legal Arrangements list of priority countries. Choices need to be www.gov.uk/government/publications/common-principles­ on-misuse-of-companies-and-legal-arrangements informed by evidence and tested against 53 G8 (2013); G8 Action Plan Principles to Prevent the Misuse of assessments of the threats we face made Companies and Legal Arrangements not only in the NCA but also in the Joint www.gov.uk/government/publications/common-principles­ on-misuse-of-companies-and-legal-arrangements Intelligence Committee. Burden-sharing PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and organised crime 39 produced in India produced can be traced back to " organised crime groups organised crime groups organised criminal groups organised criminal groups Organised criminals source Organised criminals source a source country for human a source victims of human trafficking, " operating in China. Chinese Counterfeit goods (including trafficking, including children substances, cyber crime and operating in Russia ! operate in the UK. Vietnam is medicines), new psychoactive new psychoactive substances The UK is targeted by cyber criminals through the United Arab Emirates ! through operate in the UK source of human trafficking to the UK source Organised criminals attempt to launder money Iran and Pakistan . is a major through Most heroin and half the cannabis resin entering and half the cannabis resin Most heroin the UK is produced in Afghanistan and trafficked the UK is produced human trafficking, including for the purposes of sexual Eastern is an entry point for drugs, tobacco and Europe is a source country for converted in Lithuania . Albania is a source are are a source for firearms and for firearms a source exploitation, and the Balkans are firearms, and a source of organised immigration crime. Firearms of organised immigration crime. Firearms and a source firearms, human trafficking to the UK. Organised criminals from this region this region human trafficking to the UK. Organised criminals from

East Africa is a major organised crime groups organised crime groups the UK. Many UK-linked transit region for heroin to for heroin transit region operate from South Africa operate from immigration crime to the UK is a major transit route for organised is a major transit route is a key transit route for heroin for heroin is a key transit route Turkey to Western Europe and the UK. Greece to Western Europe which is also a source country for which is also a source cyber criminals operating in Nigeria , UK. The UK is targeted by fraud and cocaine and human trafficking to the is a key transit region for Africa is a key transit region West human trafficking to the UK, including for the purposes of sexual exploitation route to the UK route point for illicit drugs and firearms en point for illicit drugs and firearms The Netherlands is used for money laundering and is a major distribution and Bolivia Serious and Organised Crime Overseas investment from the UK investment from Europe and the UK Europe from the United States of America from for cocaine destined by cyber criminals operating in Brazil are , and Ecuador are Brazil , Venezuela transit routes for cocaine destined transit routes are key Spain , Italy and Belgium are Most handguns trafficked to the UK are Most handguns trafficked to the UK are Europe and the UK. The UK is targeted Europe Spain attracts considerable criminal be an important transit route be an important transit route The Caribbean continues to UK is produced in Peru , Colombia UK is produced The majority of cocaine entering the European entry points for illicit drugs. European 40 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

with close allies will be essential to avoid foreign nationals who have self-declared an duplication. incorrect nationality or a false identity remains 4.66 We also need to better coordinate challenging. But many more foreign national UK resources deployed overseas on crime offenders have been identified in police issues. We will pilot a single platform custody suites and, where they have been approach where law enforcement officers found to be in breach of immigration law and from a range of agencies will work as a single are not being prosecuted, they have been virtual team, improving coordination and removed from the UK and prevented from reducing duplication. returning for at least 10 years. Foreign nationals and organised crime in 4.70 We need to accelerate Nexus by the UK automating and improving access for Immigration Enforcement and the police 4.67 Our own research and organised crime to each others’ biometric databases. group mapping suggest that between 13% We need to make more use of existing and 22% of organised criminals in the UK are immigration powers, including curtailment foreign nationals. In London the Metropolitan or refusal of leave to remain or entry to Police assesses that foreign nationals the UK, deportation, exclusion and refusal comprise at least 25% of high-harm offenders of naturalisation. Nexus has already been (including organised crime group members extended to the West Midlands. Planning is and predatory sex offenders). underway to extend it further to other police 4.68 We need to be able to accurately and forces. This is a high priority. quickly identify foreign nationals who commit 4.71 The roll-out of Nexus is essential in serious and organised crime whilst in the dealing with foreign national offenders already UK, ensure that their full offending history is in the UK. We also need wherever possible to quickly established and either prosecute or stop foreign national offenders coming here in immediately remove them from this country. the first place. International sharing of data on But we also want to ensure that all available serious and organised criminals is vital for this information and legal powers are used to purpose. The second generation Schengen prevent the entry to this country of people Information System (SISII) will be useful but with a history of serious offending or who we we will want to establish further data sharing believe may become involved in serious and agreements where required54. organised crime once they arrive here. UK criminals overseas 4.69 Since October 2012, the Metropolitan Police and Home Office Immigration 4.72 Many serious and organised criminals Enforcement have run a joint operation with British nationality operate against this known as Nexus, sharing intelligence to country from overseas. Some are fugitives. identify foreign national offenders at the In Spain, the Netherlands and Cyprus point of arrest. The police and Immigration collaborative work by SOCA (including their Enforcement have worked closely on liaison officers stationed in those countries) Nexus with the UK Central Authority for and the FCO, supported by publicity provided the Exchange of Criminal Records (UKCA­ 54 SIS II is an EU-wide Law Enforcement system which contains ECR) and other international policing data on people including international fugitives and missing agencies (Europol and Interpol) to access people and lost or stolen objects/property. The data is circulated to all member states in the form of “alerts”. These international criminal records. Identifying alerts will be made available to UK law enforcement officers via the Police National Computer (PNC). PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and organised crime 41

by Crimestoppers, helped to locate the most to work against serious and organised wanted criminals believed to be abroad. This crime will continue to be handled by the will continue in the NCA. We want to extend Home Office, the FCO and UK Trade and this collaborative approach to other countries. Investment. SISII will again facilitate this work. Organised crime work, the EU and wider Capacity and capability building in third collaboration countries 4.76 Many of our most important allies 4.73 Over the past few years SOCA has against organised crime are in Europe. helped to build the capacity and the capability European institutions, notably Europol, are of law enforcement agencies overseas, in also vital for our organised crime work. countries of particular importance to our 4.77 The EU has a legislative framework work on organised crime here. This capacity- for cooperation between its member states building will continue, coordinated by the on serious and organised crime. Under the NCA’s overseas network in conjunction terms of the Lisbon Treaty, the Government with the FCO, Department for International is required to decide by 2014 whether we opt Development (DFID) and the CPS. The CPS out of, or remain bound by, all of those EU has a network of Criminal Justice Advisers police and criminal justice measures adopted tasked to develop criminal justice capacity prior to the entry into the Treaty. In July, the overseas. UK military assets can also help Prime Minister informed the EU Council of to build capacity in priority countries. DFID Ministers that the Government has decided to work to develop good governance and the opt out of all pre-Lisbon police and criminal rule of law is vital to the work against serious justice measures (more than 130 in total). and organised crime. It can deal with the The opt-out will take effect on 1 December root causes of criminality and address the 2014. This does not affect those measures preconditions for a successful response. we have joined since the Lisbon Treaty 4.74 We will need to continue capacity- entered into force on 1 December 2009. The building in future. In key countries (such as Home Secretary has announced that the Afghanistan) it will need to be coordinated UK will seek to rejoin a set of 35 pre-Lisbon with international counterparts to ensure measures which we regard as important effective burden-sharing and avoid for our cooperation on policing and criminal duplication. justice. 4.75 We expect that the scope of capacity- 4.78 We intend to continue to use the building will increase. Most countries are now European Arrest Warrant (EAW) which trying urgently to improve their legislative and allows the UK to extradite people involved enforcement response to cyber threats and in organised crime and bring them to justice online crime. The FCO Capacity Building in the UK. But we want to improve how the Fund will support cyber skills development in EAW works in practice, by introducing a priority countries. In common with counter­ proportionality bar in legislation. We want to terrorism, we intend to coordinate capacity use SISII (to which we are due to connect building much more closely with our UK at the end of 2014) and the European security industry which has developed many Investigation Order (EIO) which will streamline of the capabilities which third countries the current Mutual Legal Assistance now require. Coordination with the security framework for gathering and transferring industry on opportunities overseas connected 42 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

criminal evidence between participating EU member states. 4.79 We also want to continue to support and work with Europol (in the last 12 months, UK law enforcement agencies have been involved in more than 300 major Europol operations against serious and organised crime). In particular, we will work closely with the European Cyber Crime Centre and with Interpol to encourage the development of effective protocols to manage global investigations to tackle cyber crime, including through national 24/7 Network contact points. We will continue to promote the use of Joint Investigation Teams under the auspices of Eurojust, which we believe are an effective means of coordinating and subsidising international operations in Europe and should become much more of a standard tool for law enforcement across England and Wales. 4.80 We will continue to keep serious and organised crime on the EU political agenda. We want to influence EU resources and spending, improving transparency and wherever possible making use of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to support UK organised crime (and counter­ terrorism) priorities. 4.81 We also depend on the quality of our international engagement with our close allies, including the United States, other ‘5-Eyes’ partners55, European States and multilateral organisations. We will encourage multilateral bodies, including the G8 and the UNODC to promote effective donor coordination and capacity and capability building.

55 The “5 Eyes” are allied partners comprising the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and organised crime 43

Tackling Human Trafficking

Since 2010, we have made progress in tackling human trafficking. Nevertheless, operational arrangements remain deficient: the intelligence picture is still incomplete; awareness of the problem and how to address it is low; and the means for leading and coordinating a comprehensive law enforcement response is lacking. We will address this by improving our understanding of traffickers, the routes and methods they use and the organised crime groups involved. We will prosecute more of those responsible and support those providing evidence (see 7.16). We will work to prevent people from becoming victims. Assessment of human trafficking will become a responsibility of the NCA’s intelligence hub. The hub will improve understanding of the threat through its access to new intelligence feeds. Border Force will also use its international network of risk and liaison officers to provide advice on the risk profile of potential victims before they enter the UK. The UK Human Trafficking Centre (UKHTC) will become part of the NCA and will provide expert advice to policing on the disruption and prosecution of offenders. It will develop and share new approaches to tackle human trafficking and will conduct targeted operations. The NCA will work collaboratively with ROCUs to tackle trafficking (see 4.11-4.12). To ensure police officers can identify offenders and victims, the College of Policing will deliver public protection training to all frontline officers. Border Force will also ensure all staff are trained to spot the signs of trafficking and know how to respond accordingly. Through the NCA’s overseas network, we will tackle human trafficking in source countries notably Vietnam, China, Albania, Nigeria, Romania and Poland. DFID programmes will tackle the factors which put people at risk of becoming victims (building on current anti-trafficking projects in India, Bangladesh and West Africa). The FCO will work with Governments to raise the profile of human trafficking and to lobby for changes in countries’ laws and practices We also want the private sector to play their part. Companies must be confident that they do not do business with suppliers involved in trafficking. The Home Office will work with businesses to ensure they take steps to protect their workforce, particularly through their supply chains. Travel operators also have a role to play in identifying and reporting suspicious travel activities that may be linked to the movement of people for trafficking. We will widen the Home Office training scheme to help airline staff, including check- in and cabin crew, to recognise possible signs of human trafficking amongst airline passengers. A confidential reporting number means airlines can advise Border Force before the plane lands in the UK. We will provide new leadership to tackle trafficking at a national, regional and local level. We will introduce a dedicated senior role to do this. 44 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy PREVENT: Preventing people from engaging in serious and organised crime 45

PREVENT: Preventing people from engaging in serious and organised crime

Success in PREVENT will mean that: • Fewer people engage in serious and organised criminal activity • We reduce reoffending by people convicted for serious and organised crime Our objectives will be to:

i. Deter people from becoming involved in serious and organised crime by raising awareness of the reality and consequences ii. Use interventions to stop people being drawn into different types of serious and organised crime iii. Develop techniques to deter people from continuing in serious and organised criminality iv. Establish an effective offender management framework to support work on Pursue and Prevent

5.1 We will not be able to tackle the threats into the criminal backgrounds of people who from serious and organised crime only by have become involved in organised crime disruption and prosecution. Just as we need in this country. With information held by law to prevent people being drawn into extremism enforcement and other academic research it and terrorism so we need to stop people informs the approach we have taken here. becoming involved in serious and organised 5.3 Amongst its findings, the research crime. This strategy introduces for the first established that 90% of organised crime time Prevent programmes for serious and offenders had received a criminal sanction54 organised crime, in England and Wales. before their first identified organised crime Pathways into Organised Crime offence, and on average they had been 5.2 Recent research from Lancaster sanctioned on nine occasions. A high University for the Home Office53, published proportion of the organised crime offenders alongside this strategy, provides an insight (57%) had received their first criminal sanction under the age of 18. The average age of people sanctioned for an organised crime 53 Home Office (2013) Understanding Criminal Careers in Organised Crime https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications/understanding-criminal-careers-in-organised­ 54 A sanction is a court conviction or a caution/warning/ crime reprimand recorded on the PNC database 46 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

offence was 32, and the majority of organised Prevent delivery crime offences were drug-related. 5.9 Like Prevent work in countering 5.4 Serious and organised crime offenders terrorism, we believe that most Prevent work showed little evidence of ‘specialising’ in on serious and organised crime should be particular types of offence; their criminal delivered locally. We have suggested (see histories covered a range of crime types. 4.16) that work on Pursue-related activity 5.5 We know from organised crime should in part be coordinated through a group mapping that in some local areas, law local organised crime partnership (either a enforcement intelligence indicates overlaps new body or a new agenda for a body which between street gangs and organised crime exists already). We believe that preventing groups. Organised criminals may use street serious and organised crime must also be gang members as part of their supply part of their agenda. chain, including street-level drug dealing 5.10 Organised crime Prevent work should or transporting drugs around the country. also be coordinated with work on preventing Street gangs may try to engage in organised terrorism. It may be possible in some areas criminal activity. for the same local team to take responsibility 5.6 Research55 has identified other factors for both issues. In many regions these that put people at greater risk of being drawn programmes will be operating in the same into organised crime. Having family or social geographical area: there is considerable links to organised crime and incurring a overlap between the priority places for both prison sentence (and proximity to organised these agendas. criminals) are both important. 5.11 Local delivery will be supported by a 5.7 This research highlights challenges and Home Office Organised Crime Prevent Unit, opportunities for preventing organised crime. which will coordinate national Prevent support There is no obvious single pathway into in local areas, and by the NCA. The Home organised criminality just as there is no single Office will establish a Prevent fund that local pathway into other crimes or terrorism. But partnerships can draw on to support Prevent significant numbers of organised crime have work and projects. a history of offending before their ‘career’ in organised crime begins. The connection with i. Deter people from becoming involvement in gangs is important. So are involved in serious and organised families and prisons – as they are in our work on Prevent and countering terrorism. crime by raising awareness of the 5.8 This strategy also covers aspects of reality and consequences serious crime which may not be organised but which require a national response. In the 5.12 Education and communications context of Prevent a key issue is child sexual programmes can deter people from getting exploitation and in particular cyber criminality. involved in organised crime; challenge These crime types have their own pathways attitudes to organised crime and the illicit which we also deal with below. and counterfeit commodities which it provides; and encourage communities to report organised crime and support law enforcement work against it. 55 e.g. Kleemans and de Poot (2008) Criminal Careers in Organized Crime and Social Opportunity Structure PREVENT: Preventing people from engaging in serious and organised crime 47

Education Reducing demand and improving 5 .13 A previous Home Office evidence reporting review56 identified a wide range of factors 5 .16 The Home Office is already committed which can encourage the involvement of to supporting communication projects which young people in criminality. Communication reduce the demand for the commodities and education programmes can influence five provided by organised crime. The national of these factors: lack of knowledge – young drugs advice service, ‘Talk to FRANK’, reflects people do not recognise criminality or its a commitment in the government’s Drug consequences; expectations – people may Strategy57 and has become a trusted source be accustomed to crime and have grown of balanced and credible advice to young to expect it; negative peer influences and people. The Crimestoppers ‘Fakes Fund the absence of positive role models; risky Crime’ campaign58, effectively drew attention impulsive behaviour coupled with the need to organised crime and counterfeit goods. for instant material reward and an absence 5 .17 Research59 has also shown that, when of other ways to obtain it; and a lack of people are helped to recognise organised perceived alternatives. crime and the serious harm it causes, they 5 .14 The Home Office will work alongside are more likely to report it. A recent Home the police and NCA with local groups, such Office-funded Crimestoppers campaign to as local authorities, schools, youth workers raise awareness of the role of organised and youth offending teams, to develop crime and cannabis cultivation led to a 25% educational resources which will explain what increase in public reporting and directly to organised crime looks like and help young arrests and seizures of drugs and plants. people to understand the consequences 5 .18 The Home Office will work with of involvement in it. Some of the projects government departments, law enforcement developed to raise awareness of radicalisation agencies, local authorities and voluntary may provide a template, notably the WRAP and public sector partners to coordinate (Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent) organised crime communications. DVD-based project which has reached some 44,000 people. Publicity about offenders and their crimes 5 .15 We also want to work with charitable 5 .19 The impact of serious and organised and civil society organisations, such as crime and the consequences for those Crimestoppers, Victim Support and NACRO, engaged in it can both be understated. to identify credible role models, including We need to correct this. We will publicise people who have left organised crime. Work more widely the identity and photographs conducted in partnership with the Prince’s of people convicted of offences related to Trust (as part of the Home Office’s ‘It Doesn’t organised crime and the assets which have Have to Happen’ knife crime campaign) found been removed from them. We believe that that using positive role models can be a powerful tool for demonstrating alternatives to 57 Home Office (2010) Reducing Demand, Restricting Supply, young people at risk of offending. Building Recovery Supporting people to live a drug free Life https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/98026/drug-strategy-2010.pdf 58 Crimestoppers (2013) Anti-Counterfeiting Campaign Evaluation 56 Ed Comms (2009) Drivers of Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour 59 Crimestoppers (2013) Commercial Cannabis Cultivation Among Young People. Evidence review (unpublished) Campaign Evaluation 48 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

Operation Challenger60 in Manchester offers professions involved is sufficiently well best practice in this area and we know that informed about contemporary organised other police forces are engaged in similar crime or as rigorous as we would like. work. We will work with the many organisations Informing and alerting professionals involved, notably the Anti-Money Laundering Supervisors Forum (which brings together 5.20 Organised crime cannot function the supervisors of the regulated sector61) and without the legitimate economy. Criminals will the Money Laundering Advisory Committee, seek to launder money through the financial chaired by the Home Office and HM Treasury. sector, or use the services of lawyers or accountants to invest in property or set up 5.22 The Government is also introducing front businesses. A small number of complicit compulsory licensing of private investigators or negligent professional enablers, such as (PIs). Licences will be issued by the Security bankers, lawyers and accountants can act 61 Supervisors of the regulated sector include: Law Societies of as gatekeepers between organised criminals England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, Financial Conduct Authority, HMRC, Solicitors Regulation Authority, and the legitimate economy. General Council of the Bar (England and Wales), General Council of the Bar (Northern Ireland), Faculty of Advocates 5.21 We are not yet satisfied that prevention (Scottish bar association), Association of Chartered Certified work with the regulators of the many Accountants, Institute of Chartered Accountants, Chartered Institute of Management Accountants, Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, Chartered Institute of 60 www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JVAip8eUPE and twitter.com/ Taxation, Gambling Commission, Insolvency Service and search?q=%23GMPpayback&src=typd Institute of Chartered Surveyors. PREVENT: Preventing people from engaging in serious and organised crime 49

Industry Authority (SIA) who will ensure that people with a criminal history which indicates that they are unsuitable for this work do not enter the profession. The SIA will also ensure that licensed PIs receive appropriate training and understand the relevant legal framework for example, their responsibilities under data protection legislation. It will be a criminal offence to operate without a licence. The new regime will begin to roll out from Autumn 2014. 5.23 Public sector employees are also at risk of becoming involved in fraud and corruption. In 2012 the National Fraud Authority developed an effective training package on how to counter fraud and corruption across national government, and guidance which advises local government on how to prevent fraud was distributed to local authorities. The Cabinet Office will work with public sector training providers to determine how counter-fraud and counter-corruption training could be delivered to all parts of the public sector. by 152 upper-tier local authorities and their ii. Use interventions to stop partners, is committed to helping 120,000 people being drawn into different troubled families in England turn their lives around by 2015. types of serious and organised 5.26 Over 80% of the 30 local authority crime areas with the highest number of troubled families are also in the police forces with the 5.24 Work to prevent serious and organised highest levels of organised crime. We believe crime needs to make better use of existing that the programme can deal with some government interventions and develop of the people who are at risk of turning to further projects to address specific groups organised crime and relevant families can be at particular risk. The Troubled Families referred where appropriate. Programme and Ending Gang and Youth Violence Programme are important. 5.27 The Home Office will work with the Troubled Families Team to develop evidence The Troubled Families Programme of the nature and extent of the troubled 5.25 This programme, launched in 2011, families/organised crime connection; is focused on families that have multiple monitor the referral mechanism; collaborate problems, disrupt the community around on appropriate interventions; and monitor them and put high costs on the public sector. outcomes. But in this, as in other areas of The programme, which is primarily delivered Prevent, we expect local authorities with 50 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

local expertise to take a leading role and 5.32 We will continue to work with we believe that managing referrals into and community leaders to support messages to from the Troubled Families Programme can offenders and potential offenders that child be a role for serious and organised crime abuse and exploitation are not tolerated in partnerships (see 4.16). any culture, faith or belief. The Sexual Violence Against Children and Vulnerable The Ending Gang and Youth Violence 62 Programme People (SVACV) National Group will ensure that case studies and lessons learned from 5.28 Preventing young people from police operations and court cases are made becoming involved in street gangs will available to law enforcement agencies so that reduce the risk that they become involved in they have the most current understanding of organised crime. offending patterns. 5.29 Since 2012 the Ending Gang and Youth Violence Programme has worked in 33 priority local areas, supported by a network of around 70 advisers with experience of dealing with gangs and youth violence. The programme involves local teachers, Jobcentre Plus staff, health service and safeguarding professionals, as well as the police, youth offending teams and community groups. The programme also addresses the sexual exploitation of girls and young women by street gangs. An assessment of the programme will be published later this year. 5.30 The Home Office will add people with experience of tackling serious and organised crime to the network of advisers on this programme, to provide first hand advice on how to identify and work with individual young people at risk of being drawn into serious or organised crime. This gang 5.33 The Prime Minister’s speech of programme should also be on the agenda for 22 July 2013 on child abuse online called local organised crime partnerships (see 4.16). on the main internet search engines (Google and Microsoft) to do more to tackle the Preventing Child Sexual Exploitation accessibility of child abuse images through 5.31 Child sexual abuse and exploitation the internet, building on the important work can take many different forms and are not they already do to identify and remove exclusive to any single culture or community. indecent images of children. Much of this is The police are working with other agencies to aimed at making it harder for paedophiles to identify not only those at risk of exploitation gain access to such images and delivering and abuse but also people, convicted or not, who may pose a risk to children and 62 A panel of experts and policy makers brought together by the Home Office to deliver more effective support for victims vulnerable people. of sexual exploitation established in April 2013 https://www. gov.uk/government/speeches/national-group-on-sexual­ violence-against-children-and-vulnerable-people PREVENT: Preventing people from engaging in serious and organised crime 51

deterrence messages to them when they try 5.37 The use of these interventions (see 5.38-5.39). But it also includes steps to has increased in recent years, but law deal with speculative offenders that could be enforcement can make more use of them. drawn into child sexual exploitation. The Home Office will work with the NCA, 5.34 The CEOP Command of the NCA law enforcement leadership and the College is working with the internet industry and of Policing to support law enforcement non-governmental organisations to deter officers in more routinely seeking injunctions individuals from seeking to locate and and ancillary orders to disrupt serious and view indecent images of children online. organised crime. The aim of this work is also to signpost 5.38 New forms of economic and cyber potential offenders to sources of support crime will require new forms of deterrence. and counselling to prevent further offending Influencing activity, such as warning letters behaviour. from law enforcement to individuals whose behaviour indicates they might be getting iii. Develop techniques to deter involved in criminal activity, can be effective. The City of London Police’s Tradebridge people from continuing in serious project brought together law enforcement and organised criminality and industry to target criminal groups engaged in digital piracy. The City of London 5.35 Wherever we can, we will prosecute Police sent ‘cease and desist’ notices to those involved in serious and organised people attempting to use illegal websites crime. But where we cannot, we will look to that infringe music copyright. We want to deter and disrupt engagement in organised see more initiatives of this kind. The NCA’s crime with a wide range of interventions that National Cyber Crime Unit will issue warning complement and, where appropriate, offer an emails to people who have registered an effective alternative to criminal investigations. interest in criminal websites (e.g. websites These interventions are relevant to both where stolen credit card details are bought the Pursue part of this strategy (because and sold). they disrupt organised crime) and to the 5.39 There are already arrangements Prevent programme (because they should through the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) also dissuade people from re-engaging in for sites containing illegal images to be either criminality). removed or blocked; ‘splash pages’ (warning 5.36 A range of interventions are already messages that appear in place of blocked in use including: Financial Reporting Orders; web pages) are now in place to deliver strong Serious Crime Prevention Orders; Travel deterrence messages to anyone who tries to Restriction Orders; Director Disqualification gain access to one of these pages. The IWF’s Orders; and Sexual Offences Prevention role is being expanded so that as well as Orders. Licence conditions are an important receiving reports of child abuse images, they part of this toolkit: they require offenders will also be able to proactively seek out these leaving prison following the custodial part of images. a sentence to follow certain requirements based on a case by case assessment of risk. 52 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

iv. Establish an effective offender management framework to support work on Pursue and Prevent

5.40 Lifetime management is a system for continually assessing the threat from a person who has been engaged in serious and organised crime, both before and after any conviction. Effective lifetime management identifies interventions which are appropriate for specific people and will have the greatest 5.42 It will be particularly important to impact in cutting crime and reducing their manage the movement of serious and reoffending. It includes, but goes much organised criminals through the criminal further than, other systems which manage justice system. The Police and the NCA an offender only after conviction for the will share with the National Offender duration of their licence conditions63; lifetime Management Service (NOMS) more details management can be used pre- and post- of people convicted of offences connected conviction and for as long as an individual to serious and organised crime and the risk is considered to be a threat. Lifetime they pose in prison and on probation and management is therefore a framework for will work with NOMS to actively manage the Pursue and Prevent. ongoing risk. Based on previous scoring 5.41 Lifetime management is the and intelligence, law enforcement will identify responsibility of the local police force, ROCU, priority targets for continued monitoring. or NCA Command which is taking the Released offenders will be subject to operational lead for the person concerned. risk-scoring and prioritisation to ensure a In all cases the NCA will assist in assessing managed return to the community, with the the risk that individuals or groups pose. The police and the NCA working closely with overall approach will be coordinated through the providers of probation services and 64 the NCA’s Prisons and Lifetime Management local Integrated Offender Management Threat Group, at which all key partners will arrangements, where appropriate. be represented. Success will depend upon improving information-sharing between law enforcement and their wider partners.

63 Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) and Integrated Offender Management (IOM) require local criminal 64 Integrated Offender Management (IOM) is a partnership justice agencies and other bodies dealing with offenders based, crime reduction approach that aims to achieve to work together in partnership to manage offenders. For maximum impact by tackling offenders who commit the more information see http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/ most crimes in a local area, or whose offending causes most offenders/mappa/mappa-guidance-2012-part1.pdf damage to the local community. PROTECT: Increasing protection against serious and organised crime 53

PROTECT: Increasing protection against serious and organised crime

Success in PROTECT will mean that: • We reduce our vulnerability to serious and organised crime, across government and the private sectors and among the public. Our objectives will be to: i. Protect our borders from serious and organised crime ii. Protect national and local government from serious and organised crime iii. Improve protective security in the private sector by sharing intelligence on threats from serious and organised crime iv. Protect people at risk of becoming the victims of serious and organised crime v. Improve our anti-corruption systems vi. Strengthen systems for establishing identity so that serious and organised criminals are denied opportunities to exploit false or stolen personal data

6.1 The purpose of the Pursue and the public. This matters when cyber tools Prevent components of this strategy is to and techniques (notably in connection with reduce the threats we face from serious and attempted fraud) enable organised criminals organised crime. The purpose of Protect and to reach a much larger number of people far Prepare is to reduce our vulnerability. This more quickly than ever before. requires a related but quite different set of 6.3 Corruption is a tool of organised crime. programmes, many of which build on work The UK has a good record of dealing with that has been done by SOCA, the police and this challenge. But we cannot afford to be other organisations. complacent and we have set out an explicit 6.2 Reducing vulnerability means line of work to deal with corruption in this increasing protective security across the strategy (see 6.34-6.44). public estate. But it also means providing as 6.4 According to a survey carried out for much advice as we can to the private sector the Annual Fraud Indicator (AFI) 2013 9% of who are targeted by serious and organised UK adults were a victim of identity theft in crime, notably through cyber-enabled fraud 201265; organised crime in particular makes and, increasingly, through cyber crime. The financial sector is particularly important. 65 National Fraud Authority (2013) Annual Fraud Indicator www. We must also provide effective advice to gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/206552/nfa-annual-fraud-indicator-2013.pdf 54 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

use of stolen identities. Better protecting upgrading and then replacing the Warnings identity reduces our vulnerability and makes Index System, the central database which crime harder. contains details of organised criminals who we do not want in this country. Procedures i. Protect our borders from for front-line Border Force staff taking action on the Warnings Index are also being serious and organised crime improved. The Government’s commitment to introducing exit checks will further increase our ability to stop criminals crossing the border. 6.8 Organised crime groups attempt to smuggle illicit and dangerous goods such as drugs and firearms into the country via large shipments of freight, fast parcel services and through passengers, their vehicles and luggage. The NCA and Border Force will improve intelligence-sharing with the fast parcel industry, seek opportunities 6.5 Border operations are complex, for upstream action against parcels before high-profile and high risk: over 100 million they reach the border, and carry out more people arrive in the UK each year through targeted intelligence-led operations against 139 entry points; and in 2011 Border Force parcels entering the border. staff seized 4 tonnes of class A drugs, 6.9 We have said previously66 that we 455 million cigarettes and thousands of need to develop closer collaboration between offensive weapons. Each year over £570 law enforcement agencies dealing with billion of international trade across the border counter-terrorism and organised crime. This generates £34 billion of customs and excise is particularly important at the border where duties and VAT revenue. they are often dealing with common issues. 6.6 We have set out elsewhere in this Progress has already been made in sharing strategy (see 4.19-4.23) how structures and capabilities and assessments. responsibilities at the border have changed, with the formation of the Border Policing ii. Protect national and local Command in the NCA, and the Border Force government from serious and and Immigration Enforcement directorate in the Home Office. organised crime

6.7 Effective border security relies heavily 6.10 Some of the most attractive targets for on passenger and freight data. We need to fraud against government include our most improve both our data acquisition and our complex tax and benefit systems, particularly analytical capability to effectively identify Universal Credit, which will consolidate passengers and goods of possible concern. Border Force will work with carriers and other 66 HM Government (2010) Securing Britain in an Age of commercial partners to increase coverage, Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review timeliness and accuracy of information about https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic­ passengers and goods. Border Force will be defence-and-security-review-securing-britain-in-an-age-of­ uncertainty PROTECT: Increasing protection against serious and organised crime 55

multiple benefits into a single monthly 6 .14 Public procurement is also vulnerable payment into the claimant’s bank account, because of the multiple opportunities for fraud based on an online application process. (price fixing, bid rigging, double invoicing, Fraudsters also attempt to hijack or buy diverted payments and delivery of inferior claimant identities or create fake businesses products). The AFI 2013 estimated £2.3 billion to make fraudulent repayment claims for of fraud is perpetrated against public sector Income Tax or other taxes. procurement out of an annual total of £227 billion. We are particularly concerned about 6 .11 HMRC has established dedicated organised criminals tendering for public cyber security and cyber crime units. sector contracts, including through the use The Department for Business, Innovation of front companies. We will implement the and Skills (BIS) and the Government modernised EU public procurement directive Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) through separate secondary legislation to are working to agree new organisational ensure that there are the appropriate checks standards for government for cyber security and controls in the public sector procurement products and services. process to exclude companies involved in 6 .12 The Government’s Fraud, Error and organised crime. Debt Taskforce was set up in 2011 to provide 6 .15 We want to ensure that relevant bodies strategic direction and oversight of cross- work together to increase the scrutiny on ‘at government initiatives to save taxpayers’ risk’ sectors and that a prompt and effective money through tackling fraud and error and process exists for the sharing of intelligence improving debt recovery. Significant losses between public authorities, the NCA and have already been prevented in HMRC and policing. We believe this may be another the Department for Work and Pensions important role for new local organised crime (DWP). The Taskforce will shortly assume partnership boards, which we have discussed responsibility for the Counter Fraud Checking under Pursue and Prevent (see 4.17). Service, which will bring together data about known fraud from public and private sector organisations (including government iii. Improve protective security departments such as DWP and HMRC and in the private sector by sharing major insurers and banks). Public and private intelligence and analysis on sector participants will use this database to check new applicants for benefits and threats from serious and services. organised crime 6 .13 The Audit Commission’s National Fraud Initiative has been responsible for 6 .16 In the consultation process which identifying over £1 billion of fraud and error has informed this strategy, private sector since it began in 1996 by matching data representatives have made very clear the sets within and between over 1,300 public importance of government agencies sharing and private sector bodies. The Fraud, Error intelligence and analysis with them about and Debt taskforce within the Cabinet Office serious and organised crime threats. This will assume responsibility for the operation is most important in connection with fraud, of the National Fraud Initiative at a suitable cyber-enabled fraud and cyber crime. point once the legislation abolishing the Audit Progress has been made but we understand Commission is in place. that the private sector needs complete clarity about what they can expect and from where. 56 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

Cheque and Plastic Crime Unit67, consisting of officers from the Metropolitan and City of London Police, funded fully by the banking industry), and insurance fraud (the Insurance Fraud Enforcement Unit, consisting of City of London Police offices, funded by members of the Association of British Insurers). 6 .19 Since 2009 the National Fraud Authority has developed Action Fraud as the single route for the private sector and the public to report cyber and financial crime. Action Fraud passes the reports to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) for analysis and distribution to police forces or the NCA as actionable intelligence. NFIB is managed by the City of London Police. 6 . 20 Action Fraud and NFIB need to improve the integration of their ability to receive and analyse reported cyber and financial crime, including offering more feedback to the private sector. A programme is in hand to deal with this. Where the fraud or cyber crime which is reported shows evidence of organised crime the NCA will also be involved. 6 . 21 Under the AML regulations, the 6 .17 Using intelligence from a range of regulated sector is required to make reports sources, the NCA will identify organised of suspicious financial transactions to SOCA groups committing economic crime and, for possible investigation – some 200,000 where appropriate, share information with the such reports are made each year. They private sector to allow them to take action. represent a rich source of intelligence for The NCA will work directly with the private law enforcement agencies and for the wider sector to advise how they should protect their regulated sector. The NCA will improve systems and processes from cyber-crime and the analysis of these reports so that more fraud. Specific data on known fraudsters will targeted and sector-specific intelligence is be shared with the private sector through the provided to the private sector and other law Counter Fraud Checking Service. enforcement agencies. 6 .18 In September 2013 the City of London 6 . 22 Most cyber crime can be prevented Police established a new unit to tackle online by good security and information assurance piracy and other forms of intellectual property measures, but protective measures against crime, supported by the Intellectual Property Office. This unit will also work with the private 67 The Dedicated Cheque and Plastic Crime Unit (DCPCU) sector. Similar units are already in place for estimates its work has prevented £65m in fraudulent losses cheque and credit card fraud (the Dedicated during its two year pilot. http://www.financialfraudaction.org. uk/Police-The-dcpcu.asp PROTECT: Increasing protection against serious and organised crime 57

cyber crime need to be strengthened in all Guidance Booklet for Business68 (‘the Ten sectors and among the general public. This Steps’), which provides risk management also depends on intelligence sharing about and technical guidance to larger businesses. cyber threats, easily accessible advice on In April 2013, drawing on the Ten Steps, what protective steps to take and close BIS published the Small Business Cyber collaboration between government, the Security Guidance69, followed in July 2013 internet service providers, business and the by the launch of a Cyber Governance Health public. 6.23 In September 2012 BIS, the Centre 68 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2012) www. gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-risk-management-a­ for the Protection of National Infrastructure board-level-responsibility. and GCHQ published the Cyber Security 69 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2013) Small Business Cyber Security Guidance www.gov.uk/government/ publications/cyber-security-what-small-businesses-need-to­ know 58 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

Check, which draws support from the audit • the CESG Certified Professional scheme community to help FTSE350 companies to (CCP) is on track to certify over 800 cyber identify and assess vulnerability. security professionals working within 6.24 The new Cyber Security Information the public sector and its supply chain by Sharing Partnership (CISP), launched in early 2014. Access to the scheme is now March 2013, will be the main forum through being extended to any UK-resident cyber which the government will facilitate the security professional for the benefit of the sharing of intelligence in real time with wider UK economy. Certification of cyber the private sector on cyber threats and security training and higher education vulnerabilities. CISP is managed by the courses will start in 2014 as part of the long-term drive to build the UK cyber Cabinet Office and will become part of the 72 new UK Computer Emergency Response security profession . Team (CERT-UK) in 2014 (see 7.5). It also houses a Fusion Cell including analysts from iv. Protect people at risk of industry, law enforcement and intelligence becoming the victims of serious communities. and organised crime 6.25 GCHQ is working with industry, academia and other government 6.26 The public are most likely to be direct organisations on further related projects: victims of serious and organised crime • the Commercial Product Assurance (CPA) through fraud (whether online or offline), cyber scheme has been launched to certify crime and encountering illegal or offensive commercially-available cyber security content online. products for use in the public and private 6.27 Fraud against the public is believed sectors. The first post-pilot products to cost about £9 billion a year, with the main are expected to complete certification estimated losses being mass-marketing fraud in Autumn 2013 and more will follow in (£3.5 billion), identity fraud (£3.3 billion), online 70 2014 ; ticket fraud (£1.5 billion) and private rental • GCHQ is expanding its Service property fraud (£755 million)73. Assurance capability to cover a broad 6.28 Like the private sector, the general range of security/ICT services and tailored public depend on Action Fraud and NFIB to cyber services. A number of commercial report fraud and online financial crime, and to cyber incident response providers are provide information on how an investigation is being certified to provide clean-up progressing and which police force is leading. services to private and public sector A plan is in hand for Action Fraud (see 6.19) organisations that have fallen victim to improve this service. Action Fraud and to cyber attack. Further expansion is NFIB will provide more information on their anticipated in 2014 to include certification websites on trends in fraud and known of cyber security monitoring services71; and

72 For information about the CESG Certified Professional scheme, see http://www.cesg.gov.uk/News/Pages/New-IA­ 70 http://www.cesg.gov.uk/servicecatalogue/CPA/Pages/CPA. Certification-pages.aspx aspx 73 National Fraud Authority (2013) Annual Fraud Indicator www. 71 http://www.cesg.gov.uk/ServiceCatalogue/cir/Pages/Cyber­ gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ Incident-Response.aspx data/file/206552/nfa-annual-fraud-indicator-2013.pdf PROTECT: Increasing protection against serious and organised crime 59

fraudsters74; the FCA75 already publishes about online safety. We want to develop the details of firms that are not authorised by ‘ThinkuKnow’ programme which we regard them to offer financial services. as a model of its kind. 6.29 The Home Office has conducted two important public awareness campaigns, ‘Get Safe Online’ and ‘The Devil’s in Your Details’76, intended to provide advice on the protection of personal and corporate data. The Home Office will launch a major new campaign in 2013/14 to increase awareness and understanding of online threats, improve security, help to reduce economic loss from cyber crime and increase confidence in online business.

6.30 In connection with cyber threats, 6.32 Later this year the NCA’s CEOP internet service providers (ISPs) are currently Command will launch a new educational working with government to agree what film Exploited‘ ’ which educates young information will be provided to customers people about exploitative relationships and about cyber threats. This will include briefing will relaunch the ‘ThinkuKnow’ website for materials and advice on security solutions, teenagers. The Command will continue a means of reporting attacks, effective risk to educate professionals through the mitigation and a notification procedure when ‘ThinkuKnow Ambassador’ programme and they become aware of potential compromise is developing training for professionals who to a customer’s computer or account. work in the investigation of online sexual Protecting children and blocking child abuse. abuse images 6.33 The Government will continue to 6.31 CEOP has educated children and work with the SVACV (see 5.32) to promote young people about their online behaviour, their ‘Say something if you see something’ the ‘digital footprint’ they leave, and the risks campaign which provides campaign they face online. CEOP has developed a materials such as posters and leaflets to raise specific educational programme – called awareness of child sexual exploitation within ‘ThinkuKnow’ – to tackle these issues, particular sectors (for example, the hotel which includes educational films and sector) amongst the public and practitioners. cartoons, teachers’ packs and other online resources for use with children aged v. Improve our anti-corruption 4-18. In 2012/13, over 2.6 million children saw the ‘ThinkuKnow’ products and over systems 800 professionals in the education, child protection and law enforcement professions 6.34 Serious and organised crime uses were trained by CEOP to educate children bribery and corruption to evade arrest and prosecution, conduct crime and, in particular, 74 http://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/CityPolice/Departments/ to launder the financial proceeds. Law ECD/NFIB/ enforcement estimates that a significant 75 http://www.fca.org.uk/ 76 Conducted by the National Fraud Authority 60 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

percentage of organised crime groups in the on corruption overseas. This allocation of UK are engaged in bribery and corruption. responsibilities is consistent with Home Office 6.35 Threat assessments show that work on tackling corruption in the police organised criminals and groups will seek in conjunction with the College of Policing, to develop corrupt relationships in areas Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary where they see greatest risk or opportunity. and the Independent Police Complaints Targets include law enforcement agencies, Commission (IPCC). government and local authorities, and the 6.39 Blockages in routine intelligence private sector. Organised criminals target sharing between agencies, fragmentation of law enforcement and border agencies and the operational response and the lack of an seeks to develop corrupt relationships in effective reporting mechanism for suspicions government and local authorities to gain of bribery and corruption have all hampered access to data, facilitate claims for benefits the fight against corruption. and procure public contracts. The private 6.40 The NCA will lead on the assessment sector, particularly the regulated financial of bribery and corruption by organised crime sector, is targeted for the purposes of fraud, and produce regular reporting on this theme. and to launder the proceeds of crime. The NCA will also support investigations 6.36 The Bribery Act 2010 made major into corruption affecting law enforcement reforms to the law in this area, creating agencies and others, for example prisons, offences for offering, promising or giving a where staff are at higher risk of corruption bribe, and requesting, agreeing to receive given their proximity to criminals. They will do or accepting a bribe. It also included two this through intelligence, threat assessments offences on commercial bribery: bribery of and, where required, operational support. a foreign public official to obtain or retain 6.41 The Economic Crime Command (ECC) business for commercial advantage, and in the NCA will oversee the law enforcement corporate liability for failing to prevent bribery response to bribery and corruption more on behalf of a commercial organisation. broadly. Where organised criminals are 6.37 Recent research suggests that one involved, the NCA may either take action itself in twenty people from the UK have paid or coordinate other agencies to ensure that a bribe in the last twelve months77. This is a proportionate operational response is in a higher recorded rate than before. The place. The NCA will work closely with other current response to bribery and corruption law enforcement partners including: needs to be improved at both the policy and • the Serious Fraud Office, which remains operational level. the lead agency for investigating large 6.38 Policy on bribery and corruption and complex cases of corporate bribery is currently split across Whitehall and, and corruption, and enforcing the Bribery while good areas of work exist, there is no Act in respect of overseas corruption by single Department that is responsible. The British businesses; Home Office will now take a new lead role • the City of London Police, which in coordinating all domestic bribery and investigates cases of domestic bribery corruption policy, working with the Cabinet and corruption and its Anti-Corruption Office and DFID to align this with work Unit, funded by DFID, which investigates 77 Transparency International (2013) The Global Corruption UK citizens and companies involved in Barometer 2013 http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013 PROTECT: Increasing protection against serious and organised crime 61

stronger system of vetting for police officers to be used in decisions on recruitment and promotion. 6.43 The procedures for reporting bribery and corruption also need to be made easier and much more widely known. Polling suggests that over 92% of people living in the UK would report corruption if they were aware of it but only 30% know how to do so78. We believe that there are strong benefits in creating a new single reporting mechanism and will examine the best way to do this and agree a way forward. 6.44 We need to not only target serious and organised criminals but also support those who seek to help us identify and disrupt serious and organised criminality. In July, we announced a review of the support that is available to those who report suspected illegal activity. BIS, the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office will consider the case for incentivising whistle blowing, including the provision of financial incentives to support whistle blowing in cases of fraud, bribery and corruption. As part of this work we will examine what lessons can be drawn from the bribery or corruption in DFID-funded successful ‘Qui Tam’79 provisions in the US developing countries; and where individuals who whistle-blow and work • the Proceeds of Corruption Unit in the with prosecutors and law enforcement can Metropolitan Police Service, which receive a share of financial penalties levied investigates corrupt politically-exposed against a company guilty of fraud against the persons (individuals who have been government. entrusted with a prominent public position or are a close relative of such a person) who have laundered proceeds of corruption into the UK. 6.42 On 12 February 2013, the Home 78 Transparency International (2013) Corruption In The UK: Part Secretary announced a range of measures to One – National Opinion Survey www.transparency.org.uk/ improve standards of professional behaviour our-work/publications/91-corruption-in-the-uk--part-one--­ in policing, including that the IPCC will national-opinion-survey 79 Qui Tam is the common description for the US False Claims be equipped to deal with all serious and Act which is regarded by the US Government as a vital sensitive allegations against the police, and tool for combating fraud against the federal government. The False Claims Act contains ‘qui tam’ provisions that that the College of Policing will publish a new allow private citizens to sue, on the government’s behalf, Integrity Code of Practice and establish a companies and individuals that were defrauding the government. 62 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

Metropolitan Police Project Amberhill was set up to collate and analyse data on forged, counterfeit and fraudulently obtained genuine identity documents recovered through police operations. This information, which includes a database of some 80,000 false identities and documents, has been shared with government departments and other organisations to help them detect and stop crime. It is estimated to have prevented £3m of fraud in 201281. SOCA issued a series of alerts to government departments and other organisations containing the details of 466 fraudulently obtained genuine passports. These passports were being used by criminals and illegal migrants to secure employment, gain access to financial products and services, obtain benefits, travel and commit a variety of criminal offences. Through this initiative many businesses throughout the UK were able to use the information to protect themselves from attack. SOCA also successfully applied for new terms to be added to Serious Crime Prevention Orders to prohibit serious and organised criminals from using or owning equipment capable of manufacturing or altering identity documents. They were also able to prohibit them from possessing or controlling third party identity documents. vi. Strengthen systems for 6.46 Identity crime is primarily an enabler of other crimes and is rarely committed for its establishing identity so that own sake, although it can be used to hide serious and organised criminals criminal or suspicious activities committed are denied opportunities to exploit under another name or identity. false or stolen personal data

6.45 Identity crime is the creation of a false identity or the use of someone else’s identity in order to commit a criminal offence. It involves the unauthorised use of a variety of personal documents or data including passports, driving licences, national insurance numbers, birth certificates and bank accounts. Analysis of 2012 fraud trends by CIFAS, an organisation which allows participating members to share details on suspected fraud, found that out of almost 250,000 confirmed frauds, identity fraud accounted for almost 50%80.81

80 National Fraud Authority (2013) Annual Fraud Indicator www. gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/206552/nfa-annual-fraud-indicator-2013.pdf 81 Metropolitan Police Quarterly Report on Amberhill Feb 2013 6.47 We want to do more in this area. We (unpublished) will strengthen systems to make it harder PROTECT: Increasing protection against serious and organised crime 63

to hide a criminal past through a change of name, and change procedures for issuing replacement documents (e.g. passports or driving licences). We will disrupt the manufacture of false identities and share more widely information about false identities and alleged multiple losses of documents. 6.48 The Anti Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Bill (presented to Parliament in May 2013) includes powers allowing immigration, customs and police officers to search for, examine and seize invalid travel documents. These new powers will complement the existing powers to search for and seize travel documents. 6.49 We want to disrupt the ability of criminals to purchase specialist printing equipment and materials in order to produce false identity and other documents e.g. credit cards. Guidance has been provided on how the private sector can conduct simple checks to ensure that they are not inadvertently supplying equipment for criminal use. 64 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy PREPARE: Reducing the impact of serious and organised crime 65

PREPARE: Reducing the impact of serious and organised crime

Success in PREPARE will mean that: • Major serious and organised crime incidents are brought to a rapid and effective resolution • Communities, victims and witnesses affected by serious and organised crime have the support which they need Our objectives will be to: i. Ensure that we have the necessary capabilities to respond to major serious and organised crime incidents ii. Provide the communities, victims and witnesses affected by serious and organised crime with effective criminal justice and other support

7.1 We have not previously had a Prepare criminal justice system supports people who programme for serious and organised are witnesses or victims. crime. But the police and other agencies have been engaged in work in this area and i. Ensure that we have the this strategy builds on the progress they have made. Prepare reflects the reality that necessary capabilities to respond however improved our response, serious to major serious and organised and organised crimes will continue to occur. crime incidents So there will be victims of crime and some communities will continue to be affected by 7.3 Significant improvements have been crime. made in building generic capabilities to 7. 2 We need to ensure that we are respond to, and recover from, a wide range prepared in the event of major serious or of civil emergencies82. Work is also under organised crime incidents which have national way to improve the ‘interoperability’ of the implications and, for example, are a threat emergency services: this began by looking to national systems and infrastructure. The at the response to terrorist incidents but now rapid emergence of a significant organised has a wider scope. Over and above this, we crime cyber threat makes this imperative. We believe that a stronger emphasis is needed to also need to address the corrosive impact of serious and organised crime on communities 82 Through the Cabinet Office National Resilience Capabilities and ensure that our transformation of the Programme, www.gov.uk/preparation-and-planning-for­ emergencies-the-capabilities-programme 66 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

address the particular challenges posed by National Testing and Exercise Programme major serious and organised crime incidents. 7.6 In the consultation for this strategy, 7.4 Serious and organised crime usually we found strong support in policing for comprises multiple criminal incidents rather the introduction of a new programme to than a single very high impact attack (as exercise and test the preparedness of the is the case with terrorism). But there are police, law enforcement agencies and other some criminal threats which may require a partners. This reflects the fact that serious national response, including significant denial and organised crime threats continue to of service attacks or cyber-enabled frauds; evolve, and that the policing landscape incidents involving illegal firearms; the entry of has changed with the advent of the NCA potentially lethal or adulterated drugs into the (with its mandate to task and coordinate UK market; and criminal attacks threatening the national law enforcement response to the food, energy and water security of serious and organised crime), the introduction the UK. of police and crime commissioners and the establishment of a National Police 7.5 We place a particular emphasis on 83 preparing effectively for a significant cyber Coordination Centre (NPoCC) . crime-related incident. This means ensuring 7.7 The objective of the new programme that our law enforcement agencies have the will be to test our ability to respond jointly to right capabilities, powers and connections a range of scenarios and ensure that lessons to the private sector to respond effectively, are learned. It needs to test capabilities and and that effective national mechanisms are in relationships between partner agencies. place to respond rapidly to a major incident. Exercises should be based on planning Our priorities are to: assumptions derived from the most up-to­ • build a new Computer Emergency date intelligence picture held by the NCA Response Team (CERT-UK) to improve about the threat to the UK from serious and the way in which the UK responds to organised crime. The programme will involve, major cyber attacks. CERT-UK will help where appropriate, representatives from the industry respond effectively to cyber private and voluntary sectors. Planning for incidents and restore critical services. this programme will be coordinated between It will work with similar organisations the Home Office, the NCA and police forces in other countries to enable better and must reflect force requirements. CERT­ international information sharing and UK will lead exercising and testing of revised response to incidents. The development incident management arrangements for a of CERT-UK is being led by the Cabinet major cyber incident. Office and it will be launched in early 2014; and • ensure that law enforcement has effective capabilities to respond through the NCA’s

National Cyber Crime Unit, which will lead 83 The functions of NPoCC are to assess national policing the national operational response to the capacity and capability in relation to the Strategic and most serious cyber crimes, and through National Policing Requirements; coordinate a continuous testing and exercise regime to ensure effective mobilisation of investment in wider policing capabilities. national assets in a crisis; and brokering mutual aid between police forces in the event of a crisis. For more information see http://www.acpo.police.uk/NationalPolicing/NPoCC/home. aspx PREPARE: Reducing the impact of serious and organised crime 67

ii. Provide the communities, of serious and organised criminals by the police and other agencies; more aggressive victims and witnesses affected by and visible action to recover criminal assets; serious and organised crime with local organised crime partnerships (which effective criminal justice and other should deal with the impact of organised crime on local communities); our Prevent support approach; and a programme of work to better support victims and witnesses (see 7.12–7. 20 ).

7.8 Organised crime groups have a corrosive local impact, particularly in some of our most deprived communities and 7.11 Trust and confidence in the police is also among communities which are new to vital. Neighbourhood policing teams have this country. In some local areas organised an important part to play in cutting crime criminals may be regarded as role models. (including serious and organised crime) Organised crime groups (sometimes in through building trusted relationships, conjunction with urban street gangs) may gathering community intelligence and intimidate people into silence. Organised resolving community concerns. The Home crime becomes an accepted feature of the Office and the College of Policing will ensure environment and can more easily continue that organised crime is properly taken without disruption. This is a feature of into account in developing best practice organised crime activity in many other around police community engagement and countries. neighbourhood policing. In addition: 7.9 We need to disrupt efforts by • we will expect the police and the NCA organised crime groups to develop a hold to ensure that community engagement over very local communities. This strategy and communication plans are included in and the activities of operational agencies planning for law enforcement operations in support of it need community support. against serious and organised criminals Communities need to have the confidence to to keep the public informed before, during be part of our response. and after operational activity takes place; 7.10 There are a number of actions in this • we will also expect the police and the strategy which are intended to address this, NCA to promote the use of community including the relentless (and visible) disruption impact statements which will allow the 68 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

courts, when considering sentencing, to 7.13 The Government announced in take into account the impact (including December 2012 that witnesses and other fear and intimidation) which particular vulnerable people whose lives could be at crimes have had on communities; and risk will receive enhanced UK-wide protection • the Home Office will establish a new and support from a new UK Protected Voluntary, Community and Social Persons Service, to better support those Enterprise (VCSE) sector group which who help bring criminals to justice. This will will include representatives from be coordinated by the NCA, working with the Association of Police and Crime ROCUs. Protected person status has been Commissioners, the Ministry of Justice, used across a range of crimes including the NCA, charities and other non­ victims and witnesses of the Morecambe Bay disaster, witnesses to the murder of Rhys governmental organisations. The group 84 will coordinate the VCSE sector role in the Jones and also to gun and gang crime . response to serious and organised crime. 7.14 Progress has already been made in It will provide organisations working with making the CJS more responsive and easier communities, victims and witnesses with to navigate85. There are particular issues we a conduit for two-way communication need to address regarding very vulnerable about serious and organised crime victims (for example, in the context of human issues. It will seek opportunities for trafficking and child sexual exploitation) and joint communications campaigns and witnesses to serious and organised crime. partnership working, and provide a forum Victims for providing feedback on the impact of this strategy at a local level. 7.15 We have already taken steps to improve the support given to victims of crime. Victims and witnesses A new Victims’ Commissioner (Baroness Newlove) has been appointed and a mixed model of national and local commissioning for victim support services is being introduced to ensure that they better reflect what matters locally. The Ministry of Justice will shortly publish a new statutory Victims’ Code which describes the kind of support victims of crime are entitled to receive. This will include: a clear explanation of what to expect from the CJS when people report a crime, including how and when they are informed of progress of the investigation; enhanced entitlements for 7.12 Victims of and witnesses to all types of 84 Ministry of Justice, launched December 2013, www.gov.uk/ government/news/uk-wide-protection-for-witnesses-as-new­ crime have a personal stake in the outcomes national-scheme-launched of the criminal justice system (CJS). And the 85 Ministry of Justice (2012) White Paper Swift and Sure Justice system itself depends on the cooperation of https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/217328/swift-and-sure-justice.pdf ; victims and witnesses if offenders are to be and consultation Getting it Right for Victims and Witnesses brought to justice. https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/victims­ witnesses. Ministry of Justice (2013) Transforming the CJS https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/transforming­ the-criminal-justice-system PREPARE: Reducing the impact of serious and organised crime 69

victims of the most serious crimes (including impact on public confidence in the CJS. We sexual offences, human trafficking and violent know that organised criminals have tried to crimes), persistently targeted victims and subvert justice by attempting to influence vulnerable or intimidated victims; and clarity juries. on the service that businesses of all sizes will 7.19 The Government has introduced a be entitled to receive. The Code, which will be new Witness Charter88 and a Witness Service available publicly, will set out various duties which works closely with Witness Care Units on the police, CPS and other agencies within to provide minimum standards of treatment, England and Wales; the NCA will adopt its provision of information, and support before principles and develop appropriate guidance and at court. Improvements have been made and standards. to ensure the protection of vulnerable and 7.16 We have made additional provisions to specialist witnesses giving evidence in court protect human trafficking victims participating including the new UK Protected Persons in court proceedings in England and Wales, Service. This will link to the overarching work in line with measures available to victims of the Ministry of Justice is taking forward to sexual offences86. Victims may give evidence improve services for victims and witnesses. by video link or through pre-recorded 7. 2 0 In 2011, the Ministry of Justice testimony, from behind a screen or with the issued national guidance89 to help the public removed from the court. police identify vulnerable and intimidated 7.17 We will implement measures outlined witnesses and understand some of the key by the SVACV National Group87. We are measures that can be offered to support already planning to accelerate the introduction such witnesses. It explains actions which can of enhanced special measures such as the be taken before a crime has been reported, pre-recorded cross-examination of evidence. during the investigation and after the trial. We will also review ways to reduce distress Implementation of the guidance has, to from cross-examination for victims and date, been inconsistent. Alongside the new witnesses during criminal trials, particularly measures set out here, the College of Policing those involving multiple defendants. And we will develop a new national approach for will explore a range of measures to improve managing and supporting all vulnerable and the availability and access to wider support intimidated victims and witnesses. services for child victims. Witnesses 7.18 Witnesses to crimes committed by serious and organised criminals may be subject to actual or threatened acts of violence. Witness intimidation greatly inhibits the effective investigation of serious and organised crime and has a significant adverse

86 The Trafficking People for Exploitation Regulations 2013 88 Ministry of Justice (2012) Getting it right for victims and http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/554/body/made witnesses: the Government response https://consult.justice. 87 Home Office (2013) Sexual Violence Against Children and gov.uk/digital-communications/victims-witnesses Vulnerable People National Group Progress Report and 89 Ministry of Justice (2011) Vulnerable and Intimidated Action Plan https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ Witnesses: A Police Service Guide http://www.justice.gov. system/uploads/attachment_data/file/230443/Sexual_ uk/downloads/victims-and-witnesses/vulnerable-witnesses/ Violence_against_Children_and_Vulnerable_People.pdf vulnerable­intimidated-witnesses.pdf 70 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Annex A 71

Annex A

Accountability, governance and and their agencies, law enforcement agencies funding and the wider public and private sector. VI. Chief constables of police force areas I. This annex sets out accountability in England and Wales are accountable to for this strategy, governance, performance their elected police and crime commissioners. management and funding. The Home Secretary is required to issue a Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) – to Accountability and governance which chief constables and police and crime II. The National Security Council (NSC), commissioners must have regard – which chaired by the Prime Minister, will have sets out the national threats the police oversight of this strategy and will take reports must address and the capabilities required on its progress. to deal with them. These national threats III. The Home Secretary has direct include organised crime and a large scale 90 oversight of the National Crime Agency cyber incident . We would expect police (NCA). The Home Secretary will continue and crime commissioners to scrutinise force to chair a regular Ministerial Serious and performance on organised crime and also Organised Crime meeting. The Office for support provided to policing by the local Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in authority. the Home Office has overall responsibility for Funding coordinating implementation of the strategy VII. The Spending Review 2013 set the and developing an effective performance budget for each government department. The framework. resources allocated to departments reflected IV. Performance assessment will be the priorities in the Strategic Defence and based on a set of indicators including (but not Security Review. only) prosecutions, other disruption activity, VIII. The NCA is a Non-Ministerial assets and goods seized, recidivism and Department and will receive its funding removal of foreign national offenders. directly from HM Treasury. The budget for the V. The Director General of the NCA will NCA will be approximately £450 million per have Strategic Governance Groups on the annum for the next two years. This includes principal crime types that are the subject of some additional funding for the NCA’s capital this strategy. The purpose of these Groups is to monitor and coordinate operational 90 HM Government (2011) Police Reform and Social delivery. Implementation requires the Responsibility Act http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/2011/13/contents/enacted; and the Strategic Policing collective effort of government departments Requirement www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/117445/strategic-policing­ requirement.pdf 72 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

programme to support IT and technological capabilities. Its allocation for future years will be determined along with other central government departments in the usual way. IX. The Government provided £650 million, over four years, through the National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP) to support the National Cyber Security Strategy, published in November 2011. NCSP funding is being spent to increase national, regional and local police capacity on cyber, including developing cyber skills in mainstream policing. A further £210 million funding for the NCSP for the 2015/16 financial year was announced in the Spending Round in June 2013. X. The Government also provides funding to the police to tackle serious and organised crime. In addition to the more than £8 billion per annum provided by central government to support policing in England and Wales, the Home Office provides specific funding to improve key capabilities within the police Regional Organised Crime Units. For 2013­ 2014, the Home Office is investing £26 million to further develop these units, an uplift of £10 million on the investment in 2012-2013. This additional funding has been allocated from within the Home Office’s share of the receipts gained from the seizure of criminal assets. Annex B 73

Annex B

Departmental roles and Service, which will work closely with the responsibilities for tackling serious NCA’s Economic Crime Command. and organised crime Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS): includes the Office of Fair This annex outlines the roles and Trading which is responsible for ensuring responsibilities of departments and agencies that consumers and industry are protected on or in connection with serious and from serious and organised crime, and for organised crime in England and Wales. promoting contingency planning in sectors at risk from fraud, cyber attacks or corruption. Action Fraud: the single point of reporting UK Trade and Industry (UKTI) in BIS advises for fraud and financially-motivated internet UK businesses overseas on ways to protect crime. themselves from corruption and protects incoming investment from bribery and Cabinet Office (CO): includes the Office of corruption. Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) which is responsible for delivery Department for Communities and Local of the National Cyber Security Strategy, Government (DCLG): coordinates work with coordinates the National Cyber Security local authorities and others to help troubled Programme and is responsible for the UK’s families in England relevant to Prevent work in new Computer Emergency Response Team this strategy. (CERT). The Cabinet Office also includes the Fraud, Error and Debt taskforce which will Department for Culture, Media and assume responsibility for the Counter Fraud Sport (DCMS): the sponsoring department Checking Service and the National Fraud for the Gambling Commission, an executive Initiative. non-departmental public body which regulates gambling, betting and the lottery Centre for the Protection of National and is responsible for flagging suspicious Infrastructure (CPNI): protects UK national activity to law enforcement. security by providing protective security advice to organisations, including on cyber Department for Education (DfE): has an security. interest in activity to deter young people from becoming involved in serious and organised Crown Prosecution Service (CPS): crime, either as a victim or potential offender. prosecutes serious and organised crime cases in England and Wales; also has lead Department of Energy and Climate responsibility for the Fraud Prosecution Change (DECC): responsible for combating 74 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

fraud in energy markets, protecting the Devolved Administrations: responsible Government’s energy incentive schemes, in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales for encouraging energy companies to report the functions which have been devolved to suspicious activity and protecting the UK’s them according to their different devolution energy infrastructure from attacks by serious settlements. Policing and justice are devolved and organised criminals. in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Department for Environment, Food and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA): Rural Affairs (DEFRA): its responsibilities regulates the financial sector and financial include the Environment Agency and the advisers, will pursue criminal prosecutions, Gangmasters Licensing Authority, and it including for insider dealing and market contributes funding to support the National manipulation. On organised crime, the FCA Wildlife Crime Unit. will work closely with the NCA.

Department of Health (DH): responsible Foreign and Commonwealth Office for policy relating to recovery from drug (FCO): responsible for delivering diplomatic dependence and for planning the strategic support to our serious and organised crime response to some future challenges from priorities overseas. organised crime (e.g. new and novel drugs). Government Agency Intelligence Department for International Networks (GAIN): facilitate information Development (DFID): overseas sharing about regional organised crime programmes can contribute to the delivery threats between government, law of this strategy by reducing poverty and enforcement and in some instances the addressing underlying social and economic private sector. issues (including corruption), and supporting good governance and security, economic Government Communications stability and employment services and Headquarters (GCHQ): provides access to basic services. intelligence support and information assurance advice to law enforcement. Department for Transport (DfT): the security regulator for the transport sector, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC): the across the different modes of aviation, UK’s tax and customs authority, responsible maritime, rail and (the transportation of) for tackling fiscal fraud, with civil and criminal dangerous goods. DfT’s security regulations powers to investigate organised criminals. are intended to protect the travelling public, Has an international network of Fiscal Crime transport facilities and those employed in Liaison Officers (FCLO). the transport industry. Security measures taken by DfT can serve to disrupt serious and HM Treasury (HMT): responsible for organise crime. regulating the financial and banking sectors and for ensuring that appropriate sanctions Department for Work and Pensions are in place, including asset freezing. (DWP): leads on investigating serious and organised crime involving the benefits system Home Office (HO): within the Home Office and protecting the welfare system from fraud. the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) is responsible for devising and Annex B 75

coordinating delivery of this strategy and National Crime Agency (NCA): will develop oversight of the NCA. OSCT also houses the and bring together intelligence on all types security industry engagement team which of organised crime, prioritise crime groups supports work on both counter-terrorism and according to the threats they present and, organised crime. Border Force, UK Visas & in conjunction with the police, then lead, Immigration and Immigration Enforcement, coordinate and support our operational alongside Her Majesty’s Passport Office, form response (see 4.2-4.9). the Home Office’s operational pillar. They will continue to conduct operations against Police: most of the operational work against serious and organised crime. serious and organised crime in this country will continue to be conducted by police Intellectual Property Office (IPO): the forces at local level and by police Regional national coordinator on intellectual property Organised Crime Units. There are police lead crime (counterfeiting and piracy). Its officers at chief constable rank for crime, and Intelligence Hub coordinates and exchanges serious and organised crime matters, who criminal intelligence between intellectual provide national strategic leadership and property enforcement agencies and the support to forces in England and Wales. private sector in the UK and overseas. Serious Fraud Office (SFO): responsible for Ministry of Defence (MOD): supports this reducing the threat from fraud and corruption strategy through the Defence Engagement and promoting the rule of law to protect Strategy91 by building capacity in priority confidence in the UK’s financial systems countries and, where appropriate and and business sector. It is the lead agency for available, using interdiction capabilities to investigating corruption and is responsible ensure the threats cannot reach the UK. The for action to disrupt economic crime through Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Deferred Prosecution Agreements. a trading fund of the MOD but operating across HMG, also supports Government Secret Intelligence Service (SIS): collects work on cyber security. intelligence overseas to promote and defend the national security and economic well-being Ministry of Justice (MOJ): works to protect of the UK. the public and reduce reoffending, and to provide a more effective, transparent and Security Service (MI5): is responsible for responsive criminal justice system for victims protecting UK national security against threats and the public. Also responsible for ensuring including terrorism and serious crime. that prison and probation services disrupt the activities of serious and organised criminals UK Human Trafficking Centre (UKHTC): as part of a lifetime management approach. is a multi-agency centre, led by the NCA, that MOJ published guidance to help companies provides a central point for the development protect themselves from corruption and of expertise and cooperation in relation to the bribery in 2012. trafficking of human beings.

91 Ministry of Defence (2013) International Defence Engagement Strategy www.gov.uk/government/publications/international­ defence-engagement-strategy Published by TSO (The Stationery Office) and available from:

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