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Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Cm 8715 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty October 2013 Cm 8715 £21.25 © Crown copyright 2013 You may re-use this information (excluding logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit http://www. nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ or e-mail: [email protected]. Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us [email protected] You can download this publication from our website at https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications ISBN: 9780101871525 Printed in the UK by The Stationery Office Limited on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ID 2593608 10/13 33233 19585 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum. Contents Home Secretary Foreword 5 Executive Summary 7 Introduction 13 Our Strategic Response 25 PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and 27 organised crime PREVENT: Preventing people from engaging 45 in serious and organised crime PROTECT: Increasing protection against 53 serious and organised crime PREPARE: Reducing the impact of serious and 65 organised crime Annex A: Accountability, governance and funding 71 Annex B: Departmental roles and responsibilities for 73 tackling serious and organised crime 4 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Home Secretary Foreword 5 Home Secretary Foreword The Relentless Disruption of Organised Criminals Serious and organised crime is a threat to our national security and costs the UK more than £24 billion a year. But for too long, too many serious and organised criminals have been able to remain one step ahead and out of law enforcement’s reach. A new response is needed. Our new strategy is built on the successful framework we use to counter terrorism. It sets out how we will take action at every opportunity to prevent people getting involved in serious and organised crime; to strengthen our protection against and responses to it; and, most importantly, to pursue the criminals behind it, prosecuting them and disrupting their activities. Strong partnerships are at its heart. This is a cross-government strategy, not just a Home Office strategy. Just as we have for counter-terrorism, we will work with our partners in government and law enforcement to turn the full force of the state against those behind the most serious crime. Our new strategy, together with the creation of the National Crime Agency, will target national and international serious and organised crime. Simultaneously, our reforms to policing – removing targets and increasing accountability through police and crime commissioners – will strengthen the response at a local level. Anyone involved in any form of organised crime should hear a very clear message from this strategy: we will do everything at our disposal to disrupt and prosecute them. Theresa May 66 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Executive Summary 7 Executive Summary 1.1 This is a new strategy to deal with Our approach the challenges we face from serious and organised crime. It is published to coincide 1.5 The aim of this strategy is to with the launch of the new National Crime substantially reduce the level of serious and Agency (NCA) and reflects changes to the organised crime affecting the UK and its threats we face and the lessons we have interests. The strategy uses the framework learned from our previous work. we have developed for our counter-terrorist 1.2 Organised crime includes drug work and has four components: prosecuting trafficking, human trafficking, and organised and disrupting people engaged in serious illegal immigration, high value fraud and other and organised crime (Pursue); preventing financial crimes, counterfeiting, organised people from engaging in this activity (Prevent); acquisitive crime and cyber crime. The increasing protection against serious and strategy also deals with serious crime which organised crime (Protect); and reducing the demands a national coordinated response, impact of this criminality where it takes place notably other fraud and child sexual (Prepare). exploitation. 1.6 The strategy lists strategic objectives 1.3 Organised crime is a threat to our under each of the four areas of work. Tactical national security. It costs the United Kingdom operational objectives (e.g. priority crime at least £24 billion each year, leads to loss of groups) will be set by the NCA with law life and can deprive people of their security enforcement agency counterparts. and prosperity. Crime groups intimidate 1.7 Our immediate priority is the work and corrupt and have a corrosive impact on set out under Pursue to prosecute and some communities. Cyber crime undermines relentlessly disrupt organised criminals and confidence in our communications reduce the threat they pose. technology and online economy. Organised immigration crime threatens the security of 1.8 Like other threats to our national our borders. We regard human trafficking security, serious and organised crime requires as a pernicious form of modern slavery. a response across the whole of government, Financial crime can undermine the integrity and close collaboration with the public, the and stability of our financial markets and private sector and with many other countries. institutions. 1.4 Overseas, organised crime undermines good governance and the stability of countries of strategic importance to our national security. Organised crime groups overseas can facilitate or engage in terrorism. 8 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Executive Summary 9 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy The NCA will develop an authoritative intelligence picture of Establish strong, effective and collaborative organisations organised crime and work with the police and others to lead, Develop our capabilities coordinate and support our response. New local organised crime partnership boards will provide support to local policing Attack criminal finances on all aspects of this strategy. New NCA and law enforcement capabilities will be developed to deal with developments in Ensure that effective legal powers are available organised crime, notably the move online. We will legislate on aspects of organised crime. We will increase work against ursue Internationally, improve our own capabilities and our foreign national offenders and refocus the NCA’s international cooperation with others network to deal with all crime types. Prosecute and disrupt people engaged in serious and organised criminality Reduce threat Raise awareness of the reality and consequences We will have a new preventative programme including more and better education and communications about organised Intervene to stop people being drawn into different types of crime, local coordination with existing work on troubled serious and organised crime families and gangs, and wider use of interventions (e.g. Serious Crime Prevention Orders). We want to work more closely with Develop techniques to deter people from continuing in the regulators of professions whose members may, wittingly or serious and organised criminality not, facilitate organised crime activity. We will promote effective lifetime offender management as a framework for revent Establish an effective offender management framework to both Pursue and Prevent and involving the NCA, regional support work on Pursue and Prevent police units and police forces. Aim Prevent people from engaging in serious and organised crime Reduce level of serious and Protect our borders We have changed roles and responsibilities at the border and on immigration enforcement. We are building new border organised Protect national and local government capabilities. We will increase work to cut fraud against government and in particular local government procurement. crime Improve protective security in the private sector We will share more threat reporting with at risk parts of the private sector notably on fraud and cyber crimes. Protect people at risk of becoming victims We will provide more information to the public on these issues Improve our anti-corruption systems and also on child sexual exploitation. We will work to restrict rotect circulation of illegal child abuse images. We are revising Strengthen systems for establishing identity responsibilities for the investigation and reporting of corruption. Reduce Increase protection against serious and organised crime vulnerabilty We will continue to develop emergency service interoperability to better deal with terrorism and other crimes. We will establish Ensure major serious and organised crime incidents are a new unit to coordinate our national response to major cyber brought to a rapid and effective resolution attacks including cyber crime. Ensure communities, victims and witnesses affected by A theme in this strategy is to provide support to communities serious and organised crime have the support which they need affected by organised crime. This is part of all the four main areas of our work. Specific new initiatives are also planned to repare support victims and witnesses. Reduce the impact of this criminality where it takes place 10 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy PUR SUE Wales. We want to see much more sharing of capabilities between the separate police 1.9 We are building organisations
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