Investigating Perspectives About Integration Amongst Native French and Second-Generation North African French Citizens

Investigating Perspectives about Integration amongst Native French and Second-Generation North African French Citizens

Shadia El Dardiry Department of Political Science McGill University, Montreal

February 2010

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Masters of Arts

 Shadia El Dardiry 2010 ABSTRACT

The thesis investigates and compares native French and second-generation North African French citizens’ perspectives on the ‘crisis’ surrounding France’s North African minority through surveys and interviews. Results indicate that the major point of contention between the two groups is in their views on North African French integration: native French being more likely to believe that North African French neither feel French nor share their same fundamental norms. Interviews with North African French indicate that they feel they are still treated as immigrants and rejected by French society, which consequently has an impact on their overall social cohesion, socioeconomic and political equality and sense of belonging. The diversity of opinions amongst respondents also indicates that in most cases North African French are indistinguishable from their native French counterparts and are, paradoxically, good examples of Republican integration.

SOMMAIRE

Ce mémoire a pour but, à travers des sondages et des entretiens, l’examen des perceptions des Français de souche et des Maghrébins de seconde génération sur la ‘crise’ d’intégration qui semble affliger la population Maghrébine en France. Les résultats indiquent que le point de désaccord entre les deux groupes se trouve surtout dans leur perception de l’intégration des Français Maghrébins. Les Français de souche ont tendance à croire que ces derniers ne se sentent pas Français et ne partagent pas les mêmes valeurs. Les entretiens avec les Français Maghrébins indiquent que ceux-ci se sentent perçus en tant qu’immigrés et rejetés par la société française. Cela a un impact négatif sur la cohésion sociale du pays, sur l’égalité socioéconomique et politique des Maghrébins Français ainsi que sur leur sentiment d’appartenance. Néanmoins, la plupart de leurs opinions ne peuvent être distinguer de ceux des Français de souche, illustrant, paradoxalement, le succès de l’intégration Républicaine.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge, first and foremost, my supervisor Professor Dietlind

Stolle for her guidance, support, and patience throughout the preparation and writing of the thesis. She has constantly challenged me and encouraged me to improve myself, and I hope that the results of her efforts are reflected in this final work. I am also indebted to my sister

Giulia El Dardiry for the time and effort she put into editing my work and providing constructive criticism so as to help me sharpen my arguments and ideas. Her moral support and encouragements throughout the process were an invaluable source of strength and motivation. To Owen Martin, who took time away from his own work to assist me in my quantitative analysis, I also extend my utmost gratitude. Moreover I would like to thank the

Department of Political Science for the funding they provided me to conduct field research in France, without which this project would not have been feasible.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank all those whom I met throughout my research in France and who took the time to be surveyed. To the North

African French who agreed to be interviewed, I am especially grateful for their openness and their trust. Their enthusiasm for my project and their testimonies have constantly served to remind me of the value of my endeavour. I will always be indebted to them for this gift they unknowingly gave me.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...... 1 CHAPTER I: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...... 7 1.1 COLONIAL AND POST -COLONIAL IMMIGRATION UNTIL THE 1970 S ...... 7 1.2 THE 1980 S: MOBILIZATION OF THE SECOND -GENERATION AND THE NEW DEBATE ON INTEGRATION ...... 8 1.2.1. Mobilization of the Second-Generation ...... 9 1.2.2. A New Integration Policy ...... 11 1.3 THE 1990 S TO TODAY : THE DEBATE ON CITIZENSHIP , THE RIOTS OF 2005, AND THE FIGHT AGAINST DISCRIMINATION ...... 12 1.3.1. French Nationality Laws in the 1990s ...... 13 1.3.2. L'Affaire du Foulard and the Threat to French Identity ...... 14 1.3.3. The Riots of 2005 and Sarkozy ...... 15 1.3.4. Discrimination: The Struggle against Discrimination and the Debate on Affirmative Action ...... 17 CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 20 2.1. LITERATURE ON INTEGRATION ...... 20 2.1.1. Integration theories ...... 20 2.1.2. Approaches to Integration ...... 26 2.2. LITERATURE ON THE SECOND -GENERATION AND ON THE EXISTENCE OF A CRISIS OF INTEGRATION ...... 29 2.2.1. Literature on Second-Generations: Early Literature, Quantitative Data and its Analysis ...... 30 2.2.2. On the Existence of a Crisis ...... 33 2.3. LITERATURE ON PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ...... 34 2.3.1. Why is a Study of Perception Important? ...... 34 2.3.2. Existing Literature on Perception ...... 35 2.4. GAPS IN THE LITERATURE: WHAT IS MISSING ? WHAT IS THIS STUDY CONTRIBUTING ?...... 38 CHAPTER III: PRESENTATION OF THE HYPOTHESES AND PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT ...... 41 3.1. HYPOTHESES ...... 41 3.2. METHODOLOGY ...... 46 3.2.1. Field Research ...... 46 3.2.2. Shortcomings of the Research ...... 49 CHAPTER IV: PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS ...... 51 4.1. ON THE STATISTICAL METHODS EMPLOYED ...... 51 4.2. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ...... 52 4.2.1. On the Perception of a Crisis ...... 52 4.2.2. On Ranking Integration ...... 53 4.2.3. On Ranking North African French Integration ...... 55 4.3.4. Interpreting the Riots ...... 58 4.3. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS ...... 61 4.3.1. The Crisis: A ‘Crisis’ that has Always Existed ...... 61 4.3.2. Ranking Integration: A North African French Population Resembling its Native French Counterpart ...... 64 4.3.3. Ranking North African Integration: A Notable Difference in Perception ...... 67 4.3.4. Interpreting the Riots: Political Action vs. Random Violence ...... 74 4.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS – THOUGHTS ON SOCIAL COHESION , DEMOCRACY , AND WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A CITIZEN ...... 78 4.4.1. Integration Research: Propagating the Problem through Discourse? ...... 78 4.4.2. On Citizenship, Social Cohesion, and Democracy ...... 80 CONCLUSION ...... 86 APPENDIX A: SURVEY ...... 90 APPENDIX B: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW DRAFT ...... 94 APPENDIX C: VARIABLE LIST ...... 96 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 98

INTRODUCTION

There is an increasingly widespread consensus, both in academic circles and in public and political arenas that a crisis of integration exists in most Western societies today (Cépède

2003; Favell 1998; Guilbert & Mergier 2006). The crisis has two elements; the first is socioeconomic, with there being a strong sense of having failed at integrating immigrants even “in states that were long believed to adhere to coherent national models of immigrant integration, such as ‘multicultural’ Netherlands or ‘assimilationist’ France,” (Joppke 2007:1).

The second aspect is philosophical, and consists of the presumed threat posed to Western values and liberal democratic politics by tensions that have arisen since the 1980s due to claims made by ethnic minorities and the sometimes xenophobic responses of the majority populations.

In Canada, the saliency of the issue is reflected by the highly mediatised debate over the appropriateness of ‘reasonable accommodation’ policies, with more than half of all cases brought to court since 1985 occurring in 2006 and 2007 (Bouchard & Taylor 2008). As

Bouchard and Taylor (2008) note, not only were cases increasingly mediatised, but the debate began to encompass the "much broader question of the integration of the immigrant population and minorities" rather than merely "religion's place in the public space and the accommodation of minority religious practices" as it previously had (53). Even more recently in Switzerland the referendum resulting in the banning of minarets based on the claim that they represented an Islamisation of the country demonstrates the fear of a possible loss of national identity on the part of the majority population, unless important restrictions on minorities are put into place (Fischer 2009). 1 In France the issue is best

1Phillip Fischer, “Switzerland’s minaret ban about more than xenophobia,” Harvard Law Record, December 4, 2009.

1 portrayed by the banning of the veil in public schools based on the claims that veils in public institutions are fundamentally at odds with French values and secular principles (Coroller

2005; Frégnac-Clave 2008).

The perceived integration crisis has been, no doubt, exacerbated by two important factors. The first is the global economic downturn afflicting many societies and the resulting loss of social solidarity and cohesion (Bertossi 2007; Schnapper 2006). The consequence has been an increased inability on the part of states to absorb immigrants and their families and to allow for their social mobility – whether immediate or intergenerational. The second factor is the terrorist attacks of September 11 th 2001, as well as the subsequent attacks in

Madrid (2002) and London (2005); these attacks not only served to portray Islam as an inherently radical and violent religion, but also legitimised and strengthened the “clash of civilizations” discourse (Brown 2006; Brouard & Tiberj 2006). This is especially true in

Britain, where the attacks highlighted the problem of “home-grown terrorism”.

Paradoxically, the rise – and fear – of home-grown terrorism highlights that the crisis of integration does not necessarily refer to new immigrants but instead often refers to second- generation immigrants. These will be defined here as “all individuals born in [name of country] from at least one parent born abroad” and who hold citizenship in the (host) country (Simon 2003: 1099). The ‘crisis’ thus refers to a country’s very own citizens.

There is, however, little in the literature touching upon whether immigrants and their descendents feel this crisis of integration as strongly as majority populations. Indeed, an article by Dr. Thériault, professor of sociology at the Université de Québec à Montreal notes,

“It is the majority that is concerned about its cohesion, not the minorities about their

2 integration” (Thériault 2008, my translation ). 2 In France, a PEW survey conducted in 2006 on

Muslims indicates that France’s integration model is faring well relative to that of other

European countries. The measure of integration in the survey relates to the sense of belonging immigrants have in France in terms of their willingness to adopt French customs, their sense of identity being French, etc. (Allen 2006). For instance, half of Muslims in

France identify as French before Muslim (in contrast to only 20 % in Britain), and a majority see no conflict between being French and Muslim. These findings therefore seem to indicate that a divergence may exist between majority and minority perspectives regarding the extent to which Western societies are, in fact, facing a crisis.

Consequently, this thesis aims to investigate perspectives on integration in both minority and majority populations, see how they compare, and assess what the possible political consequences of any disaccord may be. This investigation, due to resource and time constraints, focuses on the French context, and specifically the North African French minority. It will attempt to answer the following question: How do North African French and native French perspectives about integration in France compare? Thus, how do these two groups define integration and its end-goals, and how do they assess the extent to which North African French are integrated in French society?

The resurgent salience of the question of citizenship in diversifying and fragmenting societies begs the question of whether it reflects an actual “crisis” (i.e. a real and objective inability of the liberal democratic state to properly integrate immigrant populations) or rather reflects the existence of fundamentally different understandings of what actually constitutes integration and therefore, necessarily, different perceptions of whether or not it is being or can

2 Joseph Thériault, “Au-delà des valeurs communes – Investir dans un espace public national,” Le Devoir, Decembre 27, 2008.

3 ever be achieved. Differences in understandings of what integration is are critical because they highlight the fact that in resolving societal conflicts, groups may actually be aiming to achieve very different goals and thus different, even conflicting, models of citizenship.

Moreover, understanding the extent to which the “challenge” of minority populations is viewed largely as one of integration rather than more general societal fragmentation may also indicate a deligitimisation of minority discourse, as minorities become conflated with newly- arrived immigrants who are seen as not yet having a legitimate claim on the host state. It may also shed light on the extent to which minority groups actually feel integrated. These two issues inevitably affect not only the political legitimacy of minority mobilization but also the extent to which minorities feel a sense of belonging, and thus will act to reinforce and legitimize a society’s broader conception of citizenship. Finally, comparing perspectives about integration can also be an indicator of social cohesion: drastically different perspectives may indicate low levels of social cohesion, which may in turn have important political effects – as shown in the literature on diversity and social capital (Putnam 2007;

Stolle et al. 2008) – while similar perspectives could indicate higher levels of social cohesion, and thus relatively successful integration (even if the majority believes that a crisis exists).

A specific focus on the French context is justified not only because it is the oldest immigration country in Europe (Noiriel 1988), but also because it is a country which has long prided itself on its ability to assimilate people of all origins through a conception of citizenship as inherently civic and based on ideals of equality and freedom – thus contrasting strongly with more exclusionary approaches to citizenship, such as Germany’s until recently

(Statham and Koopmans 2000) where citizenship is ethnically-based and acquired through blood ties. Given its more open notion of citizenship, its relatively old immigration, and the fact that its integration model has come to be increasingly questioned in recent years,

4 investigating how integration is perceived in France is a relevant and interesting starting point from which to begin understanding perceptions and processes of integration in other countries as well. Moreover, France can also be differentiated from other old immigrant countries, such as the United States (which shares many of its Republican ideals), because unlike the US, it has never incorporated this aspect of its history into its national identity

(Schnapper 2006; Boucher 2000). Furthermore, most of its immigrants and minorities come from its former colonies, and the majority-minority dynamics in such a historical context cannot be compared to those existing in a country that does not have the same colonial history.

The analytical focus on North Africans (i.e. those originating from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) is justified and useful, as they constitute the oldest and largest non-European immigrant group in France, are mainly of Muslim origin, are the first visible minority to arrive in France – making them much more recognizable than other immigrant groups such as the Portuguese or Poles – and are amongst the most socio-economically disadvantaged groups in the country (Hargreaves 2007; Freedman 2004; Lapeyronnie 1987). Focusing on the second-generation rather than new immigrants is warranted firstly because the discourse on immigration and integration in France most often revolves around second-generation

North Africans rather than new immigrants (Freedman 2004). Therefore, understanding the perceptions held by and about second-generation North African immigrants is a good proxy, in the French context, for explicating perceptions on integration and the crisis surrounding it more generally. Secondly, a focus on new immigrants usually tends to lead to the debate about whether or not immigration should be restricted, which is distinct from the discussion on the question of how a society can most effectively ‘deal’ with a group that not only holds

French citizenship, but was also born in France with equal rights as ‘native’ French citizens.

Thirdly, while consideration of new immigrant perceptions may be controversial due to the claim that they chose to immigrate and therefore must adapt to the host society, perceptions of second-generation immigrations should be seen as equally important as those of the native population given that they were born and raised in France, and theoretically have an equal voice. Lastly, given that integration takes place over more than one generation, understanding how the perspectives of native French and second-generation North Africans compare and contrast is a more accurate indicator of the success of integration and the extent to which diversity can and is accommodated, than would be a comparison between native French and recent immigrants.

The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter I will present the historical background of second-generation North Africans in France. Chapter II will discuss extant literature regarding theories, models and policies of integration; second-generation immigrants (with a focus on France); as well as the supposed crisis of integration. Chapter III will present the field research conducted in Paris and its suburbs (the region of Ile-de-France) as well as the thesis hypotheses and methodology. Finally, Chapter IV will present and discuss the findings and will be followed by the Conclusion.

CHAPTER I: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1 Colonial and Post-Colonial Immigration until the 1970s

France has the oldest history of immigration in Europe, with immigration beginning in the 1880s from Italy, Belgium, and central Europe (Noiriel 1988). Immigration from

Algeria – officially a part of France until 1962 – started soon thereafter, with the country’s population serving as a vital source of low-wage labour for France since World War I.

Indeed, between 1914 and 1952, over 2 million Algerian immigrants lived in metropolitan

France (Alba & Silberman 2002). However, migration from the Maghreb – Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia – peaked only after decolonization, with bilateral agreements with Morocco and

Tunisia being signed in 1963 and a free movement of labour accord with Algeria maintained until 1973 (Bade 2003).

By 1970, 600, 000 Algerians, 140, 000 Moroccans, and 90, 000 Tunisians resided in

France – the vast majority of these being men (Bade 2003). In light of the post-war economic boom (referred to in France as Les trentes glorieuses ), migration from these countries to France was both necessary and desirable. As Favell notes, however, “Immigration policy was determined by economic necessity […] It was not necessarily thought that the immigrants would stay or need to be fully integrated into French culture,” (Favell 1998: 48).

The result was a wide range of short-sighted policies to deal with the influx of immigrants – limited policies to help them learn French, for example, and inadequate lodging facilities.

The growth of shantytowns eventually forced the government to build low-income housing for immigrants, now known as the large cités of the French banlieues (suburbs). Initially representing an improvement in the lives of immigrant workers, today these buildings are deteriorated and some quasi-uninhabitable. Built to quickly solve the housing problem for

7 these workers who would eventually return to their home country, they were not meant to withstand decades of use nor the high number of inhabitants currently residing in them.

While France officially froze immigration as of 1973 due to the economic crisis, a steady wave of immigrants continued to enter the country under family reunification laws.

Despite reunification and early signs that North African workers and their families were settling permanently in France, as well as the failure of repatriation efforts by Giscard

D’Estaing’s government in the latter part of the 1970s (Favell 1998), French integration policy towards these immigrants continued to be one of insertion until the mid-1980s, i.e. focus was placed on the social and economic welfare of second-generation immigrants without attempting to assimilate them (Hargreaves 2007). Such a focus continued to be justified on the basis that these populations would eventually leave, and thus did not need to be socially and culturally assimilated. Indeed, to facilitate eventual repatriation, the government officially encouraged the maintenance of a close relationship between immigrants and their cultures of origin (Weil 2004).

1.2 The 1980s: Mobilization of the Second-Generation and the New Debate on Integration

In the 1980s, France experienced fundamental demographic and political changes that had an important impact on the integration of North Africans in the country. On the one hand, there was a worsening economic crisis fuelled by the oil shock; increased unease among the majority French population; and the blurring of the issue of immigrants, asylum seekers, and illegal immigrants in the political discourse (Favell 1998). On the other hand, there was the coming of age of the first wave of second-generation North Africans – children of immigrants born in France, holding French citizenship, and having been socialized in the country's Republican institutions. The challenges associated with this

8 population transformed the debate on immigration into one on integration, still central to

French politics today (Erba 2007).

1.2.1. Mobilization of the Second-Generation

France’s insertion policy vis-à-vis immigrants meant that it was ill-equipped to deal with the second-generation North Africans who came of age during the 1980s and who were, in many ways, more French than North African. As a reaction to the inequalities and injustices they faced (notably discrimination and excessive police violence), the Beur 3 movement was born. The purpose behind the movement was not primarily to contest the racism that existed in French society – though many intellectuals, such as Alain Finkielkraut, did attempt to co-opt it into the bigger struggle against racism and anti-Semitism (Rouadjia

2004). Instead, what second-generation North Africans were primarily contesting was the fact that French society did not recognize them as being truly French. In line with this contestation, their rhetoric was fundamentally Republican – they did not want special rights, nor did they request to be recognized as an official minority within the country; rather they asked for greater concordance between the official rights they had as French citizens and the actual rights they were accorded by French society (Rouadjia 2004).

The marche des beurs, or according to some the "marche contre le racisme et pour l'égalité" which began on the 3 rd of December 1983, is the most significant historical example of this mobilization. Starting in Marseilles and ending at the Elysée in Paris, by the end of the march 100, 000 people (the majority of immigrant and North African origin) were peacefully demanding to be treated equally (Erba 2007). As Christian Delorme, a priest who took part

3 Beur is verlan for "Arab." Verlan is a form of French slang developed in French suburbs where the syllables are reversed. Beur is used to designate people of North African origin in France.

9 in the walk, notes, “What they especially wanted was not to be differentiated. They wanted to be given the right to be alike,” (Rouadjia 2004: 18, my translation ). 4

The Socialist Party’s electoral victory in 1981, and the arrival of Mitterrand to power, created a far more favourable political environment for such a mobilization by second- generation immigrants than would have been the case had the French Right been in power.

Indeed, the government quickly suspended the previous government’s repatriation policy upon the start of its mandate. Understandably then, the party quickly sided with the peaceful protestors of the marche des Beurs and promised to put in place policies that would rectify the injustices faced by this population.

There is overwhelming consensus that Mitterrand’s government, however, failed to fully take advantage of this window of opportunity, as it did little to actually change the situation at a political and social level, despite its promises. Two organisations that emerged in the aftermath of the events of 1983 – SOS Racisme and France-Plus – quickly became well- established and influential thanks to significant government funding. However, despite having leaders of immigrant origin, these associations quickly came to be seen as elitist, detached from the people they were meant to represent, and merely vehicles for the political mobility of its leaders (Rouadjia 2004; Kastoryano 2004). Thus, it quickly became apparent to second-generation North Africans and those of other foreign origins that the French Left, despite its enthusiastic reaction to their calls for recognition and equality, was not ready to relinquish its power.

4 Translated from French: “Ils voulaient surtout, fait remarquer le père Christian Delorme, qu’on ne les différencient pas, qu’on leur donne le droit à la ressemblance,” (Rouadjia 2004: 18).

1.2.2. A New Integration Policy

As previously mentioned, the emergence of second-generation North Africans coincided with the economic downturn of the 1980s, and thus led to the transformation of the debate on immigration into one on integration. It was clear that the integration policy of insertion was no longer a valid one, given that it did not take into consideration the long-term settlement of foreign populations in France. The Socialist party thus at first briefly flirted with the idea of multiculturalism (though never explicitly referred to as such), under the slogan “ le droit à la difference ” (the right to difference).

Not only did this go against the political contestation of second-generation immigrants (who contested the fact that they were being treated differently rather than trying to safeguard that difference), but it also quickly back-lashed as it increased fears that pluralistic demands on the part of immigrant groups (especially the Muslim North Africans) would threaten the cohesion of the Republic. Moreover, it was also co-opted by Jean-Marie

Le Pen of the extreme-right party Front National , who interpreted being ‘different’ as not being truly French. Consequently, he advocated the right to French difference , and the instatement of policies to protect these differences (Favell 1998).

Finally the government opted for a policy of integration, rather than one of assimilation or insertion under the slogan, le droit à l’indifference – the right to be indifferent – presented as the only way to combat Le Pen’s extreme right ideology (Giraudon 2006: 279).

This indicated a return of the notion of Republican citizenship, and “the defence of a universal ideal of integration for immigrants through public virtues and civic incorporation in the old revolutionary tradition,” (Favell 1998: 57) advocated for by intellectuals such as

Alain Finkielkraut and Pierre-Andre Taguieff. Following this new policy, the Haut conseil à

11 l’intégration (HCI) was created in 1989 to advise the government on all matters of integration. It defined integration as follows:

Integration consists of encouraging the active participation in the society of all the men and women who have been called to live permanently on our soil, accepting that cultural specificities remain, but putting the emphasis on the similarities and convergences regarding the equality of rights and obligations, in order to ensure the cohesion of our society […] It calls for the participation of differences in a common project and not, as in assimilation, the suppression of this diversity, nor on the contrary, like insertion, the protective guarantee of their reassertion (HCI 1993: 8, my translation) .5

Giraudon notes that this definition remains assimiliationist in nature: while differences are permitted, these are residual to the main public French identity (Giraudon 2006). The burden of the integration, consequently, lies on the individual immigrant, who has to converge towards the idea of the French citoyen , aided by the three pillars of Republican integration: secular schooling, the French language, and facilitated access to French nationality (Erba 2007).

1.3 The 1990s to Today: the Debate on Citizenship, the Riots of 2005, and the Fight against Discrimination

From the early 1990s through to today, four major issues have dominated the debate on integration and second-generation immigrants: 1) the reformation of French nationality laws; 2) the Islamic headscarf; 3) the periodic riots of the past thirty years culminating in those of 2005; and 4) the increased focus on the issue of discrimination.

5 Translated from french : « L’intégration consiste à susciter la participation active à la société tout entière de l’ensemble des femmes et des homes appelés à vivre durablement sur notre sol en acceptant sans arrière- pensées que subsistent des spécificités notamment culturelles, mais en mettant l’accent sur les ressemblances et les convergences dans l’égalités des droits et des devoirs, afin d’assurer la cohésion de notre tissue social. […] Elle postule la participation des différences à un projet commun et non, comme l’assimilation, leur suppression ou, à l’inverse, comme l’insertion, la garantie protectrice de leur pérennisation. » (HCI 1993 : 8)

1.3.1. French Nationality Laws in the 1990s

It is important to briefly address French nationality laws, given that the concept of integration is so inextricably linked to citizenship. French citizenship is automatically granted to children of foreigners when they turn eighteen hence “ensuring that there will be no more foreigners into the next generation,” (Simon 2003: 1092). If their parents naturalise and acquire French citizenship they can request the nationality for their children before they turn eighteen years of age. For Algerian children, the situation is slightly different. Algerians whose parents were born prior to 1962 automatically became French citizens at birth, given that their parents had been officially ‘French’ when they were born.

However, in 1993, with the French Right in power, nationality laws were changed, in line with the belief that French citizenship had to be both deserved and desired, and not simply handed out to everyone (Weil 2005). Consequently, as of 1993 children born in

France from parents of immigrant origin had to request their French citizenship between the ages of 16 and 21, as well as prove that they had lived in France without interruption for at least five years prior to turning eighteen. Several problems arose from these changes in nationality laws (Weil 2004). Firstly, many were unaware that they had to declare their desire to be French, and lost the chance to become French after the age of 21. Secondly, for some youths it was extremely difficult to prove they had lived in France for five uninterrupted years if they had left school before finishing high school – the case for many. Finally, the fact that these second-generation immigrants had to request being French solidified their perception that they were not truly French to begin with, and did not have the same rights as other youths born in France.

With the return of the French Left in 1998 the modification was reversed. The initial law was also reformed, allowing children to express their desire to be French when

13 they are thirteen years of age, and thus become French citizens well before becoming full adults (Weil 2005). However, the effects of the 1993-1998 law modifications reverberated well beyond this time period: what they reflected first and foremost was the enduring fragility of the rights of children born in France from foreign parents, as well as their legally precarious position in French society.

1.3.2. L'Affaire du Foulard and the Threat to French Identity

The debate on French identity is best reflected through the controversy regarding the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in public schools. The controversy first began in 1989 when three girls were refused access to a school in a northern suburb of Paris (Favell 1998).

Over the next fifteen years, several cases were brought to court, either because veiled girls were refused access to public schools or because their families requested exemptions for their daughters from certain school activities (for example, swimming). In 2003 then-

President Jacques Chirac formed the Stasi Commission to publish a report on the application of the principle of secularism within the country. The report confirmed the central place of secularism in France and proposed the abolishment of all religious and political symbols in public schools (Stasi 2003), which was approved by both government and parliament in 2004. While the law also targets crosses and kipas, there is overwhelming consensus that it was mainly instated to prohibit the wearing of the veil.

The wearing of the headscarf was, and continues to be seen, as the subordination of national civic values to particularistic cultural values, which the Republican state wants to relegate entirely to the private sphere, as well as the symbol of gender inequality and female submission. Moreover, as Favell notes, the common misrepresentation of the issue as having to do with the full Islamic facial veil rather than merely the headscarf served to “fix in

14 the political realm an opposition between a principled, rights-based individualism and the communautarism e” characterized in the Muslim’s position (1998: 175). This dichotomy then, makes the veil, and Islam along with it, inherently anti-Republican and thus anti-French.

As Weil (2005) notes, while the banning of the headscarf may be justified in light of the state's secular principles, there continues to be an inherent bias in France's self- identification as a secular state given its refusal to view Islam as a religion equal to

Christianity. Moreover, the ban may have negative repercussions for the integration of

Muslims in society. Firstly, the law has led to the entrenchment of an uneasy relationship between being French and being Muslim, and an increased sense amongst French Muslims of not properly belonging in, or being accepted by, French society. Secondly, if the school is supposed to be the principle agent of Republican socialization, hindering the possibility for veiled girls to attend public school may in fact further isolate them from French society, given their parents can choose to send them to private Islamic schools.

1.3.3. The Riots of 2005 and Sarkozy

While the events of the 1980s led to an increased feeling of political disillusionment amongst the second-generation youth, Rouadjia notes that in terms of political engagement, little has changed over the past 25 years. Indeed, while the 1980s was marked by the mediatisation of activists of immigrant origin, the majority of the population was generally apolitical. When militants from France-Plus attempted to mobilize young North Africans to subscribe electorally, the majority questioned why they should do so, given they knew nothing about politics. Today, they view politics as a lie aimed at deceiving those who are at the bottom of the social ladder (Roudjia 2004).

Mobilization by this segment of the population, as a consequence, has largely been through the form of riots over the past 30 years – usually following the death of a teenager in a suburb due to police violence. Rioters have, during these mobilizations, voiced their anger against the injustices they faced (especially police violence) by targeting symbols of the

French Republic, such as schools and police stations. The most recent riots of 2005 were spurred by the death of two teenagers of immigrant origin in the Parisian suburb of Clichy- sous-Bois who, thinking the police was pursuing them, died electrocuted while hiding.

Rioters made two demands: firstly, an apology on the part of the government and the police, and secondly the resignation of then Minister of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy.

The government’s response was extremely hostile and violent. The riots lasted three weeks and 217 people were injured throughout; at their peak, on the 13 th of November, 11,

500 police and gendarmes 6 were mobilized (Lapeyronnie 2006). Emergency law was also instated as of the 8 th of November, with tear gas being used against rioters – mostly minors – as well. Government discourse was notably polemical, most of all that of Sarkozy, who told citizens of Argenteuil, a French suburb, on the 5 th of November, “You’re tired of this band of racaille? We’ll get rid of them!” 7 (Auger et al. 2008: 635, my translation ). In addition to his controversial use of words, his analysis of the riots reflected a superficial understanding of

6 There is no English equivalent for gendarmes in English. The gendarmerie and the police have very similar roles, but are distinguished by the fact that the police is a civilian body while the gendarmerie is a military policing body.

7 In French: “Vous en avez assez de cette bande de racailles? Et bien on va vous en débarasser!” “Racaille” denotes a group in society that is not integrated, does not abide by the norms and laws of society, and is very provocative. Sarkozy’s choice of the word quickly fuelled greater anger amongst rioters and inhabitants of French suburbs who felt insulted by denomination (Auger et al. 2008).

Prior to the riots, in June of the same year, Sarkozy’s choice of words evoked another controversy as he promised to clean the notorious cité of 4000s in La Courneuve au Kacher, for which there is no direct translation but refers to high pressure cleaners (Karcher is a German brand). This statement was generally interpreted as implying that the inhabitants of the cités were comparable to scum that had to be washed away. Following his later statement, the words “Sarkozy” “Racaille” and “Karcher” quickly became associated – the consequence has been a deep feeling of resentment amongst youths of the suburbs towards Sarkozy until today (Auger et al. 2008).

16 their cause. Sarkozy blamed drugs and violence rather than recognizing the deeper underlying reasons behind the unrest, such as the overwhelming poverty of these suburbs and the common perception by its inhabitants of having been abandoned by the state and being discriminated by the police and other governmental institutions (Le Goaziou &

Mucchielli 2006). Two years later, Sarkozy is elected president and makes the repression of violence in the suburbs a top priority; consequently no major rioting has occurred since

2005, despite little change in policing methods or in the socioeconomic situation of the suburbs (Frégnac-Clave 2008).

1.3.4. Discrimination: The Struggle against Discrimination and the Debate on Affirmative Action

If one were to label France’s integration policy over the past ten years, it could best be termed one of anti-discrimination. Socioeconomic integration – through social ascension in the workplace – is seen to be a fundamental aspect of the integration process. This is in line with the definition of integration introduced by the HCI in 1989, which promotes an individualist process of integration (Favell 1998; Erba 2007) since non-discrimination in the workforce rewards those individuals who are committed and hardworking, without differentiating between groups that may be initially disadvantaged vis-à-vis each other and the majority population.

While intergenerational mobility does exist amongst second-generation North

Africans, for example as can be seen by the development of a small French Moroccan middle class (Simon 2003), they are still highly concentrated at the lower levels of France’s socioeconomic ladder. Indeed, when controlling for differences in education, native French are 15 to 18 % more likely to find employment than North Africans. The only explanation for such a gap is thus discrimination – usually based on the candidate’s origin and residence

(the two often overlap given the suburbs that are seen in the most negative light are also inhabited mainly by North and sub-Saharan Africans).

The negative repercussions of discrimination were officially recognized only in 1998 after a report issued by the HCI. At the local level, the departmental commissions for access to citizenship 8 (CODAC) were charged in identifying cases of discrimination in the workplace, lodging, access to public services and entertainment facilities. Anti-discrimination policy further became entrenched with the instatement of the law of the 30 th of December

2004, reaffirming the duty to treat every person equally without distinction of origin. This law led to the creation of the Haute Autorité de lutte contre les discrimination et pour l’égalité

(HALDE) in 2005 – an independent administrative authority in charge of recognizing all cases of direct or indirect discrimination, prohibited either by French law or international accords ratified by France, as well as for communicating essential information and promoting equality in the country (Erba 2007). Parallel to the creation of these institutions there has been increased debate over the appropriateness of anonymous CVs, though the effectiveness of this policy has been contested given racist employees will still be able to discriminate at later stages of the hiring process (Erba 2007).

Finally it is important to mention the debate on affirmative action that has taken a central position in all discussions regarding the integration of second-generation immigrants.

While some argue that affirmative action for certain groups of immigrant origin is necessary in order to rectify the injustices and inequalities existing in France today, there is a huge resistance to the instatement of such a policy on the basis that it violates France’s

8 In French: Commissions départementales d’access à la citoyenneté

18 constitution by giving preferential treatment to certain groups 9. Nonetheless, there have been ways to circumvent this debate by targeting low-income areas rather than ethnic groups

(thus leading to a quasi-affirmative action policy given inhabitants of these areas are often of

North or sub-Saharan African origin). L’Institut d’études politiques de Paris has been at the vanguard in this respect, since it has a number of places each year reserved solely for outstanding students from these high priority educational zones (ZEPs). Even so, however, these policies remain relatively rare and contested.

9 Article 1 of the Constitution of the 4 th of October, 1958: “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion.” (http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp#I)

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

It is important at this stage to provide an overview of the relevant literature regarding integration theory and approaches, as well as the issue of second-generation immigrants, both in France and internationally. The chapter is divided into four parts: 1) literature on integration generally; 2) literature on second-generation immigrants, in France and in Europe more generally, as well as on the existence of an integration crisis; 3) literature on public perception of the integration issue; and 4) an assessment of what the literature is missing and how this thesis aims to contribute to filling these gaps.

2.1. Literature on Integration

2.1.1. Integration theories

It is important to distinguish, when discussing literature on integration theories, between literature on societal integration in general and literature on integration as relating specifically to foreign populations. To understand what is meant by societal integration, it is useful to first briefly discuss the works of two fundamental contributors to the field: Georg

Simmel and Emile Durkheim. Simmel defines a social group in the following manner:

A social group exists … in the mental attitudes or psychological occurrences within the minds of the individuals; but the fact that these attitudes and occurrences are the product of mutual determinations and reciprocal influences creates a dynamic functional relationship between the individuals, and that dynamic functional relationship creates and is the unity of the group. The group is a unity because of this process or these processes of reciprocal influencing between the individuals (Spykeman 2004: 27).

Thus, group unity arises from reciprocal relations. Simmel also argues that social unity is not always the result of harmonious interests; conflict (especially in the form of competition) plays a positive role in the creation of group unity. As Blanc (1998) notes, in Simmel’s view integration and exclusion are “the two faces of the same complex process”, and the

“dynamic tension” that binds them together can only be solved through compromises and social transactions (Blanc 1998: 782).

Durkheim, for his part, focuses much more on the actual notion of integration than does Simmel. For Durkheim, integration is at once an outcome and process: it is the existence of a strong interdependence between members of a society, as well as the process which leads to this state (Safi 2008). A social system is integrated if its members are in interaction with each other, share a conscience, beliefs and practices, as well as common goals. The absence of integration is thus a crisis of the socialization process, and

Durkheim’s work on the division of labour in society, on suicide, and on religion can all be seen as attempts to address his more fundamental concern: by what process do individuals become integrated, i.e. how is the social formed? (Safi 2008).

While Durkheim does not focus his analysis on immigrants specifically (this is logical given France’s historical reluctance to view itself as an immigrant country), it is evident that his theory is especially relevant for an analysis of the incorporation of new immigrants.

Indeed, some intellectuals, such as Dominique Schnapper, argue that the perceived problem of ‘non-integration’ of North African and sub-Saharan second-generation immigrants in

France is not due to cultural differences or their lack of willingness to integrate, but to the fact that there is less to integrate into today than fifty years ago. The challenge of integrating immigrants, then, cannot be separated from broader issues plaguing French society – the degradation of its economic and social programs, the changing international environment and the general weakening of civic values in society as a whole (Schnapper 2006). Indeed, divisions in society may be exacerbated, if not created, by framing the problem of integration in ethnic or immigrant terms rather than as a general societal problem (Boucher 2000).

As Weil and Crowley (1994) note, integration is both the opposite of disintegration

(where disintegration is the absence of shared beliefs, practices, social interaction and shared goals) and of segregation. Segregation is unlikely to be conducive to integration given it limits the social interactions and creation of reciprocal relationships which occupy a central place in both Simmel and Durkheim’s analyses of social unity and integration. For this reason, the discussion on integration has been inextricably linked to urbanization, urban planning, and the increasingly “hourglass” structure of Western economies, among other things, which serve to reinforce segregation. For Lapeyronnie (1993), for example, the issue plaguing French society is not that of the integration of immigrants and their descendents, but rather the growth of an underclass that does not have access to the usual channels of citizenship and is segregated and detached from the rest of society. However, one cannot ignore the predominance of North African and sub-Saharan French in suburbs and hence a partially ethnic character to the segregation being observed in the country.

Weil and Crowley also note that integration is a concept derived from both political and social theory. On one hand, integration is the opposite of disintegration, as discussed above (deriving from social theory), and on the other, integration can be seen as “what makes standard majoritarian democracy possible,” (Weil & Crowley 1994: 110). The common link between state and society make it such that social cohesion – achieved through shared political institutions, shared educational systems and contact amongst members

(Harrell & Stolle 2010) – is considered essential for a functioning democracy, where democracy is understood not only in terms of the right to vote but also in terms of the respect of every citizen’s fundamental rights (Boucher 2000). The literature on social capital is relevant here – positing the importance of civil society and social cohesion in the formation of generalized trust, networks and horizontal associations (Putnam 2007;

Granovetter 1973; Taylor 2004; Uslaner 2002) essential for healthy and functioning democratic societies. Recent literature has discussed the potentially harmful effect of ethnic diversity, however, on these aspects of social capital, with ethnically diverse areas reporting lower levels of social capital when controlling for factors such as socioeconomic levels, population, etc. (Putnam 2007). If the link between social cohesion, social capital and democracy is correct, it seems that ethnic diversity may erode democracy – a conclusion that bodes ill for most Western countries today, including France.

However, some literature criticizes the underlying assumption behind this causal relationship, which is that cultural homogeneity and shared values are essential for a socially cohesive and functioning democracy (Harrell & Stolle 2010). This literature proposes a relational approach to social cohesion as “cooperative relations among individuals and groups of individuals that are based on mutual recognition, equality, and norms of reciprocity,” (Harell & Stolle 2010: 17). At the macro-level this entails structural equalities across groups and at the micro-level “extensive and overlapping networks amongst individuals” (ibid) so as to foster values, which can be shared by all individuals, no matter how diverse. These are: cooperative norms, mutual recognition, and belief in political equality. The importance of this new interpretation of social cohesion is that it allows for a questioning of older definitions that make the growth of diversity and heterogeneity in a state inherently problematic and destructive to social cohesion. In this study, social cohesion will be understood using this approach – for example, by investigating the extent to which belief in political equality exists in France and fundamental norms shared by all citizens.

This leads into the discussion of integration theory as relating to foreign populations specifically. The literature focusing on immigrant integration includes four main theoretical approaches, with most of the debate focused on the first two: the classical theory of

23 assimilation; multiculturalism; structuralism; and transnationalism. The classical theory of assimilation, with its roots in the Chicago School of sociology, is premised upon two main assumptions: that assimilation is a positive phenomenon leading to the harmonization of conflicting interests and the removal of differences, and that it is a natural, inevitable, and irreversible process (Safi 2008; Todd 1994). Notable contributors include Park and Burgess

(1921), and Gordon (1964). Multicultural theory, for which the seminal work is that of

Glazer and Moynihan (1963), emerged as a reaction to the wholly positive and homogenizing tendency of the classical theory of assimilation. The theory postulates that pluralism, and thus ethnic, religious, racial, and other axes of difference are integral to society; it views society as composed of many social groups defined through their varying and shifting affiliations.

A substantial amount of literature has focused on critiquing or supporting these two theories in terms of their ability to adequately describe the process of integration. While

Alba and Nee (1997) and Morawska (1994) defend classical assimilation theory, Ogbu (1978,

1990) criticizes it for its inability to account for the interiorizing assimilation of African

Americans in the United States. Others note its inability to account for an evident second- generation decline in terms of income and education amongst immigrant families (Gans

1992; Perlmann & Waldinger 1996; Portes and Zhou 1993). Rumbaut (1999) criticizes both theories for assuming a final endpoint in the integration process with the removal or at least balancing of all rivalries between societal groups.

The most significant critique comes from the theory of segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993; Safi 2006) that has demonstrated that in both multicultural and assimilationist countries there are three observed paths to integration: 1) ascending social mobility, 2) descending social mobility and 3) socioeconomic mobility with limited

24 acculturation. Depending on varying contextual and individual factors, immigrants will integrate into different classes of society, making integration not always desirable or positive

(thus taking into account structuralist critiques of classical assimilation theory and multiculturalism (Blau & Duncan 1967; Portes & Borocz 1989)).

What is especially important for the purposes of the proposed thesis is the multidimensional theory of integration developed by Gordon (1964) and used by scholars proclaiming the existence of segmented assimilation. Integration here is seen as a process composed of structural, cultural, identificational, normative, and social dimensions.

Gordon’s work is seminal in sociology of immigration because it was the first to decompose integration into a series of processes that could be observed individually. Gordon’s study of

American immigrant minorities led him to conclude that certain processes of integration – most notably acculturation – were easier to achieve than others, such as structural and social integration, but that often the former was less important for overall integration into the majority society than were the latter. 10 Structural integration, for example, though more difficult to achieve, often automatically led to acculturation and full integration into society; the opposite was hardly ever the case (Schnapper 2006; Safi 2008).

Gordon’s theory, though still entrenched in classical assimilation theory because it did not contest the idea of minority assimilation into a homogenous and unchanging majority

WASP (white Anglo-Saxon protestant) culture, was thus fundamental in the way it approached the issue of integration and posited the superiority of certain aspects over others for successful assimilation. It also represented a major development in terms of rendering the concept of integration more scientific and methodologically rigorous, allowing for a more systemic investigation of the topic. This explains why it has been at the basis of most

10 Social integration here referring to inter-marriage and inter-ethnic friendships.

25 major empirical work on immigrants in Europe and the United States until today (Phalet &

Swyngedouw 2003; Safi 2008).

While Gordon’s work is over half a century old, and some of its assumptions highly contestable, the continued political salience of economic inequalities, cultural affinities, and normative views of ‘foreign groups’ in Western societies indicates that it provides an excellent framework from which to launch a deeper investigation into the integration of second-generation immigrants. Furthermore, using Gordon’s theory as a basis for this thesis is methodologically sound in light of the predominance of contemporary works that also use it as a base in their investigation of immigrant integration. Finally, the framework allows one to investigate perceptions on integration more easily by dividing the term into concrete and more graspable dimensions for individuals, given ‘integration’ itself is a relatively vague term.

Indeed, while for Gordon integration is complete when integration in all five dimensions has occurred, what this thesis investigates is whether native French and North African French feel the same way – are all dimensions essential, or are some more important than others? In other words, while this thesis does not investigate the same questions as Gordon does, it is nonetheless useful to use his model as the base from which to understand the different

‘forms’ integration may take.

2.1.2. Approaches to Integration

A substantial amount of work has also focused on developing models – as opposed to theories – of integration. These models are, however, also premised on the overarching dichotomy present in theoretical developments, namely that of multicultural versus assimilationist approaches to immigrant integration. Favell (1998) makes the interesting link between policies and theories in his discussion of “official public theories” whereby

26 consensus is built around a specific theory in the public discourse, thereby influencing the policies that are instated. The literature on integration policies indicates that most of the debate on integration models centres on whether to adopt an individual or group approach in the legal and political spheres, i.e. whether to define immigrants in terms of ethnicity and origin or whether to emphasize their individual duty to assimilate as postulated in the classical theory of assimilation (Hollifield 1997; Koopmans and Statham 2000; Boucher

2000). Consequently, much literature has attempted to defend or criticize either the multicultural or assimilationist models (Joppke 2001; Kymlicka 1995; D’Souza 1991;

Brubaker & Cooper 2000; Keating 1996).

Within France, Boucher (2000) distinguishes four divergent approaches to integration: assimilationist (Todd 1994; Taguieff 1996), and ‘integrationist’ (Schnapper 1996;

Costa-Lascoux 1991) on one hand, and therapeutic communitarian (Nathan 1994) and multiculturalist (Wieviorka 1996; Lacorne 1997) on the other. While both the assimilationist and integrationist approach remain solidly entrenched in the refutation of minority rights, they differ in that the assimilationist approach proclaims that assimilation is occurring in France despite evidence to the contrary, and also that what should be defended is not the cultural diversity of foreigners but rather French culture and French Republican values in an increasingly diverse environment. On the other hand, the integrationist approach recognizes that there has been a fundamental failure to actually ensure that legal rights are translated into concrete rights – the solution is thus greater economic opportunities for all, the reinforcement of the right to be treated equally, as well as the reinforcement of France’s fundamental values: secularism, gender equality, and democracy, thought to be the best means to ensure full integration in society.

The multiculturalist approach advocates not a full-fledged multicultural policy such as that practiced in the United Kingdom or in Canada, but rather serves to contest the way multiculturalism is considered taboo in France, and highlights the need to re-assess the successes and failures of the French Republican model as well as the current reality of

France so as to allow for greater concordance between theory and reality. In other words, what is necessary is the ability to approach political tensions through the prism of not only socioeconomic inequalities but also cultural issues, and devise policies that take into account these two factors instead of completely ignoring ethnic differences (Wieviorka

1996). Lacorne, in a similar vein, argues for the need to accept a “political plurality” to mitigate societal conflicts, and while he also states that one should remain wary of multicultural approaches given they may sometimes exacerbate divisions, he is supportive of policies, such as affirmative action, to rectify historical injustices. Finally, at the extreme end of the spectrum is the therapeutic communitarian approach advocated by Nathan

(1994). The most controversial and least discussed of all four approaches, it advocates an all-encompassing multiculturalism, whether in politics, in the health sector, in family law, etc., in order to recognize the strong attachment people have to their cultures. This last approach can be seen as potentially harmful, however, as it seems to impose an ethnic identity upon everyone rather than allowing individuals to choose the extent to which they relate to their ethnic community.

There are several relevant points from this debate for this study. Firstly, the fact that France has actively adopted an official assimilationist policy discourse (Favell 1998), even if in French the term intégration is used instead of assimilation. This has led to there being no official recognition of minorities or of group rights, as well as no affirmative action policies based on ethnicity or race. Secondly, the discourse brought forward by

28 academics like Wieviorka and Lacorne demonstrates the extent to which multiculturalism is perceived as a taboo in France – one that is inherently opposed to French Republican values – and the extent to which this has meant that both political and academic discourses have remained very limited in their ability to find innovative policies to deal with the country’s integration issues.

Thirdly, the French approach to integration, as with any country’s approach, inevitably involves a normative definition of what it means to be a citizen . In France, where integration is viewed positively, it is individual – it implies an individual keeping his cultural particularities in the private sphere and publicly succeeding by explicit and strict adherence to Republican principles. Contrary to this, public demonstration of cultural particularities, or mobilization for group rights, is seen as disruptive. Moreover, in the process of integration, the nation as such remains the same and unchanged by the new populations who enter it. This, according to Alba (2005), refers to bright boundaries existing in France

– boundaries between what is and is not accepted in society are clearly delineated so that successful integration inevitably means individual boundary crossing , where the individual takes up the customs and ways of thinking of the majority. Finally, it is important to understand the perspectives of academics given the political clout they have – contrary to academia in the Anglo-Saxon world, French academics are central to French politics as well as French media, often called upon to issue reports or take part in commissions. Limits on academic discourse are thus often directly translated into political limits on the ground.

2.2. Literature on the Second-Generation and on the Existence of a Crisis of Integration

Literature on second-generation immigrants is mainly within the sociological literature, though even there research on older immigrant populations and ethnic

29 communities was sparse until the 1990s. The 1990s saw an increased focus on second- generation immigrants largely because it became clear that socio-economic marginalization and cultural affiliations with countries of origin seemed to persist across generations . Most of the literature focuses on immigrants in the United States, and is often closely linked to refuting or reinforcing integration theories, as discussed in the previous section.

2.2.1. Literature on Second-Generations: Early Literature, Quantitative Data and its Analysis

Of more relevance for this study is the literature focusing on second-generation immigrants in France, which began to develop in the 1980s with the first generation of

North African French-born (Marangé & Lebon 1982; Berque 1985; Sayad 1987, 1991;

Aissou 1987). Early work, however, was qualitative and solidly grounded in sociology – often focusing on the integration of this generation in schools (Bercque 1985; Aissou 1987), the tensions that exist between the culture of their parents, French society, and their identity as second-generations (Sayad 1987, 2006), as well as their opinions about Islam and the extent to which it can be reconciled with French culture (Gonzalez Quijano 1987).

A substantial amount of quantitative work – primarily written by French academics – focuses on assessing the degree of integration of second-generation immigrants in France.

Most studies compare the different immigrant groups with each other and with the native

French population. The majority use two major surveys conducted in the 1990s: Enquête

Histoire Familiale carried out by the Institut National de la statistique et des études

économiques (INSEE) and Enquête Mobilité Geographique et Insertion Sociale (MGIS) led by

Michèle Tribalat (1995). Most of the research highlights the ongoing socioeconomic marginalization of second-generation North Africans: not only do they suffer more severe chronic unemployment, they also occupy lower-ranking jobs, are relatively absent from

France’s elite schools and live in increasingly segregated housing units, raising fears of the ghettoization of immigrants (Meurs et al. 2006). Unemployment among men of North African origin, for example, is between 35% and 45% - more than twice the national average

(Guiraudon 2006).

Until recently, there has been a tendency to explain these trends purely in socioeconomic terms – the precarious situation of the second-generation is perpetuated by lower levels of education and poorer backgrounds, and is thus independent of cultural origins. Dubet’s work on youth in the Parisian banlieues is an example of this, where the fact that “many of the banlieues […] are also inhabited by large populations of immigrant origin, is largely ignored” (Kiwan 2007: 82). However, the research stated above has demonstrated that North African French are more likely to be unemployed even when controlling for economic status and level of education. Additional studies have shown that a curriculum vitae with a North African name receives three times fewer call-backs than the same curriculum vitae with a native French name (Erba 2007; Weil 2005). Such findings are extremely worrisome in light of the fact that, especially in France, the motor for integration is seen to be socioeconomic, with a model that aims “at invisibility through social mobility,”

(Simon 2003: 1092). This has lead to an increased focus on discrimination in the literature as the explanatory variable for these inequalities (Fassin & Fassin 2006; Silberman et al. 2007;

Erba 2007).

While the studies overlap in their findings, they differ in their analysis of these, and at times hold contradictory conclusions. For example, Tribalat (1995) concludes that despite the continued marginalization of second-generation immigrants of North African origin, integration is taking place quite successfully given that this population group, amongst other things, has the highest rate of intermarriage with native French (compared to other

31 immigrants), and demonstrates a high level of acculturation in terms of speaking French rather than Arabic at home. For Tribalat, as for less quantitative academics such as Todd and Noiriel, it is simply a matter of time before all groups are fully integrated, and there is no fundamental problem with the French Republican model. Clearly, Tribalat adopts an assimilationist view of integration, with successful integration coinciding with the loss of second-generations’ culture of origins.

Safi (2006) uses Tribalat’s data but develops a completely different analysis. Testing the theory of segmented assimilation and analysing the extent to which each immigrant population group has ‘integrated’ along Gordon’s five dimensions of integration, she finds that segmented assimilation exists in the French context. Indeed, North Africans are experiencing descending social mobility. In other words, though they are culturally integrated as Tribalat concluded, they continue to be socioeconomically marginalized.

Silberman et al. (2007) come to the same conclusion regarding the presence of segmented assimilation in France. The fundamental difference between this theory and that of Tribalat is that the socioeconomic marginalisation is not necessarily temporary, but rather may be the endpoint of this segmented assimilation – a conclusion that has important policy implications in terms of the extent to which the elimination of marginalisation of certain groups should be a governmental priority. It is also interesting that both literatures agree that North Africans are culturally integrated despite the fact that in France threats of Muslim extremism and communitarianism are often seen as emanating from the African immigrant population and their descendents (Freedman 2004; Favell 1998).

The most politically relevant quantitative study is the one by Brouard and Tiberj

(2006), which assesses the voting behaviour, political inclinations, aspirations, and norms of

Turkish and African immigrants and their descendents. Brouard and Tiberj find that

32 political and cultural integration has been fairly successful amongst this population, thus confirming findings mentioned above. This is extremely interesting because it dispels common perceptions of this population as being overly religious or homogenous and reasserts that they are in most ways similar to other French citizens in their political behaviour, ambitions, and ideals.

2.2.2. On the Existence of a Crisis

Most literature on second-generation immigrants ties into the ongoing debate on the

“crisis” of the French Republican model of assimilation due to the continued marginalization of immigrants; the failure of the Republican school system in socializing immigrants; the growth of ‘ghettos’; and the perceived persistence of religious differences as highlighted by the controversy around the wearing of the veil (Schnapper 2006; Cépede 2005; Giraudon

2006; Weil 2005; Coroller 2005). This crisis narrative is also mentioned in some comparative literature on second-generations and integration more generally, though Heckmann’s (2004) work on Britain, France, and Germany indicates that integration of the second-generation has been, for the most part, successful, and that this generation is not the ‘ticking time- bomb’ many seem to believe it is. Heckmann’s study, as well as others, confirms that there is , at the very least, a problem of misperception in Europe today concerning the lack of integration of second-generation immigrants, and the threat this can pose. Most studies note that there is a strong link between the fear of a loss of national control (in the context of increased globalization, international threats, and the consolidation of the European Union) and the perception of a crisis of integration (Joppke 2007; Brubaker 2001; Mahnig &

Wimmer 2000; Favell 1998). This literature is useful as it implies that this crisis, while perceived, is not necessarily real.

2.3. Literature on Public Perceptions

2.3.1. Why is a Study of Perception Important?

Finally, it is necessary to discuss the relevant literature on public perceptions regarding integration in France and specifically second-generation immigrants. While hard facts such as those uncovered through the quantitative analyses discussed above are important to understand the reality on the ground, a fundamental premise of this thesis is that to fully analyse the extent to which integration is successful or has the potential to be successful, people’s perception of a situation is important. 11 Firstly, perceptions and misperceptions can create conflict between groups. The perception on the part of a majority population that a minority is leeching off the country’s welfare system increases hostility towards the minority, and reinforces the idea that they are not hard workers. This indirectly limits their employment prospects. In contrast, strong perceptions of being discriminated against on the part of a minority member may increase his or her reluctance to socialise with the majority population, and hence limit the channels for full integration

(Zolberg 1998; Hochschild & Mollenkopf 2009).

Secondly, people’s perceptions are an important factor to take into account because they often determine the saliency of issues and the extent to which a government is able to actually implement necessary policies. Inevitably in a democratic structure the government in power must be careful not to go against popular opinion regarding core issues so as to remain in power. Even if a government does put in place policies that go against public opinion, these may be ineffective in light of strong perceptions about an issue. For example,

11 While perception and public opinion are not identical , they can be considered to capture the same general phenomenon – how people view a situation or those around them. Thus, in reviewing the literature, they are considered to be synonymous and both are of interest for the purposes of this study.

34 while anti-discrimination laws currently exist in France, they have had a limited effect. A firm accused of discriminating may argue that the public is more reassured when served by someone who is like them , i.e. white, and that they are merely making sure their clients feel at ease (Fassin & Fassin 2006; Bataille 1997). This is, evidently, the consequence of people not feeling at ease or not feeling that they can trust someone of foreign origin. For all these reasons, an analysis of perception is equally important to an understanding of integration policies if one truly wishes to fully explore the issue of the integration of foreign populations, whether in

France or elsewhere.

Finally, investigating perspectives on integration allows one to study the issue of integration objectively without implicitly assuming the superiority of one model over the other. Indeed, the main purpose of this study is not to determine whether a multicultural or assimilationist approach would be most beneficial for France, but rather what French citizens actually prefer, and what they value. In light of the political saliency of integration issues today – especially in Europe – such an investigation is crucial so as to consequently devise better policies to mitigate problems associated with diversity and in the future possibly develop new approaches to integration than the ones currently existing.

2.3.2. Existing Literature on Perception

Unfortunately literature on people’s perception or opinions on integration issues in

France, and elsewhere, is lacking. Rather, there is abundant literature focusing on public opinion regarding immigration and immigrants (Sides & Citrin 2007; Mayda 2005; Fetzer

2000; Hargreaves 2007). Literature on integration, in contrast, focuses more on understanding and interpreting elite governmental discourse (Bleich 2002; Favell 1998;

Kastoryano 2004; Hollifield 1997) with very little consideration of whether the elite discourse is internalized by the larger population.

The most relevant literature that can be found on public opinion and perception regarding integration in France are sociological studies on how racism is constructed through social experiences on the part of the majority population (Wieviorka 1992; Bataille

1997; Guilbert & Mergrier 2006). These studies tend to focus on low-income areas where interaction with foreign populations is more frequent, and confirm the high level of racism that exists in French society against those referred to as “Arabs” “Maghrebins” and “ Les

Blacks ”. Bataille (1997) also outlines the endemic racism that exists in state institutions and trade unions – highlighting the state’s role in propagating or reinforcing this racism. Other works touch upon the way racism and discrimination have been internalized by populations of foreign origin (Fassin & Fassin 2006). However, due to a focus on racism, these works, while useful for the study of integration, do not delve into questions such as, what constitutes a good French person? How is mobilization by citizens of foreign descent interpreted? And is there a problem of integration?

Alternatively, there have been occasional surveys questioning people on issues such as the banning of the veil in public institutions and other highly mediatised issues.

However, these are not carried out in a consistent manner and often take place when the issue is at the centre of media attention, and this mediatisation may itself influence respondents (Amiraux 2004). Nonetheless, these surveys are often worrying for foreign populations – for example, in a 2000 poll, 63 % of respondents answered that there were too many Arabs in France and 69 % of respondents admitted to being very, quite, or a bit racist (Freedman 2004; Liberation 16 March 2000).

What can be considered the closest effort to ask people what they think of integration was a conference organized by Sciences Po in 2007 investigating , Qu’est-ce qu’être Francais aujourd’hui? (What does it mean to be French today?), as well as the current debate launched by President Sarkozy investigating the same question. However, these did not take the form of surveys or interviews, but rather of a platform from which those who are active in the issue have a chance to express themselves. Moreover, they have been seen as symbolic, politically motivated debates with little or no real consequences on the ground, while also lacking the systematic rigour of an academic study.

While few studies look at integration from the perspective of the majority, some do look at minority perspectives, specifically those of second-generation North Africans. A few studies investigate the extent to which second-generations feel discriminated – showing that this population is more likely to report higher levels of discrimination than older generations of North Africans, both because of larger contact with native populations and because of the expectation to be treated like a French person (Simon 2003; Freedman 2004).

Most notable for this study is Jeunes Maghrebins de France by Evelyne Perrin (2008), based on

80 interviews conducted between 2003 and 2006 with second-generation North Africans.

The study provides an in-depth analysis of this population’s opinions on issues such as

Islam, secularism, politics, discrimination and segregation. Most importantly, the majority of the interviews, though expressing a wide range of opinions on the different issues, do nevertheless communicate the desire on the part of North African French to be full French citizens of the Republic. Indeed the majority highly dislike the term ‘integration’ being used to refer to their social issues, given that it enhances a sentiment of schizophrenia and non- belonging. It should be noted that a significant disadvantage of this study is that its sample

37 is composed largely of highly educated and politically engaged individuals, and hardly any respondents are representative of the youths from the banlieues.

The only other recent study that was identified on North Africans’ perception of integration is Générations Beurs (Barsali 2003) though its sample size is small and is constituted of successful North Africans and second-generation North Africans, such as documentarist Yamina Benguigui and journalist/film director Moloud Mimoun, and thus cannot be considered in any way representative of the more general second-generation

North African population in France. Nonetheless, its subtitle, Francais à part entière (Fully

French) also highlights the idea that though of North African origin and despite experiencing discrimination and injustices in France, North African French do view France as their home country.

2.4. Gaps in the literature: What is missing? What is this study contributing?

There are several gaps in the literature on integration of second-generation North

Africans in France and especially on their opinions on the issue. Firstly, empirical work on minorities in general is sparse in France due to the prohibition on collecting ethnic statistics

(Bleich 2002; Amiraux & Simon 2006); most quantitative studies thus use either the Enquête

Histoire Familiale or the Enquête MGIS as their main source of data. While Brouard and

Tiberj (2007) do use their own sample, their study limits itself to political behaviour rather than investigating ideas of what integration means and how second-generations perceive the issue. Furthermore, they do not only look at the second-generation but also at newly arrived immigrants and older waves of immigrants born in Africa or Turkey.

While the quantitative study conducted for this thesis is not necessarily representative due to its very small sample size, the fact that the study does not rely on the

38 two major data sets mentioned means that it can shed new light on the issue and potentially offer new directions for future studies. Furthermore, all quantitative studies thus far focus largely on ‘hard facts’ – voting behaviour, language proficiency, levels of intermarriage, socioeconomic levels, etc. rather than on perception, which, as has been argued, is an essential aspect to investigate. The study will thus simultaneously contribute to the quantitative research on integration, as well as to general studies on second-generation immigrants, by investigating these perspectives qualitatively as well as quantitatively.

Another gap in the literature is the dearth of research on perceptions and public opinion about integration , rather than only on immigration. Investigating how the integration discourse is carried out at the societal level, as this study aims to do, is a useful corrective to the literature on integration, which remains largely theoretical and based on integration theories and models. Moreover, while some surveys on general attitudes towards certain perceived aspects of integration (i.e. the wearing of the veil, importance of secular principles, etc.) do exist, 12 there is no research on minority perspectives about integration.

In an ideal world, what would second-generation North Africans want France to be, in terms of its integration model? It seems that the literature only mentions speculations and fears of majority populations and the demands of second-generations during times of crises

(such as during the 1983 March or the 2005 riots) without properly investigating the issue from their perspective.

Furthermore, there are no studies attempting to compare native French and North

African French on the same questions , as this study aims to do. This may be because the very act of doing so reinforces the idea that North African French are different from ‘normal’

12 Many of these are carried out by institutes, such as the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP). For example, Les Francais et l’interdiction du port du voile islamique dans les lieux publics , carried out on the 2 nd and 3 rd of November 2006 surveying 1011 adults on whether veils should be banned in public places .

French and hence is in itself controversial. Nonetheless, such a comparison is useful to understand the extent to which one can actually speak of ‘North African French’ as a cohesive community vis-à-vis the majority ‘native French’ population. It is also useful to understand the extent to which the perceived crisis of integration is real, and even if real, whether there is a divergence in understandings of what precisely the crisis is about and how it can best be tackled. The study, in its comparison of the two populations, aims to remedy – in part – these gaps.

A last important gap in the literature on integration in France is the disconnect between political science and sociology. This may be explained in part by the fact that sociology is a much stronger discipline in France and often incorporates aspects of political science. However, the consequence is a strong separation between the Anglo-Saxon literature on diversity and social cohesion and Francophone literature on integration. This study aims to reconcile the two fields and literatures in order to understand, not only perceptions about integration, but also how these perceptions affect the legitimacy of political mobilization . Such an understanding will allow not only for a more nuanced understanding of social interactions, but also for the possibility of developing more effective policy prescriptions. Such an approach builds on extant literature on social capital (itself a combination of sociology and political science), which makes the link between levels of social cohesion and diversity, and addresses the implications of these for democracy

(Harrell & Stolle 2010; Hooghe et al. 2009; Mutz 2002). This relatively recent branch of political science literature, however, has yet to adequately investigate the French case, as this study aims to do.

CHAPTER III: PRESENTATION OF THE HYPOTHESES AND PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

3.1. Hypotheses

Having reviewed the existing literature on integration and second-generation North

Africans in France, this section will detail the actual research conducted for this thesis. The main questions under investigation are: How do North African French and native French perspectives about integration in France compare? Thus, how do these two groups define integration and its end-goals, and how do they assess the extent to which North African French are integrated in French society? In light of the literature discussed, four issues were investigated regarding perceptions about integration amongst native French and North African French citizens:

• Whether a crisis is perceived in French society by both populations; • How both populations rank the different components of integration, and consequently whether North African French place greater focus on structural integration (allowing for a more multicultural perspective) and native French on cultural integration (reflecting a more assimilationist perspective); • The extent to which both populations perceive North African French as well integrated and how they rank their integration in terms of the different components of integration; are there differences in their perceptions and what are the consequences of these? • How both populations interpret the 2005 riots . It is important to clarify that for the purposes of this study, integration is understood as being generally structural and cultural. More specifically, it is seen as having six components:

Gordon’s five components of integration (acculturation, social mixing, identificational, normative, socioeconomic) and an added political dimension. Socioeconomic and political inclusion represent structural integration while cultural integration is encompassed by the remaining components. The political dimension has been added in an attempt to understand, firstly, how important political integration is to individuals, and the correlation between one’s perception of integration and lack of tolerance for political mobilization by

41 minorities (as demonstrated in public opinion towards the riots in the French suburbs).

Indeed, an important idea behind the questions being investigated is the extent to which framing North African French as ‘immigrants’ – or their problems as being related to the challenge of immigrant integration – serves to make their accommodation politically controversial, thus limiting the range of policies that can be instated to encourage their

(societal) integration.

Regarding the first issue under investigation – whether there is a perceived crisis in society and whether this perception, if present, is shared by both North African French and

Native French – no adequate hypothesis can be proposed, as the literature on the subject is inadequate. On the one hand, North African French may be more likely to report that there is a crisis of integration given they are its primary victims. On the other hand, they may also be less likely to report the existence of a crisis in light of the controversial use of the word

“integration” and the possibility that they see the situation as being one of long-term structural problems that have a long history and are thus ‘everyday’ and ‘unremarkable’.

Regarding the second question, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H1: Native French, when assessing integration, will consider cultural integration to be more important than structural integration, and hence will have a more assimilationist view of integration. North African French will think the opposite and will value structural integration over cultural integration, hence reflecting a more multiculturalist view of integration.

This hypothesis is based on the fact that North Africans are seen as being at the centre of the crisis of integration and that Islam is seen as the major challenge to the Republican assimilationist model (Freedman 2004); therefore one can presume that native French citizens will prioritize cultural components in their assessment of integration. The hypothesis also finds support in the work on racism carried out by Bataille (1997) and Wieviorka (1992) in which interviewees use “the good Arab” or “the correct black” to refer to those

‘exceptions’ where a non-native French has adopted French customs, and can thus be tolerated and accepted. This is reflective of France having what Alba (2005) calls “bright boundaries”, where what is accepted in society is clearly delineated, and thus the burden of any integration is placed on the individual outsider who must shed his/her past in order to properly adopt a new way of living. Thus this would predict that native French will rank cultural aspects above structural ones.

While there is little evidence that North Africans have a strictly multicultural perspective of integration (as outlined above) – especially in light of the dearth of literature on the question – it can nonetheless be expected that they will have a more pluralist perspective of integration, allowing for the possibility and the right to be an equal citizen and equally French even if one has an Arab name or is Muslim. Indeed, this is in line with the mobilization during the marche des Beurs, also understood to be a call for recognition as

French Muslims rather than as Muslims in France – indicating an attempt to blur the boundaries Alba (2005) refers to. Moreover in light of this population’s mobilizations for equality and greater employment opportunities under the banner of ‘being French’

(Hargreaves 2007; Kastoryano 2004), it is justifiable to expect that despite believing that feeling French is important, they will actually view becoming French as largely related to equality of opportunity and life chances as actualized through structural changes in the system. North African French are thus expected to value these structural aspects over other aspects of integration, given that they have been deprived of these despite being French citizens.

Investigating the third issue of interest, how both populations rank North African integration, the following hypothesis is postulated:

H2: North Africans French will be more likely to perceive their population as successfully culturally integrated than native French. Meanwhile, no major difference is expected in terms of both populations’ assessment of North African French structural integration.

This hypothesis is based on several points mentioned in the literature on integration and second-generation North Africans. On the one hand, native French will likely rank

North African cultural integration as ‘lower’ in light of the tendency to label them as immigrés

(in contrast to Italian or Portuguese second-generations for example who are viewed as

French), as well as the fact that North Africans have been placed at the centre of the crisis in the media and political discourse (Freedman 2004; Erba 2007). Moreover, in light of the polemic on the veil and Islam, one can expect the majority French population to perceive

North Africans as being culturally different and thus, less ‘integrated’ in the French assimilationist sense of the word. On the other hand, it can be expected that North African

French rank their population’s cultural integration as ‘higher’ in light of statistical evidence that their population, despite perceptions to the contrary, does have extremely high levels of acculturation and intermarriage, voting behaviour similar to the native French population, and other behavioural commonalities with the majority (Brouard & Tiberj 2006; Tribalat

2005; Safi 2006). It is likely that North African French surveyed are more aware of these high levels of integration than native French.

However, in terms of structural integration in the form of political representation and socioeconomic inequality, no major differences in perception are expected due to the widely documented marginalisation of North African French populations in terms of access to employment, elite schools, etc. and the widely held perception that North African populations are predominantly poor (Brouard & Tiberj 2006). Moreover, the reputation of the suburbs – where a significant proportion of North African French reside – and the mediatisation of the recurring riots makes it such that it is likely that both populations will

44 view North African second-generations as lacking political representation and as occupying a lower position on the socioeconomic ladder vis-à-vis the majority – even if opinions on the root cause of theses inequalities may differ.

Finally the last question being investigated, with respect to how both populations interpret the 2005 riots, leads to the following two hypotheses:

H3: Native French will have a higher tendency to view the 2005 riots as a mobilization against French values. Nonetheless, this does not exclude them from also viewing the riots as a mobilization against the government, police, and socio-economic marginalisation; thus with respect to viewing the riots as against government, police and socio-economic marginalisation, no major differences between the two populations are expected.

H4: North African French will more likely agree that greater political representation of their population group will decrease the chances of riots recurring.

The first hypothesis is based on the fact that in both media and political discourse the riots were presented as an example of the communitarian danger present in the suburbs, as illegitimate acts by a “racaille” that contested French values (recalling Sarkozy’s words as then Minister of Interior), and as an “intifada” of the banlieues in many newspaper articles. 13

Consequently, and in light of Sarkozy’s presidential victory less than two years later, it is reasonable to predict that native French will be more likely to interpret the riots – largely engaged in by North African and sub-Saharan African youths – as mobilizations against

French values. However, in light of the well-known police violence, discrimination, and levels of unemployment in the banlieues , one does not expect the two populations to differ in their assessment of the riots as also being against these concrete structural problems as well.

In terms of opinions regarding whether better political representation of North

African French would decrease the chances of riots recurring – it can be expected that native

13 Alain Finkielkraut, for example, asserted the ethnic nature of the riots in an interview (Haaretz, 17 November 2005) while others such as Ivan Rioufol, editorialist for Le Figaro, made a direct connection between the riots and the Palestinian intifadas (Le Figaro, 4 November 2005).

French will be more likely to disagree with this claim in light of the negative media representation of the riots and the general image of the rioters as young hoodlums who enjoyed breaking cars, rather than as citizens expressing anger with state institutions. From this perspective it follows that, lacking political conviction, greater political representation would not affect this population’s tendency to riot. On the other hand, North African

French who are more likely to have experienced police discriminations and marginalisation are more likely to view the riots as a rational, albeit highly disruptive, reaction to the injustices that exist in France. Given this political consciousness, then, they are more likely to think that better political representation would actually compel the government to address their problems, and hence minimize the chance of riots.

3.2. Methodology

3.2.1. Field Research

The main question of interest, and the sub-questions detailed above, were investigated both qualitatively and quantitatively through a closed answer survey and semi- structured interviews. Second-generation French citizens of North African origin and native

French citizens were randomly solicited in public areas in Paris and Ile-de-France (the

Parisian suburbs) for surveys and interviews. Choosing these areas allowed for a more diverse and representative sample, with respondents coming both from more disadvantaged areas, such as Clichy-sous-Bois and La Courneuve, and others from wealthier areas such as the 92 nd department of Paris, the second wealthiest department after Paris proper.

Face-to-face surveying was conducted in public areas, with three main filter questions: age of the respondent (to ensure respondents were adults, i.e. over 18 years); citizenship status (to ensure respondents were French citizens), and birthplace of parents

46 and grandparents. This final question ensured that the native French respondents were not, in fact, third-generation immigrants, while also allowing for the distinction between second- generation North Africans and the native French population to be properly captured. This filter question was necessary given France’s laws against the collection of ethno-racial statistics, and provided a more subtle way to capture ethnic origin without asking respondents directly whether they were North Africans (which may have ascribed them an identity for which they might not necessarily have felt any affinity). At the suggestion of respondents who stated that it would be easier to spread the survey in their community via email and social networking sites, an on-line version of the survey was also used. This on- line version also included the necessary questions regarding age, city of residence, nationality, place of birth, and place of parents’ and grandparents’ birth; consequently surveys filled out by those who did not correspond to the criteria were excluded.

Approximately 150 individuals (half native French and half North African French- born) were surveyed. Efforts were made to have an equal proportion of men and women and similar age groups in both samples. However this was not always possible given second- generation North Africans are on average quite young, and limiting the analysis of the native

French population to a similar age group would not have properly captured the general public French perception on the issue. A similar effort was also made for socioeconomic status. The survey was anonymous and included multiple-choice questions on the existence of the crisis, perceptions of integration, views on political mobilization, etc. (See Appendix

A for the final version).

Fifteen semi-structured interviews with North African French respondents who filled out the questionnaire complement this survey. These interviews lasted on average 30 minutes, and built upon answers given in the survey, hence allowing for a more in-depth and

47 nuanced understanding of how North African French citizens view integration - particularly their own integration - in France (See Appendix B for the interview outline). Questions touched upon, among other things, the extent to which they felt integrated in light of their ranking of different dimensions of integration; their sense of belonging in France and the ways in which it might have been affected by obstacles they encountered; as well as what they thought about immigrants and about how diversity should be accommodated. This last question was important to include because, as second-generation immigrants, they may have either adopted majority views about immigration and integration, or instead have grown in favour of a more multicultural approach. This question thus allowed for an assessment of whether or not second-generation North Africans and native French share similar views of what French society is and what it ought to become.

Finally, combining the empirical data with the interviews, the information was evaluated so as to explore the extent to which native and North African French perspectives differ; the extent to which there may be a misperception amongst either group regarding how the other thinks; and the implications of this for social cohesion as well as for successful integration and accommodation of diversity. This thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach in assessing perspectives about integration, given it modifies Gordon’s sociological ranking of integration by adding a fundamental political dimension, as previously discussed.

The proposed thesis, while drawing upon the social capital literature from sociology and other disciplines, nonetheless shifts the focus to investigating the implications of these findings for political outcomes. Furthermore, it combines empirical analysis with discourse analysis. Understanding how people define integration has important ideological and political consequences, and as Verkuyten notes, “the very nature of a group of people is constructed in category definitions, which has implications for rights and entitlements,”

(2005: 224). Consequently, the impact of categorizing North African French as ‘immigrants’ is thought to have powerful effects on their integration – specifically, their political integration.

3.2.2. Shortcomings of the Research

It is important to briefly discuss the shortcomings of the research and data that was gathered. Firstly, a survey sample of 150 people is evidently nowhere near the necessary amount so as to have a truly representative sample. However, financial and time restrictions impeded conducting a study with a larger sample size. For this reason, the findings may not necessarily be representative, and the power of the statistical tests conducted relatively weak.

However, this does not mean that the study, due to its small sample size, is incorrect in its findings. Rather, the results, which nuance previous findings, can still provide the basis from which to begin a deeper analysis of the issue, and it is thus still valuable in bringing to the fore interesting and relevant questions that should be addressed in the field of integration studies.

Another potential weakness of the study concerns the problem of self-selection.

Several individuals approached – both native French and North African French – declined to participate in the study claiming that they were not interested in politics, or that they did not want to talk about immigrants, integration, or the issue of second-generation North

Africans. With respect to the interviews with North African French, it was extremely difficult to interview women, who were more absent from the streets, more likely to be at work or at home, or simply too busy to sit down for an interview. While women were interviewed, they do not constitute half the sample, and hence the possibility that more interviews with women would have introduced perspectives different from the ones

49 captured in this study remains a possibility. Nonetheless, even taking into consideration these sampling problems and the issue of self-selection, the study is still valuable in that it does provide an interesting insight into a relatively diverse sample of both native French and

North African French. Interviewees ranged in socioeconomic backgrounds – with some having completed doctoral studies in political science and others not having completed high school and being relatively apolitical. Moreover, non-representativity at times was useful; highly educated interviewees could often differentiate their own privileged position and that of the majority of the population, allowing for a much more engaged and complete discussion on the issue of integration.

Future research efforts could improve on this study by not only taking into consideration these weaknesses, but also by modifying the survey instrument so as to make it shorter and more rigorous. For example, fewer and more direct questions without as many answer choices would more effectively bring out any major differences in opinions amongst North African and native French populations, while also minimizing the possibility of respondents contradicting themselves throughout the survey. The only difficulty with adopting even more direct questions than the ones used in this survey is that people are often uncomfortable answering questions which may make them appear racist or culturally insensitive – which is a challenge that was encountered using this survey when investigating the native French population.

CHAPTER IV: PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

This chapter will present and discuss the quantitative and qualitative research conducted for the study. The first section presents the statistical methods employed; the second section presents the statistical analysis; the third section discusses the findings; and the fourth section concludes by briefly discussing the findings’ implications for social cohesion, integration, citizenship and consequently democracy. The qualitative research serves to better illuminate the quantitative findings – either by providing additional evidence for the hypotheses supported by the quantitative data, or by providing alternate explanations when the quantitative data fails to support the predictions made.

4.1. On the Statistical Methods Employed

The quantitative data collected for the study is interpreted using Welch’s t-test.

Almost identical to the classical t-test, Welch’s t-test differs only in that it does not assume equal variance between the two samples under investigation. The t-tests presented in this study thus do not assume equal variance. For comparison, the data were also interpreted under the assumption of equal variance and results in both cases were extremely similar, thus indicating that either test is appropriate for this specific quantitative study and the choice does not affect results.

Given that the main question is whether two populations – native French and North

African French – hold different opinions and perceptions regarding integration, the t-test is the most logical statistical tool to use, since one of its primary applications is for two-sample location tests. The test allows for an easy and direct comparison of population mean responses, and provides the degree of correlation between belonging to a specific sample and providing a particular response. While the t-test is the principal statistical tool used in

51 this study, findings are at times complemented with more basic information from tabulation results, given that these can reveal interesting and precise information that is concealed in t- test results.

4.2. Statistical Analysis

4.2.1. On the Perception of a Crisis

The first issue to investigate is whether there is a perception of a crisis, and if there is, whether both native French and North African French share this perspective – for which no hypothesis was advanced due to insufficient literature. The t-test with unequal variance yields the following results:

TABLE 1: DOES A CRISIS OF INTEGRATION EXIST ? Group Obs Mean Std. Dev North African French 78 2.198718 0.8616646 Native French 78 1.846154 0.78669 Combined 156 2.022436 0.8411646 t =2.6687*** Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) 14 Ha = diff > 0 Pr (Tt)=0.0042 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 152.741

Mean values in the table are on a scale between 0 and 3, with 0 indicating complete disagreement and 3 complete agreement with the claim. The t-test indicates that, in fact,

North Africans are more likely to report the existence of a crisis, with results being statistically significant at the 99 % confidence level. However, there is consensus amongst both groups of the existence of a crisis, as indicated by their means well-above 1.5.

14 Where (0) refers to the North African population and (1) to the native French population. This also applies to the remaining t-tests in this chapter.

4.2.2. On Ranking Integration

Regarding the second major question of this study, how North African French and native French rank different aspects of integration, integration was presented as having six components: cultural similarity (watching similar television shows, listening to the same music, speaking the same language); similar norms; high levels of intermarriage and interethnic friendships; feeling French; socioeconomic equality; and political representation. The hypothesis presented in the previous section was as follows:

H 1: Native French, when assessing integration, will consider cultural integration to be more important than structural integration, and hence will have a more assimilationist view of integration. North African French will think the opposite and will value structural integration over cultural integration, hence reflecting a more multiculturalist view of integration.

Consequently, native French are expected to rank sharing common norms, cultural similarity, inter-mixing, and feeling French higher than North African French, while North

African French will rank socioeconomic equality and political representation higher than

Native French. Running a t-test for each component, with unequal variance, yields the results displayed on the following page.

TABLE 2: RANKING SIX COMPONENTS OF INTEGRATION Share same norms – secularism, gender equality and democracy Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 76 1.671 1.215 Native French 75 1.88 1.099 Combined 151 1.775 1.160 t = -1.1083 Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H1a : mean (0) – mean (1) < 0 Pr (Tt)=0.8652 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 147.887 Being culturally French Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 78 0.754 0.900 Native French 73 1.219 1.118 Combined 151 0.984 1.036 t = -2.8675*** Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H1b : mean (0) – mean (1) < 0 Pr (Tt)=0.9976 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 138.265 High level of inter-mixing Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 78 1.244 1.205 Native French 74 1.243 1.070 Combined 152 1.243 1.061 t = 0.0019 Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H1c : mean (0) – mean (1) < 0 Pr (Tt)=0.4993 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 149.357 Feeling French Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 78 1.359 1.238 Native French 75 1.527 1.081 Combined 153 1.441 t = -0.8936 Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H1d : mean (0) – mean (1) < 0 Pr (Tt)=0.8135 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 146.785 Socioeconomic equality Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 78 1.756 1.321 Native French 76 1.579 1.143 Combined 154 1.669 1.235 t = 0.9021 Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H1e : mean (0) – mean (1) > 0 Pr (Tt)=0.1869 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 149.925 Political representation Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 75 2.133 1.091 Native French 72 1.792 1.183 Combined 147 1.966 1.146 t = 1.8179** Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H1f : mean (0) – mean (1) > 0 Pr (Tt)=0.0356 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 142.897 54

From the table above, it is clear that there is almost no evidence to support the hypothesis made. In fact, only regarding cultural similarity and political representation were predictions supported by the results, with Native French ranking cultural similarity higher than North African French – statistically significant at the 95% confidence level – and North

African French ranking the importance of political representation higher than native French

– statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.

Despite the lack of support for the hypothesis brought forward, it is important to note the average importance ascribed to each component of integration, as indicated by the mean values. Cultural integration and inter-mixing are both seen as relatively unimportant, with means for both populations being below 1.5. Feeling French is considered slightly more important, with a native French mean slightly above 1.5. Socioeconomic equality, political representation and sharing similar norms are ranked higher, with population means between 1.5 and 2.133. Political representation is ascribed the highest value, with a combined mean of 1.966, and individual population means of 2.133 and 1.792 for North

African French and Native French, respectively.

4.2.3. On Ranking North African French Integration

The next question under investigation is how both populations perceive North

African integration in France. Given that the findings for the previous question indicated that North African French and native French rank the different components of integration in relatively similar ways, investigating perspectives on North African integration is especially useful in order to see whether the perception of an integration crisis – at least from the majority point of view – stems mainly from a misperception rather than an actual problem of integration. One can assume that such a misperception would only be problematic if it

55 regarded the issues that were ranked as relatively important components of integration by native French. Thus, in discussing perceptions about North African integration, only four components of integration rather than six will be focused on: shared norms, feeling French, socioeconomic equality and political representation, which were ascribed an importance of

1.5 or higher on the 0 to 3 scale by native French (and in most cases by North African

French as well.)

The main hypothesis here is as follows:

Consequently, one can expect North African French to rank their cultural integration as being more successful than will Native French, as well as be more likely to agree that their population believes in norms of secularism, gender equality and democracy, and feels

French. On the other hand, relating to structural aspects of integration – both populations will be equally likely to disagree with the claim that North African French are well integrated in terms of socioeconomic equality and political representation. Conducting t-tests with unequal variance for these hypotheses leads to the results summarized in the table on the following page.

TABLE 3: RANKING NORTH AFRICAN INTEGRATION Belief in norms – secularism, gender equality and democracy 15 Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 78 0.273 0.880 Native French 78 -0.272 0.645 Combined 156 0.0003 0.816 T = 4.4067*** Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H2a : mean (0) – mean (1) > 0 Pr (Tt)=0.0000 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 141.173 Feel French Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 78 1.467 0.699 Native French 77 1.292 0.598 Combined 155 1.380 0.655 t = 1.6821* Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H2b : mean (0) – mean (1) > 0 Pr (Tt)=0.0473 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 149.949 Have equal socioeconomic levels Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 78 1.487 0.841 Native French 77 1.205 0.612 Combined 156 1.346 0.746 t = 2.3964*** Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H2c : mean (0) – mean (1) = 0 Pr (Tt)=0.0089 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 140.521 Are well represented in Politics Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 77 0.779 0.883 Native French 78 0.782 0.705 Combined 155 0.780 0.796 t = -0.0220 Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H2d : mean (0) – mean (1) = 0 Pr (Tt)=0.5088 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 145.077

For the questions regarding norms, answers are given on a scale between -2.336725 for full disagreement and 1.742156 for full agreement, because this variable actually includes three variables that were placed on a scale (regarding North African adherence to norms of

15 The variable for ‘norms’ here is in fact composed of three variables which were added together on a scale: belief in secularism, belief in gender equality, and belief in democracy, which in the above ranking of integration more generally are seen ton constitute ‘norm’. Testing the correlation between the three variables indicated that they moved together, hence supporting the idea that they could be collapsed to encompass the more general variable ‘norms’. The decision to initially ask each question separately was to see whether any stood out more than the other in terms of disagreement between the two populations. The new scale for norms, given it is composed of three sub-variables, goes from a minimum of - 2.336725 to a maximum value of 1.742156.

57 secularism, equality of gender and democracy). For the remaining questions, agreement is ranked on a scale of 0 to 3, with 0 being full disagreement and 3 full agreement.

Results indicate that predictions made regarding respondents’ answers are only partly supported by the findings. On the question of whether North African French share the same norms (secularism, equality of genders and democracy), North African French do have a higher tendency to think that their population embraces these values than do native French

– with results being statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. They also tend to believe more firmly that their population feels French, statistically significant at the 90% level – even though the relatively low mean indicates that they too feel ambiguous about this.

In terms of assessments of North African structural integration, contrary to what was expected, North African French have a higher tendency to view their population as having similar socioeconomic levels to the national average than native French – significant at the

95% confidence levels – though in this case as well means for both populations indicate general disagreement with the claim. In terms of political representation, findings are not statistically significant, with both population groups disagreeing with the claim that North

African French are well represented, reflected by their very similar means at around 0.78.

4.3.4. Interpreting the Riots

Finally the last question under investigation is whether mobilization by North

Africans is seen as illegitimate and as a threat to the French Republic and its values. This question was specifically geared to the riots of 2005, because they were the most mediatised; the most disruptive riots of the past thirty years; and the freshest in people’s minds given their relatively recent occurrence.

Two hypotheses were proposed in the previous chapter:

H4: North African French will more likely agree that greater political representation of their population group will decrease the chances of riots recurring.

Running t-tests for the following hypotheses yielded the results on the following page.

TABLE 4: INTERPRETING THE 2005 RIOTS Riots as anti-values Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 75 1.007 0.840 Native French 74 1.182 0.913 Combined 149 1.094 0.878 t = -1.2226 Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H3a : mean (0) – mean (1) < 0 Pr (Tt)=0.8883 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 145.664 Riots as anti-government Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 77 2.182 0.756 Native French 75 2.08 0.846 Combined 152 2.13 0.801 t = 0.7814 Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H3b : mean (0) – mean (1) = 0 Pr (Tt)=0.2179 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 147.171 Riots as anti-unemployment Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 76 2 0.833 Native French 75 1.933 0.917 Combined 151 1.967 0.873 t = 0.4676 Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H3c : mean (0) – mean (1) = 0 Pr (Tt)=0.3204 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 147.251 Riots as anti-police Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 76 2.368 0.780 Native French 75 2.327 0.596 Combined 151 2.348 0.693 t = 0.3699 Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H3d : mean (0) – mean (1) = 0 Pr (Tt)=0.3560 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 140.162 Political representation would decrease chances of riots Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. North African French 78 1.865 0.893 Native French 75 1.553 0.845 Combined 155 1.712 0.881 t = 2.2219** Diff = mean (0) – mean (1) H4: mean (0) – mean (1) > 0 Pr (Tt)=0.0139 *Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom: 149.949

These results indicate that Hypothesis H 3 is not supported. Though as predicted both populations regard the 2005 riots as mobilizations against governmental policies, the

60 police, and unemployment levels (demonstrated by the lack of statistical significance of the t- tests), native French do not demonstrate a higher tendency of viewing the riots as being against French values. Indeed, both population means reflect a tendency to disagree with this statement, with Native French having a mean of 1.18 and North African French of

1.007 on the 0 to 3 agreement/disagreement scale. However, opinions regarding whether greater political representation would decrease the chances of the riots recurring do indicate a variance according to origin, at the 95% confidence level, with North Africans having a higher tendency of believing that greater political representation would have an impact on the recurrence of the riots than do native French.

4.3. Discussion of Results and Qualitative Analysis

4.3.1. The Crisis: A ‘Crisis’ that has Always Existed

In light of the mediatisation of the integration crisis in government discourse, the affaire du foulard , and the riots of 2005, which were for the most part engaged in by North

African and Sub-Saharan French youth, it is not surprising that both populations agree on the existence of a crisis of integration in French society today. The fact that North African

French are more likely to agree on its existence may be explained by the fact that, as victims of this crisis in terms of structural marginalisation, discrimination and societal prejudices, they are more aware of the problem than would be native French individuals.

However, deeper investigation into the question through interviews brings out interesting issues regarding how long this crisis has existed, and whether it has worsened over the years. Firstly, while interviewees agree that a crisis exists, there is an overwhelming perception amongst them that this ‘crisis’ is not a recent phenomenon – on the contrary, it simply refers to how things have always been. For some this does not mean that a crisis

61 does not exist, while for others the word ‘crisis’ does not adequately capture the dynamics of the situation:

The problem has always existed. The only difference is that before no one talked about it and now people and the media do. But it’s always existed, the suburbs, the poverty, the exclusion. (I, Paris)

I don’t think things have become more exacerbated over the past thirty, even forty years. The worries haven’t changed and the problems haven’t changed. Maybe the only difference is that back in the day immigrants were seen in a slightly more positive way because we needed them for the economy. (F, Paris)

A crisis of integration? I don’t know if I would call it a crisis. My parents have been living here since the 1960s, I’ve lived in Clichy-sous-Bois my whole life. Things have always been difficult for us. I don’t know if I would call it a crisis – that makes it sound recent, as if ten years ago things were alright. Maybe it’s because French people have finally realised how things are and so everyone says it’s a crisis, but this is how things have always been for us. This is normal life. (M, Clichy-sous-Bois)

The last comment is especially revealing – indeed can we claim that a crisis of integration exists if the conditions of North African French have not significantly changed since the arrival of their parents in the country? It seems that the use of the word crisis – even if used by both populations – is more revealing of changes in French society with regards to their foreign populations than indicative of a particularly acute situation for North

African French at the moment. Nonetheless, there are varying opinions as to whether the situation – despite always having been difficult – may not now be worse, both because conditions have deteriorated and because perceptions of rights and of belonging have also changed.

I don’t think the situation is worse today than it was twenty or thirty years ago. I think they [younger second-generations] talk about it more. They have a greater tendency to contest the way things are, more prone to protest. It’s normal with time. You know, it’s the fruits of ‘integration’ – as we feel increasingly French we also demand more. (F, Paris)

Many of them say, ‘France isn’t our country’, they start to learn Arabic again, they’re suspicious of everything around them. They understand already. When we were 14 we didn’t understand, we thought, ‘this is normal’ – to be excluded for example – ‘eventually it’ll stop’…but they see it right away. They’re in a much trickier situation. (I, Paris)

I think it’s getting worse, the crisis. I feel there’s more misery now, that children do foolish things at younger ages, they drop out of school younger. I feel their parents are increasingly overwhelmed. We see youngsters outside until three o’clock in the morning…they don’t even realise the luck they have living in France. We’re not in Anglo-Saxon countries where its to each his own, you know […] They seem to respect nothing, their parents, the buildings where they live, the elevators they use. It’s hard to understand sometimes, even if I know they're having a hard time… (N, La Courneuve)

On the one hand, there is a perception that for younger second-generations things have not worsened with respect to older second-generations, but rather that their expectations from society are greater. This confirms many studies on second-generations who, even if experiencing greater social mobility than their parents, have much higher expectations than their parents did with respect to their rights, and hence – paradoxically – are actually more quickly disillusioned (Simon 2003). The interpretation of the riots as an indication of the

‘fruits of integration’ also echoes many studies, which have seen in riots the expression of a desire to participate in and be a part of society and an internalization of norms of freedom and equality that are fundamental to French identity (Lapeyronnie 2006; Todd 1994). This last interpretation regarding the riots as being expressions of citizenship does not, however, imply that the problem afflicting this population should not be addressed with utmost urgency, but rather serves to undercut the fear that this crisis is threatening the very core of

French society, and consequently provides these youths with a legitimate place in the societal and political discourse.

For the second two respondents, however, the situation has clearly worsened for younger second-generation. The negative impact of this ‘greater integration’ brought up by the first respondent is that they are not only more aware of their disadvantaged position in society, but are also having more difficulty reconciling their different identities. While marginalised from French society like the previous generation, they are also more detached from their parents’ culture of origin – which in some cases may have helped older second-

63 generations reconcile themselves with their relative marginalisation in French society. In fact, as another interviewee noted:

My generation was able to retain a certain amount of pride with regard to our cultures of origin. Younger second-generations are too detached, they’re too far away from it all, they have less to mobilize through. These youths, they belong to neither French history nor to North African history, and as a consequence they’re lost. (A, Aubervilliers)

It is thus the historical ties to the nation that this younger second-generation seems to lack – especially when compared to older second-generations who have managed to develop dual identities and use these strategically. In this sense, then, the crisis of integration may have worsened in that the younger second generations (those between 14 and 25 years of age), who took part in the 2005 riots and who are referred to as racailles not only by society but by members of government, have less to draw upon – i.e. have fewer points of reference – when negotiating their identity and place in France.

4.3.2. Ranking Integration: A North African French Population Resembling its Native French Counterpart

Let us recall the findings regarding how North African French and native French ranked integration: the findings did not support the general hypothesis that native French would value cultural integration over structural integration, and vice versa for North

Africans. Other than cultural similarity and political representation, all components were ranked similarly by both groups, with cultural similarity and inter-mixing being ascribed little importance, feeling French average importance (1.5 on the 1 to 3 scale), and shared norms, political representation, and socioeconomic equality greater importance.

Though the findings do not confirm the hypotheses made in the study, the results are nonetheless useful. Firstly, the fact that North African French and native French answers are similar indicates that the two populations hold similar values, and that

64 consequently North African French may be more ‘integrated’ than is currently thought.

Moreover, the absence of a significant divergence of views also highlights the extent to which the so-called ‘communitarian threat’ posed by North African French citizens has been exaggerated: they do not disagree, for instance, with the importance ascribed by native

French to shared common norms. Finally, the fact that political representation is valued by both populations, but especially by North African French, as an important component of integration is reassuring for political scientists as it indicates that, while perhaps generally apolitical, North African French nonetheless do not discount the importance of political representation for full integration in society. Moreover, the importance ascribed to this component may mean that a political solution to the perceived 'crisis of integration' may be the most feasible and effective.

Despite this similarity in responses, it is critical to bear in mind the possibility that native French answers may be slightly skewed, given respondents may not have wanted to seem overly intolerant or assimilationist. 16 To the extent that they may have wanted to appear tolerant, then, it is possible that native French may have ascribed less importance to components such as cultural similarity. However, even this indicates a certain internalisation of the need to be more tolerant to differences within society and may not necessarily be negative. Assuming responses are not skewed however, the relatively low ranking ascribed by both populations to components such as level of mixing and cultural similarity may be the reason why France’s integration model, paradoxically, seems to be more successful than that of other European countries (recalling Allen’s (2006) investigation into Muslim feelings of belonging in France and other European countries). This is possibly because, despite not recognizing itself as a country of immigration, France still remains the oldest immigration

16 Indeed one French respondent commented that answering the survey made her feel racist – while this indicates that she nonetheless gave direct answers, it is possible that other respondents did not.

65 country in Europe, with one quarter of the population having at least one grandparent born abroad (Noiriel 1988).

Indeed, investigating North African perspectives on this issue, there is evidence that native French may not be as assimilationist as one might be led to believe from governmental and elite discourse. While on one hand there is the perception that,

“Everything that isn’t white isn’t French” (F, Paris), there is also the recognition of France as a very diverse country:

If there are things about being a French citizen that make me proud, it’s precisely this pluralistic notion, this diversity that we find in the country. It’s what I respect the most and what I appreciate the most. (F, Paris)

How to reconcile these two notions of French society as being both tolerant and intolerant? Most interviewees were quick to point out that in fact, France has been able to accommodate and appreciate a significant amount of diversity, but what differentiates North

Africans – as well as some sub-Saharans and more recently arrived Turks – is their religious affiliation to Islam. Indeed as one respondent commented:

Maybe the most fundamental issue in this subject, the very ‘nerve’ of the conflict, is the attitude of French society and the state towards Islam. We’ve passed the stage of ‘diabolization’. The way Islam is portrayed in the media has had a direct effect on the extent to which it – and Muslims - are rejected by French society, and you know in a way that has also shaped how Muslim populations feel about [French society and people]. (Y, Haut-de-Seine)

In other words, the real problem may be the relationship between France and Islam, and not between France and diversity. In fact, one interviewee noted:

There’s hypocrisy in the way the country approaches the problem of immigrants. Chinese communities here, for example, I see them – they don’t even try to integrate. They have different customs as well, they barely speak French … they always stay together. For them the community is all that matters. Us, our parents really tried. They made an effort to speak French – even at home, we don’t speak Arabic, we speak French. And yet we’re always the problem. (N, La Courneuve)

Indeed, the irony of the situation in France is that, while North African French are perceived as posing a cultural or communitarian threat, Asian communities are actually much more communitarian and less likely to speak French or mix with other groups (Safi 2006). While their lack of cultural integration may be evident to native French, it is not perceived to be a problem or a threat to French culture. The fact that North Africans are often defined first and foremost as Muslim (Brouard & Tiberj 2006) serves to put them in direct opposition with the secular principles of the state, thus rendering their presence in society much more problematic. Investigating this question further would be extremely useful and enriching to existing literature on integration in France.

4.3.3. Ranking North African Integration: A Notable Difference in Perception

Part of the motivation behind this study was to see whether 1) a crisis of integration was perceived to exist in French society, and 2) whether this perception of a crisis existed in two populations holding different ideas about what integration is. However, results from the previous section indicate that in fact, North African French and native French do not have different ways of ranking the fundamental components of integration; in other words, both populations seem to share the same idea of what is meant by integration in the French context. This begs the question: do both populations then hold different perceptions about the extent to which North African French have been successfully integrated? Here it was predicted that North Africans would be more likely to agree that their population feels

French and share similar norms (thus are culturally integrated) while both groups would be equally likely to disagree with the claim that they are structurally integrated.

Results indicate that North Africans French more strongly agree with the claim that their population believes in norms of secularism, gender equality and democracy. This point

67 of disagreement is understandable in light of the mediatisation of the issue of the veil in public schools, which was presented as a violation of secularist principles, as well as undermining gender equality. Consequently, those who opposed the ban of the veil – among whom were many North Africans – can easily be cast as standing against, or at least not sharing, these principles. Indeed, as one interviewee noted, there is an obsession with the issue of the veil and the need to ‘save’ veiled girls from oppression. Nonetheless, she also felt that at times North Africans were reluctant to accept secular laws, and she understood consequently why they might be perceived as resisting certain principles. Most interviewees, however, support secularism – or at least, express a lack of desire to contest the principle. As an interviewee, himself a self-declared “secularist”, noted, “ It seems to me that most Muslims accept that religion must be relegated to the private sphere.” (A, Paris) Indeed, when interviewees – especially those who defined themselves more in religious terms – were asked whether they would prefer multicultural policies allowing for a more public role for religion, they often voiced this belief in secularism:

When Muslims are no longer perceived negatively just because they’re Muslim, I will have no problem, no issues with the way things are in France. To instate policies to accommodate Muslims, separate laws, to accommodate religious holidays…I wouldn’t go that far. There’s so much diversity in France – the only way it can be managed is by really enforcing ideas of secularism and equality. If not things would get complicated… (B, Bois-Colombes)

It seems then that there is not only a lack of contestation due to a power asymmetry between

Muslims in France and the majority, but a true internalisation of secular principles by the former. The issue rather seems to be about what constitutes a violation of these principles – with many of the interviewees contesting the banning of the veil on the basis that it brings religion into the public sphere.

In terms of feeling French, results are also statistically significant, with North

Africans agreeing more strongly with the claim. However, for both populations means were

68 generally low: the North African French mean at 1.467 indicates a clear inability to confidently state that their population does in fact feel French. This was confirmed by most of the interviews conducted. When asked if they personally felt French, replies often reflected an ambiguous relationship with their feeling of belonging towards French culture and the

French state:

I feel French usually, but when, for example I watch the news and see some of the things that are going on, the discourse, etc. I don’t feel that I fit in exactly. (N, Paris)

I don’t know if I feel French. Despite the fact that I’m born here, that I studied here, part of me feels more North African... (N, La Courneuve)

Yes I feel French. But sometimes I don’t. When I see how the government reacts in its foreign policy, towards my country of origin, towards my culture…I can’t really feel French when that happens. I don’t find myself in that national image. (S, Montrouge)

More importantly, however, a fundamental reason for this hesitance to proclaim, or to fully embrace, French identity comes from the perceived and felt rejection from society and the injustices they face:

Sometimes for work, or when you look for an apartment, right away you see the difference between you and a ‘white’ person, you and a native French… (I, Paris)

Why don’t I feel French? Well there are many reasons. But mainly because the society in which we live in…in this society we, populations of immigrant origin, suffer an injustice with regard to whites. And I don’t mean whites in a racist way here. I won’t even give you the cliché example of trying to get into a night club, I’m talking about structural racism. At the employment level, for lodging, police controls, because this is it, I have short curly hair and I’m supposed to have a short temper…I’m supposed to be a robber even if here I am working like everyone, paying my taxes. (Y, Haut-de-Seine)

To feel French…it’s difficult. Because when you’re facing a society that rejects you, you’re not going to reply with love or belonging to a country that turns its back on you. That’s why there are probably many who don’t feel French. Even for me sometimes it’s difficult… (F, Paris)

Among younger interviewees, some were quick to point out that they were

Moroccan or Algerian rather than French, replying:

I come from an immigrant population, born from North African immigrants, I’m born in Haut-de-Seine, and I do not feel French for even one second…but it’s a paradox, because

I am French, because I’ve been raised here and I’ve adopted its culture… (Y, Haut-de- Seine)

No I don’t feel French. How could I feel French when the police treat me like dirt, when everyone calls us racailles. This country, it pisses me off. It doesn’t want me and I don’t want it. (R, Clichy-sous-Bois)

France only wants us when we’re athletes. When we can play on the national football team. When we’re like Zidane. Other than that, it rejects us. We’re not French for them and we’re never going to be French. (Y, Clichy-sous-Bois)

As with the older second-generation, these youths are angered by the structural racism they experience in their everyday lives by virtue of their origins. Moreover, they are resentful of the fact that France can boast about its multiethnic football team composed mainly of second-generation immigrants while simultaneously barring the majority of the population from a legitimate place in French society. What differentiates them significantly from older second-generations however is their hostility towards France and their negation of being French. As an older interviewee noted, the relationship between second- generations and France seems to have transformed from one of “ je t’aime moi non plus” into one of hatred, with many youths in his writing workshops proclaiming things such as “ La

France m’emmerde” and “ Nique la France” (A, Paris). 17

This increased hostility towards the French state is worrying not because these youths necessarily pose a threat to French society, but because it is likely to have negative repercussions on their future by propagating native French resentment towards them, as well as by legitimating far-right discourse on the danger of increased diversity. Moreover, it has facilitated the development of a fragmented identity localised in and emerging from the banlieues – exemplified, for example, by one interviewee noting that she felt much closer to her department in France than to France itself. While a local identity is not in itself negative

17 Respectively, “I love you, neither do I,” “France pisses me off” and “Screw France”

70 nor does it necessarily preclude the formation of a broader national identity, the fact that the suburbs in France are stigmatised and that this new identity is based on these suburbs means that the identity itself is often constructed in opposition to mainstream French culture.

Indeed, the very identity that was imposed upon them and that marginalised them is now the one that they are asserting (Lapeyronnie 2005). As an older interviewee noted, while this local identity can serve to empower youths, it also disengages them from the broader nation, limiting their possibilities for mobility, inclusion, and the social networks that are fundamental to succeed once reaching adulthood.

To conclude on national belonging, however, it is important to nuance the above observations by noting that while the lack of such a belonging may serve as legitimate grounds on which to believe that a crisis of integration exists in France, North Africans interviewed perceive it more as an unfortunate everyday reality rather than a dramatic rupture in social life. This problematic engagement with French identity, moreover, does not preclude the belief that France is a relatively good country to live in. As one of the younger interviewees noted:

We have to bear in mind that it’s all relative. Now you ask me about these things, we talk of integration, and of course I talk to you about discrimination and all these things, but the truth is we’re much better off than lots of other minorities in other countries. (Y, Haut-de- Seine)

Finally let us discuss opinions regarding the structural aspects of integration.

Interestingly, in terms of socioeconomic equality, North African French are more likely to agree with the claim that their population has the same socioeconomic level as an average native French than do native French themselves. This may be partly explained by the fact that the North African French surveyed in poorer neighbourhoods tended to be living with native French neighbours who shared their socioeconomic level. However, beyond this, it is unclear what these results indicate. Indeed, even in interviews very little was mentioned

71 regarding North African French’s socioeconomic marginalisation, with the focus being much more on the structural injustices faced in terms of discrimination and racism. This may be because these actually encapsulate their socioeconomic marginalisation, while also having other effects on their sense of belonging and self-worth (Wieviorka 1996; Fassin & Fassin

2006).

Opinions regarding the extent to which North African French are well represented in politics yield more interesting results, with both groups agreeing that North African

French are not well represented. This indicates that despite the political appointment of

North African French – such as Rachida Dati, former Minister of Justice and current member of the European Parliament, and Fadela Amara, Secretary of State for Urban

Policies – within Sarkozy’s administration, there is nonetheless the sense that political representation is weak. Indeed, most interviewees view the appointment of these women in highly negative terms – not only as tokenistic gestures carrying little practical significance, but actually as potentially harmful:

These politicians, they have an extremely negative impact for minorities. Extremely negative because they give a sort of counter-example, they portray the integration desired by French people, but it’s not at all representative. They’re really just puppets for the government…You know, it’s the case of the native informant. Fadela Amara is much more aggressive and hostile in debates regarding Muslim women, the veil, the burqa, all these things, than other members of government. She’s their bulldog, and they can also show that they're not racist. (F, Paris)

Us youth, we don’t feel at all represented by Rachida Dati, Fadela Amara…Fadela Amara, she’s the declared enemy. The whole political class is, but Fadela Amara…with her movement ‘Ni putes ni soumises’ 18 managed– from one incident – to stigmatise a whole youth of immigrant origin, a whole religion, all of its principles. (Y, Haut-de- Seine)

Given France’s refusal to recognize ethnic minorities, it is understandable that there is no representation of North African French in terms of a political party having a platform

18 In English the movement’s name can be translated as “Neither whore nor submissive”

72 to specifically advance their interests. Moreover, this policy also precludes the use of quotas in Parliament to ensure that a certain number of seats go to particular minorities, in order to ensure their representation within government. This refusal to officially distinguish ethnic minorities in politics seems to have been accepted by North African French. Indeed most interviewees do not support the idea of quotas to ensure representation, arguing firstly that this is useless if simply symbolic, and secondly that they do not want favoured access to political institutions, but rather the access they deserve as equal French citizens. This focus on equality over distinction is reflective of the extent to which a Republican ideology based on equality has, in fact, been internalized by North Africans.

Despite this desire for equality of treatment within the current system rather than the adoption of an affirmative action policy 19 , the mainstream political success of the politicians mentioned above is indicative of the fact that to succeed politically in the current context at best means to compromise any mandate that focuses on improving the situation of North

African French, and at worst the adoption of a hostile stance towards the population.

Indeed, the status of immigrés continues to limit the chances for North African French to be truly well-represented politically, as the passages below indicate:

There are obvious political consequences to the fact that people see us as immigrés – we have no political representation […] the only political representation we have are people who are glued to the government. (F, Paris)

The truth is we’re never going to be actually politically represented. To be politically represented you need North African French to be appointed for powerful posts, posts that would make a difference for our population…Minister of Interior for example. That’ll never happen. Maybe in fifty years, but I doubt it. You’d never have a North African in such a powerful position. (A, Paris)

19 For example:

I’m against positive discrimination because I’m against negative discrimination. There shouldn’t be discrimination period, and people should be hired for their level of competence based on demand. (F, Paris)

I think it’ll be very difficult for us to ever be politically represented, really politically represented. The problem is that the moment our population criticizes the government, we hear, “if you don’t like France then leave” and of course this is absurd! This is my country, and as a citizen I have the right to bring forward criticisms. Isn’t that one of the duties of being a citizen? But we’re denied that right, and that makes it much harder for us to be represented, it makes it much harder for someone to bring forward issues regarding us if it in doing so you contest the government. (A, Paris)

The lack of political representation thus stems in part from the branding of North

African French as immigrés and not fully French, which makes any appointment of North

African French to powerful political posts politically controversial and costly. This confirms a trend noted in the literature on the reluctance of political parties to put forward candidates of North African French origin for fear of losing voters (Kastoryano 2004). This is despite the fact that these candidates do not explicitly advocate specific policies for North African

French, but rather support the party mandate, whether it be that of the Parti Socialiste, the

Parti Communiste, etc. This brings us directly into the last main question under investigation – the way North African French and native French interpret the 2005 riots, and consequently the extent to which they think political representation is fundamental to mitigate future riots.

4.3.4. Interpreting the Riots: Political Action vs. Random Violence

To capture the way in which mobilization on the part of North African French is tolerated and seen as legitimate, respondent and interviewee attitudes towards the 2005 riots were investigated, in addition to the extent to which they believed better political representation might help minimize the chances of these recurring. The first hypothesis, that native French would be more likely to view the riots as being a mobilization against French values, was not supported by the findings, with both populations disagreeing with this claim.

Both populations, however, interpret the riots as being against governmental policies, the police, and unemployment.

While respondents agree on what and whom the riots were targeted against, they differ with respect to whether they believe greater political representation might be a solution to future rioting, with North African French having a higher tendency of believing so. This difference between the two populations is interesting because it may indicate that native French – while acknowledging that people are motivated by felt anger against policies, police and poverty – do not consider this anger to be expressive of political demands , and hence do not view this protest as politically legitimate. In other words, this contradictory finding may indicate that native French view the riots as actions devoid of any political rationale. This attitude that both recognises the causes of the riots while simultaneously undercutting their legitimacy, serves to preclude any political solution, since the blame for the felt frustration can just as easily be laid on the rioters themselves, as disruptive lazy youth who do not wish to integrate or work hard and enjoy disrupting the social order, as implied by Sarkozy’s rhetoric for example. This is in contrast to the perspective of most interviewees who, while not necessarily agreeing with the riots and their disruptive nature, note that they occurred because of the very real political, social and economic marginalisation of their communities due to long-standing police aggression, constant discrimination, and the feelings of rejection and exasperation these generate. They are all quick to agree, moreover, that the portrayal of the riots in the media and by the government was extremely biased:

I never understood when they said ‘the riots aren’t politicised,’ as if that meant their meaning could be dismissed. ‘They emanate from youths who aren’t organised nor politicised.’ …Obviously, that’s why we call it a riot! Of course it has nothing to do with ’68, but still, how do we know these youths aren’t politicized? Already it’s assumed that youths who rioted had no political conscience…the riots didn’t just occur because two kids died, there’s much more behind it. And even if this youth wasn’t politicised, does that mean the riots have less legitimacy? In France we never ask the question why, why did they occur? Why here and not elsewhere? We never ask ourselves these questions. (A, Paris)

They were presented as racailles , as rioters, when they’re not just rioters but first and foremost people who want a future. A recognition of their identities; equal chances. They were French people who were suffering […] The media presented a negative image of the whole thing as being also about immigrés – they quickly labelled the rioters as black, or Arab, and this was successful in moulding public opinion. (F, Paris)

Of course if it was French people things would have been resolved differently. Things would have changed. The police wouldn’t have reacted as it had, if it was native French or even just in nicer neighbourhoods of France. But here, of course no one cares, people think ‘they’re all Blacks or Beurs, they love to make a mess’. (M, Clichy-Sous-Bois)

These passages demonstrate the extent to which the riots were de-politicised and thus de-legitimized by the media and governmental discourse. This was done by either pointing out the young age of the rioters (thus implicitly arguing that only adults can be political conscious), or their lack of political organisation (thus implicitly arguing that legitimacy only stems from political conscience). This de-politicisation was crucial in terms of eliminating both government responsibility in fomenting the riots and in relieving it of any responsibility for subsequently implementing changes that might prevent them in the future.

However, viewing the riots as political expressions of disillusionment with a specific system leads to a radically different view:

I think that the riots are good for society if they push things forward…if we want things in France to improve we have to be interested in these people, like in the French revolution for example. I think the riots were a necessary evil for a good end. (F, Paris)

I’m sure that if North Africans – and others too of course – were better represented in politics, then it would make a difference, there would be less chances of riots occurring. They’d be better understood, and they would pay more attention to the cités that have been really left aside. Sure there are associations and all these things but it’s not the same thing, those aren’t enough. (N, La Courneuve)

I think that if we put representatives, but real representatives – not just someone like Rachida Dati or Fadela Amara or even Azouz Begag – of minorities in the government, not only would the government pay more attention to these minorities’ needs, but minorities themselves would be more interested in politics. If there were representatives who could capture this bulk of future electors who right now don’t care at all about politics because their discourse is nowhere to be found, it would make a difference, and it would contest classical policies of the UMP or the PS. But it interests no one for now… given riots and

all the injustices behind them only touch a minority, a ‘different’ minority, we try to keep them out. (F, Paris)

The last passage is especially insightful: political representation would not only decrease chances of future unrest because it would create a government that would be more responsive to the needs of minorities, but because it would increase the political interest of marginalised youth in supporting rather than acting against the system itself . This is especially important given the fears that second-generation youth of immigrant origin have become increasingly disrespectful of public property and institutions, and may increasingly develop a feeling of hostility, if not hatred (a possibility mentioned by one interviewee) towards the French state and its government.

Regardless of how riots are interpreted by interviewees, they are all adamant about the need for representatives who really advocate for the needs of the minorities they are purportedly representing. This is in contrast to current politicians such as Rachida Dati, whom the government believes demonstrate its inclusion of minorities but who in fact do not act for these groups’ interests. As one interviewee noted , “It’s not because you’re of a certain origin that you have a certain political ideal. Some North African French may even vote for the Front

National, you know,” (F, Paris). As discussed above, then, what interviewees claim North

African French want is not obligatory proportional representation in government because they constitute a significant minority in the country. Rather, they want a fair chance to be in government. Moreover, the motivation behind this desire for political inclusion is borne from the belief that it is the only real way to ensure that their population and their needs are not forgotten or ignored, since non-North African French politicians have done little to attempt to really resolve, among other things the issue of the suburbs, of police violence, and of racism within state institutions. Genuine, and not tokenistic, political inclusion is seen as

77 the only way to ensure that their presence is no longer excluded from France’s cultural, political, and economic identity.

4.4. Concluding Remarks – Thoughts on Social Cohesion, Democracy, and What it Means to be a Citizen

Finally let us conclude this chapter with more general assessments that can be drawn from the quantitative and qualitative findings. More specifically, what are their implications for integration research, citizenship, social cohesion, and democracy?

4.4.1. Integration Research: Propagating the Problem through Discourse?

One of the major questions brought up on several occasions by the North African

French interviewed and surveyed was, “Why are you working on integration? Why are you asking people who are born in France and who are French about integration?” Indeed integration in France is seen as a highly charged word used by a political elite who, despite their use of the word integration , are really talking about assimilation . One interviewee presented his opinions on the word ‘integration’ and why he disliked it:

The people who speak of integration are often those who propagate the most denial, who are most against diversity, who are causing the most damage, they are those who have a certain idea of France, of its history, and the place of each person in this country in function of their elitist vision…It continues to be a one way-process, on the part of the immigrant and of his children. (A, Aubervilliers)

Another interviewee clearly affirmed:

The problem of integration will be resolved when people stop talking about it. The best thing you, yourself, can do is to stop talking about integration. (Y, Haut-de-Seine)

These comments highlight the role not only of political elites but of intellectual elites as well. The researcher here is implicated in perpetuating the very issue that is trying to be understood in order to be resolved. This is an important consideration particularly in

France, where there is a long history of public intellectuals, and where academics have thus far used their work to actively and publically defend an official position rather than to simply describe and analyse a problem (Favell 1998). For this reason work on integration, such as that by the French intellectuals Todd and Schnapper, is often seen as reinforcing governmental discourse on the issue of integration, widely interpreted as “assimilation by another name”, rather than simply seeking to explain or critically analyze it. The question then is how can one go about investigating social issues in a way that neither exacerbates the very problems they generate nor propagates elite rhetoric? Future studies on the issue will have to take this question into serious consideration. It is certain, however, that at a governmental level ceasing to use the word integration to refer to the social problems of the suburbs might be extremely useful to increase the sense of belonging felt by second-generations. Such a consideration should be taken seriously in light of the observation by several interviewees that the use of the word integration reinforces their impression that they are considered immigrants who do not have a right to be different or, even worse, merely guests in France rather than French-born citizens.

Despite the fact that this study, too, could be seen as propagating the use of the word ‘integration’ in France, its focus on perceptions rather than behaviour allows one to avoid defending either assimilationist or multicultural perspectives, since the attempt is to understand what people value and feel is important for a functioning society. The positive finding of the study is that it has uncovered the possibility that native and North African

French views on integration are not necessarily irreconcilable – native French do not seem to be as assimilationist as originally thought, and North African French do not seem to be as communitarian or multiculturalist as some fear. In fact, in many ways the two populations

79 agree on many fundamental values, but have a different perception of the reality on the ground.

This means, on one hand, that reaching a consensus on what integration really means

– in a politically-neutral sense – between majorities and minorities in France may not be as unrealistic or politically unfeasible as one may think. Secondly, in order to reach such a consensus, communication between groups must be enhanced and facilitated. This communication is fundamental to remove misperceptions between populations and to understand which issues are really at the base of perceived integration problems. Is the wearing of the boubou , the African dress, really problematic for native French, or is it rather the wearing of the boubou in a specific environment? Is the discrimination faced by North

African French related to being North African or to their being Muslim? Only by truly investigating these questions can a clear understanding of what the problem of integration really means without pushing forward a specific agenda emerge, all the while facilitating the creation of a real consensus between citizens regarding what they want integration in France to be.

4.4.2. On Citizenship, Social Cohesion, and Democracy

The findings from the study also bring out several issues relating to citizenship and social cohesion, which in turn have important consequences for a functioning and healthy democracy. With respect to citizenship, it is important to note that North African French are limited in their ability to exercise their right to contestation, as discussed above.

However, there is a point to be made that is even more fundamental. Amidst the overwhelming amount of literature on integration, specifically on France, it seems that a fundamental question has been overlooked: to what extent do different models of

80 integration enhance or hinder the possibility of becoming full and equal citizens? One interviewee’s commentary is especially insightful:

The problem I had at school was that I was absent. They didn’t discuss the social history of my parents, or their political history, nor did they present any literature that was close to my imaginary. They didn’t give me the tools I needed to construct myself and become a citizen, the tools to grow and deal with the issues I encountered. That was, and continues to be today, the fundamental problem. (A, Aubervilliers)

The issue then is more fundamental than simply determining whether a country should adopt a multicultural or assimilationist model of integration; rather the real issue at stake is how a country will create the possibility for individuals to develop legitimate identities of belonging in the societies in which they live, and consequently become fully realised citizens. It is not about prioritizing, for example, Algeria’s history over France’s history, but of including history of Algerian workers in France as an integral and important part of French history. Moreover, it is not about including this history as a ‘sub-history’ relevant only to Algerians, but about recasting it as crucial to the successful post-war reconstruction of France. It is by giving minorities the possibility to find and recognize themselves in the country’s portrayal of its own history that can then allow for the development of genuine attachment, the recognition that their families helped shape the country in the past, and consequently the realisation that they have a role to play in building its future. This is the fundamental role of the citizen in a healthy democracy and a role that has thus far been difficult for North Africans French to fully engage with.

The notion of citizenship is also inextricably linked to that of social cohesion, for a citizen is a citizen by virtue of belonging to a nation-state and actively participating in its everyday life. Many of the interviews highlight the increased lack of cohesion in France today, especially with regards to younger second-generation North Africans. The existence of ethnically non-white suburbs, the ongoing process of ghettoization in schools and

81 districts, and the recent development of a banlieuesards culture and identity based on one’s district rather than the nation, have all exacerbated the risks for future marginalisation of this younger generation. This marginalisation may prove to be extremely difficult to overcome as this generation grows older and finds itself excluded from the working sector, as well as lacking both the horizontal and crosscutting networks needed to succeed, and the cultural and social know-how of the majority population.

This fragmentation of identity and increased marginalisation has important political repercussions; even today it is evident that North African French youth are disillusioned and uninterested in politics, since they are unable to relate to politicians and to the discourse they espouse. How will this population express its disagreement with the government, and how will it mobilize to make its interests and needs heard in a manner seen as legitimate by society? The dearth of legitimate channels through which to mobilize and contest social realities may only serve to worsen their image in society, as occurred during the 2005 riots.

Moreover, fragmented social cohesion also means a lack of social solidarity for the cause of

North African second-generations. In other words, it allows for a separation between the problems of North African second generations in the suburbs from broader social issues.

Since they are not part of the broader social fabric, they can more easily be ignored; politically, this means it becomes much easier for parties to neglect this population in the quest to win electoral votes.

Though the issue seems to be less critical for older second-generation North

Africans, the perception on the part of native French that North African French in general do not believe in the much-valued norms of secularism, gender equality, and democracy also has potentially harmful effects on social cohesion. Indeed bearing in mind Harrell and

Stolle’s (2010) definition of social cohesion as including respect for common norms, the fact

82 that native French perceive North African French as not sharing their same norms has important consequences. Specifically, this perception that North African French have different norms means that native French may neither be open to their views on sensitive issues, such as the veil, nor trust them to vote in ways that are beneficial for French society as a whole. It also has repercussions on the extent to which parties can bring forward candidates of North African French origin without worrying that this will cause them to lose votes, for fear that they will be seen as advancing a communitarian anti-Republican agenda

(even if until today there is no evidence to substantiate this fear).

Finally, a last important finding from the study that should be mentioned is that, in addition to pointing out the lack of social cohesion between the minority North African population and the native French population, it also highlights the absence of group cohesion within the North African French community. Indeed, the diverse range of answers provided both on the survey and in the interviews indicates that the North African French population cannot be easily categorized, whether politically, economically, or religiously.

Even if respondents raised similar issues in their discussions, their analysis of the fundamental causes of and solutions to problems often diverged significantly, as did their sense of belonging, the importance of their religious identity, and their political convictions.

This supports findings by Perrin (2008) whose interview with 80 North African French indicated various opposing views on most subjects, including for example, whether the ban on the veil in public schools is justified, and the extent to which integration is stifled by discrimination. This diversity suggests that a homogenised community does not exist, and that claims to know what the North African community as a whole wants or thinks must be interpreted with caution.

This internal absence of social cohesion can paradoxically be seen as the consequence of successful integration, confirming studies that point to the high level of integration of North African French (Safi 2006; Tribalat 2005; Brouard & Tiberj 2006). That integration has been successful means that the community is in some sense weaker and more disadvantaged in terms of the extent to which it can constitute itself as a community with political claims on the state, precisely because of its high level of integration in terms of loss of culture of origin, acculturation and high levels of intermarriages. Indeed, North African integration, even if not perceived as such, has largely followed the integration process prescribed by the government – integration has been undertaken individually, thus fragmenting the community. While, for example, the creation of a Moroccan upper middle class has been observed, the majority of the population still remains socioeconomically and geographically marginalized (Simon 2003). Discussions with interviewees regarding the extent to which they and those around them are socioeconomically and culturally integrated confirm this individualistic process of integration:

I personally don’t have any integration problems in terms of my studies or finding a job. Other than my Muslim identity which is difficult to reconcile, I feel relatively well integrated and I have no real identity problems. But it’s also because, for example, I work in an industry that’s very in demand. If I was working in your field, in political science, I do think it would be more difficult, they would prioritize a native French over me. But in my case I don't feel it… (B, Bois-Colombes)

Of course you know my perspective is very post-colonialist, but if I brought you ten friends we’d be sitting together and half of them would tell me ‘come on, stop talking about colonialism, it’s been over for a while!’ So you see, we’re North African but we don’t have the same ideas. There will be many who will tell you, ‘what problems? I have an excellent job, I worked hard and I’ve succeeded, even if my name is’….Mohamed, or Ahmed, or Rachid… ‘if you want to succeed you will.’ You’ll find this discourse. That because an individual has succeeded there’s no greater problem for the community from which he comes from. (Y, Haut-de-Seine)

The first passage is a perfect example of this individual process of integration, whereby the interviewee recognizes the discrimination others of his same origin often face but is not

84 affected by it and consequently does not share the same feeling of disillusionment as others in his community. The second passage highlights the prominence of an individualistic mentality amongst some North African French, whereby because of their individual success, the obstacles claimed to exist by others in their community are seen as non-legitimate, and as a sign of their lack of willpower.

While the extent to which such an individualist approach to integration is desirable can be debated, it is certain that is has important consequences on the extent to which those who succeed are willing to then invest in promoting the social mobility of younger generations of North African origin. In fact, the ‘to each his own’ approach to integration in many ways impedes the desire or perceived need to foster in-group social capital that would then facilitate and support the upward mobility of the group, as opposed to just individuals.

In light of the coming of age of a second-generation which simultaneously feels rejected by

French society and detached from its culture of origin, such an absence of social capital is especially unfortunate. Indeed, it is likely to make an already difficult societal integration even more difficult for these youths by depriving them of role models to which they can relate and through which they can be empowered so as to mould for themselves a legitimate and valued place in French society.

Conclusion

Bearing in mind the principle question of this study – How do North African French and native French perspectives about integration in France compare? – the findings point to several interesting conclusions. Firstly, both groups confirm the existence of a crisis of integration, although for

North Africans this crisis, while perhaps exacerbated for current younger generations, has always existed and is therefore not a new phenomenon. Secondly, both groups define integration in similar ways – for example both groups recognize the importance of political representation and the sharing of similar norms, and both ascribe relatively little importance to cultural aspects such as feeling French or speaking the same language, watching the same television shows and listening to the same music.

The main point of contention between the two groups stems not from any difference in understandings about what integration fundamentally ought to be, but rather from their divergent assessments of the success (or lack thereof) of North African integration specifically. Indeed, while both populations recognize the socioeconomic and political marginalisation of North

Africans, they disagree on the extent to which this population shares the same norms as the majority (secularism, gender equality and democracy): native French disagree with the claim that

North African French share the majority norms, while North Africans themselves do not perceive this to be the case. This finding is particularly revealing since it suggests that while for

North Africans the crisis is about structural integration, for native French fears surrounding integration stem from the perception that North Africans hold fundamentally different norms that are irreconcilable with Republican values. The fact that North Africans in contrast claim to support these norms indicates that there is a problem of misperception or miscommunication between the two groups that would be important to address.

Finally, the study uncovered a difference in perception regarding the effectiveness of greater political representation of minorities (and thus North Africans) in decreasing the chance of riots such as those of 2005 from recurring. While native French do not think such political representation would help, for North Africans it is fundamental. Indeed there is a strong consensus among the North African French community that since they continue to be seen as immigrants (despite being born and raised in France), they will be excluded from the political system even if they espouse an explicitly French Republican discourse. Increased representation would not only lead to greater attention paid to issues affecting North African French, but might also be able to capture the interest of a younger apolitical second generation that is both disillusioned with French politics and detached from its North African culture of origin. The divided opinion over the effectiveness of greater political representation is one which should and must be investigated more deeply – not only to understand the extent to which there may be an implicit absence of recognition of political equality on the part of native French, but also to avoid a myopic view of social unrest as only having a political solution if participants in this unrest advance an explicit political discourse.

Perhaps the most valuable aspect of this thesis is its approach to the study of integration in

France and its North African population specifically. While most literature on the issue focuses on country models and policies or on the extent of structural integration of minorities, this study focuses on perceptions about integration so as to better understand what people value and where divisions and misperceptions between groups exist. Indeed, while policies are fundamental in shaping the integration of minorities, the case of France and the ongoing ‘crisis’ of North

Africans indicates that there is also an important role for ordinary citizens to play in making any integration genuinely successful. For instance, citizens can contribute to integration by accepting those of foreign origin as French, by deciding whom to hire for a position, or by voting for a

87 political party regardless of whether some of its members are of North African origin. Moreover, in light of the rise of right wing anti-immigrant parties throughout Europe, it is crucial to understand, on the one hand, what citizens – both those part of the majority population and minorities – actually value, how they perceive different groups in society and importantly, what they fear. This is necessary so as to form just policies that do not create backlashes on the part of either minorities or majorities, and are hence effective in accommodating diversity.

While the small size of the sample used in this study certainly makes the above findings tentative, it nevertheless can serve as a guideline for further research. Future studies, using larger and more representative samples, will therefore be necessary before any truly conclusive claims can be made. However, the value of this study – albeit exploratory – is in the fact that it has uncovered and reaffirmed the importance of certain questions and possible answers, which require greater investigation. For example, is the current tension around integration in France due to diversity in general or to fears of Islam specifically? Do native French really value cultural aspects of integration as little as this study suggests? To what extent may a real political solution to the crisis surrounding second-generation North Africans be the only effective way to resolve their continued marginalization? While the fears of a North African fifth column in France seem to be exaggerated, it is nevertheless the case that the concerns of and challenges faced by increasingly resentful and disillusioned younger second-generation North Africans must be addressed with utmost urgency, both on the research and policy fronts. This is not because they constitute a religious or ethnic threat, but rather because they are part of France’s future, and their continued marginalisation will have consequences on the health and richness of French society as a whole.

What this study has shown is that there are indeed problems of integration in France that must be addressed. There is an explicit structural marginalisation of North African French, a

88 conflict of identity within this population, and significant doubts among native French regarding whether North African French share the same fundamental French norms. The ‘crisis’ is thus real, but exacerbated and amplified by misperceptions; both the concrete crisis and the distortions that surround it must be addressed for integration to be successful. However, the crisis can only be resolved if there is a shift in focus, both among politicians and researchers, from seeing the crisis as one concerning Arabs and Muslims, to one concerning French citizens who are being marginalised within the French state. As one interviewee asserted, “ First and foremost we’re French. And we’re not going anywhere. We were born here, we grew up here, we will raise our children here and die here. Because we’re French ,” (A, Paris). It is the responsibility of responsible politicians and researchers to bear this in mind and to make a concerted effort to move from a discourse focused on immigrants to one focused on minorities, so as to ensure that diversity is not seen as a threat to social cohesion which can be contained, reversed or ignored, but rather a central characteristic of the modern state that must be accepted and accommodated, if not actively protected and valued.

APPENDIX A: SURVEY

SECTION A:

1) When we talk of ‘immigrants’ ( immigrés ) in France, who do you think of? An individual…(Several answers possible) 1 – living in France without French citizenship 2 – born abroad, having obtained French citizenship 3 – born in France from parents born abroad

2) What do you think of the following claim: Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly I don’t “There is a ‘crisis’ of integration in France regarding disagree Agree know the Republic’s ability to integration immigrants from different cultures.”

3) If you answered “agree” or “strongly agree”, please specify by checking the answer which seems most appropriate, if not please go directly to question 4. In your opinion, the crisis of integration: concerns North African, even if many are born in France concerns immigrants recently arrived in France concerns both groups: recently arrived immigrants and North Africans other (specify) : ______

SECTION B :

5) On a scale of 0 to 10, Completely Completely I don’t how would you rank the impoverishes enriches know value added by immigrants culture culture 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 to French culture?

Srongly Disagree Agree Completely I What do you think of the following claims? disagree Agree don’t know 6) It’s better for France if the majority shares the same traditions and culture.

7) If immigrants have a difficult time integrating it’s often because they don’t try hard enough or don’t want to integrate.

8) If immigrants have a difficult time integrating, it’s often because the host society or the government don’t do enough to facilitate the process.

9) The host society and immigrants are equally responsible for ensuring a successful integration.

10) French should do the effort of adapting themselves to the different cultures now existing in France (i.e. respect different customs, allow for religious holidays to be taken in addition to national holidays, etc. )

11) Concerning the criteria allowing for a foreigner to immigrate to France, please indicate the importance you ascribe to each criteria:

Not at all Extremely I important important don’t 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 know a) Being able to speak French b) Being of Judaeo- Christian culture c) Adhering to French values

SECTION C :

12) Integration has several components. Please indicate the importance you ascribe to each on a scale from 0 to 10: Not at all Extremely I don’t important important know 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 a) have a similar income and educational level as the majority b) speak the same language, watch the same television shows and listen to the same music c) feel French d) have high levels of intermarriages and interethnic friendships e) Adhering to the same norms as the majority f) Being well represented in politics (having a proportion of representatives of immigrant origin in local and national governments)

13) In light of your classification of the different components of integration, do you think second- generation North Africans (born in France from one or two parents born in North Africa) are well integrated?

Not at all Very well I don’t know integrated integrated 1 2 3 4 5

What do you think of the following claims. North African French: Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly I don’t disagree agree know

14) believe in secularism 15) believe in gender equality 16) believe in democracy 17) have a similar educational and income level as the majority of French 18) feel French 19) mix socially 20) share the same values as native French 21) are well represented in French politics 23) will never be fully integrated due to their Muslims origins.

SECTION D :

24) Are you aware of the riots that took place in French suburbs over the past 20-25 years, of which the most recent is that of 2005? (Circle “yes” or “no”) Yes No

What do you think of the following claims: In the riots of 2005, people were mobilizing Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly I don’t against: disagree agree know

25a) French society and its values 25b) government policies 25c) the high level of unemployment

25d) French police

Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly I don’t What do you think of the following claims: disagree agree know

26a) The riots will most likely reoccur in the near future.

26b) If minorities were better represented in government, the probability of riots reoccurring would decrease.

27) What principal identity do you ascribe to the rioters of 2005? (Only one answer possible) 1 – An economically disadvantaged youth 2 – A youth that is principally Muslim 3 – A youth that is principally of immigrant origin 4 – Other (Specify): ______

SECTION E:

Can you indicate: 1) The highest educational level you have attained: ______2) The annual household income (including salary and any government transfers): a. 30 000 euros or less b. between 30 001 – 60 000 euros c. between 60 001 – 80 0000 euros d. between 80 001 – 130 000 euros e. 130 001 euros or greater 3) If you are currently: a. Employed b. Not Employed c. Unemployed d. Other (Specify): ______4) Your gender: 1 – Male 2 – Female 5) The place of birth of your parents: ______6) The place of birth of your grandparents: ______7) Your nationality and place of birth: ______8) Department of residence: ______

APPENDIX B: SEMI -STRUCTURED INTERVIEW DRAFT

1) Can you please tell me how you feel about the use of the word ‘immigrés’ in France? Probe on: a. Whether they feel it is used to refer to North African second-generation immigrants b. Whether use of the word affects their sense of belonging in France c. How they feel about being collapsed with actual immigrants, and what effects this may have on their rights as French citizens. d. When and how they feel someone stops being an immigré in the current French context (i.e. do you have to stop being Muslim? Do you have to dress a certain way? Do you have to have a French name? Etc).

2) Can you please tell me whether you think there is a crisis of integration today, and what you think of this ‘crisis’? Probe on: a. Whether crisis is based on immigrants having a different culture vs. on the racism that exists in French society b. Whether the crisis of integration is just reflective of economic problems in France c. Who is to blame for socioeconomic inequalities (the foreigner vs. people who discriminate vs. the state that is not doing enough; or a combination of these)

3) Can you please tell me a bit more about how you view immigration in France? Probe on: a. Whether they feel that France is enriched by different cultures, including newer immigrant cultures from Asia and sub-Saharan Africa b. Whether they perceive there to be a preference for White/Christian immigrants in French society, and how this may affect their sense of belonging in the country c. The extent to which the responsibility to integrate is on the immigrant versus on the host state d. The extent to which they may have a ‘multiculturalist’ approach to diversity with a high degree of tolerance for the accommodation of differences, or whether they have adopted a more ‘assimilationist’ approach to diversity.

4) Can you please tell me more about the extent to which you feel integrated in French society, keeping in mind your ranking of integration components? Probe on: a. Reasoning behind their ranking (i.e. whether one aspect leads to other aspects, or the lack of an aspect inhibits other aspects of integration) b. Extent to which they feel integrated (according to each dimension) c. The extent to which they feel North Africans are integrated in general (along each dimension) d. If there is a lack of integration – which dimension of integration is lacking, and why they think these dimensions are lacking.

5) Can you please tell me more about how you feel about the riots that occurred in 2005? Probe on: a. The extent to which they view the riots favourably or not, and why b. What they think the riots reflected (fundamental issues) c. How they feel about how the government reacted to the riots (for example, Sarkozy’s rhetoric will be provided as an example as well as a few others) d. The extent to which they feel having more representatives in government would decrease chances of rioting (i.e. is political integration potentially the answer?) e. Their perceptions regarding how the more native French population interpreted the riots – whether they perceived there to be racism, the reluctance to legitimate demands by immigrants and descendents, or anything similar.

6) Finally, can you please elaborate on your views regarding the importance of colonialism in discussions about integration Probe on: a. Whether the fact that North Africans are from ex-colonies makes them unique (in contrast to newer waves of immigrants) b. Whether France owes North African immigrants and descendents anything as a consequence c. Whether the fact that they are from ex-colonies has affected their sense of belonging in the country.

Appendix C: Variable List

TABLE 5: VARIABLE LIST Sample Mean Std. Min. Value Max. Value VARIABLE Size Dev. (observed) (observed)

Existence of a Crisis of Integration Overall Sample 156 0.841 0.841 North African French 78 0.787 0.861 0 3 Native French 78 0.862 0.767

RANKING SIX COMPONENTS OF INTEGRATION Share same norms (secularism, gender equality and democracy) Overall Sample 151 1.160 1.160 North African French 76 1.215 1.215 0 3 Native French 75 1.099 1.099 Being culturally French Overall Sample 151 1.036 1.036 North African French 78 0.900 0.900 0 3 Native French 73 1.118 1.118 High level of inter-mixing Overall Sample 153 1.441 1.061 North African French 78 1.359 1.205 0 3 Native French 75 1.527 1.070 Feeling French Overall Sample 154 1.441 North African French 78 1.359 1.238 0 3 Native French 76 1.527 1.081 Socioeconomic equality Overall Sample 154 1.669 1.235 North African French 78 1.756 1.321 0 3 Native French 76 1.579 1.143 Political representation Overall Sample 147 1.966 1.146 North African French 75 2.133 1.091 0 3 Native French 72 1.792 1.183

TABLE 5: VARIABLE LIST CONTINUED Sample Mean Std. Min. Value Max. Value VARIABLE Size Dev. (observed) (observed)

RANKING NORTH AFRICAN INTEGRATION Belief in norms (secularism, gender equality, and democracy) Overall Sample 156 0.0003 0.816 North African French 78 0.273 0.880 -2.337 1.742 Native French 78 -0.272 0.645 Feel French Overall Sample 155 0.655 0.655 North African French 78 0.699 0.699 0 3 Native French 77 0.598 0.598 Have equal socioeconomic levels Overall Sample 156 1.346 0.746 North African French 78 1.487 0.841 0 3 Native French 77 1.205 0.612 Are well represented in politics Overall Sample 155 0.780 0.796 North African French 77 0.779 0.883 0 3 Native French 78 0.782 0.705

INTERPRETING THE 2005 RIOTS Riots as anti-values Overall Sample 149 1.094 0.878 North African French 75 1.007 0.840 0 3 Native French 74 1.182 0.913 Riots as anti-government Overall Sample 152 2.13 0.801 North African French 77 2.182 0.756 0 3 Native French 75 2.08 0.846 Riots as anti-unemployment Overall Sample 151 0.873 0.873 North African French 76 0.833 0.833 0 3 Native French 75 0.873 0.917 Riots as anti-police Overall Sample 151 2.348 0.693 North African French 76 2.368 0.780 0 3 Native French 75 2.327 0.596 Political representation would decrease chance of riots Overall Sample 155 0.881 0.881 North African French 78 0.893 0.893 0 3 Native French 75 0.845 0.845

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