Peacekeeping_4.qxd 1/14/07 2:29 PM Page 124

4.11

Kosovo

The year 2006 was one of uneasy stasis for it launched domestic interior and justice min- Kosovo. In February, Serbian and Kosovo istries, despite concerns raised by evidence of Albanian leaders met in Vienna to launch talks criminality in the government of President overseen by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari Ibrahim Rugova. The ministries had limited on the future status of the province, still techni- initial duties, but Belgrade argued that their cally under Serbian sovereignty.1 With both formation represented a de facto step toward sides under pressure to reach agreement by the Kosovar statehood. end of the year, the international organizations Kosovo’s political landscape was altered that have held executive authority in Kosovo significantly by Rugova’s death from cancer since 1999 undertook detailed planning for their on 21 January 2006. This followed a period of future roles there. While it was assumed that an political drift caused by his illness and the res- external presence would be required for some ignation of his popular prime minister Ramush time, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Haradinaj in March 2005 to face war crimes Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO-led Kosovo charges at the International Criminal Tribunal Force (KFOR) emphasized the transfer of for the Former Yugoslavia. The president’s responsibilities to local police and administra- death allowed a new leadership to emerge: tive structures. But a lack of progress in the sta- Fatimir Sejdiu, a longtime Rugova ally, tus negotiations meant that the basic peacekeep- became president and appointed a new prime ing framework had not undergone major minister, Agim Çeku. The latter is also alterations as 2007 approached. rumored to have committed war crimes, but This framework is a complex arrange- had worked closely with the international com- ment, by which KFOR maintains military munity as a reforming commander of the security, while executive policing and civilian Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civil duties lie with UNMIK. The latter includes not defense force with ties to criminality and only UN staff, but also personnel of the EU Albanian radicalism. Soon after taking office, (overseeing economic matters) and the Organi- Çeku insisted that the status talks should lead zation for Security and Cooperation in Europe to Kosovo’s independence. (OSCE) (responsible for developing both po- The initiation of the status talks had both litical structures and the country’s police acad- positive and negative effects inside Kosovo. emy). After three days of rioting severely After a brief increase in low-level violence in tested the international presence in March late 2005, the province remained relatively 2004, KFOR maintained its force level at calm through much of 2006, as Albanian radi- 17,000 until early 2006, and then it shrunk by cals refrained from upsetting the negotiations. nearly 1,000 during the year. Conversely, The government also made some progress UNMIK gradually entrusted day-to-day secu- toward achieving international standards on rity to the 7,000-strong Kosovo Police Service minority rights and a decentralization plan (KPS), reducing its own police element from intended to give Serb-ethnicity enclaves 3,500 to 2,146 during 2005. In December 2005 greater self-governance. Nonetheless, the Serb

124 Peacekeeping_4.qxd 1/14/07 2:29 PM Page 125

KOSOVO • 125

community (approximately 5 percent of the status talks conclude successfully. An informal total population), always wary of dialogue, steering group, including representatives of the reduced its cooperation with the government three organizations, and Martti Ahtisaari’s still further as the status talks failed to progress. negotiating team held a series of meetings Talks between Kosovar and Serb authorities on through the year under the chairmanship of issues other than status also lost impetus. UNMIK’s Special Representative of the Secre- Although faced with limited immediate tary-General (SRSG). While the OSCE indi- security challenges, KFOR was shaken in Jan- cated its interest in maintaining a long-term uary 2006 when a plane crash killed forty-six role on governance issues, it was accepted that Slovak troops flying home from the mission. the EU should take over justice and policing Through the rest of the year, KFOR ran a responsibilities from the UN under any future series of military exercises aimed at demon- settlement. In April 2006 the European Coun- strating its ability to bring NATO reserves into cil mandated a planning team to be based in the province on short notice should the situa- Kosovo. Deployed in June, this consisted of tion deteriorate, and to sustain high-intensity twenty-four staff, including five police and operations in two parts of the province simul- four justice experts, authorized to operate taneously. These were intended to dispel the until the end of the year. By September 2006, poor impression the force made in the March EU member states were contributing 608 of 2004 riots, after which its structure was re- UNMIK’s 1,907 police, and it was assumed formed to emphasize flexibility. that any post-status international police pres- Meanwhile, the UN, EU, and OSCE pre- ence would be below current levels. pared for a transition from UNMIK should the The strategic direction for the international

Box 4.11.1 Macedonia

While planning to reorient its roles these reforms, emphasizing police rela- Commission duly took over monitoring in Kosovo and Bosnia, the European tions with the judiciary, and internal con- duties, the July elections failed to pro- Union also reshaped its presence in the trol mechanisms. duce a majority government, and politi- Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo- EUPAT was scheduled to be replaced cal attention was temporarily focused on nia (FYROM) in 2006. December 2005 by a European Commission monitoring coalition building. In September, the par- saw the replacement of a two-year police team in June 2006. Its operations coin- liament finally passed a police reform mission, the EU Police Mission Proxima cided with the run-up to national elec- law, which had been drafted by the pre- (EUPOL Proxima), with a smaller mis- tions on 5 July, which were accompanied vious government and supported by the sion, the EU Police Advisory Team by low-level but frequent violence in the EU. (EUPAT), having a six-month mandate. second quarter of the year. Nonetheless, EUPAT thus contributed to real, if Police reform was a significant element EUPAT judged that the domestic police slow, progress on implementing the of the 2001 Ohrid Agreement, which were advancing in initiating investiga- Ohrid Agreement, but events in FYROM averted civil war between ethnic Albani- tions, working with public prosecutors on may be affected by disputes over ans and Macedonians. The agreement organized crime, and coordinating border Kosovo’s status. The current government envisaged decentralization of authority to control. Less progress was made on the excludes former Albanian guerrillas who the local level on issues including polic- decentralization issue, due to both delays were backed by Kosovar radicals during ing. EUPOL Proxima was required to in necessary legislation and the resistance the 2001 conflict. While FYROM’s lead- balance this political priority with helping of some senior police officers. On con- ers remain committed to moving toward the domestic police develop a profes- cluding its operations in June, EUPAT EU and NATO membership, renewed vio- sional culture and tackle cross-border drafted a series of recommendations for lence in Kosovo could unsettle their crime. EUPAT was mandated to support further improvements. While the European plans. Peacekeeping_4.qxd 1/14/07 2:29 PM Page 126

126 • MISSION NOTES

community in Kosovo also required further tus itself was minimal. While Kosovar leaders definition. A 2005 policy statement agreed by insisted on independence, it was clear that the European Council and Commission de- Belgrade would not yield it up easily. Bel- clared that the key mechanism for such direc- grade’s line hardened throughout the year, and tion “could take the form of an international after Montenegro voted for independence in a office with an important EU component but referendum in May 2006, a new Serbian con- cannot be EUMIK.” In September 2006, UN stitution was drawn up reasserting sovereignty Secretary-General Kofi Annan reported to the over Kosovo. When this was made public in Security Council that the nucleus of such an September, Kosovo’s calm gave way to a spate international office had already been estab- of attacks on Serbs and a warning of potential lished in Kosovo. “revolts” by the speaker of the province’s par- But if there was progress on planning for liament. In early October, Martti Ahtisaari the post-status environment, progress on sta- admitted that he could not see either side back- ing down. On 10 November, he responded to a decision by Serbia to hold national elections in January by announcing that he would make UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) recommendations on Kosovo’s future immedi- ately after these polls. Ahtisaari’s decision prompted widespread • Authorization and 10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244) speculation that he would urge the UN Security start date (note: paragraph 19 of the resolution states that international civil and security Council to recognize Kosovo’s independence in presences are established for an initial spite of Serbia’s opposition. But the fragility of period of twelve months, to continue Kosovo’s security situation was demonstrated thereafter until the Security Council on 28 November when Albanian protesters decides otherwise) • SRSG Joachim Rücker (Germany) attacked the UN headquarters in Pristina. One • Police commissioner Stephen J. Curtis (United Kingdom) possible compromise, previously rejected by • Chief military Brigadier-General Raul Cunha (Portugal) the international community but occasionally liaison officer raised by Belgrade, would be a partition of • Budget $217.9 million (1 July 2006– 30 June 2007) Kosovo by which its ethnically Serb north • Strength as of Military observers: 37 would revert to Serbia. This option gained 30 September 2006 Police: 1,870 attention during 2006, as the Serb authorities in International civilian staff: 509 the north increasingly cut off contact with the Local civilian staff: 2,044 UN volunteers: 148 provincial government. Opinion polls con- ducted for the UN Development Programme For detailed mission information see p. 305. (UNDP) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) saw support for parti- tion among Kosovo Serbs jump from 8 percent NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) to 47 percent—an important shift, given that the minority had previously been overwhelmingly opposed to any outcome other than Kosovo • Authorization date 10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244) • Start date June 1999 remaining part of Serbia in its entirety. But par- • Head of mission Lieutenant-General Roland Kather tition might well endanger the many Serbs liv- (Germany) ing in enclaves in Albanian-majority Kosovo, • Budget $31.4 million (October 2005– and the precedent would encourage secession- September 2006) • Strength as of Troops: 16,160 ism among Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 30 September 2006 Civilian staff: 30 (approximate) UN officials predict that, whatever arrange- ment is reached over northern Kosovo, it may Peacekeeping_4.qxd 1/14/07 2:29 PM Page 127

KOSOVO • 127

require the maintenance of a heavier inter- and UNMIK may find themselves responding national presence compared to the rest of the to threats from both Serb and Albanian radicals province. But with negotiations adrift, KFOR throughout the province in the near future.

Note 1. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan informed the Security Council of his intention to appoint Pres- ident Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy for the Kosovo status talks on 31 October 2005, and indicated that Albert Rohan of Austria would be Deputy Special Envoy. The Security Council welcomed this decision in a letter of 10 November 2005. The United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK) was established in Vienna, employing eighteen international staff as of 30 June 2006.