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Home , Adem Jashari, Ibrahim Rugova, Llap (region), Pristina

SÜDOSTEUROPA, 54. Jg., 3/2006

Isabel Ströhle*

Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" – Conflicting Commemorations

1. Introduction : January 2006.1 Hundreds of thousands of people are waiting in the freez- ing cold in the hope of catching a glimpse of Ibrahim 's coffin passing by. It is escorted through the streets of the capital of by honorary guards of the (KPC)2, the transformed guerrilla troops of the for- mer (KLA)3. Representatives of all Kosovo parties and international dignitaries are attending the subsequent obsequies in a sports hall near the cemetery. They are paying their last respect to the man who had been the political leader of the Kosovo for about sixteen years. Thereafter he is buried in a white marble tomb at the "Martyrs' Cemetery". He is laid to rest only a few metres away from the communist monument remembering the victims of World War II and the fallen KLA fighters of the recent war. Many thousand Al- banians living in Kosovo and in the diaspora in Western and the USA are following the funeral on TV. The appearance of unanimous unity of all political camps in Kosovo during this day, however, is misleading. When the KLA successor organisations4 first learned that President Rugova would be buried next to the site where their fallen fighters were at rest, they were outraged. For them it came as an insult that someone who neither fell in combat nor died from an injury resulting from the war within the first year of freedom, would be buried on the "Martyrs' Cemetery".5 The families of the so-called mar-

* Isabel Ströhle studied Political Science at University and South-East European Studies at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at the University College . This article is based on her M.A.-Dissertation that been supervised by Dr. Ger Duijings and by Dr. Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers from the wider SSEES envi- ronment. 1 The toponymies Kosovo and Pristina are used in this work, because they are more commonly found in Anglosaxon literature. This choice is, however, free of any political implications. The Serbian names are Kosovo (and ) and Priština, the Albanian forms are Kosovë, -a and Prishtinë, -a. 2 In Albanian Trupat të Mbrojtjes së Kosovës (TMK). 3 In Albanian Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK). 4 Namely the Organisation of the "Association of the KLA-Martyrs' Families" [Shoqata e Famileve të Dëshmorëve të UÇK-së], of the "KLA's War Veterans" [Shoqata e Vet- eranëve të UÇK-së], and the "Association of KLA War Invalids" [Shoqata e Invalidëve të UÇK-së]. 5 Musliu, Jeton: Permendoret e Sherreve [Quarreling Monuments]. In: , 03 February 2006. Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" – Conflicting Commemorations 405 tyrs (in Kosovo fallen KLA-fighters are currently referred to by this term) felt provoked by 's grave who had never supported the KLA, nor the war; neither visited the sites of Serb massacres and, according to them, never even expressed his condolences to the families of fallen KLA fighters.6 Conse- quently, the nation's most prominent dignitaries, veteran leaders of the KLA and who are today vested in the higher ranks7 of the KPC, stayed away from the fu- neral. "The decision to bury him on the Martyrs' Cemetery is unacceptable for us and the reaction will hit those responsible for it.8 This grave has to be re- moved from this place and we will insist that only martyrs of the nation will be there." 9 June 2006: Ibrahim Rugova's grave is located on Velania hill in Pristina, only five minutes walk away from his manorial residence. There are two entrances to the fenced-in complex that relate to three different periods of Kosovo's history, all of which have considerable influence on the present. When walking up Velania, stairs lead onto neglected grassland. From there one can approach the concrete communist memorial remembering the partisan fighters that fell in the "battle against fascism" during World War II. Further right a weathered Albanian flag is flaunted above some graves covered in plastic flower wreaths as is cur- rently the custom in Kosovo. Fallen fighters of the KLA are buried there, giving the name to this "Martyrs' Cemetery", as do the previously fallen "partisans". On the very top of the slope lies a small memorial compound in which the grave of the former president is embedded. To access this site you have to leave the bigger memorial park and use another entrance to the compound, as it is not connected by a footpath with the martyrs' graves. Iron gates lead on the cobbled access way that is seamed with flowerbeds which detach narrower footways with benches for the visitors. At the end of the access-path a large, deep blue carpet catches one's eye, covering the entire space around the white marble tomb in the centre in the shape of a circle. A simple golden engraving "Ibrahim Rugova 1944–2006" deco- rates the marble. There is no further information given on the buried, no inscrip- tion on the tomb, no sign, picture or poster nearby. Miniatures of the Albanian flag and a flag which is dominated by the colours dark blue, red, and yellow with a double-headed eagle and a coat of arms in its centre, are fixed on the right and

6 Musliu, Jeton and Maxhuni, Nebih: Kunder Varrimit Mes Dëshmorëve [Against the Burial among Martyrs]. In: Gazeta Express, 25 January 2006. 7 Nuredin Lushtaku, a friend of , had led the KPC Ceremonial Guard Unit and refused an order to provide the honours at the funeral and was consequently re- placed. See International Crisis Group (ICG): An Army for Kosovo? Europe Report No. 174, 28 July 2006, p. 16. Xhavit Jashari, head of the Organisation of the KLA Martyrs' Families, and Selim Krasniqi, former zone-Commander were also absent during the funeral. 8 Statement by the KLA successor organisations in: Musliu and Maxhuni, Kunder Var- rimit Mes Dëshmorëve, op. cit. (above n. 6). 9 Xhavit Jashari in: Musliu, Permendoret e Sherreve, op. cit. (above n. 5). 406 Isabel Ströhle left margin of its pedestal. A bigger version of the just described flag is waving above the grave. Flowerbeds are framing the blue carpet with yellow and red flowers reflecting the colours of this very flag. An adjacent path enables the visi- tor to inspect the dozens of flower wreaths carrying the names of their donators skilfully arranged in a half circle behind the grave. On its road to a final status, post-war Kosovo bears witness to a fierce power struggle. The dominant political actors seek to legitimate political claims by refer- ring back to what they claim is their contribution to the liberation from Serbian rule, through either passive resistance – as under Rugova's leadership – or active militant involvement – as led by the KLA. For the Albanians of either trajectory the ongoing limbo with regard to the unresolved final status of Kosovo made the achievement of independence a sine qua non. The necessary national cohesion is currently enforced through the evocation of a heroic master narrative of militant resistance to foreign oppression, of national unity and of 'sacrifice for the father- land' through death in combat. This has largely silenced voices of less militant convictions, as was recently pointed out by Anna di Lellio and Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers.10 Can the material culture of Rugova's grave and its repro- ductions tell us whether his non-militant stance has really lost its spell in post-war Kosovo? In the ongoing struggle for political power, dead bodies became a particular powerful resource in the post-socialist and post-war context.11 In an attempt to in- fuse the public sphere with one's own interpretation of the past, are made through claiming martyrs, monuments and graveyards of one's own group as na- tional symbols. This is clearly and exemplary reflected in the above cited dispute over Rugova's place of burial. This essay explores the ways in which political identity and conflict in post-war Kosovo are reflected in the material culture of the "Martyrs' Cemetery"12 in Pristina and, in particular, the grave of the former Albanian President. It argues that the negotiation of political claims based on an interpretation of the recent past finds expression in the material culture of ceme- teries such as this; and explores the messages this culture conveys to the Albanian visitors. To illustrate these theoretical and empirical points further, it briefly jux- taposes the material culture of Rugova's grave to a prominent KLA cemetery and the site of commemoration in the village of Prekaz in Kosovo's heartland , which has developed to a national shrine in post-war Kosovo. The material used in this research was collected during three weeks of inten- sive fieldwork in Kosovo from June to July 2006 and through constant contact with informants in Kosovo since 2001. It consists of ethnographic observations at

10 Di Lellio, Anna and Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie: The Legendary Commander: The Construction of an Albanian Master-Narrative in Post-War Kosovo. In: Nations & Na- tionalism, 12 (2006) 3, (pre-print distribution version). 11 A topic intensely explored by Katherine Verdery. Cf. Verdery, Katherine: The Political Lives of Dead Bodies. Reburial and Postsocialist Change. New York: Columbia Uni- versity Press, 1999. 12 In Albanian Varrezat e Dëshmorëve të Kombit. Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" – Conflicting Commemorations 407 the sites, participant observation, and thirteen formal interviews13 with members of the socio-politically active stratum of the capital's citizens which either lasted between one and five hours or were conducted several times. I further sought to find and collect as many original Albanian printed sources that have emerged since the president's death, for example monographs and newspaper articles cov- ering his death, funeral and related political issues. In conversations on Rugova with ordinary people,14 certain tropes and clichés were repeated that were trans- mitted by the media. According to what was labelled "traffic light mentality" by Ivan Čolović,15 only set phrases identified as appropriate were used. The first chapter focuses on exploring the ideological trajectory of the LDK, first a popular movement then political party, and their 'spearhead' Rugova. It is argued that in an attempt to legitimate the strategy of peaceful resistance, active identity management has been deployed to gather national support for the former president and his party since its early days until today. This self-stylisation made itself recognisable to the Albanian people through specific material symbolism; It will be juxtaposed with the perceptions of people who knew him personally and in some cases worked closely with him over a period of many years, who al- though bare of any mystification from the beginning onwards, were increasingly disillusioned with time. The second part examines the dominant form of memori- alisation in post-war Kosovo. Focusing on a site which originally bore witness to a Serb massacre and became "the popular destination for an Albanian political tourism that has acquired the character of pilgrimage"16 after the war, the narra- tive embodied in the material culture of KLA-monuments will be traced. This narrative and its symbolism will serve as a blueprint for the contrasting of the KLA martyrs' cemetery with Rugova's grave on the Velania memorial complex in Pristina in the last part of this study. It will be examined whether the material cul- ture of Rugova's grave conveys similarly strong political messages as is the case with KLA-monuments, and how these statements can eventually be put into the context of the struggle over political power caused by the new power constella- tions resulting from the war.

13 Find the interviews listed with information on the relevance of the informants in the appendix. The interviews all took place in Pristina during June 2006 in the form of semi-open theme guided interviews. 14 Investigation of how Rugova, whose legacy is attributed to the sixteen years of his leadership is remembered among the ordinary citizens of Pristina, was inhibited by the short period of my stay, more precisely by the lack of time available to develop the necessary trust in people, who are primarily occupied with making ends meet. Their general political fatigue was also a barrier, even more so as politics are blamed for the recent war and the poor living situation in which the majority of the population finds it- self. 15 Čolović, Ivan: Bordell der Krieger. Folklore, Politik und Krieg. Osnabrück: fibre Ver- lag, 1994, p. 76. 16 Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers, The Legendary Commander, op. cit. (above n. 10), p. 2. 408 Isabel Ströhle

2. Identity management: Rugova and the LDK Rugova was famous for his numerous quirks. Indeed he cultivated these idiosyn- crasies so diligently, that they have only scarcely appeared as natural traits. My informants repeatedly referred to him as the "master of manipulation"17. Therefore it seems valuable to explore the carefully contrived PR-concept behind the brand name 'Ibrahim Rugova', which was attempting to gather support for the move- ment's and later the party's goal of national sovereignty through non-violent resis- tance. This backup was to be created by offering a 'modern' Kosovo Albanian identity, which for a short period was able to bridge the gaps in this society, and which was embodied by the leader, Ibrahim Rugova. The constructed image was simultaneously directed at the International Community in an attempt to gain at- tention for the conflict, and at the in order to demonstrate national unity and to define one's own in opposition to the 'enemy'. Rugova's death contributed only further to the condensation of his public im- age, which is to do with the fact that criticism of the dead is disliked universally and that the time does not yet seem ripe in Kosovo for a mature and reflective criticism of the former president's political career. But it is also in the interest of a faction within the LDK containing his son and his nephew that still sees potential profit in their association with the legacy of Rugova's public image for their role in the ongoing Status Talks18 and for the next .

2.1. Rugova's Style of Leadership Although Rugova had not been the first choice for the post of party leader, he later became famous as the LDK's public face, especially abroad. According to secondary literature ,19 among others, had turned down the offer to lead the movement at the time.20 Statements of LDK members vary regarding the number of candidates who had hesitated to take on the responsibility for this task.21 Having this in mind, Rugova initially appears to be the lowest common de- nominator for the position of the leader of Kosovo's resistance movement.22

17 Interview I, XII and IV when describing Rugova, see Appendix 2. 18 Status Talks: the currently ongoing, internationally facilitated, political negotiations in between and Pristina regarding the future status of Kosovo: as autonomous part of (Belgrade's position), full national independence (Albanian position) or, possibly, conditional independence (the most likely UN position). 19 Rexhep Qosja is a well-known writer and a scholar in literature and cultural studies, who was influential in politics during the 1990s through his activity in the CDHRF (Council for Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms) [KMDLNJ (Këshilli për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave e të Lirive të Njeriut)]. Academically and politically he used to be one of Rugova's harshest critics. 20 Judah, Tim: Kosovo. War and Revenge. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 66–67. 21 Interview XIII and V on the election of Rugova as party leader. 22 Journalist Ramiz on Rugova, cf. Judah, Kosovo, op. cit. (above n. 20), pp. 66–67. Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" – Conflicting Commemorations 409

The LDK was not the only registered party in Kosovo in 1990, but due to its internal and external style of leadership, it managed to marginalise other parties that had an alternative agenda apart from the national one.23 The LDK was very successful in filling the vacuum left by the League of Communists (LCY) in Kos- ovo by taking over all of the old institutions. It had far more members than the LCY and because of the initial activism and wave of solidarity among a far wider outreach into the private realm than the communists ever aimed for.24 It managed to reach into the most remote Albanian villages in Kos- ovo through instrumentalising structures of both the former Communist Party and kinship. Dr. Rugova was elected the president of the ""25 one year after it had been declared in 1992.26 No other candidate ran for the post and his role remained undisputed for at least three years. Although he had not been a well known or influential politician before he became leader of the LDK and president of the "Republic of Kosova", he and his advisers understood well how to gain actual control of the party, the structure of which favoured the rule of a small circle of people. No action could be taken within or by the party without the presidency's personal authorisation. The presidency would not allow for anything without their president's approval. Arguably, such an autocratic form of rule was a continuation of Tito's communist style of rule in the former . Since Rugova and his inner circle monopolized 'touring' the world's capitals in search for support of the Albanians' cause, they soon were identified as its sole representatives outside Kosovo. The importance attributed to the internationalisa- tion of the conflict in Kosovo in turn consolidated Rugova's recognition among the population at home each time that he was shown on TV together with some Western diplomat. The Kosovo Albanian media, that were set up when the old TV and Radio stations had been taken over by Belgrade and after the daily Rilindja had been

23 Vickers, Miranda: Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo. London: Hurst, 1998, p. 283. 24 Clark, Howard: Civil Resistance in Kosovo. London: Pluto Press, 2000, p. 84. 25 After the abolishment of Kosovo's autonomy, former Albanian parliamentarians adopt the Resolution on the Independence and Sovereignty of Kosovo on 22 September 1991. This is confirmed by a clandestine referendum with the support of 99% of the Albanian voters. The Albanian deputies declare independence of 'The Republic of Kosovo' shortly thereafter. 26 'Parliamentary elections' are held by the self-declared state on the 24 May without in- terference of the Serbian authorities. Out of the round 18 parties, the LDK manages to reach an absolute majority of 76%. The only running candidate and LDK leader Rugova wins 99.5% of the votes. Federal and Serbian elections later that year are con- sequently boycotted by ethnic-Albanians. During these years an Albanian 'parallel sys- tem' to the Serbian regime is created to prove the absence of Serbian de facto rule over Kosovo and to further legitimate claims for Kosovo independence. By introducing a voluntary tax of 3% on the income of each household, it is attempted to maintain edu- cation and health care for Kosovo Albanians. The Serbian regime tolerates the simu- lated statehood as long as no 'hard competences', e.g. Defence, Justice are touched upon. 410 Isabel Ströhle shut down, were either controlled or dominated by the LDK. After a TV channel started to broadcast Kosovo Albanian news from 1992 on, they managed to directly transmit their views, as the majority of Kosovo Albanian households had bought satellite dishes by that time. The former agricultural newspaper Bujku that now appeared four times a week also stuck to the LDK-line, as did other per- mitted magazines.27 As Howard Clark summarises: "With the LDK in control of the content of both Bujku and the Tirana broad- casts it had a powerful means of presenting its version of reality, one de- signed to encourage Albanian perseverance, while magnifying any sign of international support." 28 Rugova's strict policy of information control was maintained until after his death. There are few publications available penned after Rugova's death. The mono- graphs On the Dardanian State and Rugova: His political model,29 written by journalists of the LDK-loyal daily [The World Today],30 had to be spe- cifically ordered in June. The homogenous style of these publications is proof for the long-term repercussions of Rugova's paternalist style of leadership.

2.2. Rugova – The Western Intellectual To many of my respondents Ibrahim Rugova seemed more like an intellectual than like a politician. He was a rank and short man, modest in his appearance and standing out due to his soft features, especially when compared to other Kosovo Albanian politicians. Famous characteristics of his style were glasses and free fly- ing hair, which only with growing age got shorter and shorter. Also his style of dress was very distinct. In public he usually wore a shirt and a tie, with a jumper

27 Judah, Kosovo, op. cit. (above n. 20), p. 92; Clark, Civil Resistance, op. cit. (above n. 24), pp. 108–109. When the independent Koha [Time] was re-opened in 1994, the edi- tors Veton Surroi and Baton Haxhiu were repeatedly labelled 'traitors' for their critical reporting on Rugova and for their readiness to negotiate with Serbian oppositionists; cf. Dujizings, Ger and Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie: War Within a War. The Rise of the KLA and Internal Political Struggles Among the Kosovo Albanians in the 1990s. Based on an Expert Witness Report by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2004, p. 64; Interview IV. 28 Clark, Civil Resistance, op. cit. (above n. 24), p. 109. 29 Mehmetaj, Gani: Për shtetin e Dardanisë [On the Dardanian State]. Prishtina: Faik Konica 2006; Ahmetaj, Arbër: Rugova. Modeli i tij Politik. Shënime per një sprovë politike [Rugova. His political model. Signs for a Political Test]. Prishtina: Mërgimi A&B, 2006. 30 On the search for publications that had been released after January 2006 on Rugova's style of leadership, the sheer absence of these comes as a surprise. His illness had been publicly known for at least six months, which would have enabled the timely prepara- tion of some critical analysis or informed resume of his lifework. Merely the 'Komplet', an eight volume collection of Ibrahim Rugova's literary work that has already been re- leased during his lifetime, was exhibited in the shop displays in the first months after his death. Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" – Conflicting Commemorations 411 on top, completed always by a dark suit jacket and, most prominently, a scarf. More and more, he notoriously displayed the colours red and dark blue, most of- ten a red jumper and a blue scarf. These are the colours of the party LDK. Rugova was constructed as a Western style politician among the Albanians of Kosovo, and as "at this time everything that came from the West or seemed West- ern was good",31 special emphasis was put on the fact that he had studied at the renowned Sorbonne University in with the famous literary critic . Having lived in France and having been under the influence of Western schools of thought Rugova seemed above many of the Albanian politicians, who were more often educated in other Yugoslav republics or in the Eastern Block: "Rugova is the most emblematic Albanian person in the 20th and the begin- ning of the 21st century. With one word, he is the best known Albanian per- sonality in the world and the most respected statesman in Western Europe and the US. [...] In middle of those, who were boiling in the scolding hot cauldron together with his co-nationals was Ibrahim Rugova, a remarkable intellectual, well known name in the Albanian literature, with Western culti- vation, who in the 1970s brought fresh air to Pristina, the cultural Albanian centre." 32

2.3. Rugova – Creator of a Historical Kosovo Identity Another of his self-styled 'trademarks' clearly reflected in the material culture sur- rounding him and resumed after his death by the above mentioned textbooks, was his role as "identity creator"33 for Kosovo. These books, uncritical laudations in respect to what the authors claim are president Rugova's achievements, reproduce – as evident from the titles – the tropes of his ethno-nationalist political legacy: the presumed distinct Dardanian origin of the Albanians of Kosovo and their na- tional unity: "Rugova was the most persistent and strongest statesman we had in Darda- nia [...]. Independent from the media campaigns, independent from the sar- casm of denationalising mercenaries, president Rugova continued to do re- search on the Dardanian roots, stressing the elements of statehood at that time. A people and a state with over 2000 year old traditions, aspiring self determination and their taking part in the European family, because we be- long to this continent." 34 Rugova was researching and writing on the ancient state of Dardania, which comprised all Albanians of the Balkan Peninsula. From these findings he was try- ing to legitimate the Kosovo Albanians' claim to the territory of Kosovo and to

31 Interview X. 32 Mehmetaj, Për shtetin e Dardanisë, op. cit. (above n. 29), p. 8. All translations from Al- banian are the author's. 33 Interview XI. 34 Mehmetaj, Për shtetin e Dardanisë, op. cit. (above n. 29), pp. 16–17. 412 Isabel Ströhle the right of statehood by establishing a link to the ancient 'Dardanian' state. Con- tinuity with the past was to be established through the integration of the ancient symbols into the presidential flag and coat of arms, which were to become official symbols of an independent Kosovo. For unclear reasons, the symbolic language of Dardania was not decoded for the public in detail. In my inquiries even close associates like his nephew were not able to explain the symbols on the Dardanian flag and coat of arms, but merely stated: "He was an identity creator for Kosova. He created the Dardanian flag. It unites the Albanian flag with the key symbols of our history until today." 35 Similarly vague formulations are used by Mehmetaj: "He introduced the Dardanian flag, started to be interested with the cultural and intellectual heritage, to research on the ruins of our traditions and to in- tegrate these elements into the modern state." 36 Therefore, it may be concluded that the symbols are mainly signifying Rugova's focus on the alleged Dardanian past. The significance attributed to this historical enterprise is reflected by the last resting place of the president, where the symbols and material culture stemming from the Dardanian history project are also domi- nant.

2.4. The Role of Symbolism in Rugova's Surroundings Rugova presided in his private house, where he had set up his own office, his ad- visors' offices, his documents, and his parlour.37 Also situated in his residence were a private photographer and a cameraman, who preferred to capture his im- age in the room which appears on most of the pictures of his meetings with inter- national diplomats. It was, and still is, decorated with little signifiers of all the president's 'trademarks' on the basis of which the LDK's and his ideology will be traced. These underpin the same material culture that can be found at Rugova's grave. Fixed to the wall above the mantelpiece in Rugova's parlour there were framed and signed photographs of Rugova and and Rugova and Madeleine Albright. Behind the arm chair on which Rugova used to sit when re- ceiving a guest, was an arrangement of various flags. These were the Albanian, the Dardanian, the UN, the EU38 flags and that of the USA. From the early 1990s onwards Ibrahim Rugova and his party were at pains to attract the attention of the so-called International Community (IC), particularly that of the USA and of the EU, to the cause of the Albanians in Kosovo. Among the long-term aims of the

35 Interview XI. 36 Mehmetaj, Për shtetin e Dardanisë, op. cit. (above n. 29), p.16. 37 Interview X, VIII, III. 38 Apparently a delegation of European parliamentarians was expressing their dissatisfac- tion with the absence of an EU-flag, so that one was added subsequently; cf. Interview III. Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" – Conflicting Commemorations 413 movement was the establishment of an UN-Trusteeship over Kosovo, a special relationship to the and the integration of an independent Kosovo into the transatlantic structures of the IC. Through this display of flags the Kos- ovo Albanians positioned themselves clearly on the side of the IC in juxtaposition to the Serbian counterpart which, at the time, was so obviously disregarding the IC, e.g. for their interference in the case of Bosnia. Simultaneously it was to be demonstrated that Rugova was acknowledged by Western diplomats and states, for the strategy of non-violence but also for his appearance as the moderate ex- ception from the irrational and belligerent Balkan politicians. By presenting these symbols, not only the loyalty to these states and institutions was to be displayed, but also the presence and acceptance of Rugova and his party in the arena of in- ternational politics was to be indicated to the Kosovo Albanians. The other pictures exhibited in his parlour and office, also visible in the back- ground of many press conferences, were those of Mother Tereza, an ethnic Alba- nian from Macedonia, and of him shaking hands with Pope John Paul II. Presi- dent Rugova and his party were striving to present the majority confession of Kosovo Albanians – the Muslim faith – as irrelevant for Kosovo Albanian iden- tity, and by seeking the closeness of the Vatican demonstrated their religious tol- erance and openness as parts of a modern and civilised national identity. This must be seen in the context of the Western reaction to the irrational outlook of the religiously tainted nationalisms presented by nationalist leaders in the wars in and Bosnia.39 Further there was a general suspicion in regard to national movements of Muslim ethnic communities in the West. Religion never seemed to have played an important role in Kosovo Albanian identity, due to Kosovo's his- tory as an "ethnic shatter zone"40 and repeated conversions of large parts of the population. The outcome was a high degree of religious syncretism, heterodoxy and the practice of sharing pilgrimages across religious boundaries.41 In Kosovo religious practices have been anchored more in folk tradition than in religiosity. However, the Albanian leaders felt the need to demonstrate their Western orienta- tion, even by converting collectively to Catholicism, if necessary.42 Where all kinds of Kosovo Albanian organisations and unions were seeking links and coop- eration with international counterparts, they were avoiding any affiliation with such groups in the Islamic World.43 The Pope, engaged in bringing down the communist regime in his homeland Poland, in contrast was perceived as a power- ful ally by Rugova. Having good relations to the appreciated institution of the Vatican served to legitimate one's moral integrity and to prove a success in win- ning over Western centres of power.

39 Duijzings, Ger: Ethnic Unmixing under the Aegis of the West: A Transnational Ap- proach to the Breakup of Yugoslavia. In: Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies (Aman), 5 (2004) 2, pp.1–16. 40 Duijzings, Ger: Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo. London: Hurst, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 5. 41 Ibid. 42 Clark, Civil Resistance, op. cit. (above n. 24), p. 66. 43 Ibid., p. 90. 414 Isabel Ströhle

While the material culture of Rugova's personal appearance and environment tells us a lot about his intentional self-representation as well as the political mes- sages it conveys, Ibrahim Rugova was, indeed, a classic intellectual in the conti- nental sense. Therefore his background was predestined for the cultivation of the image of a sophisticated and illustrious politician. The largely rural population of Kosovo saw the world of academia and sciences as somewhat above the daily business and attributed an almost visionary talent to intellectuals. "He is an intel- lectual, he must know."44 According to Rugova's nephew he had spent most of his time in his personal library.45 Rugova's efforts for creating an historical ethno-national identity served two functions. First, it legitimated Rugova's choice for the strategy of non-violent re- sistance rationally. A cost-benefit analysis predicted a disaster for Albanians in case of a military conflict, so that it was more reasonable to search for a sound strategy to win over external allies preferably from the West. Who should be more credible in doing this than an intellectual who had studied in the West and who knew the international leaders' mentality? Secondly, it proved that Rugova was a patriot deeply involved with all of Kosovo's history and culture, who was fighting for the Albanian's natural and historical right to independence.

2.5. Reflections on Rugova's Public Image The results of participant observation suggest that Rugova's media image may well have reached the ordinary citizens in Pristina, who only learned about him through newspapers and the evening news. The same impression I gained in in- terviews with members of the Kosovo Albanian community in , who re- ceive their daily update on developments in their homeland through the media. Among the ordinary Albanians in Kosovo none of his 'trademarks' was put into question. Having discussed the deliberate public messages conveyed to the Albanian public and constructed through the material culture of Rugova as persona and his immediate environment, I need to juxtapose his intentional self-stylisations to the much different perception found among those interviewees, who repeatedly met Rugova in person or even cooperated with him over long periods during his life time. Though aware of the various aspects of Rugova's personality myth and leadership cult described above, in interview their attitude was bare of any mysti- fications and openly critical. Rugova's success in internationalising the conflict through his close, personal relations with many Western high profile diplomats was questioned heavily. In my informants' opinion only an illusion of Western support was created without much real substance to it. "On 20 January 1992 Rugova took part in the White House Ceremony with President Clinton. He met Clinton for 30 seconds shaking hands with him

44 Interview VI. 45 Interview III. Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" – Conflicting Commemorations 415

like any other guest did. Of this moment pictures were taken and made into a poster. They became part of every family's home and the daily interaction with the leader was created." 46 Another problem was that meetings with rather low profile diplomats were exaggerated by the press and people were not able to qualify the importance of certain meetings.47 According to informants who have taken part in discussions where Rugova was present, his behaviour on round tables also did not serve the proclaimed goal of the party: "During the crisis, an Albanian diplomat was here for a visit and spent one and a half hours to talk about the ongoing crisis. But all Rugova did was walking around a table offering food. Throughout the whole time of the meeting: Do you want cheese? Do you want peppers?" 48 By using phrases like, "I have my reasons. You cannot know this", and by sending regards to Western statesmen or the Pope49 after giving a public speech he managed however to uphold authority. The audience in front of the TV under- stood that his reservation was caused by the fact that he simply could not disclose what he knew for strategic reasons, and that his critics did not have the full in- sight into the circumstances. His critics were never really sure if he had access to some extra information.50 Rugova was not in the habit of making decisions or of clearly advocating his stance apart from the catchphrases "Liri, Democraci, Pavaresi" [Freedom, De- mocracy, Independence]. In all instances when important decisions within the presidency lay ahead, President Rugova listened courteously until a proposal was fully presented, then bypassed a further discussion of the topic. Always smiling he either announced the delay of the decision, or he resorted to formulations like: "We will have to see how this can serve the overall goal of independence of Kos- ova" or the even more general "We will have to see".51 This hesitancy influenced the fortune of the party, e.g. when a LDK-branch was to be opened in Washington DC on invitation of the US State Department. The necessary funding and even the premises for the office had been organised in its entirety, but the branch was never opened due to the Presidents inability to decide for a head of office.52 How- ever,

46 Interview IV. 47 "Before the war he went to the states and only if he met some member of staff of the state department people thought he met Clinton. People at that time had no clue; every- one thought that he was something." Quoted from Interview X. 48 Interview XII. 49 Interview V, VI. 50 Lajçi on the negotiations about the student demonstrations in 1997 and a precedent ne- gotiation on this topic with Christopher Hill in the US-Embassy in Belgrade; Interview VI. 51 Interview V, XII. 52 Interview XIII. 416 Isabel Ströhle

"the population esteemed him for being above the hurly burly of political de- bate. He 'presided' rather than showed the way, and increasingly tried to play the role of 'head of state' rather than leader of a movement in struggle." 53 The image of the mild and well-tempered leader or president is hard to recon- cile with plentiful statements of Ibrahim Rugova to have been an "autocrat" and "(soft) dictator". His character was described as resentful and vengeful, never able to forget about criticism or lack of support. While he would not openly express his discontent with a statement or behaviour, he would either leave the room or not say a word. But subsequently he would not consider the critics in political de- cisions, not invite them anymore, or ignore them in the distribution of political posts. In situations of criticism in front of an audience, the president used to merely smile and counter his adversary with friendly words, which came to be in- terpreted as great personal strength, as he never replied by criticism or defensive behaviour. Clark notes in this context: "Somehow the more Rugova refused to an- swer his critics, the more presidential his aura became."54 While his intellectual background was well accepted by all of my conversa- tion partners, his kind of patriotism was discredited for most of them. Those who met him were rather sceptical or at least derisive on the president's creation of a historical identity for Kosovo. While many agreed with or least respected a non- violent strategy in the first half of the 1990s, their trust was increasingly shaken from the time of the announcement of the Dayton agreement up to the breach of the Agreement and the beginnings of the student protests. The majority of my informants were active in politics at that time, either in the grassroots of the LDK, in its leadership or in the student movement. Those active in the LDK lead- ership and in the student movement were pointing at their shifting stance from passive to active non-violent resistance. When this did not find support, many started to become radicalised. Rugova's rejection of change, his passivity and 'sit- and-wait' tactics were making them doubt his courage to really fight for inde- pendence. For many it was clear "you could not talk to Serbs, you could not send them a declaration, if you really want to achieve something words are not strong enough." 55 While Rugova's decision to deny the existence of the KLA was interpreted as a "childish mistake"56, his ongoing refusal to support the war put his whole credibil- ity into question. Rugova's TV performance with Milošević57, which was forced on him by the Serbian regime, discredited him in the eyes of many as a national and even politi- cal leader:

53 Clark, Civil Resistance, op. cit. (above n. 24), p. 119. 54 Ibid., p. 199. 55 Interview VI, XII. 56 Interview XIII. 57 On 15 May 1998 a meeting between Milošević and Rugova was broadcasted on Ser- bian TV. The feature spread the rumour that both leaders had signed an agreement on Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" – Conflicting Commemorations 417

"There are things I cannot forgive him or forget, like that he turned up on TV during the bombardement with Milošević and appealed to stop the bombings. He violated his moral duty as a president in this moment, because no one else appealed to stop the bombing and we were here [in Pristina]. And he did not even ask for it as a private person, but in his function as our presi- dent." 58 A much disputed issue in this context was his motivation to go to meet Milošević. For the family-worshipping Albanians it is an accepted excuse that he must have been pressured through threats towards his family. However, it was expected that he would not claim leadership after that. "Because as a private person you have to protect your family, as a president you cannot." When asked, however, for the KLA commandant Adem Jashari, my male in- terviewees showed deep respect and called his behaviour "a completely different thing. What he did was a sacrifice to our nation."59 Rugova's return from exile in was too belated for many and not under- standable in a situation where he was gathering enough criticism.60 For those who had to make the experience themselves of returning to their eventually destroyed homes, and those who had held out in Pristina throughout the war period and the subsequent period of anarchy, his physical absence and his lack of support and leadership had discredited his authority as their president. All the same they attribute the continuation of his political success after the war to the mistakes of the KLA and their political leaders or to questions of men- tality, like "Old people say we were always with Rugova, we will be with Rugova." 61 "He was in power because people who were victims like victims. And he was a victim: Of the IC, of the Serb regime, and of his own mistakes." 62 Rugova had been backed by unqualified support in the early nineties as long as the 'myth' of the liberation from Serbian rule through non-violent resistance was not proven wrong in reality. Those people close to Rugova, and those active in politics and journalism backed the mystification of their political leader at that

Kosovo. Although it remained unclear under which circumstances Rugova agreed to meet Milošević, in Kosovo many Albanians interpreted his appearance on TV together with the Serbian leader as treason. 58 Interview I. 59 Interview VII; results from participant observation. 60 According to Merovci, who had stayed with Rugova during the house arrest and who accompanied him to Belgrade and to Italy, he had to plead him to come back to Koso- vo. He was sent to Pristina first, to look after the house and the LDK offices. Interview VIII. 61 Interview VI, X. 62 Interview X. 418 Isabel Ströhle time, as they understood it was necessary to strengthen his political authority and to increase cohesion among the Albanians of Kosovo. His authority, however, crumbled significantly from that moment on, the IC in the contract of Dayton dis- appointed any hopes for an intervention in the Kosovo conflict. The picture that had been presented to the Albanian public and which had been backed by many of my respondents increasingly lost its spell. The growing disillusionment among Kosovo's political elite at that time was only accelerated by Rugova losing con- tact to the reality. To many the time seemed ripe for more active means of resis- tance.

3. The "Martyrs of the Nation" and their commemoration Pristina's KLA martyrs rest in peace only a few metres away from Rugova's me- morial site, as was already mentioned. The capital's KLA-"Martyrs' Cemetery" is one of hundreds of this kind of graveyard and monument, which since the recent war "punctuate"63 Kosovo's actual and memorial landscape. They "mark"64 all the places the KLA considers significant for their history and their struggle for na- tional liberation; the places where KLA-fighters died in combat, the places of the fighter's origin, the places of fierce fighting and the places of KLA-strongholds all over Kosovo. Pristina's KLA-graveyard is a rather inconspicuous and uncared-for version. In the middle of the graves is a medium-sized modernist style, black and dark brown marble stone which is decorated by the KLA emblem. The Albanian flag flying above the graves is, however, weathered, and the flower wreaths decorating them had wilted some time ago. The unprominent appearance of Pristina's KLA- cemetery is likely to be rooted in the mental mapping of the KLA and its succes- sor organisations. The Liberation Army's strongholds were in the rural regions of Drenica which is located in the centre of Kosovo, and in the Western regions of , Dukagjin and Deqan. Its 'spiritual' capital was, and still is Prekaz, a village in the heartland of Drenica. It acquired this status on account of a Serb massacre in March 1998 against the extended family of the "insurgent KLA leader Adem Jashari".65 The massacre bestowed the – until then – underground organisation with an influx of voluntary fighters, the sheer numbers of which overwhelmed even the KLA.66 The actual capital of Kosovo, however, is disregarded by the tra-

63 Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies, op. cit. (above n. 11), p. 39. 64 Ibid. 65 Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers: The Legendary Commander, op. cit. (above n.10), p. 1. 66 The KLA, which had been a marginal clandestine militant organisation up until 1997, had originally been composed of "the most traditionalist rural families or clans" with a history of resistance to Yugoslav rule reaching back into the 1920s, and of underground diaspora groups. Past Dayton this militant guerrilla faction was stepping up its activi- ties, mainly by attacking Serbian police stations and other Serb institutions. The lack of progress made by Rugova and the LDK frustrated the majority of the population but not many were yet radicalised to such a degree that they would support this kind of Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" – Conflicting Commemorations 419 ditionalist KLA-supporters because of "the putative Yugoslav corruption of the urban population."67 Accusations were directed at the urban Albanian elites of having sold out traditional Albanian values and rightful claims to national sover- eignty for the benefit they got from subordinating themselves to the Yugoslav state and the Communist power structure.68 When assaults by the Serbian police against the rural Kosovo Albanian popu- lation aggravated and accumulated throughout the year 1997, the Albanian villag- ers became increasingly radicalised. Not only had the tactic of non-violence and passive resistance lost its protective function for them, but it also ceased to be an effective form of assertion of the Albanian identity. Their self-imposed steadfast- ness in the face of the arbitrariness of the Serbian police in retaliation to 'terrorist- attacks' against Serb institutions and officials on the Albanian population, slowly transformed itself into a picture of victimisation. This status of victimhood finally found a chance to be replaced by a powerful counter-narrative of heroic militant resistance in March 1998. This Serb massacre consequently established Prekaz as the centre of the subsequent 'martyr cult' which is so prominent in the post-war memorial sphere. In addition, it also made the KLA presentable in popular opin- ion. From the 5–8 March 1998, after repeated attempts by Serbian police forces to arrest Adem Jashari, one of the KLA founders and leaders, the compound of the Jashari extended family was surrounded by mixed Serbian police and army forces which attacked, leaving behind fifty one dead on the side of the Jasharis, with only one eleven year old girl surviving the assault.69 The fierce armed resistance in the forlorn situation of the siege by the male members of the family – lead by Adem, his brother Hamzë and their father Shaban – prepared the ground for the confrontation's interpretation along the lines of "resistance unto death" and "sacri- fice for the love of the country", elevating the killed to a status of "immortality".70 They were not being victimised, but actively chose to fight and die for their con- victions. This enabled their elevation to martyrs for the renewal of the Albanian nation. This interpretation is reproduced and spread in the form of publications, pop songs and traditional songs, but also through material culture by "memory entre-

militant action. Therefore, the group that was disclosing itself only in 1997 as the "Kosova Liberation Army" remained on the margins of Kosovo Albanian society. On the history and organisation of the KLA, see Lipsius, Stephan: Untergrundorganisatio- nen im Kosovo. Ein Überblick. In: Südosteuropa, 47 (1998) 1, S. 75–82; Reuter, Jens: Zur Geschichte der UÇK. In: Clewing, Konrad and Reuter, Jens (Koordination): Der Kosovo-Konflikt. Ursachen – Akteure – Verlauf. München: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, 2000, S. 171–186; Duijzings and Schwandner-Sievers, War within a War, op. cit. (above n. 27). Judah, Kosovo, op. cit. (above n. 20); 67 Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers, The Legendary Commander, op. cit. (above n. 10), p. 8. 68 Cf. ibid., p. 10. 69 Cf. ibid., p. 5. 70 Ibid., p. 6. 420 Isabel Ströhle preneurs"71 stemming from the Jashari surroundings and from the Drenica region. Its particular appeal to the Albanians of Kosovo is to be found in the appropria- tion of key concepts of the traditional, north-Albanian customary law72 and there- fore, determines its understanding culturally. As Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Anna Di Lellio have pointed out, Adem Jashari's sacrifice of his life and fam- ily set the seal on his "amanet" [the pledge] to fight for "national liberation, inde- pendence and unity". The demand of "internal solidarity, loyalty and commitment in conduct as well as secrecy towards outsiders" for this mission lies in the other traditional concept of "besa" ["faithfulness to one's word", "allegiance guaran- tee"]. Accordingly, fallen KLA-fighters are interpreted as having borne witness to the cause of the liberation from Serbian rule by sacrificing their lives just as Jashari did. The "religious themes of martyrdom and sacrifice" and the "traditionalist ide- als of solidarity and militancy"73 have since been expressed in the form of monu- ments and memorial sites raising political claims for the KLA successor parties and organisations. The former themes are resembled in the iconographical venera- tion of the Jasharis and the intended site sacralisation of the Jashari compound as a "shrine to the Albanian nation" and an "altar to the martyrs of the nation"74 in post-war Kosovo.75 The latter find expression in monumental or pictorial repre- sentations of Adem Jashari presenting him as an exemplary and strong fighter al- ways with machine gun and military attire.76 The Jashari compound is preserved in its destroyed state to keep the memory of the massacre alive and as a reminder of the Jashari's 'sacrifice'. Those politicians with a KLA past77, regularly renew their legitimacy by as- sociating themselves with this powerful "myth of armed resistance towards for- eign oppression, national independence and unity"78 and by visiting the site of Prekaz. The myth of Prekaz and the Jasharis is also reflected in every other KLA- monument and in this way is firmly inscribed into Kosovo's memorial landscape. Although not as prominent as many other KLA graveyards in regions that are of higher importance for the self-identification of the KLA successor organisations, Pristina's KLA Martyr Cemetery carries the same political message. Claims for political power and claims for the authorship of the eventual achievement of in-

71 Ibid., p. 3. 72 Ibid., p. 9. 73 Di Lellio, Anna and Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie: Sacred Journey to the Albanian Nation in Postwar Kosovo. In: Journeys. The International Journal of Travel and Travel Writing, 7 (2006) 1, (pre-print version), pp. 1–23. 74 Ibid., p. 2. 75 Cf. ibid., p. 5. 76 Cf. ibid., p. 5. 77 For instance , leader of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), and , leader of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). 78 Cf. Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers, The Legendary Commander, op. cit. (above n. 10), p. 1. Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" – Conflicting Commemorations 421 dependence are derived from the KLA's fighters' sacrifice of their lives for the sake of national independence.

4. Interpretation of Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" "Myth is one of the ways in which collectivities – in this context especially nations – establish and determine the foundations of their own being, their own systems of morality and values. In this sense, therefore, myth is a set of beliefs, usually put forth as a narrative, held by a community about itself. Centrally myth is about perceptions and not historically validated truths." 79 Ibrahim Rugova and the presidency of his party, heading the popular move- ment against the repression by the Serbian regime, created and offered such a nar- rative to the Kosovo Albanians in the early 1990s, understanding that strong co- hesion among the Albanians was needed to win the struggle over the physically superior Serbian antagonist. The necessary degree of cohesion could only be achieved by offering an identity that was enforced by the fact that it stood in op- position to the image that was drawn of the Albanians by the Serb nationalists and was therefore able to bridge internal cleavages in the face of the enemy. Building on available assets, e.g. the intellectual background of Rugova and his genuine interest for 'the old', a mythologised image of their leader was promoted, as was examined in the first part of this study. Numerous symbols in the former presi- dent's environment, and Rugova's extended elaborations on them, were constantly reminding his followers of certain aspects of this myth. His insistence on these symbols, and the cultivation of seemingly odd rituals, like giving away stones, soon prompted people to identify Rugova personally with 'independence', 'paci- fism', 'Western intellectualism' and so on. This study shows, that the material cul- ture of his grave offers a specific reading based on a shared register of interpreta- tions available to the Albanians of Kosovo because of the ways they experienced Rugova's leadership. Political claims to independence based on the legacy of the ancient state of Dardania and on the historical right to statehood and to national unity are con- veyed in it. This is what the colours at his grave, which resemble the Dardanian flag, tell us. Contrasting the material culture of Rugova's grave and Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" with Prekaz (the heartpiece of numerous other KLA monu- ments) it becomes clear that political conflict in post-war Kosovo is reflected in the material culture of cemeteries. In the context of the current status-talks and their likely result of some form of independence, the heroes of the Kosovo memo- rial sphere that are negotiated at present by the political actors will come to em- body liberation from Serbian rule and national independence.

79 Schöpflin, George: A Taxonomy of Myths and Their Functions. In: Id. (Ed.): Nations, Identity, Power. The New Politics of Europe. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2000, pp. 79– 98, p. 80. 422 Isabel Ströhle

When the Organisation of the KLA Veterans argued that "the burial of Rugova on the "Martyrs' Cemetery" is only politically motivated"80 they had a point. The fact that Rugova was buried on the "Martyrs' Cemetery" must be seen in the context of the ongoing negotiations in the 'politics of space', in which dead bodies are of indispensable use.81 As Katherine Verdery notes, "their corporeality makes them important [...] localising a claim", in this case the claim is: "He also deserves a place here". Anna Di Lellio and Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers re- cently examined that the politics of space in Kosovo currently are changing their master, but are dealt with in a similar way. Where Serbs previously claimed Kos- ovo for the Serbs, extending Serb borders to all places marked by Serbian bones, Albanians are now countering this by basing their territorial claims on the "blood of their fallen fighters".82 The 'politics of space', however, concern also the inter- nal struggle for political power. The memorial landscape in Kosovo at present is strongly dominated by the former KLA-faction, leaving little room to the non- militarists for expressing their claims. As the war supporters succeeded in creating so many landmarks, marking it as 'their' reconquered territory, it was vital for the LDK to assert themselves in the capital. While they cannot draw on the heartland Drenica and other former KLA strongholds, Pristina is the place of the LDK's origin and the place where their ideology and urban intellectualism sprang from. Pristina is also the capital, which has the highest significance for representation towards the outside world and to- wards the international institutions inside Kosovo. Another argument for the significance of Rugova's place of burial in the power struggle in Kosovo is that he was buried in Velania against his will to be buried next to his mother on the public city-cemetery in the district of Arbëria.83 The reasons named for the decision announced by the Organisational Council one day after he died were of strategic and of practical nature. While there are plenty of graves in the city-cemetery, there are only few others at the site's current loca- tion, which for logistical reasons served the purpose of a state funeral.84 Further- more, it was said to offer a more special and more salient position to the presi- dent's grave.85 The memorial site is not visible from beneath the hill. But on account of its naturally elevated position, the perspective from Velania hill offers a bountiful view over Kosovo's capital hinting at the role attributed to history in Kosovo. Metaphorically speaking the historical phases embodied in this memorial com- pound are watching over the political business going on in Pristina, but also over daily life. They are undeniably present, either in form of their materialisation in monuments or in form of memories.

80 Musliu, Permendoret e Sherreve, op. cit. (above n. 5). 81 Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies, op. cit. (above n. 11), pp. 39–40. 82 Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers, Sacred Journey to the Albanian Nation, op. cit. (above n. 73), pp. 17–18. 83 Musliu, Permendoret e Sherreve, op. cit. (above n. 5); Interview IX. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid.; Interview II. Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" – Conflicting Commemorations 423

The naturally elevated position of the cemetery, also expresses the martyrs' symbolically elevated position in society. Their moral superiority is founded on their sacrifice to a common cause, here the liberation of the nation. Rugova's natural death contradicts this logic. However, LDK-loyal writers present Rugova as a Christ-like martyr: "The biggest displacement of Albanians from Kosovo took place. It was this biblical exodus which history had not known in these dimensions until then. Rugova lived through the fate of his own people, he fell hostage to the occu- piers. The displaced Albanians were aware of the position of their leader, but they lifted him onto the level of the crucified Christ, so that he did not only not lose popularity, but his position was raised into a myth of martyr- dom." 86 In the eyes of his adherents his insistence on passive resistance, risking his reputation in the confrontation with the militarists around the KLA, resembles the sacrifice of his political life. In their eyes he was proven right, when he was resur- rected in 2002 with his election to the office of the president.87 In contrast, for the organisations of the former KLA, Rugova's place of burial constitutes a sacrilege. They condemn the burial of a non-martyr and even more so of someone who they consider a traitor, one who never supported the war, de- nounced the KLA as an invention of the Serbian secret service and never visited any of the KLA-martyrs' families,88next to the graves of those "who rightfully gained the status of immortality, the status of a national martyr."89 In their eyes it profanes and insults the sacrifice they once made. As a consequence Rugova's grave is under surveillance twenty-four hours a day. However, the option to exhume and bury the KLA martyrs somewhere else further apart from Rugova was given up for several reasons. Firstly, the KLA successor organisations were appealed to several times not to do so, as the crucial period of the 'Status Talks' demands the demonstration of unity from all Albanian parties towards the IC. Secondly, they could not give up on the landmark they had set here, for similar reasons, that made it attractive for their opponents to bury Rugova there. The same issue is reflected in the dispute over the presidential flag flying above Rugova's grave and thereby also above the martyrs' graves. The KLA-organisations have protested against the flying of the presidential flag next to the Albanian one on earlier occasions, e.g. on the Albanian National Holiday.90 They do not want to be associated with the Dardanian flag nor do they want Kos- ovo to be represented by a flag Rugova designed, while they fought for Kosovo's independence under the Albanian flag. The Albanian flag is also used by and enables the unifications of Albanian inhabited territory at least in the sym-

86 Mehmetaj, Për shtetin e Dardanisë, op. cit. (above n. 29), p. 12. 87 Interview XI. 88 Musliu, Permendoret e Sherreve, op. cit. (above n. 5). 89 Ibid. 90 The Albanian national holiday marks the day of Albania's independence on 28 Novem- ber 1912. 424 Isabel Ströhle bolic realm. The domination of the picture of Rugova's grave by the Dardanian flag, which is displayed twice, as well as the choice of colours, indicates the ma- jor influence he attributed to his historical project for Kosovo's future. The size and the clear structure of the memorial park around Rugova's grave place the martyrs' graves in a marginalised position. Contrasting both graveyards, the strict organisation of Rugova's grave emphasises the more provisional ar- rangement of the martyrs' graves. This also reflects the style of organisation of the two camps. While Rugova's party and his position in the party were clearly struc- tured and their strategy planned on long-term, the KLA and their later political offspring were adapting more spontaneously to upcoming situations. A further contrast is displayed by the singularity and central position of Rugova's grave in its arrangement in relation to the numerous adjacent graves of the fallen fighters. During his leadership Rugova increasingly became the central figure of the LDK, and up to the war even of the parallel state. This is mirrored in the symbolism in- herent in the material culture of his last resting place, and in the colours and ar- rangements chosen, which were certainly intended to be significant, as his wish to be buried in the city cemetery was ignored on account of the multitude of graves there. The neighbouring graves of the KLA soldiers represent much more cama- raderie and equality in their status due to their commitment to a common cause. While it is possible to walk unhindered from the communist monument to the KLA cemetery and back, the access to the presidential arrangement would require crossing freshly planted tree rows and walking over flowerbeds. The planted trees also create a stark visual separation from the other sites, symbolically cutting any links between them. It appears as if Rugova's leadership is meant to be interpreted and evaluated separately, but not in the historical or political context embodied in the other sites. This elevates Rugova's personality and absolves him from criti- cism, as he is figuratively removed from the plane of equal comparison. Rugova's plain white marble tomb creates a further contrast to the memoriali- sation of the KLA heirs. It is paying credit to the rejection of "the backwardness of the socialist aesthetic", which is a rejection "of what seems foreign to the west- ern world they want to belong to"91 often found among urbanites and the intellec- tual class Rugova stemmed from. Many KLA-monuments are designed in a "modernist aesthetic rooted in socialist memorial iconography"92 expressing a he- roic style, which is disrespected in the city as rural backwardness. Having this in mind the visual separation from the communist monument and the KLA-grave- yard, appears as the aspiration to be seen as Western, while the other two sites are disregarded as primitive and Eastern. This ethnographic study attempted to show, that strong political messages are conveyed in the material culture of Rugova's grave and that they have to be inter- preted in the political context of a post-war power struggle in which political claims are based on the interpretation of the recent past. Although having sug-

91 Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers, The Legendary Commander, op. cit. (above n. 10), p. 11. 92 Ibid. Pristina's "Martyrs' Cemetery" – Conflicting Commemorations 425 gested that the memorial landscape is dominated by the surroundings of the for- mer KLA, I would like to conclude by briefly discussing the public reception of the message transmitted by Rugova's grave among the citizens of Pristina. My ar- guments are confirmed by the changing number of visitors to his grave. When Rugova's body was laid out in the Kosovo Assembly building after his death, tens of thousands of Kosovo Albanians came to pay their last respects to the man who had played an immense role in the first half of the 1990s in the resis- tance to the Serb regime. This experience of national solidarity created a high de- gree of identification at that time and prompted hundreds of thousands of people to attend the procession of his coffin around Pristina before his burial. The sym- pathies for Rugova, however, refer in many cases to his leadership in the first half of the 1990s which is reflected in the decline in visitor numbers since the funeral. After Dayton, and particularly after the war, disillusionment with their mytholo- gised leader and his empty promises took over ever bigger parts of society. For a lack of alternatives many continued to vote for him despite their growing reserva- tion, but his voter support fell from 99% in 1992, to 70% in 2000, to 46% in 2004.93 These days his grave is mainly visited by LDK partisans. Several delega- tions from the LDK have been visiting the grave recently: The youth forum of the LDK, the various regional branches of the LDK, and the actual President in company of other high party officials have come to pay their respects to the laid president. Further support comes from the diaspora, which has been reli- ant on the media to inform them and is therefore much less disillusioned than, for instance, the citizens of Pristina. On several occasions during my stay, I came across Albanians living in the diaspora there, who visited during their summer holidays. Also from the official position his myth is still promoted, as it is impor- tant to remember that the LDK still dominates the Kosovo Assembly. Therefore official visits or visits of school classes are organised, which are of a more obliga- tory than of an emphatic nature, as according to my observations the students are neither guided through the complex nor do they show any real interest in the site. Contrasting the picture of the mostly deserted memorial site of the first waiting in vain for guests to come, to the very often visited pilgrimage in Prekaz, it becomes clear that Rugova's non-militant stance has finally lost its spell in Kosovo.

93 Cf. . 426 Isabel Ströhle

Appendix 1: List of Interviews

I , Alush Former LDK-activist in fiscal issues; Bank of Kosovo II Anoymous Former Advisor to PDK high-profile politicians III Anonymous Advisor to several high-profile politicians from PDK IV Haxhiu, Baton Ex-editor of ''; Journalist for 'Gazeta Express' V Këpuska, Fetije Ex-Deputy for LDK VI Lajçi, Driton Leader of the student protests in 1997 VII Mehmeti, Fadil Citizen of Pristina, professor in Social Sciences VIII Merovci, Adnan Former Chief-of-Protocol; closest confidant of Ibrahim Rugova for 7 years before the war IX Musliu, Jeton Journalist for 'Gazeta Express'; working on topic of the "Martyrs’ Cemetery" X Rama, Lumi Ex-Member of the Administrative Council of Provisional Institutions XI Rugova, Naser Nephew of Ibrahim Rugova; LDK Deputy XII Shala, Behxhet Executive Director of the CDHRF; former political prisoner XIII Tahiri, Edita Ex-LDK Deputy; Ex- Member of the LDK- Presidency

Appendix 2: Abbreviations AAK Alliance for the Future of Kosovo CDHRF Council for Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms [Këshilli për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave e të Lirive të Njeriut / KMDLNJ] EU IC International Community ICG International Crisis Group ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia KLA Kosovo Liberation Army [Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës / UÇK] KPC Kosovo Protection Corps [Trupat të Mbrojtjes së Kosovës / TMK] KMDLNJ Këshilli për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave e të Lirive të Njeriut [Council for Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms / CDHRF] LCY League of Communists of Yugoslavia LDK Democratic League of Kosovo [Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës] OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo [Partia Demokratike e Kosovës] TMK Trupat të Mbrojtjes së Kosovës [Kosovo Protection Corps / KPC] UÇK Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës [Kosovo Liberation Army /KLA] UN