THE KOSOVO REPORT CONFLICT v INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE v LESSONS LEARNED v THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO 1 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford Executive Summary • 1 It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, Address by former President Nelson Mandela • 14 and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Map of Kosovo • 18 Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogotá Buenos Aires Calcutta Introduction • 19 Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris São Paulo Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw PART I: WHAT HAPPENED? with associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Preface • 29 Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the uk and in certain other countries 1. The Origins of the Kosovo Crisis • 33 Published in the United States 2. Internal Armed Conflict: February 1998–March 1999 •67 by Oxford University Press Inc., New York 3. International War Supervenes: March 1999–June 1999 • 85 © Oxford University Press 2000 4. Kosovo under United Nations Rule • 99 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) PART II: ANALYSIS First published 2000 5. The Diplomatic Dimension • 131 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, 6. International Law and Humanitarian Intervention • 163 without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, 7. Humanitarian Organizations and the Role of Media • 201 or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organisation. Enquiries concerning reproduction 8. Kosovo: The Regional Dimension • 227 outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above 9. The Future Status of Kosovo • 259 You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover PART III: CONCLUSION and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data 10. Conclusion • 283 Data available ANNEXES Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data isbn 0–19–924308–5 1. Documentation on Human Rights Violations • 301 isbn 0–19–924309–3 (pbk) 2. Kosovo—Facts and Figures • 319 13579108642 3. The Rambouillet Agreement—a Summary • 320 The royalties for this book go directly to The Humanitarian Law Center, 4. The Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin Agreement—a Summary • 324 founded and led by Natasa Kadic. hlc works in both Serbia and Kosovo, documenting violence against all victims—without regard for their ethnic 5. un Resolution 1244 • 325 origins—and works for peace and reconciliation among the different 6. The Commission’s Work • 331 ethnic groups in Kosovo and Serbia. 7. Endnotes • 342 Cover design and typeset by Cecilia Medin/Global Reporting Sweden 8. Literature on Kosovo and the Crisis • 364 Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by 9.Acronyms• 367 Butler & Tanner, Ltd., Frome 10. Index • 369 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY MAIN FINDINGS www.kosovocommission.org PREVENTION v The origins of the crisis have to be understood in terms of a new wave of nationalism that led to the rise of Milo- sevic and the official adoption of an extreme Serbian nationalist agenda. The revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 was fol- lowed by a Belgrade policy aimed at changing the ethnic compo- sition of Kosovo and creating an apartheid-like society. From the early 1990s onwards, governments and international institutions were aware of the impending conflict in Kosovo.There were plenty of warnings, and moreover, the Kosovo conflict was part of the unfolding tragedy of the break-up of Yugoslavia. Yet prior to 1998, the international community failed to take suffi- cient preventative action. There were some diplomatic initiatives especially in 1992–3, but they were confused and not backed by sufficient high-level pressure. More importantly, insufficient sup- port was provided to the non-violent resistance movement, which created its own parallel institutions and which managed to prevent large-scale violence in Kosovo up to 1997. The decision to exclude the Kosovo question from the Dayton negotiations, and the lack of results achieved by the strategy of non-violence, led many Kosovar Albanians to conclude that violence was the only way to attract international attention. It was during this pe- riod that the kla groups first made their appearance. Until late main findings main findings 1997 they were small resistance groups who pursued hit and run, of widespread rape and torture, as well as looting, pillaging and low level guerrilla warfare, hoping for international intervention. extortion. The Serbian response to the initial kla attacks was, as expected, The pattern of the logistical arrangements made for deporta- brutal and was also directed against civilians. The Serbian mas- tions and the coordination of actions by the Yugoslav army, para- sacre of 58 people in Prekazi/Prekaze in February 1998 became a military groups and the police shows that this huge expulsion of turning point. The internal war escalated. Kosovo-Albanians was systematic and deliberately organized. The general conclusion to be drawn from this experience is The nato air campaign did not provoke the attacks on the civil- that much more effort needs to be devoted to prevention. It is not ian Kosovar population but the bombing created an environment necessarily a matter of early warning; it is a matter of political that made such an operation feasible. will, readiness to expend resources, and having a presence on the ground. THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT v The most promising window of diplo- matic opportunity was prior to 1998. At each stage of the con- ARMED CONFLICT v This armed conflict between the kla and the flict, the diplomatic options narrowed. However, the political will fry lasted from February 1998 to June 1999 although it escalated to mount a major diplomatic effort could only be mobilized after after March 1999 when the nato air campaign supervened. It the conflict escalated into full-scale violence. can be characterized both as an armed insurgency and counter- The diplomatic effort throughout 1998, culminating in Ram- insurgency, and as a war (against civilians) of ethnic cleansing. bouillet, was characterized by confusion and mixed signals. In the The Commission has collated information from a wide variety face of Milosevic’s ruthless strategy of oppression and the maxi- of sources in order to assess the extent of atrocities. In the first malist demands of both the ldk and kla, there was little chance phase of the conflict from February 1998 to March 1999, casual- that diplomacy would prevail. The Holbrooke-Milosevic agree- ties were relatively low: around 1,000 civilians were killed up to ment of October 1998 led to the introduction of unarmed inter- September although the evidence is uncertain; the number of national monitors and did succeed in reducing the level of vio- victims between September and March is unknown but must be lence. However, kla units took advantage of the lull in the fight- lower. More than 400,000 people were driven from their homes ing to reestablish their control of many positions vacated by the during this period, about half of these were internally displaced. redeployed Serbian troops. Violence escalated again in December Most of these internal refugees returned after the Holbrooke- 1998 also after Serbian forces reentered the province. Milosevic agreement of October 1998. There were also wide- The Commission believes that there are important lessons to be spread arrests and detentions during this period. learned about the role of unarmed monitors in reducing the level In the period March 24, 1999 to June 19, 1999, the Commis- of civilian suffering, if not averting humanitarian catastrophe. sion estimates the number of killings in the neighborhood of The overall narratives of the international response are inher- 10,000, with the vast majority of the victims being Kosovar ently inconclusive, and hence without clear “lessons” beyond the Albanians killed by fry forces. Approximately 863,000 civilians prudential observations in favor of early engagement and greater sought or were forced into refuge outside Kosovo and an addi- attentiveness to nonviolent options. Certain key conclusions are tional 590,000 were internally displaced. There is also evidence worth emphasizing. main findings main findings 1 Multiple and divergent agendas and expectations and mixed in Serbia proper, which increased the risk of civilian casualties. In signals from the international community impeded effective spite of the fact that nato made substantial effort to avoid civil- diplomacy, ian casualties there were some serious mistakes. Some 500 civil- 2 The international community’s experience with Milosevic as ian deaths are documented. The Commission is also critical of not amenable to usual negotiations created a dilemma. The the use of cluster bombs, the environmental damage caused by only language of diplomacy believed open to negotiators was the use of depleted-uranium tipped armor-piercing shells and that of coercion and threat. This lead to legal and diplomatic missiles and by toxic leaks caused by the bombing of industrial problems—such threat diplomacy violates the Charter and is and petroleum complexes in several cities, and the attack on hard to reconcile with peaceful settlement. The credibility of Serbian television on April 17, 1999. The Commission accepts the the threat must, in the final analysis, be upheld by the actual view of the Final Report of the icty that there is no basis in the use of force. available evidence for charging specific individuals with criminal 3 It is impossible to conclude, however, despite these weak- violations of the Laws of the War during the nato campaign.