Kosovo, the Former Autonomous Province of Serbia

Home , Autonomous province, Bajram Rexhepi, Elections in Serbia, Government of Serbia, Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovo Albanians

The Rambouillet conference held in February- March 1999 and the establishment of an international protectorate in June 1999 were breakthro- ughs in the most recent history of Kosovo, the former autonomous province of Serbia. These two events opened the debate on Kosovo’s final status. If it were regulated, one of Europe’s most difficult problems would be solved.

Historical background of the problem

Kosovo is home to one third of the 6.3 million- strong Albanian nation. Its population accounts for 70 percent of Albanians living outside Alba- nia. Albanians presently account for over 90 per- Kosovo – the question cent of the region’s population. If we include non-Albanian (mostly Serbian) refugees who live outside Kosovo but retain their voting rights, of final status this percentage is slightly lower: approx. 83 per- cent1. Albania’s borders with Kosovo, Montene- Adam Balcer gro and Macedonia are located in areas predominantly inhabited by Albanians. Most of the remaining 30 percent of Albanians living outside Albania inhabit areas in the close vicinity of Ko- sovo, such as North Macedonia and the Preseva Valley. In the neighbouring countries, Albanians form large minorities (e.g. they account for approx. 25 percent of Macedonia’s population). Kosovo has played an immensely important role in the history of Serbia. At the time of Ser- bia’s greatest power, it was the centre of state and church authority. It was also the scene of the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, the leitmotiv of Serbian national mythology. Enormously important to Serbia’s national identity2, Kosovo became the object of a long and fierce Serbian-Alba- nian conflict, which further exacerbated after World War II owing to higher birth rates among the Albanians and the increased emigration of Serbs from Kosovo. It is extremely difficult to solve the Serbian-Alba- nian conflict because the interests of the two sides differ radically. Since the 19th century, the two nations have been aspiring to form Great Al- bania and Great Serbia, i.e. states uniting all Al- banians and all Serbs respectively. After Kosovo was incorporated into Serbia, Albanians began armed attempts to unite it with Albania. Before

CES Studies 1945, Belgrade refused to recognise the Albanian 1989–1998, at times sought compromise with national minority. Kosovo’s autonomy was im- Belgrade, agreeing to abandon aspirations for posed on the Serbs following World War II aga- the province’s independence8. These efforts we- inst their will by Yugoslav communists. It was re futile, though, because Milosevic and a large expanded considerably in 1968–1974. Under the majority of Serbs rejected the option to restore 1974 constitution introduced by Marshal Josip the pre-1989 situation9. Broz Tito, Kosovo remained an autonomous re- The Serb opposition came up with two plans: gion within Serbia, but it was granted a broad 1. to divide Kosovo into two sections; a Serbian autonomy (the status of a federal unit3). At the and an Albanian and, in the case of any border same time, Albanians as a nationality (a national changes in the Balkans, to annex the former di- minority) were recognised as equal to the other rectly to Serbia, Yugoslav nations. However, unlike the republics 2. the cantonisation of Kosovo10. These solutions of Yugoslavia, Kosovo and the other Serbian au- were unacceptable to Albanians because of Ko- tonomous province – Voivodina had no right to sovo’s ethnic map (the areas with Serbian majo- secession. In terms of practical policy, Koso- rities were largely dispersed and island-like). The vo’s position within the federal system was we- failure of Rugova’s policy led to the formation of aker also than that of the republics. The Alba- an armed alternative, the Kosovo Liberation Ar- nians’ most popular idea was to demand the sta- my (UCK), which started a guerrilla war at the tus of a nation equal to “the republican nations” end of 1997. Initially, UCK backed the Great Alba- and to transform Kosovo into a republic4. Serbs, nia idea, but soon limited it to the independen- on the other hand, generally opposed the status ce of Kosovo. granted to Kosovo under the 1974 constitution, As the rebellion broke out, the West became in- seeing it as the first step towards the provin- volved with Kosovo for the first time – a deve- ce’s secession5. lopment that could not have been attained using The 1974 constitution dissatisfied both Alba- peaceful means. In 1998, US mediators put for- nians and Serbs, which led to the outbreak of ward a number of peace plans for Kosovo, all of ethnic conflict in the 1980s (following Tito’s de- which suggested that its autonomy should be ath). As a result, Slobodan Milosevic came to po- considerably extended. These plans ranged from wer in Belgrade and Kosovo’s autonomy was si- the restoration of the 1974–1989 status of the gnificantly restricted (1989/1990). The break-up region to the factual transformation of Kosovo of Yugoslavia in 1991 inclined Albanians to give into a third republic. However, both Belgrade up seeking solutions while remaining within and UCK rejected the plans. A breakthrough in Yugoslavia, in favour of aspirations for indepen- the history of the Serbian-Albanian clash over dence. For a short time, it breathed new life into Kosovo came with the Rambouillet conference in the idea of a Great Albania6. Even though many February–March 1999. The Albanians skilfully Albanians considered it to be an ideal solution, used the uncompromising, anti-West policy of this concept never became very popular due to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, winning firm objection on the part of the West. This is the West’s approval for discussions about inde- why, following the declaration of Kosovo’s independence for the first time. The final document pendence in October 1991, Albanians represen- of the conference included a provision that the ted the declaration of independence as a com- final status of Kosovo would be determined in promise between the Great Albania idea and the three years’ time. This way, it did not explicitly province’s continued existence within Serbia 7. preclude any solution. Kosovo’s final status was The West refused to recognise Kosovo’s declara- to be determined by an international conference tion of independence. It was believed that the based on “the will of the people”, the opinions of optimum solution was to restore the pre-1989 si- “authoritative experts” and provisions of the tuation or, in the maximum variant, to trans- Helsinki Final Act (which permits border chan- form Kosovo into a third republic within Yugo- ges exclusively with the consent of both intere- slavia. Faced with this attitude, Ibrahim Rugo- sted parties). For UCK, accepting the Rambouillet va’s Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the do- decisions meant a silent consent to the possibi- minant party on Kosovo’s political scene in lity that they might have to give up their inde-

CES Studies pendence aspirations. The Serbian side rejected that projected by the Rambouillet final document. the Rambouillet agreement 11 and started a new Shortly after KFOR entered Kosovo, the interna- offensive in Kosovo, the aim of which was to cle- tional community created a local administration anse parts of the province of Albanians. This was under its control and, in July 1999, established probably done with a perspective to subsequen- the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), which tly divide Kosovo, and ultimativly it caused NA- played an exclusively advisory role. An impor- TO’s bombing of Yugoslavia. In response, Milose- tant concession made by the United Nations to vic initiated ethnic cleansing on a huge scale 12, Albanians was the consent to transform the Ko- accompanied by massacres of civilians. After sovo Liberation Army (UCK) into the Kosovo Pro- two and a half months of bombings, Belgrade tection Corps (KPC/TMK), a kind of civil guard, agreed to withdraw troops from Kosovo and which the Albanians treated as a back-bone of transform the province into a protectorate. Un- their future army. The formation of KPC/TMK der Resolution 1244, passed by the UN Security had not been envisaged either in the Rambouil- Council on 10 June 1999, Kosovo became an in- let conference document or in Resolution 1244. ternational protectorate while de iure remaining The Disarmament of the UCK, which was one of an integral part of Yugoslavia until the final de- the conditions of Resolution 1244, was imple- cision on its status is taken. Resolution 1244 did mented only in part, because not all weapons not state exactly when such decision should be were delivered to the KFOR. taken, unlike the Rambouillet final document, In December 1999, the international civil admi- which established a three-year transition period. nistration mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) signed an Compared to the Rambouillet decisions, the pro- agreement with Albanian parties considerably visions of Resolution 1244 on Kosovo’s final sta- expanding the composition of the KTC and esta- tus were less rigorous and allowed ample room blishing the Interim Administrative Council for interpretation. The resolution provided that, ( I AC), a quasi government subordinated to when taking the final decision, the international UNMIK. In November 2000, self-governmental community would “take into account” the conc- elections were held. In May 2001, following con- lusions of the Rambouillet conference. Meanwhi- sultations with Albanians and Serbs, UNMIK ad- le, the Security Council was to extend the pro- opted the Constitutional Framework, which ca- tectorate every 12 months until the final status me into force as of the date parliamentary elec- of Kosovo were determined. Resolution 1244 pla- tions were held in November 2001. This new law ced more emphasis on the preservation of Yugo- established the president’s office and a govern- slavia’s territorial integrity13. However, unlike ment whose competencies included the econo- the Rambouillet document, it minimised Belgra- my (including foreign trade14), health care, infra- de’s influence on the situation in Kosovo (e.g. structure, public administration and education. the absence of Serb police forces and Yugoslav The UNMIK chief was supposed to gradually troops). transfer most of his competencies in the economic sphere to local authorities. This process commenced in early April 2003 and was imme- Development of autonomous diately criticised by the Serbs as being prematu- institutions re. The Albanians, on the other hand, were dissatisfied with the absence of a guarantee that the other competencies reserved for the head of Under Resolution 1244, the United Nations obli- UNMIK would be transferred as well. ged itself to establish institutions for the Kos o v o UNMIK retained control over foreign policy, bor- pr otectorate and gradually transfer authority to der protection, security structures, and the re- the locals. In theory, Resolution 1244 obliged the turn process of non-Albanian refugees. It also re- international community to implement the deta- tained the right to veto all major decisions of the iled decisions of the Rambouillet conferen c e , parliament and government. This way, it could which precisely defined the prot e c t o r a t e ’ s go - prevent a unilateral declaration of independence vernment system. In rea l i t y , however, the system by the parliament. The Constitutional Frame- developed after 1999 differed substantially from work obligated the UNMIK chief to co-operate

CES Studies with local authorities in the scope of foreign po- – KPC/TMK should become more involved in en- licy and border control15. As regards the admini- suring security, e.g. by demining; stration of justice, the UNMIK chief retained full – KPC/TMK should co-operate with NATO with control over international judges and the appo- the intention to participate in peace missions; intments and dismissals of local judges and pro- – a new institution; the Kosovo Council for Secu- secutors. The competencies of the local authori- rity and Public Order, should be established wi- ties included nominations of candidates for jud- thin UNMIK to control KPC/TMK and the conside- ges and the administrative aspect of the opera- rably enlarged KPS. tion of courts and prosecutors’ offices. In April US authorities stated that this was not an offi- 2002, UNMIK decided to gradually increase the cial government plan, but they emphasised the number of local judges, expand their powers need to reform KPC/TMK. The project came un- and reduce the roles of international judges to der severe criticism in Serbia, which saw it as an auxiliary role. the first step towards the formation of a Kosovo This gradual transfer of competencies was part of army. Albanians criticised it as well, because the international community’s strategy known as they opposed the downsizing of the Corps. “S t a n d a r ds Before Status”. Under this strategy, di- The KPC/TMK reform is linked with the scussions on the final status of Kosovo may only UNMIK’s plan to eliminate radicals and persons commence once certain conditions have been linked with the underworld. KFOR had assumed met. The “Standards Before Status” strategy was an overly passive approach towards KPC/TMK formulated in April 2002 by Michael Steiner, Head and UCK, creating conditions that allowed the of UNMIK. Its conditions included: members of these formations to take part in re- – the development of a democratic system based bellions in Presevo Valley and Macedonia. In on the rule of law; 2001–2002, UNMIK either dismissed or brought – the return of non-Albanian refugees; about the arrest of, and high imprisonment sen- – integration of non-Albanians into a multi-eth- tences for, more than a dozen KPC/TMK officers. nic society; In June 2001, more than a dozen prominent for- – the solution of economic problems and regula- mer UCK members were blacklisted (declared tion of the property issue; personae non gratae) by the EU and the US. – the commencement of direct talks between The Constitutional Framework included no di- Pristina and Belgrade on technical matters; rect reference to Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity – KPC/TMK reform. in the transition period or even to the provisions In autumn 1999 the local Kosovo Police Service of the Helsinki Final Act. However, it did include (KPS) was established within the security struc- a provision that the future status of Kosovo sho- tures. It co-operates with UNMIK police and re- uld be determined in accordance with Resolu- ports to the head of the UN mission. The KPS for- tion 1244, “taking into full account” all appro- ce is being increased systematically, while, at the priate factors, including the will of the people same time, the international police contingent is (the only factor named explicitly). Compared to being downsized. Towards the end of 1999 KPS, Resolution 1244, the Constitutional Framework alongside the international police, began to con- placed more emphasis on the need to hold a re- trol Kosovo’s border crossings, including those ferendum but, unlike the Rambouillet document, with Serbia and Montenegro. UNMIK is also im- it specified neither the exact date of such refe- plementing the strategy of gradual take over of rendum, nor the date on which talks about the the managerial functions in the police force by final status should begin. This absence of a date Kosovo officers. This process will be concluded for the referendum dissatisfied Albanians. The in 2005, when a Kosovo officer is to become Serbs, on the other hand, fiercely criticised the chief of the entire police force. absence of an explicit provision on Yugosla- In late December 2002, the Serbian daily Da n a s da - via’s territorial integrity (in the context of the ily published a plan for the res t r ucturing of Kosovo issue). Subsequent statements by the KPC/TMK prep a r ed by US experts at the request of UNMIK chief and EU and US politicians and, to the National Security Council. The plan states that: a smaller degree, the conclusion of the agre- – the force should be downsized; ement with Belgrade in November 2001, showed

CES Studies clearly that Resolution 1244, and not the Consti- The concept of a m u l t i - e t h n i c tutional Framework, is the document of primary Ko s o v o importance for the international community. After three years, the results of the policy implemented by UNMIK and new local authorities de- Since the beginning of the Kosovo crisis, the in- serve some degree of criticism, but without go- ternational community has officially stuck to the ing to extremes. Kosovo faces the serious pro- concept of a multi-ethnic Kosovo in which non- blem of high unemployment and a very large Albanians would be treated as equal to the Alba- group of people living below the poverty level16. nian majority, and not as national minorities in The difficulties experienced by Kosovo’s econo- an Albanian Kos o v o . The implicit assumption un- my are visible e.g. in the frequent interruptions derlying this idea was that territorial divisions of the water and electricity supply. However, and population exchanges are not to be accepted. there are also some positive trends. Small enter- It is difficult to estimate Kosovo’s ethnic structu- prises are developing and trade is on a good re. According to the most recent and most relia- track, a modern tax system has been introduced ble UN estimates, 230 thousand non-Albanians and tax collectibility is improving systematically. presently inhabit Kosovo, and around 240 tho- However, a decisive improvement in the econo- usand refugees live beyond its borders19. Toge- mic situation will not take place as long as the ther, they account for approx. 17 percent of Ko- issue of Kosovo’s final status remains unreso- sovo’s population. When serious debates on the lved. Solving this matter would help Kosovo at- final status of Kosovo begin, there may emerge tract foreign investments and contract credits. the problem of the citizenship of thousands of As regards Western investments, it is particular- Albanians and non-Albanians who left Kosovo ly important to regulate property rights. This before the outbreak of fighting in 1998, frequen- process was initiated with the regulation issued tly due to discrimination, and have not returned by the head of UNMIK on 9 may 2003 on the sta- to date20. The significance of non-Albanians in tus of former state property, which made it po- Kosovo becomes even more important if one re- ssible to start the privatisation process. Another members that before 1998 territories with serious problem is corruption. Finally, the parlia- a non-Albanian ethnic majority accounted for ment works slowly. Faced with Kosovo’s unreso- approx. 25 percent of Kosovo’s territory21. The lved status, it spends too much time preparing Rambouillet conference proposed a system of symbolic resolutions intended to bring closer multi-ethnic democracy for Kosovo in which, for the prospect Kosovo’s independence, while it do- example, one third of seats in the parliament es nothing to improve the difficult economic si- would be reserved for non-Albanians. The Con- tuation of the protectorate17. stitutional Framework guaranteed 17 percent of Ever since KFOR entered Kosovo, the security si- seats in the parliament to non-Albanians, and it tuation has been improving systematically. This also envisaged the option to vote for candidates manifests itself, for example, in an evident de- from outside the guaranteed quota. As a result, crease in the number of murders. However, con- nearly 30 percent of MPs (holding 35 seats) tinuing problems include: in the Kosovo Parliament are non-Albanian. This – organised crime linked with political circles; percentage would be even higher, if not for the – politically motivated assassinations18; low turnouts of Serbs. Over the one and a half – low crime detection rate owing to the poor years of his rule, Prime Minister of Kosovo, Baj- functioning of the witness protection system. ram Rexhepi, has substantially increased the Kosovo has also become an important location number of non-Albanian officials working in go- on the routes of drug and cigarette smuggling, vernment institutions. However, non-Albanians illegal immigration and human trafficking. continue to account for a negligible percentage of employees working for major state-owned en- terprises. On the local level, non-Albanian villages, especially those inhabited by Serbs, are frequently discriminated against by self-government authorities as regards finances and admi-

CES Studies nistration. Under pressure from UNMIK, this si- lieve that returns should be an evolutionary pro- tuation began to improve in 2003. cess and that refugees should come back to the- The still smouldering Serbian-Albanian conflict ir former homes. The Serbian side, on the other is a major obstacle to the implementation of the hand, promotes mass returns, mainly to Serbian multi-ethnic Kosovo concept. After 1999, tho- enclaves. Albanians perceive this as an attempt usands of non-Albanians fled from Kosovo for fe- to prepare the division of Kosovo. ar of the Albanians’ revenge, which claimed In order to encourage Serbs to vote, Hans Haek- hundreds of lives22. As a result, most of Kosovo kerup, then Head of UNMIK, signed an agre- Serbs and Romas are staying outside Kosovo for ement with Nebojsa Covic, Serbian Deputy Pri- the moment. Serbian enclaves have formed in me Minister, in November 2001. The agreement Kosovo, and they offer refuge to some of the reaffirmed the primacy of Resolution 1244 over Serbs who used to live dispersed in other re- the Constitutional Framework, and assure d gions of the province. In the largest of these enc- Serbs that the number of their representatives in laves, Serbs have expelled most Albanians by the justice system and the police would be incre- force or prevented refugees, who had fled at the ased, that the process of refugee returns would time of ethnic cleansing during the NATO bom- be hastened, that curricula developed in Belgra- bings, from returning to their homes. The posi- de would be introduced to Serbian schools and tion of Albanians living under Serb “rule” is ve- that the number of international judges would ry much like the situation of small Serbian “eth- be doubled. However, this agreement was imple- nic islands” in regions populated predominantly mented only in part. by Albanians. The most important of these enc- In July 2002, the new UNMIK chief Michael Ste- laves is Kosovska Mitrovica, a region that bor- iner and a representative of Belgrade, signed an ders Serbia directly23. After 1999, this enclave be- agreement on the inclusion of Serbian judges in- came an actual part of Serbia: Serbian state insti- to the Kosovo administration of justice. It was tutions were preserved there and were not repla- implemented in December 200227. Towards the ced by UNMIK structures, which was contrary to end of November 2002, Steiner concluded an the provisions of Resolution 1244. Even today, agreement with Covic on the gradual integra- the Serbian government continues to have offi- tion of the Mitrovica region with UNMIK structu- cials in other parts of Kosovo as well. res. The process projected by this agreement The number of attacks on Serbs has gradually was frozen in February 2003 when Mitrovica be- decreased, owing to the progressive shrinking of came the focus of the Serbs’ efforts to divide Ko- their population, their concentration in the enc- sovo. In 2003, a self-government reform (decen- laves and KFOR’s intensified security efforts24. tralisation) prepared by the Council of Europe is Nevertheless, the situation of Serbs in Kosovo is to be implemented. still unsatisfactory, e.g. their freedom of move- The multi-ethnic Kosovo concept is linked to the ment is restricted25, and they continue to be tre- issue of direct talks between Pristina and Belgra- ated as second-class citizens 26. de on strictly technical matters, which UNMIK The fundamental precondition of success of the hopes will help build mutual confidence. Howe- refugees’ return process is the affirmative attitu- ver, both sides approach these talks with cau- de of the Albanian majority. However, Albanian- tion because of the radical differences in their Serbian resentment remains strong, and the sta- views on the key question of Kosovo’s future status of Kosovo is still indeterminate. As a result, tus28. These talks were scheduled to commence despite the fact that a decisive majority of Alba- in March 2003, but they did not take place be- nians say they support the return of refugees, cause of the assassination of Serbian Prime Mini- many of them fear that, in practice, this could je- ster Zoran Djindjic. Besides, those Albanians opardise Kosovo’s independence aspirations. On- who wanted to reaffirm the separation between ly less than three percent of refuges have retur- Kosovo and Serbia are much more interested in ned so far, although the number of returning talks with Kosovo Serbs, without Belgrade’s me- persons has been increasing steadily since 1999. diation. The very organisation of the refugees’ return is In May 2003 Hashim Thaci, the former UCK le- a point of contention. Albanians and UNMIK be- ader, extended a proposal of dialogue to Kosovo

CES Studies Serbs, but his offer was rejected after the Kos o v o ently ended with spectacular fiascos as UNMIK Parliament passed the declaration honouring the in spite of Belgrade’s protests took decisions Kosovo people’s long struggle for independence. against Serbia’s will. Typical examples of this included the commencement, in April 2003, of the transfer of competencies to local authorities, Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs and Michael Steiner’s regulation authorising privatisation of former state-owned property in Ko- sovo issued on 9 May 2003 (Belgrade considered Before Milosevic lost power in October 2000, Bel- these state-owned assets to be Serbian proper- grade’s policy had been resolvedly anti-Western. ty). Aware of its limited influence, Belgrade so- In the relations with UNMIK, this policy had metimes accepts the reality that is imposed on a destructive impact (supporting Serbian encla- it. For example, in July 2002, it established bor- ves in Kosovo). The new democratic government der crossings with Kosovo on the Serbian side of in Belgrade, which succeeded Milosevic in Octo- the border. ber 2000, adopted a two-way strategy: on the While Belgrade recognises Resolution 1244, it one hand, it continued to support parallel struc- obviously interprets it in line with its own inte- tures that were independent of UNMIK (especial- rests. It claims that the Kosovo area de iure rem a - ly in the enclave of Kosovska Mitrovica) and, on ins part of Yugoslav territory. Serbian authorities the other, it tried to include Serbs into the main- have emphasised this rep e a t e d l y , e.g. by signing stream of political life in return for certain con- an agreement on the delimitation of borde r s cessions made by the UN. with Macedonia in Feb ru a r y 2001 (the agree m e n t One of the most significant moves made by Ser- pertained to the Macedonian-Kosovo section of bian authorities, which aimed to co-ordinate the the border as well) or by including Kosovo Alba- Serbian policy towards Kosovo, was the establi- nians in turnout calculations during pres i d e n t i a l shment, on 3 July 2001, of the Co-ordination elections in Serbia. The constitution of Serbia and Centre for Kosovo and Metohija. The Centre was Mo n t e n e g r o, crafted for months and which was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic, finally adopted on 4 Fe b ru a ry 2003, was also an who earned his position of authority by solving important element in this strategy. The constitu- the conflict in the Presevo Valley (on the Serbian- ti o n’ s pr eamble includes a pr ovision that Kos o v o Kosovo border) in 2001. For some time, Serbian is an autonomous province of Serbia, temporari- authorities hoped that the success Presevo Vallin ly under the control of the United Nations30 . move would persuade UNMIK to allow the gra- In Belgrade, the project to solve the Kosovo pro- dual expansion of Belgrade’s influence on the si- blem by dividing the province into a Serbian and tuation in Kosovo. an Albanian section is gaining popularity. Were The most important manifestation of Serbian it carried out, the Serbian section would be in- pragmatism was the formation of the Return Co- corporated directly into Serbia, and the Albanian alition that took part in the parliamentary elec- part, with a very broad autonomy, would rema- tions of November 2001. However, this strategy in an international protectorate. This way, the was criticised by many Kosovo Serbs, who oppo- territorial integrity of Yugoslavia (Serbia and sed integration with UNMIK and followed the Montenegro) would be preserved. Another va- tactic of boycotting the protectorate’s institu- riant of this concept is to radically alter borders tions. based on ethnic criteria throughout the region. Faced with Albanian pro-independence efforts The former project once again became the sub- and compromises reached by UNMIK and the Ko- ject of public debate in May 2001 when work on sovo Albanians leading to the expansion of the the Constitutional Framework was about to be competencies of local authorities, the Return Co- finished in Kosovo. At that time, Serbian Deputy alition also resorted to boycotting administrati- Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic put forward the ve structures established by UNMIK as a weapon concept of dividing Kosovo. Covic’s deputy in the in its political struggle29. Co-ordination Council and his chief advisor was Belgrade attempted to play a role in Kosovo in the town planner Branislav Krstic, the leading several different ways, but these attempts frequ- ideologist of the concept to divide Ko s o v o,

CES Studies which he discussed in his book Kosovo pred su- Belgrade. At that time, a “covert” joint action dom istorije (Belgrade, 2000)31. The international strategy was adopted, which projected the deve- community has sometimes tried to take into ac- lopment of Serbian struc t u r es within Kos o v o . The count some demands of Serbs regarding the di- pr oclamation establishing the Union made it clear vision of Kosovo along ethnic lines. Before the lo- that the deepest concession the Kosovo Serbs cal elections in October 2002, the UNMIK chief would be ready to make was the acceptance of promised Serbs that a self-government reform the secession of the Albanian part of Kos o v o 35 . would be carried out allowing non-Albanians to On 1 February, Djindjic demanded in a letter to establish special administrative units with bro- Admiral Gregory Johnson, commander of NATO ad competencies within communes in areas po- forces in South Eastern Europe, that the Yugo- pulated by non-Albanian majorities, if they vo- slav army and Serbian police units be allowed to ted in large numbers during the elections. The return to Kosovo in numbers authorised by Reso- turnouts were low, however, and this project lution 1244. The same demand was included in was postponed until a later date. At the mo- the letter sent on 7 February to UN Secretary Ge- ment, a new self-government reform project pre- neral Kofi Annan. The international community pared by the Council of Europe is in the pipeline. rejected Djindjic’s initiative, emphasising that In January 2003, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran the only armed force authorised in Kosovo was Djindjic told Der Spiegel32 that if Kosovo Alba- KFOR and that the resolution only mentioned nians continued to push for independence, Bel- the return of army and police personnel, and not grade would call for a new “Dayton conference” armed units. In his response on 22 February, to establish new borders based on ethnic crite- Djindjic said that if the West refused to allow the ria. Djindjic made it clear that he meant a divi- return of Serbian forces to Kosovo, Belgrade wo- sion of Kosovo, incorporation the Serbian parts uld back the formation of a Serbian mini-state in of Kosovo into Serbia and the inclusion of the Kosovo36. Three days later, the Union of Serbian Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia into Serbia, in re- Communes of Kosovo and Metohija proclaimed turn for the separation of the Albanian part of the formation of its own parliament and passed Kosovo from the federation of Serbia and Monte- a declaration on Kosovo’s territorial integrity wi- negro. This statement was criticised fiercely by thin Serbia. This declaration also provided that the US and the EU and Djindjic finally withdrew Serbian enclaves within Kosovo should be con- his proposal claiming that his objective was to nected by special corridors and that they should win the backing of the international community maintain close ties with Serbia in terms of edu- for the preservation of Yugoslavia’s territorial cation, the welfare system, health care and secu- integrity, identical to that enjoyed by Bosnia. rity. On 29 February, Djindjic stated in an inte- A week later, he called for direct talks to be held rview for the Serbian newspaper Vesti that Koso- with the Albanian side, Kosovo Serb leaders and vo should be transformed into a Serbian-Alba- the international community in order to deter- nian federation similar to the Muslim-Croatian mine the future status of Kosovo. Djindjic justi- federation in Bosnia (the canton system) and re- fied his proposal with the policy of faits accom- main part of Serbia, enjoying a status higher plis allegedly pursued by the international com- than that of an autonomy, but lower than that of munity, which led to the formation of a de facto federal units (Serbia and Montenegro)37. This independent state in Kosovo33. meant that Kosovo would be granted an autono- The talks were scheduled to start in June 2003. my broader than that of Voivodina, but smaller The Serbian Prime Minister’s pr oposal was criti- than the one it had in communist Yugoslavia cised by the EU and the US, which maintained (1974–1989). However, because of the assassina- that talks on the final status of Kosovo should tion of Djindjic and Serbia’s internal problems not commence until certain conditions were met, linked to the struggle against organised crime, in keeping with the “Standards Before Status” the Serbian offensive in Kosovo had to slow st r a t e g y . On 20 January, Kosovo Serbs proc l a i m e d down. the formation of the Union of the Serbian Com- munes of Kosovo and Metohija34 and, a week late r , the Union’s rep r esentatives met Djindjic in

CES Studies Kosovo Albanians and Albania linked to parties originating from the UCK, in the rebellion in Macedonia condemned by the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and the Ever since KFOR entered Kosovo, the main goals Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) under Western of Kosovo Albanians have been to hasten the pressure. process of transferring competencies to local au- Albanians firmly oppose any agreements conclu- thorities and to hold talks on the final status of ded with Belgrade by the neighbouring coun- Kosovo as soon as possible. The weak point of tries or UNMIK, which relate to Kosovo but have the Albanian policy, which limited its effective- not been consulted with the Albanian side. One ness, was the deep division of the political scene of the reasons for the increased activity of the between Hashim Thaci’s Democratic Party of Ko- Albanian guerrillas in the Presevo Valley in No- sovo (PDK) and Ramush Haradinaj’s Alliance for vember 2000 was the fear that democratic Bel- the Future of Kosovo (AAK) (groups originating grade might become UNMIK’s chief partner39. from the UCK), on the one hand, and Ibrahim Ru- On 23 May 2002, the parliament of Kosovo pas- gova’s Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), on sed a resolution declaring that the agreement on the other. Unlike the former two, the latter gro- the delimitation of borders concluded in Febru- up sought the legitimisation of Kosovo’s inde- ary 2001 between Serbia and Macedonia was vo- pendence in the events of the early 1990s, cla- id. The head of the UN mission immediately ve- iming that Kosovo had already proclaimed inde- toed this resolution but, at the same time, made pendence and now it only needed to seek inter- it clear that the final shape of the Kosovo-Mace- national recognition. The passing, in May this donian section of the border should be determi- year, of the common parliamentary resolution of ned in talks between the Macedonian govern- the three parties, honouring all forms of the Al- ment and UNMIK. Several months later, Alba- banian people’s struggle for independence in nians were seriously annoyed by the EU’s appro- the 1990s, was of historical importance and val of the preamble to Serbia and Montene- marked the first step towards bridging these di- gro’s constitution. After it was presented to the visions. public in early November 2002, Kosovo’s prime Following the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops minister, Bajram Rexhepi, stated that the draft from Kosovo, Albanians initially tried to pursue preamble was unacceptable to Kosovo Albanians a policy of faits accomplis to bring closer the and threatened that if the EU approved it, the prospect of independence. In June 1999, Hashim Kosovo Parliament would probably pass a decla- Thaci’s government took advantage of the inter- ration of independence. On 7 November 2002, regnum that followed the withdrawal of Yugo- the parliament in Pristina passed a resolution slav troops, and immediately appointed mayors proclaiming the invalidity of Serbia and Monte- to nearly all the communes except for the three negro’s constitution preamble. This resolution, that formed the Serbian enclave north of Mitro- in turn, was vetoed by Michael Steiner. When vica. Under pressure from the international com- Zoran Djindjic raised the issue of the cantonisa- munity, Thaci subsequently approved the self- tion of Kosovo in January 2003, the AAK respon- government authorities appointed by UNMIK. In ded with a proposal for the Kosovo Parliament to order to ensure that independence remains a pu- draft a declaration of independence. This con- blicly debated issue, Albanians sometimes took cept of the AAK won the support of a large gro- measures that were sure to provoke criticism up of PDK MPs. In the end, however, the Parlia- from the international community. For example, ment’s leaders decided under international pres- on 15 May 2003, the MPs of all Albanian parties sure not to start a debate on this issue, in spite and representatives of non-Serb nationalities of AAK’s protests. passed a symbolic resolution “honouring Koso- On the other hand, Hashim Thaci’s moratorium vo’s long struggle for national independence”38. concept presented in April 2003 was an example The official declarations of the Albanian side fre- of a constructive (counter) offensive of the Alba- quently differed from the policies actually pursu- nians, which had the support of the West. It pro- ed. An example of this was the involvement of vided that a specific date should be determined members of the Kosovo Protection Corps, a force for the start of talks on Kosovo’s final status,

CES Studies that any debates on this issue should be suspen- Washington of all countries in the region. These ded until that date, and that efforts be concen- relations improved further when Albania firmly trated on the development of democratic institu- backed Washington’s policy following the at- tions in Kosovo. The Serbian side, opposed to the tacks of 11 September 200143 and during the Ira- transfer of further competencies to local autho- qi crisis. Unlike Belgrade, Albanian political eli- rities and other Albanian parties, disapproved of tes in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia backed Thaci’s proposal40. the US policy without reservations44. Today, the Albania is obviously the most earnest backer of United States, more than any other country, is Kosovo’s independence aspirations. Since the theoretically prepared to approve Kosovo’s inde- fall of communism, Tirana has been pursuing pendence on certain conditions, though its sup- a firmly pro-American foreign policy, hoping to port for this idea is rather moderate. Support for win US support for Kosovo’s independence. This this concept is mainly evident within the US policy leads to tensions between Albania and Congress. In the 1990s, Robert Dole, the leader the EU. However, as the prospect of European in- of the republican majority and a candidate in the tegration for Albania remains vague, relations presidential elections of 1996, was an advocate with the US are of priority importance for Tira- of Kosovo’s case. In June 2002 in the House of Re- na. Authorities in Tirana compared with Alba- presentatives congressmen Tom Lantos and Ben nian elites from Kosovo are adopting a more mo- Gillman, both affiliated with the Albanian lobby derate position on the independence issue (e.g. in the US, put forward a draft resolution calling they accept the UN’s line on the date on which on Washington to back Kosovo’s independence. talks should commence) in order to avoid ten- In January 2003, Lantos and Henry Hyde, Chair- sions in their relations with Brussels and Wa- man of the International Relations Committee of shington, two major sources of financial assi- the House of Representatives, proposed a new stance for Albania, one of Europe’s poorest coun- draft, which differed from the original one in tries. Tirana supports Kosovo’s independence that it made the formation of democratic institu- aspirations mainly through the promotion of tions in Kosovo and the inclusion of the EU in mutual economic co-operation. The plan to build this process a prerequisite for the recognition of a highway from Durres to Pristina, connecting Kosovo’s independence (the previous draft reso- Kosovo with the Adriatic coast, is of key impor- lution only mentioned NATO and the United Na- tance in this respect. The highway will restore tions). In May 2003, Joseph Biden, Chairman of commercial links between these two regions the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, filed broken ninety years ago. a draft resolution calling for an independence referendum to be held in Kosovo. However, none of the senior officials of the Pre- Kosovo vs. the international sident’s Administration, the main author of Wa- c o m m u n i t y shington’s foreign policy, ever officially backed the idea of an independent Kosovo. [Former] US President Bill Clinton did it only once, in a spe- The United States has played the most impor- cial situation, i.e. during the 1999 bombings of tant role in Kosovo’s recent history. In the mid Yugoslavia, threatening Milosevic that Yugosla- 1990s, Washington determined that removing via might lose Kosovo forever. Presently, the Bal- Slobodan Milosevic from power was a necessary kans are no longer a region of priority for the prerequisite for the stabilisation of the Balkans. United States. The US is gradually withdrawing The US’s firm stand, combined with Belgra- from the Balkans, e.g. in 2002, it left the Monte- de’s confrontational policy in the period of the negro issue to the determination of the EU. This Kosovo crisis41, led to rapprochement in Ameri- was particularly meaningful given the fact that, can-Albanian relations and strengthened the unlike the EU, the United States had no serious firmly pro-American sentiments of Albania’s po- reservations concerning Montenegro’s indepen- litical elites42. Even after the toppling of Milose- dence. vic, when the American-Yugoslav relations were The European Union is believed to approach Ko- improving, Albania had the best relations with s o v o’ s independence aspirations with more

CES Studies scepticism than the United States45. The greatest representatives of UNMIK and Kosovo authori- potential opponents of independence include ties. On 13 March a European envoy, UNMIK Greece, Belgium and France. The EU’s fear of Ko- Chief Michael Steiner and Kosovo’s prime mini- sovo’s uncontrollable independence aspirations ster Bajram Rexhepi met in Pristina for the first manifested itself in Brussels’ commitment to the time. This meeting marked the beginning of the process of Yugoslavia’s transformation into Ser- “implementation of co-ordination mechanisms bia and Montenegro. The EU’s objective was to necessary for the functioning of the SAP monito- prevent Montenegro’s secession as that would ring mechanism”, i.e. the initiation of the Stabi- signify the end of Yugoslavia, of which Kosovo lisation and Association Process47. remained an integral part. The federation of Ser- In the 1990s, Belgrade’s most important patron bia and Montenegro was established largely due on the international scene was Russia, although to the strong pressure of Brussels, exerted in it treated Serbian interests largely as an instru- particular on the weaker Montenegro. In March ment of its policy towards the US and the EU. 2002, Belgrade and Podgorica reached a compro- Russia’s position was substantially undermined mise on a peaceful “divorce”46. Montenegro agre- by NATO’s intervention in Kosovo carried out in ed to postpone discussions on the independence spite of Moscow’s objections. Following Vladi- referendum, initially until 2005, and then until mir Putin’s rise to power, Russia’s policy towards 2006. The constitution of the new state includes the Balkans became more pragmatic. Russia ca- the provision that, if Montenegro secedes in me to terms with reality (meaning the limits of 2006, Serbia will become Yugoslavia’s successor. its potential), which manifested itself, for exam- Th e r e is hope within the EU, to solve the Kos o v o ple, in the insubstantial role it played during the pr oblem by waiting until the Albanians’ “indepen- crises in Presevo Valley (2000–2001) and Mace- dence fever” abates, then reintegrating Kosovo as donia (2001), and the withdrawal of all Russian a th i r d republic within a ne w , democratic and de- units from peace missions in Bosnia and Kosovo eply decentralised Yugoslavia. Chances that this in 2003. However, as regards Kosovo, support scenario might succeed improved after Milosevic extended by Russia to Belgrade still appears to was toppled in October 2000 and the democratic be stronger than the backing provided by the US opposition came to power in Belgrade. to Albanians. The problem of Kosovo’s final status is very im- The United Nations appears to be ready to ap- portant for the process of integrating the Bal- prove Kosovo’s independence more than any kans into Europe, as only independent states other organisation. In October 2000, the Inde- may apply for membership in the EU. Brussels pendent International Commission on Kosovo, wishes to prevent Kosovo from becoming a black working under the auspices of the UN and cha- hole in the Balkans, due to its indeterminate sta- ired by Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson, tus, as the region integrates with the EU. The EU presented a report on the future of Kosovo pre- plays an important role in the development of pared for UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. The Kosovo because, within UNMIK, the European Commission decided that forcing Kosovo Alba- Union is responsible for the economic develop- nians to accept autonomy within Serbia or the ment of the protectorate. For a long time, the EU status of a third constituent republic of Yugosla- has been declaring readiness to take over UN pe- via was unrealistic and immoral. It maintained ace missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Within the that the optimum solution would be conditional framework of the Stabilisation and Association independence for Kosovo – in order to obtain it, Process (SAP), the objective of which to make Kosovo would be required to meet the criteria Balkan states to conclude association agre- defined by the UN in the “Standards Before Sta- ements with the EU, Brussels is implementing tus” strategy. Two months later, in December a strategy of parallel relations with Kosovo inde- 2000, Kofi Annan proposed a plan to create pendently of its relations with Belgrade. In order a confederation of three independent states – to establish direct contacts with Pristina, the EU Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro. This proposal opened a European Office within the UNMIK in was met with very critical responses on the part early 2002. In November 2002, a conference on of the Serbs and relatively critical reactions on “Kosovo in the SAP” was held in Brussels with the part of Kosovo Albanians48.

CES Studies Fo r e c a s t rities, retaining control only over foreign and de- fence policies. The governor, in co-op e r a t i o n with the local government, will also continue to Over the next few years, Kosovo’s autonomy will “E u r opeanise” Kos o v o’ s le g i s l a t i o n 51 . Some politi- be expanded further (e.g. it will become a rule cians in Brussels may hope that the “stick and for the Kosovo’s prime minister and the head of ca r r ot” policy (integration with the EU and Kos o - UNMIK to participate in international conferen- vo’ s dependence on Western financial assistan- ces). Elements of the EU legislation will be intro- ce), the threat of complete international isolation duced in Kosovo as part of the Stabilisation and and awareness of NATO’ s mi l i t a r y power should Association Process. These developments will persuade Albanians to give up their independen- continue to breed tension between UNMIK and ce aspirations. In order to implement this solu- Belgrade. Kosovo Albanians, on the other hand, tion, KFOR would have to stay in Kosovo with will demand talks on Kosovo’s final status more a relatively large number of troops and be trans- pressingly (through demonstrations). This issue formed into an occupying force pacifying any de- will surely re-emerge in the context of the Euro- monstrations organised by the Albanians. What pean integration process, when Serbia and Mon- is more, one could not preclude the emergence of tenegro file applications for EU membership in te r r orist organisations of disappointed radical Al- Brussels or when the time comes to decide on banians targeting international forces. Ko s o- the further fate of this state. vo’ s pr oblems could also be easily “exported” to Macedonia and the Presevo Val l e y . As regards Kosovo’s final status, the most likely scenario is that in 2005 the Security Council will Even if Albanians were successfully forced into determine the date on which talks on this issue accepting the status of an EU protectorate, the will begin, subject to certain criteria being met. issue of independence would still re-emerge on At the same time, the EU will probably take over the occasion of each election. The EU would face UNMIK’s competencies in the civil sphere and a difficult task explaining why Kosovo sho- the EU and NATO will establish joint command uldn’t have the same rights as other states in the over KFOR. region once the Balkans became stabilised and Reuters reported on 20 May 2003 that, accordi n g integrated with the EU. On the other hand, if Ko- to anonymous sources in the EU, Brussels is mo- sovo’s independence was recognised, the protec- re than ever convinced that no stability in the re- torate would not end automatically: Bosnia and gion or the protectorate will be possible as long Kosovo alike would remain under the supervi- as Kos o v o’ s status remains indeterminate. The sion of Brussels and Washington for a few more EU gradually admits that forcing Albanians to ac- years, as a theoretically independent state. cept reintegration within Serbia and Montenegro is unrealistic, even if the relations were asymme- Talks on Kosovo’s final status will certainly invo- tric, i.e. if Kosovo enjoyed a br oader autonomy. lve the participation of the US, the EU, the Uni- The new federation of Serbia, Montenegro and ted Nations, and perhaps also Russia. From the Kosovo would be a dysfunctional state due to point of view of Albanians’ aspiration for inde- permanent internal conflicts. On the other hand pendence, the diplomatic commitment of the US the division of Kosovo into a Serbian and will be of crucial importance. The problem of Ko- Albanian part would be easy to implement only sovo is more serious than that of neighbouring for Mitrov i c a 49 . For this reason, the most prob a - Montenegro. Albanians are the only predomi- ble scenario is that Kosovo may gain conditional nantly Muslim nation in the world with firm in d e p e n d e n c e 50 . Following negotiations with the pro-American sentiments. Hence, Washington UN Security Council, the European Union will will probably not leave the decision on Koso- pr obably take over the civil aspect of the prot e c - vo’s status to the EU. Because of foreign policy torate over Kosovo from the latter, leaving the differences within the EU, the commitment of mi l i t a r y aspect to NATO . An EU-appointed gover- the United States will play a decisive role. The nor co-operating with the local government will scale of US activities in the Balkans will depend, further expand the competencies of local autho- among other factors, on the situation in the Mid-

CES Studies dle East. If this region does not become political- become EU and NATO members within the next ly destabilised or, more so, if Washington mana- four years, Brussels will probably try to make ges to secure peace in the Israeli-Palestinian con- the remaining states of the region, i.e. Albania, flict, the US will probably take a decisive stand Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro and the Ko- on the issue of Kosovo’s final status, thus reaffir- sovo protectorate, co-operate more closely, for- ming its position as a superpower. The materia- ming a kind of regional mini EU. lisation of any pessimistic scenarios for the Mid- One of the most important conditions imposed dle East, however, will mean that Kosovo’s sta- by the international community will certainly be tus may remain suspended for longer. Russia, that Kosovo’s independence may be recognised China and France because of their strong sup- only if refugees are allowed to return. Theoreti- port for idea of invariability of borders and their cally, the prospect of independence offers the traditional distance toward ns. policy will proba- best chances for the constructive involvement of bly have the greatest reservation towards Koso- Albanians in this process. Presently, Serbian au- vo’s independence. However, this issue is not of thorities are threatening that, if Kosovo chooses strategic importance in world politics. Therefo- to push for independence, they will appeal to re, it can be assumed, taking into account, the Serbs living in Kosovo to leave the protectorate pragmatism of Beijing and Moscow, as well as on a mass scale and to stop the return of refuge- the lack of Germany’s support for parts’ stance, es. This position may change, however, once Ser- the above cited countries will not conduct an bia comes to terms with reality and realises that uncompromising policy in the matter. the more Serbs return, the stronger its position If the EU and the US choose to proceed towards in Kosovo will be. Obviously, not all refugees will Kosovo’s independence in an evolutionary man- return. According to the Council of Europe’s esti- ner, imposing certain conditions, it will be very mates, approx. one third of refugees are not wil- important to include Belgrade in the process. ling to do this. The scale of returns will depend International community is afraid that the inde- on whether the West makes returning financially pendence of Kosovo could harm proeuropean attractive. However, it is highly likely that most orientation of Serbia. However, the position of of the refugees will not be interested in return- chauvinist forces is weaked. it is hardly possible ing to independent Kosovo. At least some Alba- that the leaders coming from democratic oppo- nians will be dissatisfied with any concessions sition could keep being adamant as long as made to Kosovo Serbs over internal issues. Besi- Kosova’s future is concerned since Serbia has a des, there will always be extremist Albanian gro- perspective of integration with the EU. The most ups calling for Kosovo to be cleansed of Serbs important arguments that could persuade Bel- and opposing any concessions being made to grade to co-operate include: prospects for Ser- Belgrade. A resolved stance of the West and the bia’s integration with the EU the development prospect of independence should keep these in of regional co-operation enabling Belgrade to re- a marginal position, however. tain influence on the situation of Kosovo Serbs, joining Mitrovica with Serbia and broad autono- The greatest fear of the international communi- my for non-Albanians5 2. Independent Ko s o v o ty is that Kosovo’s independence may rekindle will be forced to sign the international treaty the Albanians’ hopes of creating a Great Albania. which will forever exclude the possibility of its Albanian rebellions in the Presevo Valley and union with Albania. Macedonia in 2001 justified apprehension concerning the consequences that Kosovo’s inde- A similar “carrot” (integration with the EU) pendence may have on regional stability. Particu- should also be offered to Bosnian Serbs. When larly vulnerable is the situation in Macedonia, the question of Kosovo’s independence emerges, where the Albanian minority of nearly 500 tho- the EU and the US will probably have to make usand accounts for approx. one quarter of the certain concessions to the Serbian Republic population. The present situation in Macedonia in Bosnia, offering guarantees that it retains its warrants moderate optimism – former rebellion autonomy within Bosnia and Herzegovina. After leaders are acting constructively, participating Romania and Bulgaria (and perhaps also Croatia) in the government and approving the compro-

CES Studies mise peace agreement, which preserved the co- 1 It is extremely difficult to estimate the real size of Koso- untry’s integrity and granted a broad autonomy vo’spopulation and its ethnic structure. This problem is di- to Albanians. Nevertheless, it should be expec- scussed in the chapter on “The Concept of a Multi-Ethnic Kosovo”. ted that any concessions to Kosovo Serbs would 2 Numerous Serbian church monuments found in this re- encourage Macedonian Albanians to demand gion are a material symbol of the Serbs’ historical claim on a broader autonomy as well. On the other hand, Kosovo. there will always be groups in Kosovo deman- 3 Equal representation on the federal level and permanent ding its unification with Albania. It is unlikely, borders. 4 however, that they should garner a broader bac- Radical groups advocating the formation of Great Albania king – Albanians have to take into account the had limited support. However, the concept to annex areas inhabited by Albanian majorities beyond the borders of Ko- position of the West on this issue. This traditio- sovo to the Republic of Kosovo enjoyed some popularity. nal Albanian pragmatism stems from an aware- 5 The constitution provided that any alteration of Yugosla- ness of the nation’s weakness and the need for via’sborders, e.g. secession of one of the republics, required the support of a mighty patron, which is neces- the consent of all federal units. Thus, even if Kosovo were sary for the change in status quo. In the end, it granted the status of a republic, this would not automati- will be of key importance for the solution of the cally enable its secession. 6 In October 1991, Albanian parties from Serbia, Kosovo, Kosovo problem that the West adopt a firm and Montenegro and Macedonia met in Pristina. At that me- resolved stance providing it with the ability to eting, a declaration was adopted stating that, in the event impose its own solutions. However, it must first of Yugoslavia’s break-up and the alteration of the borders; develop an action plan for the region and shape areas inhabited by Albanian majorities should have the reality on this basis, rather than merely respon- right to join Albania (http://www.kosova.com – the page of ding to current difficulties and observing the si- Qendra per informim e Kosoves – a news agency linked with LDK). tuation develop. 7 The declaration of independence, recognised solely by Al- Adam Balcer bania and only in theory, was passed by the Kosovo Parlia- ment previously dissolved by Milosevic. 8 In 1996, Ibrahim Rugova concluded an agreement with Slobodan Milosevic under which cultural autonomy was to be restored. The signing of this agreement in fact meant that Kosovo gave up its independence aspirations. This agreement was never fully executed. 9 Acc o r ding to res e a r ch carried out in August 1997 by the independent Serbian daily Nasa Borba and the Kosovo paper Koha Ditore, 42 percent of Serbs opposed any form of autonomy for the Albanians, even the autonomy that was in place, and 40 percent were prep a r ed to extend the existing autonomy moderately in the cultural dimension only. Over 50 pe r cent of Albanians were ready to give up independence aspirations and accept the pre-1989 autonomy, and an even la r ger group was ready to accept the status of a Yugoslav republic (International Crisis Group, Kosovo Spring, 20 March 1998, pp. 45–46, http://www. c r i s i s w e b . o rg / p ro j e c t s / b a l- kans/kos o v o / re p o r t s / A 4 0 0 1 7 8 _ 2 0 0 3 1 9 9 8 . p d f ) . 10 The concept to divide Kosovo first emerged in the famo- us 1986 memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU). This concept was supported by Dobrica Cosic, the mentor of this memorandum, a well-known wri- ter and president of Yugoslavia in 1992–1993. The concept of cantonisation had been authored by Serb historian Du- san Batakovic, presently Serbia’sambassador to Greece. His plan assumed that Kosovo would be divided into five can- tons and that an Albanian-Serbian administration would be established for the large cities. In February 1999, the Ser- bian Orthodox Church presented this plan to the French Fo- reign Affairs Ministry.

CES Studies 11 The key point of contention was the stationing of inter- many years remain lower as compared to the entire popu- national troops in Kosovo, any variant of which was oppo- lation. At the moment, approx. 1/4 of adult inhabitants of sed by Milosevic. On the other hand, in the course of nego- Kosovo, including refugees, are non-Albanian. tiations, the West imposed very stringent conditions on 22 Most Serbs left Kosovo in three waves: during the bom- which NATO forces could be stationed in Kosovo. bings of Yugoslavia, with the leaving Yugoslav army, and 12 Ap p r ox. 850 thousand Kosovo Albanians were driven away during the first few weeks that followed the army’s with- to the neighbouring Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro, drawal. Migration to Serbia continues even today, however, a further several hundred thousand had to seek ref u g e in the the number of returning refugees is greater than the num- mountains and other inaccessible areas of Kos o v o . ber of those leaving. 13 In the resolution, all UN member states “reaffirms” their 23 The division of Mitrovica shows how mini-enclaves form support for the integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia, as within enclaves. In the northern, Serbian part of the city, it is termed in the Helsinki Final Act and Annex 2, which in- a portion of the pre-war Albanian population still lives in cludes a provision that the international administration is compact settlements. Their situation is the same as that of supposed to secure Kosovo’s autonomy within Yugoslavia small Serbian enclaves in those parts of Kosovo where the in the transition period. In the Rambouillet final document, ethnic conflict is still in the hot phase. the international community backs the sovereignty and in- 24 The number of attacks against Serbs remained stable for tegrity of Yugoslavia in accordance with the Helsinki Final over a year, suggesting that, in part, this must have been Act, and states that national communities in Kosovo should a planned action. Since the issue of Kosovo’s status remains not jeopardise Yugoslavia’s sovereignty. open, radical Albanian groups, including a portion of the 14 In March 2003, a representative of the Kosovo govern- UCK, see cleansing Kosovo of as many Serbs as possible as ment and a UNMIK representative signed a free trade agre- the best way to eliminate Belgrade’sinfluence and to disco- ement with Macedonia (http://www.radio21.net – the inde- urage refugees from returning. pendent Albanian radio in Kosovo). 25 Michael Steiner, the head of UNMIK, blames this partly 15 In May 2003, representatives of the local authorities and on Belgrade because, in spite of the fact that a special agre- the head of UNMIK were supposed to take part in NATO and ement was signed in August 2002, Belgrade has been post- EU-organised conferences for the first time. However, Mi- poning the solution of this problem and uniform registra- chael Steiner, the head of UNMIK, cancelled their participation plates have not been introduced throughout Kosovo to tion after the Kosovo Parliament passed a resolution hono- date. uring the people of Kosovo struggling for independence. 26 Ge n e r a l l y , the situation of non-Serbian ethnic groups, e.g. 16 Official figures are not completely reliable because a lar- Turks, Bosnians, Ashkalis, or Egyptians (in this order; the ge portion of the unemployed work illegally. latter two groups being of Roma origin), is much better than 17 In 2002, the parliament passed only two out of twenty the situation of Serbs and Romas. Pres e n t l y , their political laws drafted by the government. elites support the independence aspirations of the Alba- 18 Most victims were activists of the Democratic League of nians (OSCE, Reports, Situation of ethnic minorities in Kos o - Kosovo (LDK), the formation of President Ibrahim Rugova vo , http://www.o s c e . o rg / ko s o v o / d o c u m e n t s / re p o r t s / m i n o r i - (http://www.kosova.com). ti e s / ) 19 Some sources quote a smaller number of refugees (200 27 Albanians have raised objections regarding some of the thousand), while others claim it was higher (280 thousand). judges, claiming they had been at the authorities’ disposal International Crisis Group (ICG), Return to uncertainty: Ko- at the times of Milosevic (www.kosovapress.com – website sovo’s internally displaced and return process, 13 Decem- of the Kosovo press news agency linked with the political ber 2002, p. 1–2; parties originating from the UCK). h t t p : / / w w w. c r i s i s w e b . o rg / p ro j e c t s / b a l k a n s / ko s o v o / re- 28 The position of Albanians in negotiations was weaker ports/A400851_13122002.pdf) from the very beginning, because of the indeterminate sta- 20 In Western countries, there are large groups of Albanians tus and limited competencies. In addition, Belgrade was who left Kosovo in the 1990sand to date have not acquired not interested in treating Kosovo’s local authorities as equ- citizenship of the countries where they are staying to date. al partners. After 1999, they could not cast their votes in Kosovo elec- 29 Serbian MPs left the parliament’smeetings each time any tions abroad, unlike the Serbian refugees staying in Serbia. issues relating to Ko s o v o’ s independence or Yu g o s l a- Thousands of Serbs left Kosovo in the 1980s; in future, Bel- via’s sovereign rule over it were on the agenda. After the grade may offer them Kosovo citizenship. Among Serbian parliament in Pristina passed the resolution declaring the refugees from Kosovo and Serbs living in Kosovo there are invalidity of the preamble of Serbia and Montenegro’s con- also Serbs from Croatia. In 1992-1995, during the war in Bo- stitution that stated Kosovo was an autonomous province snia, thousands of Bosnians left Kosovo under Serbian pres- of Serbia in November 2002, the Serbs boycotted the parlia- sure. ment’s meetings for nearly four months. 21 In terms of ownership, the proportion of land owned by 30 Under Resolution 1244, Kosovo remains an integral part non-Albanians, and Serbs in particular, is larger than the of Yugoslavia in the transition period. proportion of non-Albanians in the entire population of Ko- 31 Krstic is opposed to cantonisation as the final solution. sovo. Albanians are a relatively young society. In terms of However, he advocates the division of large cities into Alba- the adult population, the percentage of Albanians will for nian and Serbian sections. Covic does not preclude cantoni-

CES Studies sation based on the model of the Muslim-Croatian Federa- pliant with Resolution 1244 and that the EU was not taking tion in Bosnia. As regards Mitrovica, it is assumed that se- a step further”, thus precluding Kosovo’s independence. veral communes constituting one city district will be esta- However, resolution 1244 theoretically precludes no option. blished. Following the parliamentary elections in November 2001, 32 Der Spiegel, 11 January 2003. when Rugova called for the recognition of Kosovo’s inde- 33 Djindjic’s position was also criticised by Yugoslav Presi- pendence, the head of the diplomacy of Belgium, at that ti- dent Vojislav Kostunica. Many commentators believed that me holding the EU presidency, once again declared that the Djindjic’s sudden turn was intended to win popularity with Fifteen was opposed to Kosovo’s independence. the nationalist part of the Serbian electorate. 46 The EU’s policy was facilitated by the fact that the idea 34 This two-way policy of Serbia may be exemplified by the of maintaining ties with Belgrade was very popular in Mon- decision taken four days later to end the boycott of the Ko- tenegro. sovo Parliament. 47 After this meeting, Michael Steiner stated in apress con- 35 It included the following provision: “In case that someone ference that “the standards required of Kosovo were identi- attempts to establish a new Albanian state within a part of cal to those imposed by the EU on other countries in the re- the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, including Kos o - gion” (www.radio2.net). vo , the Union of Serb municipalities and municipal units in 48 Albanian politicians have expressed either firm objection Kosovo shall call the Government of Serbia and the bodies of against any retained ties with Serbia, or admitted that such the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro to ensure full so- ties could be pres e r ved, simultaneously demanding that Ko- ve r eignty in the areas inhabited by Serb people for centu- so v o’ s independence first be recognised (http://www.u n m i - ries”. ICG, Kosovo Ethnic Dilemma: The Need for Civic Con- kon l i n e . o rg / p r ess/lmm00.htm – a review of the Kosovo pres s tract, 28 May 2003, p. 20. http://www. c r i s i s w e b . o rg / on the official UNMIK website). pro j e c t s / b a l k a n s / ko s o v o / r eports/A400983_28052003.pdf 49 For example, the issue of the incorporation of the Alba- 36 http://www.b92.net nian part of Kosovo into Albania would emerge. The most 37 http://www.b92.net controversial region would be the Gjilan/Gnjilane enclave 38 Michael Steiner disapproved of this resolution, but he ad- near the Serbian border. On the Serbian side, it borders the mitted that its message had been partly mitigated in ke- Presevo Valley inhabited predominantly by Albanians. eping with his earlier objections (www.kosovalive.com – 50 According to Reuters (20 May 2003), more and more EU the website of an independent news agency). officials admit that the most realistic final solution for Ko- 39 The Albanian offensive in the Presevo Valley followed the sovo would be conditional independence. invitation of the Yugoslav President to the Stabilisation Pac t 51 Within the EU, Kosovo would have identical rights to summit to which no Kosovo rep r esentative had been invited. those of the other members but, formally, it would be the 40 Veton Surroi, Fillimi i shekullit – përgjigje ndaj morato- EU’s protectorate. riumit të Hashim Tha˜it (Koha Ditore, 20 May 2003; 52 Deep decentralisation is of key importance. Possible con- http://www.koha.net/read_kosove.asp?id=2664). cessions to Serbs should include changes to commune bor- 41 The solution of the Presevo Valley problem by Belgrade in ders along ethnic lines. 2001, shortly after Milosevic lost power, suggested that if the methods of fighting Albanian guerrillas had been different (surgical operations of special units instead of pacifica- tion of entire villages and massacres of civilians) and if Ser- bia had been under a different kind of rule, the West’s policy towards Kosovo in 1999 would certainly have been different. 42 After Milosevic remained in power following the entry of KFOR into Kosovo, Americans unofficially supported the operations of Albanian guerrillas in the Preseva Valley, in a tactical scope. 43 Unlike in Albania, comments made in Serbia expressed that the US had become a target of attacks because of its expansive foreign policy. Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostu- nica was one to voice such an opinion. 44 Another manifestation of this tendency was the agreement concluded between Albania and Washington in May 2003, which guaranteed that American soldiers would not be denounced to the International Criminal Court. 45 After the report of the Independent International Com- mission on Kosovo (see below) was published in October 2000, proposing the conditional recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations, stated that the EU’sposition on Kosovo was com-

CES Studies