Kosovo, the Former Autonomous Province of Serbia
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The Rambouillet conference held in February- March 1999 and the establishment of an interna- tional protectorate in June 1999 were breakthro- ughs in the most recent history of Kosovo, the former autonomous province of Serbia. These two events opened the debate on Kosovo’s final status. If it were regulated, one of Europe’s most difficult problems would be solved. Historical background of the problem Kosovo is home to one third of the 6.3 million- strong Albanian nation. Its population accounts for 70 percent of Albanians living outside Alba- nia. Albanians presently account for over 90 per- Kosovo Ð the question cent of the region’s population. If we include non-Albanian (mostly Serbian) refugees who live outside Kosovo but retain their voting rights, of final status this percentage is slightly lower: approx. 83 per- cent1. Albania’s borders with Kosovo, Montene- Adam Balcer gro and Macedonia are located in areas predomi- nantly inhabited by Albanians. Most of the re- maining 30 percent of Albanians living outside Albania inhabit areas in the close vicinity of Ko- sovo, such as North Macedonia and the Preseva Valley. In the neighbouring countries, Albanians form large minorities (e.g. they account for ap- prox. 25 percent of Macedonia’s population). Kosovo has played an immensely important role in the history of Serbia. At the time of Ser- bia’s greatest power, it was the centre of state and church authority. It was also the scene of the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, the leitmotiv of Serbian national mythology. Enormously impor- tant to Serbia’s national identity2, Kosovo beca- me the object of a long and fierce Serbian-Alba- nian conflict, which further exacerbated after World War II owing to higher birth rates among the Albanians and the increased emigration of Serbs from Kosovo. It is extremely difficult to solve the Serbian-Alba- nian conflict because the interests of the two si- des differ radically. Since the 19th century, the two nations have been aspiring to form Great Al- bania and Great Serbia, i.e. states uniting all Al- banians and all Serbs respectively. After Kosovo was incorporated into Serbia, Albanians began armed attempts to unite it with Albania. Before CES Studies 1945, Belgrade refused to recognise the Albanian 1989Ð1998, at times sought compromise with national minority. Kosovo’s autonomy was im- Belgrade, agreeing to abandon aspirations for posed on the Serbs following World War II aga- the province’s independence8. These efforts we- inst their will by Yugoslav communists. It was re futile, though, because Milosevic and a large expanded considerably in 1968Ð1974. Under the majority of Serbs rejected the option to restore 1974 constitution introduced by Marshal Josip the pre-1989 situation9. Broz Tito, Kosovo remained an autonomous re- The Serb opposition came up with two plans: gion within Serbia, but it was granted a broad 1. to divide Kosovo into two sections; a Serbian autonomy (the status of a federal unit3). At the and an Albanian and, in the case of any border same time, Albanians as a nationality (a national changes in the Balkans, to annex the former di- minority) were recognised as equal to the other rectly to Serbia, Yugoslav nations. However, unlike the republics 2. the cantonisation of Kosovo10. These solutions of Yugoslavia, Kosovo and the other Serbian au- were unacceptable to Albanians because of Ko- tonomous province Ð Voivodina had no right to sovo’s ethnic map (the areas with Serbian majo- secession. In terms of practical policy, Koso- rities were largely dispersed and island-like). The vo’s position within the federal system was we- failure of Rugova’s policy led to the formation of aker also than that of the republics. The Alba- an armed alternative, the Kosovo Liberation Ar- nians’ most popular idea was to demand the sta- my (UCK), which started a guerrilla war at the tus of a nation equal to “the republican nations” end of 1997. Initially, UCK backed the Great Alba- and to transform Kosovo into a republic4. Serbs, nia idea, but soon limited it to the independen- on the other hand, generally opposed the status ce of Kosovo. granted to Kosovo under the 1974 constitution, As the rebellion broke out, the West became in- seeing it as the first step towards the provin- volved with Kosovo for the first time Ð a deve- ce’s secession5. lopment that could not have been attained using The 1974 constitution dissatisfied both Alba- peaceful means. In 1998, US mediators put for- nians and Serbs, which led to the outbreak of ward a number of peace plans for Kosovo, all of ethnic conflict in the 1980s (following Tito’s de- which suggested that its autonomy should be ath). As a result, Slobodan Milosevic came to po- considerably extended. These plans ranged from wer in Belgrade and Kosovo’s autonomy was si- the restoration of the 1974Ð1989 status of the gnificantly restricted (1989/1990). The break-up region to the factual transformation of Kosovo of Yugoslavia in 1991 inclined Albanians to give into a third republic. However, both Belgrade up seeking solutions while remaining within and UCK rejected the plans. A breakthrough in Yugoslavia, in favour of aspirations for indepen- the history of the Serbian-Albanian clash over dence. For a short time, it breathed new life into Kosovo came with the Rambouillet conference in the idea of a Great Albania6. Even though many FebruaryÐMarch 1999. The Albanians skilfully Albanians considered it to be an ideal solution, used the uncompromising, anti-West policy of this concept never became very popular due to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, winning firm objection on the part of the West. This is the West’s approval for discussions about inde- why, following the declaration of Kosovo’s inde- pendence for the first time. The final document pendence in October 1991, Albanians represen- of the conference included a provision that the ted the declaration of independence as a com- final status of Kosovo would be determined in promise between the Great Albania idea and the three years’ time. This way, it did not explicitly province’s continued existence within Serbia 7. preclude any solution. Kosovo’s final status was The West refused to recognise Kosovo’s declara- to be determined by an international conference tion of independence. It was believed that the based on “the will of the people”, the opinions of optimum solution was to restore the pre-1989 si- “authoritative experts” and provisions of the tuation or, in the maximum variant, to trans- Helsinki Final Act (which permits border chan- form Kosovo into a third republic within Yugo- ges exclusively with the consent of both intere- slavia. Faced with this attitude, Ibrahim Rugo- sted parties). For UCK, accepting the Rambouillet va’s Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the do- decisions meant a silent consent to the possibi- minant party on Kosovo’s political scene in lity that they might have to give up their inde- CES Studies pendence aspirations. The Serbian side rejected that projected by the Rambouillet final document. the Rambouillet agreement 11 and started a new Shortly after KFOR entered Kosovo, the interna- offensive in Kosovo, the aim of which was to cle- tional community created a local administration anse parts of the province of Albanians. This was under its control and, in July 1999, established probably done with a perspective to subsequen- the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), which tly divide Kosovo, and ultimativly it caused NA- played an exclusively advisory role. An impor- TO’s bombing of Yugoslavia. In response, Milose- tant concession made by the United Nations to vic initiated ethnic cleansing on a huge scale 12, Albanians was the consent to transform the Ko- accompanied by massacres of civilians. After sovo Liberation Army (UCK) into the Kosovo Pro- two and a half months of bombings, Belgrade tection Corps (KPC/TMK), a kind of civil guard, agreed to withdraw troops from Kosovo and which the Albanians treated as a back-bone of transform the province into a protectorate. Un- their future army. The formation of KPC/TMK der Resolution 1244, passed by the UN Security had not been envisaged either in the Rambouil- Council on 10 June 1999, Kosovo became an in- let conference document or in Resolution 1244. ternational protectorate while de iure remaining The Disarmament of the UCK, which was one of an integral part of Yugoslavia until the final de- the conditions of Resolution 1244, was imple- cision on its status is taken. Resolution 1244 did mented only in part, because not all weapons not state exactly when such decision should be were delivered to the KFOR. taken, unlike the Rambouillet final document, In December 1999, the international civil admi- which established a three-year transition period. nistration mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) signed an Compared to the Rambouillet decisions, the pro- agreement with Albanian parties considerably visions of Resolution 1244 on Kosovo’s final sta- expanding the composition of the KTC and esta- tus were less rigorous and allowed ample room blishing the Interim Administrative Council for interpretation. The resolution provided that, ( I AC), a quasi government subordinated to when taking the final decision, the international UNMIK. In November 2000, self-governmental community would “take into account” the conc- elections were held. In May 2001, following con- lusions of the Rambouillet conference. Meanwhi- sultations with Albanians and Serbs, UNMIK ad- le, the Security Council was to extend the pro- opted the Constitutional Framework, which ca- tectorate every 12 months until the final status me into force as of the date parliamentary elec- of Kosovo were determined. Resolution 1244 pla- tions were held in November 2001.