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Home , Gaza War (2008–2009)

Expert Analysis

August 2014

After the : what directions for and Palestine?

By Khalil Shikaki

Executive summary

As efforts to stabilise the Gaza front in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continue in Cairo, the ­impact of this third Gaza war on the larger conflict could be ominous. Coming just a few months after the collapse of U.S. efforts led by Secretary of State John Kerry to broker a permanent Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, the future of peace negotiations and the two-state solu- tion might now be more in doubt than at any time since the early 1990s. Failure to permanently ­stabilise the Gaza front could also deliver a further blow to the larger political process.

Palestinians confront hard choices: a return to armed resistance, a non-violent resistance ­campaign, dissolving the Palestinian Authority (PA), or waging an international diplomatic ­campaign to isolate Israel and delegitimise its occupation. Israel’s choices are hard too. Among the various options, maintaining the status quo – the one currently preferred by most – will not be cost free, even in the short term and even if do not resort to violence or dissolve the PA.

As efforts to stabilise the Gaza front in the Israeli-Palesti­ forced to confront Israel in various international forums, nian conflict continue in Cairo (as of mid-August 2014), the including the (UN) and the International impact of the third Gaza war on the larger conflict could be Criminal Court (ICC). His ability to back away from such a ominous. Coming just a few months after the collapse of confrontation has now been greatly constrained by the U.S. efforts led by Secretary of State John Kerry to broker a huge humanitarian suffering and the likely findings of the permanent Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, the future recently appointed UN commission of inquiry into possible of peace negotiations and the two-state solution might now human rights violation and war crimes committed during be more in doubt than at any time since the early 1990s. the latest Gaza war. Israeli reaction to Abbas’s diplomatic Failure to permanently stabilise the Gaza front could also challenges might lead to a great destabilisation in the deliver a further blow to the larger political process. and the eventual collapse of the PA.

Three dynamics are likely to contribute to this outcome. Thirdly, the war in Gaza might make the Israelis even more Firstly, and its strategy of military resistance, with concerned about security arrangements in any permanent its accompanying narrative of “victory”, will no doubt agreement regarding the West Bank. Many Israelis will emerge stronger than ever in the post-Gaza-war environ- accept the argument that maintaining greater security ment. Public support for Hamas might grow considerably control in the West Bank is the most prudent position. stronger and demands in the West Bank to emulate Gaza Israeli prime minister Netanyahu was quick to point out in might attract greater support. the early days of the Gaza war that one should expect a toughening of Israel’s security demands in future negotia- By contrast, the status of the president of the Palestinian tions, including continued Israeli military presence in and Authority (PA), , and his strategy of access to the entire West Bank. A withdrawal from the non-violence and peace negotiations might suffer a West Bank, Netanyahu implied, would place Israel in considerable setback. Abbas might find himself quickly intolerable danger, exposing its heart to West Bank Noref Expert Analysis – August 2014

rockets and tunnels. If, as expected, the war strengthens campaign to isolate Israel and delegitimise the occupation. Netanyahu domestically, there will likely to be little or no Various Palestinian and pro-Palestinian groups are likely to internal pressure on him to compromise with the Palestin- accelerate the efforts to wage boycott, divestment and ians; indeed, he would be too strong to make peace, as sanctions campaigns against Israel. The next critical step President Obama implied in a recent interview. in this approach is the signing of the Rome Statute consti- tuting the ICC. Signing this treaty would allow Palestinians Options for the Palestinians to go to the ICC and accuse Israelis of committing war The Palestinians confront hard choices. A return to armed crimes in the Occupied Territories. The U.S. and many resistance might be more popular today than it was before European countries are opposed to such a Palestinian step. the Gaza war. Yet most Palestinians realise that a return to The U.S. and Israel will most likely impose financial and a third Intifada or the emulation of a Hamas model in the other sanctions on the PA if it takes this step, which in turn West Bank will most likely bring wholesale devastation to might threaten the viability of the PA. Palestinian life in this area and push the PA to certain collapse. Abbas is determined to oppose violence, viewing Options for Israel it as destructive of Palestinian interests. If Palestinian Israel’s choices are hard too. To weaken Hamas’s appeal, it violence is resisted by the PA security services, such a has to bolster the notion that Palestinians can succeed strategy might lead to internal strife and discredit the PA without resorting to armed resistance. To do so it has an altogether. interest in strengthening Abbas, because he too needs to demonstrate that his approach is as effective as or even A second approach, a non-violent resistance campaign, more effective than that of Hamas. Yet Netanyahu and most while supported by most Palestinians, is not seen by the of his coalition partners do not view Abbas or his reconcili- public as an effective way of ending the Israeli occupation. ation government as a viable partner. Without such a Even during the height of the Arab Spring in 2011 only a few partner, some Israelis who worry about the demographic were willing to participate in such a campaign. A third implications of continued occupation for the Jewish nature approach, a plan to dissolve the PA and force Israel to of Israel have called for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from confront the choice between ending its occupation or fully parts of the West Bank. Yet those who advocate such a step reoccupying the West Bank, is supported my most of those find themselves having to explain how it would prevent the who favour a one-state solution. But it lacks popular transformation of the West Bank into another Gaza. support, because most Palestinians continue to want the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel Maintaining the status quo – the preferred option for most and view the PA as the midwife of such a state. Moreover, Israelis at the moment – will not be cost free, even in the the PA has failed thus far to take any serious steps to short term and even if Palestinians do not resort to vio- mitigate the serious negative consequences the implemen- lence or dissolve the PA. Israel’s image in international tation of such plan would inflict on the Palestinians. public opinion has been hurt by the scenes of civilian death and destruction in Gaza. Such an option will expose Israel Although Abbas has from time to time been flirting with the to an increasing boycott, divestment and sanctions threat, options of non-violent resistance and dissolving the PA, his while Abbas and the PA will be left with no alternative but actions have indicated a preference for the fourth option to pursue their UN and ICC options, regardless of the risks mentioned above: waging an international diplomatic involved.

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The author

Khalil Shikaki is a professor of political science and director of the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research (Ramallah). He The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre has a PhD in political science from Columbia University and has Norsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging taught at several Palestinian and U.S. universities. His research has focused on the peace process, Palestinian state-building, public opinion, the transition to democracy and the impact of domestic The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) is a ­resource centre integrating knowledge and experience to strengthen Palestinian politics on the peace process. His recent publications peacebuilding policy and practice. Established in 2008, it collaborates include “Coping with the Arab Spring: Palestinian domestic and re- and promotes collaboration with a wide network of researchers, gional ramifications” (Middle East Brief no. 58), Public Opinion in the policymakers and practitioners in Norway and abroad. Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Public Imperative during the , with Yaacov Shamir (Indiana University Press), and Arabs Read NOREF’s publications on and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East, with Abdel www.peacebuilding.no and sign up for notifications. Monem Said Aly and Shai Feldman (Palgrave Macmillan). Connect with NOREF on Facebook or Disclaimer @PeacebuildingNO on Twitter The content of this publication is presented as is. The stated points Email: [email protected] - Phone: +47 22 08 79 32 of view are those of the author and do not reflect those of the organisation for which he works or NOREF. NOREF does not give any warranties, either expressed or implied, concerning the ­content.

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