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ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST POLICY BRIEF FOR THE MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE ON A WMD/DVS FREE ZONE

NO. 3 • DECEMBER 2011

The Reconciliation of and Smoothing the Way to the Middle East Conference by Contributing to Peace and Security in the Region Margret Johannsen (Coordinator), Ziad AbuZayyad, Karima El Ouazghari, Judith Palmer Harik, Anat Kurz, and Jamil Rabah

In their review of the Nuclear The Palestinian Split: Abstract Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 28 May Features and Factors 2010, the 189 parties to the NPT endorsed a The reconciliation agreement between Final Document call ing for a 2012 Conference The formal political split between Hamas the two major Palestinian factions Hamas to be attended by all Middle East states on the and Fatah dates back to June 2007 when and Fatah could contribute to reviving the establishment of a Middle East zone free of Hamas militias took over the after fl edgling Middle East peace process. This weapons of mass destruction including their attacking Fatah-led Palestinian Authority POLICY BRIEF identifi es the platform of the delivery vehicles. The document called on (PA) security forces. They claimed that their future as the key the UN Secretary General and the United coup was a pre-emptive act aimed at aborting for linking Palestinian unity and the possible States of America, the , a planned attack by Fatah to liquidate Hamas resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace and the Russian Federation (the co-sponsors militias. The take-over was followed by the process; progress on this front could help of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East) ousting of the short-lived Saudi-mediated mitigate regional tensions and therefore to consult with the states of the region on unity government and the establishment by enhance prospects for success of the 1 specifi c preparatory steps. presidential decree of a caretaker government envisaged 2012 Middle East Conference. in the ; meanwhile Hamas retained Any political settlement between and It is too early to predict at this stage of the its own government in Gaza. the requires the presence of a preparations, how questions such as regional representative acceptable by both Gaza and rivalries and drive for hegemony, hostile and The split between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah the West Bank. As such, Palestinian recon- friendly alliances, win-win versus zero-sum in the West Bank led each party to create a ciliation is a pre-requisite to achieving peace thinking and confl icting interests of regional monopoly of force in their respective areas and security in the region. states will impact on the 2012 Middle East of control. The build-up and employment Conference (MEC). The linkage between of two separate security services is the most This POLICY BRIEF is based on contribu- the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement conspicuous expression of this contest for tions made at the meeting of the ACADEMIC and the regional environment is only one of power and prevalence in the national arena. PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST in Vienna in many issues connected to the MEC. Both are The Legislative Council, which was democra- July 2011. The Working Group on the 2012 in fl ux, infl uence each other and resemble tically elected, is since defunct. Two parallel Middle East Conference included academic moving targets. When identifying conditions governments rule in and in Gaza, colleagues from , Israel, , for success or failure for the Conference the both of them without electoral legitimization. and . Margret Johannsen acted as weapons issue needs to be put within the Presidential and parliamentary elections coordinator.  overall framework of regional security and are not only overdue but also necessary if stability of which reconciliation between the process of building the institutions of a Hamas and Fatah is an important ingredient. future sovereign and democratic Palestinian Two related issues are of immediate impor- state is to continue. Any political settlement tance to regional instability and deserve between Israel and the Palestinians requires a special attention. The fi rst is the political Palestinian representative acceptable to both split in the Palestinian arena; the second is Gaza and the West Bank. As such, Palestinian the security tensions between Hamas and reconciliation is a pre-requisite for achieving Israel. peace and security in the region. ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST – POLICY BRIEF NO. 3 • DECEMBER 2011

At the same time, the weapons fi red at Israeli Margret Johannsen is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace Research territory are also an expression of the power and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). She obtained her struggles within the intra-Palestinian sphere. doctorate with a thesis on “American nuclear weapons in Europe”. Since 2009 she The breakdown of the six-month truce has co-edited the annual German Peace Report. Her research interests include which preceded the of 2008/09 is confl ict transformation and arms control in the Middle East. She is lecturer in the evidence that, in a political sense, the rockets program Master of Peace and Security Studies at the University of Hamburg. and grenades were also directed against the Palestinian Authority. They were meant to Ziad AbuZayyad is an attorney-at-law and a weekly columnist of Al-Quds prove its incapacity to deliver the commodity daily newspaper. He is a former Palestinian Authority Minister and a former member Israel was most seeking, namely security, so of the Palestinian Legislative Council. From 1994-1996 he was head of the Palestinian that the PA was unable to make any progress delegation to the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the Middle in the negotiations with Israel on fi nal status East multilateral peace talks. In 1994 he helped to establish the Palestine-Israel Journal issues. Escalation between Israel and Hamas of Politics, Economics and Culture and has since acted as co-editor and publisher. became part of the internal competition Karima El Ouazghari is Research Associate at the Peace Research Institute between different factions targeted by Israel (PRIF) and PhD Student at Goethe University, Frankfurt. She holds a degree besides the rivals Hamas and Fatah. in Political Science and German language and literature. Her current research project is entitled: “Islamic opposition movements and the state: The case With tensions upheld by tit-for-tat military of and ”. Her expertise includes the African Union, Islamic operations in the Gaza sphere, the political opposition movements in Arab countries and Political . climate in the region might well deteriorate so that it adversely affects the preparations of the Judith Palmer Harik is a political analyst and President of Matn University, MEC. An eventual reconciliation of Hamas . She holds an MA and a PhD from the University of Iowa and was and Fatah would therefore remove one of the professor of comparative politics at the American University of Beirut from obstacles that has obstructed negotiations on 1981 until 2003. She has studied Lebanon’s movement since its a bilateral, jointly-agreed ceasefi re between emergence in the early 1980s and is the author of “Hezbollah – the Changing Hamas and Israel and which under the new Face of ”. conditions could be expected to be more sustainable than the truce declared by both Anat Kurz is Director of Research and Senior Research Associate at the Institute parties in June 2008. Alleviating the rocket for National Security Studies (INSS), . She holds a PhD in political threat and allowing the Gaza area to recover science. She has published and lectured extensively on the Palestinian national both psychologically and materially would movement, Israeli-Palestinian relations, and policy dilemmas of dealing with undoubtedly enhance the prospects for the sub-state confl icts. Dr. Kurz is a regular participant in ongoing Track II dialogues envisaged Conference even if the rocket issue on Israeli-Palestinian confl ict resolution and Middle Eastern regional security. itself is not to be part of the agenda.

Jamil Rabah is a pollster and political analyst. He was the fi rst to start scientifi c public opinion surveys in Palestine with the Media and The Unity Agreement Communications Center. Since 2000, he has been working as a full-time After long-lasting confrontation and researcher at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Geneva on a countless mediation efforts, Fatah and project to monitor Palestinian public perceptions of their living conditions. His Hamas managed under Egyptian auspices publications include “Palestine and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”. to reach consensus on a number of measures which the signatories present as conducive The security tensions between to achieving Palestinian national unity. Hamas and Israel The agreed document entitled “Palestinian National Reconciliation Agreement” was One of the major problems overshadowing signed in on May 4, 2011 by the two the envisaged Middle East Conference is the major Palestinian factions as well as by each element of hostility in the Palestinian-Israeli of the relevant minor groups.2 arena. As the sporadic violent confrontations in the Gaza sphere and their media echo in The agreement provides for a shared provi- the region demonstrate, this is still a signi- sional government of independents whose fi cant feature of Middle Eastern relations. major tasks will be the preparation of The Gaza War of 2008/09 between Israel elections, making efforts to end the and Hamas not only brought death and of the Gaza Strip and working on its reconst- destruction to the Gaza Strip and demons- ruction, as well as overcoming the Palestinian trated the vulnerability of southern Israeli split. It was agreed that the members of towns to Palestinian rocket fi re. It was also the designated national unity-government testimony to the crucial threat posed by should be neither from Hamas nor Fatah but the tit-for-tat strategies in the Gaza sphere ‘technocrats’ accepted by both sides, thereby to efforts to rehabilitate Israeli-Palestinian emphasizing its non-political character. mutual trust and to revive the dialogue Presidential and Legislative Council as well towards a resolution of the confl ict. as Palestinian National Council elections

2 The Reconciliation of Hamas and Fatah Smoothing the Way to the Middle East Conference by Contributing to Peace and Security in the Region are to be held one year after the signing of account of the widespread dissatisfaction with the agreement. Furthermore, Hamas and the internal split. Both movements claimed Box No. 1: Speeches at the Declaration Fatah are to agree upon a Central Election that they signed the reconciliation agreement Ceremony in Cairo on 4 May 2011 Committee which will be responsible for as a response to the publicly voiced demands the ballots. The security forces are to be put for overcoming the split. Our people have always rejected under one umbrella. »this rift. All factions will now have to The upheavals also affected the mid-term show that they have learned from In order to assess the prospects of the calculations of the Palestinian power this diffi cult experience, and that they agreement to overcome the intra-Pales- elites and their respective allies. With the will accept a democratic government tinian division it will be helpful to look at displacement of the Mubarak regime in through the coming elections. the motivating factors as well as circum- , Fatah initially appeared to have lost an (, President, Palestinian« stances that facilitated the conclusion of the important regional ally in its power struggle National Authority) agreement. with Hamas. Fatah is, however, benefi tting from the developments in , where the [Our] only fi ght is with Israel...our aim is Political Deadlock regime is going through a deep crisis and is »to establish a free and completely sovereign busy with its own internal problems so that Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza The deadlock in the intra-Palestinian struggle Hamas faces the loss of its steadfast ally Strip, whose capital is Jerusalem, without for power is intricately linked to the political against Fatah. Without the solid backing any settlers and without giving up a single impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian relations. provided by Syria, neither Fatah nor Hamas inch of land and without giving up on the Hamas opted for armed resistance, but could be confi dent that the continued division right of return [of ]. Israel’s military responses to the continuation would benefi t them in their respective sphere (Khaled Meshaal, Chairman, Hamas« of the struggle have limited the scope and of control. Political Bureau) number of its operative options. At the same time, Hamas has focused on establishing its For its part, the High Military Council, which Source: Julia Pettengill and Houriya Ahmed control over the Strip, forcing the de facto replaced Mubarak’s regime, has sought to (2011) ‘Regional Actors and the Fatah- Hamas Unity Deal. Shifting Dynamics in ceasefi re on rival factions and garnering limit the potential for a fl are-up in the Strip the Middle East?’. Online, available at http:// popular approval there. by reconstructing civilian infrastructures www.henryjacksonsociety.org/cms/harrier- and integrating Hamas in the PA. In doing collectionitems/Fatah+Hamas+Document. pdf (November 18, 2011). Fatah, for its part, opted for negotiations, so, the new Egyptian regime has hoped to but made them contingent upon a freeze in restrain Hamas as well as to contain the expansion only to see an Egyptian . It conveyed upsurge in those activities. In addition, the clearly to Hamas that in order to benefi t from failure of the recent attempts to revive the the overthrow of Mubarak’s regime they peace process has dashed Fatah’s hopes of would have to end the Palestinian division reducing the infl uence of Hamas through a in their own backyard as soon as possible. political breakthrough towards a settlement. Showing greater openness towards Hamas than the ousted regime had, Egypt promised Thus, both movements understood that their increased economic aid (extended by ) options had failed and that the continued and defense in the event of Israeli military division enabled Israel to shy away from operations in the Gaza Strip. A promise to resuming the peace talks, while at the same remove the ban on the movement of people time carrying on its settlement policy. Against on the Egyptian border with the Strip was yet this backdrop, Palestinian public opinion came another incentive that spurred Hamas into to view the division as severely damaging to the signing the agreement with Fatah. Palestinians’ national interest and demanded that both parties put an end to it. The Palestinian Quest for International Recognition The Arab Awakening: Inspiration and Political Calculations As part of the plan of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to seek recognition The unity agreement can also be interpreted of Palestinian independence in the United within the context of the so-called Nations, its leadership has sought to reinforce of 2010-2011. The enthusiasm and persistence its international image by consolidating of the Arab youth in the revolting countries its democratic features. For this purpose, apparently inspired thousands of Palestinian the plan to hold general elections has been youth to publicly voice their frustration revived. However, doing so without Hamas’ with the situation in the Palestinian terri- inclusion threatens to deny any legitimacy tories. Rallies were held under the banner of to the results; moreover, going to the polls ending inter-party division. This demand was requires public order which Hamas could presented both as a national goal for its own easily disturb if they were held without its sake and as a means for ending the occupation. approval. For its part, Hamas has made its The leaders in Ramallah and took participation in the elections conditional

3 ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST – POLICY BRIEF NO. 3 • DECEMBER 2011

on institutional coordination with the PA. their respective, separate military and police Box No. 2: Palestinian Public Opinion Hamas’ inclusion in the Palestinian Authority apparatuses, this will not necessarily lead on the Reconciliation Agreement would provide the movement with the oppor- to an immediate relaxation of the Israeli- tunity to obtain international legitimacy Palestinian security tensions but it will help • 57.2% of the West Bank respondents rather than being marginalized and branded to resume the political process. Relaxation and 61.2% of the Gaza Strip respon- as a terrorist organization. This opportunity of security tensions will occur only if Hamas dents are optimistic about the chances could not be achieved without reconciliation endorses the approach towards Israel and that the reconciliation agreement will be with Fatah, while Fatah for its part needs to the desired solution to the confl ict through implemented. At the same time, 54.9% include Hamas in the Palestinian Authority the two-state formula as advocated by the expect the return of international fi nancial and so challenge the Israeli argument that mainstream body of Palestinian politics and, sanctions after the establishment of a Abbas does not represent all the Palestinian according to recent polls, what seems to be 3 reconciliation government. people and that any deal with him will not the majority of the Palestinian population. • 45% of the respondents prefer Fatah’s survive because Hamas will undermine it. candidate as Prime Challenges and Prospects Minister, while only 22.3% (19.0% in As a result of presidential and legislative – What Lies ahead the West Bank and 28.7% in the Gaza elections in the as Strip) prefer Hamas’ candidate Jamal Al well as elections to the Palestinian National Palestinian Considerations Khodari. Council – the Parliament of the PLO, which • 62.0% of the West Bank respondents and represents the Palestinian people world- The Cairo Reconciliation Agreement is 58.8% of the Gaza Strip respondents want wide – the Palestinian political institutions facing the same challenges as earlier agree- 4 the new government to follow the policies can renew their democratic legitimization. ments such as the Mecca Agreement of of the PA president and the PLO rather Reinvigorating the Palestinian leadership, February 8, 2007 which provided for a unity than the policy of Hamas, whereas only however, has to reckon with existing government but eventually did not prevent 14.7% in the West Bank and 24.3% in the structures such as the PLO’s Executive the division between Gaza and the West Gaza Strip prefer the policies of Hamas to Committee. The agreement stipulates that Bank. Though cautious optimism prevails those of Abbas and the PLO. the Executive Committee’s authority, which this time because of the inter-Palestinian and includes foreign policy, shall not be affected regional changes mentioned above, there [N=1,200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 by the tasks and decisions of the provisional is an obvious anxiety among Palestinians randomly selected locations. Margin of error 3%.] government. As a result, the Palestinians are that this agreement may fall apart at any represented by the present Head of the PA, moment. This anxiety is becoming a means Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey President Abbas, who in his capacity as the of pressure on the leadership of both Research (2011) ‘Poll No. 40, 16-18 June’. Chairman of the PLO will remain in charge movements to hold to the agreement and Online, available at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/ polls/2011/p40e.pdf (November 15, 2011). of negotiating with Israel. This division of prevent its collapse. Six months after the labor could ease the work of the provisional national unity ceremony in Cairo, Hamas According to another poll in the West Bank government and also facilitate the resumption and Fatah agreed on holding parliamentary and the Gaza Strip, of negotiations with Israel. and presidential elections in May 2012. • 53% of the respondents agree that Hamas should play a central role in the Indeed, the attempt to reconcile the diffe- However, the two factions continued to government versus 32% who think that rences between the two leading parties in the function separately in the areas under their Hamas’ involvement will threaten the Palestinian arena could advance Palestinian respective control after having failed to agree relations with foreign countries, and 15% institutional and political unity. However, on the name or the identity of the prime who say that Hamas’ participation will not many questions remain regarding the imple- m in ister of t he fut ure prov isional government change anything. mentation of the agreement’s principles that of independents. Fatah’s decision to nominate • In addition, only 32% of Palestinians involve diffi cult and potentially divisive Salam Fayyad as a candidate to this position surveyed favored the establishment of a decisions. They pertain to the formation aimed to give assurances that the new two-government system, one in the West of the interim government including its government would provide continuity to the Bank and one in the Gaza Strip, while tasks and authorities, the pending elections former one, thus to facilitate the acceptance of 77% oppose the idea, as it will harm including the election system, the merger of the new government by the U.S. and Europe. Palestinian internal unity. the separate institutions in the West Bank In particular, Abbas favored to retain Fayyad • Moreover, the government favored by and the Gaza Strip including above all the as prime minister of the PA on account of 67% of those surveyed is one in which security services, and the integration of his international credibility and the strategy all factions would be included rather than Hamas into the PLO. of establishing a de facto Palestinian state by one that would comprise only members of building institutions that promote security, the winning party (33% of respondents). If these challenges are not met, the Cairo good governance and a free-market economy agreement will turn out to be just a fl eeting that won the approval of the International [N=838 individuals randomly chosen and episode in the ongoing inter-organizational Monetary Fund and the World Bank. over 18 years of age. Margin of error: 3.4%] rivalry within the Palestinian camp and will fail to contribute positively to develop- Hamas, on the other hand, refused to accept Source: Near East Consulting (2011) ‘Survey 4-6 ments in the region that could enhance the Salam Fayyad’s nomination, arguing that July’. Online, available at http://www.neareastcon- positive potential of the MEC. Moreover, the candidate ought to come from Gaza sulting.com/press/2011/NEC-PressRelease- July2011-EN.pdf (November 26, 2011). even if the two parties manage to reconcile given the fact that the power base of the PA their differences, especially those relating to President and the PLC’s speaker is in the

4 The Reconciliation of Hamas and Fatah Smoothing the Way to the Middle East Conference by Contributing to Peace and Security in the Region

West Bank. Hamas resented Fayyad’s coope- Hamas from dictating the political agenda ration with the in creating the or from escalating the confl ict with Israel Box No. 3: Rejection of the Palestinian new National Security Forces, which have which would force it to choose between Reconciliation Agreement been employed by the Fatah-led PA to secure either standing shoulder to shoulder with its rule in the West Bank and target political Hamas or being committed to the political What happened today in Cairo is a mortal opponents – primarily affi liated with Hamas, path. Together with Hamas, it also faces the »blow to peace and a big prize for terrorism leading it to accuse Fayyad of serving Israeli challenge of preventing extremist […]. Israel continues to want peace and seek security interests. fact ions from provok ing yet anot her Israel i- peace but we can only achieve that with our Palestinian cycle of violence. An extensive neighbors that want peace. Those of our Not even a confi dence-building measure, like military operation mounted by Israel to neighbors that seek the destruction of Israel the reciprocal release of prisoners between stop rocket and fi re from the Strip and use terrorism are not partners to peace. Hamas and Fatah has taken place. Obviously, and to weaken Hamas’ military infra- (Israeli Prime Minister )« four years after the setting up of two structure would likely halt any progress distinctive Palestinian polities the stakes for towards holding elections and unifying the Source: ‘Fatah and Hamas proclaim landmark reconciliation pact’, The Journal, May 4, 2011. both parties are even higher than in 2007. Palestinian political ranks. Online, available at http://www.thejournal.ie/fatah- and-hamas-proclaim-landmarkreconciliation- • The merger of the security organizations The Need for Negotiations pact-131343-May2011/ (November 19, 2011). can be expected to be the most compli- cated and challenging goal to meet. Hamas As far as Israel is concerned, the Fatah– Box No. 4: Voices from Western Capitals has full control of these organizations Hamas rapprochement is widely perceived in Gaza and is unlikely to allow Fatah by the Israeli right wing government as a We will not deal with, nor in any way to regain control over them. The new sign of radicalization on the part of the PA. »fund, a Palestinian government that security branches in the West Bank, which This perception was clearly refl ected in the includes Hamas unless and until Hamas were rebuilt under the guidance of U.S. demand, posed to the PA by the Israeli Prime has renounced violence, recognized and European experts (named by Fatah’s Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to choose Israel and agreed to follow the previous opponents as Dayton forces) are becoming between peace with Israel and peace with obligations of the Palestinian Authority. more professional. These forces are Hamas. (U.S. Secretary of State ) « unaccepted by Hamas, and Fatah will not give in to Hamas’ demand to disband or This perception may well reduce the already Source: ‘Clinton: U.S. won’t deal with Hamas until it accepts our terms’, , April reconstruct these forces to include Hamas limited Israeli readiness to soften its position 22, 2009. Online, available at http://www. members. regarding resumption of the dialogue and the haaretz.com/print-edition/news/clinton-u- • There is no solution either for the fate outlines of the fi nal status settlement, and swon-t-deal-with-hamas-until-it-accepts- of tens of thousands of security and civil also make it all the more problematic for the ourterms-1.274554 (November 11, 2011). servants appointed by Hamas in Gaza government of Israel to articulate an initiative after the split in 2007 from among its that would encourage the PA to return to the [T]he EU must welcome this reconcili- own followers after dismissing all those negotiating table – and also halt Israel’s slide »ation that will allow Palestinians to speak with suspected of loyalty to Fatah, nor for those towards international isolation. one voice and it must agree to work with all who were dismissed. The four year-long members of the new unity government that division created a new class which benefi ts To be sure, a nationally legitimate Palestinian is likely to emerge from this agreement. from the split, such as those involved in the leadership is perceived in Israel to be in the (Chairman of the European Parliament’s« business conducted through the extensive Israeli interest. However, from the widespread Delegation for Relations with the Palestinian network of tunnels that were built under- Israeli perspective, any such representation Legislative Council Proinsias de Rossa) ground, across the Strip’s border with would not facilitate resumption of the peace Sinai. They will defi nitely not benefi t from process if based on institutional coordination Source: ‘EU must bless Fatah-Hamas draft agreement, says EP Delegation for relations with the agreement’s success. between Fatah and Hamas while Hamas still the Palestinian Legislative Council’, April 28, 2011. • There was no unifi ed national plan on how adheres to its rigid ideological directives. Online, available at http://www.europarl.europa. to move towards future diplomatic options Thus Israel insists that the demands that eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dmed/ dv/5a_dplcpressreleasepalestin/5a_dplcpressre- – the UN vote on Palestinian indepen- were presented to Hamas as preconditions leasepalestina1.pdf (November 30, 2011). dence or resuming negotiations with Israel for political dialogue, which essentially imply if it decides to freeze settlement activities endorsement of the two-state fi nal status and to accept the 1967 lines with minor settlement, remain on the agenda. If the principles are not upheld, it puts land swaps as a basis for negotiations. It is »us in a very diffi cult position […]. I think the not at all clear what the national strategy For its part, the PA did not present the quest central question people ask is, ‘Does this would be if the plan of getting UN confi r- for international recognition at the UN as mean a change of heart on behalf of Hamas mation of Palestinian independence fails an alternative to negotiations as such, but or not?’ […] We want them in this process. and nothing new justifying the resumption as an option against the backdrop of the Otherwise there will be no peace. of the negotiations takes place. prolonged deadlock in the negotiations. Of (Middle East Quartet’s Representative )« • The PA will have to take care lest its course, recognition of the declared commitment to the political in the territories occupied by Israel in Source: ‘Fatah and Hamas proclaim landmark reconciliation pact’, The Journal, May 4, 2011. process undercuts the effort to regulate its 1967 would remove none of the obstacles Online, available at http://www.thejournal.ie/fatah- inter-organizational relations. Alternately, to effective statehood: the occupation and-hamas-proclaim-landmarkreconciliation- the PA will have to work hard to prevent regime, the Jewish settlements and their pact-131343-May2011/ (November 19, 2011).

5 ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST – POLICY BRIEF NO. 3 • DECEMBER 2011

infrastructures, and the ongoing blockade more cautious, revealing fears that the Box No. 5: Voices from , of the Gaza Strip. Nor would international presence of Hamas in a unity government Syria, and Hezbollah recognition bring about a solution to the would be problematic. In their view, this will fi nal issues regarding security arrangements, breach the Quartet Principles, which were The head of Iran’s majlis, National the exact line of the border, the status of adopted by the U.S. and the EU after Hamas Security and Foreign Policy Commission Jerusalem, and the future of the refugees. won the 2006 elections. Alaeddin Boroujerdi, viewed unity among Recognition of the State of Palestine is not a all Palestinian factions “as a leap substitute for negotiations but could create a The Quartet’s conditions for accepting towards the decline of the Zionist regime.” new dynamic in the talks that is badly needed Hamas as a partner are still on the table. The if the two-state settlement is still to stand Quartet reaffi rmed its statements regarding Source: ‘Iran supports Palestinian a chance. Seen in this light, the quest for its support for a Palestinian government unity efforts’, Press TV, May 3, 2011. international recognition at the UN is not an committed to non-violence, recognition of Online, available at http://www.presstv.ir/ detail/177974.html (November 24, 2011). expression of unilateralism but rather a step Israel, and acceptance of previous Israeli- that should be followed by a return to the Palestinian agreements including resulting negotiation table. A profi le of Hamas as part obligations such as the road map, and Syria’s offi cial news agency SANA carried of the PA that is directed towards garnering encouraged progress in this direction. A the foreign Ministry’s congratulations to support and achieving electoral success by Palestinian unity government would be the Palestinian people for the settlement’s legitimate means, namely good governance, an opportunity to put these demands in a “positive result” in generating Palestinian could help to alleviate the concerns voiced new context. Even while remaining within strength, considering the reconciliation mainly by Israel and the U.S. on the occasion the framework outlined in the Quartet agreement “as a great victory to the of the reconciliation agreement. principles, it will not be necessary for the Palestinian people’s cause in their just U.S. and EU to sever fi nancial support and to struggle to liberate the occupied lands In preparation for a vote in the UN General break off diplomatic relations with the new and restore the rights, an issue Syria has Assembly on recognizing Palestinian national unity government. Withholding sought and worked for its achievement.” independence, both sides were interested aid from the Palestinian Authority or in demonstrating national unity. Any imposing sanctions on it will enforce Source: ‘Syria considers the Palestinian political process offered to Abbas to justify extremism rather than pragmatism and reconciliation a Great Victory’, DP News.com, the returning to the negotiating table will moderation. A government platform in line April 30, 2011. Online, available at http://www. 5 dp-news.com/en/detail.aspx?articleid=82143 have a crucial impact on the reconciliation with the can be read (November 24, 2011). process and its chances of realization. as a commitment by all parties, including Abbas has said repeatedly that there will be Hamas, to these requirements. As for the Lebanon’s Prime Minister Neguib Mikati no return to the negotiations unless Israel political process, the Palestinian position congratulated the Palestinians on “conso- agrees to a total freeze of the settlements is that the representative who will conduct lidating bonds between different segments activities and accepts that the borders of the the negotiations on behalf of the Palestinian of the people and taking a united stance future Palestinian state will be based on the people is neither Hamas nor Fatah but the regarding the struggle against the Israeli June 4, 1967 lines. Until real progress is made PLO, which recognized Israel a long time enemy. on these issues, preserving at least the unity ago when exchanged letters intentions underlying the signed agreement with the late Prime Minister Source: ‘Mikati: Lebanon endorses an would seem to be in the joint interest of both in 1993 that paved the way towards the Oslo independent Palestinian state, rejects Fatah and Hamas. Agreements. refugees’ settlement’, The Daily Star, June 29, 2011. Online, available at http://www. dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2011/Jun-29/ The Role of External Actors The External Mikati-Lebanon-endorses-an-independent- Palestinian-state-rejects-refugees-settlement. ashx#axzz1jGRyaXS7 (November 24, 2011). The initial reactions of the United States and Hamas’ external backers – Iran, Syria, the to the unity agreement and Hezbollah – strongly supported the ranged from outright rejection to cautious announcement of a Palestinian unity support. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary agreement, taking it as evidence of Palestinian Clinton made it very clear that Washington determination to continue on the path of will not support any government that resistance. includes Hamas unless and until Hamas adopts the Quartet principles. The position taken by Hamas’ allies can be viewed as political and popular in that it EU institutions and member states were not signals continued pressure on Israel by the trio able to agree on a position: the chairman of in support of their Palestinian ally. However, the European Parliament’s Delegation for what was either omitted from public state- Relations with the Palestinian Legislative ments or de-emphasized, yet nonetheless Council, Proinsias de Rossa, welcomed the obvious, was the fact that representation unity agreement. He also urged the EU to by a single government also strengthens respect the democratic wishes of Palestinian Palestinian bargaining power. Such empow- voters when new elections are held under erment would enable the leadership to follow this agreement. However, the reactions of through with the plan to obtain statehood at individual European heads of state were the UN and possibly further down the road,

6 The Reconciliation of Hamas and Fatah Smoothing the Way to the Middle East Conference by Contributing to Peace and Security in the Region to formulate and negotiate an agreed political and also as a means to pressure Israel to go platform in serious negotiations with Israel. back to the negotiating table. Referring to the procedural aspect of the dialogue with Israel, If the Palestinians are able to move along this PA spokespersons stress that it is the PLO road, their allies would presumably support and not the government that is in charge their efforts. Such steps would likely be of conducting negotiations with Israel. To viewed as hastening a comprehensive Middle be sure, integrating Hamas as part of the East peace wherein land-for-peace bargaining Palestinian national representation is the only could be extended to Syria and Lebanon. In guarantee for the success of any future deal – such a scenario, which would take care of if such a deal is indeed to be accomplished. long-standing grievances of both countries, And as such the reconciliation agreement Iran would stand to lose infl uence. should be welcomed as a step forward and not used as an excuse to justify the continued Conclusions and deadlock in the political process. In order to Recommendations facilitate the very establishment and sustai- nability of such a unity government, and also Palestinian National Unity and the to increase the chance that its establishment 2012 Middle East Conference would directly or indirectly help mitigating regional tensions in the Middle East, state To be sure, if a jointly formulated national supporters of the PA should refrain from program incorporates the commitment of imposing sanctions on it. They should rather Hamas to armed struggle the unity agreement consider it a functioning administrative body will not deliver on the various expectations of a national entity on the path to self-deter- it has raised. One way of turning the unity mination and sovereignty. agreement into a positive impulse on the way to mitigating cores of tension in the Finally, on the presumption that the members Middle East, and thus also on prospects for of the Quartet are still committed to the holding the 2012 MEC, would be to base two-state settlement, they would give the the platform of the unity government on Palestinian diplomatic initiatives the benefi t the principles of the ’s Peace of the doubt by committing to the recognition Initiative. This could provide a face saving of a Palestinian state. They should do so way out of the present deadlock not only in along with assertive support for resumption the context of the Israeli-Hamas stand-off of Israeli-Palestinian talks and mediating but also in the context of Fatah-Hamas talks. pre-negotiations and actual negotiations However, a clear cut Israeli decision to freeze between Israel and Palestine. In this regard, all settlement activities in the West Bank the Quartet’s proposal of September 23, and would provide strong 2011 that the two sides commit to reaching evidence of Israel’s peaceful intentions, which an agreement within a time frame agreed to are widely suspect among the Palestinians, by the parties but not longer than the end of and help to move forward in the conciliation 20127 lacks the clout necessary to revive the and mitigation of the confl ict. stagnant peace process.

The Quartet and the Intra-Palestinian Endnotes Reconciliation: Recommendations 1. See Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear The reconciliation agreement could represent Weapons (2010) Final Document, Vol. 1. Online, available at: www.un.org/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20%28VOL.I%29 (November 13, 2011). a window of opportunity for the stalled peace process in the Middle East. In the past, the 2. ‘Fateh and Hamas Reconciliation Agreement’, May 4, 2011. Online, available at http:// www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=828 (November 20, 2011). ideological divide and power struggle in the Palestinian arena was used both by Palestinian 3. See Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (2011) ‘Poll No. 40, 16-18 June’. Online, available at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2011/p40e.pdf (November 15, leaders and Israeli governments to justify 2011). their inability to fully carry through with the 6 4. ‘Mecca Agreement and the Program of the Palestinian Unity Government (2007)’. stipulations of the Quartet’s 2003 Road Map. Online, available at http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic/?c=1598&a=109086 (November However, a national unity government which 21, 2011). encompasses all Palestinian factions would 5. ‘The Arab Peace Initiative, 2002: Offi cial translation of the full text of a Saudi-inspired be in a better position to alleviate Israel’s peace plan adopted by the Arab summit in Beirut, 2002’. Online, available at http://www. concerns that peace with only half of the al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm (November 22, 2011). Palestinians would amount to no peace at all. 6. ‘A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli- Palestinian Confl ict’, April 30, 2003. Online, available at http://www.un.org/media/main/ roadmap122002.pdf (November 18, 2011). Indeed, Palestinians hope that the formation 7. ‘Statement by Middle East Quartet’, September 23, 2011. Online, available at http:// of a technocrat government will be seen as www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sg2178.doc.htm (November 10, 2011). a positive step towards national reunifi cation

7 ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST – POLICY BRIEF NO. 3 • DECEMBER 2011

Primarily designed by the U.S. and the linking its support for Palestinian statehood Further Reading EU as a substitute for the recognition of a to intra-Palestinian political dilemmas. Palestinian state at the UN, the statement was Indeed, offi cially withdrawing the demands • Camille Mansour (2011) ‘Toward not perceived by the Palestinian leadership that were presented to Hamas as precon- a New Palestinian Negotiation as suffi cient to facilitate the resumption of ditions for dialogue would be politically Paradigm’, Journal of Palestine Studies, the negotiations. Spokespersons of the PLO diffi cult, but the Quartet can still leave the 40(3): 38-58. including President Abbas pointed out that matter for the PA’s leadership to solve. Thus • Shimon Stein (2010) ‘The European the statement lacks a clear mentioning of a the Quartet should focus on efforts to pave Union and the Middle East’, in Shlomo total freeze of settlements activities and the the way for a revival of the Israeli-Palestinian Brom and Anat Kurz (eds) Strategic 1967 borders as a reference for the negotia- dialogue – also by relentless support for Survey for Israel 2010, Tel Aviv: Institute tions. At the same time, it was welcomed by Palestinian statehood. for National Security Studies, 157-173. t he Israel i govern ment wh ich has i nsisted t hat • International Crisis Group (2011) negotiations begin without preconditions. Efforts to get the parties back to the table ‘Palestinian Reconciliation: Plus Ça Hence, in light of the discrepancy between and negotiate in good faith should also be Change...’, Middle East Report 110, the Palestinian and Israeli approaches as to motivated by the wish to reach a settlement July 20, 2011. the terms under which negotiations could that would earn major public support among • Khaled Hroub (2010) Hamas: A Beginner’s start, the Quartet must assume a proactive and Palestinians, erode the attrac- Guide, : Pluto Press. role instead of being content with the role of tiveness of hard-line positions on both sides, • Anat Kurz (2005) Fatah and the Politics a railbird. The complex linkages between the and also enhance Hamas’ integration into the of Violence: The Institutionalization of issues at hand – the quest for unity and the PA on the basis of acceptance of the two-state, a Popular Struggle, Brighton: Sussex PA’s diplomatic momentum on the one hand, negotiated, fi nal status agreement with Israel. Academic Press. progress towards the international recog- In order to actively help the parties to bridge • Margret Johannsen, Ghassan Khatib, nition of Palestinian statehood and Hamas- the gaps, the Quartet should provide for a and Anat Kurz (2012) ‘Designing disar- Fatah efforts to establish political common mediating mechanism, including monitoring mament strategies: The case of Hamas’, ground on the other hand – put high demands of progress or setbacks in the negotiations. in Bernd W. Kubbig and Sven-Eric on the empathy of any external mediator. By offering services of such nature, the Fikenscher (eds) Arms Control and With the aim of defusing the potentially Quartet would make a serious effort to help Missile Proliferation in the Middle East, detrimental inter-party relationship in the smoothing the road to the envisaged Middle London: , 186-214. Palestinian arena, the Quartet should avoid East Conference. 

About the ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST (APOME)

The ORCHESTRA is the follow-up project of the “Multilateral Study Group (MSG) on the Establishment of a Missile Free Zone in the Middle East”. The ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST is a classical Track II initiative: It consists of some 70 experts – mainly from the Middle East/Gulf, one of the most confl ict-ridden areas of the world. The ORCHESTRA is meeting regularly in working groups (CHAMBER ORCHESTRA UNIT s) on specifi c topics in the context of a workshop cycle from 2011-2014. The main goal of this initiative is to shape the 2012 Middle East Conference on the estab- lishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles agreed upon by the international community in May 2010.

For this reason, these experts develop ideas, concepts, and background information in a series of POLICY BRIEFS which are the results of intense discussions within the CHAMBER ORCHESTRA UNITS . In this framework, the broader normative Cooperative Security Concept will be further developed, embedded, and institutionalized in the region. At the same time, the ORCHESTRA meetings serve as venues for confi dence-building among the experts. The networking activities of PRIF’s Project Group are documented by the ATLAS on Track II research activities in or about the Middle East/Gulf region.

Editor/Project Coordinator: The views presented by the Adj. Prof. Dr. Bernd W. Kubbig authors do not necessarily Co-Editors: Roberta Mulas, MA represent those of the project and Christian Weidlich, MA coordinator, editors, sponsors, or PRIF. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, © 2011 ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA Baseler Straße 27-31, D-60329 Frankfurt am Main, MIDDLE EAST and Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Phone: +49-69-95910436, Fax: +49-69-558481, All rights reserved. E-Mail: [email protected], Internet: www.hsfk.de Layout: Anke Maria Meyer

The Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East wishes to thank its generous sponsors, the Foreign Ministry of , the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and the Protestant Church of Hesse and Nassau.