BROOKINGS 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20036-2103 www.brookings.edu ANALYSIS PAPER Number 25, February 2012 THE MIDDLE EAST QUARTET: A Post-Mortem Khaled Elgindy ANALYSIS PAPER Number 25, February 2012 THE MIDDLE EAST QUARTET: A Post-Mortem Khaled Elgindy The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are not determined by any donation. Copyright © 2012 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 www.brookings.edu Table of Contents Executive Summary..........................................................iv Acknowledgements ......................................................... x The Author................................................................xi Introduction .............................................................. 1 Background and Description ................................................. 3 The Quartet’s Track Record.................................................. 9 Why the Quartet Does Not Work............................................ 34 Conclusion ............................................................... 52 Appendixes................................................................ 54 THE MIDDLE EAST QUARTET: A Post-Mortem The Saban Center at BROOKINGS iii Executive Summary t has been ten years since the four most pow- The Quartet’s Track Record erful players in the Middle East peace pro- cess—the United States, the European Union, Of all its interventions, none are more illustrative of IRussia, and the United Nations—came together the Quartet’s performance and modus operandi than under the diplomatic umbrella known as the the Roadmap and the Quartet Principles, the two Quartet. Formed in response to outbreak of the most important and consequential actions taken by Second Intifada in late 2000 and the collapse of the group to date. The publication of the Roadmap peace negotiations a few months later, the Quar- in April 2003 sought to correct three fundamen- tet appeared ideally suited for dealing with the tal shortcomings in the Oslo peace process of the seemingly intractable conflict between Israelis and 1990s. In addition to calling for parallel (rather than Palestinians. Its small but powerful membership sequential or conditional) implementation of each allowed it to act swiftly and decisively, while its side’s obligations and insisting on monitoring and ac- informal structure gave it the flexibility needed countability for both sides, the Roadmap sought to to navigate crises and adapt to changing develop- articulate a more clearly defined end game. Whatever ments on the ground. theoretical or potential benefits the Roadmap might have offered, however, were negated by the fact that it Yet, despite the high expectations that accompa- was for all intents and purposes a dead letter. nied its formation, and some modest success early on, the Quartet has little to show for its decade- The Israeli government, already highly suspicious of long involvement in the peace process. Israelis and the Quartet, rejected the entire Roadmap exercise Palestinians are no closer to resolving the conflict, precisely because of its emphasis on parallelism and and in the few instances in which political negotia- monitoring. As a result, despite ostensibly agree- tions did take place, the Quartet’s role was usually ing with the Quartet consensus regarding both of relegated to that of a political bystander. Mean- these principles, the George W. Bush administra- while, the Quartet has failed to keep pace with the tion worked systematically to block or hinder them. dramatic changes that have occurred in the conflict Having enthusiastically backed the Sharon govern- and the region in recent years, particularly since ment’s “security first” doctrine, key elements within the advent of the Arab Awakening. Having spent the Bush administration agreed to make Israel’s most of the last three years in a state of near paraly- implementation of the Roadmap conditional on the sis, and having failed to dissuade the Palestinians Palestinians meeting their obligations first. Simi- from seeking UN membership and recognition in larly, despite the strenuous efforts by various actors September 2011, the Quartet has finally reached to set up an official monitoring structure, no Quar- the limits of its utility. tet monitoring mechanism was ever established. THE MIDDLE EAST QUARTET: A Post-Mortem The Saban Center at BROOKINGS iv Instead, in keeping with Israel’s objections to in- never intended as conditions on international do- ternational or independent monitoring, only the nor assistance to the PA, the Bush White House United States was allowed to monitor implementa- made sure they would be implemented as precisely tion and compliance. And even then, such missions that. The U.S. and EU decisions in 2006 to with- were given low priority and were sporadic and high- hold international aid, which virtually all donors ly constrained in their operation—for example by including Arab states complied with, amounted to not publicizing their findings or even sharing them an international sanctions regime. This, combined with the other three Quartet members. with Israel’s nearly simultaneous decision to with- hold valued added tax (VAT) revenues collected The Roadmap was eventually discarded altogether on Palestinian imports that accounted for some 60 by the Bush administration’s—and later the Quar- to 70 percent of all PA revenue, triggered a severe tet’s—support for Israel’s Gaza Disengagement economic and humanitarian crisis throughout the Plan, a primary objective of which was to neutralize West Bank and Gaza Strip. the Quartet plan. The fact that it was the United States rather than the Quartet that ultimately sub- Once again, despite the apparent consensus among verted the Roadmap meant little in light of EU, the four powers, it soon became clear that the Quar- UN, and Russian acquiescence at each stage of tet members each had a very different understand- the process. The subversion of the Roadmap later ing of what the new policy meant, or how to put proved to be the Quartet’s “original sin,” with far- it into effect. These differences spanned the entire reaching consequences that are still felt today. The spectrum, from the U.S. insistence on a “no aid/ consensus that had been so painstakingly forged no contact” policy to the Russian call for engaging around the Roadmap was exposed as a farce. Any Hamas in a dialogue in the hope of moderating its benefits the plan may have offered were nullified positions, with the EU position leaning more to- by the divergent goals of the United States and the ward the American one and the UN position more other three Quartet members, along with their de- toward the Russian one. Despite the apparent simi- sire to maintain the unity of the group at all costs. larity in the U.S. and EU positions, in practice the goals of the United States and the European Union Within months of Israel’s withdrawal from the diverged sharply: whereas the Europeans have Gaza Strip, the Quartet faced an even greater chal- sought compromises by which to continue chan- lenge after the surprise election victory of the Pal- neling aid into Palestinian hands, the United States estinian Islamist faction Hamas gave it control over has been far less flexible. The intense disagreement the Palestinian Authority (PA) in January 2006. In over the Quartet Principles, which almost caused response, the United States, the European Union, the group to break up, only added to the sense of the United Nations, and Russia called for three cri- confusion regarding its mission and further un- teria to be met—nonviolence, recognition of Israel, dercut its standing. Ironically, Hamas’s takeover of and acceptance of previous agreements—for the Gaza in July 2007 may well have saved the Quartet new Hamas-led government to receive recogni- by removing the single most potent source of inter- tion and support. While on the surface the Quartet nal conflict it had ever had to face. Principles reflected a consensus among all four of the group’s members, major divisions surfaced al- Two other experiences offer additional insights into most from the start and have persisted ever since. the Quartet’s handling of crisis situations and its overall approach to conflict management: the May Despite attempts by Alvaro de Soto, the UN en- 2010 flotilla tragedy and the role of the Quartet voy at the time, to argue that the principles were representative. For many of its proponents, the THE MIDDLE EAST QUARTET: A Post-Mortem The Saban Center at BROOKINGS v Quartet’s true value was demonstrated in the wake Why the Quartet Does Not Work of the deadly May 2010 Israeli raid on an interna- tional aid flotilla attempting to reach Gaza, which The Quartet’s failings stem mainly from three fac- subsequently led to an easing of Israel’s blockade tors: its loose, informal structure; the imbalance of of Gaza. A UN-led initiative propelled by Ameri- power and