Tightening the Noose Author(s): Trude Strand Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Winter 2014), pp. 6-23 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2014.43.2.6 . Accessed: 24/09/2015 02:26

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This content downloaded from 130.58.102.238 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 02:26:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Tightening the Noose: The Institutionalized Impoverishment of Gaza, 2005–2010

TRUDE STRAND

This article outlines and analyzes ’s Gaza policy during the period from 2005 to 2010. Based on primary materials, including the testimony of Israeli officials before the Turkel Commission investigating the Mavi Marmara incident, classified documents that have come to light through Wikileaks, and Israeli government documentation, the article argues that in the wake of Israel’s evacuation of the territory under its 2005 Disengagement Plan, the became the object of a deliberate and sustained policy of institutionalized impoverishment. Looking at Israeli policy-making as both process and outcome, the article highlights how measures ostensibly implemented to “punish” —from the incremental tightening of restrictions to the imposition of a full blockade, in addition to periodic military assaults—have pauperized a large proportion of Gaza’s more than 1.5 million inhabitants.

“We won’t allow for a humanitarian crisis, but have no intention of making their lives easier. And the harder their lives, excluding humanitarian damage, we will not allow them to lead a pleasant life.” Israeli prime minister , 21 January 20081

“There is not, and never was, any intention to harm the Palestinian population living in Gaza.” Former Israeli foreign minister , 25 October 20102

MARKED BY military occupation, poverty, and oppression, Gaza’s recent history has been punctuated by wars and the impact of two intifadas. The of Gaza have lost and rebuilt countless times—their freedom increasingly constrained by the limits of a fence and the Israeli diktat of checkpoints, permits, and closures.3 Against this backdrop, Israel’s promise of disengagement—publicly announced in 2004—was internationally acclaimed as a step in the right direction. For the first time since the onset and consolidation of occupation, no Israeli soldiers would be present, and no settlements or checkpoints would prevent the movement of people or slice off Gaza’s most fertile territory from its owners. Yet far from disengaging, Israeli policymakers remained deeply involved in Gazan affairs. While it abandoned a physical presence

Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XLIII, No. 2 (Winter 2014), p. 6, ISSN: 0377-919X; electronic ISSN: 1533-8614. © 2014 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/jps.2014.43.2.6.

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This content downloaded from 130.58.102.238 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 02:26:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Tightening the Noose in the Strip, Israel resorted to remote management of the territory, dictating the lives of its more than 1.5 million inhabitants. Drawing on documents from the proceedings of the Turkel Commission,4 official Israeli and American materials, statistics, and media reports, this article presents Israel’s policy toward Gaza as both process and outcome. As such, it examines the debates and motivation among Israeli political decision makers, outlines the practical implementation of the policies they formulated, and assesses the impact of these policies on the population of Gaza. Starting with the “disengagement,” the first part of the article focuses on Israeli policy-making from the formulation of the Disengagement Plan in 2004 to September 2007, when Israel declared Gaza a hostile entity and instituted a full-blown blockade, which in most aspects continues to this day. The second part of the article discusses policy implementation and its impact on the ground, emphasizing the rhetoric and reality of what I will argue has been the deliberate, institutionalized impoverishment of Gaza. Although Israel’s policy and its key effects remain in force, with an additional overlay of factors resulting from regional, and specifically Egyptian, events, the discussion focuses on the period leading up to the Mavi Marmara incident of May 2010.

“Disengagement”: Prelude to the Gaza Blockade

Between 17 August and 12 September 2005, the world’s eyes were fixed on the Gaza Strip as Israel unilaterally pulled out its military installations and civilian settlements from territory it had occupied for almost forty years. When in April 2004 it announced its intention to withdraw from the Strip, the Israeli government stated that the so-called Disengagement Plan was designed to break a “harmful” stalemate in Israeli-Palestinian relations.5 In fact, the exact opposite was the purpose. By “disengaging,” Israel sought to neutralize the peace process and more specifically the road map, an international initiative to launch a formal, goal-driven, reciprocal process that had been put forward by the Middle East Quartet exactly a year earlier.6 The road map posed serious domestic and foreign policy challenges to Israeli policymakers. First, it was based on the parallel fulfillment by the two sides of specific obligations: for the Palestinians, the cessation of violence, and institutional and security reform; for the , the cessation of all settlement activity, including so-called natural growth. Second, the road map’s stated goal was the realization of “an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors.”7 A halt to settlements and the prospect of a Palestinian state were anathema to Israel; hence, its deep opposition to the road map, and its own counterplan: disengagement. Dov Weissglas, Prime Minister Sharon’s close aide and chief of staff, spelled out the connection between the two plans bluntly: “Thedisengagement...supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political process with the Palestinians.”8 Some years later, former Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni would make explicit the same linkage. Testifying before the Turkel Commission, she clearly articulated the party’s dilemma vis-à-vis the Quartet’s initiative. “[D]o we remain in the first stage of the Road Map where, basically, there are Israeli obligations and Palestinian obligations? Or do we create an act that is an additional act? And here I come to the Disengagement.”9

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This content downloaded from 130.58.102.238 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 02:26:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Tightening the Noose

U.S. approval of the Disengagement Plan (expressed in a letter from President George W. Bush to Prime Minister on 14 April 2004) and the acquiescence of the international community would prove a powerful tool in Israel’s hands. The letter endorsed not only Israel’s continued control of Gaza’s access points, and of its coastal waters and airspace, but also its “basic right to self-defense, including taking preventive steps as well as responding by using force against threats that will emerge from the Gaza Strip.”10 These two elements—full control and carte blanche on military action—constituted the blueprint for Israel’s future dealings with the territory. While the new arrangement excluded a permanent Israeli presence inside the Gaza Strip and acknowledged the possibility of future changes, the gates to Gaza were left firmly in Israeli hands. As far as the Sharon government was concerned, the evacuation marked an end to Israel’s occupation of the Strip. Under that interpretation, according to international humanitarian law, Israel was relieved of all responsibility for the welfare of Gaza’s population, although it would still be required to provide essential humanitarian supplies in keeping with the laws of armed conflict.11 This was also the interpretation of Israel’s Chief Military Advocate, who argued that “on September 12, 2005—in practice, the completion of the Disengagement Plan—and in our concept, the concept of the State of Israel, from that timeframe onwards there is no longer a belligerent occupation of the Gaza Strip. We remained in a state of armed conflict but there is no longer belligerent occupation.”12

Economic Dependence Unchanged

In Israeli political rhetoric, the Gaza evacuation carried “potential for improvement in the Palestinian economy and living conditions.”13 Addressing the opening session of the UN General Assembly on 15 September 2005, days after the pullout was completed, Prime Minister Sharon argued that with “the end of Israeli control over and responsibility for the Gaza Strip,” the Palestinians were now allowed, “if they so wish, to develop their economy and build a peace- seeking society.”14 In reality, however, Gaza remained deeply dependent on Israel for its economic survival and future prosperity. Because Gaza had neither a seaport nor an airport, its economic fate was irrevocably tied to the “umbilical cord” of land crossings.15 Under the 1994 Protocol, an integral part of the , all legal trade from Gaza had to be channeled to or via Israel.16 The November 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access, negotiated by the , upheld Israel’srolein determining the volume of goods going through the commercial crossings, with Rafah added on as a passenger terminal and potential future site for export to .17 An indication of what was to come could also be found in the Disengagement Plan’s annex, which stipulated that “in line with Israel’s interest in encouraging greater Palestinian economic independence,” the entry of Palestinian workers into Israel would be reduced “to the point that it ceases completely.”18 (Their numbers had already declined elevenfold to a mere three thousand in the year following the onset of the in 2000.)19 The Gaza economy was thus to depend on Israel’s easing of restrictions and the establishment of a sustainable business environment. As specified by Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev,

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This content downloaded from 130.58.102.238 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 02:26:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Tightening the Noose however, the relaxation of Israeli restrictions was contingent on improvements in the Palestinian security sphere. “We are all interested in a successful Gaza,” Regev stated. “We’re all interested in seeing the Gaza economy thrive—but they [the Palestinians] can also play a part.”20 Thus, responsibility for Gaza’s economic success was laid at the door of the Palestinian Authority (PA), shifting the focus away from Israel’s continued control of the Gaza Strip and onto a weakened Palestinian president.

The Policy Takes Shape

While the road map was effectively dead, its provisions concerning Palestinian obligations—an end to violence and terror, security reforms, elections, and institution-building, as well as cooperation with Israel—were very much alive. One idea floated among international policymakers was to provide the necessary time and space for the Palestinians to set their house in order, the expectation being that over time, President Abbas, with the help of the PA security apparatus, would pressure Hamas to make the “right” choice between politics and the gun.21 Although President Abbas made it clear that he would be unable to disarm Hamas in time for the polls,22 under the U.S. administration’s steady pressure for reforms, he agreed to hold Palestinian parliamentary elections on 25 January 2006. The Israeli government was very much opposed to the elections, especially since Hamas had decided to participate. The Israeli fear was not so much of a Hamas victory (which virtually no one anticipated), but of the fact that the movement, which was at the forefront of armed resistance against Israel, could gain international legitimacy through its electoral participation, and hence inclusion in the wider Palestinian political framework. Prime Minister Sharon even convened his cabinet to discuss steps that might be taken to disrupt the polls.23 Three weeks before the election, however, Sharon suffered an incapacitating stroke and was replaced by Ehud Olmert, who refrained from interfering after being cautioned by U.S. officials not to disrupt the Palestinian vote.24 To the surprise of all observers, including Israel, Hamas emerged the winner. Along with his loyalists in the cabinet, including Foreign Minister Livni, Olmert immediately embarked on a campaign to seek out an international response that would deny Hamas legitimacy in its new role.25 In discussions with the United States and the , Israel set forth a series of conditions that would have to be fulfilled by Hamas in order for it to gain international acceptance.26 Within days, Israeli demands were formalized in the Quartet conditions. As a prerequisite for international engagement, the new Palestinian government would have to renounce violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and accept the terms of all previous agreements, including provisions in the road map for the confiscation of illegal weapons, the consolidation of the Palestinian security apparatus, and cooperation with Israel over security.27 The Israeli government suspended all transfers of the tax revenue and customs duties it was obligated to hand over to the PA (of which Hamas was now a part). In order to circumvent the Palestinian administration, humanitarian assistance was to be provided to the Palestinian population “directly,” with the assistance of international organizations.28

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This content downloaded from 130.58.102.238 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 02:26:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Tightening the Noose

Against a background of bitter accusations leveled at Olmert, Sharon’s close ally, for having facilitated the creation of “Hamastan”—“stepchild of and the ”29—the Israeli government met in mid-February 2006 to discuss policy options vis-à-vis the PA, and specifically the Gaza Strip, Hamas’s stronghold. Weakening and ultimately bringing down Hamas became Israel’s central priority with respect to Gaza, with economic sanctions and closures as the means to do so. Speaking to the press, Dov Weissglas likened the economic sanctions and border closures being discussed to “a meeting with a dietician”: “We have to make them much thinner, but not enough to die.”30 Tzipi Livni exhibited a little more restraint and described the emergent Israeli policy as a “dual strategy,” fostering a diplomatic process with PA President Mahmud Abbas while sidelining Hamas from international recognition and peace negotiations, on the one hand,31 and isolating Gaza economically, politically, and diplomatically, on the other.32 By late March, the Israeli approach had solidified and garnered U.S. support. In seeking international backing for its strategy, Israel took pains to emphasize that Gaza’scivilianswere “hostages to Hamas”33—in other words, any actions that were taken were directed against Hamas, not the people. This approach seemed to sit well with the Americans. In a meeting with Israeli defense minister on 30 March 2006, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State David Welch explained that the administration thought it necessary to “maintain contact with Abu Mazen,” partly in order to calm the Europeans who, “seized with the notion of an impending humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip,” could “act in a way that undercuts U.S. and Israeli efforts to weaken Hamas.”34 But the Americans also wanted to make sure that “those who say yes [to the three Quartet conditions set for dealing with Hamas] still have an address in the U.S.” Referring again to these conditions, Welch noted in a subsequent meeting with Livni that “[i]f Hamas says yes three times then they have one [a U.S. address] too. If not, then we want them to fail.”35 While diplomatic efforts continued, the Israeli security establishment discussed the technical measures and mechanisms that would be needed to intensify the sanctions on Gaza. Control of five of the six land crossings (Rafah, connecting with Egypt, being the sixth), as well as a firm— and literal—grip on the main levers of basic utility supplies to the Strip, gave Israel virtually free rein. Qarni, the main commercial crossing between Gaza and Israel, had been closed on the heels of the Palestinian elections. Israel’s success in unilaterally imposing the rerouting of humanitarian supplies through Kerem Shalom, a small, underdeveloped crossing at the southernmost tip of Gaza, signaled the increasingly singular Israeli focus on facilitating access to supplies of a purely humanitarian rather than commercial nature.36 With the closure of the Qarni crossing, the vital artery between Gaza and Israeli and foreign markets was effectively blocked. In her appeal for U.S. support of Israel’s Gaza isolation policy, Foreign Minister Livni argued that “efforts to keep the crossings open could weaken efforts to undermine Hamas because monitoring the crossings requires constant contact with officials of the new Hamas government.” In his response, Assistant Secretary of State Welch noted the need to “draw attention to the failures of Hamas,” while making it clear “that we are not collectively punishing the Palestinian people.”37 In her discussions with U.S. officials in early May 2006, Livni elaborated on Israel’sproposed efforts to undermine Hamas, using a strategy of mainly economic pressure. The initial timeframe indicated was for economic sanctions to last for three to four months, as Livni claimed it would take that much time before a humanitarian crisis would emerge and to provide a “wait and see”

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This content downloaded from 130.58.102.238 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 02:26:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Tightening the Noose period for how Hamas would respond.38 To Livni, the pressure was aimed at ensuring that Hamas would not gain legitimacy as a political partner in future negotiations with Israel.39 Meanwhile, Israel expected that its own willingness to negotiate with Abbas and to participate in the diplomatic track would garner broad international support, which in turn would secure approval for the second pillar of its strategy of keeping Gaza “an isolated place.”40 Thus, under the cover of peace talks, Gaza could be pushed into the political and economic wilderness, weakening its links to the , and isolating its people from the rest of the world.

Gaza: The “Hostile Entity”

Doomed from the start, the cohabitation of Hamas and under the PA umbrella lasted only one year and four months, ending in a bloody showdown in June 2007 between Palestinian forces from both sides. Despite U.S. support, the forces loyal to President Abbas failed to stem the tide and were completely overrun by Hamas, which seized control of the Strip. Prime Minister Olmert’s immediate reaction was the imposition of a comprehensive closure of access points to and from the Strip. Meeting in the wake of Hamas’s takeover, the new Israeli cabinet41 tried to reach a consensus on an overall punitive approach. The security establishment, including the Ministry of Defense, was in favor of sealing off the Gaza Strip and allowing only the transfer of minimum humanitarian supplies, with the stated goal being to topple Hamas.42 While this view was supported by both Foreign Minister Livni and Defense Minister Barak,43 there was no agreement among cabinet members. Another option, attributed to members of the National Security Council, urged less pressure on Hamas, arguing that an escalation could result in Israel being forced to launch a large-scale invasion of the Strip.44 Partly in response to increasing domestic criticisms of the government in general, and of Prime Minister Olmert in particular, pressure on the government to act decisively began to mount. Already in late April 2007, Olmert’s public support had plummeted to a mere 3 percent45 following the release of preliminary findings from the on Israel’s 2006 War and then corruption allegations against the prime minister, which fueled yet more negative publicity. Opposition leader had also been reminding the Israeli public, ever since the Hamas takeover, of warnings he had made when he was finance minister in the Sharon government. He had then denounced the Disengagement Plan as a “flight from terror” that would ignite more Palestinian violence46 and turn Gaza into “a base for Islamic terrorism.”47 Speaking to the press, Netanyahu excoriated the current government for its failure in Gaza, and especially the continued rocket attacks against Israel. His advice to Olmert was to “besiege Gaza, strengthen the military siege on Gaza, and the economic and diplomatic isolation of the Hamas regime,” adding that Israel could count on support from the U.S., Egypt, and Jordan for this policy.48 It was against this background that Olmert’s security cabinet met in early September 2007. By that time, it had become clear which side was winning the Gaza policy debate. Speaking to the press, Deputy Prime Minister , a close Olmert ally, declared the government’s intention to cut off electricity, water, and fuel supplies to Gaza.49 Israeli public opinion clearly

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This content downloaded from 130.58.102.238 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 02:26:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Tightening the Noose favored the move: towns near the Gaza perimeter were being hit by rockets, one of which had landed near a day-care center in on 3 September. Reports of children being treated for shock and the mayor of Sderot’s accusations that the government had abandoned the town only increased public support for the measures announced by Ramon. Defense Minister Barak (Labor), Trade and Industry Minister Eli Yishai (), and Environment Minister Gideon Ezra () all spoke in favor.50 For the prime minister, busy preparing for the November hosted by the United States to relaunch peace talks, a large-scale military operation against Gaza was out of the question, in the short term. Rather, on the eve of talks with Abbas in Annapolis, the time seemed ripe to roll out fully the second pillar of Israel’s dual strategy—thecompleteisolationof Gaza by means of a blockade, using the well-being of the population as leverage to exert pressure on Hamas, with the corollary effect of driving a further wedge between the West Bank and Gaza. At a time of resounding public support for harsh treatment of Gaza,51 Dov Weissglas, a lawyer by training and now an Olmert adviser, justified the case for a tightened blockade regime on legal grounds and in terms appropriate for the international community. Writing in Israel’s leading daily, Yedi’ot Aharonot, he acknowledged that “[a]n embargo, by definition, is a collective punishment imposed against a country or type of country and which primarily harms the civilian population with the aim of coercing the government (whether recognized or not).” He then defined the relationship between Israel and Gaza as a state of war, citing chapters 6 and 7 of the UN Charter to emphasize that economic sanctions were preferable to military force as a means of coercion. Opining that “every regime is sensitive to the will of the population, its desires and distress,” he argued for economic sanctions on the residents and regime of Gaza, maintaining that cuts in supplies such as “goods, fuel, food, raw materials, communication services and other infrastructure-related services, including electricity and water,”52 would deter Hamas from firing rockets. Before enacting such measures, however, Israel took the unprecedented step of declaring Gaza hostile territory. On 19 September 2007, the Israeli security cabinet announced that it had unanimously decided to place additional sanctions “on what has been labeled the Hamas regime in order to restrict the passage of various goods to the Gaza Strip and reduce the supply of fuel and electricity.”53 To Israel, Hamas’s classification as a terrorist organization and its control of the area had turned Gaza into hostile territory. Therefore, the government resolved “to adopt the recommendations made by the security establishment, including the continuation of the military and intelligence operations against the terrorist organizations.”54 In addition to limiting the supply of fuel and electricity, Israel imposed further restrictions on the movement of people to and from the Strip, “bearing in mind the legal ramifications of the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, in order to prevent a humanitarian crisis.”55 Considerable and similar restrictions had been in place for several years, and had been incrementally tightened since the January 2006 Palestinian elections, but this newly formulated policy represented a qualitative change. The term “hostile entity” underscored Israel’sprevailing legal interpretation of its position vis-à-vis Gaza in the post-evacuation phase: that there existed a state of armed conflict between the State of Israel and Hamas. Under the laws of belligerent occupation, Israel was responsible for the welfare of the population, as well as for the maintenance of public law and order, whereas the interpretation of the situation as armed conflict relieved it of

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This content downloaded from 130.58.102.238 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 02:26:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Tightening the Noose any such obligations and restricted its remaining responsibilities to fulfilling “basic humanitarian needs” and “avoid[ing] harm to the civilian population that finds itself in the combat zone.”56 Citing the Fourth Geneva Convention, specifically Articles 70 and 54 of the First Protocol, Israel maintained that it was not required “to allow passage of non-essential goods or of goods in amounts that exceed what is required for basic humanitarian needs.”57 In practice, this interpretation made it possible for Israel to allow a bare minimum of essential goods and supplies into the Strip while asserting its right to continue targeting it militarily.

Refining the Gaza Watchman System

Having redefined the terms of engagement by evacuating the Gaza Strip, the Israeli political, military, and legal establishments were now able to describe the territory as a state-like entity, which they officially considered a “hostile entity.” In the words of Public Security Minister , “This [decision] allows Israel to order a number of administrative sanctions against the Gaza Strip, of course on condition they don’t cross the red line in terms of inflicting humanitarian damage.”58 The United States was also concerned about perceptions of such “damage.” As far back as June 2006, U.S. officials had highlighted that European and international support for an Israeli isolation policy could be sustained only “by ensuring that Hamas cannot blame Israel or the U.S. for a humanitarian crisis in the West Bank and Gaza.”59 According to former foreign minister Livni, acceptance of Israel’s policy was immediate, both among allies and in diplomatic circles, and it grew in the weeks following the designation. As plans for the November Annapolis conference firmed up, Livni found that no one—whether Quartet representatives, individual diplomats, or PA officials—questioned Israel’s authority to do what it did.60 Assured that Israel would not precipitate a humanitarian crisis, U.S. Secretary of State gave a nod of approval the same day the policy was announced. Speaking in alongside Foreign Minister Livni, Rice stated that Hamas represented “a hostile entity to the United States as well.”61 While no one questioned Israel’s authority to declare Gaza a hostile entity, Livni notes, the central concern in diplomatic circles was that “an appropriate humanitarian standard” be maintained and that positive developments in Gaza be attributed to the Ramallah-based PA under Mahmud Abbas.62 To enforce its Gaza-as-hostile-territory policy, Israel relied on its tight control over land crossings into the Strip, instructing the military to take direct charge of policy implementation and supervision. Since initial restrictions on movement and trade in the form of closures in the aftermath of the 1990–91 Gulf War, Israel’s grip on Gaza had tightened over the years to include the construction of a fence, the imposition of full closures at short notice, and the erosion of market accessibility for Palestinian exporters and importers based in Gaza.63 Terms such as “red lines” and “humanitarian damage” were not merely rhetorical, but represented deeply practical matters of policy implementation. Under an elaborate system of control and supervision, Israel’s Gaza policy became institutionalized through the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), a branch of the Ministry of Defense responsible for civilian matters pertaining to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, reporting to the defense minister and the chief

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This content downloaded from 130.58.102.238 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 02:26:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Tightening the Noose of general staff. In line with policy principles, COGAT established procedures to monitor and assess the transfer of goods to the Strip. In the document entitled “Food Consumption in the Gaza Strip— Red Lines,” COGAT calculated anticipated food consumption according to age and gender, and it specified the volume of “humanitarian products” that would be permitted to enter the territory “in order to allow for a basic fabric of life in the Gaza Strip.”64 AcentralobjectiveofCOGAT’s monitoring system as outlined in the so-called red lines document was “to identify the point of intervention for prevention of malnutrition in the Gaza Strip.”65 Using standardized forms for the assessment of depleted stocks, COGAT officials were tasked with maintaining detailed inventories of the transfer of food items, animal feed, and poultry to Gaza. Data in each category was compiled, reviewed, and reported weekly to the Israeli defense leadership.66 The defense minister or the chief of general staff would regularly be briefed on the status of the situation in Gaza.67 Calculations of the Gaza population’s basic food needs were made according to a “minimum basket” allowing “nutrition that is sufficient for subsistence without the development of malnutrition.”68 Food consumption data in the Gaza Strip was estimated according to a health index of average daily portions per person, with specifications on caloric intake by gender and age, ranging from the age of two to above the age of fifty-one. The movement of trucks into Gaza, set at 106 per day, five days per week, including 77 trucks of basic food, was determined by Israeli officials to cover the needs of an estimated population of 1,480,000 people, leaving a “safety margin” that would ensure “[t]he stability of the humanitarian effort critical to prevent the development of malnutrition.”69 Israeli defense officials calculated the “breathing space” of a given product on the basis of what COGAT knew to be existing reserves in Gaza, allowing them to estimate how long it would take for stocks to run out. In order to prevent a crisis and avoid starvation, the COGAT inventory system included different warning lines: the upper warning line, the lower warning line, and the warning of a shortage. This last merited action “to increase the transfer of relevant products unless it is a case of a policy of deliberate restriction.”70 The warning lines served COGAT in its role as overseer of the transfer of basic supplies to ensure survival in a situation that allowed “sustenance under the circumstances.”71 The meticulous bureaucratic mechanisms to ensure compliance in implementing the Israeli policy included lists of products permitted into Gaza, and a standard procedure to be followed by persons inside Gaza making goods-related transfer requests. Products allowed for transfer were organized according to the broad categories of “long shelf life,”“short shelf life,”72 and “oil and gas.”73 According to the established inventory system, each individual item requested for transfer would be assessed by COGAT in line with the perceived need and quota set by the Israeli authorities. COGAT would make decisions on a case by case basis, according to a set of criteria, including the requirement that a product meet “humanitarian needs,” whether the product was considered “aluxury,” the potential implications of the product’stransferandusageinGaza, concerns over possible “dual use” (i.e., whether the product could be used for military ends), perceived international sensitivity, and whether an alternative product already existed in Gaza.74 Approval for the transfer rested primarily on the assessment of the product as “necessary to the survival of the civilian population.”75 As a result, mundane items such as chocolate, jam, children’s

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This content downloaded from 130.58.102.238 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 02:26:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Tightening the Noose clothing, A4 paper, and wood were banned from transfer into Gaza for over three years. Though COGAT had the final word on the transfer of goods, the bureaucratic machinery entrusted with implementing and monitoring the Gaza blockade included representatives from the Palestinian Coordination Committee (PCC), which operated from Gaza under the guidance of the Ramallah-based PA. In cooperation with the Israeli security establishment, the PCC’smaintasksincludedcompilinglistsofgoodsrequestedfortransferbylocal merchants and the communication of such lists to the Israeli authorities.76 Speaking to the Turkel Commission in 2010, the head of COGAT, Major-General Eitan Dangot, highlighted the role of the PCC, describing relations with the West Bank–based PA as “direct and active” throughout the period of the blockade.77 For Israel, an essential element of the success of its Gaza policy was the increasing involvement of the PA in Gazan affairs.78 If positive developments in Gaza could be attributed to the PA, so the Israeli reasoning went, the population would support the PA rather than Hamas, and thus the latter would be undermined. According to Defense Minister , “The isolation and weakening of Hamas, as compared to the Palestinian Authority, [was] objective number one.”79 This scripted role of the Ramallah-based PA ultimately contributed to further fragmenting the Palestinian political front, fuelling tensions between the West Bank and Gaza at a time when the people of Gaza were subject to considerable hardship.

Institutionalized Impoverishment

Prior to 2007, some 95 percent of productive inputs were imported to Gaza from Israel, while Israeli buyers accounted for 70 percent of the Gazan export market.80 The economic hardship for the Gazan population—half of whom are children under eighteen—triggered by the Israeli restrictions on imports and exports was thus entirely predictable. After the Israeli security cabinet’s September 2007 decision to put the Gaza Strip under perpetual full closure, what remained of the Strip’s legal economy collapsed almost instantly. By September 2008, one year into the blockade, the Palestinian Federation of Industries estimated that 98 percent of businesses had been forced to shut down, throwing Gaza into an economic crisis.81 Based on household income—excluding remittances from abroad and food assistance from international aid agencies—the poverty rate in Gaza quickly rose to 79 percent, with about two- thirds of the population living in deep poverty.82 Restrictions on imports played a critical role in precipitating the decline, as the average import figure dropped dramatically to about one-fifth of previous levels. This volume of imports achieved the Israeli target of allowing in only what Israel deemed necessary to avoid malnutrition or a humanitarian crisis.83 Israel’s narrow definition of humanitarian supplies left Gazan manufacturers and workers in a bind. Only 114 types of items could be imported, with raw materials and inputs for industries firmly excluded. As a result, Gaza businessmen who had traded with Israel for decades could no longer sustain their operations and closed shop, leaving thousands of people unemployed.84 Aban on imports of construction materials—vital to the development of Gaza and its ever-growing population—resulted in the suspension of internationally funded large-scale projects, with local

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This content downloaded from 130.58.102.238 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 02:26:58 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Tightening the Noose contractors forced to lay off their workers. Prior to the tightened restrictions, construction supplies had accounted for more than half of total imports into Gaza.85 Similarly, agricultural exports—which had been identified as a priority with respect to both employment opportunities and economic prosperity in the post-2005 evacuation era—quickly faltered.86 Before September 2007, agricultural produce exported from Gaza to the Israeli market reached a monthly average of more than one thousand truckloads. After Hamas’stakeoverand the designation of the territory as a hostile entity in 2007, the entire sector collapsed. From an average export figure of 47 truckloads per day prior to the blockade, a total of 327 truckloads were allowed out over a period of three and a half years.87 Gaza farmers who had built their lives on the export of vegetables, and even cash crops such as strawberries and carnations, saw their livelihoods disappear, leaving families who had lived on agricultural production prone to economic hardship and, in some cases, destitution. Gaza’s infrastructure and civilian assets, as well as its industrial and agricultural sectors had been and would be further devastated by military assaults on the Strip. For decades, periods of calm had been punctuated by Israeli military attacks. However, in the summer of 2006, in February–March 2008, and Operation Cast Lead in December 2008–January 2009 indicated the extent to which Israeli policymakers and army leadership relied on military means to undermine local leadership and destroy productive assets, leaving the civilian population to suffer the brunt of the devastation. On 27 December, fewer than ten days after a visit to Jordan by Prime Minister Olmert and Defense Minister Barak, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead with an aerial bombardment of Gaza. A few days later, on 3 January 2009, the ground invasion commenced. The stated aim of the Israeli military was to put an end to rocket fire from Gaza, but targets were as disparate as industrial plants in the northern part of the Strip, the Gaza American School, and the individual houses of Gaza civilians. The offensive wrought immense destruction: by the time Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire at midnight on 17 January 2009, more than 1,400 Palestinians had been killed and about 4,000 homes had been destroyed. The BBC likened parts of Gaza to “an earthquake zone” and early estimates indicated that assets in excess of $1 billion had been lost.88 Some 46 percent of Gaza’s agricultural land had been damaged or was deemed inaccessible,89 and more than 1,100 private sector establishments, including small industries, had been totally or partially destroyed.90 The Gaza business community was completely shattered. The hostile separation from the Israeli economy and the devastation resulting from the three- week offensive created a state of economic shock with long-term consequences including unprecedented levels of unemployment. A comprehensive study of Israeli-Palestinian economic relations in 2006 had specifically warned against the separation of the two economies, highlighting the heavy price the Palestinian population would pay.91 The private sector had constituted the backbone of the Gaza labor market for decades, accounting for more than 50 percent of total employment.92 By the end of 2010, however, only one-third of companies that had been operational in early 2006 were still functioning, most of them at very low capacity.93 As a result of this erosion of the labor market, unemployment reached 39 percent in the second quarter of 2010—a dramatic surge from the 17 percent recorded in the early years after the Oslo accords.94

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It is estimated that 120,000 people lost their jobs in the private sector as a result of the blockade, including 34,000 in the industrial sector and 40,000 in the agricultural sector.95 As these job losses directly affected up to 700,000 dependent family members, Gaza’s fabric of self-sufficiency was effectively destroyed. The structural weakening of the Gaza economy saw living standards plunge well below 1994 levels, and food insecurity and aid dependence became a reality for hundreds of thousands of people.96 Denied the opportunity to fend for themselves, or to maintain a certain standard of living through the income of a breadwinner in the family, much of the population became reliant on food aid. In a market completely distorted by external factors, ordinary people who had lost their jobs joined the food queues, where limited handouts provided the basic sustenance allowed into Gaza through the COGAT bureaucracy and its control mechanisms. Highlighting the consequences of Israel’s policy, UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes noted that the destruction of hundreds of thousands of lives and livelihoods had become “the collective price that Gaza’s civilians must pay for the acts of a few among them.”97 A 2010 UN study revealed the scale and precariousness of Gaza’s food security situation. After three years of severe access restrictions, 52 percent of the Gazan population was deemed food insecure, 13 percent vulnerable to food insecurity, and another 16 percent considered only marginally food secure. A mere 19 percent qualified as being food secure, meaning they had the means and access to meet required needs.98 With food insecurity reaching such staggering levels, the two largest UN agencies operating in Gaza stepped in, providing direct food assistance to 1.1 million people. Approximately 750,000 people received a basic food basket from the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), while another 350,000 people were provided food aid under the World Food Programme (WFP).99 Just as Dov Weissglas had prescribed in 2006, Gaza had indeed been placed on a diet—aregimen formulated, endorsed, and implemented by Israel’s political, military, and security establishments and supported by the international community. The policy of isolation, fragmentation, and institutionalized impoverishment had succeeded.

Postscript

In a meeting with U.S. officials in May 2006, Foreign Minister Livni was asked whether the endgame of Israel’s proposed policy on Gaza would be “to put a noose around Hamas’sneck.”100 Almost eight years on from that meeting, the noose certainly remains in place. However, rather than being strangled by Israeli policies, Hamas continues to control the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, the main burden of the blockade is being carried by ordinary people, as prophesized by Dov Weissglas on the eve of its imposition. Today, around 80 percent of Gaza’s population is estimated to be aid dependent. For years, a network of tunnels linking Gaza with Egypt has provided a lifeline to both Hamas and the general public.101 Largely replacing the legal economy, the tunnel economy enabled access to basic goods (for those who could afford them) beyond the trickle allowed from Israel. It also created an entirely new class of businessmen associated with Hamas. But political developments in

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Egypt during the second half of 2013 have intensified the chokehold on Gaza. After the removal of Egypt’s President Morsi in early July 2013, relations with Gaza took a new and far more restrictive turn, and hundreds of tunnels were destroyed or closed in a clampdown by the Egyptian authorities. This has completely crippled economic activity in the Strip, in addition to drying up Hamas’s funding sources and stripping the organization of a key ally. At the time of writing, Gaza’s Palestinians are facing a double blockade—one implemented by Israel, the other by Egypt. Unsurprisingly, the result is further destruction of livelihoods and deepening poverty. UNRWA, the largest provider of relief assistance in the Strip, has indicated that demand for food aid is expected to increase by 10 to 20 percent in 2014 alone. Concurrently, Hamas has presented a $589 million budget forecasting a 75 percent deficit, laying the blame for the latest economic downturn at Egypt’sdoor. The well-being of Gaza’s population thus continues to be used as a lever in political maneuvers, both domestic and regional, by all the key actors. To Israeli decision makers, the welfare of Gaza remains the ultimate bargaining chip with which to pressure Hamas, exacerbate tensions between Palestinian factions, and cement the West Bank-Gaza split. The policy implemented in pursuit of such objectives follows well-known and well-rehearsed patterns of control. Meanwhile, in response to the challenges before them, Palestinian political leaders have moved further apart. Clinging on to their slivers of land, both Hamas and the Ramallah-based PA have rallied core supporters at home and cheerleaders abroad, seeking vindication rather than unification, as ordinary people continue paying the price. The noose has indeed tightened. Yet beyond isolation, fragmentation, and chronic economic hardship through institutionalized impoverishment, the endgame appears as elusive as ever.

About the Author Trude Strand is a doctoral research fellow in history at the University of Oslo. Her PhD research focuses on Israeli policy vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip, 1967–2010. Strand spent over three years in Gaza, where she worked for the UN. This article, for which she is solely and personally responsible, expresses the findings of the author’s research, and in no way reflects the view of the UN. The author would like to thank Aidan O’Leary, former deputy director of UNRWA Operations in Gaza, for the permission to use the term “insti- tutionalized impoverishment.” The term was coined by O’Leary during discussions in Gaza in June 2011. She would also like to thank Philippe Grandet.

ENDNOTES

1 Amnon Meranda, “Olmert: No Fuel? Gazans Can Walk,” News, 21 January 2008. 2 Testimony by former foreign minister Tzipi Livni to the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010 (Turkel Commission), Session 14, 25 October 2010, p. 12. 3 See Sara Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995, 2001); Amira Hass, Drinking the Sea at Gaza: Days and Nights in a Land under Siege (New York: Henry Holt, 1999); and Sara Roy, Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (London: Pluto Press, 2007). 4 The Turkel Commission was set up by the Israeli government in June 2010 to investigate what became known as the Mavi Marmara incident. On 31 May of that year, Israeli soldiers boarded one of six ships in an international flotilla destined to break the blockade on the Gaza Strip. Nine passengers were killed and another fifty-nine injured as a result of the raid, and Israel set up its own independent commission of inquiry in response to an international outcry. The

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commission was charged, inter alia, with examining whether the naval blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip complied with the rules of (para. 4a of the government’s resolution) and whether the actions carried out by Israel to enforce the naval blockade on 31 May 2010 complied with the rules of international law (para. 4b of the government’s resolution). With minor exceptions, the proceedings were held in English and transcribed by a stenographer. Testimonieswerepublishedonthewebsiteofthecommissionandaccessedbytheauthorin December 2010 and January 2011. While the original documents are not paginated, pagination has been completed by the author according to the format of the documents at the time of publication. The testimonies comprise almost one thousand pages of source material. See http://turkel-committee.gov.il/index.html and http://turkel-committee.gov.il/content-49.html. Official U.S. documents used include material released through the web site www.wikileaks.org. 5 Israel Prime Minister’sOffice,“Overall Concept of the Disengagement Plan,” 15 April 2004. 6 The Quartet on the Middle East consists of the United States, the European Union, , and the United Nations. It was established in Madrid in 2002 to bring together entities engaged in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 7 U.S. State Department, “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 30 April 2003. 8 Ari Shavit, “Top PM Aide: Gaza Plan Aims to Freeze the Peace Process,” Ha’Aretz, 6 October 2004. See also interview with Ariel Sharon in Uri Dan, Ariel Sharon: An Intimate Portrait (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 236. According to Sharon, “Without an initiative on my part, Israel would have had to enter into negotiations that would have ended in an agreement imposed on us from the outside.” 9 Testimony by Tzipi Livni to the Turkel Commission, p. 6. 10 Israel Prime Minister’sOffice,“Overall Concept of the Disengagement Plan,” 15 April 2004. These points are emphasized in President George W. Bush’s letter of assurances to Sharon, which also formally accepts, inter alia, Israel’s interpretation of the road map as demanding the complete end to Palestinian violence before any action is required of Israel and Israel’s right to maintain “major Israeli population centers” in the West Bank. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Letter from US President George W. Bush to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon,” 14 April 2004. 11 See judgment of the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, 27 January 2008, Jaber al-Bassiouni Ahmed and others v. Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, HCJ 9132/07 (30 January 2008), p. 9, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/07/320/091/n25/070913320.n.25.pdf. For detailed discussions of the Israeli position on the legal status of Gaza, see Gisha, “Disengaged Occupiers: The Legal Status of Gaza,” Gisha, January 2007; Yuval Shany, “The Law Applicable to Non-Occupied Gaza: A Comment on Bassiouni v. Prime Minister of Israel,” the International Law Forum of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Law Faculty, February 2009; and Gisha, “Scale of Control: Israel’s Continued Responsibility in the Gaza Strip,” November 2011. 12 See testimony of military advocate general, Gen. Avihai Mandelblit to the Turkel Commission, session 6, 26 August 2010, p. 14. 13 Israel Prime Minister’sOffice,“Overall Concept of the Disengagement Plan,” 15 April 2004. 14 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “PM Sharon Addresses the United Nations General Assembly,” 15 September 2005. 15 Gerald Butt, Life at the Crossroads: A History of Gaza (Nicosia: Rimal Publications, 1995, 2009), p. 20. 16 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Gaza-Jericho Agreement—Annex IV Economic Protocol,” 29 April 1994. 17 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Agreement on Movement and Access” and “Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing,” 15 November 2005. 18 Israel Prime Minister’sOffice,“Addendum A—Revised Disengagement Plan—Main Principles,” 6 June 2004. 19 Roy, Failing Peace,p.256.

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20 Alan Johnston, “All Eyes on Gaza’s Fragile Future,” BBC News, 11 September 2005. 21 International Crisis Group, “Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration,” International Crisis Group Middle East Report, no. 49 (18 January 2006), p. 4, and Yitzhak Benhorin, “Rice: PA Will Eventually Disarm Hamas,” Ynet News, 1 October 2005. 22 Steven R. Weisman, “Rice Admits U.S. Underestimated Hamas Strength,” New York Times,29January 2006. 23 Herb Keinon, “PM Overrules Mofaz on Hamas,” Jerusalem Post, 6 November 2005. 24 Classified (confidential) diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in , reference ID 05TELAVIV6875, “Mofaz tells A/S Welch he will shut Karni, Erez if PA does not implement November 15 agreement,” 10 December 2005. Cable released on 30 August 2011 and available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05TELAVIV6875.html#. According to Tzipi Livni’stestimonyto the Turkel Commission (pp. 8–9), Olmert henceforth focused on the “day after” and embarked on a campaign to delegitimize Hamas internationally in its new participatory role. 25 Testimony by Tzipi Livni to the Turkel Commission, pp. 8–9. 26 Testimony by Tzipi Livni to the Turkel Commission, p. 9. 27 United Nations, “Quartet Statement,” 30 January 2006. 28 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Cabinet Communique,” 19 February 2006. 29 Sheera Claire Frenkel, “Netanyahu Warns of Birth of Hamastan,” Jerusalem Post, 26 January 2006. 30 Benn, “U.S. Backs Israel on Aid for Humanitarian Groups, not Hamas,” Ha’Aretz, 16 February 2006, and “Israel to consider Palestinian sanctions,” 18 February 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/ WORLD/meast/02/18/hamas.abbas/ . 31 Soon after Hamas’s electoral victory, Abbas took steps to create parallel security and other structures in order to bypass the Hamas-led government. 32 Testimony by Tzipi Livni to the Turkel Commission, pp. 10–13. 33 Testimony by Tzipi Livni to the Turkel Commission, p. 11. 34 Classified (secret) diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, reference ID 06TELAVIV1319, “Israeli DefMin tells A/S Welch Israel will take no action against Hamas, will not talk with a Hamas government,” 4 April 2006. Cable released on 30 August 2011 and available at http://wikileaks.org/ cable/2006/04/06TELAVIV1319.html. 35 Classified (confidential) diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, reference ID 06TELAVIV1318, “FM Livni seeks new mechanism for delivering aid to Palestinians,” 4 April 2006. Cable released on 30 August 2011 and available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/ 06TELAVIV1318.html#. 36 Classified (confidential) diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, reference ID 06TELAVIV991, “Israeli MOD’s Amos Gilad on Gaza-West Bank crossings, Suleiman visit and Iran,” 10 March 2006. Cable released on 30 August 2011 and available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/ 2006/03/06TELAVIV991.html#. 37 Cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, reference ID 06TELAVIV1318, “FM Livni seeks new mechanism.” 38 Classified (secret) diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, reference ID 06TELAVIV1981, “FM Livni promotes financial pressure strategy,” 19 May 2006. Cable released on 30 August 2011 and available at http://wikileaks.lu/cable/2006/05/06TELAVIV1981.html#. 39 Cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, reference ID 06TELAVIV1981, “FM Livni promotes financial pressure strategy.” 40 Testimony by Tzipi Livni to the Turkel Commission, p. 11. 41 In mid-November 2005, Prime Minister Sharon called for new elections after having left the Likud party to form Kadima (Forward). The move was prompted by the ideological fallout within the party over the decision to implement the Gaza pullout. Sharon was followed by several high-

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profile Likud members, including Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni. He was also joined by Haim Ramon (Labor). All those who joined the new party supported the disengagement policy. By the time of Israeli elections in March 2006, Sharon had suffered an incapacitating stroke, leaving Ehud Olmert as caretaker prime minister. Having won 22 percent of the vote, Kadima formed a government coalition alongside Labor, Shas, and Gil (and later ). 42 Classified (secret) diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, reference ID 07TELAVIV1918, “Israel weighing alternative responses to Hamas takeover of Gaza,” 22 June 2007. Cable released on 30 August 2011 and available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07TELAVIV1918.html#. 43 Testimony of Defense Minister Ehud Barak to the Turkel Commission, Session 3, 10 August 2010, p. 10. 44 Cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, reference ID 07TELAVIV1918, “Israel weighing alternative responses.” 45 See Roni Singer-Heruti, Barak Ravid, and Nir Hasson, “Roughly 100,000 People Rally in Tel Aviv to Call on PM, Peretz to Quit,” Ha’Aretz, 2 May 2007, and “Global Note: Olmert under Fire,” Time, 3 May 2007. 46 Aaron Klein, “Netanyahu: Gaza Evacuation a Reward for Terror,” World Net Daily, 3 June 2005. 47 Conal Urquhart, “Netanyahu Quits over Withdrawal from Gaza,” Guardian, 8 August 2005. 48 Amnon Meranda, “Netanyahu: I warned of Hamastan,” Ynet News,17June2007. 49 “Israel threatens to Cut Gaza Supplies over Rockets,” Agence -Presse, 3 September 2007, http:// www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jQNXd7du08nnrmSOxjEvJUvX2lQQ?hl=en. 50 Classified (confidential) diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, reference ID 07TELAVIV2707, “Pressure building on Israeli government to address terror threat from Gaza Strip,” 7 September 2007. Cable released on 30 August 2011 and available at http://wikileaks.org/ cable/2007/09/07TELAVIV2707.html#. 51 In a public opinion poll published by Yedi’ot Aharonot on 7 September 2007, 72 percent of those polled supported an immediate halt in water and electricity supplies to Gaza following every rocket attack. 52 Dov Weissglas, “An Embargo on Gaza: Economic Sanctions That Would Hurt Gazans Permitted by International Law,” Ynet News, 6 September 2007. Arguments made by Weissglas were echoed in the testimonies to the Turkel Commission by Israel’s former chief military advocate general, Gen. Avihai Mandelblit (Session 6, 26 August 2010). 53 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Security Cabinet Declares Gaza Hostile Territory,” 19 September 2007. 54 Text of the decision adopted by the Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs, 19 September 2007, as cited in Jaber al-Bassiouni Ahmed, HCJ 9132/07, p. 2. 55 Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs, as cited in Jaber al-Bassiouni Ahmed, HCJ 9132/07, pp. 2–3. 56 Jaber al-Bassiouni Ahmed, HCJ 9132/07, 30 January 2008, p. 9. Full case deliberations available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/07/320/091/n25/07091320.n25.pdf. 57 Jaber al-Bassiouni Ahmed, HCJ 9132/07, p. 11. 58 Barak Ravid, “IDF Formulates Plan to Limit Services to Civilians in Gaza,” Ha’Aretz, 19 September 2007. 59 Classified (confidential) diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, reference ID 06TELAVIV2225, “Peretz says he will take risks to help the Palestinians,” 9 June 2006. Cable released on 30 August 2011 and available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06TELAVIV2225. html#. 60 Testimony by Tzipi Livni to the Turkel Commission, pp. 25–28. 61 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference with FM Livni and US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice,” 19 September 2007. 62 Testimony by Tzipi Livni to the Turkel Commission, pp. 25–28.

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63 Arie Arnon and Jimmy Weinblatt, “Sovereignty and Economic Development: The Case of Israel and Palestine,” Economic Journal 111 (June 2001), p. 298; Roy, Failing Peace, pp. 102–4andpp.257–58; and Roy, Gaza Strip, pp. 312–13. 64 Ministry of Defense, Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories, “Food Consumption in the Gaza Strip—Red Lines,” 1 January 2008. Unofficial translation into English by Gisha, available through Ha’Aretz at http://www.haaretz.com/resources/Pdf/red-lines.pdf. 65 Ministry of Defense, “Food Consumption.” 66 Testimony by the head of COGAT, Maj.-Gen. Eitan Dangot to the Turkel Commission, Session 7, 31 August 2010, p. 42. See also p. 91, 93, and 98. 67 Testimony by Avihai Mandelblit to the Turkel Commission, p. 57. 68 Ministry of Defense, “Food consumption.” 69 Ministry of Defense, Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories, “Food Consumption in the Gaza Strip—Red Lines,” 27 January 2008. Unofficial translation into English by Gisha, available through Ha’Aretz at http://www.haaretz.com/resources/Pdf/red-lines.pdf. 70 COGAT letter to Gisha, “Re: Administrative Petition 2744/09 Gisha v. Ministry of Defense—Transfer of Documents Requested in the Petition,” 13 October 2010. See “Procedure for Monitoring and Assessing Inventories in the Gaza Strip,” COGAT Economic Branch with reference to order no. 605, April 2009, p. 2. See also testimony by Eitan Dangot to the Turkel Commission, p. 52. 71 Testimony by Eitan Dangot to the Turkel Commission, p. 59. See also p. 65. 72 COGAT letter to Gisha, “Re: Administrative Petition 2744/09,” Procedure for Monitoring and Assessing Inventories in the Gaza Strip, COGAT Economic Branch with reference to order no. 605, April 2009. 73 See COGAT letter to Gisha, “Re: Administrative Petition 2744/09,” Appendix A: Table of Products, COGAT Economic Branch with reference to order no. 605, April 2009. 74 COGAT letter to Gisha, “Re: Administrative Petition 2744/09,” Permission to Transfer Goods into the Gaza Strip, COGAT Economic Branch with reference to order no. 606, July 2009. 75 COGAT letter to Gisha, “Re: Your Requests Regarding Policies on Permitting the Entry of Goods to the Gaza Strip,” 13 January 2010. Letter available in unofficial translation to English at http://www.gisha. org/UserFiles/File/COGAT_response_130110English.pdf. 76 Testimony by Eitan Dangot to the Turkel Commission, p. 51. See also pp. 37–38 and pp. 40–41. 77 Testimony by Eitan Dangot to the Turkel Commission, p. 11. See also pp. 37–38. 78 Testimony by Eitan Dangot to the Turkel Commission, p. 17. 79 Testimony by Ehud Barak to the Turkel Commission, p. 10. 80 World Bank, “Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid, Access and Reform,” World Bank,22September 2008, p. 22, and Mohammed Skaik, “Gaza Private Sector Performance,” PalTrade, 21 February 2011. 81 World Bank, “Palestinian Economic Prospects,” p. 22. 82 World Bank, “Palestinian Economic Prospects,” p. 20. 83 Gisha, “Reconstructing the Closure,” Gisha, December 2010. See also testimony by Eitan Dangot to the Turkel Commission, p. 72. 84 Gisha, “Three Years of Gaza Closure—by the Numbers,” Gisha, 14 June 2010. 85 Skaik, “Gaza Private Sector Performance.” 86 “Rice Announces Israel, Palestinian Agreement on Movement, Access,” Reliefweb,15November 2005, http://reliefweb.int/node/191918. 87 The calculation covers Gaza exports in the period from 14 June 2007 until the end of 2010. See Skaik, “Gaza Private Sector Performance.” 88 “Gaza ‘Looks Like an Earthquake Zone,’” BBC News, 19 January 2009.

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89 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)—Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People, “Gaza One Year after Report. Early Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment,” UNDP, May 2010, p. 67. 90 UNDP, “Gaza One Year After Report,” p. 73. 91 See PalTrade and the Peres Center for Peace, “The Untapped Potential: Palestinian-Israeli Economic Relations: Policy Options and Recommendations,” October 2006, p. 8. 92 “The Private Sector in Gaza,” Portland Trust, December 2010, economic feature. 93 “Private Sector in Gaza,” Portland Trust. 94 World Bank, “The Underpinnings of the Future Palestinian State: Sustainable Growth and Institutions,” World Bank, 21 September 2010, p. 9, and the International Monetary Fund, “Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework for the West Bank and Gaza: Seventh Review of Progress,” IMF, 13 April 2011, p. 25. 95 UN OCHA, “Locked In: The Humanitarian Impact of Two Years of Blockade on the Gaza Strip,” UN OCHA oPt, August 2009. See also World Bank, “Palestinian Economic Prospects,” 22 September 2008, p. 22. 96 International Monetary Fund, “Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework for the West Bank and Gaza: Sixth Review of Progress,” IMF, 21 September 2010, p. 3, and the World Bank, “Building the Palestinian State: Sustaining Growth, Institutions and Service Delivery,” World Bank, 13 April 2011, p. 11. 97 John Holmes, “Life and Livelihoods in Gaza Are Being Made Impossible,” European Voice,30April 2009. 98 The World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics (PCBS), “2010 Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey: West Bank and Gaza Strip, occupied Palestinian territory,” WFP/FAO (2010), p. 8. 99 UNDP, “Gaza One Year After Report,” p. 109. 100 Cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, reference ID 06TELAVIV1981, “FM Livni promotes financial pressure strategy.” 101 See Nicolas Pelham, “Gaza’sTunnelComplex,” Middle East Research and Information Project, no. 261 (Winter 2011), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer261/gazas-tunnel-complex. See also Tomer Avital, “Peres Center: Israel Failed to Curb Hamas’ Financial Power,” Ynet News, 10 June 2011.

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