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Dr-Thesis-2015-Frode-Løvlie.Pdf (3.639Mb) 7KHLQVWLWXWLRQDOWUDMHFWRU\RI+DPDV )URPUDGLFDOLVPWRSUDJPDWLVP²DQGEDFNDJDLQ" )URGH/¡YOLH Dissertation for the degree philosophiae doctor (PhD) at the University of Bergen Dissertation date: 0DUFK © Copyright Frode Løvlie The material in this publication is protected by copyright law. Year: 2015 Title: The institutional trajectory of Hamas From radicalism to pragmatism—and back again? Author: Frode Løvlie In memory of my father v Contents Illustrations xiii Tables xiv Abstract xv Acknowledgments xvi Chapter 1: Introduction 17 1.1 Research outline: Hamas as a case of party institutionalization 19 1.1.1 Institutionalization explained 19 1.1.2 From movement … 21 1.1.3 … toward institutionalized political party 22 1.2 Consequences of Palestinian politics ordinary politics 23 1.2.1 Hamas as a party—the empirical rationale 24 1.2.2 The theoretical case for traveling to Palestine 26 1.3 The analytical framework 27 1.3.1 Party institutionalization in Palestine 28 1.3.2 The roots of Hamas—a social movement organization in Palestine 30 1.3.3 The institutionalization of Hamas as a political party 34 The process of institutionalization 34 Institutionalization as a property variable 37 1.3.4 Tracing the process and measuring the degree of institutionalization 40 The criteria 42 1.4 Structure of thesis 44 Chapter 2: Researching Hamas—methods, sources, and data 50 2.1 Comparative case studies as a remedy to ideological bias 51 2.1.1 Theoretical comparisons 53 2.1.2 Within-case comparison 54 vi The spatial aspects 54 Temporal comparison 54 2.2 Sources and the quality of “occupied” data 56 2.2.1 Fieldwork and expert interviews—some reflections 56 The fieldwork localities and the interviewees 58 Sampling, translating, interpreting, and facilitating 63 Reciprocity and credibility under occupation 65 2.2.2 Questions of quality in the extant literature 69 The common problem 69 The culturalist biases—pro et contra both Israel and Palestine 70 Useful nevertheless—secondary sources used 73 2.2.3 Numbers from the occupied territories 74 Palestinian public opinion 74 Chapter 3: Historical and contextual background 78 3.1 A brief history of the Israel-Palestine conflict 79 3.1.1 From the Ottomans to the nakba (1880s–1948) 79 3.1.2 From the nakba to The Six-Day War (1948–1967) 83 3.1.3 From occupation to the intifada (1967–1987) 86 3.2 The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 89 3.2.1 The organization 90 3.2.2 From a diaspora of diplomats to exiled guerrillas 92 3.2.3 Fatah—powerful and pragmatic 94 3.3 The Muslim Brotherhood—Hamas’s ancestor 97 3.3.1 The Society of the Muslim Brothers 97 The first 20 years at a glance 98 Ideology and strategies 100 Organizational characteristics 102 3.3.2 The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood 104 Egyptian and Jordanian rule (1948–1967) 104 vii The Israeli occupation (1967–1987) 106 Chapter 4: Enter Hamas—the intifada years (1987–1993) 110 4.1 The establishment of Hamas 111 4.1.1 Competing narratives and the creation of Hamas 112 4.1.2 The founding of a social movement organization 115 Exploiting the opportunities 115 Religious mobilizing structures 118 Hamas’s stated aims interpreted as frames 119 4.2 The building and rebuilding of an organization 122 4.2.1 Persecution and organizational restructuring 123 Amman and the Political Bureau 125 A militant proxy with an armed wing 128 4.2.2 A rudimentary organizational structure 130 The formal structure 131 Decision-making 133 4.3 Hamas at the end of the first intifada 136 4.4 Hamas’s level of institutionalization at the end of the first intifada 138 4.4.1 Systemness 139 4.4.2 Decisional autonomy 140 4.4.3 Value infusion 141 4.4.4 Reification 141 Chapter 5: Hamas and the Oslo years (1994–1999) 144 5.1 A new Palestinian politics 145 5.1.1 The Palestinian National Authority 146 5.1.2 The de-development of occupied Palestine 148 Continued violence 149 The rise of Likud in Israel 152 De-development 153 viii 5.2 Arrested development—Hamas in the new system 155 5.2.1 From movement toward party and the legacy of violence 156 5.2.2 The question of identity and ideology 158 Continued commitment 159 Toward moderation 161 Confused ideology 164 Inconsistent identity 166 5.2.3 Organizational development under persecution 166 The formal structure and intra-party democracy 167 A new composition: persecution, recruitment, and defection 171 The dominance of the Bureau and the Brigades—electoral boycott and violence 173 Gaza obtains factional dominance—renewed moderation 177 5.3 Hamas after Oslo—still more movement than party 179 5.3.1 Partial ideological moderation 179 5.3.2 Patchy organizational development 180 5.3.3 Still movement, not yet party 182 5.4 Hamas’s level of institutionalization at the end of the 1990s 183 5.4.1 Systemness 183 5.4.2 Decisional autonomy 184 5.4.3 Value infusion 185 5.4.4 Reification 186 Chapter 6: Hamas and the second intifada (2000–2006) 187 6.1 The second intifada and the death of Oslo 188 6.1.1 Palestinian violence and the rise of Hamas 191 6.1.2 The institutionalization of the Palestinian political system 194 From presidentialism to semi-presidentialism 195 A new electoral system 197 6.2 Hamas developing—reactive progress 199 ix 6.2.1 The eventual adoption of a pragmatic ideology 200 Continued ambiguity 202 The reinterpretation and demotion of the 1988 Charter 203 The (re)articulation of ends 204 6.2.2 Organizational survival under persecution 208 Mass arrests and the rank-and-file 209 Targeted assassinations and the dominant faction 214 Demonstrating maturity and stability 216 6.3 The dual roles of Hamas—between movement and party 222 6.3.1 A political party will participate in elections … 223 The effects of institutions 223 Push factors and political opportunism 224 Internal deliberations, decision-making, and the limits of intra-party democracy 226 The campaign 230 6.3.2 … but a movement might refuse to govern 231 Surprise victory 231 A reluctant winner 233 6.4 Hamas’s level of institutionalization at the end of the second intifada 236 6.4.1 Systemness 236 6.4.2 Decisional autonomy 237 6.4.3 Value infusion 239 6.4.4 Reification 239 Chapter 7: Hamas—between government and resistance (2006–2011) 241 7.1 The disintegration of the Palestinian political system 243 7.1.1 Failed government negotiations and international boycott 244 International boycott 246 Persecution 247 7.1.2 The Mecca Agreement and the National Unity Government 248 7.1.3 A Palestinian civil war and the political-territorial split 250 x Background for the war 251 Consequences of the war 253 Losing ground … 254 … but surviving nevertheless 258 7.2 Hamas—a reluctant rebel in power 258 7.2.1 Governing for survival, not politics 260 Reconciling governing and resistance 263 The unclear role of religion 267 Self-preservation and -preparation 270 7.2.2 Organizational challenges and dilemmas 272 Inadequate decision-making procedures 274 Internal elections and organizational development 276 The horizontal power struggle and factional dominance—from abroad to Gaza 280 The vertical power struggle—the power of activists 285 7.3 The triple roles of Hamas—government, statelet, and liberation movement 290 7.4 Hamas’s level of institutionalization in 2011 293 7.4.1 Systemness 294 7.4.2 Decisional autonomy 295 7.4.3 Value infusion 296 7.4.4 Reification 296 Chapter 8: Conclusion 299 8.1 Summary of findings 300 8.1.1 The first intifada—Hamas emerging 300 8.1.2 The Oslo years—commence transmutation 301 8.1.3 The second intifada—ideological pragmatism, organizational maturity 302 8.1.4 In power—between government and resistance 303 8.1.5 Hamas’s level of institutionalization through the years 304 Hamas’s degree of institutionalization at the end of the first intifada 305 Hamas’s degree of institutionalization by the end of the Oslo years 306 xi Hamas’s degree of institutionalization by the end of the second intifada 307 Hamas’s degree of institutionalization by 2011 307 8.2 Transmutation interrupted 308 8.2.1 Theory and occupation 309 8.2.2 Quality of occupied data and consequences for the findings 311 8.2.3 Contextual and theoretical explanations for Hamas’s interrupted transmutation 313 Imprinted legacies, both religious and violent 314 The development of Hamas summarized 315 8.3 Hamas after 2011—euphoria, dashed hopes, and uncertainty 317 8.3.1 Hamas and the Arab Spring 318 Euphoria and optimism 319 Obstacles to reconciliation 322 8.3.2 Miscalculations and dashed hopes 323 Miscalculations 324 Forced reconciliation and de facto abdication 325 Reconciliation derailed 327 The return to the status quo ante 328 8.3.3 Concluding remarks 330 Appendix A: List of abbreviations 333 Appendix B: List of interviewees 334 Appendix C: Election data in occupied Palestine 339 Appendix D: Criteria and indicators of party institutionalization 343 Appendix E: Factional support 344 Bibliography 345 xii Illustrations Figure 1: Organizational strength of party sub-groups 40 Figure 2: Political map of Palestine 84 Figure 3: Settlers and settlements, 1976–1987 (West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem) 88 Figure 4: Schematic Hamas organogram, approximately 1993 132 Figure 5: Factional support in the occupied territories, 1994–1999 160 Figure 6: Hamas organogram at the end of the 1990s 168 Figure 7: Factional support in the occupied territories, 2000–2005 193 Figure 8: Number of suicide attacks and the share of Hamas, 2000–2005 213 Figure 9: Factional support in the occupied territories, 2006–2011 255 Figure 10: Schematic organogram of Hamas, post-2009 280 Figure 11: Religiosity and support for Hamas, 2007–2011 297 Figure 12: Hamas flag
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