SWP Comments 14/2007)
Introduction
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs
»Hamastan vs. Fatahland« A Chance for Progress in the Middle East?
Muriel Asseburg SWP Comments
In mid-June 2007, the »Islamic Resistance Movement« Hamas gained the upper hand in the Gaza Strip after a series of bloody conflicts. After seizing control of security facil- ities, Hamas announced the beginning of »Islamic rule« in the Strip. Palestinian President and Fatah leader, Mahmoud Abbas, responded by dissolving the government of national unity and declaring a state of emergency. He appointed an emergency government headed by Salam Fayyad, the previous minister of finance, declared the military wing of Hamas and its security forces to be illegal and ordered their disarma- ment. He has since rejected any cooperation with Hamas in unusually strong terms. Israel and the international community have regarded this split as an opportunity to resume support for the Palestinian Authority (PA) and return to the diplomatic process.
As of mid-June 2007, there have been two In particular, Hamas calls for all security governments in the Palestinian territories. forces to be placed under the control of the While Hamas controls the Gaza Strip, the Interior Ministry and for effective power West Bank is ruled by the emergency (since sharing in the institutions of the Palestinian mid-July 2007 the care taker or transition) Authority (PA) and the PLO. Hamas claims government under Salam Fayyad in coope- that its actions in the Gaza Strip were not ration with President Mahmoud Abbas. The directed against Fatah as such, but rather Hamas leadership rejects the Fayyad govern- against those people in Fatah and the Fatah- ment as illegal, arguing that the Palestinian dominated security forces who were harass- basic law requires any government to be ing the local population, engaging in crimi- ratified by the Palestinian Legislative Coun- nal activities, and preventing the unity gov- cil (PLC). Hamas thus insists that the govern- ernment from working efficiently. And it ment of the previous Prime Minister, Ismail is true that the atrocities committed by Haniyeh, remains the legitimate caretaker Hamas were primarily directed against the until ratification has taken place. It also Fatah militias established under the leader- calls for the restoration of the government ship of the National Security Adviser, of national unity and the implementation Mohammed Dahlan, with the intention of of the Mecca Agreement of February 2007. defeating Hamas by military means.
Dr. Muriel Asseburg is Head of the Middle East and Africa Research Unit SWP Comments 14 July 2007
1 Efforts at stabilisation by Hamas also prohibited carrying weapons in pub- and by Fatah lic – a measure that first met with rejection Ever since the violent enforcement of its from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Yet after a claim to power in the Gaza Strip, Hamas mid-July 2007 Israeli goodwill gesture, some has made fostering public order a priority, of its members have voluntarily disarmed. relying on the broad presence of its Execu- Under the terms of the agreement, some tive Force. It has also sought to break up 180 Fatah-affiliated militants in the West criminal networks and to disarm Fatah mi- Bank wanted by the Shin Bet security ser- litias. As a consequence, the Strip’s popula- vices are granted immunity from arrest or tion has already witnessed significant im- assassination for a trial period of three provements in personal safety. While Hamas months on the condition that they hand has been careful not to turn off ordinary in their weapons and pledge to abandon Gazans through repressive measures, threats armed activities. In an attempt to curb Ha- against media outlets have been reported mas’ influence on society, President Abbas and members of the press have been afraid has ordered by decree that all NGOs must to speak their mind. In early July, Hamas apply for new licensing with the ministry succeeded in liberating the BBC reporter of the interior and he has given the minis- Alan Johnston, who had been abducted in try a free hand with regards to »closure, cor- mid-March by the Doghmush Clan (Jaish al- rection of status, or other measures« – effec- Islam). Hamas has also begun to post secu- tively revoking the law on non governmen- rity forces along the border between the tal organisations and thereby further restrict- Gaza Strip and Egypt (the Philadelphi Line) ing the political space for civil society. in order to control the area and bring about President Mahmoud Abbas and the Fay- the reopening of the Rafah border crossing. yad government have governed by decree, At the same time, however, the Hamas as the emergency government was unable leadership has failed to stop the launching to win the absolute majority in the PLC that of Qassam missiles against Israel from the the basic law demands. Indeed, the Palestin- Gaza Strip. After a lengthy respite, its Izz al- ian Parliament has been paralyzed since Ha- Din al-Qassam Brigades resumed their missile mas boycotted its first session under emer- attacks in response to Israeli military opera- gency rule and prevented other factions’ re- tions and the murder of Hamas cadres in presentatives from attending the session in air strikes, albeit initially at a low intensity. Gaza. In reaction, a PLC session called for by Apparently this was done against the will of Hamas was boycotted by Fatah. Both attempts the political leadership, who clearly ex- failed to reach quorum. Hence, neither the pressed their interest in calming the situa- state of emergency nor the Fayyad govern- tion and achieving a long-term cease-fire ment have parliamentary approval. As the with Israel. However, the leadership is un- period of 30 days expired, Abbas dissolved likely to have much success in containing the emergency government and immedia- radicals in their ranks as long as Israel uses tely reinstated Prime Minister Fayyad at the military force to combat these groups. head of an enlarged cabinet as caretaker or In the West Bank members of Fatah and transition government. As the President the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades responded to the may not dissolve the PLC during a state of public executions and humiliation of Fatah emergency, he will go on ruling by decree militias in the Gaza Strip with excesses and has made it clear that in the future he against Hamas institutions and acts of re- intends to rely on the institutions of the PLO venge. For the time being, at least, a further rather than the legislative branch of the PA, escalation of violence has been prevented, the PLC. To bolster his rule, Abbas has also even as Fatah-dominated security forces have called for the Fatah-dominated PLO Central begun to target Hamas structures and insti- Council, which in his view represents the tutions in the West Bank. The President has higher authority, to meet in Ramallah.
SWP Comments 14 July 2007
2 Background of the confrontations Haniyeh government of funds. Directly The violent confrontations in the Gaza Strip after Hamas’ election victory, the Middle did not come as a surprise. Rather, they East Quartet (the USA, the EU, the Russian were a consequence of developments since Federation, and the UN) formulated three the Palestinian parliamentary elections of conditions for continued cooperation with January 2006. In particular, the conflict has the PA: recognition of Israel’s right to exist, its roots in the reaction of the erstwhile recognition of all prior agreements between governing party, Fatah, and of the interna- Israel and the PLO, and a general renuncia- tional community, to Hamas’ electoral vic- tion of violence. As the Hamas leadership tory. The January 2006 elections, judged was unwilling to submit to the Quartet’s »free and fair« by the international commu- demands, the Haniyeh government was ob- nity, gave Hamas an absolute majority in liged to find other sources of funding – for the PLC, with 74 of 132 seats, compared to example, Iran. Additionally, the govern- Fatah’s 45 seats. As the Hamas leadership ment established with the so-called Execu- did not succeed in integrating Fatah into a tive Force a powerful militia of its own. government of national unity, they formed Israel and Egypt also share responsibility a government in mid-March 2006 headed for the massive armament of the Hamas by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh which militias, as both chose not to agree on effec- consisted of some technocrats and indepen- tive control of the Philadelphi Line after dent forces alongside Hamas representatives. Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in Subsequently there were several rounds 2005. They rejected the suggestion of post- of violent clashes between parts of the ing international monitors there and in Fatah-dominated security forces and Fatah recent months failed to make serious ef- militias on the one side and Hamas militias forts to prevent the smuggling of weapons on the other. Over 200 Palestinians died in through tunnels underneath the border. these confrontations between March 2006 Only in July 2007 did Egypt begin to deploy and May 2007. Violence among Palestinians a greater contingent of security forces along escalated primarily because Fatah was its side of the Philadelphi Line. unwilling to concede its defeat at the polls Ultimately, the Hamas-led cabinet could and hand over power to the victors. Instead, neither govern effectively nor stabilise the the Palestinian President, with the support security situation. With repeated outbreaks of the international community, reversed of violence, curbed only temporarily and the reforms which had been initiated be- with great effort, the situation careened tween 2002 and 2004. These reforms aimed towards civil war. to create greater transparency in Palestin- ian finances, to strengthen the office of the prime minister against that of the president, A missed opportunity: and to unify the security forces under the The government of national unity authority of the Interior Ministry. As a con- The Mecca Agreement, mediated by the sequence, the Hamas government could Saudi King Abdullah in February 2007, rely neither on the security forces nor on provided for a power sharing arrangement the administration, both dominated by between Fatah and Hamas which tempo- Fatah. rarily put a stop to the bloodshed. A govern- At the same time, the policy of isolation ment of national unity was formed, on the pursued by Israel and the West – no dia- basis of this agreement, in mid-March 2007. logue or cooperation with the government, Led by Prime Minister Haniyeh, this govern- Israel withholding transfers of VAT and cus- ment included representatives of the two toms payments, cessation of European bud- large parties as well as members of the getary aid for the PA, financial sanctions by smaller parliamentary groups (the Third the USA – achieved its aim of starving the Way, DFLP, PPP, and al-Mubadara).
SWP Comments 14 July 2007
3 However, it soon became clear that while »Hamastan vs. Fatahland« the international community was ready to Israel, the USA, and the EU swiftly agreed engage in dialogue with those representa- to put a positive spin on the split in the PA, tives of the government who were not Ha- arguing that the new situation created cla- mas members, it remained reluctant, with rity and offered new approaches for con- very few exceptions, to cooperate with a structive policies. The logic was that, with coalition government that included Hamas the Islamists in the Gaza Strip easier to iso- – even though the government’s programme late, the Fayyad government in the West came close to fulfilling the Quartet criteria. Bank could restart cooperation, promoting The programme referred to documents economic development and returning to which obliged the government to adhere to the diplomatic process. By quarantining the Oslo framework, a two-state settlement, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Palestinians would and the conditional recognition of Israel in come to understand that Hamas was the accordance with the Arab League’s peace wrong choice. At the same time, »flourish- initiative of 2002. Though it was unrealistic ing landscapes« and new freedom of move- to expect a Palestinian coalition govern- ment in the West Bank would demonstrate ment to explicitly submit to the Quartet to the Palestinian population that Fatah of- criteria, the programme could have formed fered hope for the future. Early parliamen- the starting point for dialogue. tary and presidential elections could thus As it happened, the ambition of Fatah return a Fatah government to power. In the cadres to return to power sooner or later interim, the EU and the USA have sided un- – through the use of violence, if necessary – equivocally with Mahmoud Abbas and the was bolstered by the continued isolation of Fayyad government– the legality of which is Hamas. In spring 2007, the USA began to questionable from a constitutional perspec- supply Fatah directly with money, training, tive – and have begun cooperating with it. and military supplies in order to bring the However, the »Hamastan vs. Fatahland« former regime party back into power approach is highly unrealistic. Firstly, the through early elections or military means. West Bank is not »Fatahland«. While Hamas By so doing, the USA – with explicit or im- has greater support in the Gaza Strip than plicit support from European govern in the West Bank, it still retains a powerful ments – not only condoned violent confron- constituency there – in 2006, in personal tations between Palestinian groups, but elections in the constituencies, it won 30 fuelled them. The ultimate objective was seats to Fatah’s 11, for instance. The main not, as claimed, to encourage Hamas to difference between the strength of Hamas change its behavior, but to push it out of in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip owes the political process. In this way, the USA to Israeli military presence. The presence and the Europeans deliberately under- of Israeli forces and their operations have mined the power sharing arrangement be- weakened the military wing of Hamas, for- tween the two parties. As new Fatah mili- cing it to operate underground, and simi- tias were formed and trained, Hamas came larly weakened its political wing through under increasing pressure. With Israel the arrest of 30 Hamas members of parlia- consenting to the delivery of heavy wea- ment and ministers, as well as other lead- pons to Fatah units in the Gaza Strip in ing cadres and mayors, in reaction to the early June 2007, and Fatah leaders and abduction of the soldier Gilad Shalit in late other representatives of the unity govern- June 2006. ment outside the country, Hamas sought to Secondly, it is doubtful that the enfee- eliminate the growing danger through a bled and fragmented Fatah movement, still pre-emptive strike. dominated by the old Tunis leadership, can play the role envisioned for it by the West in bringing about a new beginning. Fatah
SWP Comments 14 July 2007
4 lost the elections in January 2006 precisely soners (including some from other leftist because of internal divisions and incompe- PLO factions) from Israeli jails, the introduc- tence that culminated in a disastrously ma- tion of VIP status for members of the Fayyad naged election campaign. Nothing that has government, and the resumption of secu- happened since has changed the public’s rity cooperation. Additionally, Israel in- perception that a Fatah government would tends to lift individual roadblocks in the once again bring corruption and misrule. West Bank, dismantle some settlement out- Fatah’s strategy of achieving independence posts, grant entry permits to veteran PLO through negotiations and cooperation with leaders for the Central Council session in Israel has also failed. Even though opinion Ramallah and permit weapons deliveries polls show a decline in popular support for such as shipments of armoured vehicles to Hamas since the elections, Fatah’s gains strengthen Fatah. At the same time, Israel have been marginal at best. The party has and President Abbas have also floated the failed to use the last year and a half to ini- idea of using the so-called Badr Brigades (Pales- tiate overdue reforms, build consensus be- tinian units of the Jordanian army), or even tween the different trends, and modernise the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, in the battle its apparatus. More important still, even if against Hamas. It is in this context that Fatah leaders were to succeed in launching Israel has granted conditional immunity to a new peace process with Israel or even some of the Fatah-affiliated militants. negotiating a final status agreement, they However, the only measure that will would still require Hamas’s implicit sup- actually strengthen Abbas and the Fayyad port to implement it. government is the transfer of the withheld funds. This step enables the government to finally pay the salaries of the public ser- Israeli gestures vants, who have not been paid or paid fully Thirdly, much depends on Israel. The legiti- for 15 months. The other measures, rather macy of Fatah and the Palestinian President than strengthening Abbas as the President could only be strengthened and a new dyna- of all Palestinians, are more likely to have mic generated if the Israeli government the opposite effect: Abbas looks like a colla- were to take dramatic steps towards ending borator, the Fayyad government nothing the occupation. However, it is unrealistic to more than puppets, and the Fatah-domi- expect more than symbolic gestures from nated security forces resemble a militia of Israel on this matter. While the Israeli Prime the occupation – all the more so as the Isra- Minister, Ehud Olmert, has affirmed his eli army continues to arrest and kill Palesti- willingness to resume regular talks with nians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. President Abbas, he has refused to draw up Most importantly, however, none of the a blueprint for a final status settlement measures recently announced will foster a which could be implemented as soon as the new dynamic and bring about a lasting and security situation improves (in accordance tangible improvement of the situation in with a suggestion from the American Secre- the West Bank. The Palestinian economy tary of State, Condoleezza Rice). will be unable to make a lasting recovery At the summit in Sharm al-Sheikh on 25 while the system of roadblocks and permits June 2007, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan expli- remains in force – currently there are about citly aimed to bolster Abbas. For his part, 550 such roadblocks and checkpoints in Olmert announced the gradual transfer of place in the West Bank. Additionally, an ap- withheld Palestinian customs and VAT funds proach which banks on continued military totalling some 700 million US dollars (about confrontations between Fatah and Hamas 118 million US dollars were transferred to cannot contribute to stabilising the situa- the PA in an initial payment in early July tion; rather, it runs the risk of fuelling in- 2007), the release of about 250 Fatah pri- ternal violence that could ultimately esca-
SWP Comments 14 July 2007
5 late into a civil war. In such an environment, Additionally, under the new (and old) the prospect of investing money in the approach of the international community Palestinian territories remains unattractive. the vision of a two-state solution appears increasingly unrealistic. The approach has sacrificed the development of functional, Additional dangers democratic Palestinian institutions to the Fourthly, it is impossible to increase the exigencies of short-term stability. It has also pressure on the population of the Gaza failed to counter the ever-greater fragmen- Strip without causing a humanitarian tation of West Bank territory – where the disaster. Even before the latest round of construction of the separation barrier and violence, the official unemployment rate in the expansion of settlements, together with the Gaza Strip was around 35 percent, their road networks, do not leave any con- while the poverty rate was over 75 percent, tiguous territory for a Palestinian state. and about two-thirds of the population Alternative approaches, propagated by some were dependent on international aid ship- Israelis and pundits in the international ments. In this situation, Abbas and the Fay- community as a possible way out, such as yad government may be able to insist on the Jordanian option, or a Jordanian-Egyp- the political isolation of the Haniyeh gov- tian option, will not solve the Israeli-Pales- ernment, but they cannot join in efforts to tinian sticking points and therefore cannot economically isolate the Gaza Strip. In early replace final status negotiations. July 2007, therefore, they paid the wages German and European policies should and salaries of public servants in both the therefore concentrate on 1) preventing a West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Following humanitarian disaster in the Gaza Strip; Hamas’ assumption of power, Israel has per- 2) creating the preconditions there and in mitted the import of humanitarian goods the West Bank for an economic recovery; only while blocking imports and exports of 3) supporting Palestinian reconciliation; all commercial goods. As a consequence, 4) improving governance within Palestinian some 80 percent of Gaza’s private sector institutions; and 5) taking serious steps manufacturing industries, with their near together with the partners of the Middle to complete dependency on imports of raw East Quartet and the Arab Peace Initiative materials, machinery and maintenance to bring about a two-state settlement. parts, have been forced to temporarily shut down. Agricultural exports have come to a complete standstill. Dealing with the Gaza Strip Fifthly, this approach runs the risk of European policies should first and foremost pushing Hamas to abandon its current poli- focus on stabilising the situation in the cies, which are in principle geared towards Gaza Strip – even under Hamas rule – and cooperation. At the moment, Hamas still preventing a humanitarian disaster. In par- has an interest in maintaining the cease- ticular, this requires: fire with Israel and extending it to the West providing emergency relief in coopera- Bank. However, if international isolation tion with international aid organisa- and Israel’s military operations continue, it tions; is unlikely that Hamas will remain interes- obliging Israel, which continues to con- ted in the cease-fire. Also, increased pres- trol all the borders of the Gaza Strip, to sure bears the danger of further radicalis- keep border crossings open for humani- ing the Strip’s population, increasing the tarian aid and to refrain from implemen- popularity of Salafist and Jihadist groups, ting its threat to cut supplies of water, which – contrary to Hamas, – are not pur- fuel, and electricity; suing a national agenda and are not interes- rejecting the notion that the Gaza Strip ted in stabilising the situation. now represent a »terrorist entity« and
SWP Comments 14 July 2007
6 that therefore agreements such as the very in the West Bank will be possible only customs union do no longer apply; if the rigid checkpoint and permit system is insisting on the compliance with inter- dismantled to allow significantly greater ational humanitarian law and the pro- freedom of movement. tection of the civilian population. At the same time, Israel’s legitimate con- cerns about the arming of Hamas need to Intra-Palestinian reconciliation be addressed. This, however, should not be Defeating Hamas by military means is an done by means of military operations. In- illusion, especially in light of its deep social stead, weapons smuggling should be pre- roots. Rather, policies based on confronta- vented by tightening the border controls tion and attempts to oust the parliamen- along the Philadelphi Line. This could be tary majority from the political system have achieved by extending the mandate of the a high probability of resulting in further EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah (EU-BAM) escalation and radicalisation. Even though or the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) it might seem inconceivable now, in the stationed in the Sinai peninsula. This will, medium term, only a renewed power sha- however, require the consent not only of ring agreement between Fatah and Hamas Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinian President, will provide a basis for a legitimate Pales- but also of the de facto government in the tinian leadership. Only such a government Gaza Strip. will give the Palestinian President the neces- sary backing to conduct peace negotiations and implement a final status agreement. Long-term economic development Instead of taking sides in the intra-Pales- Regardless of who controls the Gaza Strip, tinian conflict, Germany and the EU should it is in the interest of both the Palestinians support a process of reconciliation. Should and the EU for the population not to re- Fatah and Hamas reach a new power sha- main permanently dependent on interna- ring agreement, it must not be undermined tional aid shipments. For any kind of econo- again. On no account should Germany and mic and commercial activities to take place, the EU support the arming of militias. It is the border crossings must be permanently particularly important to bring the USA and reliably open for people and goods. aboard on this issue as well. In view of the atrocities committed by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the current mo- ment is certainly not suitable for the EU to Governance and institution building begin high-level talks with the Hamas lea- The mandate of the newly appointed Quar- dership. On a technical level, however, it tet envoy, Tony Blair, rightly focuses not is unavoidable, for example by representa- only on coordinating international aid and tives of EU-BAM, to open contacts with economic development, but also on insti- Hamas security personnel in order to en- tution building, governance, and the rule sure the opening of the Rafah border cross- of law. The primary objective must be to ing and the smooth functioning of border enable PA institutions to govern effectively. controls. As a principle, in order to improve gover- To avoid making a two-state settlement nance, institutional support should not fol- completely impossible, the territorial unity low the dictate of political opportunism, between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank but should rather be oriented towards must be preserved. It is therefore necessary transparency, adherence to the rules of to apply the benchmarks submitted by democracy, and the strengthening of gov- General Dayton in April 2007 for implemen- ernment structures rather than individual ting the agreement of November 2005 on persons. Only in such a context, and after a movement and access. An economic reco- minimum of reconciliation between the
SWP Comments 14 July 2007
7 main factions has taken root, will early because a) it does not lead to lasting stabi- elections not be perceived as a farce. lity; b) it consumes more and more resour- The Temporary International Mechanism ces without creating an economic recovery; (TIM) should not be prolonged beyond its and c) it reduces the chances of reaching an current duration, which ends on 30 Sep- agreement because it goes hand in hand tember 2007. Rather, the PA should swiftly with the progressive fragmentation of the return to an orderly budgetary process. The West Bank and the danger that the PA TIM has been used since June 2006 to by- might collapse entirely. pass the PA and pay out monies directly to With the Arab Peace Initiative and the Palestinians to alleviate hardship and main- declared interest of the Bush administra- tain basic infrastructure and vital services. tion in reaching an agreement on final sta- The TIM has not only proved inefficient and tus before the end of its term of office, the vulnerable to corruption, but also contra- chances for international cooperation are dicts the objective of institution building. relatively good. The EU should act on its
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und Instead, a central account of the finance responsibility, seize the opportunity and Politik, 2007 ministry should again be used to process all submit a plan to the Quartet for achieving All rights reserved revenues and expenditures, and parliamen- stability through confidence building mea-
SWP tary control over the budget should be re- sures in the short term and a two-state set- Stiftung Wissenschaft und stored. Also, the EU should impress upon tlement in the medium term. To this end, Politik German Institute for the Fayyad government that it is both un- the EU should present a blueprint for final International and desirable and counterproductive for the sta- status on the basis of the results of negotia- Security Affairs bility of government institutions if the se- tions to date. The Quartet should then ob- Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 curity forces in the Gaza Strip receive salary lige the parties to the conflict to implement 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 payments only when they are not working. the plan. This also means that the Quartet Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Additionally, the EU should aim at must be ready to back up negotiations on www.swp-berlin.org a speedy end to the state of emergency the details of a final status agreement as [email protected] and a return to political process based on well as its implementation with serious and ISSN 1861-1761 the basic law; sustained engagement, including a commit- a clarification of competences and re- ment to mediation, conflict resolution, and sponsibilities of president and prime in all likelihood a long-term military pre- minister as well as those of the PA and sence. It is only in this context that an in- PLO institutions; ternational peace enforcement or peace- in the medium term disarming all militia keeping force makes sense: its mission should or incorporating them into non-partisan, be to provide security guarantees to safe- non-competing security forces controlled guard the implementation of a final status by the interior ministry; this should be a agreement. focal point of EU efforts as Europeans al- ready support the civilian police through their EUCOPPS mission. Without a com- prehensive restructuring of the security apparatus, however, these efforts will have little effect.
A two-state settlement The EU should be aware, and should make its partners in the Quartet aware, that the continuation of mere conflict management is not in the interest of Israel, the Palestini- ans, and the international community
SWP Comments 14 July 2007
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