Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs »Hamastan vs. Fatahland« A Chance for Progress in the Middle East? Muriel Asseburg SWP Comments In mid-June 2007, the »Islamic Resistance Movement« Hamas gained the upper hand in the Gaza Strip after a series of bloody conflicts. After seizing control of security facil- ities, Hamas announced the beginning of »Islamic rule« in the Strip. Palestinian President and Fatah leader, Mahmoud Abbas, responded by dissolving the government of national unity and declaring a state of emergency. He appointed an emergency government headed by Salam Fayyad, the previous minister of finance, declared the military wing of Hamas and its security forces to be illegal and ordered their disarma- ment. He has since rejected any cooperation with Hamas in unusually strong terms. Israel and the international community have regarded this split as an opportunity to resume support for the Palestinian Authority (PA) and return to the diplomatic process. As of mid-June 2007, there have been two In particular, Hamas calls for all security governments in the Palestinian territories. forces to be placed under the control of the While Hamas controls the Gaza Strip, the Interior Ministry and for effective power West Bank is ruled by the emergency (since sharing in the institutions of the Palestinian mid-July 2007 the care taker or transition) Authority (PA) and the PLO. Hamas claims government under Salam Fayyad in coope- that its actions in the Gaza Strip were not ration with President Mahmoud Abbas. The directed against Fatah as such, but rather Hamas leadership rejects the Fayyad govern- against those people in Fatah and the Fatah- ment as illegal, arguing that the Palestinian dominated security forces who were harass- basic law requires any government to be ing the local population, engaging in crimi- ratified by the Palestinian Legislative Coun- nal activities, and preventing the unity gov- cil (PLC). Hamas thus insists that the govern- ernment from working efficiently. And it ment of the previous Prime Minister, Ismail is true that the atrocities committed by Haniyeh, remains the legitimate caretaker Hamas were primarily directed against the until ratification has taken place. It also Fatah militias established under the leader- calls for the restoration of the government ship of the National Security Adviser, of national unity and the implementation Mohammed Dahlan, with the intention of of the Mecca Agreement of February 2007. defeating Hamas by military means. Dr. Muriel Asseburg is Head of the Middle East and Africa Research Unit SWP Comments 14 July 2007 1 Efforts at stabilisation by Hamas also prohibited carrying weapons in pub- and by Fatah lic – a measure that first met with rejection Ever since the violent enforcement of its from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Yet after a claim to power in the Gaza Strip, Hamas mid-July 2007 Israeli goodwill gesture, some has made fostering public order a priority, of its members have voluntarily disarmed. relying on the broad presence of its Execu- Under the terms of the agreement, some tive Force. It has also sought to break up 180 Fatah-affiliated militants in the West criminal networks and to disarm Fatah mi- Bank wanted by the Shin Bet security ser- litias. As a consequence, the Strip’s popula- vices are granted immunity from arrest or tion has already witnessed significant im- assassination for a trial period of three provements in personal safety. While Hamas months on the condition that they hand has been careful not to turn off ordinary in their weapons and pledge to abandon Gazans through repressive measures, threats armed activities. In an attempt to curb Ha- against media outlets have been reported mas’ influence on society, President Abbas and members of the press have been afraid has ordered by decree that all NGOs must to speak their mind. In early July, Hamas apply for new licensing with the ministry succeeded in liberating the BBC reporter of the interior and he has given the minis- Alan Johnston, who had been abducted in try a free hand with regards to »closure, cor- mid-March by the Doghmush Clan (Jaish al- rection of status, or other measures« – effec- Islam). Hamas has also begun to post secu- tively revoking the law on non governmen- rity forces along the border between the tal organisations and thereby further restrict- Gaza Strip and Egypt (the Philadelphi Line) ing the political space for civil society. in order to control the area and bring about President Mahmoud Abbas and the Fay- the reopening of the Rafah border crossing. yad government have governed by decree, At the same time, however, the Hamas as the emergency government was unable leadership has failed to stop the launching to win the absolute majority in the PLC that of Qassam missiles against Israel from the the basic law demands. Indeed, the Palestin- Gaza Strip. After a lengthy respite, its Izz al- ian Parliament has been paralyzed since Ha- Din al-Qassam Brigades resumed their missile mas boycotted its first session under emer- attacks in response to Israeli military opera- gency rule and prevented other factions’ re- tions and the murder of Hamas cadres in presentatives from attending the session in air strikes, albeit initially at a low intensity. Gaza. In reaction, a PLC session called for by Apparently this was done against the will of Hamas was boycotted by Fatah. Both attempts the political leadership, who clearly ex- failed to reach quorum. Hence, neither the pressed their interest in calming the situa- state of emergency nor the Fayyad govern- tion and achieving a long-term cease-fire ment have parliamentary approval. As the with Israel. However, the leadership is un- period of 30 days expired, Abbas dissolved likely to have much success in containing the emergency government and immedia- radicals in their ranks as long as Israel uses tely reinstated Prime Minister Fayyad at the military force to combat these groups. head of an enlarged cabinet as caretaker or In the West Bank members of Fatah and transition government. As the President the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades responded to the may not dissolve the PLC during a state of public executions and humiliation of Fatah emergency, he will go on ruling by decree militias in the Gaza Strip with excesses and has made it clear that in the future he against Hamas institutions and acts of re- intends to rely on the institutions of the PLO venge. For the time being, at least, a further rather than the legislative branch of the PA, escalation of violence has been prevented, the PLC. To bolster his rule, Abbas has also even as Fatah-dominated security forces have called for the Fatah-dominated PLO Central begun to target Hamas structures and insti- Council, which in his view represents the tutions in the West Bank. The President has higher authority, to meet in Ramallah. SWP Comments 14 July 2007 2 Background of the confrontations Haniyeh government of funds. Directly The violent confrontations in the Gaza Strip after Hamas’ election victory, the Middle did not come as a surprise. Rather, they East Quartet (the USA, the EU, the Russian were a consequence of developments since Federation, and the UN) formulated three the Palestinian parliamentary elections of conditions for continued cooperation with January 2006. In particular, the conflict has the PA: recognition of Israel’s right to exist, its roots in the reaction of the erstwhile recognition of all prior agreements between governing party, Fatah, and of the interna- Israel and the PLO, and a general renuncia- tional community, to Hamas’ electoral vic- tion of violence. As the Hamas leadership tory. The January 2006 elections, judged was unwilling to submit to the Quartet’s »free and fair« by the international commu- demands, the Haniyeh government was ob- nity, gave Hamas an absolute majority in liged to find other sources of funding – for the PLC, with 74 of 132 seats, compared to example, Iran. Additionally, the govern- Fatah’s 45 seats. As the Hamas leadership ment established with the so-called Execu- did not succeed in integrating Fatah into a tive Force a powerful militia of its own. government of national unity, they formed Israel and Egypt also share responsibility a government in mid-March 2006 headed for the massive armament of the Hamas by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh which militias, as both chose not to agree on effec- consisted of some technocrats and indepen- tive control of the Philadelphi Line after dent forces alongside Hamas representatives. Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in Subsequently there were several rounds 2005. They rejected the suggestion of post- of violent clashes between parts of the ing international monitors there and in Fatah-dominated security forces and Fatah recent months failed to make serious ef- militias on the one side and Hamas militias forts to prevent the smuggling of weapons on the other. Over 200 Palestinians died in through tunnels underneath the border. these confrontations between March 2006 Only in July 2007 did Egypt begin to deploy and May 2007. Violence among Palestinians a greater contingent of security forces along escalated primarily because Fatah was its side of the Philadelphi Line. unwilling to concede its defeat at the polls Ultimately, the Hamas-led cabinet could and hand over power to the victors. Instead, neither govern effectively nor stabilise the the Palestinian President, with the support security situation. With repeated outbreaks of the international community, reversed of violence, curbed only temporarily and the reforms which had been initiated be- with great effort, the situation careened tween 2002 and 2004. These reforms aimed towards civil war. to create greater transparency in Palestin- ian finances, to strengthen the office of the prime minister against that of the president, A missed opportunity: and to unify the security forces under the The government of national unity authority of the Interior Ministry.