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The Oslo Accords and the Dynamics of Palestinian Self-Governance

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The Oslo Accords and the Dynamics of Palestinian Self-Governance Journal of Undergraduate Studies at Trent (JUST) ISSN 1913-0937 (Print) | 1913-0945 (Online) Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 5 - 16, Summer 2009 © Journal of Undergraduate Studies at Trent A Law of Diminishing Returns: The Oslo Accords and the Dynamics of Palestinian Self-Governance Ryan Perks, Julian Blackburn College, Trent University The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) has for decades claimed to embody the national aspirations of the Palestinian people. The 1993 Oslo Accords conducted be- tween Israel and the PLO, and the ‘Middle East peace process’ which resulted, seemed only to cement this claim. However, the 2006 electoral victory of the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas, and their subsequent formation of a majority government within the Occupied Territories, shocked much of the world, as well as Palestinian observers. While the stipulations of the Oslo Accords allowed for a much sought-after degree of Palestinian self-governance within the Occupied Territories, the PLO’s performance was far from stellar. This paper aims to explore the difficulties inherent in the post-Oslo ‘state-building’ process, and the complex process by which Hamas came to provide the PLO with the first significant political opposition of its four-decade history. In the wake of Hamas’s historic victory at the polls of the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, much ink was been spilt regarding the regional consequences of such a victory. Some have expressed dismay at the prospect of an Islamic resistance movement, having refused for years to join the political process1, forming a majority government in the Occupied Territories; a group which, unlike its predecessors in the PLO, remain steadfast in their refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist.2 Indeed, this feeling of trepidation was echoed, albeit in its most extreme form, by former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reaction to the Hamas victory: “Hamastan has been formed, a proxy of Iran in the image of the Taliban.”3 Yet, despite the significant, if not extraordinary, shift 1 Graham Usher; Bassam Jarrar, “The Islamist Movement and the Palestinian Authority,” Middle East Report 189 (1994): 29. 2 Article 11, Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), translated and reprinted by Muhammad Maqdsi, “Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies 22.4 (1993): 125. 3 Associated Press, January 30, 2006, qtd. in Aaron D. Pina, Palestinian Elections (Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, February 9, 2006) 11 (Order Code Ryan Perks in Arab-Israeli politics that the Hamas victory has come to signify, it would be wrong to perceive this shift merely as a sudden move on the part of the Palestinian population towards a more radical or extreme form of government. Rather, this period of change is in marked contrast to the three decades which preceded the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords by Israel and the PLO, in which the PLO could safely claim the mantle of ‘sole representatives of the Palestinian people,’ and as such, constitutes a clear rejection on the part of the Palestinian electorate of the status quo that the PLO, and its brand of secular nationalism, had come to engender. Moreover, it may be argued that a PLO- dominated Palestinian Authority contained the seeds of its own destruction; A national resistance movement, scattered throughout various Arab capitols, was a concept not easily translated into the nuances of democratic institution- building, such as the PLO, and later the Palestinian Authority, intended to undertake. With a Palestinian electorate only too aware of its desire for democratic forms of government, compounded by the perceived failures of the PLO in the Middle East peace process, the PLO’s future as the manifestation of Palestinian political will was far from secure. The 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO marked a significant step in the so-called ‘peace process’ initiated by the two parties. Israel was now engaged not only in direct talks with the PLO, but as the ‘Letters of Mutual Recognition’ exchanged by then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat assert, was willing “to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.”4 This recognition marked a drastic turn-around for an Israeli government which had hitherto reserved little distinction between the PLO and other, more extreme Palestinian ‘terrorist’ groups.5 The PLO, for its part was continuing down the path it had earlier embarked upon during the late 1980’s. The resolutions adopted at the nineteenth session of the Palestinian National Council of 1988, which included RL33269). 4 Burhan Dajani, “The September 1993 Israeli-PLO Documents: A Textual Analyses,” Journal of Palestine Studies 23.3 (1994): 7. 5 Amnon Kapeliouk, “Israel, Terrorism, and the PLO,” Journal of Palestine Studies 16.1 (1986): 188. - 6 - A Law of Diminishing Returns: The Oslo Accords and the Dynamics of Palestinian Self-Governance among others, the formal renunciation of terrorism, as well as the recognition of the State of Israel,6 set the PLO firmly on the course of a “two-state solution”;7 a move which necessarily foreshadowed any political development vis-à-vis Israel.8 However, while the talks which preceded the signing of the Accords constituted no small undertaking for either side, it was the projected outcome of the agreement itself which would provide the PLO especially with several challenges far greater than any they had confronted during the negotiations. The first of these challenges was the formation, as stipulated within the agreement, of the ‘Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority,’ of which the intended function was to be, “the elected council . for the Palestinian people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years . .”9 This foray into self-government, while long touted as the goal of the Palestinian resistance, was to have a significant impact on the way politics were conducted, both inside the Occupied Territories as well as the wider Diaspora, as it amounted to nothing short of the fundamental reorientation of the decades-old system through which the PLO, not to mention the myriad of lesser resistance movements, had conducted their struggle for the liberation of Palestine.10 For the first time since 1948, the political center was to be inside Palestine itself, rather than the various Arab capitols which had at one time or another provided the PLO with a base from which to organize a scattered constituency.11 This was something for which the Palestinian resistance had been fighting for decades, both diplomatically and militarily, yet had never come close to achieving.12 Paradoxically though, the long awaited goal of ‘self-rule’ within the 6 Yezid Sayigh, “Struggle within, Struggle without: The Transformation of PLO Politics Since 1982, Royal Institute of International Affairs 65.2 (1989): 247. 7 Jamil Hilal, “PLO Institutions: The Challenge Ahead,” Journal of Palestine Studies 23.1 (1993): 48. 8 Dajani, 7. 9 Ibid, 9. 10 Ali Jarbawi, “Palestinian Politics at a Crossroads,” Journal of Palestine Studies 25.4 (1996): 29-30. 11 Ibid, 29-30. 12 Yezid Sayigh, “Armed Struggle and State Formation,” Journal of Palestine Studies 26.4 (1997): 17. - 7 - Ryan Perks Occupied Territories would present the newly formed Palestinian Authority (PA) with a set of challenges not encountered during the PLO’s decades of exile, and unique to the transition to an institutionalized democracy .13 These challenges were especially present in terms of security. Indeed, the very success of the Accords, and the resulting Palestinian self-rule, were predicated from the start on the PA’s ability to provide law and order in Gaza and the West Bank.14 As Article VIII of the Declaration of Principles stresses: . the [Palestinian] Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.15 As straightforward as this statement may appear, it does highlight the curious discrepancy which arose out of the signing of the agreement, between that which was required of the PA in regards to security, and the wide ranging, and at times ambiguous, powers which the Israeli government had reserved for itself. This may lead one to ask the obvious question: is an agreement, concluded between two parties of such disparate positions of power, significantly flawed from the start? Indeed, it could be argued that the notion of Palestinian self-rule as outlined in the Oslo Accords, and any legitimacy that may derived from it, was contingent, first and foremost, upon Israeli security.16 As some Palestinian critics have noted, the inordinate emphasis placed on the PA’s obligation to deliver up “Israel’s right to exist in peace and security”17, while no doubt a reasonable request, necessarily subordinates the right of the Palestinians within the West bank and Gaza to these same luxuries.18 Nonetheless, the PA 13 Naomi Weinberger, “The Palestinian National Security Debate,” Journal of Palestine Studies 24.3 (1995): 17. 14 Ibid, 16. 15 Article VIII, Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles, reprinted in “Special Document File: The Peace Process,” Journal of Palestine Studies 23.1 (1993): 117. 16 Graham Usher, “The Politics of Internal Security: The PA’s New Intelligence Services,” Journal of Palestine Studies 25.2 (1996): 21. 17 Dajani, 6. 18 Ibid, 6-7. - 8 - A Law of Diminishing Returns: The Oslo Accords and the Dynamics of Palestinian Self-Governance went to great lengths to fulfill their obligation to “establish a strong police force,”19 following the implementation of the Accords - a task performed, at times, with startling efficiency.
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