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New Dynamics in the Middle East 1 COUNTRY REPORT Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES New Dynamics in the Middle East FELIX DANE JÖRG KNOCHA 2011 – An eventful year for the Palestinian Territories 16 December 2011 For the Palestinian Territories the year the West Bank and began building up pub- 2011 was first and foremost marked by lic institutions and fighting corruption and the events of the so-called “Arab Spring”. police violence; he strengthen the Rule of www.kas.de/ramallah Although there has been no overthrow of Law and supported the private sector. www.kas.de the political regime or even mass demon- However, Fayyad could not put an end to strations in either the West Bank or the Palestinian dependency on international Gaza Strip for that matter, the “Arab donors. Spring” had a significant impact. Neither would there have been the (so far unsuc- President Mahmoud Abbas was convinced cessful) attempts of reuniting both territo- that this policy had to end in receiving full ries nor would the release of the Israeli UN membership. He promoted the Pales- soldier Gilad Shalit, who was held hostage tinian case during his speech in front of by the Islamist Hamas, have taken place, the UN General Assembly in September if it were not for the upheavals in Egypt. 2011 and ensured the international com- munity that the Palestinian National Au- The situation within the Palestinian Territo- thority will continue to pursue a two-state ries was primarily marked by three inter- solution without returning to violent twined issues: means. Despite this, the Palestinians could not achieve the necessary majority of nine 1. The Palestinian quest to become a full votes within the Security Council. This oc- member of the United Nations (UN). curred mainly due to pressure applied to 2. The prisoner swap between Hamas and Israel. smaller and less influential countries within 3. Several attempts of reconciliation be- the Security Council by the United States. tween Fatah and Hamas. If the Palestinians had reached a majority, the United Stated would have been forced Even though the last two points particu- to exercise their right of veto. Since those larly are closely linked to the regional up- developments, while disappointing, did not heavals, there is also a connection to in- come as a surprise, the Palestinians have ternal political developments after 2005. recently begun joining UN subsidiary or- During the parliamentary elections of ganizations. In that context, Palestine be- 2006, which were evaluated free and fair came a member of UNESCO in October by international observers, Hamas gained 2011. A two-third majority is almost as- the outright majority. After several efforts sured, if the Palestinians should decide to to create a unity government had failed step in front of the General Assembly to and Hamas increasingly feared that Fatah upgrade their status to a non-member was planning a military coup, they took state. Besides declaring Palestinian state- over the Gaza Strip in the cause of a mili- hood, this means that Palestine could also tary raid in June 2007. The Palestinian become a full member of the International Territories have been divided into two Criminal Court (ICC). It can be expected parts ever since. There are two govern- that the Palestinians will continue pursuing ments and all national elections have been the goal to become a full member of the delayed so that neither the parliament nor UN. the municipalities or the president are de- mocratically legitimized. Salam Fayyad The great attention paid to the UN- was designated head of the government in initiative pressured Hamas into bringing 2 about success as well. In addition to the Prospects of new peace negotiations Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. UN-initiative, however, it was the increas- ing instability within the Syrian regime Currently, the prospects of resuming peace PALESTINIAN that encouraged Hamas to act. Syria is negotiations must be rated rather nega- TERRITORIES Hamas’ most important ally right next to tively. The views of the Israeli government FELIX DANE Iran, foremost due to the fact that Hamas’ under Benjamin Netanyahu on a prospec- JÖRG KNOCHA political leadership is located in Syria. Ac- tive peace process can be cut down to cording to Palestinian and Israeli media seven points: (1) there will be no negotia- 16 December 2011 the Hamas leadership feels as threatened tions with a government that is supported by the current situation in Syria that many by Hamas, (2) the Palestinians have to officials found themselves forced to leave recognize Israel as the homeland of the the country. For this and other reasons Jews, (3) a future Palestine must be de- www.kas.de/ramallah www.kas.de Hamas was willing to accept unprece- militarized and shall not have any control dented compromise in order to realize a over the Jordan Valley, (4) the Palestinian prisoner swap with Israel. The Islamists refugee question has to be resolved out- even accepted the condition that their side the borders of Israel, (5) the 1967 most noted prisoner Marwan Barghouti borders are indefensible and Israel will was not being released and some of those keep the settlement blocs in the West who were have been forced into exile. But Bank, (6) Jerusalem is the undivided capi- Israel gave in as well. Within several steps tal of Israel, (7) a peace agreement must Israel will release 1027 Palestinian prison- entail a declaration of an end to the con- ers in exchange for the Israeli soldier Gilad flict and entail renouncement of future Shalit who was kidnapped by Hamas in claims. June 2006. From those who have been re- leased so far, 280 had received a life sen- The Palestinian response to the aforemen- tence. tioned points is clear. President Abbas re- peatedly emphasized that the yet to be es- Since a major point of criticism made by tablished Palestinian technocratic govern- the international community regarding the ment will consist of independent members UN-initiative was the mere fact that the and will merely focus on two goals: the Palestinian Territories are still divided, prearrangements for the elections due in there have been enhanced efforts in 2011 May 2012 and, respectively, the reunion of to reconcile Fatah and Hamas. The recon- the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Peace ne- ciliation agreement in Cairo in May 2011 gotiations are still solely his responsibility. has never been implemented, though. The In addition, the chief negotiator Saeb fact that there had been a second attempt Erekat sees no need to recognize Israel as to reconcile the two last fall can also be a Jewish state as it would be just a matter explained by the (so far) unsuccessful UN- of self-definition. Nonetheless, the Pales- initiative, which also weakened Fatah. The tinians strictly oppose a continued pres- meeting of President Abbas and Hamas’ ence of Israeli security forces in the Jordan leader of the politburo, Khaled Meshal, in Valley. After all, the Palestinians are willing Cairo in November 2011 brought together to abandon the creation of an army as two parties of equal strength. This meeting long as a robust police force is ensured. In mainly revolved around the establishment a meeting with George Mitchell – U.S Chief of a provisional government which should Middle East Envoy at the time – in Febru- prepare the parliamentary and presidential ary 2009, Erekat gave in “ that Palestine elections scheduled for May 2012. Once will not have an army, navy and air force ”, more, a crux was the person Fayyad. yet would need the support of a third While Abbas wishes to keep him in office, party. Whether the majority of the ap- he is a red rag to Hamas. Fayyad himself proximately five million Palestinian refu- has announced that he would be willing to gees would ever “return” is an open ques- step down for the sake of reconciliation. tion. The Guardian reported in January 2011 that President Abbas expressed pri- vately that granting all refugees the right 3 to “return” would be “ illogical ”. After all, of the Netanyahu government are unac- Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. “that would mean the end for Israel ”. ceptable for the EU and the great majority Nonetheless, Palestinians will not turn of the international community. The indi- PALESTINIAN their back on a symbolic return of a few visibility of Jerusalem, moreover, is not TERRITORIES thousand refugees. The borders of June 4, recognized by a single state. Furthermore, FELIX DANE 1967, prior to the outbreak of the Six-Day denying the legitimacy of the boarders of JÖRG KNOCHA War, remain the baseline for any peace 1967 and the announcement of holding on talks. However, those could only start if to settlement blocs by all means cannot be 16 December 2011 Israel would stop its settlement activities. accepted as preconditions for negotiations. Under these conditions, the Palestinians would be willing to agree to a land swap Focal Point Gaza with a 1:1 ratio. According to a memoran- www.kas.de/ramallah www.kas.de dum published by the Negotiations Sup- Due to the events mentioned above, the port Unit (NSU) – the negotiations unit of international focus was predominantly set the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on the West Bank. Only little light was – such a land swap would need to be not casted on the impoverished shoreline. The only equal in quantity, but as well in qual- fact that the economy suffers severely ity. The Palestinians have a similar stand- from the partial embargo brought upon by point regarding Jerusalem. According to Israel and that the export volume has de- the “Palestine Papers” the Palestinians are creased to 1% compared to the time prior willing to make great sacrifices in this re- to 2007 hardly drew attention so far.
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