FOKUS | 2/2009

After Gaza: A New Approach To

Almut Möller

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die israelische Off ensive im Gazastreifen Ende 2008 hat den Nahen Osten erneut erschüttert. Eine der zahlreichen Fragen, die der dreiwöchige Krieg für die Europäische Union aufgeworfen hat, ist, wie sie in Zukunft mit Hamas umgehen wird. Bisher hat die Europäische Union die Hamas boykottiert und Palästinenserpräsident und die im Westjordanland unterstützt, obwohl die Hamas im Jahr 2006 freie und faire Wahlen gewonnen hat und trotz der Spaltung der Palästinensergebiete eine politische Kraft auch im Westjordanland geblieben ist. Damit hat die Europäische Union entscheidenden Gestaltungsspielraum im israelisch-palästinensischen Konfl ikt eingebüßt.

Die EU bekennt sich weiterhin dazu, ein Friedensabkommen zwischen und den Palästinensern in Gestalt der Zwei-Staaten-Lösung zu un- terstützen. Die Spaltung der palästinensischen Führung steht eff ektiven Friedensverhandlungen jedoch im Weg. Es muss daher eine Verständi- gung zwischen Fatah und Hamas geben. Dieses Szenario setzt nicht nur ein Ende der gewaltsamen Machtkämpfe zwischen Fatah und Hamas voraus, die die Europäische Union durch ihre Politik zwar nicht beabsichtigt, aber de facto dennoch unterstützt hat. Es setzt auch voraus, dass die Europäische Union Hamas als politischen Akteur akzeptiert und ihr Verhältnis zu Fatah überdenkt.

The Middle East has once again been December 27th, 2001. The member states to Hamas, and violence broke out. shaken. For the , one of decided to freeze funds and other fi nancial The ensuing fragmentation of the the many questions that the three-week assets or economic resources of persons, Palestinian leadership was aggravated Israeli off ensive in the in late groups or entities involved in terrorist by the boycott of the European Union. It 2008 has raised is how to deal with the acts. The terrorist wing of Hamas, ‘Kata’ ib was certainly the good intention of the ‘Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya’, the al-shahid Izz al-din al-Qassam’, as well as European Union to strengthen a mode- Islamic resistance movement, Hamas, from Palestinian Islamic Jihad were put on a list rate Palestinian leadership. However, the this point on. of terror groups. On November 29th, 2005 boycott contributed to deepen the intra- the Council signifi cantly amended that Palestinian divisions and actually further The “Fatah & First Approach” list and added the political wing of Hamas weakened Fatah. as well as a number of other Palestinian In elections in 2006, that were qualifi ed radical movements, including Fatah‘s Aqsa After months of intra-Palestinian fi ghting as free and fair by international observers, Brigades. It was on the basis of this list King Abdullah of mediated Hamas won the absolute majority of seats that the decision was taken to boycott the the establishment of a national unity in the Palestinian Legislative Council. In March 2006 Hamas government. government in March 2007. This included March 2006 Hamas formed a government both Hamas and Fatah as well as several led by Prime Minister . The ------smaller factions. However, the agreement European Union along with Israel and the only lasted for a few months. In June 2007 refused to recognize the The ensuing fragmentation of the rift within the Palestinian leadership new regarding was cemented in geographic terms. David Hamas as a terrorist organization that does the Palestinian leadership was Rose published a widely read article in not adhere to the Middle East Quartet’s cri- Vanity Fair in 2008 with evidence that teria: the recognition of the State of Israel’s aggravated by the boycott of the US was backing the security forces of right to exist, the recognition of previous Fatah’s Muhammad Dahlan to challenge agreements between Israel and the PLO, the European Union. Hamas in Gaza. Hamas reacted to the and a complete renunciation of violence. situation by expelling Fatah from Gaza in Israel, the EU and the US therefore decided ------a violent coup and subsequently seized to block all aid to the Hamas government. power in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist Within the Palestinian camp, Hamas’ Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas attacks the Council of the EU adopted a victory was challenged by its rival Fatah. dissolved the national unity government. Common Position on the application of Fatah did not accept the electoral defeat He declared a state of emergency and specifi c measures to combat terrorism on and a full transfer of its governing powers appointed then Minister of Finance Salam

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Fayyad to become the Prime Minister of a The EU’s Policy Towards the Palestinian address the access and border control issu- transition government. Fayyad’s govern- Leadership After the es with Israel. The EU is involved in the dif- ment of technocrats was never approved fi cult access arrangements because it has by the Legislative Council. Hamas at the The war in Gaza aff ected intra-Palestinian a currently suspended border assistance same time continued to be an administra- dynamics and aggravated the unresolved mission in on the Gaza-Egyptian tive force in many West Bank cities. question of how to deal with the new role border. Yet none of these issues can realis- of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and within the tically be resolved without Hamas. During With these events, the European Union, Palestinian leadership in general. While the the war in Gaza the European Union, the Israel and the United States continued Israeli intervention was still on the way, US and Israel relied on the services of the to enforce their boycott of Hamas and to Yossi Alpher concluded in a piece for bit- Egyptians, other Arab states and maintain political and economical support terlemons on December 29th, 2008, that that were off ering to mediate indirect talks for Fatah. The idea being to alienate even if the confl ict in Gaza ended and the between Israel and Hamas about a cease- Hamas from the by fostering ceasefi re between Israel and Hamas was fi re. But this indirect mechanism clearly economic growth and political stability in renewed “under the best of circumstances, has its problems. For example in the case the West Bank. In November 2007 a new none of this will really solve our Hamas of Hamas and the Gaza Strip it is questio- political attempt to reach peace between problem.” If the European Union continues nable to what extent follows its own Israel and the Palestinians was launched to adhere to facilitating the two-state- agenda in trying to contain the Islamist in the US city of Annapolis. The following solution, this is as relevant to Europe as it is Hamas government and its infl uence on months of US mediated negotiations bet- to Israel. But Hamas is only one side of the Egyptian domestic politics. ween Israel and the Palestinians were cle- coin. There is also a “Fatah problem”. arly restricted to the West Bank leadership. During the Israeli off ensive, the European The downsides of the Hamas boycott have Two high level international conferences Union continued its policy of trying to been addressed in European capitals from were held in Paris and Berlin to foster the stabilise the Palestinian leadership around the very beginning. Behind closed doors economy and to reform the judicial and Abbas and Fayyad in the West Bank. offi cials would at the same time express security institutions in the West Bank. their unhappiness with Fatah’s inability to ------reform. Unoffi cially, there were always con- In January 2008 Israel imposed a total tacts with Hamas and they have recently on movement in and out of Hamas is only one side of the coin. been intensifi ed. But offi cially the Euro- the Gaza Strip as a reaction to rocket fi re pean Union has not changed its stance. continuously targeting the Israeli town of There is also a “Fatah problem” . However, things could change, in particu- . A humanitarian crisis started to lar with the prospect of a renewed national unfold in the Gaza Strip, where 1.4 million ------unity government. For the European Union Palestinians live in an area that is only this would be a rather comfortable way 41 kilometres long and between 6 to 12 This became increasingly diffi cult. Firstly out of the “Hamas problem”: Hamas could kilometres wide. because the events on the ground put the be politically included, perhaps through international attention on Hamas and the mediation of an Arab third party. That way, Despite joint eff orts of the US, the EU and Gaza Strip, secondly, because the legiti- there would be an inclusive Palestinian lea- the international community, Annapolis macy of the West Bank leadership further dership body. The European Union could failed to produce results before the end eroded when President Abbas’ term of work with its Fatah representatives while of George W. Bush’s Presidency. The Israeli offi ce formally ended in January 2009, and sticking to its boycott of Hamas. However, Prime Minister and President thirdly, because Fatah declined in popu- this would be a diffi cult political limbo Abbas had met on a regular basis, but wit- larity. A poll conducted by the to the detriment of a coherent European hout taking any decisions on contentious Media and Communications Center (JMCC) policy towards a new Palestinian govern- issues. In the fall of 2008 Olmert fell over in January 2009 shows a rise in popularity ment. And intra-Palestinian reconciliation corruption allegations and early elections of Hamas’ leaders and government since has become a lot more diffi cult since the were scheduled in Israel for February 2009. the war. A majority of 46.7% of Palestinians war in Gaza. Rocket fi re continued from the Gaza Strip in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank into Israel and Hamas and Israel failed to believed that Hamas came out of the war Nevertheless, the renewal of the unity renew the six-months ceasefi re that had victorious. A striking 53.3% of West Bank government is still being pushed by the been mediated by in June 2008. respondents are of this view, compared to European Union in the aftermath of the On December 27th, 2008, Israel started its 35.2% in the Gaza Strip. Gaza war. After an EU-27 meeting on off ensive in the Gaza Strip. With severe problems of access for January 25th, 2009 with Egypt, , humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, there the Palestinian Authority and Turkey, was also increasing pressure on the EU to Czech foreign minister Karel Schwarzen-

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berg representing the EU Presidency told dition for talks is asking too much. Hamas’ Secondly, how would the EU practically reporters: “We believe that Palestinian readiness to accept Israel as a fact on the carve out relations with Hamas? reconciliation behind president Mahmud ground should be tested in the course of Abbas is fundamental to progress”. UK for- negotiations, they argue. And even though There are diff erent options and variables eign secretary David Miliband was quoted the current political leadership in the West that will have to be discussed: saying: “The reunifi cation of the Palestinian Bank has accepted the Quartet’s condi- people with a single voice to speak to tions, there are also radical forces within - The question of direct versus indirect them, to speak for the West Bank and for Fatah that do not adhere to them. action: If an indirect approach is taken, Gaza is absolutely essential.” The meeting who would be a trustworthy third party? was also attended by the Norwegian Intra-Palestinian leadership struggles are foreign minister Jonas Gahr Store. Norway another important factor. Hamas’ political - The question of timing: When is a good has maintained some relations with the leadership has to an extent accepted the moment to start talking to Hamas? What Hamas government in Gaza. system created by the Oslo process with should the kick off look like? How can it the decision to run in the Palestinian elec- be made coherent? The new US administration under Presi- tions in 2006 as the party of “Change and dent is also likely to adopt Reform”. Palestinian voters in these elec- - Continued secret versus open enga- a new approach towards Hamas. In an tions clearly expressed dissatisfaction with gement: What are the pros and cons of interview with the Council on Foreign Fatah that they felt had failed to become either of these approaches? Relations in January 2009 Middle East a reliable and transparent political force. veteran Richard W. Murphy is quoted The problem of the Fatah government’s - In the case of an open engagement is saying “I think we are now getting pulled legitimacy has become much more acute adopted: Should the EU consider a into a more active position on the ground since Abbas’ term formally ended in Janu- public statement or a symbolic gestu - [in Gaza]. Whether this will lead to the ary 2009. Both the President and the Prime re? Should it even consider removing opening of political contact with Hamas Minister now lack democratic legitimacy. Hamas’ political wing from its 2005 is the question. I don’t think it will happen And the support of Fatah on the streets is terrorist list? quickly but I think it is inevitable.” So the at a low ebb. Nevertheless, the Europeans question is not if, but when and how this have carried on with their “Fatah fi rst - Whom within Hamas should the EU talk policy adjustment will come about. approach”. The Czech EU Presidency has to? Where are its moderate forces after made it quite clear that Abbas and Fatah the war, and do they have suffi cient How to Deal With Hamas – and Fatah? had its backing to take the political lead if backing within Hamas and the a new unity government was installed. At Palestinian public? A new stance towards Hamas will be a dif- the beginning of February 2009, President fi cult undertaking involving high political Abbas was invited to Strasburg to speak - What would be Hamas’ political calculus costs for the European Union. A number in the European Parliament. For Fatah, the for engaging with the EU? Does the of imponderabilities would be involved: support of the European Union, amongst majority of Hamas want to talk, and why? the EU’s credibility would be questioned, others, is a guarantee of its survival. What are possible spoilers within Hamas it would create frictions with Israel, Fatah and other radical forces? and perhaps the US, a political upgrading ------would give Hamas and other resistance - How can Arab states be included in order or terrorist movements a boost, a positive The question is not if, but when to establish a regional approach? outcome of an engagement would not be guaranteed, to name but a few. and how the policy adjustment Finding a new stance towards the Pa- lestinian leadership will be a challenging Hamas would also be a diffi cult partner. towards Hamas will come about . undertaking. But the political costs of Some of Hamas’ members and factions do carrying on with business as usual would not aspire to become part of the Palesti------certainly be higher for the European nian political system created by previous Union. negotiations. On the contrary, they are So if the Europeans decided to engage fi ghting it. It is a fact that the Hamas lea- with Hamas, what would it mean? Firstly, a “Good Guys” Versus “Bad Guys” dership has not publicly accepted Israel’s re-assessment of EU relations with Fatah. legitimate right to exist, nor has it shown At its very core the European Union’s Finally, public opinion does matter. It was a public commitment to the two-state- “Hamas problem” is a “Hamas&Fatah pro- the majority view expressed in the Wes- solution. However, many analysts claim blem”, i.e. a problem with the Palestinian tern media and by Western statesmen that that asking Hamas to do this as a precon- leadership as such. Hamas was responsible for the war be-

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cause of its ongoing rocket fi re into Israel. Conclusion Analyst Ivesa Lübben, however, in a recent paper that has not been published yet, has Like it or not, Hamas is a fact on the documented in great detail Hamas’ power ground. A negotiated, lasting solution for struggles with the other radical groups in the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict can only be the Gaza Strip over whether to renew the achieved if Hamas is involved. That means ceasefi re with Israel. Lübben has reconst- Hamas has to be accepted as a legitimate ructed, along credible sources, that before political player and the one-sided backing the June 2008 ceasefi re between Israel of Fatah has to come to an end. A sound and Hamas was mediated, only 15% of the knowledge of intra-Palestinian dynamics rockets fi red into Israel from the Gaza Strip post Gaza will be a decisive asset in this were of Hamas origin. An analysis of the process. A European discussion on how to last weeks in 2008 is likely to tell a diff erent deal with its “Hamas problem” and a decis- story to that portayed by the western ion to revise its stance on both Hamas and media. This does not mean that Hamas did Fatah would be a valuable contribution to NOT fi re rockets into Israel, an act that de- Palestinian reconciliation and, eventually, serves to be condemned. But it means that to the two-state-solution. The EU urgently Hamas is far from being the ONLY organi- needs a more diff erentiated and honest sation fi ring rockets. For example, the Aqsa debate on the nature of both Hamas and Brigades associated with Fatah are still Fatah and on the EU’s anti-terror policies active in the Gaza Strip and fi red rockets as as a whole. well. This fact does not take away respon- sibility for rocket fi re from Hamas. But it Almut Möller is an Associate Fellow at the sheds light on intra-Palestinian dynamics Austrian Institute for European and Security that are often overlooked to the detriment Policy (AIES). of real understanding. A crucial question is, for example, if and when Hamas wants to contain and is capable of containing the other forces in the Gaza Strip? ------It is time that the Europeans portray Hamas and Fatah for All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, what they are. stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherweise without ------the permission of the Austrian Institute for Euro- pean and Security Policy (AIES). Simplifi cations also portray an image of The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent, and Hamas in the West as an entity like ‘al Qa- should not be attributed to, the AIES. eda‘ or ‘Jama’at al-Islamiya‘, which is inac- curate and misleading. Equally simplistic is the dichotomy of the “good” Fatah versus © Institut für Europa- und Sicherheits- the “bad” Hamas, part of the axis of evil of politik, 2009.

Iran, Hisballah and . It is time that the Schlossgasse 6 Europeans portray both Hamas and Fatah A-2344 Maria Enzersdorf for what they are. This would help a great ph. +43 (0)2236 411 96 fax +43 (0)2236 411 96-9 deal in the process of understanding and e-mail: offi [email protected] readjusting the EU‘s policy towards the www.aies.at Palestinian leadership. Layout and Printing: Magoo Events & Marketing www.magoo.ag

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