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The War in Chechnya Baylis, Wirtz & Gray: Strategy in the Contemporary World 6e No End in Sight: The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict Since Oslo The difficult relationship between Israelis and Palestinian Arabs has a history that long predates the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and over time the struggle between these two peoples for control of a small territory on the Mediterranean has become ever more tangled, with superpowers, international organizations such as the UN, and other actors becoming involved in the controversy.1 This case study addresses the recent years of the conflict, from the Oslo Accords of August 1993 to mid-2018. This history raises a number of interesting questions concerning how seemingly intractable conflicts can be brought to an end. The Oslo Accords, more formally known as the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, resulted from a long series of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, a group which used terrorism but nonetheless had received broad international acceptance as representing the Palestinian people. The Madrid Conference of October 1991 was hosted by the Soviet Union and the United States in the hope of moving toward a stable peace between Israel and all its neighbours. Inherently, however, Israel’s relationship with neighbouring Arab states was related intimately to the demands of the Palestinians. Over the following two years, several interlocked sets of negotiations, some public and others secret, occurred. The agreement that eventually emerged in Oslo was one of the most important in the history of the Israeli– Palestinian conflict. The Accords were signed publicly on 13 September 1993 in a White House ceremony hosted by US President Bill Clinton and attended by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. The Accords were intended to provide an outline for the resolution of hostilities between the Israelis and Palestinians. The Israelis would allow a Palestinian Authority (PA) to be created that would govern most of the territories that Israel had occupied in the Six-Day War of 1967. Over the next five years the two sides would negotiate until a final agreement that would resolve any outstanding issues, including the status of the eastern 1 Background on the struggle is provided in Gregory Harms and Todd M. Ferry, The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction (2nd edn, London: Pluto Press 2008) and Walter Lacquer and Barry Rubin, The Israel- Palestine Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (7th rev. edn, New York: Penguin 2008). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All rights reserved. Baylis, Wirtz & Gray: Strategy in the Contemporary World 6e portion of Jerusalem, which was claimed by both sides, and whether there would be a ‘right of return’ for Palestinians who had fled Israel during Israel’s 1948 War of Independence and their descendants. Later, in 1995, an interim agreement on the transfer of West Bank and Gaza territory to the PA, which sometimes is referred to as ‘Oslo 2’, was signed. The Situation After the Signing of Oslo The framework constructed by the Accords quickly proved to be unstable. A key part of the agreement was an understanding that PA officials would vigorously police the territory under their control and prevent terrorist activity. PA President Yasser Arafat, who also remained chairman of the PLO and leader of the PLO’s Fatah faction, failed to do this. The PA was soon overrun with terrorist activity conducted by a variety of groups, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, an organization actually affiliated with Fatah. In response to terrorist attacks, and in an effort to prevent future terrorism, Israel’s military, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), frequently launched military operations against targets located in the PA. These operations included what Israel refers to as ‘targeted killings’, the assassination of specific terrorist leaders. In addition, Israel continued to strictly control Palestinian movements from the West Bank and Gaza into Israel and Israeli settlements. This was intended to mitigate the danger presented by Palestinian terrorists, particularly suicide bombers, who would attempt to slip into Israel and attack civilian targets such as shopping malls and restaurants. Because of the geography of Israel and the PA, Israel’s security measures made movement within the PA difficult. The Gaza Strip and West Bank are not physically connected, and the layout of roads and checkpoints is such that often it was (and is) time-consuming for Palestinians to travel from one area of the West Bank to another. These travel difficulties, along with alleged disrespect and harassment by Israeli soldiers manning checkpoints, were resented by many Palestinians. Israel, however, argued that if the Arafat government was unwilling or unable to control terrorist activity within the PA and prevent attacks on Israel, then it was necessary for the Israelis to do so. © Oxford University Press, 2018. All rights reserved. Baylis, Wirtz & Gray: Strategy in the Contemporary World 6e Complicating the issue, and creating further tension between the two parties, were the existence of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and, especially, the West Bank. The settlement programme initially began after the Six-Day War, the 1967 conflict in which Israel defeated a coalition of Arab states and came into possession of the eastern portion of Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank (as well as the Sinai Peninsula, which was returned to the Egyptians as a result of the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt). Israel launched a programme to create ‘settlement’ communities and encourage Jewish families to move to these areas. This was seen as a security measure, placing loyal Israelis on tactically important pieces of ground which could be of value to Israel’s enemies, as well as a way to occupy space which many Israelis felt they were entitled to under previous arrangements and guarantees such as the Balfour Declaration of 1917. The settlements grew over time, and by the time the Oslo Accords were signed, hundreds of thousands of Jews lived in these disputed territories. The negotiations that resulted in the Accords were often referred to as a ‘land-for-peace’ process—in essence, Israel trading territory to the Palestinians in exchange for a halt to the threat of terrorism. However, the Accords did not resolve the status of the settlements and the precise borders of a future Palestinian state, leaving these issues to be resolved at a future date. The Stalled Peace Process In September 1995, the Israelis and Palestinians concluded the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza. The Interim Agreement, which set out the broad parameters for the handover of the West Bank and Gaza, in turn served as the basis for further negotiations. However, the sense that the peace process was moving forward was short-lived, as terrorism against Israel, as well as Israeli retaliation, continued. In 1996, the Labour Party government—led at that time by Shimon Peres, who had become prime minister in 1995 after Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli extremist angered by Rabin’s peace policy—was succeeded by the Likud-dominated government of Benjamin Netanyahu. In his campaign, Netanyahu had called for a tougher stance in negotiations with the Palestinians, and his government was perceived internationally as being considerably more hawkish than was its predecessor. However, peace negotiations did not end altogether, and in October 1998, Netanyahu and Arafat agreed to the Wye River Memorandum. The Memorandum, a complex agreement which emerged from a © Oxford University Press, 2018. All rights reserved. Baylis, Wirtz & Gray: Strategy in the Contemporary World 6e series of meetings hosted by President Clinton, was intended to implement the 1995 Interim Agreement. However, execution of the provisions of the Memorandum stalled as terrorism continued and the Israelis and Palestinians accused each other of failure to abide by the various agreements. In 1999, Netanyahu’s government, beset by various domestic scandals, fell and was replaced by one headed by Labour’s Ehud Barak. In July 2000, President Clinton made a final major effort to broker an Israeli–Palestinian peace, hosting a series of meetings at the presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland. However, no final settlement was reached, and shortly thereafter the Second Intifada began. Most Western observers, including Barak and Clinton, blamed Arafat for the failure of the talks, but the collapse nonetheless was a devastating political blow to Barak. The Beginning of the Second Intifada The Second, or al-Aqsa, Intifada started in September 2000. Its catalyst was a visit to eastern Jerusalem’s Temple Mount area by Ariel Sharon, who headed Israel’s Likud Party. The hawkish Sharon was loathed by many Palestinians, but controversy remains over the degree to which the Intifada was pre-planned. Although pro-Palestinian sources generally portray the Second Intifada as a spontaneous uprising, many observers contended that the ‘October riots’ which marked the beginning of the Second Intifada were carefully prepared by Palestinian leaders who wished to take advantage of Sharon’s visit to spark violence and thus gain negotiating leverage over Israel.2 It is notable that the October rioters were mainly Arab citizens of Israel. When considering matters of domestic security, many Israelis have long worried about the loyalty of Israeli Arabs, and
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