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Variation on a Theme Israel’S Operation Cast Lead and the Gaza Strip Missile Conundrum

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Variation on a Theme Israel’S Operation Cast Lead and the Gaza Strip Missile Conundrum THE RUSI JOURNAL Variation on A THEME Israel’S Operation Cast LEAD AND THE GAZA STRIP MISSILE ConundruM Sergio Catignani Israel’s assault on Gaza in early 2009, Operation Cast Lead, achieved significant tactical successes and managed to redeem the Israel Defence Forces’ poor performance during the 2006 Lebanon War. Sergio Catignani examines Israel’s military and public information campaign and why Cast Lead failed to accomplish the government’s two main goals of stopping rocket attacks on Israel and the influx of weapons for resupplying Hamas. he Israeli-Hamas conflict rockets and mortars against towns The End of (Another) Ceasefire has endured since Hamas’s and communities in southern Israel. On 19 December 2008 the post-Operation Testablishment in 1988 during Israel accordingly carried out various Hot Winter ceasefire agreement between the height of the first Intifada. As a operations before and after its unilateral Hamas and Gaza-based terrorist radical Islamist organisation bent on disengagement from the Gaza Strip in organisations and Israel, which was liberating all of Israel/Palestine from order to dismantle Hamas’s increasingly negotiated by Egypt in June of that year, any Israeli presence, Hamas adopted lethal rocket and mortar capacities and expired. Hamas had issued a statement suicide terrorism as its weapon of choice to re-establish security for its southern on 18 December that it would resume for reversing the positive outcome of communities. attacks on Israel and had already fired the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between Whilst the damage and casualties around 200 rockets and mortars into Israel the Palestinian Liberation Organisation inflicted on Israeli civilian communities by in November following an Israeli raid (PLO) and Israel; and subsequently for Hamas’s rocket and mortar attacks were that had killed six Hamas operatives in bleeding Israel and the Israel Defence relatively limited, the psychological effect the Gaza Strip on 4 November. True to its Forces (IDF) during the 2000-05 Al-Aqsa of such tactics was significant and able to word, on 21 December Hamas launched Intifada. Its Gaza-based terrorist and disrupt very often the daily lives of such seventy rockets whilst issuing a statement guerrilla campaign eventually led Israel communities. For example, according to that it would renew the ceasefire if Israel to unilaterally disengage from the Gaza the Society for Recording Terror-Induced were to stop its ‘aggression’ on Gaza and Strip in August 2005. By then Israel Trauma Cases, by late 2008 ‘55 per open up its border crossings.4 had, in effect, been able to debilitate cent of Sderot’s citizens had witnessed Within the space of a week, the Israeli Palestinian suicide terrorist capabilities Qassam missile blasts; 28.4 per cent were leadership triumvirate comprising Prime originating both from the West Bank and made dysfunctional by post-traumatic Minister Ehud Olmert, Foreign Minister Gaza Strip. effects; while 33.6 per cent of the town’s Tzipi Livni and Defence Minister Ehud Despite Israel’s success at stifling schoolchildren aged 13-18 suffered from Barak decided to unleash the IDF once suicide terrorism, by 2004 Hamas was severe learning disabilities’.2 The Israeli again onto Gaza in order to re-establish able to adapt its tactics to what amounted government, in effect, felt compelled to the ever-elusive ‘quiet’ and deterrence to an ‘over/under’ campaign in which it conduct Operation Cast Lead so that it that many Israelis yearned for. The Israeli would use tunnels to smuggle weapons could attempt to re-establish its deterrent Government was intent on employing the and carry out underground attacks on IDF posture vis-à-vis the region’s terrorist IDF on a much greater scale than it had bases and patrols, as well as conduct an organisations. This deterrent posture had, done in previous Gaza-based operations. unrelenting rocket and mortar barrage in fact, been significantly eroded after Some even labelled the operation the against Israeli villages and towns in close Hamas’s abduction of IDF Corporal Gilad ‘Gaza War’ and a ‘war of no choice’, a term proximity to the Gaza Strip – most notably, Shalit in June 2006 and by the IDF’s poor normally used by Israeli policy-makers Sderot, Netivot and eventually Ashkelon. performance during the 2006 summer for wars involving major conventional Since Israel’s unilateral disengagement, Lebanon War.3 threats. They hoped that this ‘war’ would Palestinian factions had fired over 6,000 provide Olmert – who would soon step © RUSI JOURNAL AUGUST 2009 VOL. 154 NO. 4 pp. 66–73 DOI: 10.1080/03071840903216502 RUSI 154_4.indd 66 18/08/2009 12:49:52: Tanks roll towards Gaza, December 2008. Photo courtesy of IDF. down as prime minister following the front will eventually determine our ability Furthermore, the Israeli security Israeli General Election in February – as to complete the mission’.5 cabinet made sure that limited and clear well as the IDF the opportunity to redeem Olmert’s exhortations alone could goals would be given to the IDF, so that their dismal performance during the 2006 not prepare the Israeli population to military leaders could operationalise such Lebanon War. withstand Hamas’s retaliation. Israel had goals without having to second-guess learnt from the Lebanon War that in order their civilian masters, as had occurred Israel and especially to avoid terror-induced hysteria and the occasionally in the past. Moreover, such mass-fleeing of whole communities from goals were provided to the IDF before the IDF were intent on targeted areas, it would have to provide rather than during the campaign as had delivering a lethal blow sufficient passive defensive measures occurred in Lebanon in 2006. In this case, through a reinforced and extended bomb the Israeli leadership, after some debate, to Hamas shelter and early warning system. Such decided that the operation’s overarching measures were all the more crucial given goal would be that of achieving a In order to achieve this, Olmert and other that Hamas was focused on terrorising considerably more advantageous long- government leaders made sure that the population in order to force the term ceasefire based on deterrence. grandiose statements on what could be cessation of the IDF’s campaign. Scores The Israeli government’s ability achieved by the IDF campaign would be of Israelis had received text messages to curb any excessive enthusiasm and avoided at all costs. Various government from Hamas alerting them that they bold declarations for the operation, as leaders warned the Israeli population would bear the brunt of its reprisal rocket well as the IDF’s excellent tactical and that the IDF’s mission to extirpate Gaza- campaign as long as OperationCast Lead operational performance during Cast based terrorism would be an arduous continued. The text read, ‘Rockets on Lead, played a significant part in capturing task and that the population would have all cities, shelters not protect, Qassam and maintaining Israeli public support to endure certain reprisals from Hamas. rocket, Hamas’.6 This time around the during the whole campaign. For example, Olmert stated at the start of Operation Home Front Command, responsible for a survey on Israeli Jewish public opinion Cast Lead that ‘This will be a long and protecting Israel’s rearguard, was able to conducted between 4 and 6 January difficult war which will be very painful. provide vital protection and assistance (a week into Operation Cast Lead) by The expectation that we will be able to to the local population.7 It was able to the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace hit hundreds of terrorists a day cannot be mitigate the military and psychological Research, Tel Aviv University, found that realized … The patience, determination effects of Hamas’s rocket and mortar 94 per cent of the public polled supported and stamina of the people in the home retaliatory attacks. the operation itself and 93 per cent gave 67 RUSI 154_4.indd 67 18/08/2009 12:49:55: variation on a theme positive appraisals of the IDF’s fighting weapons smuggling tunnel network • To conduct targeted killings of performance.8 The Israeli population’s along the Philadelphi Corridor (an 8.5 Hamas leaders (particularly those frustration with Hamas’s rocket campaign kilometre-long buffer zone along the belonging to its military wing, the over the years had made the public Egypt–Gaza border) so as to hinder Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades), more hawkish in relation to Gaza-based Hamas from replenishing its stockpile of such as: Nizar Rayan (killed 1 terrorism. Consequently, both the civilian weapons. In order to destroy smuggling January); commander of Hamas’s and leadership echelons were able to tunnels within the Philadelphi Corridor, rocket launching programme capitalise on such sentiments during the the IAF employed 5,000-pound laser- in Gaza City, Amir Mansi (killed campaign. guided ‘bunker-buster’ GBU-28 bombs 10 January); Minister of Interior with a 4,400-pound penetrating warhead. Affairs Sayyed Siam, and head of ‘After this operation The IAF’s surprise attack was centred on Hamas’s interior security services a large ‘target bank’, which had been Salah Sharah (both killed 15 there will not be one collated over a number of months before January). These regime-targeting Hamas building left the operation through a mixture of air, strikes would, they believed, human and signal intelligence-gathering deter further incitement by standing in Gaza’ resources. Hamas against Israel, but in As the campaign progressed into the main were designed to With such public support, political and its first few days, IDF leaders discussed reduce the effectiveness of military leaders could not resist the at least two potential scenarios for a the organisation by robbing it temptation of trying to achieve more ground invasion.
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