Variation on a Theme Israel’S Operation Cast Lead and the Gaza Strip Missile Conundrum
THE RUSI JOURNAL
Variation on a Theme Israel’s Operation Cast Lead and the Gaza Strip Missile Conundrum
Sergio Catignani
Israel’s assault on Gaza in early 2009, Operation Cast Lead, achieved significant tactical successes and managed to redeem the Israel Defence Forces’ poor performance during the 2006 Lebanon War. Sergio Catignani examines Israel’s military and public information campaign and why Cast Lead failed to accomplish the government’s two main goals of stopping rocket attacks on Israel and the influx of weapons for resupplying Hamas.
he Israeli-Hamas conflict rockets and mortars against towns The End of (Another) Ceasefire has endured since Hamas’s and communities in southern Israel. On 19 December 2008 the post-Operation Testablishment in 1988 during Israel accordingly carried out various Hot Winter ceasefire agreement between the height of the first Intifada. As a operations before and after its unilateral Hamas and Gaza-based terrorist radical Islamist organisation bent on disengagement from the Gaza Strip in organisations and Israel, which was liberating all of Israel/Palestine from order to dismantle Hamas’s increasingly negotiated by Egypt in June of that year, any Israeli presence, Hamas adopted lethal rocket and mortar capacities and expired. Hamas had issued a statement suicide terrorism as its weapon of choice to re-establish security for its southern on 18 December that it would resume for reversing the positive outcome of communities.1 attacks on Israel and had already fired the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between Whilst the damage and casualties around 200 rockets and mortars into Israel the Palestinian Liberation Organisation inflicted on Israeli civilian communities by in November following an Israeli raid (PLO) and Israel; and subsequently for Hamas’s rocket and mortar attacks were that had killed six Hamas operatives in bleeding Israel and the Israel Defence relatively limited, the psychological effect the Gaza Strip on 4 November. True to its Forces (IDF) during the 2000-05 Al-Aqsa of such tactics was significant and able to word, on 21 December Hamas launched Intifada. Its Gaza-based terrorist and disrupt very often the daily lives of such seventy rockets whilst issuing a statement guerrilla campaign eventually led Israel communities. For example, according to that it would renew the ceasefire if Israel to unilaterally disengage from the Gaza the Society for Recording Terror-Induced were to stop its ‘aggression’ on Gaza and Strip in August 2005. By then Israel Trauma Cases, by late 2008 ‘55 per open up its border crossings.4 had, in effect, been able to debilitate cent of Sderot’s citizens had witnessed Within the space of a week, the Israeli Palestinian suicide terrorist capabilities Qassam missile blasts; 28.4 per cent were leadership triumvirate comprising Prime originating both from the West Bank and made dysfunctional by post-traumatic Minister Ehud Olmert, Foreign Minister Gaza Strip. effects; while 33.6 per cent of the town’s Tzipi Livni and Defence Minister Ehud Despite Israel’s success at stifling schoolchildren aged 13-18 suffered from Barak decided to unleash the IDF once suicide terrorism, by 2004 Hamas was severe learning disabilities’.2 The Israeli again onto Gaza in order to re-establish able to adapt its tactics to what amounted government, in effect, felt compelled to the ever-elusive ‘quiet’ and deterrence to an ‘over/under’ campaign in which it conduct Operation Cast Lead so that it that many Israelis yearned for. The Israeli would use tunnels to smuggle weapons could attempt to re-establish its deterrent Government was intent on employing the and carry out underground attacks on IDF posture vis-à-vis the region’s terrorist IDF on a much greater scale than it had bases and patrols, as well as conduct an organisations. This deterrent posture had, done in previous Gaza-based operations. unrelenting rocket and mortar barrage in fact, been significantly eroded after Some even labelled the operation the against Israeli villages and towns in close Hamas’s abduction of IDF Corporal Gilad ‘Gaza War’ and a ‘war of no choice’, a term proximity to the Gaza Strip – most notably, Shalit in June 2006 and by the IDF’s poor normally used by Israeli policy-makers Sderot, Netivot and eventually Ashkelon. performance during the 2006 summer for wars involving major conventional Since Israel’s unilateral disengagement, Lebanon War.3 threats. They hoped that this ‘war’ would Palestinian factions had fired over 6,000 provide Olmert – who would soon step
© RUSI JOURNAL AUGUST 2009 VOL. 154 NO. 4 pp. 66–73 DOI: 10.1080/03071840903216502
RUSI 154_4.indd 66 18/08/2009 12:49:52: Tanks roll towards Gaza, December 2008. Photo courtesy of IDF.
down as prime minister following the front will eventually determine our ability Furthermore, the Israeli security Israeli General Election in February – as to complete the mission’.5 cabinet made sure that limited and clear well as the IDF the opportunity to redeem Olmert’s exhortations alone could goals would be given to the IDF, so that their dismal performance during the 2006 not prepare the Israeli population to military leaders could operationalise such Lebanon War. withstand Hamas’s retaliation. Israel had goals without having to second-guess learnt from the Lebanon War that in order their civilian masters, as had occurred Israel and especially to avoid terror-induced hysteria and the occasionally in the past. Moreover, such mass-fleeing of whole communities from goals were provided to the IDF before the IDF were intent on targeted areas, it would have to provide rather than during the campaign as had delivering a lethal blow sufficient passive defensive measures occurred in Lebanon in 2006. In this case, through a reinforced and extended bomb the Israeli leadership, after some debate, to Hamas shelter and early warning system. Such decided that the operation’s overarching measures were all the more crucial given goal would be that of achieving a In order to achieve this, Olmert and other that Hamas was focused on terrorising considerably more advantageous long- government leaders made sure that the population in order to force the term ceasefire based on deterrence. grandiose statements on what could be cessation of the IDF’s campaign. Scores The Israeli government’s ability achieved by the IDF campaign would be of Israelis had received text messages to curb any excessive enthusiasm and avoided at all costs. Various government from Hamas alerting them that they bold declarations for the operation, as leaders warned the Israeli population would bear the brunt of its reprisal rocket well as the IDF’s excellent tactical and that the IDF’s mission to extirpate Gaza- campaign as long as OperationCast Lead operational performance during Cast based terrorism would be an arduous continued. The text read, ‘Rockets on Lead, played a significant part in capturing task and that the population would have all cities, shelters not protect, Qassam and maintaining Israeli public support to endure certain reprisals from Hamas. rocket, Hamas’.6 This time around the during the whole campaign. For example, Olmert stated at the start of Operation Home Front Command, responsible for a survey on Israeli Jewish public opinion Cast Lead that ‘This will be a long and protecting Israel’s rearguard, was able to conducted between 4 and 6 January difficult war which will be very painful. provide vital protection and assistance (a week into Operation Cast Lead) by The expectation that we will be able to to the local population.7 It was able to the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace hit hundreds of terrorists a day cannot be mitigate the military and psychological Research, Tel Aviv University, found that realized … The patience, determination effects of Hamas’s rocket and mortar 94 per cent of the public polled supported and stamina of the people in the home retaliatory attacks. the operation itself and 93 per cent gave
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positive appraisals of the IDF’s fighting weapons smuggling tunnel network • To conduct targeted killings of performance.8 The Israeli population’s along the Philadelphi Corridor (an 8.5 Hamas leaders (particularly those frustration with Hamas’s rocket campaign kilometre-long buffer zone along the belonging to its military wing, the over the years had made the public Egypt–Gaza border) so as to hinder Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades), more hawkish in relation to Gaza-based Hamas from replenishing its stockpile of such as: Nizar Rayan (killed 1 terrorism. Consequently, both the civilian weapons. In order to destroy smuggling January); commander of Hamas’s and leadership echelons were able to tunnels within the Philadelphi Corridor, rocket launching programme capitalise on such sentiments during the the IAF employed 5,000-pound laser- in Gaza City, Amir Mansi (killed campaign. guided ‘bunker-buster’ GBU-28 bombs 10 January); Minister of Interior with a 4,400-pound penetrating warhead. Affairs Sayyed Siam, and head of ‘After this operation The IAF’s surprise attack was centred on Hamas’s interior security services a large ‘target bank’, which had been Salah Sharah (both killed 15 there will not be one collated over a number of months before January). These regime-targeting Hamas building left the operation through a mixture of air, strikes would, they believed, human and signal intelligence-gathering deter further incitement by standing in Gaza’ resources. Hamas against Israel, but in As the campaign progressed into the main were designed to With such public support, political and its first few days, IDF leaders discussed reduce the effectiveness of military leaders could not resist the at least two potential scenarios for a the organisation by robbing it temptation of trying to achieve more ground invasion. The first option would of its more experienced and with Cast Lead: either the destruction entail a rapid in-and-out raid with tanks, charismatic leaders of Hamas’s military capabilities or the armoured infantry and close air support • To carry out attacks on Hamas complete elimination of Hamas as a viable in order to target Hamas members before logistics and infrastructure entity in Palestinian politics. Two days redeploying back into Israel. This scenario in order to debilitate both its into the operation, Deputy IDF Chief of would, they hoped, bring about a more civilian and military assets, which Staff Major General Dan Harel declared, favourable ceasefire agreement. The had allowed Hamas to conduct ‘This operation is different from previous second scenario involved a much more its rocket campaign against Israel ones … We are hitting not only terrorists extensive operation aimed at destroying since the Al-Aqsa Intifada. This and launchers, but also the whole Hamas completely Hamas’s military capabilities line of operation involved striking government and all its wings … After this and possibly Hamas itself. Ultimately at the vast tunnel network linking operation there will not be one Hamas the IDF operated on the basis of the first the Gaza Strip to Egypt, as well building left standing in Gaza, and we option, given the growing international as at the arms storage and rocket plan to change the rules of the game’.9 pressure and condemnation as the production facilities scattered Even the IDF spokesperson, Brigadier campaign progressed, due to a steady all over the Gaza strip, in both General Avi Benayahu, reiterated these rise in Palestinian collateral damage official Hamas government and far-reaching aims by explaining that and civilian casualties. Moreover, security service buildings as well the IDF’s ‘intention is not to arrive at whilst Olmert would have liked to have as in civilian buildings used by a ceasefire; it is to destroy Hamas’s extended the campaign to obtain greater Hamas for military purposes.11 motivation and intention to fight’.10 gains from Cast Lead, both Barak and Israel and especially the IDF were intent Livni were fearful that an extended The Ground Invasion on delivering a lethal blow to Hamas if campaign and possibly a greater number On 3 January, day eight of Cast Lead, the given the opportunity. Operation Cast of IDF casualties could land a blow to IDF finally initiated its tank and armoured Lead seemed to present the occasion for their electoral fortunes in the Israeli infantry invasion of the Gaza Strip. realising such ambitions. parliamentary elections scheduled for Following a week of air, artillery and naval 10 February. bombing, the IDF carried out a ground Operation Cast Lead Commences In sum, the IDF’s three principal incursion simultaneously from several Operation Cast Lead began at 11:30 am lines of operation set out by the IDF high directions into Gaza with three infantry on 27 December 2008 with Israeli Air command for Operation Cast Lead were: brigade task forces (Paratroopers, Golani Force (IAF) bombardments on Hamas and Givati Brigades) and one armoured government offices, weapons depots and • To erode the military capabilities task force (401st Armoured Brigade) each factories and other critical infrastructure of Hamas and other Gaza-based supported by Engineering, Artillery and in central and northern Gaza. Around Palestinian insurgent/terrorist Intelligence Corps units. Ground units 100 warplanes and strike helicopters groups. This would be carried advanced under the cover of heavy dropped over 100 bombs within the first out initially by a devastating ground and naval artillery fire and with hour of the operation, catching Hamas air campaign, followed a week close air support. Amphibious landings entirely by surprise. On the second day later by a limited ground forces of IDF troops were also carried out in the IAF began targeting the underground incursion the south Philadelphi enclave in order
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The IDF operationalised ‘diffused warfare’ in order to tackle the urban insurgency, Gaza, January 2009. Photo courtesy of IDF.
to target remaining tunnels and Hamas mortar launching areas were (UAVs), helicopters and fighter jets units. targeted.12 were assigned to ground forces without The four brigade task forces cut IAF operational headquarters having Gaza into three areas of operations in By the second day of the ground to approve sortie targets. According order to impede the smuggling and incursion, Israeli forces had already taken to a senior IDF commander, this was replenishment of Hamas units as well as over launching sites in Beit Hanoun in the the ‘first time aircraft were controlled to stop Hamas operatives from moving north and had captured sections of the by the brigade commanders in their in between sectors controlled by the Zeitun refugee camp and Netzarim, which area of operation’.13 This was possible different brigades. Each brigade was permitted them to cut off Gaza City, the by allocating air support co-ordination also specifically assigned an operational operational ‘headquarters’ of Hamas’s officers to brigade headquarters and to objective relative to their area of leadership. each battalion or smaller-size fighting operations: units operating in Gaza. UAV units were IDF ground forces particularly decisive in enabling ground • Along the Philadelphi Corridor, force units to operate effectively within rocket and weapons-smuggling avoided cramped crowded Gaza urban centres. UAVs would routes were targeted alleyways and confined fly 500 metres ahead of advancing units • In the south, training compounds and provide real-time imagery and advice and weapons storage facilities zones of fire regarding imminent ‘over the urban were targeted horizon’ threats. • In Gaza City, Hamas command- In order to improve joint operations Each brigade, which came under and-control bases were between air and ground units, the the overall operational command of attacked IDF adopted a different operational Southern Command rather than under • In the northern Gaza Strip, command structure compared to previous that of General Staff Headquarters, Hamas units and rocket/ operations. Unmanned aerial vehicles operated with a great level of autonomy
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in order to adapt as rapidly as possible most Hamas leaders and fighting units blow, though, on 9 January when three to the evolving tactical situation on the underground (literally), only for them to Golani Brigade soldiers were killed and ground, thus enabling better exploitation re-emerge after a new ceasefire had been over twenty injured by a tank shell fired of targeting opportunities, which often established in mid-January. mistakenly at a building in Tel Al-Shakef required very rapid decision-making in the Tofah district of Gaza City where cycles. All four brigade commanders IDF troops had taken shelter. Other than fought alongside their units rather than The IDF’s overall this friendly-fire incident (in which the commanding them from a rearguard military superiority Golani Brigade Commander, Colonel Avi operational headquarters as had occurred Peled, was lightly wounded), the IDF was during the 2006 Lebanon War. Knesset forced most Hamas able to co-ordinate its ground, air and Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee leaders and fighting naval operations fairly seamlessly. This member Rafi Eitan noted how the so- was a significant improvement over its called ‘LCD culture’ command-style units underground operations in southern Lebanon in 2006. had led to various operational blunders IDF officials expected to encounter during the Lebanon War, and how such Air surveillance from Heron and Hermes ‘nature reserves’ containing Hamas units a leadership style had been changed 450 UAVs and Apache attack helicopters and weapons, similar to those that IDF since then under the stewardship of IDF granted an unparalleled degree of real- units came across in Lebanon whilst Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Gabi time close air support to units operating fighting Hizbullah. In Gaza’s case, the IDF Ashkenazi: ‘We all remember the brigade within the urban battlefield (helicopters would be operating in an ‘urban jungle’ commanders in the Second Lebanon War, operated within thirty metres of friendly and such reserves would not only be used sitting at their computers while their men forces). Each brigade was supported to ambush and booby-trap IDF units, were in the field. Now they are the first by an attack helicopter squadron. but also would be employed to abduct in the field’.14 The IDF would not repeat Intelligence sources state that ‘F-15 and IDF soldiers. Lieutenant Colonel Yehuda such command and control errors in Cast F-16 aircraft could identify and fire air-to- Cohen, commander of the Givati Brigade’s Lead. ground missiles within 30 seconds of data Rotem Battalion, gave an example of how transmission to take out fleeing targets’.16 Hamas operatives booby-trapped civilian Diffused Warfare These improved sensor-to-shooter cycle homes intended to inflict significant During Operation Cast Lead the IDF capabilities were especially crucial for casualties on the IDF as it operated in implemented ‘diffused warfare’ as an targeting Hamas rocket and mortar launch Gaza’s urban centres: 20 operational concept in order to deal units, which would often ‘shoot and with urban terrorist and insurgent scoot’ within the densely populated and We saw house bombs here [areas around threats. This concept is based on the built-up conurbations of Gaza. In order Gaza City], houses booby-trapped from premise that rather than employing to pre-empt or deter further attacks, the inside or houses where the gas only a small part of fighting units during the IAF employed many ‘“hover and pipe was left open and all openings conventional combat, fighting insurgents kill” missions, where attack helicopters were sealed so that they blow up on in the urban battlefield requires the [would] circle above the combat area at us as we enter. Those who booby-trap military to employ forces independently high altitude before dropping to low level houses should not be surprised when and contemporaneously over a large to engage their targets’.17 we detonate them from afar in order to area of operations. In order to achieve In order to co-ordinate all air assets protect our soldiers’ lives. this effectively, the diffused warfare as well as air-to-ground operations, the concept incorporates multidimensional IAF employed two ‘Conformal Airborne In order to avoid suffering major intelligence gathered by electronic Early Warning and Control aircraft casualties when entering urban areas sensors and humans. ‘Processed via a – Gulfstream G550s each modified with of operation, IDF ground forces avoided network-centric infrastructure, Intel three large active electronically scanned cramped alleyways and confined zones is rapidly transformed into targeting array radar’.18 These aircraft were of fire; they also tended to manoeuvre at information and distributed to the consistently used for ‘early warning, a high operational tempo without taking most appropriate’ ground or air asset air situation picture generation and air protracted breaks. Booby-trap mines in order to eliminate the target within combat command and control’, which and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) a much more rapid sensor-to-shooter were crucial in reconciling data from along incursion routes were cleared by cycle.15 The operational tempo of the IDF the scores of UAVs, fighter jets, strike employing ‘rocket-launched chains of proved too overwhelming for Hamas, helicopters, MEDIVAC units, artillery small charges’ and other means at the which in the end decided to avoid direct and missile fire from various ground disposal of the Engineering Corps and frontal assaults or engagements with and naval platforms, all of which were its elite reconnaissance unit, Sayeret the vastly superior conventional forces operating within a very confined and Yahalom.21 The IDF also moved through of the Israeli military. In a sense, the dense air-land battle-space.19 The IDF’s unexpected routes and often used D-9 IDF’s improved operational capabilities ability to co-ordinate its forces and bulldozers in order to circumvent booby- and overall military superiority forced avoid self-inflicted casualties did suffer a trapped alleyways by ploughing through
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actual buildings, thus enabling troops to and human shields during the campaign. ordination Communication Headquarters, move under the cover of such buildings, Foreign Minister Livni, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Avi Biton, Hamas albeit at the cost of collateral damage. stated during a foreign press conference would often seize such convoys in order that ‘We need to understand that they to sell the items to the population.29 Operating in a Civilian produce missiles in homes occupied The firepower employed by the IDF Battlespace by civilians who are well aware of this. and the deployment of its armed forces The IDF insisted that it tried to limit Before each attack, we announced it via in such a densely populated area resulted collateral damage and civilian casualties their media and asked civilians to leave. in a significant number of civilian deaths. during Cast Lead, but there were instances We dropped leaflets from the air, and According to a senior IDF military official in which it deliberately targeted civilian made more than 19,000 phone calls to during Cast Lead, Palestinians suffered infrastructure, claiming they were being residents in the area’.25 These leaflets 1,166 deaths; 709 of these were Hamas used by Hamas for military purposes read, ‘Area resident, as a result of the acts and Islamic Jihad operatives whose – and as such, therefore, were legitimate undertaken by terror activists in your area names are known by the IDF; 162 of military targets under international law. against Israel, the IDF is forced to respond the fatalities were men between the By the first week of the Gaza offensive, immediately and operate in this area. For ages of 16 and 45, whose connection for example, Israel had bombed nine your own safety you are asked to leave to either organisation is unclear; 295 of Gaza mosques which were being used the area immediately’.26 They contrasted the deaths were Palestinian civilians.30 by Hamas as rocket and weapons such warnings with Hamas’s statements, Consequently, and despite an improved storehouses.22 During the campaign IDF which declared that civilians would be public diplomacy campaign, Israel’s image Combat Camera teams were deployed deliberately targeted in retaliation for the abroad was adversely affected, although with units in order to provide footage IDF’s ongoing Gaza campaign. it is difficult to assess how severely. for intelligence purposes but also for the Despite three weeks of heavy media. Their aim was to demonstrate Israel’s image abroad bombardments and two weeks of Israeli that Hamas had booby-trapped civilian ground operations, Israel proved unable buildings, such as schools, had used was adversely affected, to reach a favourable ceasefire agreement civilians as human shields and stored although it is difficult with Hamas and could not eliminate weapons caches in mosques and other Hamas’s rocket and mortar launching civilian infrastructure.23 to assess how severely capabilities. (Hamas fighters were still Furthermore, ground and aerial able to launch over 600 rockets into Israel intelligence units were able to observe Accusations against Israel that it was during the twenty-two day conflict.) In and record secondary explosions after causing a humanitarian disaster due to the face of mounting international hitting ‘civilian’ targets. The IDF claimed OperationCast Lead were rife during the pressure,31 Israel unilaterally declared a that this was clear evidence of the campaign. Israel’s public diplomacy was, ceasefire on 17 January 2009. existence of large quantities of ordinance however, largely successful in rebutting and explosive materials hidden by Hamas, such allegations. Dismissing charges that Operation Cast Lead: An Israeli which confirmed Hamas’s disregard Israel had not allowed humanitarian aid Success? for Palestinian civilian casualties and to reach Gaza during the conflict, Israeli Israel achieved significant tactical collateral damage. President Shimon Peres stated that successes and managed to redeem On balance, Israel’s public diplomacy ‘42,327 trucks transporting essential its poor performance during the 2006 and information operations campaign supplies had been allowed into Gaza’.27 Lebanon War. The head of Southern during Cast Lead was far superior to Moreover, the IDF reported that ‘more Command, Major General Yoav Galant, the one it had carried out during the than one million liters of fuel were stated that ‘there was nearly not one 2006 Lebanon War. Nevertheless, Israel transferred into the Gaza Strip through weapon storage facility, smuggling was roundly condemned by some the Nahal Oz fuel crossing’ in order tunnel and terror operative house that countries. Following the attacks on the to enable the continued operation of was not hit in the Gaza Strip, and there Gaza mosques, the chairman of the power stations, hospitals and other were minimal tactical encounters by our Egyptian Parliament’s Foreign Relations critical infrastructure.28 Following the forces with them … that ended without Committee, Dr Mustafa El-Fiqi, stated commencement of the ground invasion an achievement on our part’.32 Yet very that ‘Israel is an aggressive country which (and given the international outcry little was obtained from a strategic and poses a danger to all the nations in the regarding the dire conditions of Palestinian political point of view. region’.24 civilians), the IDF also implemented a In a sense, Israel’s inability to dent IDF spokespeople and members daily humanitarian ceasefire usually Hamas’s military capabilities was due to of the Israeli government repeatedly between 10:00 and 13:00 in order to the fact that rather than seeking to fully stressed the serious efforts that the IDF allow humanitarian convoy deliveries to capture two critical areas – the Philadelphi was making in order to avoid civilian enter Gaza through the Kerem Shalom Corridor and Rafah in the south and the casualties and collateral damage despite and Erez crossings. However, according rocket- and mortar-launching sites in Gaza Hamas’s reported use of civilian quarters to an operations officer in the Gaza Co- City in the north – the IDF General Staff
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stretched its troops out too thinly and with regards to Hamas and other anti- building and six smuggling tunnels in over-relied on heavy air bombardment Israeli organisations in the Gaza Strip. southern Gaza. This only reinforced what in order to target such an area of Following Israel’s unilateral ceasefire most ministers had been saying since operations. During the initial few days declaration, which included warnings Israel’s unilateral ceasefire declaration: of the ground campaign the IDF seemed that it would continue to retaliate Operation Cast Lead did not accomplish set on entering such areas. Yet instead of against any terrorist activity, Hamas the two main goals of stopping rocket going in to mop-up Hamas units, weapons defiantly declared that its ‘resistance’ attacks on Israel and the influx of caches and factories, units were halted at would carry on. International pledges for weapons for resupplying Hamas, and thus the outskirts of these target areas. The the reconstruction of what some have should be continued until both goals are IDF for the most part left its forces on the estimated as $2 billion dollars worth of achieved. outskirts of the more densely populated damage caused by the IDF will, in effect, areas. These areas often consisted of enable Hamas to re-establish again its It is probable that open, flat agricultural land, and in such government infrastructure and services, terrain the IDF clearly faced less of a thus frustrating Cast Lead’s attempt at Israel will be enmeshed topographical challenge than when it had incapacitating Hamas’s governance in fought Hizbullah in the hills and wadis of Gaza. again in Gaza southern Lebanon in 2006. An enduring Even Israeli diplomatic attempts at feature of contemporary militaries is trying to cajole Egypt into being more In spite of the IDF’s much-improved casualty aversion but the IDF, despite its proactive at stemming the smuggling of tactical and operational performance, increased preparedness for Cast Lead weapons via the Philadelphi corridor into securing Israel’s southern communities and its superiority vis-à-vis Hamas forces, Gaza have not borne fruit. Accordingly, has been a strategic goal that has eluded nonetheless did not run the risk of putting on 16 January Israeli Foreign Minster Israel even in this most recent round of its forces in more danger than it thought Tzipi Livni and then US Secretary major hostilities. As Stuart Cohen, an necessary. Whilst such considerations of State Condoleezza Rice signed a expert on the IDF, has argued, ‘the end helped avoid a casualty count that could memorandum of understanding in of the operation left a somewhat bitter have backfired in the election campaign, which the US committed to provide taste, principally because it seemed it limited the extent to which ground Israel with the resources and technology so indecisive. There was no dramatic forces could dismantle Hamas’s military needed in order to ‘prevent the supply finale’.35 With the newly-established infrastructure. of arms and related materiel to terrorist Benjamin Netanyahu government in organizations that threaten either party, power, it is probable that Israel will be Securing Israel’s with a particular focus on the supply of enmeshed again in Gaza with another of arms, related materiel and explosives its episodic major operations in order to southern communities into Gaza to Hamas and other terrorist try once again to improve the security of has been a strategic organizations’.34 its southern communities. The question Notwithstanding the US-Israeli that Israeli policy-makers might be asking goal that has eluded memorandum of understanding, it themselves now is whether or not the Israel seems highly likely that Hamas will next IDF operation in Gaza will achieve continue to rearm itself, recruit and train anything greater than another unstable Professor Ruth Gabizon, a member of the new members, and persist in relying ceasefire. ■ Winograd Committee, which investigated on escalating Iranian financial and the failures of the 2006 Lebanon War, military help in order to provoke Israel Dr Sergio Catignani is a Lecturer in argued two weeks after the end of into another invasion, which it hopes Strategic and Security Studies in the Operation Cast Lead that ‘both wars will prove more costly to the IDF than Department of International Relations, ended with an insufficient ceasefire [and Operation Cast Lead has been. Such University of Sussex. He is the author of that] the conflict in Gaza is not over’.33 provocations have come sooner rather Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Such a statement could have easily been than later. Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional applied to the myriad other major Gaza On 1 February, after fourteen Army (Routledge, 2008) and co-editor of operations carried out by the IDF since rocket and mortar rounds were fired Israel and Hizbollah: An Asymmetric 2004. Israel again was not able to re- into southern Israel, the IAF carried out Conflict in Historical and Comparative establish a satisfactory deterrent posture air strikes against a Hamas government Perspective (Routledge, 2009).
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NOTES
1 Operations Rainbow and Days of Washington Institute for Near East Policy 26 Hanan Greenberg, ‘IDF enters Gaza; 2 Penitence in 2004; Operations Summer (14 January 2009). soldiers seriously hurt’, Yediot Ahronot, 3 Rains and Autumn Clouds in 2006; and January 2009. Operation Hot Winter in 2008. 12 David Fulghum, ‘New War, Fresh Ideas’, Aviation Week & Space Technology (Vol. 27 Greer Fay Cashman, ‘Peres Blasts 2 ‘Ehud Barak Holds IDF on Leash against 170, No. 2, 12 January 2009), p. 26. “Misrepresentation of Facts” on Cast Hamas Missiles, Hizballah Rockets’, Lead Casualties’, The Jerusalem Post, 27 DEBKAfile Special Analysis, 10 January 13 Robert Wall, ‘Fighting Under Fire’, January 2009. 2009,
8 Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, War 22
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