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IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2020 70 The Relationship of the EU with Keys regional-strategy org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/393441468202137255/-future-and-the-world-banks-support-to-it-africa- hacia_africa_y_no_son_los_unicos CIDOB 2019 1 to economiccooperationandforeignpolicy. can polity. This is changing, at least when it comes rather thanperceivingthemselvesaspartoftheAfri- cultural identities(Arab,MediterraneanandMuslim) Maghreb havegivenprioritytoothergeographicor yet, veryoften,thecountriesandsocietiesfrom and peoplehavecirculatedinbothdirections. And been a space through which goods, ideas, beliefs the Africancontinent.Historically, theSaharahas Geographically, theMaghrebisanintegralpartof CIDOB, Senior researcher iLecha Soler Eduard to Africa Ten Reasons Why the Maghreb Pivots RelationshipThe of the EU with Africa 2 ed –explainingwhytheMaghrebislookingsouth. nary listoftenreasons–morecouldsurelybeadd- those questions,thisarticleshedslightonaprelimi- global affairs?Inordertoprovidesomeanswers extent is this altering the position of the Maghreb in vour thisforeignpolicyreorientation?Andtowhat since theindependences?Doexternalfactorsfa- that havecharacterizedintra-Maghrebrelations tion mirrorthecompetitiveorconflictingdynamics Maghreb capitals?To whatextentdoesthisevolu- nent ordoesitreflectchangingprioritiesinthe the resultoftransformationsinrestconti- a deliberate(geo)politicalchoice.Whynow?Isthis Maghreb countriesarepivotingtoAfricaandthisis Brief Africa-ECDPM-Apr-2018.pdf per See W , 225. ECDPM, 2018. Available online: https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP-225-Starting-afresh-Maghreb-relations-sub-Saharan- online: 2018. Available ECDPM, 225. , orld ,2020. Available online: www.ecfr.eu/page/-/a_return_to_africa_why_north_african_states_are_looking_south.pdf online: Available ,2020. A b B derr a n k , pp. 157-164. Available online: 157-164., pp. online: Available a

Africa’s future and the ’s support to it: Africa regional strategy regional Africa it: to support Bank’s World the and future Africa’s him p. 2. , p. , , Tasnim and and Tasnim ; S oler A gg ; and ; and a

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d L , , ech Faten D wor a , www.cidob.org/ca/articulos/anuario_internacional_cidob/2019/los_paises_del_magreb_pivotan_ Eduard . “Starting afresh: The Maghreb’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa,” ECDPM Discussion Pa Africa,” sub-Saharan with relations Maghreb’s The afresh: “Starting k in ECFR Policy Policy ECFR south,” looking are states African North Why Africa: to “A return , Anthony. . “Los países del Magreb pivotan hacia África… y no son los únicos,” únicos,” los son y no África… hacia pivotan Magreb del países “Los 1 The 30 yearsearlier. brink ofaneconomictake-off,muchlikeChinawas 2011, theWorld BankstatedthatAfricawasonthe accompanied byrapideconomicgrowthtoo.In an Africancountry. Thisdemographicgrowthwillbe one outoffourpeopleintheworldwouldbeliving whichmeansthat have almostdoubled(2.5billion), lation. By2050,theUNpredictsthisnumbermay ing inAfrica,representing17%oftheworld’spopu- In 2020,thereareanestimated1.3billionpeopleliv- Weight Relative 1. Africa’s this continental dimension are well awarethatposi- tries inNorthAfricathathadoccasionallyneglected Africa, butAfricanvoicesaremoreinfluential.Coun- only istherestofworldpayingmoreattentionto is changingAfrica’spositioninworldaffairs.Not This growth–demographicallyandeconomically in productivity. this processislikelytotranslateintorapidincreases major investmentsanddevelopmentprojects million inhabitants.Thisrapidtransformationrequires there willbemorethan100Africancitieswithovera expected tohappeninurbanareas;alreadyby2025, urban areas.Infact,80%ofthepopulationgrowthis another. Asignificantpartofthisgrowthwilloccurin bustness of the growth will vary from one country to economy willonlygrow, althoughthespeedandro- zations now concur thatAfrica’sweightin the world’s , 2011 , . 2 Available online: https://documents.worldbank. online: Available Manyinternationalfinancialorgani- Anuario Internacional Anuario Internacional - perceived success. nisia –seeminterestedinreplicatingMorocco’s kets. sistently increasedtheirpresenceinAfrica’smar- many smallandmediumenterpriseshaveallcon- caine duCommerceExtérieur(BMCE)–,andalso Banque Populaire (BP)andBanqueMaro- (AwB), Telecom, thethreelargestbanks–AttijariwafaBank technologicalcompanies suchasMaroc (OCP), erates suchastheOfficeChérifiendesPhosphates leading roleofitsbusinesssector.Largeconglom- esting aspectsofMorocco’sAfricanpolicyisthe dent example. In that respect, one of the most inter- er thanarisk.Moroccois,perhaps,themostevi- the firstonestoframeAfricaasanopportunityrath- Some ofthecountriesinMaghrebwereamong 3 pre-existing perceptionsaboutthecontinent. also encouraginginternationalpartnerstochange mism thatisnotonlyspreadingthroughAfrica,but has contributedtogeneratingawaveofafro-opti- charismatic leaderships at national and local levels can middleclasses,verydynamiccivilsocietiesand to riseabove6%.Morebroadly, theriseofnewAfri- Rwanda, ,Ghana,Tanzania andIvoryCoast pected thegrowthofcountriessuchasEthiopia, COVID-19, internationalfinancialinstitutionsex- economies in theworldareonthis . Before ly basedonthefactthatsomeoffastest-growing with ahighexpectedreturn.Thisassessmentispart- rica is “the place to be,” considered an investment nent ofburgeoningopportunities.Inotherwords,Af- manitarian crises, it is increasingly seen as a conti- of protractedconflicts,rampantinequalitiesorhu- Even ifAfricastillfacesmanychallengesintheform Opportunities of AContinent 2. investors. and politicalattractivenessforexternalpartnersor African realityincreasestheirindividualeconomic tioning themselvesasanintegralpartofthisnew 5 4 framework of the Africa-EU partnership. See: https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/afcfta See: partnership. Africa-EU the of framework veloppement_des_entreprises_marocaine_en_Afrique.pdf www.finances.gov.ma/Etude/depf/2018/D%C3%A9 online: 2018. Available Développement, de Française Agence et Maroc du nances The hopeful continent), in sharp contrast to the one published 11 years earlier depicting the continent as a “hopeless” case. a“hopeless” as continent the depicting 11 earlier years published one the to contrast sharp in continent), hopeful The Although estimates substantially vary depending on the sources and time frame, we are referring here to this 25% goal, as stated in the the in stated as goal, 25% this to here referring are we frame, time and sources the on depending vary substantially estimates Although The of page front the by illustrated well is future Africa’s regarding narrative of change The O u k essou 4 OthercountriesintheMaghreb–namelyTu - , Ministère de l’Économie et des Fi des Développement et al. et des entreprisesTaoufik marocaines en l’Économie Afrique: de réalité et perspective, Ministère 3

investors. crease theattractivenessofAfricaforinternational 13% to25%ormore)and,consequently, willin- nificantly boostintra-Africantrade(fromtoday’s pan-African free trade area is expected to very sig- expected toresumesoon.Theconstitutionofthe due tothepandemic,buttechnicalworksare seen for July 2020 – has momentarily been delayed ment (AfCFTA). Itsfullimplementation–initiallyfore- in 2018oftheAfricanContinentalFreeTrade Agree- cally, themostrelevantdevelopmentwassigning positive forcedeliveringAfricansolutions.Economi- Union (AU)isbecomingincreasinglyrelevantasa pects forregionalcooperation.Politically, theAfrican Another facetofthisafro-optimismarethepros- Momentum ARegionalist 3. from Africanregionalismin1984,quittingtheOr- ing fromTunis. ,instead,haddisengaged tions there–somecentralservicesarestilloperat- the deteriorationofpoliticalandsecuritycondi- back to Abidjan – it had left the due to and eventhoughitwent (from 2003and2014), headquarters oftheAfricanDevelopmentBank and SecurityCouncil. temporarily hosted the consistently playedamajorroleintheAU’sPeace 1962, also developed a robust Africa policy and has nial poweronceitregaineditsindependencein geria, acountrythatprojecteditselfasananti-colo- ganization of African Unity into the AU in 2002. Al- driving forcesinthetransformationofoldOr- ism. ,underGaddafi’srule,wasoneofthe major roleinthedevelopmentofAfricanregional- Some Maghrebcountrieshavetraditionallyplayeda most populatedcountryonthecontinent. Nigeria, thelargestAfricaneconomyandalso whichismadeupof15members,including WAS), Economic Community of West AfricanStates(ECO- example ofthissubregionaldynamismisthatthe sions andmonetarytradeintegration.Aclassic when itcomestopoliticaldialogue,securityprovi- are reinforcingsubregionalcooperativemechanisms 5 Inparallel,somepartsofthecontinent

Economist in December 2011 (African Rising – Rising 2011 (African December in -

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2020 71 The Relationship of the EU with Africa Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2020 72 The Relationship of the EU with Africa Keys for Sub-Saharan Africans, Morocco Wrestles with Immigrant Integration,” Migration Policy Institute, 2019. Available online: www.migration online: 2019. Available policy.org/article/growing-destination-sub-saharan-africans-morocco Institute, Policy Migration Integration,” Immigrant with Wrestles Morocco Africans, Sub-Saharan for be Libyathatattractedmost Africanmigrantsinthe sub-Saharan Africanmigrants.Inthepast,itusedto have becometransitanddestinationcountriesfor two decades.Oncecountriesofemigration,they the Maghrebhassignificantlychangedinlast Regarding internationalmigration,thepositionof Flows Migration 4. the existingpowerstructure. competitor, andbecauseitcouldsignificantlyalter regional bloc,asitisseenadisruptiveeconomic the prospectofMoroccobecomingpartsub- tion, noritseconomicagents,areenthusiasticabout with Morocco, neither the members of this organiza- maintaining orevenreinforcingbilateralrelations though West Africancountriesareinterestedin tion formembershiptotheECOWAS in2017.Al- the samestrategy, Moroccosubmitteditsapplica- that hadtheSADRasoneofitsmembers.Aspart this meantagreeingtoformpartofanorganization tions, MoroccorejoinedtheAUin2017,eventhough across the continent. Thus, after intense negotia- increase itseconomic,politicalandsocialpresence but alsoitwasincompatiblewithMorocco’splansto influence of the SADR and in African affairs, can strategyhadfailed.Notonlydiditincreasethe As timewentby, itbecameclearerthattheMoroc- investors attractiveness for international and will the increase continent’s significantly intra-African boost trade free trade isexpected area to very constitutionThe of the pan-African (SADR) asafullmember. mission oftheSahrawiArabDemocraticRepublic ganization ofAfricanUnityinretaliationforthead- 7 6 For further details and updated data on sub-Saharan migration to Morocco, see, for instance, instance, for see, Morocco, to migration sub-Saharan on data updated and details further For M unshi , Neil . “Morocco’s Ecowas bid sparks African fear and suspicion,” Financial Times 6 on theinternationalagenda arewell-known:fragile The reasonswhytheSahelhasgainedprominence Nexus Insecurity Maghreb- The 5. the participantsinthisdialogue. co’s bilateralrelationswithasignificantnumberof became aforeignpolicytoolforimprovingMoroc- for bi-regionalcooperationonmigration,whichalso what isstillknownastheRabatProcess,aplatform the so-called Western route, Morocco promoted ciding withanincreaseinirregularmigrationalong sion datingbacktotheyear2006.Thatyear,coin- EU countries.ThisalsohasanEU-Africandimen- ceived by European institutionsandneighbouring increase thefinancialandtechnicalsupportre- control andmaritime surveillance, as an argument to ferred totheircooperationonmigration,border tions in Libya. Morocco and Tunisia have also re- main prioritiesofEuropeancountriesandinstitu- precisely, humansmuggling–isalsooneofthe bilateral relationswithSpain.Migration–or,more nary Islandshaschanged the value and contentof migrants travellingnorthortryingtoreachtheCa- ritania has become a transit area for West African its MemberStates.Forinstance,thefactthatMau- tional partners,mainlywiththeEuropeanUnionand with othercountriesinAfrica,butalsointerna- altered theway Maghreb countries relate notonly ily dependentonsmugglingactivities.Migrationhas consequences forlocalcommunitiesthatareheav- The pressuretocontrolitssouthernbordershas this topicatthecentreofglobalconversation. when the#BlackLivesMattermovementhasplaced prevalence ofracismanddiscriminationatatime tive societiesandre-energizingthedebateon tion systems, increasing thediversity of the respec- ics allacrosstheMaghreb:strainingsocialprotec- This hasprofoundimplicationsforsocietaldynam- living inthiscountry, manyinanirregularsituation. destination, with700,000sub-Saharanmigrants 2011 war.NowadaysMoroccoisthemostpopular , butthiswasabruptly interrupted with the , 24 January, 2020. 2020. , 24 January, E l G h a zou a ni , Driss “A Growing Destination Destination . “A Growing 7

Sahel insecuritynexus. of thepolicycommunityhavedepictedaMaghreb- neighbours totheextentthatexpertsandmembers cult todisentangletheMaghrebfromitssouthern security dynamicsithasbecomeincreasinglydiffi- anating fromthisregion.Infact,whenitcomesto fragility of those countries and themultiplerisks em- the Maghreb had known for a long time about the players but,duetotheirproximity, thecountriesof sis inMaliwasaneye-openerformanyinternational see, for instance, instance, for see, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/74588 2017. online: 31 October, Available Peace, International for O 9 8 ready tobecomearelevantsecurityactorinitsim raised thequestionofwhetherAlgeriawasgetting participate inmissionsoutsideitsborders,which Algerian constitutiontoallowthearmy recent noveltiesistheproposedamendmentof more specifically, intheTuareg issue.Oneofthe tionally played an influential political role in and, policy andsecuritypriority, andAlgiershastradi- hel. ForAlgeria,theSahelhasbeenamajorforeign as itisbothacountryfromtheMaghrebandSa- This nexushasparticularsignificanceforMauritania, for non-African powers compete becoming where ascenario byconcerned the of idea Libya countriesAfrican are increasingly becoming ’ssouthernborder. connections andtherealizationthatthisregionis inal andterroristgroupswithinternational legal traffickingroutes,thepresenceofvariouscrim- tion, politicaldestabilization,themultiplicationofil- states, underdevelopment, environmental degrada- 12 11 10 in the Libyan conflict of 2011”. of conflict International Affairs Libyan the in tion reconfiguration-and-resilience/ Working Paper MENARA euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/EuroMeSCo-Joint-Policy-Study-8_The_Sahel_Europe_African_Border.pdf For a broader discussion, see Luis Luis see discussion, abroader For G

For further details on this road map and also on the AU’s role and position during the Libyan crisis see Alex de Waal (2013), “African roles roles (2013), Waal de “African Alex see crisis Libyan the during position and role AU’s the on also and map road this on details further For

j S G ed h . Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2017; York, New and Macmillan, . Palgrave turm h influence a a a - nem nem G a a n - rci Y , , African Security Review Security African Player, a Regional as Libya of Rise The Kathryn. Dalia a a z R., R., b ech Eye East Middle non-interference?” of acentury half with breaking Algeria is . “Why L F ounn ernández , Dalia (ed.). “The Sahel: Europe’s African Borders,” Borders,” African Europe’s Sahel: “The (ed.). Dalia a s . n. 16. http://menara.iai.it/portfolio-items/jihadist-groups-in-north-africa-and-the-sahel-between-disintegration-. n. , Djallil. “Jihadist Groups in Africa North and the Sahel: Between Disintegration, Reconfiguration and Resilience,” - M 9

olin a I., I., M a V rtinez eguill and Rasmus A. Rasmus and a 8 R V. (eds) Global, Regional and Local Dimensions (eds) V. of Western ’s Protracted Decoloniza The2012cri- ousselier , 89: 365-379. doi: 365-379. , 89: , , Jacques B oserup - . “The Forgotten Maghreb – Sahel Nexus” Sada Nexus” –Sahel Maghreb Forgotten “The 10.1111/1468-2346.12022

“Beyond , the Sahel-Maghreb Axis Looms Large.” In: In: Large.” Looms Axis Sahel-Maghreb the Sahara, Western “Beyond EuroMeSCo Joint Policy Study, Study, Policy Joint EuroMeSCo on deaf ears. the needforanendtoallhostilities.However,itfell dialogue betweentheLibyanparties,andreiterated that included the distribution of humanitarian aid and Aziz. This emergency initiative presented a road map the MauritanianPresident,MohamedOuldAbdel fort through a panel of African leaders, chaired by conflict. TheAUdidlaunchalast-ditchmediationef- 2011, andtheAUunsuccessfullytriedtostop ni, explicitlyopposedtheinternationalinterventionin friends, suchasUganda’sPresident,Yoweri Musevi- tries onthecontinent.SomeofGaddafi’sAfrican invested largeamountsofmoneyinseveralcoun- promoted there-foundingofAfricanUnionand The manwhocrownedhimselfas“kingofkings” Gaddafi’s highlypersonalisticforeignpolicypriority. mediate neighbourhood. an honestbroker.Thisalsocoincidedwithepisodes not seenbytheopponentsofGaddafiregimeas external actors,asaregionalpower. ceived byitsfellowAfricancountries,aswell in Africanaffairsandevenaspiredtobeingper- As explainedabove,Libyausedtoplayanactiverole Libyan the of Crisis Dimension African The 6. gaged init. intervention inMali,althoughwasnotformallyen- other globalactors.MoroccoalsobackedtheFrench strongly supportedbyFrance,theUnitedStatesand and development challenges oftheregion – which is Burkina Faso,NigerandChadtofacethesecurity mechanism createdin2014byMauritania,Mali, bat has shown support for the G5 – the institutional ed todevotemoreattentionit.Inthatrespect,Ra- tional partners,andparticularlyforFrance,alsostart- the increasedimportanceofSahelforitsinterna- , 12:2, 109-112, 10.1080/10246029.2003.9627226 DOI: 2003 12 At that time, the African Union was , 19 May 2020. , 19 2020. May 10 n. 8, 2018. Available online: online: 2018. Available 8, n. Morocco,wellawareof . Regarding the terrorist threat, , Carnegie Endowment 11 Thiswas www. -

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2020 73 The Relationship of the EU with Africa Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2020 74 The Relationship of the EU with Africa Keys magazine/l-algerie-bat-enretraite-en-afrique,1734 bours. conflict has direct implications for its southern neigh- thus reinforcingthe idea that the evolutionofthis of thecountry, havestrongtiesacrosstheborder, tory, suchastheTuareg orTubu militiasinthesouth armed groupsthatcontrolpartsoftheLibyanterri- fighters comingfromLibya.Additionally, someofthe tainly amplifiedbytheavailabilityofweaponsand morocco-relations-and-their-impact-on-the-maghrebi-regional-system/ MENARA Working Paper System,” Regional Maghrebi the on Impact ies Stud African North of Journal post-2011 The the in era,” Morocco and Algeria between rivalry the of shape changing The Maghreb? 16 15 14 13 across theborder. weapons enter Libya they can easily be smuggled Libya’s neighbours realized many years ago that once political, militaryorfinancialsupport. ence andconsequentlyprovidethecombatantswith Russia andsomeEUmembers,competeforinflu- African powers,suchastheGulfcountries,Turkey, the ideaofLibyabecomingascenariowherenon- der. Africancountriesareincreasinglyconcernedby threats arespillingovertotheothersideofbor- concerned abouttheriskofcontagionandhow African problem.Its neighbours aremainly ceased tobeanAfricanactor,becominginstead As aresultofthisprotractedinstability, Libyahas bel-controlled areas. of racismagainstblackcitizensandforeignersinre- 18 17 3, February 2014. Available online: www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/R-SANA/SANA-Dispatch3-Libyas-Fractious-South.pdf online: 2014. Available February 3, their supportofthefightingparties. global actorsthatcontinuetofueltheconflictthrough to thisconflict,incomparisonthoseregionalor are giventoosmallaroleintheattempttoputanend threats emanatingfromLibya.Theyregretthatthey share isanacuteperceptionofvulnerabilitytothe One aspectthatMaghrebiandsub-SaharanAfricans that conflictcouldspilloverLibya’ssouthernborders. fensive toseizeTripoli, onlyreinforcedtheperception of the country in 2019, as part of Haftar’s failed of- danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/med.2015/IEMed%20Yearbook%202015_FragmentedMaghrebSecurityChallenge_KhadijaMohsenFinan.pdf curity Challenge,” in 2 (2013),no. 3-15. : Karthala, p. 204, 2011. 204, p. (dir.), Maroc-Algérie, analyses Karthala, croisées CEI d’un in voisinage hostile,Paris: ennes” cidob.org/es/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/notes_internacionals_cidob/n1_227/how_libya_impacts_north_afric

For a detailed analysis on this rivalry and its regional implications see see implications regional its and rivalry this on analysis adetailed For

L G B K B 10.1080/13629387.2018.1454657; 2019. DOI: 506-531, , 24:3, a houttrou enchi øås hilès cher , 14 Morten and and Morten , ba , Francis and and Francis The displacement of the fighting to the south Thedisplacementofthefightingtosouth Wolfram XXI Orient économique» et politique Immobilism Afrique. en retraite en bat “Algérie , Lakhdar. b , Smail . “Libya’s Fractious South and Regional Instability. Small Arms Survey, Security Assessment in ,” Dispatch No. No. Dispatch Africa,” North in Assessment Security Survey, Arms Small Instability. Regional and South Fractious “Libya’s Mediterranean Yearbook 2015 U . “L’intensification des menaces sécuritaires dans la région sahélo-saharienne et l’avenir des relations maroco-algéri K 13 t h a a s The2012crisisinMaliwascer- riel Strategic Review Strategic for Africa,” West and Sahel the in Repercussions “Post-Gaddafi , Mats. f , Akram “How Libya impacts North Africa,” Notes CIDOB Internacionals Africa,” North impacts Libya “How Akram 15

, Barcelona: IEMed, pp. 81-84, 2015. Available online: online: 2015. 81-84, Available pp. IEMed, , Barcelona: L , n.20,2 018. Available online: http://menara.iai.it/portfolio-items/algeria- online: 018. Available , n.20,2 ounn ; and ; and H ern when itcomestohisinternationaltravel. Mohammed VIhasbeenabletogivepriorityAfrica prevented himfromcarryingoutofficialvisits,while former PresidentAbdulazizBouteflika’sillhealththat fits fromthevacuumleftbyAlgeria,aggravated Africa policy, intheSahel, but notexclusively, bene- Seen fromAlgiers,theintensificationofMorocco’s tion itselfasoneofAfrica’sfewgreatpowers. Sahel had sought toweaken Morocco andto posi- Seen fromRabat,Algeria’straditionalstrategyinthe cooperation mechanismsthatexcludedtheother. great extentprioritizedthosediplomaticorsecurity followed differentstrategiesintheSahel,andtoa terialized. Asexplainedabove,MoroccoandAlgeria Africa isoneofthespaceswherethisrivalryhasma- ship withsignificantregionalimplications. ence, configuratesafarmorecontentiousrelation- or areas where both countries compete for influ- tic diplomaticstrategiesinmultilateralorganizations litical statementsandpressincidentsantagonis- Sahara issue,periodiccontroversiessteeredbypo- two countriessince1994,theunresolvedWestern war dynamics,theclosureofborderbetween independence, theirdifferentpositioninginthecold the twocountriesfoughtawarrightafterAlgeria’s brotherly nations.Ontheotherhand,factthat cations theneighboursoftenrefertooneanotheras respective constitutions–andinofficialcommuni- Maghreb –infact,thisgoaliscontainedwithintheir cially aspiretoachievinggreaterintegrationinthe ambivalent one.Ontheonehand,bothstatesoffi- The relationshipbetweenRabatandAlgiersisan and Algeria Morocco 7. between Rivalry The a s a , M ndo Djallil ohsen

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L -F M a in rr ess a a n mendi a , Khadija, “A Fragmented Maghreb Facing a Facing Maghreb “A Fragmented , Khadija, ri , Nizar. “Algeria – Morocco Relations and their their and Relations –Morocco “Algeria Nizar. , Miguel , n. 227, 2020. Available online: www. online: 227,, n. Available 2020. , 2 March, 2017., 2March, http://orientxxi.info/ “Doomed regionalism in a redrawn aredrawn in regionalism . “Doomed www.iemed.org/observatori/arees- a 18 16 Despite

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countries. to berestrictedtheFrench-speakingWest African ing beyonditstraditionalcircleoffriends,whichused and deployingaforeignpolicystrategyaimedatgo- ripheral position,underliningitsAtlanticcharacter Morocco hasredoubleditseffortstocounterpe- from exported been the Gulf region alternativean to the models that have cooperation in the religious as field model of moderate and offers isnowMorocco promoting its own tor. jects itselfasastrongmilitaryanddiplomaticac- can capitals.Itreliesuponancientalliancesandpro- discourse thatstillresonatesstronglyinsomeAfri- on its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist trajectory, a ploys itsforeignpolicytoolkit.Algeriatries to build In thiscompetition,eachofthetwocountriesde- up lostgroundinAfrica. most ofitseffortsdomestically, itstillaimstomake may oblige the new Algerian leadership to focus the factthatpersistenceofHirakmovement 20 19 ranean Politics its ownmodelofmoderateIslam andofferscoopera- as partofitsforeignpolicyinAfrica,is now promoting ously usedSufism–themysticalcurrentofIslam transcontinental projects.Morocco,whichhadprevi- role asaninternationalinvestorandgatewayfor dynamism ofitseconomicsectorandstresses and theGulfofGuinea. optical fibrelines)connectingtheMediterranean a naturalpassageforinfrastructure(roads,pipelines, that vein,Algeriatriestopresentitsvastterritoryas closer toAbuja,Nigeria’scapital,thanAlgiers.In proximity is thatthesouthern city ofTamanrasset is borders withMaliandNiger.Anotherexampleofthis continent’s largestcountryand,unlikeMorocco, also stressesthegeographicalfactor.Algeriais are aimed at better exploiting those assets. Finally, it items/-african-foreign-policy/

Z M ou 19 ess b Theaforementionedconstitutionalrevisions ir a ri , Yahia. “Algeria’s role in the OAU/African Union: From national liberation promoter to leader in the global war on terrorism,” Mediter terrorism,” on war global the in leader to promoter liberation national From Union: OAU/African the in role “Algeria’s Yahia. , Nizar 20 Unlike Algeria, it puts the focus on the UnlikeAlgeria, it putsthefocuson . 20:1. 2015. pp.55-75 MENARA Future MENARA Notes Policy,” Foreign African . “Morocco’s forgotten continent” isnolongervalid.Quitetheop- will trytobalanceitout.TheoldmottoofAfricaas“the cion amongitscompetitors,who,asaconsequence, certain globalorregionalpowerinAfricaraisessuspi- conflictual global order, any reinforced presence bya More broadly, inanincreasinglycompetitive andeven maine réservé. example –thathadalwaysseenAfricaastheirdo- anxiety oftheoldpowers–Francemaybebest ment cooperation projects. This has increased the quent, together with military contracts and develop- summits andofficialvisitshavebecomemorefre- have alsoincreasedtheirpresenceinthecontinent, recently, Turkey, India,RussiaandtheGulfcountries centrality ofAfricainBeijing’sglobalstrategy. More as an indication of a more ambitious policy and the Beijing’s long-terminterestinthecontinent,butalso nese militarybaseinDjiboutiwasseenasproofof academic and policy circles. The opening of theChi- Africa hasbecomearealitydiscussedatlengthin ades, Chineseeconomicandpoliticalinvestmentin range ofextra-regionalpowers.Inthelasttwodec- opportunities hasincreasedtheattentionofawide and thegeneralizedperceptionthatitoffersmany TherealizationofAfrica’sgrowingweight activities). schools forlocalelitesandinsomecasesreligious instruments (scientificcooperation,scholarships, minerals, etc. – and are also deploying soft power ence instrategicareas–militarybases,ports,rare gional powersareaggressivelyincreasingtheirpres- influence andprojectsinAfrica.Otherglobalre- It is not only Morocco and Algeria that compete for Africa for Scramble and the Competition Global The 8. also alltheothercoastalcountriesofWest Africa. would notonlyconnectNigeriawithMorocco,but ample istheprojectofanunderwaterpipelinethat comes to infrastructure projects. The best-known ex- nally, itisalsotryingtocompetewithAlgeriawhen els thathavebeenexportedfromtheGulfregion.Fi- tion in the religious field as an alternative to the mod- , n. 12, 2018. Available online: http://menara.iai.it/portfolio- online: 12,, n. 2018. Available -

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2020 75 The Relationship of the EU with Africa Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2020 76 The Relationship of the EU with Africa Keys not beastrategyofmarketshareandinfluence, strategy inAfrica.Isincerelybelievethatoursmust their ownapproaches,andofcourseanAmerican Japanese and Turkish strategies in Africa, each with the followingdiagnosis:“Today, thereareChinese, cron, inthe2019ambassadors’ conference,made competition. TheFrenchPresident,EmmanuelMa- States, are not passive bystanders in this global The EuropeanUnion,andevenmoresoitsMember The Factor European 9. noeuvrings inTunisia hasraisedtensionswithAlgeria. together withtheirpoliciesinLibyaandpoliticalma- also supportedtheG5inSahel,andthispolicy, Arabia andtheEmirates.RiyadhAbuDhabihave development andmilitarycooperationfromSaudi coinciding with a significant increase of investment, of theMaghrebthatbrokeoffrelationswithQatar, tion, is a very interesting case.It was the only country 27/08/2019). https://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/vues/Kiosque/FranceDiplomatie/kiosque.php?fichier=bafr2019-08-28.html#Chapitre6 27/08/2019). 22 21 states areplayinganincreasinglysignificantrole.” petition in which China, Russia, and the Arab Gulf “Morocco itselfhasbecomeanarenaofglobalcom- West-Africa-to-Western EuropeCorridor” isthat tition forthemanufacturingvaluechainsin ing a“geopoliticalgatekeeperinnewglobalcompe- quences ofMorocco’sdeliberateattemptatbecom- As explainedbyMichaëlTanchum, oneoftheconse- The Maghrebdoesnotescapefromthosedynamics. haps evenmorethanthecontinentcanabsorb. posite, thecontinentreceivesalotofattention,per- 25 24 23 AIES Fokus pdf www.iemed.org/observatori/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/med.2018/IEMed_Gulf_NorthAfrica_Medyearbook2018_Eduard_Soler. africa-45496655 01.07.2020]: namics inWest Africa. Maghreb, withstrongconnectionssimilardy- defined thegamesofregionalalliancesin 2018 editionofthisYearbook, intra-Gulfrivalrieshave this extra-regionaldimension.Asexplainedinthe of theMaghrebcountrieswealsoneedtoincorporate Thus, whentryingtounderstandtheAfricanpolicies

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a L , , n 08/2020. www.aies.at/download/2020/AIES-Fokus-2020-08.pdf 08/2020. ech Michaël Andrew https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/ U nion a , Eduard . “Juncker unveils EU’s Africa plan to counter China,” China,” counter to plan Africa EU’s unveils . “Juncker . “Morocco’s Africa-to-Europe Commercial Corridor: Gatekeeper of an emerging trans-regional strategic architecture,” Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa, “Gulf Rivalries Reach North Africa,” in IEMed in Mediterranean Yearbook Africa,” 2018 North Reach Rivalries . “Gulf 22 , due toits loca- system/files/communication-eu-africa-strategy-join-2020-4-final_en.pdf 21

Brussels, 9.3.2020 JOIN (2020) 4 final (online). [Accessed on [Accessed (online). (2020) 4final JOIN 9.3.2020 Brussels, weight tothegrowingChineseinfluence. newed interestofEuropeinAfricaasacounter- Jean-Claude Juncker, candidly presented the re- The formerPresidentoftheEuropeanCommission, of sometheprojectswhichIhavejustmentioned.” predatory hegemony, whichissometimesatthecore which contrasts with a certain frustration when it which contrastswithacertainfrustrationwhenit profit fromtheinterestofEuropeinAfricanaffairs, key playersinthisnewframework.Theycouldtryto for Africa,andtheycouldtrytoprojectthemselvesas EU approach is coherent with their renewed interest countries havemixedfeelings.Ontheonehand, of developingcontinentalapproaches.Maghreb policies, known as NDICI, also offers the possibility tion ofasinglefinancialinstrumenttounifyallexternal North Africaandtherestofcontinent.Thecrea- mentioning thegrowinginterconnectionsbetween and theMiddleEastinsamesection,specifically dresses sub-SaharanAfrica,theMaghrebcountries with the 2016 European Global Strategy, which ad- of thecontinent.Thisdistinctionstartedtogetblurred and theEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy andtherest – thatfellundertheEuro-MediterraneanPartnership distinction betweenthepoliciestowardsNorthAfrica proach? Untilnotthatlongago,therewasaclear Where doestheMaghrebstandinthisnewap- leased inMarch2020. ship, as expressed in the Strategy with Africa, re- aims todevelopacontinent-to-continentpartner- the African--Pacific(ACP)groupitalso the EUhasbeennegotiatinganewagreementfor Cotonou Agreement–hasrecentlyexpired.While operation relations with sub-Saharan Africa – the a timewhentheframework regulating trade andco- serve theirtraditionaleconomicinfluenceinAfrica,at side the EU. Moreover, Europeans are trying to pre- ters of theAfrican Union, for her first official visit out- chose AddisAbaba,thecityhostingheadquar- by hazardthathis successor, UrsulaVon derLeyen, BBC News BBC , 12 September 2018. , 12 September 25 , Barcelona: IEMed, 2018. 53-57. p. IEMed, , Barcelona:

www..com/news/world- 24 Itisnot 23 and measures to facilitate trade could significantly mitigate COVID-19’s economic impact in Africa,” in in Africa,” in impact economic COVID-19’s mitigate significantly could trade facilitate to measures and 27 26 ca. way tomitigatetheimpactofpandemicinAfri- but continentaltradeliberalizationismainlyseenasa the AfricanContinentalFree Trade Area (AfCFTA), Africa? COVID-19maydelaytheentryintoforceof What doesitmeanforMaghreb’spoliciestowards require specificpoliciestomitigatetheeffects. the informalsectorhavebeenhithard,andthiswill rica andintheglobalSouth,vulnerableworkers and bothintheMaghreb,aswellelsewhereAf- affects everyone,butnotwiththesameintensity, on tourism,remittancesandoilrevenues.COVID-19 and theimpact on countries that wereheavily reliant lockdowns, the alteration of global supply chains the economicandsocialconsequencesofstrict Africa thereisstillalotofuncertainty, mainlydueto pandemic isanacceleratorofpre-existingtrends,in While mostanalyststentativelyconcludethatthe able todeployinnovativeandcooperativesolutions. tered fewercasesthanotherregionsandproved writing thisarticle,mostofthecontinenthadregis- of COVID-19areforAfricaandtheMaghreb.When It maybetooearlytodiscussherewhattheeffects 10. Pandemic The by theUnionforMediterranean. eration mechanism,whichisnowmainlyrepresented lationship withtheEUandaspecificregionalcoop- around theMediterraneanshouldhaveadistinctre- partners orgiveupontheideathatcountries they donotwanttolosetheirspecificityasprivileged comes toMiddleEasternaffairs.Ontheotherhand, 29 28 a regional approach. Some countries have already a regionalapproach.Somecountrieshavealready economies torevisittheirindustrializationplanswith equipment, suchasventilators,ispushingAfrican etc..) andfromothersuppliersformoresophisticated na for basic protection goods (facemasks, gloves, be asked to foot the bill,” ICTD, 8 April, 2020. Available online: www.ictd.ac/blog/covid-coronavirus-tax-breaks-informal-economy-workers/ online: Available 2020. 8April, ICTD, bill,” the foot to asked be responses/l-investissement-dans-la-region--a-l-heure-du-covid-19-03cbddc6/ article/2020/06/15/coronavirus-le-maroc-joue-la-diplomatie-du-masque-vers-l-afrique-subsaharienne_6042873_3212.html to-facilitate-trade-could-significantly-mitigate-covid-19s-economic-impact-in-africa/ www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/05/22/the-african-continental-free-trade-area-and-measures- online: Available 2020. May, See, for instance, instance, for See,

Le Monde Le subsaharienne,” l’Afrique vers masque’ du ‘diplomatie la joue Maroc le “Coronavirus: OCDE “L’investissement dans la région MENA à l’heure du COVID-19,” 4 June, 2020. Available online: www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy- online: Available 2020. 4June, COVID-19,” du àl’heure MENA région la dans “L’investissement OCDE G 27 a llien Therealizationofahyper-dependenceonChi- , Max and and Max va O ulm n

den a ne B , Nassim; oog aa rd , S Vanessa a dni J a ll “To fight Covid-19, only the formal economy is getting tax breaks. The informal economy may may economy informal The breaks. tax getting is economy formal the only Covid-19, . “To fight ab and , Mustapha 26 R élouendé gies. destinations forreshoringornearshoringstrate- and areopenlypositioningthemselvesasattractive that COVID-19couldhaveforglobalvaluechains rocco andTunisia arespeculatingabouttheeffects cerns internationaltradeandinvestmentflows.Mo- A seconddimensioninthisadaptationstrategycon- litres ofhydroalcoholicgelto15Africancountries. operation tosend8millionfacemasksand30,000 mask diplomacy,” when in June 2020 it organized an with Rabatlaunchingwhatsomedepictedas“face- neighbours. Moroccoisoneofthebestexamples, ries andexportingmedicalequipmenttotheirAfrican adapted tothenewreality, transformingtheirfacto- more relevant. blurred orwhyinterregionalrelationsarebecoming how regionalboundariesarebecomingincreasingly Mediterranean are all good examples that illestrate and thegeopoliticalgordianknotinEastern Africa, betweenSouthAsiaandtheMENAregion tions betweentheArabianPeninsulaandHornof countries of the Maghreb. The growing interconnec- no longerpossible.Andthisisnotexclusivetothe region, thusneglectingitsAfricandimension.Thisis world ortheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica(MENA) analysed and operationalized as part of the Arab in andwhoisout.Inthatrespect,theMaghrebwas definitions ofwhataregionandsubregionis,whois ment cooperationhavebeenboundbyconventional relations, foreignandsecuritypoliciesdevelop- that itispartofabroaderphenomenon.International Maghreb’s pivottoAfrica,butitisworthunderlining This articlehasanalysedtenreasonsthatliebehind Picture Broader The Conclusion: sion toincreasetheirappealforeigninvestors. strategies includeanAfricanorEuro-Africandimen-

29 Z idouem It will be worth observing to what extent those Itwillbeworthobservingtowhatextentthose ba , Patrice “The African Continental Free Trade Area Area Trade Free Continental African . “The , 15 June 2020 www.lemonde.fr/afrique/ 2020 , 15 June Africa in Focus in Africa , Brookings Institution, 22 22 Institution, , Brookings 28

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2020 77 The Relationship of the EU with Africa Keys