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Home , Afri, Algeria, Algiers, Central Africa, Habib Bourguiba, Hichem Mechichi

NO. 54 2020 Introduction

Maghrebi Rivalries Over Sub-Saharan and Seeking to Keep Up with Isabelle Werenfels

The Covid-19 pandemic has moved relations with Sub-Saharan Africa further up the countries’ agenda and consolidated existing trends. Morocco is the Maghreb with the most sophisticated Sub- policy. Its motivations include attractive growth markets in Africa, frustration over restricted access to , stalemated in- tegration in the Maghreb and the wish to see the recognised as Moroc- can. Morocco’s Sub-Sahara policy has heightened tensions with Algeria and awakened ambitions in Tunisia. , as a significant funder and security actor in the (AU) and “protector” of the Western Sahara independence movement, is seek- ing to thwart ’s advances. for its part is trying to follow in Rabat’s foot- steps, hoping that closer relations with Africa will boost economic growth. The Euro- pean Union should treat these trends as an opportunity for African integration and triangular EU/Maghreb/Sub-Sahara cooperation. This could counteract Algeria’s feel- ing of growing irrelevance, strengthen Tunisia’s economy, put Morocco’s hegemonic ambitions in perspective, and thus mitigate the negative dynamics of the rivalry.

The Africa policies of the Maghreb states and diplomatic role in Africa. Mohammed differ significantly in their intensity, vis- VI took personal charge of the country’s ibility, motivations, and priorities. On a Africa policy, backing it with intense travel broader level they reflect each state’s gen- diplomacy and strategic appearances, for eral domestic and foreign policy capacities. example at the 5th AU-EU Summit in 2017 This is visible not least in the way the coun- in . Rabat has achieved notable suc- tries market their Africa policies. cesses with its soft power approach, which For some time Morocco has had the most encompasses economic, development co- dynamic and progressive Africa policy of the operation, migration and religious compo- three countries. II, who ruled nents. In 2017 Morocco was re- from 1961 to 1999, had already put out admitted to the AU after 33 years, against feelers to Africa. But it is under his the objections of heavyweights like South son Mohammed VI (since 1999) that Morocco Africa and Algeria but strongly supported has proactively pursued a key economic by numerous West African states as well as

Rwanda. Morocco quit the AU’s predeces- of its military, logistical and financial sup- sor in protest in 1984 after it accepted the for anti-colonial movements. Close Western Sahara into membership. development cooperation with the newly Morocco has enormously expanded its independent African states and significant presence in Sub-Saharan Africa in the past engagement in the Non-Aligned Movement decade, above all economically. It is one also boosted Algeria’s standing across the of the ’s largest African investors, continent. alongside , and , Since its civil war in the , which and the biggest African investor in West coincided with the end of the Africa, where Moroccan insurance compa- order, Algiers has failed to restore its lost nies, telecommunications providers, and grandeur and its policy of “strategic depth” banks enjoy significant market shares. Mo- in Africa. The security sphere represents a rocco also exports agricultural and renew- partial exception. Here Algeria plays a rele- able energy , especially to West vant role within the AU institutions, and Africa, and is increasingly looking to East Algiers has also engaged as a mediator in and too, for example Ethio- African conflicts with some success. - pia, and . Since 2017 nomic initiatives under President Abdelaziz Rabat has also been seeking accession to Bouteflika between 1999 and 2019 – such the Economic Community of West African as an ambitious investment conference in States (ECOWAS), to date without success. Algiers at the end of 2016 – have been less One central driver of this policy is the successful. Although Algeria was a found- desire to open up new markets for Moroc- ing member of the AU’s development agency can businesses, especially those controlled NEPAD (now AUDA), its engagement has by the royal . Two relevant aspects remained modest, despite having had con- here are the limited access to the European siderable material resources at its disposal and marginal economic inter- until a few years ago. action across the closed border with Algeria. From 2013, Algeria’s engagement in Morocco’s desire for recognition of its claim Africa was hampered by Bouteflika’s severe to the Western Sahara is at least as impor- health problems, which ended his travel- tant for its “turn to Africa”. Related to this is ling diplomacy. Yet even before that, the the regional rivalry with Algeria that goes Algerian President had shown waning in- beyond the Western Sahara question, where terest in Africa, despite having belonged Algeria functions as the “protector” of the decades ago to the architects of Algeria’s independence movement, the Polisario. early foreign policy and its support for anti- Both states are seeking to exploit new op- colonial movements. portunities created by changes in the larger His successor , regional context, such as the ousting of the in office since December 2019, announced Libyan leader and advocate of greater - Algeria’s “return to Africa” at his first AU can unity Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, who played Summit in February 2020. While this is an extremely active role in African diplo- probably motivated by a desire not to leave macy, development, and security questions. the field entirely to Morocco, external secu- rity challenges also lead Algiers to look to the south: instability in , chaos in Neighbour Algeria Irritated , pressure of migration on its southern borders, and the European and US military Morocco’s rise on the continent could be presence in the . The latter Algiers described as close to traumatic for Algeria, observes with suspicion. whose influence has waned substantially. However a contoured Africa strategy During the first decades after independence comparable to Morocco’s is not currently in 1962 Algeria enjoyed great prestige in observable. And the prospects of one emerg- large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa on account ing are not especially good. Algerian deci-

SWP Comment 54 November 2020

2 sion-makers are preoccupied with signifi- the fundamental problems of the young cant internal and economic challenges – – slow decision-making, an for which they have to date been unable to overwhelmed , and a lack of present strategies. political continuity – this is inevitably a protracted process.

Tunisia Seeking to Catch Up Institutional Power Play Tunisia has been observing Morocco’s Africa policy increasingly closely and en- Morocco’s confidence, Algeria’s defence of viously. In ministries and business circles its legacy and Tunisia’s reawakening inter- one hears that Tunisia could in fact offer est are also reflected within the African comparable or better expertise, for example institutions and organisations. The demise in the IT, real estate development, and of Libyan dictator Qadhafi in 2011 made banking sectors, in planning of Algeria the unchallenged Maghreb heavy- major infrastructure projects, and in weight within the AU. But Morocco health and education services. now contributes at least as much financial- After a good two decades where Sub- ly and expects relevant positions and Saharan Africa played a marginal role, influence in AU organs. Tunisia has been gradually awakening from For almost two decades an Algerian has its slumber. Following the removal of the held the post of AU Commissioner for Peace Ben Ali regime in 2011 the transitional and Security, who also oversees the AU’s government attempted to revive the African Peace and Security Council (PSC). Morocco diplomatic engagement of the era of Presi- joined the PSC in 2018 and held its rotating dent Bourguiba (1957–1987). But chair in 2019. Where Rabat is represented this was a brief episode of little strategic in AU bodies there is often conflict over import. For example Tunis was unable to formulations that (could potentially) relate prevent the decision of the African Devel- to the , and over opment Bank in 2013 to move its head- the presence of the Sahrawi as a quarters back to Abidjan. member of the AU. Although Morocco Tunisia has nevertheless incrementally has not to date succeeded in excluding the expanded its engagement in Sub-Saharan Polisario from the AU, the fronts have Africa, as demonstrated by its joining hardened. Influential countries like South ECOWAS in 2017 as an observer, and its Africa maintain their unequivocal backing accession to the Common Market for East- for the Polisario, but thirteen AU members ern and (COMESA) in 2018. explicitly support Morocco’s claim to the In 2017 the then prime minister, Youssef Western Sahara, having opened consulates Chahed, visited , Mali and Burkina in the Moroccan-occupied part since 2019. Faso. The new prime minister appointed in Algeria is home to an important AU in- autumn 2020, , announced stitution, the African Centre for the Study that he would step up and Research on (ACSRT). Morocco in Africa. The country’s president, Kaïs and Tunisia now have their own too: The Saïed, to date has shown only limited inter- African Migration Observatory founded in est in Sub-Saharan Africa. 2018 is based in Rabat, the AU Institute for So far it is the private sector that presses Statistics in Tunis. In 2020 Morocco also hardest for a clearer orientation on Africa, achieved a minor victory in relation to Afri- first and foremost the Tunisia-Africa Busi- can representation in the , ness Council (TABC). It establishes contacts, providing the chair of the UN Rights organises conferences, and lobbies for the Council’s Independent Fact-Finding Mission legal and administrative reforms required on Libya. Algeria’s candidate for the post of to encourage investment and exports. Given UN Special Representative in Libya was ap-

SWP Comment 54 November 2020

3 parently rejected by Washington. This exam- coup, Morocco soon arrived to offer its ple illustrates how influence of the Magh- services. reb states in Africa sometimes functions Tunisia seeks prominence principally obliquely and/or relies on external backing. in peace-keeping. In 2019 the Maghreb’s smallest nation participated in five UN missions in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Jostling over Security Alliances MINUSMA in Mali. Morocco was involved in three missions in 2019, in two cases with Negative effects of the Algerian-Moroccan large contingents. In November 2020 Algeria rivalry are especially obvious in the secu- adopted a constitutional amendment per- rity domain. Algeria was one of the driving mitting its armed forces to participate in forces behind the African Peace and Secu- international peace-keeping operations – rity (APSA) through its engage- most of which occur in Africa. This could ment in the AU Peace and Security Council trigger a Maghreb peace-keeping race, with and the ACSRT. But despite pressing shared potentially positive effects. security challenges in the Sahel/Sahara , none of the multilateral security ini- tiatives includes all three Maghreb states – Unequal Economic Competition apart from loose involvement in Washing- ton’s Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Part- The sector where both Algeria and Tunisia nership. Instead Algeria and Morocco each have the most catching up to do is the attempt to make their own mark. economy. is by volume the con- In 2010 Algiers set up a Joint Military tinent’s largest and Morocco Staff Committee (CEMOC) in to is streets ahead in with and invest- fight terrorism in the Sahel with Mali, Mau- ment in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure). ritania and Niger and develop their security Between 2005 and 2019 Morocco’s ex- capacities. Morocco and Tunisia participate quadrupled and Tunisia’s more than in the Community of Sahel-Saharan States doubled. Both have large trade surpluses (CEN-SAD), which was founded by Qadhafi with Sub-Saharan Africa. Algeria on the and also has a security dimension. But other hand imports considerably more from neither CEN-SAD nor CEMOC play a signifi- Sub-Saharan Africa than it exports there. Its cant role in the Sahel. Initiatives also in- export volume has however been increasing volving international actors, such as the noticeably for some years and its imports G5-Sahel, are more visible. from southern Africa have soared. This in- Although Algeria has achieved successes dicates growing trade relations with certain in the field of conflict resolution, for exam- Sub-Saharan economies. ple with the Accord d’ for Mali in 2015, The African Continental Free Trade Area Morocco has been challenging for that role. (AfCFTA) launched in 2019 includes all three For example the Libyan Political Agreement Maghreb states. It is designed to come into establishing a UN-supported government effect incrementally, and is initially unlikely was signed in , Morocco, in 2015. In to alter the imbalance towards Morocco. autumn 2020 the Libyan conflict parties Tunisia and Algeria have no economic strat- again negotiated in Morocco, and later in egy for Sub-Saharan Africa (yet). Further Tunisia – despite Algeria repeatedly offer- hurdles are foreign exchange controls and ing its services as mediator and enjoying the lack of double taxation agreements. the confidence of important conflict parties. Algeria also suffers a lack of diversification What we see here yet again is the strong in its export sector and uncompetitive ser- strategic and implementation capacity of vices; it remains to be seen whether govern- the Moroccan . Even in Mali, ment ideas such as offering services from its where Algeria hoped to rapidly position public sector to Sub-Saharan itself as the mediator after the August 2020 Africa states will be implemented and find

SWP Comment 54 November 2020

4 rivalled in the longer term, if only by virtue of the country’s geographical location. Casablanca is far and away the Maghreb’s largest flight hub and Tanger Med has estab- lished itself as Africa’s largest port in terms of container shipping volumes, benefitting from its location where the Atlantic meets the Mediterranean. routes from Algeria to Sub-Saharan Africa are long, from Tunisia even longer. Tunisia suffers an additional disadvantage in that all its land routes pass through Libyan or Algerian , mak- ing exports either dangerous or dependent on Algerian cooperation. For Tunisia’s export capacity to the south it will be vital to expand air transport – and its ports, de- spite the comparatively long sea routes. Yet, Moroccan connectivity also has its Achilles heel: its only land route to Sub-Saharan Africa runs through Western Saharan ter- ritory, making it vulnerable to conflict related blockages or even direct confronta- tion between Morocco and the Polisario, as was the case in November 2020. demand. Tunisia for its part has undertaken Rivalries also exist in relation to energy first concrete steps, such as opening two new infrastructure. Plans for a trans-Saharan gas embassies and four trade offices in Africa. pipeline from Nigeria to Algeria have been around for decades. An agreement for a pipeline from Nigeria via Morocco to Connectivity Is Key signed in 2016 appears to have better pros- pects of realisation. Both Algeria and Tunisia have recognised The progress of such infrastructure proj- that Morocco’s economic success in Sub- ects depends not least on support from non- Saharan Africa has been boosted by a for- African states. is especially prominent ward-looking policy of connectivity. In and is discernibly thinking about trilateral response, Tunisia has established new air cooperation with North and Sub-Saharan routes to Sub-Saharan Africa and Algeria Africa. As such it influences the Maghreb has opened a border crossing to . competition for the role of “gateway to Algiers lauded the latter as a step towards Africa”. To date Algeria has been ’s intensification of cooperation with West so-called “comprehensive strategic partner” Africa as a whole. In 2020 Algeria also com- in the Maghreb. But more recently China pleted its section of the Trans-Sahara High- has been turning increasingly to Morocco, way, which is planned to eventually reach for example as an automotive manufactur- Nigeria; Tunisia is also connected. Whether ing and export base for Africa as a whole. this route – if its Sahel stretch is complet- , as a traditional partner of Algeria, ed one day – can become a major transport is also showing interest in Morocco for tri- artery will depend crucially on stability and lateral cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa. security in the Sahel/Sahara region. Morocco’s transport connections to Sub- Saharan Africa are likely to remain un-

SWP Comment 54 November 2020

5 Winning Hearts and Minds students from African countries has almost halved, from 12,000 (2010) to 6,500 (2018) Tunisian and Algerian attempts to keep up In religious diplomacy, too, Morocco stands with Morocco in the field of soft power are unchallenged. Rabat trains imams from still modest, as reflected in their external about ten African states and makes fre- communication. Algeria was unable to capi- quent use of its Sufi orders to open . talise strongly on debt relief of – according This applies especially to the Tijaniyya, to Algerian announcements – around which has millions of adherents in West three billion US dollars for fourteen African Africa. Leaders of the Moroccan Tijaniyya states between 2013 and 2018. By contrast have accompanied the king and business Rabat managed to generate international delegations to Sub-Saharan Africa, and visibility for its deliveries of protective equip- when the Moroccan foreign minister visited ment “made in Morocco” to Sub-Saharan Mali after the coup in 2020 he also met with Africa during the first wave of the Covid-19 the order’s local leader. While the tomb of pandemic. the founder in , Morocco, has become In the substance as well as the represen- a place of pilgrimage for believers from tation, Morocco’s Sub-Sahara strategy also across Sub-Saharan Africa, Algiers has failed pursues a significantly more sophisticated to generate symbolic capital from his birth- approach. First of all, much more research place in Algeria. on Africa is conducted in Morocco. King Last but not least, Morocco has outplayed Hassan II founded an Institute of African the other Maghreb states with its migration Studies back in 1987; since then a growing policy. Since 2014 it has granted temporary number of Moroccan think-tanks have residence permits to tens of thousands of sprung up working on Sub-Saharan Africa irregular migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, and Morocco’s role there. enabling access to the labour market and The strategy is also reflected in concrete health and education systems. Even if this policies. In development policy, for example, policy looks more convincing on paper than Rabat has a well-established South-South it is on the ground, it has earned Morocco focus encompassing classical development goodwill in Sub-Saharan Africa and a better aid such as water projects. Algeria is at- look than Algeria and Tunisia. Although tempting to catch up: in spring 2020 Presi- Tunisia set a milestone in 2018 as the first dent Tebboune announced the creation of Arab country to pass legislation against a development agency for Africa. The Tuni- , its measures, like Algeria’s, often sian Agency for Technical Cooperation lack visibility. Morocco simply sells what it (ATCT) currently covers Africa with just one does better, both at home and abroad. office in Mauritania, but is increasingly drawing on external support for its African activities, for example from the German The Limits of Africa Policy Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammen- arbeit (GIZ) and the Turkish Cooperation Quite aside from the competition between and Coordination Agency (TİKA). them, the African ambitions of the Maghreb Morocco’s education policy is also unri- states encounter constraints: valled. In 2019 it hosted more than 17,000 Firstly, the Africa policies of the respec- students from Sub-Saharan Africa, about tive governments are not supported by half of whom received Moroccan scholar- their societies, which generally look more ships. Algeria opened an institute of the to Europe and the Arab . Morocco’s Pan-African (PAU) in 2014 with Africa policy is the king’s hobbyhorse but German support, although its student num- finds little resonance among the political bers are relatively small. Comprehensive parties. Civil society actors complain that figures for African students in the country big business linked to the monarchy profits are not available. In Tunisia the number of most while trickle-down effects are absent.

SWP Comment 54 November 2020

6 In Algeria too, indifference towards Sub- markets to outside actors like China, Russia, Saharan Africa predominates, with Africa , the Gulf and European states. policy dependent on a handful of elites from the independence movement, some civil society actors, and a few visionary entre- : preneurs. Tunisia’s turn to the South is Promote Positive Dynamics propagated primarily by dynamic private- sector elites. The EU’s policy towards the Maghreb has to At the other end of the equation Magh- date operated principally within the frame- rebi ambitions also encounter resistance work of its Neighbourhood and Mediter- among the governments and populations of ranean policies. Individual EU states, in- Sub-Saharan Africa. Widespread racism in cluding , also cooperate closely the Maghreb – brought to light by growing with individual Maghreb states. Growing migration from Sub-Saharan Africa – plays interest in Sub-Saharan Africa in both the a role. Sub-Saharan Africans frequently Maghreb and Europe opens up new per- experience discrimination and violence, in- spectives for all sides. Realising them will cluding at the hands of the authorities. require German and European economic Since 2018 Mali and Niger have seen recur- and political actors to conceptualise their ring demonstrations against Algeria’s ruth- policies more strongly in terms of the con- less deportation policy. The Maghreb states tinent as a whole, and specifically conti- risk acquiring a reputation as the enforcers nental integration. They must not treat the of European policies against irregular Maghreb’s interest in Africa as competing migration. with its interest in Europe or with Europe’s Rabat has experienced the limits of its own interest in Africa. Appropriate starting Africa policy since 2017, with the West Afri- points include the framework of the G20 can states denying accession to ECOWAS Compact with Africa (CwA). over concerns about Morocco’s economic – In the medium term African integration and general – dominance. Across Sub- could function as the motor for the Magh- Saharan Africa there are fundamental doubts reb integration process that the EU seeks over the willingness of the Maghreb states to foster, to date unsuccessfully. Successful to fully integrate – and be prepared to for- (economic) integration in Africa could also go special status, for instance in trade rela- function to stabilise the Maghreb, which tions with Europe. Only one Moroccan has would clearly be in the EU’s interest. been officially ranked in the pool of can- For the EU, supporting such promising didates for the election of new AU Commis- developments implies firstly a stronger focus sioners in 2021 (with little prospect of suc- on trilateral economic and development cess) and no Algerians or Tunisians have cooperation. Concretely this could mean pre-qualified. One factor here may be many employing and learning from Maghrebi AU members’ reservations about the Magh- expertise, for example in German and Euro- reb states. pean economic partnerships and develop- Nevertheless, the Maghreb states are ment projects with Sub-Saharan Africa. likely to profit from the growing desire to Here the Maghreb can help to build or ex- find African solutions for Africa. In light pand financial and technological bridges of the shutdowns and transport disruption between Europe and Africa. associated with the Covid-19 pandemic, It is therefore obvious, secondly, for ex- voices within Africa are increasingly calling perienced exporters like Germany to offer for purely continental supply chains to be technical expertise to the two “stragglers” established to reduce dependence on exter- on matters such as developing strategies nal actors. Morocco especially appears deter- and expanding the infrastructure for mined to assume a central role and not exporting locally produced goods to Africa. simply leave Sub-Saharan Africa’s attractive This would also benefit German and Euro-

SWP Comment 54 November 2020

7 pean manufacturers producing in the and Sub-Saharan Africa and forges ahead Maghreb by opening up markets compris- with triangular cooperation. This would ing about one billion consumers. A cor- slow the growth of openings for other ex- responding project for Tunisian small ternal actors such as China, , Turkey, and medium-sized enterprises is already and the Gulf states and strengthen the running, with funding from the Federal European-African axis. Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Trilateral cooperation can also mean jointly creating the precondi- tions for positioning Tunisia as an IT hub © Stiftung Wissenschaft and health training centre for Africa; in und Politik, 2020 both areas the country is a leader on the con- All rights reserved tinent. It is also an opportune moment to offer Algeria support for exporting goods This Comment reflects and expertise: Algiers is currently interested the author’s views. in export diversification and in rectifying The online version of its trade deficit with Africa. The govern- this publication contains ment stands under great pressure to pro- functioning links to other duce results. SWP texts and other relevant Thirdly, European actors must work to sources. minimise the potential negative (side-) SWP Comments are subject effects of European policies in the Maghreb. to internal peer review, fact- Migration management must take into con- checking and copy-editing. sideration the reputation of the Maghreb For further information on states, which is closely bound up with the our quality control pro- treatment of migrants from Sub-Saharan cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- Africa. It must also be ensured that the berlin.org/en/about-swp/ border management policies Europe pushes quality-management-for- in Africa do not interfere with African inte- swp-publications/ gration. Europe should also take Africa’s efforts to develop the AfCFTA seriously: SWP negotiations over bilateral trade agree- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments with Morocco and Tunisia should German Institute for pay heed to possible consequences for International and African integration. Security Affairs Fourthly it is important to counteract Maghrebi zero-sum thinking. Rather than Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin supporting the Africa policy of either Mo- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 rocco or Algeria or Tunisia, the EU should Fax +49 30 880 07-100 support the constructive elements of each. www.swp-berlin.org This also applies to the Maghreb states’ [email protected] engagement for peace and security in Sub-

ISSN 1861-1761 Saharan Africa. In relation to the Western doi: 10.18449/2020C54 Sahara Europe should continue to support the UN line and not subscribe to unilateral by Meredith Dale French or Spanish initiatives. There is a great deal to gain geopolitically (Updated English version if Europe establishes itself as a dependable of SWP-Aktuell 83/2020) supporter of closer relations between North

Dr. Isabelle Werenfels is Senior Fellow in the and Africa Division.

SWP Comment 54 November 2020

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