Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa Ana R

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Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa Ana R THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION Regions of Enduring Interest: Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa Ana R. Quintana and Charlotte M. Florance he United States has an abiding geopolitical Transnational organized crime continues to pro- interest in both the Latin America/Caribbean liferate throughout Latin America, fueling violence, Tregion and Africa, an interest that derives from eroding the rule of law, and hindering economic America’s close economic, cultural, and demograph- development. While overall homicide rates have ic ties with these two regions. Though their security decreased around the world, this region has expe- challenges do not rise to a level at which they threat- rienced a very different trend: Excluding anomalies en the vital national interests of the U.S., numerous like Chile and Costa Rica, the Central American and destabilizing forces still plague these regions, pos- South American subregions are among the most ing substantial hurdles to their economic develop- dangerous in the world. ment and political stability. Successes in eradicating Colombian cartels and Challenges aside, these areas also present great increased counter-crime initiatives in Mexico have opportunities. The U.S. certainly remains engaged pushed drug trafficking organizations into Central with the governments and peoples of the states that America, where smaller and poorer governments comprise Africa and greater Latin America, but so are ill-equipped to deal with such violent entities. In too do competitors of the U.S.—rivals who seek to addition, a resurgence of illicit smuggling routes in gain access to these regions’ markets and resources the Caribbean corridor has raised concerns about and, for good or ill, cultivate relationships that sup- the future of U.S. maritime interdiction efforts. port competing security agendas. As the U.S. consid- Violence and associated criminality continue in ers just how much it should invest in its defense, it Mexico’s ongoing drug war, affecting not only Mexico, should remain mindful of these regions and the role but also the U.S. because of the cross-border traffick- that they play in geostrategic affairs. ing of illicit drugs that links the Mexican cartels with U.S.-based gangs. In many regions where police have Latin America and the Caribbean failed, vigilante and militia groups have emerged— Due to geographic proximity, high levels of trade, an attempt to restore order that only highlights the persistently growing demographic and cultural ties, deficiencies of the central government. Venezuela and a lengthy history of diplomatic connections, the has emerged as a major regional and internation- U.S. has strong links to and strategic interests in Latin al drug trafficking hub, with established networks America. Although regional security threats of the type throughout Central and South America, the Carib- that plague the Middle East and Africa and major threat bean, and West Africa. actors like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are U.S. instruments of foreign policy vary through- absent from Latin America, the U.S. still has a vested out the region. Free trade agreements and bilat- interest in the region’s economic and political stability. eral economic assistance play an important role 89 2015 INDEX OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH in expanding markets for U.S. exports as well as in Approaching its 20th anniversary, the North building partner capacity. While security coopera- American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with tion between the U.S. and regional partners plays Canada and Mexico surpasses America’s trade with a critical role in combating transnational criminal the EU and Japan combined—and even with China. organizations, such arrangements are quite uneven The U.S. is also party to the Dominican Republic– across the region as a whole, with the bulk of assis- Central America–United States Free Trade Agree- tance going to Colombia and Mexico. ment (CAFTA–DR) with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Domini- Current U.S. Military Presence can Republic. Bilateral FTAs with Colombia, Chile, in Latin America and the Caribbean Peru, and Panama also have been implemented. The United States’ Northern and Southern Com- Aside from trade, the U.S. energy sector is heav- mands (USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM) han- ily reliant on the Latin America/Caribbean region. dle U.S. military engagement with the countries of The U.S. imports about 40 percent of the crude oil Latin America and the Caribbean. and petroleum that it consumes, and more than half of this 40 percent comes from the Western Hemi- l U.S. Northern Command. NORTHCOM, head- sphere.1 The largest suppliers of these imports are quartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, Canada (28 percent); Mexico (10 percent); and Ven- focuses on Mexico and much of the Caribbean: ezuela (9 (percent). In comparison, Persian Gulf the U.S. Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, countries Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Ara- Bermuda, Puerto Rico, The Bahamas, and the bia, and the United Arab Emirates supply 29 percent. Turks and Caicos Islands. NORTHCOM’s Joint Strategically, the region’s geographic proxim- Task Force North (JTF North), based at Biggs ity to the U.S. increases its importance to Ameri- Army Airfield, Fort Bliss, Texas, provides support ca’s national interests. The U.S. shares an almost to federal law enforcement agencies interdicting 2,000-mile border with Mexico that spans Texas, potential transnational threats within and along New Mexico, Arizona, and California. In 2013, the approaches to the U.S. (e.g., narco-trafficking, U.S.–Mexico border was crossed by over 166 million alien smuggling, and international terrorism). people and nearly 72 million vehicles, making it the most heavily trafficked border in the world.2 l U.S. Southern Command. USSOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility for U.S. security inter- Mexico: Transnational Criminal ests includes the continental landmass south of Organizations, Gangs, and Violence Mexico, its surrounding waters, and the Carib- With the dismantling of Colombian cartels in the bean Sea. Headquartered in Doral, Florida, 1990s, the illicit drug trade in Latin America shifted USSOUTHCOM oversees the coordination of U.S. northward. Mexico is a large producer, supplier, and military efforts with 31 countries and 15 territo- transit zone for U.S.-bound cocaine, heroin, meth- ries. USSOUTHCOM focuses on supporting fed- amphetamine, and marijuana. Over 95 percent of eral and foreign agencies countering transnation- the cocaine sold in the U.S. is transported through al organized crime, working with the militaries of Mexico. At the helm of this destabilizing threat are the region, contingency planning, and terrorist transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and detention (Naval Station Guantanamo Bay). gangs that operate throughout Mexico. Competing TCOs—in this case, Mexican cartels—vie for control Trade and Energy in Latin America of key smuggling routes into the U.S. and critical High levels of trade and integrated economies have transshipment points within Mexico. created strong connections between Latin America Mexican cartels operate as full-scale criminal and the United States. The region is America’s fastest- enterprises, controlling vast systems of illicit net- growing regional trade partner: The U.S. sells more works throughout the U.S., Mexico, Central America, goods to Latin America and the Caribbean than it sells and the Caribbean. In addition to wholesale distribu- to the entire European Union (EU). Out of the 20 free tion of the majority of illicit drugs in the U.S., Mexi- trade agreements (FTAs) that the U.S. has entered into can cartels also engage in human smuggling and traf- force, 11 are with countries in Latin America. ficking, kidnapping, extortion, and arms trafficking. 90 THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION The illegal drug trade alone accounts for roughly $30 per 100,000. In comparison, the U.S. registers five billion in annual revenue for the cartels,3 an amount homicides for every 100,000 people. A shaky gang equal to the gross domestic products of Hondu- truce in El Salvador reduced overall homicide rates ras and Nicaragua combined,4 thus enabling them from March 2012 to mid-2014, but these gangs still to corrupt local authorities or overwhelm them by perpetrated other violent crimes. A multitude of force. While noteworthy cartel-related violence has transnational criminal organizations like the Mexi- yet to spill over into the U.S., the corrosive effect that can Zetas and Sinaloa drug cartels have capitalized these criminal organizations have on the rule of law, on the weak governments of the Northern Triangle citizen security, and good governance affects U.S. and are now fully operational within the region. security and national interests. Much like the trend seen in Central America, High-level corruption within the Mexican gov- islands like Puerto Rico and the Dominican Repub- ernment and security forces continues to under- lic are increasingly becoming layover spots for U.S.- mine U.S.–Mexico cooperation. The United States bound illicit drugs. Because it is a U.S. territory, ship- has provided Mexico with counter-drug assistance ments coming in from Puerto Rico are subject to less since the 1970s, but after the assassination of a U.S. scrutiny than are international shipments, a fact Drug Enforcement Agency agent in 1985, bilateral that further undermines maritime interdiction.6 cooperation slowed. Following the signing of a Bina- tional Drug Control Strategy in 1998, however, col- Interference of Foreign Adversaries laboration improved. and Countering of U.S. Influence To date, the most significant cooperation between America’s geopolitical foes have exploited and the U.S. and Mexico has come through the Mérida will continue to exploit the region’s proximity to Initiative, which emphasized the shared responsi- the U.S. homeland by seeking relationships with bility of both countries to combat drug trafficking willing regional partners to counter U.S.
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