Abdallahi Ibn Muhammad, Khalifa

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Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-17607-2 — Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa Philip Roessler Index More Information

379

Index

‘Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, Khalifa, 167 power, 313 ; policy on South Sudan Abaker, Abdalla, 191 , 192 , 194 , 197 ; after outbreak of violence (2013), 315 ; threatens Déby, 192–193 sanctions for coup conspirators, 310 Abbala Arabs (Sudan), 171–173 ; Bashir al- Assad, Bashar, 307 ; commits to civil allies with after split, 176 , 201 ; elites war, 307 oppose negotiatied solution to Darfur Alawis (Syria), 306 ; ethnocracy in rebellion, 195 ; elites support Bashir after Syria, 306 split. 172–173 ; hakura and, 172 ; rivalry al- Bashir, Omar, 10 , 23 , 29 ; accepting with Zaghawa, 172 , 176 , 201 civil war risk over coup risk, 271 ; Acholi ethnic group (Uganda), 91, 93 collaborating with Turabi to seize power, Africa: big states problem in, 289 ; coup– (1989), 24 ; coup- prooi ng tactics, 160 ; civil war trap, time trend, 307–308 ; dismissal of Darfur governor (1991), ethnically representative cabinets in, 133 ; fears coup threat from Turabi 58–59 ; international relations and, 87 ; (2000), 159 ; meeting with Déby in El legacy of colonialism, 47 ; legacy of slave Fasher (April 2003), 196 ; power struggle trade, 47; “strong societies and weak with Turabi, 155 – 161 ; public face of states” problem in, 47 ; two political 1989 coup, 151 ; purge of Turabi, 24, equilibriums in, 29 , 269 149 ; purge of Turabi faction, 159 – 171 ; Africa’s Great War, 26 , 29 , 243 – 265 ; as rejects negotiated solution to Darfur co-conspirator civil war, 294 ; as coup- conl ict (2003), 180 ; restructuring of prooi ng civil war, 26, 243 ; illicit mineral political network in Darfur, 24 ; self- coup exploitation during, 253 ; limitation of (1999), 159, 175 ; social identity of, 164 instrumental exclusion with imperfect al-Gama’a al- Islamiyya, 153 information argument, 254 – 256 ; al- Haj, Ali, 128 , 137, 157 , 163 , 182 ; limitation of resource war argument, appointed Turabi deputy, 157 , 164; 252 – 254 ; outbreak of, 252, 264 Western Salvation Road and, 185–186 African Union (AU), 310 ; African Charter Al- Ingaz regime (Sudan), 123 ; avoids on Democracy, Elections and Good indiscriminate violence in Darfur Governance, 312n. 48 ; anti- coup rules (1991), 143 ; cooperation from Fur adopted by, 310 ; anti- coup rules, limits Islamists (1991), 138 – 142 ; defeat of of, 312 ; anti- coup rules, weakening of Bolad rebellion, 138 – 142 , 147 ; defeat accountability, 314 ; constitutionalism, of rebellion in Darfur (1991), 23; one- sided approach, 314 ; lifts suspension disarmament campaign in Darfur of Egypt, despite el-Sisi staying in (1991), 134 ; divide and rule policies,

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380 Index

130 ; dual centers of power, 151 , 153 ; Osman Taha, 152 ; comparisons to ethnoregional divisions, 148 , 161 – 171 ; Mahdi , 167 ; constitutional coup, 24 ; Fourth of Ramadan decrees (1999), constitutional amendments 159 , 166 , 183 ; jihad in South Sudan weakening Bashir’s power, 159 ; and Nuba Mountains, 73 ; Mubarak control of Sudanese shadow assassination attempt and, 153 – 155 ; state, 151 , 153 ; debate about ethnic power struggle between Turabi and origins, 167 ; decides against coup Bashir, 155 – 161 ; purge of Darfurian against Bashir (2000), 160 ; Islamists, 147 ; purge of Turabi faction, dismantling of National Islamic Front, 159 – 171 ; resignation of Mohamed al- 151n. 5 , 175 ; education of, 120 ; Amin Khalifa, 166 ; shadow state v. state, faction purged from Al- Ingaz regime, 151 ; split between Turabi and Bashir, 159 – 171 ; family background, 164n. 62 ; 147 , 161 – 171 , 176 ; state violence by, foreign minister of Sudan, 122 ; house 126 ; vice president selection (1998), 157 , in Manshiya, 159n. 37 ; international 163 Islamist agenda, 152 ; Islamic Charter Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour Front, secretary general of, 121 ; jailed la Libération du Congo- Zaire (AFDL), to mask role in 1989 coup, 123 , 151 , 229 , 244 ; breakdown of, 256 – 264 ; 152n. 10 ; mobilizes support from communication problems within, periphery, 158 , 165 ; Mubarak 254 – 256 ; composition of, 246 – 249 ; assassination attempt, noninvolvement, overthrow of Mobutu, 246 – 249 ; 154 ; Mubarak assassination attempt, role of RPF in creation of, 246–247 ; reaction to, 154 ; power struggle with uncertainty within after Masasu Bashir, 155 – 161 ; purge of old guard arrest, 258–259 ; weakness of political from Islamic Movement, 121 ; return to structure, 250 Sudan (1964), 120 ; social identity of, al-Mahdi, Sadiq, 118 , 123 , 130, 131 , 131n. 164 ; speaker of parliament, 155 ; western 91 ; becomes Sudanese prime minister political strategy, 129 (1986), 116 ; overthrown by National Amin, Idi, 91 , 92 , 93, 228 , 229 ; Islamic Front (1989), 119 ; support for uses ethnopolitical exclusion as murahaliin , 116 ; ultimatum by Sudanese coup- prooi ng strategy, 224 military, 123 anarchy, 88 al-Maliki, Nouri: “Shiai cation” of Iraqi Angola, 252 ; involvement in overthrow of government, 305 ; coup- prooi ng tactics Mobutu, 247 ; last- minute intervention by, 305 ; Prime Minister of Iraq (2006– to save Kabila regime (August 1998), 2014), 305 ; replaced in face of strong 252 , 264 ; security concerns and civil war threat, 306 Kitona raid, 265n. 91 al- Nur, Abdel Wahid Mohamed: alliance anocracy, 11 with Zaghawa, 184 ; early attempts Anyanya 112 at rebellion, 182 ; founder of Sudan Arab Spring, 306 Liberation Army (SLA), 182 Arusha Accords (Rwanda), 78 , 79 ; al- Tayib “Sikha” Ibrahim Muhammad breakdown of, 78 Khair, 127 , 133, 134 , 141 , 174 ; Asmara, Eritrea, 183 cooperation with Fur Islamists, assassination attempt of 141 ; countermobilization against Hosni Mubarak, 150 , 153 – 155 Bolad, 141 Atabani, Ghazi Salahuddin, 128, 155 , al- Turabi, Hassan, 23 ; appointed attorney 162 , 236 general (1979), 114 ; anti- Abboud Azam, Jean-Paul, 14 , 54 demonstrations and, 121 ; attacked at Ottawa airport, 153 ; call for reforms Banyamulenge ethnic group (Congo): after Mubarak assassination attempt, mutiny by soldiers (February 1998), 259 ; 155 ; collaborates with Bashir to seize youth join AFDL, 248 power, 1989, 24 ; compared to Ali Bayart, Jean-Francois, 49

381

Index 381

Belgium, 41 escalation, 43 ; as strategic choice, 18 ; Beni Halba ethnic group (Sudan), 139 average charactersitics of in Africa, 7 ; Benin, 27 , 286 ; coup d’état (1963), Collier-Hoefl er model, 7 ; compared 287 ; coup- civil war trap in, 225, to coup d’état, 37 – 38 ; compared to 285 – 288 ; ethnoregionalism in, 286 ; rebellion, 37 – 38 ; correlated with GDP puzzle of absence of ethnopolitical per capita, 39 ; coup- prooi ng and, 98 ; exclusion, 294; split domination regime dei nition of, 5 ; economic crises and, 40 ; in 225 Table 8.2 effects of institutions on, 11 – 16 ; ethnic Biafran War, 83 , 224 – 227 geography and, 40 , 93n. 51 ; Fearon- Big Men, 3 , 5 , 14 , 16 , 18 , 49 Laitin model, 9 ; foreign sanctuary Black Book , The (Sudan), 24 , 168 – 169, and, 40 ; gaps in understanding of, 183 10 , 291 , 296 ; greed mechanism, 7 ; Bolad, Daud, 135 – 142; alliance with grievance mechanism, 7 , 15 ; macro-level SPLA, 138 ; capture, 142 ; defection approach, 38 ; meso- level approach, 11 , from Al- Ingaz regime, 137 ; discontent 33 – 59 ; meso- level theory of, 33 – 59 , with Islamic Movement, 137 ; effect on 291 ; microcomparative approach, 10 , future rebellions in Darfur, 142n. 140; 41 – 44 ; microcomparative research execution, 142 ; Khartoum University agenda, 10 ; opportunity or feasibility Student Union (KUSU) president, 135 ; framework, 39 , 41 ; organizational legacy, 182, 199; rebellion in Darfur, basis of, 37 – 38 ; population size and, 138 – 142, 187 ; runs for parliament, 136 ; 40 ; prevalence in Africa, 7 ; regime unaware of government disarmament instability and, 40 ; rough terrain and, campaign, 140 ; youth and entry into 40; weak state paradigm, 8 , 9 , 10 , Islamic Movement, 135 36 – 41 ; weak state theory. See weak state Bugera, Deogratias, 248 , 250 paradigm Burundi, 27 , 28 , 66 , 79, 94, 247 ; clientelism, 47, 52 attempted coups (1993), 77 ; civil war co-conspirator civil wars, 21 , 294 ; Africa’s in, 77 ; ethnic politics as two-level game, Great War, 294 ; Chad, (1989–1990), 77 – 79 ; ethnopolitical exlcusion in, 236 – 238 ; empirical analysis of, 233– 77 – 79 ; failed coup (1965), 94 ; shadow 235; Liberia, (1989), 238 – 241 ; structural of history on ethnopolitical bargaining, roots of, 288 80n. 67 co-conspirators: camaraderie and, 235 – 241 ; Buyoya, Pierre, 77 commitment problem and, 235 – 241 ; exclusion of, empirical analysis, 230 – 232 ; capital city rule, 17 ; changed by African operationalization of, 229 Union, 309 – 312 ; dei nition of, 86 ; coethnic peace, 48 ; dei nition of, 48 incentivizes coups d’état, 86 coethnicity: lowers costs of collective case study, 21 ; heuristic, 21 ; action, 48 ; patronage and, 52 ; hypothesis-generating, 21 sociological bases of, 49 ; tax Cederman, Lars-Erik, 15, 24, 295 enforcement and, 51 Cetinyan, Rupen, 68 collective action, 41 Chad, 25 , 27 , 28, 48, 57, 228 ; breakdown colonialism: as bureaucratic rule, 84 ; end of Habré regime, 236 – 238 ; Chadian of, 17 ; legacy of weak institutions, 85 ; army intervention in Darfur (2003), 105 , metropole as security guarantor, 84 197 ; collusion with Darfur rebels, 197 ; commitment problem, 18 , 80 , 83 , 88 ; civil war in (1990), 131 ; failed coup as primary cause of civil war, 296 ; as (1989), 238 source of ethnopolitical exclusion, civil war, 7 – 11 , 33 – 44; and ethnic 293 ; capital city rule and, 293 ; ethnic powersharing, 15 ; as bargaining puzzle, politics and, 80 ; in domestic politics vs. 6 ; as function of instrumental exclusion international politics, 90 ; powersharing with imperfect information, 71 ; as and, 83 , 93 , 219 ; preemptive war and, result of bargaining failure and conl ict 92 ; shadow of the coup d’état and, 296 ;

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382 Index

source of conl ict in weak states, 18 ; Darfur conl ict (2003): emergence of worsened by civil war outbreak, 180 rebellion, 181 – 185 ; government Comprehensive Peace Agreement counterinsurgency campaign, 106 ; weak (Sudan), 3 state model of civil war and, 105 CONAKAT (Confédération des Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), 105 , 194 ; Associations Tribales du Katanga), 47 i rst attack, 185 ; initial grievances, 185 conl ict escalation, 35, 41, 43; state Darfurians, and political grievances, 24 ; capacity and, 39 non-Arab groups, 24 Congo, Republic of, 54 de Waal, Alex, 72 , 145 cooperative counterinsurgency, 23 , 28 , Déby, Idriss, 132 , 149 , 182 , 237 ; alliance 106 , 146 , 187 , 200 , 292 ; against Bolad with Bashir, 192 , 196 ; Bashir employs rebellion in Sudan, 143 – 145 ; dei nition to lobby Sudanese Zaghawa, 170 ; of, 13 ; failure of in Second Darfur concerns about emergence of rebellion Rebellion, 200 ; local brokers and, 144 in Darfur (2003), 193 ; falling out with Côte d’Ivoire, 54, 229 Habré, 236 – 238 ; meeting with Bashir counterinsurgency, 56 ; ethnicity and, 56 ; in El Fasher (April 2003), 196 ; military identii cation problem and, 56 victory over Libya, 237 ; opposed to coup d’état, 90 , 92 ; compared to civil war Darfur rebellion, 201 ; opposition to and rebellion, 37 – 38 , 296 ; dei nition JEM, 182 ; seizure of power (1990), 132 , of, 5 , 17 ; distribution of power 238 and, 86 ; frequency of in Africa, 18 ; Decalo, Samuel, 93 organizational basis of, 37 – 38 , 296 ; Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), prevalence in Africa in 1960s, 86 26 , 28 , 41 , 228 ; disarray of mining coup- civil war trade-off: competing sector (1997–1998), 253 ; illicit mineral incentives, 297 ; empirical analysis of, exploitation, 252 ; outbreak of Africa’s 215 – 219 ; operationalization of, 211 – 215 . Great War in, 243 – 265 ; secession of See coup– civil war trap Katanga after independence, 47 coup– civil war trap, 5 , 20 , 29 , 98 , 207 , Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), 122 293 , 297 ; as Hobbesian problem, 6 ; Deng, Francis, 73 , 117 effect of a lot of powersharing on, 221 ; Derg (Ethiopia), 89, 228 ; shoot-out among effect of threat capabilities on, 273 , 285 ; regime elites (1977), 90 empirical analysis of, 25, 211–220 ; ethnic Dinka ethnic group (Sudan), 115 , 145 geography and, 303 ; external factors Djamous, Hassan, 237 ; military victory and, 301 ; in Iraq, 306 ; in Syria, 307 ; over Libya, 237 pathways out of, 308 ; relevance outside Doe, Samuel, 57 , 94 , 229 , 238 – 241; Africa, 302 – 307 ; scope conditions of, removes Thomas Quiwonkpa as head of 302 ; sovereignty premium and, 303 ; time the army, 240 trend in Africa, 307–308 ; weak states dominant coalition, 12n. 42 , 45 ; as source and, 302 of order in weak states, 12 coup-prooi ng civil wars: Darfur as example of, 178 – 204 ; in Burundi, 227; Economic Community of West African in Chad, 236 – 238 ; in DRC, 243 – 265 ; States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), in Liberia, 238 – 241 ; in Nigeria, 226 ; in 310 ; intervention in Sierra Leone, 310 South Sudan, 1 – 5 ; in Uganda, 224 Egypt, 313 ; coup d’état (2013), 313 ; coup- prooi ng theory of civil war, 98, 99 suspended by African Union (2013), 313 El Fasher (Sudan), 170, 194 ; Darfur rebels Darfur, 21 ; as theory-building case study, surprise attack on (April 2003), 105 , 198 28, 293 ; case study of, 21 ; First Darfur elite accommodation, 45 Rebellion compared to Second Darfur Ellis, Stephen, 57 Rebellion, 147 , 199 ; el-Sisi, Abdel Fattah, 313 politicization of ethnicity Equatoria Province (Sudan), 112 after split, 183 Eritrea, 105 , 106

383

Index 383

Ethiopia, 64, 89, 228 ; sanctuary for 80 , 83 , 294 ; as coup-prooi ng strategy, SPLA, 115 in Sudan, 175 ; as deliberate policy, ethnic accommodation, 17 83 ; as means to weaken rivals, 69 ; as ethnic alliances, 53 ; and counterinsurgency opportunity structure for civil war, success, 56 16 , 97 , 178 , 295 ; as self- correcting, ethnic balancing, in Sudan, 169 –173 , 176 ; 72 ; as source of violence, 72 ; budget Sudan government policy in Darfur, 149 constraints and, 83 ; channels through ethnic favoritism, benei ts of, 52 which increases rebellion, 97 , 295 ; ethnic groups, as minimum winning colonial legacy, 68 ; commitment coalition, 66 ; as unit of analysis, 65 problem and, 80 ; cultural bases, 73 ; ethnic politics, as two-level game, 62, dei nition of, 64 ; different logics of, 75 – 79 , 300 ; outbidding, 76 ; “politics of 60 – 61 , 292 – 293 ; dynamic instrumental fear” and, 96 model, 67 , 68 ; ethno national exclusion, Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, 15 , 61 , 292 ; and split in Sudan’s Islamic 25 , 29 , 55, 208 – 211; coding of Sudan, Movement, 149 ; ethnonational theories 210n. 8 of, 72 – 75 ; exclusion because it is ethnic powersharing, 14 , 15 , 20 , 25 , 27 , appropriate, 61 ; imperfect information 54 ; and coup– civil war trap, 16 – 20 , and, 70 – 72 ; instrumental exclusion, 207 ; brokerage and, 292 ; commitment 60 , 66 –72 , 292 ; instrumental exclusion problem and, 80 ; ethnic geography and split in Sudan’s Islamic Movement, and, 295 ; frequency of in postcolonial 148 ; instrumental theories of, 66 – 72 ; Africa, 58 instrumental theories of, applied ethnic transfers of power, 86 , 303n. 19 to DRC, 252 – 254 ; limitations of ethnicity, 13 , 95 ; and collective ethnonational logic, 62 ; limitations of mobilization, 65 ; as barrier to instrumental logic, 62 , 67 , 72 ; mistrust societal cooperation, 53 ; as bases of and, 97 ; of co-conspirators, 6 , 16 , political networks, 48 – 51 ; ascriptive 24 , 25 ; politics of persistence, 201 ; characteristics, 66 ; primacy of strategic logic, 62 ; source of attribute substitution and, 164 – 166 , grievances, 97 ; strategic exclusion, 61 , 175 ; colonial institutions and, 50 ; 81 , 293 ; strategic exclusion and common descent, 49 ; constructivist split in Sudan’s Islamic Movement, interpretation, 14n. 55 , 48 , 279 ; 149 ; strategic theories of, 75 – 81 ; dense social networks and, 50 ; legacy weakens societal control, 55, 27 , 29 , of colonialism, 13 ; monitoring costs, 95 , 96 50 ; norms of reciprocity, 50 ; periodicity, exclusion-conl ict cycle, 27, 269 50 ; political salience in Africa, 49 ; Eyadéma, Gnassingbé, 86 ; purge of reachability, 50 ; social bases of Emmanuel Bodjolle, 87 civil war in Africa, 82 ; social sanctioning, 50 ; sociological Fearon, James, 38 , 43 , 67 , 89, 280 foundations of, 48 – 51 ; vis-à- vis other Fur ethnic group (Sudan), 130 ; arrest sources of mobilization, 13 ; visibility of members (1990), 131 ; attacked by of, 95 , 165 Musa Hilal’s militia, 173 ; brokerage ethnocracy, 27 , 94 ; in Burundi, 227 role during Bolad rebellion, 187 ; ethnopolitical bargaining, 16 – 20, 75 – 81 , government of Sudan tries to arm 300 ; interests of ruler v. ruling group, (2002), 190 ; members’ petitioning of 286n. 19 ; interethnic dynamics, 16 –20 , Bashir (2002), 184 ; militia attacks 75 – 81, 300; intra- ethnic dynamics, 84n. against (2000– 2002), 184 ; protest 4 , 300 against Darfur governor (1990), 132 ; ethnopolitical exclusion, 55 , 60; and weakness of brokers during Second indiscriminate violence, 97; as cause of Darfur Rebellion, 188 , 190 civil war, mechanisms, 55 , 178 , 180t. Fursan militia, attack Bolad rebellion, 139, 7.1 , 224 ; as coup-prooi ng strategy, 18 , 141

384

384 Index

Gaddai , Muammar, 130 to overthrow Nimeiri, 114 ; conceal Garang, John, 1 , 3 , 114 , 193 ; backs Bolad role in 1989 coup, 151 ; ethnoregional rebellion, 138 ; founding of SPLA, 114 ; divisions, 161 – 171 ; federalism and, vision of New Sudan, 115, 193 156n. 26 ; history in Sudan, 127 – 130 ; Gbadolite (DRC), 52 history of, 119 – 130 ; Mubarak génocidaires, 246 , 259 assassination attempt leads to mistrust Ghana, 27 , 286 ; coup–civil war trap and divisions, 155 , 175 ; opposition to in, 285 – 288 ; ethnic politics in, 287; Nimeiri, 121 ; organizational structure puzzle of absence of ethnopolitical of tanzim , 124 – 126 ; participation in exclusion, 294 National Front, 121 ; political network Gio ethnic group (Liberia), 57, 94 , 240, in Darfur, 106 ; power struggle between 241 ; persecuted by Doe regime, 57 Turabi and Bashir, 150, 155 – 161 ; Gouran ethnic group (Chad), 237 solidarity of members, 125 ; Turabi's Guinea, 95 dissolution of tanzim , 124 ; Zaghawa and, 127 Habré, Hissène, 57, 131 , 132 , 137 , Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 305 236 – 238, 238n. 60 Habyarimana, Juvénal, 78 , 247 Ja’aliyin ethnic group (Sudan), 149, 164 ; Haile Mariam, Mengistu, 90 Bashir support among, 165 ; massacres Harir, Sharif, 182 , 191 against (1897), 167 hegemonial exchange, 45 janjawiid , 106 , 149 , 188 , 198 , 199 , 201 Herbst, Jeffrey, 85 , 87 , 289 Jebel Marra, 107 , 139, 140 , 173 , 176 , 184, Hilal, Musa, 173 – 174 , 198 ; arrested 186 , 187 ; establishment of rebel camps (2002), 189 ; moves to Misteriha, 173 ; in (2001), 184 removed as nazir , 189 Jervis, Robert, 89, 91 Hobbes, Thomas, 88, 235 Juba (South Sudan), 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 Hobbesian problem, 88 Justice Equality Movement (JEM), 181 ; Horowitz, Donald, 69 , 92 , 94 , 221, 222 , attack on Khartoum (2008), 182 ; origins 306 ; Ethnic Groups in Conl ict , 222 of, 182 ; split in Islamic Movement and Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, 54 , 74 emergence of, 181 ; The Black Book Hussein, Saddam, 304 and, 181 Hutu ethnic group (Burundi), 94 Hutu ethnic group (Rwanda), 77, 78 , 79 ; Kabarebe, James: biography, 250n. 27 ; Arusha Accords and, 80 ; genocide and, chief of staff of Congolese army, 244, 78 ; Hutu Power ideology among, 78 , 79 250 ; expulsion from Congo (July 1998), 245 , 251 ; Kitona raid, 264 – 265 ; military Ibrahim, Khalil, 163, 168, 169, 181–182 commander of AFDL, 244 ; negotiates Igbo ethnic group (Nigeria), 224, 225, with Banyamulenge mutineers, 226, 227 260 ; replaced as chief of staff of the indirect rule, 53, 111 Congolese army, 262 indiscriminate violence: as reponse to Kabbah, Ahmed Tejan, 309 Darfur rebellion in Sudan, 199 ; as Kabila, Joseph, 251 , 260 trigger of civil war, 39 ; effects on costs of Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, 229 , 249 ; collective action for rebellion, 41n. 25 ; accepting civil war risk over coup risk, ethnopolitical exclusion and, 57, 72 ; in 271 ; assumes presidency of Congo, Liberia, 94 250 ; biography, 249n. 20 ; commitment Iraq, 30 , 303 – 306; de-Baathii cation, problem with RPF, 245 ; Cuba trip 304n. 25 ; de- Baathii cation in, 304 ; US (July 1998), 262 ; expulsion of RPF, intervention in, 304 245 ; expulsion of RPF as preemptive Islamic Charter Front (Sudan), 121 , 127 strike, 246 , 263 ; expulsion of RPF Islamic Movement (Sudan), 23 , 29 , 119 ; from Congo, 26 , 263 ; Faustian pact alliance with Nimeiri, 121 ; attempts with génocidaires, 261 ; l ees Kinshasa

385

Index 385

after outbreak of war (August 1998), 311 ; suspended from African Union 251 ; Katangization of regime, 255 , (2012), 311 257 ; problems arising from external Malinké ethnic group (Guinea), 95 dependence on RPF, 245 ; removes Mandingo ethnic group (Liberia), 94 Kabarebe as chief of staff of Congolese Mano ethnic group (Liberia), 57, 94 , army, 262 ; restructures presidential 241 ; persecuted by Doe regime, 57 guard, 261 ; seeks breathing room vis-à- Mauritania, 27 vis RPF, 254 ; strategic interdependence McGowan, Patrick, 269 ; coups d’état with RPF, 250 , 256 dataset, 213n. 14 Kabré ethnic group (Togo), 85 Mende ethnic group (Sierra Leone), 228 Kagame, Paul, 246 ; goals of Zaire Minnawi, Minni, 183 , 191 , 194 , 199 intervention, 254 ; opposed to Mobutu Misseriya ethnic group (Sudan), 118 regime, 247 ; views on Kabila’s expulsion mixed-methods research design, 99 ; order, 263 benei ts of, 298 Kalyvas, Stathis, 41, 57 ; theory of selective Mobutu Sese Seko, 69 , 95 , 228 , 246 , 247 ; violence, 57n. 106 ‘revolving door of politics’ and, 69 ; Karaha, Bizima, 250 , 255 ethnic favoritism, 52 ; revolution against Kasavubu, Joseph, 47 (1996), 246 Katanga (DRC): attempted secession, 47 Movimento Popular de Libertação de Kenya, 52, 54 ; ethnic politics in, 67 ; ethnic Angola (MPLA): involvement in violence in, 67 overthrow of Mobutu, 247 Kenyatta, Jomo, 54 Mugabe, Robert, 92 , 228 Khartoum (Sudan), 108 Museveni, Yoweri, 209 , 229 , 247 ; Kibaki, Mwai, 67 , 74 history of collaborating Kiir, Salva, 1 – 5; exploits AU’s anti-coup with RPF, 247 rule, 314 ; purge of Riek Machar, Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), 120 (2013), 2 Muslim Brotherhood (Sudan), 120 Kinshasa (DRC), 251 Krahn ethnic group (Liberia), 57, Nai e Ali Nai e, 155, 167 , 195 94 , 240 National Congress Party (Sudan), 156 ; Kukudji, Gaëtan, 255 General Conference (1999), 158 ; Memorandum of Ten, 157 , 163 Lagu, Joseph, 112 National Islamic Front (Sudan), 23 ; Langi ethnic group (Uganda), 91 , 93 dismantling of sectarian parties’ Liberia, 25 , 27 , 57 , 94 , 228 , 238 – 241 ; political networks, 119 , 129 ; elections breakdown of Doe regime, 238 – 241 ; (1986), 122 , 129 ; electoral setback in indiscriminate violence in, 57 Darfur (1986), 129 ; founding of political Limba ethnic group (Sierra Leone), 228 party, 122 ; political charter (1987), Luba ethnic group (DRC), 229 156n. 27 ; Sadiq al-Mahdi government, Luttwak, Edward, 37 excluded from, 123 ; Sadiq al- Mahdi Lyall, Jason, 56 , 57 government, included in, 122 Machakos Protocol, 193 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Machar, Riek, 1 – 5; l ees Khartoum, (2013), 238 , 241 3 ; reintegration in SPLA, (2002), 3 natural states, 11n. 42 , 44n. 40 Maga, Hubert, 287 ; overthrown in coup Ndadaye, Melchior, 77 d’état (1963), 287 nested research design, 20–21. See also Mahdist Revolution (Sudan), 105, 110 , mixed-methods research design 128 ; British war against, 110 ; Ja’aliyin Nigeria, 27 ; Biafran War, 224 – 227 ; coup and, 167n. 71 and counter coup (1966), 224 Mali, 311 ; coup d’état (2012), 311 ; Nile River Valley, 108 French military intervention in (2013), Nimba County (Liberia), 57 , 241

386

386 Index

Nimeiri, Jaafar, 121 ; adoption of sharia Posner, Daniel, 50 (1983), 114n. 26 ; overthrown in 1985, preemptive war model, 91 ; ethnic 122 ; seizes power in Sudan (1969), powersharing and, 98 113 ; signs Addis Ababa Agreement preventive war model, 98 (1972), 113 purge, 86 , 90 , 92 ; as coup- prooi ng, 93 Nindaga, Masasu, 229, 249 , 250, 256 ; “political assassination” of by Kabila, Quiwonkpa, Thomas, 94 , 229 ; executed, 256 – 259 241 ; falling out with Doe, 238 – 241 ; l ees Nkomo, Joshua, 92 to Nimba County (1983), 240 ; founds non-cooperative counterinsurgency, 180 , NFPL, 241 ; installs Samuel Doe in 190 ; in Iraq and rise of ISIS, 305n. 26 power, 239 ; invades Liberia (1985), 241; Nuer ethnic group (Sudan), 3, 115 ; militia, removed as head of the army, 240 3 ; violence in Presidential Guard, 3 Nyerere, Julius, 74 , 249 rebellion, coup d’état compared to, 92 ; organizational basis of, 37 – 38 Obote, Milton, 91 , 92 , 93 , 224 Reno, William, 209 Odinga, Raila, 67 Revolutionary Command Council Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, 226 (Sudan), 124 Olson, Mancur, 41 Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 309 Olympio, Sylvanus, 85 Riverain Arabs (Sudan), 109 , 165, 188 ; Organization of African Unity (OAU), 17 , Bashir faction mobilizes amid split 85 ; Lomé Declaration, 310 ; shifting with Turabi, 167 ; political dominance policy on capital city rule (1997), 310 in Sudan, 162 ; support for Bashir after split, 165n. 65 patronage, 50 Rothchild, Donald, 14 , 45 , 51 , 54 patron-client networks, 13 , 45 ; as key to Rwanda, 27 , 28 , 66 , 74 , 77 , 228 ; penetrating society in weak states, 12 ; akazu, 77 ; civil war (1990– 1994), 78 ; as source of information, 71 ; dominant economic networks in Congo (1997– coalitions and, 45 ; ethnic bases in Africa, 1998), 253 ; ethnic politics as two-level 13 ; in weak states, 45 ; reciprocity in, 51 game, 77 – 79 ; ethnopolitical exlcusion personal rule, 44 , 46 ; dei nition of, 46 in, 77 – 79 ; killing of Habyarimana, 78 ; political accountability, threat of force northwest insurgency (1997–1998) and, 297 , 259 ; shadow of history on political exclusion, consequences of, 64 ; ethnopolitical bargaining, 80n. 67 ; costs of, 93 ; dei nition of, 63 –65 ; in social revolution (1959), 85 autocracies, 64 ; in democracies, 63 ; in Rwandan genocide, 57 , 79 Ethiopia, 64 Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 78, 246 ; political instability, as source of civil counterinsurgency against northwest war, 11 insurgency, 259 ; expulsion from Congo political networks, 28, 42 ; sources of (July 1998), 245 ; foreign occupation unity, 50 problem in Congo, 245 ; intervention in political networks hypothesis of civil war, Congo, 244 ; northwest insurgency and 20 , 46 , 48 , 98 , 178 , 293 ; applied to First Congo strategy, 259 ; plans to remove Darfur Rebellion, 142 Kabila, 262 ; strategic interdependence political order, 88 with Kabila, 250 , 256 ; threat from politics of the revolving door, 83 génocidaires in Zaire, 247 ; tight control Popular Arab and Islamic Conference over Kabila, 254 (PAIC), 152 , 155 Popular Congress Party (Sudan), 170, 175 , Sai al-Nur, Abdalla, 172 , 173 , 198 ; 194 , 195 ; demonstrations in Darfur, tries to reign in Musa Hilal, 173 172 Salih, Zubair Mohamed, 157

387

Index 387

Sara ethnic group (Chad), 228 (1963), 112 ; civil war in South Sudan Sassou-Nguesso, Denis, 54 (1983), 114 – 116 ; civil wars in, 9 ; secessionist conl icts: infrequency in Africa, Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 3 ; 16n. 66 constitution (1998), 156 ; consultative security dilemma, 6 , 24 , 25 , 91, 92 conference in El Fasher (2003), 195 ; Selassie, Haile, 89 coup d’état (1958), 112 ; coup d’état selective exclusion, 93 ; challenges of in (1969), 113 ; coup d’état (1985), 122 ; weak states, 95 coup d’état (1989), 119 , 123 ; cultural- selective violence, 57 religious social groups, 109 ; diversity self- enforcing powersharing, 19 – 20; in, 109 ; effect of Turabi’s shadow on balance of threat capabilities and, 273 ; Darfur negotiations, 195 ; elections conditions leading to, 294 ; dei nition (1986), 122 , 129 ; failed coup (1971), of, 272 113 ; First Darfur Rebellion, 138 – 142 ; Senghor, Leopold, 74 Fur Leadership Conference (2002), shadow state, 45 , 209 188 ; Fur–Arab conflict (late 1980s), Shi’a Arabs (Iraq), 303 131 ; independence of, 112 ; Kass Sierra Leone, 228 , 309 ; coup d’état Conference (2002), 189 ; Khatmiyya, (1997), 309 110 , 118 ; legacy of slave trade, 109n. slave trade, legacy of, 13 8 ; militias in, 117 ; murahaliin , 116 , societal peace, 12 118 , 123 ; Muslim Arabs in, 109 ; South Africa, 66 , 74 National Reconciliation (1977), South Sudan, 1 – 5, 7 , 27, 301, 314 ; 114 , 121 , 122 ; Nationalist Union independence from Sudan, 3 ; Party (NUP), 112 ; non-Muslim, non- outbreak of civil war, (2013), 1 – 5 ; Arabs in, 109 ; Nuba Mountains and Presidential Republican Guard, 1 SPLA , 116 ; political exclusion of Southern Sudan Liberation Movement southern Sudanese, 111 ; political (SSLM), 113 topography of, 109 ; power struggle sovereign power, 17 between Turabi and Bashir, 155– 161 ; split domination regimes, 216, 221 , 224 ; propaganda about Greater Zaghawa commitment problem in, 223 ; coup– civil State, 196 ; Revolutionary Command war trade- off in, 224 Council (RCC), 151 , 153 ; road state capacity, as determinant of civil network in, 103 ; sanctions after war, 9 , 39 Mubarak assassination attempt, state failure, 5 155 ; social hierachy in, 109 ; South Stewart, Frances, 15 , 39n. 12 Sudan independence, 3 ; southern strategic uncertainty, 84 Sudanese, 109 ; state centralization, Sudan, 21 , 28 , 41 , 66 , 73 , 103 – 204 , 103 ; state of emergency (1999), 159 ; 228 ; Abboud, Ibrahim, 112 ; Addis The Black Book , 168 – 169 ; Torit Ababa Agreement (1972), 113 ; mutiny (1955), 112 ; Turkiyyah, 110 ; adoption of sharia (1983), 114 ; Ansar, Umma Party, 112 , 114 , 116 , 118 , 127 , 110 , 118 ; anti- regime protests (2000), 129 ; Western Salvation Road, 185 160 ; Anyanya, 112 ; Arab– African Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance divide, 117 – 119 ; as weak state, 9 , (SFDA), 183 103 – 106 ; Bolad rebellion (1990), Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), 181 , 182 ; 138 – 142 ; capture of Golo (2003), 191 ; change British colonization of, 110 ; name from Darfur Liberation Front, British Southern Policy in, 111 ; 194 ; initial attacks in North Dafur campaigns of mass killing in, 57 , (2003), 191 ; kidnapping of Shartay 199 , 203 ; center-periphery divide, Adam Sabi, 191 ; neutralization of 105 ; civil war in Darfur (2003), Zaghawa tribal chiefs, 191 ; opens 178 – 204 ; civil war in South Sudan camps in Dar Zaghawa, 191 ; origins of

388

388 Index

rebellion, 181 – 185 ; surprise attack on El threat capabilities theory of powersharing, Fasher, 198 21, 270 , 271 – 285 , 295 ; empirical Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), analysis of, 277 – 278 1 , 106 , 123 , 138 , 193 , 215 ; alliance Togo, 86 ; coup d’état (1963), 85 with Turabi, 161 ; coup attempt against Tshisekedi, Étienne, 245 Garang (1991), 139 ; extracts right Tshombe, Moise, 47 of self- determination, 3 ; founding of, Tutsi ethnic group (Burundi), 94 115 ; negotiations with government Tutsi ethnic group (DRC), 229 ; of Sudan, 193 ; sponsor Bolad members accused of plotting coup rebellion in Darfur (1991–1992), against Kabila, 261 ; citizenship 138 – 142 ; strategy for spreading war in Congo and, 247 ; labeled as to northern Sudan, 145 ; support for “foreigners”, 251 ; linkages with RPF, Darfurian rebels, 105 ; support for SLA 248 ; opposition to Mobutu regime, 247 ; (2003), 194 participation in AFDL, 248 ; pogroms Sudan People’s Liberation Movement against (August 1998), 251 ; targeted by (SPLM), 2 , 109 ; outreach to génocidaires, 248 Bolad, 138 Tutsi ethnic group (Rwanda), 78, 85 Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF): against Bolad rebellion, 140 ; arming of Uganda, 27 , 78 , 91 , 92 ; economic Chadian battalion (2003), 197 ; networks in Congo (1997–1998), 253 ; counteroffensive in Jebel Marra intervention in South Sudan (2014), 5 , (January 2003), 190 ; faces Bolad 301 ; split domination regime in, 222 rebellion, 139 ; failed counteroffensive Uganda National Liberation Army in Ain Siro (2003), 198 (UNLA), 229 Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), 113, Umma Party, 122 121 United Nations, 47 Suleiman, Ibrahim, 186 , 191 ; attempts to contain Darfur rebellion, 186 – 188 ; violence, as source of exclusion from shadow state, 188 ; powersharing, 6 , 88 opposed by Musa Hilal, 189 Violence and Social Orders (North Sunni Arabs (Iraq), 303 et al.), 11n. 42; 44; 44n. 40 Sunni Arabs (Syria), 306 ; armed uprising in violence specialists, 11; 12n.42, 44 , 82 ; Syria (1976– 1982), 306 elite accommodation, 12 Syria, 30 , 306 – 307 ; Hama massacre (1982), 306 Walter, Barbara, 16n. 66 weak state model of civil war, limitations Taha, Ali Osman, 149 , 152 ; appointed vice of, 41 , 106 president, 157–163 ; compared to Hassan weak states, 11 , 45 ; civil war in, 9 ; al-Turabi, 152 ; controls purse of Islamic ethnopolitical exclusion and, 83 ; Movement, 165n. 64 ; minister of social information problems in, 71 ; affairs, 153 ; Mubarak assassination natural states v. weak states, 44 attempt, alleged role in, 154 ; removed Wendt, Alexander, 236 as Turabi deputy, 157 , 164 ; support for Wimmer, Andreas, 15 , 73 Bashir against Turabi, 160 ; ties with Wrong, Michela, 67, 74 Sudanese military, 152 Tanzania. overthrow of Idi Amin, 224 Yakoma ethnic group (Central African taxation, 51 Republic), 95 Taylor, Charles, 238 , 241 threat capabilities, 19 ; dei nition of, 272 ; Zaghawa ethnic group (Chad), 95, 237 ; distance to the capital and, 275 ; group persecuted by Habré regime, 57 ; size and, 275 ; operationalization of, 275 rebellion against Déby government, 48

389

Index 389

Zaghawa ethnic group (Sudan), 183 ; to Darfur rebellion, 195 ; rivalry with alliance with Fur, 182 ; clash with Abbala Arabs, 173 ; Aulayd Zeid (2001), 184 ; collectively support for Déby’s rebellion against labeled Habré, 197 ; Turabi support among, 149 Turabi loyalists, 169 , 170 , 176 ; join Zaire. See Democratic Republic of the Popular Congress Party, 170 ; members Congo (DRC) purged from Al- Ingaz regime, 171 ; Zimbabwe, 92 , 228 , 252 ; intervention in members warn against military solution Congo (August 1998), 264