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A publication of ihe African Studies Program of The Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies No. 61 • August 28, 1986 OAU Assembly XXII by J. Coleman Kitchen, Jr. The twenty-second annual Assembly of Heads of State President Abdou Diouf, as having significantly of the Organization of African Unity was held in Addis influenced Zaire's decision that it must play a role iii Abba, Ethiopia from July 28 to 30. These were some of Africa commensurate with its importance and thus the major developments and decisions of the summit: "should not be absent from OAU discussions." The Empty Chair Passing the Torch Morocco's King Hassan was not among the 22 heads of The 1985-86 term of President Diouf as OAU chairman state or government who gathered in Addis Ababa for ended in an exceptional shower of praise. Summit the OAU's 1986 Assembly (see page 3), nor was the participants paid "glowing tribute" to the Senegalese North African state represented at the presummit president for the "inexhaustible strength, talent, and meeting of the organization's Council of (foreign) imagination" he had placed at the service of the Ministers. Morocco resigned from the OAU in organization and the "most effective manner" in which November 1984 in protest against the seating at the he had carried out his mandate. In a resolution twentieth Assembly of a delegation representing the honoring him, the Assembly decided to adopt his report "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic" - the Polisario as a working document. nationalist movement with which Moroccan forces have In a more specific accounting of Diouf' s contribution, been fighting since late 1975 for control of the the London weekly West Africa (July 28) concluded that 102,703-square-mile territory of the former Spanish he "has provided the OAU with a new unity and Sahara. The SADR has claimed OAU membership credibility." During his year in office, the organization since 1982 on the basis of a letter from the organiza­ ended a long period of indecision over the selection of a tion's secretary-general at that time, Edem Kodjo of new secretary-general and began a restructuring of its Togo. (For background, see "Where Does the OAU Go administration. In the course of extensive travel From Here?" in CSIS Africa Notes no. 3, September 1, throughout the continent during his term of office, 1982.) Chairman Diouf focused special attention on the two The procedural legitimacy of the Polisario/SADR problems that dominated the 1986 summit - Africa's seating remains a controversial issue, although Zaire economic malaise and southern Africa. He is widely was the only member state to support Morocco's 1984 credited with being the driving force behind the recent walkout by "suspending" its own participation in OAU UN special session on Africa (see "Economic Priorities" affairs for an indefinite period. After sitting out the 1985 below), and also took a special interest in promoting Assembly, President Mobutu Sese Seko sent First State Afro-Arab cooperation. Commissioner Kengo wa Dondo to represent him at the Congo's President Denis Sassou-Nguesso was elected 1986 Assembly. The official Zairian news agency quoted as 1986-1987 chairman. In the course of his July 29 Kengo wa Dondo on July 28 as having stated that "the address to the Assembly, Sassou-Nguesso reminded his reasons for the suspension of Zaire's activities within colleagues that the July 1985 summit had "reassigned the OAU still exist .... The SADR is not a state." He cited the Congo, in collaboration with the OAU, to pursue the intercessions by OAU Secretary-General Ide Oumarou search for peace and national reconciliation in Chad." and the organization's outgoing chairman, Senegal's After consultations with the rival Chadian leaders, Editor: Helen Kitchen, Director of African Studies • Research Associate: J. Coleman Kitchen, Jr. • Production/Circulation: Evelyn Barnes CSIS Africa Notes, Suite 400, 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 • Telephone (202) 887-0219 • ISSN 0736-9506 2 Hissene Habre and Goukouni Oueddei, a meeting had • condemned the U.S. policy of "constructive been arranged in Brazzaville at which the two warring engagement" and the "infamous" U.S.-South African parties were invited to convene reconciliation talks. The policy of linking "Namibia's independence with the meeting, planned for March 28, 1986, was to have been withdrawal of Cuban forces in Angola"; attended also by Diouf, who in fact traveled to • appealed to the international community "to increase Brazzaville for this purpose. "Regrettably," Sassou­ its moral, political, diplomatic, and material support Nguesso reported, Goukouni Oueddei "declined the to the national liberation movements of South invitation to attend the talks at the last minute, even Africa"; though he had earlier agreed to do so without • demanded the "unconditional and immediate preconditions. The abortive meeting meant that another release" of Nelson Mandela, Zephanta Mothopeng, opportunity had been missed to settle the conflict in the and all other political prisoners and detainees; strife-torn country." "The Chadian crisis," he said, is "a • condemned South Africa for the reimposition of the long and complex one" and requires "the serious state of emergency and other violations of human attention of Africa, Chadians, and some foreign powers." rights; In a resolution on Chad, the heads of state asked • called upon the UN Security Council to impose Chairman Sassou-Nguesso to continue his efforts to comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against bring about reconciliation, and called upon all parties to South Africa in order to force Pretoria to end its the conflict to cooperate closely with the new OAU occupation of Namibia. chairman. (For background, see "Why Chad?" by Alex While the resolution seemed to represent a generally Rondos in CSIS Africa Notes no. 18, August 31, 1983.) acceptable compromise, some discomfort was reported. According to Agence France-Presse (July 27), Cote Southern Africa d'lvoire had "expressed a reservation" during the The Assembly's July 29 statement on South Africa was foreign ministers' deliberations. A Zaire radio Assembly based on a draft prepared by the OAU's Council of wrap-up noted: "During this twenty-second summit, Ministers in their presummit deliberations. Reuter several resolutions were adopted, among them the quoted "conference sources" as saying that "the resolution on South Africa. On this issue, Zaire ministerial resolutions were strong enough in language expresses its reservations on various motions of to satisfy the radicals, but not specific enough in condemnation against some countries that have close practice for the conservatives to press the other heads relations with [South Africa]. Zaire is of the opinion that of state to tone them down." A Zimbabwean proposal to as far as these close relations are concerned ... , the create a pan-African rapid deployment force to counter policy that consists of condemning the South African cross-border attacks by Pretoria's military foundered in regime will only result in the authorities hardening their the face ofthe OAU's (and many ofthe member states') position. The present phase of the struggle of the black cash-strapped condition; instead, the summit called for people of South Africa to recover their fundamental voluntary support of South Africa's "national liberation rights demands from us a realistic and constructive movements." (In this connection, Nigeria recently attitude in order to put an end to the situation prevailing pledged $50 million to liberation movements and the in this country." Front Line states over the next five years, and has given A special heads-of-state committee (chaired by $10 million to Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to incoming Chairman Sassou-Nguesso and including the help repair damage caused by the May 1986 South leaders of the Front Line states plus Senegal, Algeria, African military raids on their capital cities.) Inter alia, Ethiopia, Cape Verde, Nigeria, and "the independence the summit resolution on South Africa: movements") was appointed to monitor the situation in • condemned Margaret Thatcher's government for its southern Africa, to identify methods of toppling the "relentless campaign against the imposition of apartheid system, and to accelerate Namibia's progress comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the toward internationally recognized independence. Pretoria regime" and called on "the African, nonaligned, and other freedom-loving countries to U.S. Aid to UNITA exert pressure on the British government by taking The heads of state condemned U.S. military and concrete measures of their choosing against Britain," financial support to Jonas Savimbi's Uniiio Nacional which "could include a sports boycott, economic para a lndependencia Total de Angola (UNITA) and measures, and severance of diplomatic relations"; called on the U.S. Congress to "put to a halt without • urged member states which have not yet adopted delay this act of gross interference by the present U.S. comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South administration in the internal affairs of Angola." The Africa to do so and "to abstain from granting landing "deliberate and overt involvement" of the U.S. and berthing facilities to South African aircraft and administration in the internal affairs of Angola was ships"; described as constituting a hostile act against the OAU, • condemned West Germany, France, Britain, the and the summit warned that the Angolan people United States,
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