Emmanuel Gerard, Bruce Kuklick. Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015. xiii + 276 pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-674-72527-0.

Reviewed by Alanna O'Malley

Published on H-Diplo (April, 2016)

Commissioned by Seth Ofenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

The assassination of the Congo’s frst demo‐ the United States. At the UN, the perceived duplici‐ cratically elected prime minister, Patrice Lumum‐ ty of the secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld, ba, seven months after the Congo gained indepen‐ who had promised to defend the sovereignty of dence from Belgium on June 30, 1960, was a shot the Congo, led to the closing of the General Assem‐ heard around the world. For the Congolese peo‐ bly when protestors stormed UN buildings in New ple, the loss of their most charismatic politician York. In the ffty-fve years since the murder, the had a profound efect on the unity of the state and question of who killed Lumumba has continued struck at the heart of ideas about the Congolese to intrigue historians and the general public alike. nation. Arguably, the assassination also afected Death in the Congo, Murdering Patrice Lu‐ the contours of the state as it grappled with unsta‐ mumba is an eminently readable and absorbing ble government before the imposition of a dicta‐ book by Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick torship by General Joseph-Desiré Mobutu Sese which examines the evidence in a balanced and Seko in 1965 which lasted until 1997. For other coherent manner while examining the complex African states, the fate of the decolonization tapestry of the alliances, pacts, and promises that project as a whole seemed to hang in the balance. comprised relations over the Congo between The assassination of Lumumba drew protests in Léopoldville (now Kinshasa), Brussels, the Katan‐ African and European capitals from Accra to gan capital Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), Lon‐ Dublin as newly independent African states and don, New York, and Washington. It has long been their supporters railed against what they per‐ known from the inquiry mounted by the US Sen‐ ceived as a blatant manifestation of neocolonial‐ ate, the Church Committee, which in 1975 con‐ ism in the Congo. Leaders such as Ghanaian ducted an investigation into the assassination, prime minister Kwame Nkrumah publicly pointed and later investigations by the UN and by the Bel‐ the fnger of blame towards Britain, Belgium, and gian government in 2001, that in 1960 there was H-Net Reviews an array of plots to assassinate Lumumba. Al‐ Ludo de Witte, have outlined the role of members though the book does not ofer a defnitive verdict of the Belgian intelligence agency, the Surete, in on how these murderous plots may have inter‐ advancing the plot to kill Lumumba, Gerard and sected, nor a clear line of responsibility, what it Kuklick use recent interviews with the last re‐ does with excellent clarity is to outline the com‐ maining members of the organization to recon‐ plexity of the relationship between Brussels, Elisa‐ struct the events which lead to Lumumba’s death bethville, and Léopoldville, and the wider frames and how what they term the “process of murder” of decolonization and the Cold War that efective‐ unfolded (p. 218). What emerges is a chilling por‐ ly sealed Lumumba’s fate as a variety of aims col‐ trait of deceit, political bargaining, and ultimately, lided. betrayal of the basic principles of human dignity. The book has two prominent features from Drama characterized much of Lumumba’s the beginning which outline its important contri‐ short-lived political career. He emerged on the po‐ bution to the rather crowded feld of literature on litical scene in the Congo in 1958 as one of the the history of the Congo and the assassination of founders of the Mouvement National Congolais Lumumba.[1] First, the book centers the story in (MNC) one of the main political parties in the the Congo itself. It reveals in impressive depth the state. He quickly became identifed as a rabble- variety of connections and alliances that existed rouser and was arrested a year later for leading a between the African politicians and their Belgian protest against the Belgian colonial administra‐ counterparts, even as administrations in both tion in Léopoldville in which thirty people were countries changed during this period. Crucially, killed. Despite being arrested for his part in incit‐ the research brings to light the often intimate con‐ ing the riots, following the MNC’s sweeping victo‐ tacts that existed between Belgian intelligence of‐ ry in the frst elections held in December 1959, he fcers, members of the Belgian King Baudouin’s was dramatically freed from prison and fown to court, and advisors to the Armée Nationale Congo‐ Brussels to participate in a series of roundtable lais (ANC). Through this network of formal and in‐ talks to prepare the Congo for independence. The formal cooperation, the authors describe how for authors sketch a provocative outline of Lumumba a variety of diferent aims, the plan to “eliminate” in a way that highlights his perspicacity, vigor, Lumumba evolved from August-December 1960 and vision for the Congo, rather than the mercuri‐ before he was fnally killed in January 1961. al and insecure image of him that has been ad‐ While there is no clear line of direction, it is ar‐ vanced by others. gued that Lumumba threatened the stability of During the independence ceremony on June the government led by Joseph Kasavubu, chal‐ 30, Lumumba’s relationship with Belgium got of lenged the loyalty of troops in the ANC, which was to a rocky start when he changed his speech at the problematic for the head of the army General last minute to denounce Belgium’s colonial record Joseph Moubtu (later Mobutu Sese Seko), and di‐ in the Congo--an act that soured any bonds of rectly denounced the legitimacy of the secession‐ friendship that may have existed between the two ist regime in Katanga, led by Moise Tshombe. This states. His appeal to the UN a week later to inter‐ internal African opposition was not however, vene to defend Congolese sovereignty from Bel‐ enough to lead to Lumumba’s murder. It was the gian incursion served to deepen the divide. Bel‐ role of the Belgians in supporting this idea which gian paratroopers had been dispatched back to proved crucial during these months. the Congo less than a week after independence This is the second important contribution of when the ANC revolted against their commanding the book. While previous works, such as that of ofcers (who were primarily Belgian). Brussels ar‐

2 H-Net Reviews gued that they were necessary to protect the Euro‐ efectively placed under house arrest. A ring of pean populations of Léopoldville and Elisa‐ UN soldiers encircled him at his home in order to bethville, though this was also a convenient cover protect him from the ANC. For its part the United to ensure that they continued to protect their States, under President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s business interests. The crisis deepened when the administration, was concerned that Lumumba wealthy province of Katanga, in the southeast of would push the UN out of Congo and invite the the country, seceded under Moise Tshombe, tak‐ USSR in. The increasing contacts between Lu‐ ing with it most of the resources and revenue on mumba and the Soviet Union over the summer of which the Congolese economy was reliant. 1960 persuaded American ofcials, including The UN responded to the request for aid by head of the CIA Allen Dulles and the president mandating the largest peacekeeping operation to himself, that Lumumba posed a serious threat to date in order to restore peace and the rule of law. international peace in Africa. In response, they Hammarskjöld was concerned that the Congo cri‐ turned to the subversive activities of the CIA in or‐ sis might become infused with Cold War politics der to provide a solution. It has been alleged by and sought to prevent either the United States or some, including Robert Johnson, the ofcial the USSR from becoming directly involved. The record-taker at the National Security Council actions of the UN immediately internationalized meeting where it took place, that Eisenhower the confict and the legacy of the organization be‐ gave the order for the assassination. The authors came tarnished as the crisis continued to unfold concur, arguing that “Eisenhower endorsed an as‐ until the ofcial withdrawal of troops in 1964. Dis‐ sassination more than the head of the CIA” (p. appointingly, Gerard and Kuklick paint a dismal 149). and rather oversimplifed view of the UN and Although Eisenhower’s specifc role is disput‐ how it worked at the time, describing the organi‐ ed by other historians, there is a consensus that zation as “scrawny and sometimes feckless” (p. there was widespread irritation with Lumumba. 74). Despite the fact that they grant the organiza‐ The authors argue that Dulles instructed the chief tion and its ofcials little agency in the evolution of the CIA station, Lawrence Devlin, that Lumum‐ of events, they still maintain that the UN was ulti‐ ba in opposition still posed a threat to the careful mately duplicitous as it failed to prevent Lumum‐ balance of power in Léopoldville. Therefore, am‐ ba from being captured by his enemies and mur‐ ple scope and opportunity was given to Devlin to dered. fnish the job, even if he did not have time to con‐ Gerard and Kuklick also take a dim view of sult Washington frst (p. 146). In his own recollec‐ the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in attempt‐ tion, Devlin maintains that he circumvented or‐ ing to shape the political landscape in ders from Washington to commit the murder, but Léopoldville and in advancing its own nefarious rather opted to put Lumumba in harm’s way. His schemes to dispose the prime minister. By Sep‐ largely discredited personal account is dismissed tember 1960, Kasavubu, with the support of the by the authors, who point to “his desire to vali‐ United States, announced that he was dismissing date his credentials within the Agency” (p. 152). Lumumba as prime minister, throwing the Con‐ The CIA, it seems, was determined to get the job golese government into chaos. Mobutu arranged done and dispatched two further agents and an his own coup several weeks later when he created outside freelancer called ROUGE to execute the a College of Commissioners to replace the elected mission. It is argued that this was an efort to in‐ government until the internal political situation sulate Devlin and the CIA from any blowback could be stabilized. In the process, Lumumba was which would result if the assassination attempts were successful. But the authors also raise issues

3 H-Net Reviews of morality: did CIA agents and ofcials have the (p. 170). In the meantime, Count Harold sense that the murder of a democratically elected d’Aspremont Lynden, the former head of the Bel‐ leader was fundamentally wrong? Moreover, the gian technical mission to Katanga, was appointed book also points to, but frustratingly does not pur‐ minister of African afairs. D’Aspremont is de‐ sue, lines of inquiry with regard to the activities scribed as behaving “as if decolonization had not of other intelligence agencies from Britain and taken place” (p. 162). He was granted a discre‐ France, long suspected to have played a role. They tionary budget of $1 million which he soon put to also leave open the question whether Lumumba good use in helping Mobutu pay the ANC to en‐ was aware of these reprehensible schemes and sure his loyalty in opposing Lumumba, and ex‐ also if UN protection really did serve to thwart the panding the network and activities of the Belgian eforts of these countries to fnish him of. intelligence agency the Sûreté in conspiring with It is difcult to assess how much Lumumba Mobutu and Lumumba’s enemy Victor Nendaka was aware of the intersecting plots to kill him to fnd a solution to defnitively remove him. At while he remained under the protection of the UN the same time as Belgium accelerated its secret from September to November 1960. What campaign to dispose of Lumumba, the relation‐ emerged, however, was, as the authors argue, a ship between Brussels and the UN deteriorated. situation in which the CIA had “little need to kill” Hammarskjöld’s demands, and successive Securi‐ (p. 189). Following the instructions of Rajeshwar ty Council resolutions that the Belgians halt their Dayal, special representative of the secretary-gen‐ activities in opposing the UN force, were received eral, the UN sought to protect Lumumba from lo‐ as a mark of disrespect by the Belgian govern‐ cal threats by stationing its forces between him ment. Dayal’s controversial report detailing how and the ANC. This was an act which was viewed Belgian advisors were shaping Congolese opposi‐ by the United States as granting him an opportu‐ tion to UN activity in November angered the Bel‐ nity to reposition himself and led to disputes with gian government further. What is absent from the UN over how the Congo operation was to be this analysis however, is the role of other African handled. This contrasts with Gerard and Kuklick’s states in urging Hammarskjöld to take a stronger allegations that the UN acted “ambiguously and line against the Belgians. Indeed, outspoken lead‐ duplicitously” (p. 181). In fact, in light of the politi‐ ers such as Nkrumah who dominated the public cal bargaining which was simultaneously taking discourse in the General Assembly on the Congo place between leaders in Léopoldville, Elisa‐ question during these months, and led the cam‐ bethville, and Brussels, it appears that for a time, paign of criticism against Belgium, appear only as UN protection kept Lumumba out of the hands of shadowy fgures in this interaction. his enemies until one fateful night in November Lumumba’s attempt to fee to Stanleyville was when, hidden in the back of a car, he decided to the action which brought the situation to a head. fee to join his supporters in the northern city of His supporters, led by Antione Gizenga, estab‐ Stanleyville. lished a provincial government in the northern In the months leading up to Lumumba’s city between December 1960 and January 1961 fight, negotiations were ongoing between the Bel‐ while Lumumbist forces extended into Kivu and gians and the Congolese regarding the problem of north Katanga, threatening the stability of the the prime minister. The authors recount, with re‐ regimes in both Elisabethville and Léopoldville. markable detail, how in October, Mobutu and Lumumba sought to join the provincial govern‐ Tshombe agreed to “neutralize” Lumumba in re‐ ment but was hindered on his journey by the deci‐ turn for an increased share of Katanga’s revenue sions to take back roads and stop to make speech‐ es to his supporters along the way. Eventually, the

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Congolese Sûreté and the ANC caught up with him cians and in particular the precise role of the Bel‐ at a village called Lodi. With Lumumba fnally in gian Sûreté and the police ofcers completes the custody, a radio message was sent on behalf of the puzzle. Kasavubu regime to Katanga: “‘Will the Jew ac‐ The question of precisely who killed Lumum‐ cept Satan?’ (Will Tshombe accept Lumumba?)” ba is only partially resolved by the end of the (p. 181). Initially Tshombe refused to accept him book. The authors cite the diary of Flemish police and Lumumba was moved to Camp Hardy, a mili‐ ofcer Frans Verscheure, discovered during the tary base in Thysville, south of the capital. Further Belgian parliamentary inquiry in 2000 and 2001, insistence from the Belgians that Lumumba be as the only piece of archival evidence of the mur‐ handed over to Katanga, lest Léopoldville agree to der. On January 17, 1961, Verscheure entered: a prisoner exchange in Stanleyville, alongside the “9.43 L. dood [dead]” (p. 210). Later he changed tenuous grip of Mobutu and Kasavubu over the this to “9.43 L. doorgevoerd [transferred].” In the ANC accelerated the decision to fnally hand Lu‐ original entry, shown in this book, the attempt to mumba over to his sworn enemies on January 16, alter the frst diary entry is clear. The plot thick‐ 1961. ens further when details of an oral history inter‐ Once Lumumba arrived in Katanga, with the view with Verscheure are revealed. The book re‐ connivance of the Belgians, the advisors and Fran‐ verts to more dramatic prose as the authors cophone politicians now distanced themselves record that it is as if he relives the moments of Lu‐ from the Elisabethville Africans. Lumumba was mumba’s fnal hours during this interview as he transported to a farm near the airport, where he recounts, minute by minute, the fnal ordeal, was “in all likelihood” tortured and tormented (p. adding details about the torture the prisoners had 202). In comparison to other accounts, especially sufered and their physical condition by the time that of Ludo de Witte’s The Assassination of Lu‐ they arrive at the graveside where the fring mumba (2003), the authors spare the reader the squad waited. When questioned about the diary, more grisly details of his detention and instead fo‐ Verscheure breaks down, ripping open his shirt cus on Tshombe’s movements. He convened a war and screaming at the interviewers in an unrecog‐ cabinet at his residence from 6 pm and here, nizable African language. This is important. He along with four other Elisabethville politicians, records only his entry about Lumumba in his na‐ decided the manner of Lumumba’s end. Fueled by tive Flemish but the working language in Congo alcohol, which raises questions about the right‐ was French. The explosion of their subject in a eousness of their decision-making process, the completely foreign African tongue leads the au‐ ministers soon headed for the farm, where they thors to wonder whether “in this fnal and un‐ abused Lumumba and his fellow prisoners fur‐ nerving existential moment did Verscheure try to ther before transporting them to the execution express a common humanity?” (p. 214). spot where a fring squad fnished the job. The These details which arise from the most re‐ story turns a little more gruesome when the re‐ cent investigation is what really adds a substan‐ burial and fnally the dissolving of the bodies in tially new research element and a reasoned anal‐ acid is recounted alongside the allegation that ysis to this book. The authors manage to weave Gerard Soete, another Flemish Belgian ofcer, their narrative convincingly with the facts avail‐ who carried out two days of destroying the body able while expending some time investigating cul- parts, kept teeth as keepsakes (p. 208). Although de-sacs of speculation about the motivations of the details of Lumumba’s fnal hours have long the other actors, in the process constructing a rea‐ been known, the focus here on the movements sonable and logical sequence of events which and direct involvement of the Elisabethville politi‐

5 H-Net Reviews leads to Lumumba’s assassination. However, even terrifc detail in a very stimulating narrative, the in their account, the chain of command, as twisty book would have beneftted from a closer posi‐ as it is made out to be, does not refect all the pos‐ tioning of why this issue was important in the sible infuences. While they fnd evidence of a wider context. While it remains a though-provok‐ clear conspiracy “less compelling,” what they of‐ ing work of history, it also straddles the boundary fer is a picture of the assassination as the outcome between academic and popular literature. of a process of “contingency, confusion, duplica‐ tion of labor and bungling” (p. 216). Note How can this depiction of the “‘traveling car‐ [1]. David N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of nival of death” be assessed (p. 215)? Gerard and Third World Intervention, Mines, Money and U.S. Kuklick do not fully make the case that “With Lu‐ Policy in the Congo Crisis (Chicago, IL; Chicago mumba’s death, the West had given its frst post‐ University Press, 1991); Madeleine G. Kalb, The colonial tutorial” (p. 217). Although the book does Congo Cables, The Cold War in Africa-From Eisen‐ help reposition the Congo dilemma in the longer hower to Kennedy (New York: Macmillan, 1982); history of decolonization, it paints only in very Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in the Africa broad strokes the impact of the assassination in (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Lise the wider context of the Cold War, the postcolo‐ Namikas, Battleground Africa: Cold War in the nial history of Africa, and the emergence of the Congo 1960-1965 (Stanford, CA: Stanford Universi‐ Global South. Part of the reason that the book fails ty Press, 2013); Stephen R. Weissman, American to fulfll this broad mandate is due to its hasty and Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964 (Ithaca, NY: rather defated conclusion, which reads as a Cornell University Press, 1974); and Susan rushed summary of what happened to the main Williams, Who Killed Hammarskjöld? The UN, actors and the Congo. Further refection on the as‐ The Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa sassination and its wider and deeper signifcance (London: Hurst Publishing, 2011). for Congo, Africa, the UN, and decolonization would have strengthened the impact of this book. It also wrongly undercuts the agency of the African actors themselves, referring to their activ‐ ities within the Congo as “palavering” and barely mentioning the role of other states negotiating at the UN in New York (p. 111). It also renders a rather conventional, uninspired, and inaccurate reading of the activities of the organization in the Congo, in particular Hammarskjöld’s shift to‐ wards Lumumba in the latter part of 1960. This points towards one of the faws of the book, which is a false reading of the relationship between the United States and the UN over the Congo which also deteriorated during this period as the Afro- Asian bloc drove policy for Congo from the Gener‐ al Assembly and Hammarskjöld seized the oppor‐ tunity to utilize the organization to realize a par‐ ticular vision of world order. While the intricacies of the plot to kill Lumumba here are revealed in

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Citation: Alanna O'Malley. Review of Gerard, Emmanuel; Kuklick, Bruce. Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. April, 2016.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=43950

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