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Home , Andrei Kozyrev, Boris Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev, Fredrik Reinfeldt, World Policy Conference

Foreign policy of the Russian Federation

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY (1945-1985) came to power in the Kremlin. Under his rule, the Soviet Soviet diplomacy after the Second World War was grounded Union strengthened the policy of “socialist internationalism” in a number of assumptions dating back to Leninist doctrine. which, in practice, meant expansion of the USSR-controlled First, it was taken for granted that is doomed and geopolitical sphere, as well as enhanced assistance to the should be replaced by the communist system as the incarna- Third World national liberation movements. The Brezhnev tion of social progress. Second, the class-based theory of doctrine was interpreted in the West as a declaration of “lim- world revolution was believed to be universally valid. Third, ited sovereignty” in relations between socialist countries that the was considered to be the vanguard of what are destined to “help each other” in solving their domestic was dubbed “progressive mankind”. Fourth, since wars were problems. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was believed to be brought about by the imperial powers, peace justified by this doctrine, which prevented the Soviet allies could be achievable only with a systemic demolition of impe- from making domestic policy changes and blocked transfor- rialism. In the meantime, the Soviet rulers drew a distinc- mation in the Soviet-imposed model of . tion between “unjust wars” provoked by capitalist countries, In relations with the West, Brezhnev supported the policies and “just wars” of national liberation that pledged of detente which, in his view, did not challenge the primacy to support by all means for the sake of “world revolutionary of the class-struggle approach to world politics. Soviet-Amer- progress”. ican relations at the time were characterised by the policy of As the direct outcome of World War Two, the Soviet Un- nuclear deterrence and the conflict arising from by the Soviet ion became one of most politically influential countries of the Army’s invasion of in 1982. world. Yet it still lacked economic power comparable to the West. Hence, in the first post-war months the Soviet leader- ’S FOREIGN POLICY DURING ship sought to portray the USSR as a peaceful nation ready THE PRESIDENCY OF to compromise with its partners from the West. Yet the anti- (1985-1991) fascist coalition soon fell apart, and the Soviet Union started Gorbachev drastically changed the previous approach to for- to seek predominance in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, the eign policy, which was based on the Marxist-Leninist concept were declared – first unofficially, then publicly – of irreconcilable conflict between capitalism and . Russia’s main challenger and contender. Taking into account He proclaimed that foreign policy must be based on coopera- the growing enmity between Moscow and Washington, the tion instead of a military balancing act. In the spirit of a policy Soviet leadership started investing resources in putting an of “New Thinking”, Gorbachev made a number of concessions end to the nuclear monopoly of the United States and going in the resolution of regional conflicts and arms negotiations ahead with the Soviet atomic bomb project which, after its that would have been unimaginable during the Soviet era. In successful implementation, gave rise to the nuclear arms 1987, the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate its intermediate- race between the Soviet Union and the United States. and short-range missiles in Europe, and secured this obliga- In 1953, with the death of Stalin, Soviet foreign policy un- tion in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty derwent sweeping changes. The new Soviet leader Nikita signed by Reagan and Gorbachev at the . Khrushchev declared the policy of peaceful co-existence be- In February 1989 the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from tween two types of countries (socialist and capitalist) and Afghanistan. questioned the feasibility of “exporting the revolution” abroad. Gorbachev’s conciliatory policy brought an end to the Cold Khrushchev also acknowledged the multiplicity of transitory War, but also led to results his administration had not fore- pathways from capitalism to socialism, and called for a more seen: the communist governments in Eastern Europe were tolerant and flexible attitude towards the experience of - overthrown during 1989-1990. This came about as a result pean social . was equivalent of Gorbachev’s rejection of the and his to the repudiation of war as a means of solving political con- proclaiming the principle of “the sovereign right of each peo- flicts and recognition of the endurance of the capitalist sys- ple to choose their own social system”, which he mentioned tem. The , according to the new logic of Soviet for- for the first time in his speech to the Council of Europe. In eign policy, was considered to be dangerous and wasteful. keeping with this principle, the Soviet Union did not attempt In 1964 the new Secretary General, , to restore communist rule in Eastern Europe and neither did 223 224 CIDOB International Yearbook 2010 Russian Federation, Country Profile eign policy strategy. This process was rather controversial controversial rather was process This strategy. policy eign for new a out work to had now it state independent an As successor. Union’s Soviet the as organisations ternational in and world the around states by recognised was Russia ing betweenSovietandChineseleaderssincethe1950s. summit a hold with to Gorbachev in Beijing in 1989, which was the agreed first meet government Chinese the result, aborder. As northern ’s along deployed weapons troops and Soviet of number the reduced significantly and stan Afghani from troops withdrew Cambodia, in presence tary mili Vietnamese the for support Soviet back rolled it tions: rela Sino-Soviet for blocks stumbling were which problems of number a resolved Union Soviet The China. with lations re closer develop to was priorities top country’s the of one Arabia, South , and . Gorbachev considered that Saudi with relations diplomatic established Union Soviet the aircraft. fighter and artillery, vehicles, combat armoured tanks, tle TreatyEurope in Treaty),(CFE bat in reductions to agreeing most of the European states signed the Conventional Forces and Union, Soviet the States, United the 1990, November ballistic missile warheads within the following seven years. In Soviet of cent per 50 about and warheads missile ballistic duction of approximately 35 per cent in the United States of re a on agreed parties the eliminated: be to were missiles ballistic intercontinental of numbers START,large Under I). Treaty(STARTReduction Arms Strategic the signed bachev Gor and Bush when improvement, of signs significant more By 1991, the United States-Soviet relationship showed even sovereignty.Kuwait’s restore to resolutions Nations United supported and Kuwait of invasion Iraqi the condemning States in United the joined Union Soviet the 1990, August In War.Cold the to end an W.declared H. Bush George dent At a summit in Malta in the end 1989, Gorbachev and Presi bymid-1991andfromPolandin1993. kia andHungary Czechoslova from years, four next the over Europe Central and Eastern from withdrawn were troops Soviet suit. lowed fol Pact Warsaw the 1991 July recast In ties. to multilateral agreed their states member although dissolved, was In disbanded. AssistanceEconomic Mutual for Council the 1991, January were Europe Eastern in organisations tional sented totheNATO membershipofaunifiedGermany. had worked out an agreement by which the Soviet Union con Kohl Helmut Chancellor and Gorbachev 1990, of middle the it stand in the way of reunification in . Moreover, by nomic and political development, and, finally, as a potential potential a as finally, and, development, political and nomic ally, political its as defined was Russia’s for prototype a eco the West independence, Russia’s of days first the from less, Neverthe ideology. War Cold and communism replace to identity,hadRussia’snew which in clarity of lack the to due After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991,of end the at Union Soviet the of collapse the After PRESIDENCY OFBORISYELTSIN (1991-1999) THE DURING POLICY FOREIGN RUSSIA’S policy,Thinking Gorbachev’sNew of framework the Within The United States-Soviet relations were steadily improving. interna Soviet-controlled , the of beginning the In ------unipolarity accepted by Kozyrev was seen not as Pax Ameri Pax as not seen was Kozyrev by accepted unipolarity of globalisation and fostering unification of the world. Yet the thrust the facilitating for system best-equipped the be would spective, it was believed that a unipolar international society per this (Trenin,from interests” Seen common 2000). and values basic shares which formed, is society international of core a that States United the around is It … power bal glo truly only the as States United the of “centrality the of national narrow recognition in from grounded was worldview Kozyrev’s interests. distinct as values human universal of support and institutions multilateral bolstering of ability the desir all, of first premises, shared of number a upon based was West the with partnership strategic in interest avowed Kozyrev’s Andrei aired. were NATO in membership eventual Russia’s of ideas the that time this at is It . Foreign first Russia’s with associated policy foreign Russian in stage pro-Western explicitly an diplomacy, Kozyrev called so- the by exemplified and Union, Soviet the of demise the of aftermath immediate the in widespread especiallywas worldview of type This reforms. economic for source of financial assistance which was desperately needed tial term reduced Russia’s dependence on foreign economic economic foreign on dependence Russia’s reduced term tial the UnitedStates. in the post-Soviet area and challenge the global hegemony of consolidateRussia’sto assumed ability that concept power” of “balance a resembling to close very came worldview new Moscow’s Primakov, Under interests. Moscow’s of spheres the into move to not Gorbachev to given promise alleged its of the reminding NATOexpansion, of policies the to objections strong voiced Primakov unipolarity. of drawbacks the of example perfect a presented Balkans the in vention multipolarity. of idea the in grounded philosophy policy foreign different a with up came Primakov, Yevgeniy successor, His 1996. January in Yeltsin by announced was resignation Kozyrev’s from both the nationalist camp and President Yeltsin himself. unleashed harsh criticism of the Kozyrev brand of diplomacy 1995,September in targets Serb Bosnian of bombardment NATO intensified the including events, of other A sia. number pushing for a more self-reliant and independent foreign policy in Rus started Critics expansion. NATO and Yugoslavia in war the as issues such over 1993 in falter to began 1992 the sole“”. as capacity its in not but accepted, broadly was leadership America’s words, other In respect. to had Washington that was constraints and filters superiority institutional of number a American by mediated where unipolarity” “soft of sort a represented vision Kozyrev’s 2003). (Bogaturov, nations Western of group a of leadership joint a as rather but cana Fast recovery Fast of recovery Russia’s economy in Putin’s first presiden The IdeaofRussia’s resurgence (2000-2008) PUTIN VLADIMIR OF PRESIDENCY RUSSIA’S FOREIGNPOLICYDURING THE inter NATO the politicians, Russian many of minds the In of beginning the of policies pro-Western the However,

and ------assistance, allowing Russian leaders to offer more vigorous invasion. Putin chose the second option and, during his visit resistance to Western policies that failed to meet Russia’s to Paris in February 2003, he and President Chirac officially expectations. The 1990s were assessed by his administra- announced their intention to block the US draft of a new UN tion as the period of Russia’s subjugation to the West. The resolution that would authorise the war in Iraq. Joined by feeling that Russia’s interests were being disregarded was the German leader Gerhard Schröder, they confirmed -ad fuel for more assertive and aggressive behaviour from Rus- herence to the principles of counter- but insisted sia in the international arena. Putin turned reaffirmation of that the war in Iraq was not an appropriate response to the Russia as a great power into the mainstay of his foreign terrorist threat. policy, while pragmatism and pursuit of Russia’s national in- Joining the “global ” fitted in with Russia’s terest became its key guiding principles. The five-day war interests as it gave justification and legitimacy to its policy in in August 2008 was one climax in Russia’s in- in . In other respects, Russia’s contribution to the ternational self-assertion in post-Soviet space as well as in war on terrorism was not as expansive as the United States Europe. It is worth mentioning that many analysts attribute expected it to be. Russia contributed to the NATO operation the aggressive tone of Putin’s foreign policy discourse to in Afghanistan but never sent its own troops to this coun- his domestic strategy of exploiting Russian patriotism for try. Moreover, as a counterweight to American presence gaining support to his leadership and unifying the nation by in Central Asia, Russia built up its own military contingent promoting the idea of a perpetual external threat. in Tajikistan and . Again, Russia never sacrificed to anti-terrorism goals its partnership with Iran and Russia’s resistance to US hegemony and multipolarity in the arms trade, despite the fact that both states were discourse accused by the United States of supporting terrorism. Nei- policyForeign the Russian Federation of Russia under increasingly identified itself as ther did Russia suspend construction work at a nuclear plant being in opposition to US hegemony, as a result of which Pu- in Bushehr, which is being built on the basis of the Iran- tin’s foreign policy is usually described as rather confronta- Russia inter-governmental agreements dating from 1992. tional. In the beginning of Putin’s presidency there was great The United States was extremely dissatisfied with Russia for hope for US-Russian cooperation, based on the change of supplying these countries with arms and refusing to support administration in both countries. The disagreements of the sanctions against Iran. In Latin America, Russia was building Yeltsin-Clinton era were expected to be overcome by new lead- ties with Venezuela, led by the anti-American president Hugo ers. From the first days in office, Putin was inclined towards Chavez. Striving to further diversify its foreign policy, Russia building stronger ties with the United States. In April 2000 declared as one of its top priorities partnership with India, he convinced the to ratify START II. This treaty provid- China and Brazil (BRIC). ed for a significant reduction in strategic nuclear warheads Consistently undermining the system for both the United States and Russia by 2007. The next op- based on United States unilateralism, Russia put forward its portunity to reach new levels of cooperation with the United own idea of the optimal world order, which was the multipo- States came with the appearance of the counter-terrorism lar world. The concept of multipolarity was not new to Rus- coalition. After 11 September 2001, Putin expressed his sia’s foreign policy discourse, but after Sergei Lavrov was ap- willingness to join efforts in the “war on terrorism” declared pointed Foreign Minister in 2004, this idea prevailed. Putin by the United States. It seemed that the counter-terrorist eagerly promoted the idea of “democratic multipolarity”. In strategy could hold out a good opportunity for expanding his speech at the Munich Security Conference of 2007 he general cooperation between Russia and the United States. accused the United States of seeking global domination and Indeed, Russia supported the NATO operation in Afghanistan lambasted the American concept of the unipolar world as and stepped up cooperation on disarmament. During the being premised upon “one single centre of power” and “one US-Russia Summit in May 2002 in Moscow, the presidents single master, one sovereign”, a situation that arguably “has of both countries, Vladimir Putin and George Bush, signed a nothing to do with democracy”. In the Kremlin worldview, Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, pledging to cut down multipolarity fits with the idea of democracy which, in this their nuclear arsenals by two-thirds, bringing the number of reading, is void of political meanings and is basically reduced warheads to about 2,000 each. However, less than a month to a mere multiplicity of sovereign states, regardless of the later the Bush administration withdrew from the 1972 Anti- nature of their political regimes. It is worth mentioning that Missile Treaty claiming that it was detrimental to US pro- Russia employs the concept of “democratic multipolarity” tection against possible terrorist or “rogue-state” ballistic mainly in communication with countries like China, , missile attacks. Russia saw this step as the intention of the Iran, Venezuela, India, Cuba and others, all of them lacking United States to build up military supremacy at the expense a convincing record of democratic rule. By the same token, of other states’ security, and retaliated by withdrawing from the multipolarity discourse does not seem to be employed in the nuclear arms reduction treaty START II. Russia’s communications with the EU. Instead Russia pre- When the United States’ intention to attack Iraq became fers to use the concepts of “common Euro-Atlantic space” clear, Putin faced a choice of either remaining neutral on and “larger Europe”. the issue, thus implicitly supporting the Americans, or sid- The Kremlin’s concept of multipolarity had been criticised ing with “old Europe” in their against the US-led Iraq by many Russian experts, who point out that it may foster

225 226 CIDOB International Yearbook 2010 Russian Federation, Country Profile redoubled its efforts to maintain a distance from Moscow.from distance a maintain has to efforts its government redoubled Georgian the then Since in republics. mission these Sochi the a of established result Agreement, a as Peace and, ceasefire the mediated sia hazian governments to appeal to Russia for protection. Rus Abk and Ossetian South the led which 1992, and 1991 in attacks armed on embarked government Georgian the this, prevent to order In . and its Ossetia South of republics, two of secession of prospect the face Georgia made tist tendencies which were accelerating in post-Soviet space Separa countries. independent became Georgia and Russia with Georgia arose Disputes in the beginning of hostility.the 1990s when both open into escalating were tensions the relations, Russian-Georgian for As complicated. somewhat the new Ukrainian government led by Viktor Yushchenko were of membershipinthealliance. prospect the and Georgia offer to decision NATO’s to negatively extremely reacted also Kremlin The rhetoric. lowed by a stepping up of Moscow’s defensive anti-American fol was candidates pro-Russian the of fiasco the elections, itself was using every available instrument to influence those Moscow’sof Russiathat fact the Despite interest. strategic sphere the in located allegedly countries the over influence its exert to attempt States’ United the and elections, dential presi Ukrainian and Georgian the in interference western US-led of result the be to power,Russia to in deemed were came Yushchenko Viktor candidate pro-Western the when 2004, late in Ukraine in ThisRevolution” event, “Orange the with along space. Soviet former the across influence its strengthening of policy Russia’s to blow significant first the tensify trade. in to and goods the of categories other on tariffs customs reduce to working also were sector.countries gas The and oil the in cooperation deepening Turkmenistansigned, were and Uzbekistan , Kazakhstan, with agreements inter-governmental of number A transportation. energy was neighbours eastern its and Russia between cooperation of sphere main The (CSTO). Organisation Treaty Collec Security tive the and institutions CIS existing of framework the within states CIS the with integration security and economic deeper for striving was Russia interest. special of sphere a space post-Soviet declared and region CIS the to tention Korea,andsoon. ment ofChinaandNorth the Middle East, the advance strengthening of Iran, the military in conflict the of escalation be may which of quences conse specific the society, further international to of lead destabilisation thus and poles competing among conflicts oiia coeain ih hs to eulc, n te ex the and republics, two these with cooperation political increasing its was Russia against accusation main Georgia’s ing corps from the territories of and Abkhazia. tensified its demands for a withdrawal of Russian peacekeep After Mikhail Saakashvili came to power in 2004, Georgia in Throughout Vladimir Putin’s second term the relations with was 2003 November in Georgia in Revolution” “Rose The at its presidency,Putin’sturned of Russia start the From power Russia asaregional ------ment insists that it will not renew the lease which expires in in expires which lease the renew not will it that insists ment govern Ukrainian The Ukraine. from Russia by leased rently cur is which , in base naval the over argument long-running a in engaged been have sides Both . of peninsula Ukrainian the in presence naval Russian the and Europe to transit gas Russian the been have Kyiv and cow its ambassadorfromMoscow. recalled Georgia rhetoric, bellicose ongoing the In republic. latter the in corps peacekeeping its of build-up a announced Russia Abkhazia, of Georgia by invasion military possible a of pretext the Under NATO. joining against Georgia warned tion of Georgian goods. A number of Russian officials publicly regime for Georgia and imposed an embargo on the importa visa a introduced Russia response, In Abkhazia. in keepers ber 2006 and imposed visa requirements on Russian peace Septem in charges spying on officers Russian five arrested Georgia gorge). Pankisi the (in territory Georgian in hiding were rebels Chechen that claimed Moscow flared. tensions ing breakaway tendencies in both territories. In 2005-2006 encourag thus them, giving was it support financial tensive this trend. breaking of challenge the faced Medvedev Dmitry Russian President next The politics. world from marginalisation tial consequen and isolation Russia’s of projections pessimistic ropean Union and the United States), which gave ground for Byelorussia and the Baltic States) and its strategic allies (Eu Ukraine, (Georgia, neighbours closest its both with lations Ukraine raisesthegastransitpriceby60%. but Ukraine, for prices gas market establishes Russia which to according agreement acceptable mutually a reached ties with his Ukrainian counterpart Yulia negotiations Timoshenko and in the par engaged Putin Minister Prime 2009 diplomacy. During energy politically-motivated of Russia accused Ukraine whereas logic, market on based rational, purely as motives its described Russia consumers. European to plies 2008 and 2009, each time resulting in the cutting-off of debt sup Ukrainian 2007, in recurred situations identical Almost the growing. kept but agreement, preliminary a reached Russia and Ukraine later, days Several additional discord. an of source became which Europe, to transported being gas Russian some withheld Ukraine response, In 2006. ary Janu in Ukraine to supplies gas off cut Russia result, a As purchases. gas its for to owed Ukraine that debt enormous an recover to trying was Russia addition, In iffs. tar preferential former the with continuing of instead price market international the at Ukraine to gas sell to going was it that announced Russia 2005, In conflict. this in hostages territory Ukrainian to the European through Union countries, which became passing the and Ukraine to sold gas natural of price the around revolved disputes The mid-2009. until a time-consumingandexpensivematter. is which base, naval its of relocation the for to preparing has start Russia extended, be to not is lease the If priority. strategic top of is base naval this Russia for whereas 2017, As for Ukraine, two main points of discord between Mos between discord of points main two Ukraine, for As y h ed f ui’ peiec Rsi hd tand re strained had Russia presidency Putin’s of end the By up flared periodically and 2005 in started conflicts Gas ------Russia as an energy superpower RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY DURING Extremely favourable oil and gas prices have had an effect THE PRESIDENCY OF not only on Russia’s economic development, but also on its (2008-2009) political self-identification. This is when the term “energy su- Russia’s foreign policy priorities under the presi- perpower” became current, mostly due to the fact that the dency of Dmitry Medvedev Russia government considered its energy supply as one of The gist of Dmitry Medvedev’s foreign policy is Russia’s its most important sources of international competitive ad- integration into the international community on an equal vantage. Nevertheless, it was precisely the period of Putin’s footing with the EU and NATO, but without shedding the presidency when Russia chose to switch its energy policy pragmatic approach to international politics based on the towards a more technocratic and pragmatic one. During his pursuit of Russia’s national interests. This is reflected in tenure Vladimir Putin presented Russia’s energy strategy as foreign policy documents issued by the Medvedev adminis- being based on “technical-economic thinking”, which gave rise tration: the new Russian Foreign Policy Concept, approved to numerous discussions about Russia’s implicit intentions in July 2008 and the Russian National Security Strategy with this transformation, including accusations of using en- until 2020, released in May 2009. Both documents re- ergy as a political instrument to influence both transit and place older versions adopted during Putin’s presidency. They consuming countries. mostly reproduce the same content stating that Moscow In order to understand properly the controversy raging is seeking to establish a world order based on collective around this issue, one should recall that Russia tradition- decision-making, security indivisibility, the primacy of inter- ally practised a politicised approach to energy supplies, offer- national law while, at the same time, Russia safeguards its ing exceptional conditions of gas and oil delivery to a limited sphere of “privileged interests”, preventing any unfriendly policyForeign the Russian Federation of number of countries considered to be its most loyal allies. interference therein. The difference between these docu- The pricing policy of Russia was never governed by the logic ments and their older versions is in Russia’s self-positioning of “market prices”. On the contrary, at the core of Russian as a fully-fledged, influential international actor. Along with energy diplomacy was a series of politically motivated excep- this idea both documents imply that Russia’s interests in tions extended to a number of “special partners”. In 2005, the international arena are not taken into proper considera- Gazprom with the support of the Putin administration an- tion. In other words, Russia’s international status does not nounced that it was unifying its pricing policy and setting match its real potential. On the practical level, this contro- same-level prices for all its consumers, including Ukraine versy is reflected in the main issue of Russia’s international and (later) Byelorussia. Considering Russia’s negative reac- policy for the year 2009 – the dispute over the American tion to the Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” of 2005, the new anti-missile system in Europe. On the one hand, Medvedev strategy was perceived as a “political move”. Russian officials does not want to confront the West and start a new arms kept insisting that this strategy could be explained by purely race but, on the other hand, Russia cannot tolerate NATO’s economic reasoning. Many analysts came to the conclusion attempts to bring its anti-missile defence system close to that this was indeed true: Russia’s self-positioning as the “en- its borders and thus increase its influence in the spheres of ergy superpower” was driven not “by the desire to restore Russia’s strategic interest. Russia’s proposal of new Euro- the empire […] but to boost profits earned by ‘Gazprom’, Atlantic security architecture has the purpose of preventing ‘’ and other major corporations close to the Kremlin this system from being deployed. […]. The logic of pragmatism and profit are indeed replacing as the major factor determining the development Medvedev’s proposal on the New European Security of Russia’s foreign policy” (Morozov, 2007). In this context, Architecture the Russian government’s determination to charge Russia’s Dmitry Medvedev often claims that “in international affairs neighbours for gas supplies at non-preferential market prices as well as in domestic affairs we will first and foremost insist could be regarded as a victory of “Gazprom” over the more on the supremacy of law” (Medvedev, 2008a). The proposal traditional Kremlin approaches, or, in other words, as a pre- of developing a new European Security Treaty follows from ponderance of business logic over the (geo)political one. Medvedev’s aspiration to form a broad legal basis for interna- Nevertheless, Russia’s transition from the rather tradi- tional cooperation in the sphere of security. The practical de- tionalist exception-based policy in the oil and gas sector at- mand for this treaty, as Medvedev states, comes, first, from tracted accusations that it was using energy as a manipula- Georgia’s arbitrary and irresponsible actions towards South tive tool. In the domestic sphere, the concept of the energy Ossetia in August 2008 and, second, from NATO’s plans of superpower is criticised because of the critical imbalance boosting its security at the expense of Russia’s security. To of Russian exports and its being heavily dependent on raw avoid similar clashes in the future, Medvedev suggests sign- materials, which became especially evident after the world ing a security treaty based on the primacy of the principles of financial and economic crisis erupted. At the end of 2008 ; a multi-polar world; a non-confrontational ap- the Minister for Economic Development of Russia, Elvira proach to international relations; peaceful conflict resolution; Nabiullina, admitted that the model of a Russian economy and avoidance of alliances and blocs in the sphere of security. based on oil and gas exports had been substantially faulty Soon after his inauguration, during his visit to Berlin in June (, 2008). 2008, Medvedev called on European countries to start work-

227 228 CIDOB International Yearbook 2010 Russian Federation, Country Profile (“Russia to promote…”, 2009). 2009). promote…”, to (“Russia community European the from response proper the ceived re not had it if even initiative Medvedev’s Dmitry promoting keep to going was Russia that said Lavrov Sergei 2009, in of internationallaw”(“TheForeignPolicy…”,2008). basis the on always but unilaterally, act to have will interests, national its to protect in order Russia, efforts, joint for pared alism is veiled by the wording, “Should our partners be unpre In Russia’s Foreign Policy concept, this inclination to unilater (Medvedev,2008c). there” over deployed be will bases tary we need there, where they will be based and what kind of mili would abide by any rules … It is up contingent to us to whatdefine troops this that envisages Sarkozy, President with plan our joint including document, not a to that tion the fact single South Ossetia) is concerned, I should like to draw your atten (in contingent military our as far “As decision-making: lateral uni of favour in discourse multipolarity drops also easily rather he multipolarity, of concept the develop to continues Medvedev proposal his in although Thus, rhetoric. pure are appeals his of many that and inconsistent rather is strategy consideration Russia’s interestsandsecurityconcerns. into take must Europe that is concept security Medvedev’s the of demand implicit the European because relations, in international authority more gain to attempting is Moscow treaty this of means by that say also critics The countries. and USA missile defence negotiations with Eastern European enlargement NATO potential further to response in created reactive, purely be to said is treaty proposed This Charter. his of UN the and Act principles Final Helsinki the in chief fixed already are the project since substance, of lack its for treaty.the mainlyMedvedev’s criticised was proposal Dmitry December 2009. in council ministerial OSCE the during Athens in presented Lavrov Sergei Minister Foreign Russian the that (2009) rity Secu European on Treaty Draft the of form the taken had suggestions these 2009, November of end the By space. necessity of a new security treaty for the entire Euro-Atlantic expense of other is parties” to be allowed. He the insisted on the at alliances military of expansion and development “no where security” comprehensive of system solid and grated inte an “building suggesting by security of indivisibility the of importance the emphasised Medvedev (Medvedev,2008b). actions” unilateral of “series its by relations” international in where he lines the blamed dividing for States United “creating 2008, 8, October on Evian in Conference Policy World the at architecture security European new the of vision his on the expanded He within (Medvedev,2008a). community” relations Euro-Atlantic in factor power the of role the clarify ing out a new all-European security treaty “which would finally bilateral relations with individual European countries instead countries European individual with relations bilateral was priority Russia’s EU and NATO. Putin’s presidency During the with partnership institutional an establish to ever than determined more is Russia – issue this of aspect one least h sgiiac o Mdee’ pooa i eiet n at in evident is proposal Medvedev’s of significance The interviews his of one in policy foreign Russia’s Summarising Medvedev’s that is initiative Russia’s of critique Another about enthusiastic very not were leaders European The ------signed to assist Russia in remedying the fact of its lagging lagging its of fact the remedying in Russia assist to de signed Modernisation”, for “Partnership programme a bilateral launch to agreed have Medvedev Dmitry President sian Rus the and Reinfeldt, Minister,Fredrik Prime Swedish the Barroso, Manuel Jose President, Commission European the Moreover,year). every extended automatically is and 2007 December in expired (which Cooperation and Partnership on on is which the to New Agreement Agreement replace Basic work the accelerate to and EU the and Russia between ion agreed to start negotiations on abolishing the visa regime successful to be held in the past few years. most The the European Un as acknowledged was It 2009. November in holm Stock in held summit EU-Russia the by substantiated was partner.and trustworthy security treaty, shifted Euro-Atlantic towards recognition of the EU as a a fully-fledged suggesting by Medvedev, . and view,Germany, of point Moscow’s from were, decision-makers, who actual with relations establish to sought and Union European the of subjectivity political the doubted of cooperation with the EU institutions. Putin’s administration oenet o tee onre, u ipyn ta i would it that implying but countries, these of governments NATO into the threatening going not was Russia cases from both In Georgia. with refrain to right the have they ship, member NATO support Ossetia South nor Abkhazia neither well – made since Georgia: was to regard with - war 2008 August the before argument same The alliance. it if the borders joined current its maintain to able be that would unlikely Ukraine was it that said NATO, to representative sia’s Rus Rogozin, Dmitri tone. aggressive an to resorted ficials of some heated, especially were tensions When member. NATO a as unwelcome be therefore should and democracy Westernmeet not does Georgia that ofstandards asserting by dimension democratic the pushes Russia unquestioned, NATOis for support popular where case, Georgia’s In ance. alli the in membership against NATO are join Ukrainians not most since should Ukraine that argues It security. and NATO, Russia is wielding normative links between democracy for non-territorialthreats. remedies right the not are expansion territorial accordingly, territories. For both Putin and Medvedev, “bloc thinking” and, specific to bound not are challenges security which in ment environ international altered completely today’s in security providing of War,incapable Cold the of relic a be to said is it hand, other the On interests. Russian threatens that bloc military unfriendly and omnipotent) (even strong dangerously a be NATOto hand, said one is the On arguments. exclusive mutually two on premised NATObeen to has opposition sian Rus off. War shake Cold to the difficult of most acy the was ganisation (EuropeanParliament,2009). or this in membership Russia’s of importance the stressed Barroso Manuel Jose discussed. duly was WTO the joining Russia’s of issue the Again, matters. technological in behind The improvement of EU-Russia relations throughout 2009 throughout relations EU-Russia of improvement The To discredit the idea of Ukraine’s and Georgia’s joining joining Georgia’s and Ukraine’s of idea the discredit To leg the Russia where one is Russia-NATOrelations of of sphere The rival external primary a as NATO ------support breakaway tendencies when it came to the issue of ence of Kosovo” (O pozitsii Rossii … 2009). It claims that the joining NATO. With this belligerent rhetoric Russia was trying secession of Kosovo is a dangerous international precedent. to force Kyiv and Tbilisi to make a choice between territorial Besides, the independence of this territory “did not contrib- integrity and NATO membership, which is certainly a rather ute in any way to addressing the key problems of Kosovo”. controversial strategy in the light of Russia’s continued op- Despite the evident inconsistency of Russia’s argument, it position to Kosovo’s independence. kept insisting on a new peacekeeping mandate, which would In many contexts of Russia’s foreign policy discourse NATO be void of any assertion of Georgia’s territorial integrity. Due is mentioned as an unfriendly actor undermining Russia’s to Russia’s veto the mission was not extended and the UN security and provoking distrust and irritation. Nevertheless, peacemakers withdrew from Georgia. NATO can hardly be considered to be a real enemy to Russia. September 2009 saw the publication of a report prepared Rogozin says that nobody in the Russian political establish- by the EU commission chaired by the Swiss diplomat Heidi ment believes in the possibility of armed conflict with NATO: Tagliavini. It gave an account of the causes of the Russian- “Both NATO and Moscow understand that real threat can Georgian war in August 2008, accused Georgia of starting emerge only in the South” (Zygar’, 2009). the hostilities and Russia of overreacting and breaking the territorial integrity of Georgia, thus violating international War in Georgia and its impact on Russia’s relations law. with Euro-Atlantic community The armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August “Reset” in Russia’s relations with the United States 2008, when Moscow intervened in the territory of Georgia The Obama Administration changed its policy towards Rus- to protect South Ossetia after an armed attack was launched sia in favour of improving bilateral relations with Moscow. policyForeign the Russian Federation of against it, became the most important issue of Russia’s de- In March 2009 the Secretary of the State fence discussions with the EU, the United States and NATO. visited Moscow and offered to “reset” relations between the On 26 August, Russia officially recognised the breakaway two countries. The offer was willingly accepted by her coun- regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, terpart Sergei Lavrov. The most significant decision in the which thenceforth constituted a thorny issue for Russia’s re- framework of “resetting” the relations concerned anti-missile lations with Europe. The resolution of the conflict in these systems in Eastern Europe. Since 2006 the United States’ republics had been achieved with the active participation of plans on deployment of ballistic missile defence in Poland the French President acting on behalf of the and the Czech Republic have been a source of irritation for . Medvedev and Sarkozy charted a plan for Moscow. The turning point of this issue came in 2009. In overcoming the Caucasus crisis, which was later signed by September that year the Obama Administration announced the Abkhazian and South Ossetian presidents and amended the cancellation of plans to deploy the missile defence sys- and signed by the Georgian president. The plan included such tem in these two countries. The United States explained the terms as non-renewal of the use of force, free access to hu- decision by referring to a change of strategic priorities but manitarian assistance, international monitoring procedures was apparently expecting Russia to reciprocate this step backed by observers from the OSCE and the EU, withdrawal by supporting more rigid sanctions against Iran and discon- of Russian forces to a line that precedes the zone of military tinuing sales of S-300 air-defence missiles to Teheran. Nev- conflict, and the beginning of international discussions on the ertheless, neither the Russian President nor the Russian future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Foreign Ministry made any move in this direction. In his in- The latter issue provided the basis for numerous rounds terview with CNN on 20 September 2009 Dmitry Medvedev of Geneva talks throughout the end of 2008-2009. During mentioned that Russia did not feel obliged to make recipro- these negotiations Georgia gained international support in cal concessions and stated that selling arms to Iran did not demanding that South Ossetia and Abkhazia must be rec- contravene international law. These events gave grounds ognised as an integral part of Georgia, whereas Moscow for questioning the success of the much-vaunted “reset” as had consistently insisted on the signing of legally-binding non- neither with the case of Iran nor with that of Georgia was aggression treaty between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Os- there any alleviation of tensions. In addition, by the end of setia, arguing that both republics must be made secure from 2009, the two sides still had to overcome a lot of disagree- Georgia’s attempts to preserve its territorial integrity by the ments over the terms of the treaty on reduction of strategic use of military force. nuclear arsenals. In June 2009, Russia vetoed a plan to extend the UN peacekeeping mission in Georgia, because the UN resolu- An overview of basic foreign policy documents of the tion on extending this mission was based on the premise of Medvedev Administration Georgia’s territorial integrity. Russia labelled the argument Under the presidency of Medvedev, the conceptual frame- of its opponents on the inviolability of frontiers as “politicised work for foreign policy has been renewed. A number of basic and ideologised formulas”. This position was perceived as strategic documents, such as Foreign Policy Concept, Mili- somewhat debatable because, in the case of Kosovo, Russia tary Doctrine and The Russian National Security Strategy, refers precisely to the principle of territorial integrity when have been revised and updated. Most of them were worked condemning the “illegal unilateral declaration of independ- out in the Security Council of Russia.

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Rus Germany,with relationships bilateral advantageous mutually The Concept also stresses the importance of developing developing of importance the stresses also Concept The The priority strand in Russia’s foreign policy remains coopera globali the to related directly are Russia of interests The based is policy foreign Russian Concept, the to According Federation The Russian Foreign Policy Concept was issued on the 12 in July 2008. of Concept Policy Foreign ------http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/11/223072. Federation Russian the of President 2009-0134+0+DOC+WORD+V0//E sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+MOTION+B7- website, ficial 2009”, November 18 on model Ru, 2008, ischerpannoi”, Rossii el’ April, p.12. WorldPolitics and Relations International of veke”, nastupivshem english.ruvr.ru/2009/12/28/3308904.htm curity”, russia/new/MainRootrus/docs/interview/pos64.ht website, Nations United The pp. 6-7. 3March, - February 28 Il, Chicago, Conference, Annual ISA ing Europe, Constructing Each Other appears/2008/11/209126.shtm Federation newspaper” 82912type82914_207457.shtm eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type Federation Russian the of President the France”, Evian, 2008 8, October ference 82914type84779_202153.shtm text/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type Federation Russian the 2008”, Ber June, Leaders, 5 Civic lin, and Parliamentary Political, German Language=e e=IP/09/1724&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?referenc official websiteoftheEuropeanUnion shtm Erpa Scrt Tet Draft”, Treaty Security “European in Summit EU-Russia the on Resolution “European “El’vira Nabiullina sochla tekuschuyu ekonomicheskuyu mod v poriadok “Mezhdunarodniy 2003, Alexei, BOGATUROV, Bibliographical references “Russia to Promote Medvedev’s Proposals on European Se “O pozitsii Rossii na 64-i sessii General’noi Assamblei OON”, MOROZOV,Viacheslav, West:the and “Russia 2007, Divid 2008c, Dmitry, MEDVEDEV, MEDVEDEV,2008b, Dmitry, 2008a, Dmitry, MEDVEDEV, Stockholm”, in November 18 on Summit “EU-Russia 9 November, 19 l /

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