INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Issue 5 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Spring 1995 COLD WAR CCRISESRISES , 1956 POLAND, 1980-81 Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the “” Policy During the Polish Crisis

by L.W. Gluchowski by Mark Kramer

Eastern was central to Soviet foreign and defence policy The prolonged crisis in Poland in 1980-81 was one of the most throughout the Cold War. After World War II, and especially from intriguing episodes of the Cold War, but until very recently almost 1947 onward, the Soviet military and security forces, together with no primary sources relating to the crisis were available. That local communist elites, constructed the most integrated alliance problem has greatly diminished over the past few years. This article system of the Cold War period. Soviet state institutions of control will draw on new archival materials and memoirs from , also helped to reconstruct the mili- Poland, , and Czechoslova- tary and security forces of states dev- AND POLAND, 1956 kia to provide a reassessment of the astated by World War II. Their aim Khrushchev’s CPSU CC Presidium Meeting ’s role in the Polish cri- was to secure communist regimes in on East European Crises, 24 sis. The article will begin with a brief postwar dedicated to review of some of the most important defend the Soviet Union’s western Introduction, Translation, and Annotation new sources, and will then analyze the frontier. To ensure loyalty, unifor- by Mark Kramer decision-making calculus in mity, and quality, Soviet military in 1980-81. The third part will take up and security officers were recruited The document below has been translated from a 19- the controversial question of whether, to staff or to advise the East Euro- page Czech manuscript entitled “Zprava o jednani na UV and under what circumstances, the pean military and security forces.1 KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad’arsku” Soviet Union and its Pact This pattern applied in particular to (“Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, 24 October allies might have invaded Poland in continued on page 38 1956, on the Situation in Poland and Hungary”). The December 1981. manuscript, which is stored in Fond 07/16, Svazek 3, at The discussion here is based in part on a longer chapter about the SUDOPLATOV RESPONDS: the Central State Archive in (Statni ustredni archiv, or SUA), is one of many items in the Czech Polish crisis in my forthcoming book The Authors of Special Tasks on Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, Reply to Critics— see page 155 archives that shed valuable new light on the Soviet Union’s response to the crises in Poland and Hungary in 1945-1991. Further coverage of the continued on page 50 continued on page 116

KOREA, 1949-50 , 1962 To Attack, or Not to Attack? The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Stalin, Kim Il Sung, IN THIS ISSUE: ’s Secret 1968 Speech and the Prelude to War 1953 GDR Uprising 10 1956 Hungarian Crisis 22 by Philip Brenner and James G. Blight by Kathryn Weathersby The Yeltsin Dossier 22 Reassessed 23 On 25 and 26 January 1968, Cuban leader The historical record of the has 1962 58 Fidel Castro gave an extraordinary 12-hour recently been greatly enriched by Russian Presi- KGB Documents 58 speech before the Central Committee of the dent ’s presentation to President Diplomatic Cables 58 Cuban on the history of Cuba’s Kim Young-Sam of , during the Soviet-Cuban Talks 59 relationship with the Soviet Union. It is well “Lessons” 59 latter’s visit to Moscow in June 1994, of 216 1980-81 Polish Crisis 116 known that the relationship in the six years after previously classified high level Soviet docu- Soviet Documents 116 the Cuban Missile Crisis was turbulent. But the ments on the war from Russian archives. The Honecker’s Appeal 124 disclosure of this speech, kept secret at the time, collection totals 548 pages and includes docu- Carter-Brezhnev helps clarify how important the Missile Crisis ments from the period 1949-1953. Most of the Correspondence 140 was in setting the stage for the turbulence. documents are ciphered telegrams between Response 155 The Cuban government recently declassified

continued on page 2 continued on page 81 2 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

KOREAN WAR Document #1, the minutes of a conver- questions of military formation and supply. continued from page 1 sation between Stalin and Kim Il Sung in From Kim’s statement in Document #6 pre- Moscow and Pyongyang, and between Moscow on 5 , sets the stage, sented below, recording a conversation in Moscow and Beijing. The collection also revealing in a most intimate way the nature Pyongyang nine months later, it appears that includes notes of conversations among key of the relationship between Kim’s newly during another conversation between Stalin figures in , the USSR, and ; created state, the Democratic People’s Re- and Kim in March 1949, which may have letters from Kim Il Sung to Stalin; and public of Korea (DPRK), and its Soviet pa- occurred during a dinner or reception, Kim resolutions of the Soviet and Coun- tron. The conversation recorded in this re- asked Stalin about the possibility of attack- cil of Ministers. All of the documents are port was the first and only formal discussion ing South Korea and was rebuffed. Accord- from either the Presidential Archive or the between Stalin and the official North Korean ing to Kim’s account in , Stalin Foreign Ministry archives and, with a few delegation that travelled to Moscow in March had said that it was “not necessary” to attack exceptions,1 were unavailable to scholars 1949 to conclude the DPRK’s initial agree- the South, that North Korean forces could prior to their presentation to South Korea. ments with the USSR.4 This rare and intrigu- cross the 38th parallel only as a counterat- In July 1994, the Ministry of Foreign Af- ing glimpse of Stalin handling a petitioning tack to an assault by South Korean forces. In fairs of the Republic of Korea released Ko- vassal shows, above all, the importance to March 1949, American troops were still in rean translations of these documents and in both leaders of matters of economic develop- South Korea and the was November 1994 the Archive of the Foreign ment and material supply. As is shown in still not resolved, which led Stalin to reject Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF) exhaustive detail in the thousands of pages of for the time being any military adventure on began granting permission to scholars to documents on post-war Korea in the Russian the Korean peninsula. read photocopies of the collection.2 Foreign Ministry archive, in the years prior Document #3 (a ciphered telegram from Unfortunately, these records represent to and during the Korean War, North Korea then-Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei only a portion of the top level documents on was utterly dependent economically on the Gromyko to the Soviet embassy in the war in Soviet archives, several of which Soviet Union. As a result of the collapse of Pyongyang on 11 ) indi- (such as the KGB and Defense Ministry the Japanese empire, Soviet occupation cates that on 12 August 1949, Kim Il Sung archives) remain largely inaccessible to policy, and the civil war in China, North again raised the question of a military cam- scholars. The narrative of events we can Korea was cut off from its former economic paign against South Korea, this time in con- construct from these materials still has sig- ties with southern Korea, and Man- versation with a Soviet official in Pyongyang, nificant gaps, especially for the several churia. Except for very limited trade with most likely Ambassador Shtykov. Docu- months immediately preceding the North Hong Kong and two Manchurian ports, in the ment #2 (a ciphered telegram of 3 September Korean attack on 25 June 1950. Nonethe- period prior to and during the Korean War 1949 from the Soviet ambassador to North less, these new sources reveal a great deal the Soviet Union was the only source of Korea to Soviet Foreign Minister A. more than has previously been known about supply and the only market for North Korean Vyshinsky) reveals that on September 3 the relationship between the Soviet Union goods. Kim again requested permission to attack, and North Korea, the decision-making sur- Furthermore, to an unusual degree, North this time claiming that South Korea was rounding the attack on South Korea, the role Korea was dependent on the Soviet Union preparing to attack DPRK territory. He of in all stages of the war, the for technical expertise.5 Japanese colonial requested permission to make a roughly formulation of the communist positions at policy had permitted only a small number of equivalent counterattack and then added that the armistice negotiations, and the role of Koreans to gain higher education or manage- “if the international situation permits,” which Stalin’s death in bringing the war to an end. ment experience, and the politics of the occu- was no doubt a reference to possible Ameri- These documents, when examined to- pation from 1945-48 prompted most can reactions, they could easily seize control gether with the larger body of records de- northerners who possessed such skills to flee of the remainder of the peninsula. classified in recent years by Russian ar- to the South. With regard to questions of the It is interesting that the Soviet ambassa- chives, thus shed light on several questions origin of the Korean War, these economic dor confirms the interception of South Ko- central to the history of the Cold War (e.g., and demographic circumstances meant that, rean attack orders but notes that no attack the efficacy of American threats to use for the most basic and profound reasons, in occurred. Other documents in this collec- nuclear weapons in Korea) and a full analy- the years prior to and during the 1950-53 tion show that through June 1950, North sis of them requires a full-length study. This war, North Korea was simply unable to take Korean leaders repeatedly claimed to have essay will offer a small sample of these new any significant action without Soviet ap- intercepted offensive orders from the South, sources, presenting translations of and brief proval, regardless of the nationalist inclina- even though the attacks did not materialize. commentaries on seven documents from tions of the DPRK leadership.6 Some of these interceptions could well have 1949 and 1950 that illuminate with signifi- Document #1 also reveals that in March been genuine, since South Korean leaders in cantly greater specificity than the 1966 So- 1949 Stalin had a strong interest in the bal- the months before the war often expressed viet Foreign Ministry background report ance of military forces between North and their desire and intention to reunify the coun- presented in an earlier Bulletin3 the question South Korea, but was far from approving a try through military means. However, if of when, how, and by whom the decision military campaign against the South. The Stalin had made an attack from the South a was made to launch a military assault on North Korean military was still quite unde- necessary precondition for a North Korean South Korea. veloped; the discussion was instead on basic military action, the steady stream of such COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 3 reports is more easily understood. should devote their efforts to strengthening pendence by stating that he hopes “Kim Il Document #3 also suggests that by 11 the movement in the South in order Sung will not refuse us in this.” Stalin’s September 1949, following the withdrawal to prepare to unify the country through an crude calculation of material advantage to of U.S. forces from South Korea in June, armed uprising in South Korea. Had this the Soviet Union was characteristic of his Stalin had warmed to the idea of a military strategy been followed skillfully, given the dealings with the Chinese communists as campaign in Korea, at least on a limited extreme unpopularity of the well and it produced bitter resentment among scale. The Soviet leadership was now ready regime, it may well have succeeded.7 both Korean and Chinese communist lead- to entertain Kim’s request and asked him for On 4 October 1949, Shtykov reported to ers, just as it had earlier helped provoke the specific military and political information Stalin that he had fulfilled the Politburo split with . with which to make a decision. Document directive of September 24 and that Kim and The approval Stalin communicated on #4 (a ciphered telegram to Moscow from the Pak Hon-yong had received his report “in a January 30 paved the way for Kim Il Sung Soviet charge d’affaires in Pyongyang dated reserved manner.” Kim was clearly disap- and Pak Hon-yong to go to Moscow in April 14 September 1949) reports Kim Il Sung’s pointed, responding only “very well,” but 1950 to make specific preparations for the rather unconvincing response to the Pak was more expressive, stating that the attack on South Korea, and to argue their Kremlin’s questions. It also conveys the decision was correct, that they must develop case to Stalin in person. Following those opinion of the USSR embassy in Pyongyang the partisan movement more widely. Shtykov deliberations in Moscow, a new of that the limited offensive operation outlined added that Kim and Pak had subsequently Soviet military advisors was sent to by Kim was inadvisable at that time. Since reported to him that they had sent around Pyongyang to plan the campaign and huge the DPRK army was not sufficiently strong, 800 persons to the South to lead the partisans shipments of weapons and supplies were such an operation would probably turn into and the movement was growing.8 sent to North Korea. Stalin insisted that Kim a prolonged civil war, which would be dis- The Politburo decision of September 24 secure the approval of Mao Zedong before advantageous both militarily and politically. ended the discussion of a military campaign the final preparations could be made. Kim Moreover, as the embassy quite correctly in Korea for the remainder of 1949, but as accordingly travelled to Beijing in mid-May forecast, a “drawn out civil war” initiated by Document #6 (a ciphered telegram from the and obtained Mao’s consent.9 an attack from the North would give the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang dated 19 To conclude this brief discussion, the an opportunity to intervene January 1950) vividly records, on 17 Janu- documents presented to South Korea flesh effectively, “more decisively than they did ary 1950, Kim again raised the issue, this out and substantiate the account given in the in China,” and in general to agitate against time with increased urgency. The commu- 1966 report published earlier in the CWIHP the Soviet Union. Under existing condi- nist victory in the Chinese civil war had Bulletin. They show that the initiative for tions, the embassy concluded, an attack on made it intolerable to Kim that Korean com- the North Korean attack on South Korea on the South would be “correct” only if the munists were not allowed similarly to liber- 25 June 1950 was clearly Kim Il Sung’s. North Koreans could be certain that the war ate the rest of their country. Referring to Kim requested Stalin’s approval several would end quickly. Mao’s promise of to help in 1949 before the Soviet leader fi- Although the record of deliberations in Koreans once the fighting in China ended, nally agreed in early 1950 to support a North April, May, and June 1950 is still quite Kim fervently entreated Shtykov to allow Korean offensive. These documents vividly fragmentary, it appears that the idea that the him to go to Moscow to discuss with Stalin reveal Kim Il Sung’s dependence on the war must be won quickly became the basis the possibility of launching an attack on Soviet Union and at the same time his ability for planning the eventual attack of June 25. South Korea. This account of Kim’s con- to propose actions that he desired. They It is tragically ironic that Soviet insistence versation with Soviet and Chinese represen- raise questions about the idea some have on a quick victory led them to devise a tatives in Pyongyang makes it perfectly clear advanced that Soviet officials formulated all strategy which, by giving the appearance of that Kim Il Sung considered himself unable of Kim’s statements, saying through him the kind of massive tank-led assault the to take such action without Stalin’s approval. whatever they thought Stalin wanted to Western allies so feared would happen in The final document presented below is hear.10 Instead, it appears that despite the Europe, prompted the United States to re- Stalin’s telegram to Shtykov on 30 January significant restrictions on his ability to act, spond with precisely the intervention in 1950, giving his reply to Kim Il Sung’s latest and the considerable doubts that were some- Korea that Moscow wanted above all to entreaties. This is one of the most interesting times expressed by Soviet officials regard- avoid. documents of the entire collection because it ing his proposals, Kim was nonetheless an Document #5, the Politburo decision of reveals so bluntly Stalin’s strategic thinking important, if not entirely independent, his- 24 September 1949, confirmed the response and his mode of operation with subordinate torical actor in his own right. Shtykov was ordered to make to Kim Il rulers. Stalin cautiously stated that he was Of course, Stalin did not approve Kim’s Sung’s reply for an offensive military ac- “ready to help” Kim but that the matter plan in 1950 simply because Kim was per- tion. One should note that the Soviet leader- “needs large preparation” and “must be or- sistent and fervent in his appeals. Stalin ship did not question the goal of bringing the ganized so that there would not be too great based his decision on his own calculations of rest of Korea under DPRK control; the issue a risk.” He then, in perfect mafioso style, relative cost and benefit to the Soviet Union, was only whether the attempt to do so would “requested” that Kim provide the Soviet as he did in 1949 when he rejected Kim’s bring disadvantageous results. They con- Union with at least 25,000 tons of lead per appeals. The question that then remains is cluded that at present the North Koreans year, maintaining the fiction of Kim’s inde- what made Stalin change his mind in Janu- 4 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN ary 1950 about the advisability of a military so badly needed. In terms of the Cold War, drafting plans for the construction of new objects offensive on the Korean peninsula. Unfor- Stalin’s reasoning in approving the attack is (factories and plants), conducting geological ex- tunately, the documentary record available the most intriguing question about the out- ploratory work. thus far does not answer that question clearly; break of the Korean War. To answer this Stalin asks what kind of objects? Kim answers, e.g., irrigation structures [at] it reveals only that Stalin considered it pos- question definitively, however, we must wait Anju, the construction of which they have now sible in early 1950 to support Kim’s plan for the release of the remainder of the top moved toward, but they do not have enough because of the “changed international situ- level Soviet documents from 1950. specialists, and also the restoration and comple- ation.”11 tion of the Seisin metallurgical plant, repair of the We have then to deduce from the mass Document I: Sufun hydroelectric plant and others. of evidence what Stalin meant by “changed Stalin’s Meeting with Kim Il Sung, Stalin asks if there is iron ore in Korea. international situation.” We can note first of Moscow, 5 March 1949 Kim answers that there is very much iron ore all from the documents presented here that in Korea. 5 March 1949. Notes of the conversation between calculations of the likelihood of U.S. inter- Stalin says that it is possible to render this Stalin and a governmental delegation from the assistance, and it is also possible to provide vention were at every point a key factor in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea headed specialists. Soviet deliberations about whether to ap- by Kim Il Sung. The meeting began at 8:00 p.m. Kim indicates that until now trade between prove a military campaign against South Present were A.Ia. Vyshinsky,15 T.F. Shtykov,16 the two countries has been conducted success- Korea. The timing of Stalin’s approval— Kim I.M. (Translator). On the Korean side: Pak fully, but in the future, for the fulfillment of the late January 1950—must therefore have been Hon-yong,17 Hong Myong-hui,18 Chong Chun- two year plan, they need to import from the Soviet at least in part a response to the new defense taek,19 Chang Shi-u,20 Paek Nam Un,21 Kim Union equipment, steam engines, electric loco- policy announced by Secretary of State Dean Chong-ju,22 the Korean ambassador to the USSR motives, spare parts and equipment for the textile Acheson on January 12, that placed South Chu Yong-ha, Mun Il (Translator). industry. But exports from Korea will not cover Korea outside the American defense perim- the imports, therefore they need credit from the Stalin asks the members of the delegation Soviet government. eter in the Pacific. The documents pre- how their trip was, was it difficult on the journey? Stalin says “Fine” and asks in what amount sented below, when combined with the Kim Il Sung thanks the Soviet Government they need credit. 12 record of Stalin’s actions in June 1950, for its attention to them and says that they arrived Kim answers from 40 to 50 million Ameri- suggest the conclusion that if the United safely. can dollars. States had made it clear that it would defend Stalin asks how they travelled—by railroad Stalin—fine, what else? South Korea, Stalin would never have ap- or by air. Kim Il Sung answers that for convenient proved the North Korean attack. Kim Il Sung answers that they came by transport and for strengthening the economic ties The second most salient component of railroad. between our countries it is necessary to build a Stalin asks whether they became ill on the the “changed international situation” in Janu- railroad from Aoji to Kraskino. way. Stalin asks where this is and how many ary 1950 was the formation, then underway Kim Il Sung answers that they were healthy. kilometers is the distance of this railroad. in Moscow, of an alliance between the So- Stalin suggests that they proceed to business Shtykov reports that this railroad should be viet Union and the newly established and asks what will be the questions. built from the station at Kraskino (Soviet terri- People’s Republic of China. As Goncharov, Kim Il Sung says that after the of tory) to the station at Aoji (Korean territory) for Lewis, and Xue Litai have shown so con- Korea by Soviet troops, the Soviet Government a total distance of 58 km, of which 10 km is on the vincingly,13 Stalin’s relations with Mao and the rendered aid to Korea in the territory of Korea and 48 km is on the territory of Zedong were extremely delicate and fraught matter of economic development, in the matter of the USSR. with potential disasters for the Soviet leader. the development of Korea along the democratic Stalin says that we will think about it and path, and that the Korean government under- Given the close ties between North Korea asks if there are some more questions. stands that without further economic and cultural Kim Il Sung indicates the necessity of estab- and China, Stalin’s concerns about the new aid from the Soviet Union it will be difficult for lishing air communications between Korea and communist regime in Beijing must have the DPRK to restore and develop its national USSR and says that they do not yet have their own figured prominently in his decision to ap- economy and culture. The assistance of the Soviet transport planes and no pilots, but an air link is prove a military campaign against South Union is required for the further development of needed. Korea. We see from the documents released the Korean economy and culture. Stalin asks aren’t there Russian planes in thus far that Stalin was careful to draw Mao Stalin asks what kind of aid. Korea. into the final decision-making on the Ko- Kim Il Sung answers—economic and cul- Kim answers that after the withdrawal of rean venture. New Chinese sources also tural. Soviet troops Soviet aviation units and planes Stalin asks what precisely is needed. indicate that Stalin and Mao discussed the were not left in Korea. He indicates that they now Kim Il Sung says that they have confirmed a have begun the preparation of their own pilots. proposed Korean campaign while Mao was two year plan for the restoration and development Stalin asks if they have their own planes. 14 in Moscow. It may well be that Stalin of the national economy. They need economic Shtykov reports that they have their own calculated that a war in Korea would be assistance to fulfill this plan and to strengthen the training aviation regiment and they have training beneficial to the Soviet Union because it foundation of the economy. They need machines, and military planes, but they do not have trans- would tie the PRC more firmly to Moscow equipment and spare parts for industry, communi- port planes. by making it less likely that the Chinese cations, transport and also for other branches of Stalin asks how many planes they have. communists would be able to turn to the the national economy. They also need technical Shtykov answers that they have 48 military United States for the economic support they assistance: sending Soviet specialists to Korea, and 19 training planes. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 5

Stalin indicates that we now have fewer Stalin indicates that we cannot do this. You Stalin asks how many American troops are planes in a regiment, that we have lowered the need machines, but machines must be ordered in South Korea. number of planes in a regiment and asks what and manufactured. This requires time. Kim answers that there are up to 20,000 other questions they have. Kim indicates that they need automobiles, men. Kim Il Sung indicates the necessity of cul- steam engines, equipment for the textile industry, Shtykov—approximately 15-20 thousand tural ties with the USSR. It is hoped, for example, and oil, and that it is hoped that they would men. that Soviet teachers could be sent to Korea for receive this during this year. Stalin asks if there is a national Korean army work in Korean institutions of higher education, Stalin answers that in one year it is not in the south. that Korean students could be sent to the Soviet possible to do this and asks in what currency they Kim answers that there is, the number is Union for study, that Korean specialists could be wish to receive credit. around 60,000 men. sent to the USSR for practical work in production Kim answers in American dollars. Stalin asks if this number includes only technology, that teaching programs and literature Stalin answers that we do not now calculate regular army or also police. for institutions of higher education and technical in dollars but we calculate in rubles and indicated Kim answers that it includes only regular schools could be sent to Korea and that there be that soon one dollar will equal 5 rubles. Stalin army. exchanges of cultural and artistic figures. proposed to present equipment and machines in Stalin (joking) asks, and you are afraid of Stalin asks if there is an agreement with the credit in the course of three years in equal por- them? Soviet Union on these questions. tions and indicated that during these three years Kim—No, we are not afraid, but we would Kim indicates that earlier there was such an they will not pay credit, but in the course of the like to have naval units. agreement. Now, after the formation of the following three years they must produce pay- Stalin asks which army is stronger—north government, there is no such agreement. ment, also in equal portions. For example: credit or south. Stalin indicates that it is possible to do this, is given in 1949, 1950, 1951, and perhaps 1952, Pak Hon-yong answers that the northern but [sending] specialists and students will be and payment of credit will begin from the fourth army is stronger. difficult, since they do not know the . year in equal portions. In such a way, credit will Stalin asks if there are dry docks in Korea Kim Il Sung says that instruction in Russian be given out over 6 years. We render assistance left by the Japanese, for example, in Seisin or in language has been organized in all schools and to the countries of the peoples’ ac- other places of Korea. institutions of higher education in Korea. It is cording to these principles. We take the follow- Kim answers that there are none. necessary to send teachers to Korea from the ing percentages for the credit received: 2% yearly, Shtykov reports that there are dry docks, but Soviet Union. if the state has recovered [from the war], and 1% only small ones. Stalin says that it will be difficult for them if the state has still not recovered. Moreover, Stalin says that it is possible to render assis- because of not knowing the . close trade in goods between the countries will be tance in this, and that Korea needs to have mili- Kim Il Sung indicates that there is not a continued without credit. This order will be tary planes. sufficient number of qualified teachers in Korea, established by agreement. Stalin asked if they Stalin asks are they penetrating into the that Soviet teachers are already working in Korea have any people who can begin work on drafting South Korean army, do they have their own and that they have translators, through whom it is these agreements. people there? possible to conduct pedagogical work. Kim answers that they have such people. Pak Hon-yong answers that they are pen- Stalin answers that it is possible to send Stalin indicates that we can give credit in the etrating, but so far they are not revealing them- teachers. sum of 200 million rubles, i.e. 40 million dollars. selves there. Kim says that it is necessary to conclude an We would give more, but now we are not able. Stalin says that this is correct, that it is not agreement on all the above-indicated questions, Kim says that they agree. necessary to reveal themselves now and indicates specifically about economic cooperation and the Stalin asks if they have any automobiles. that the southerners also, apparently, are sending broadening of trade, a trade agreement, an agree- Kim answers that they do not have their own their people into the army of the north and that ment about technical assitance from the Soviet cars, they would like to acquire them in the Soviet they need [to exercise] caution. Union and about cultural ties. Union. Stalin asks what has happened along the Stalin asks if Kim has thought about credit Stalin says that it is possible to provide cars. 38th parallel. Is it true that several points have or a loan. It is possible also to provide planes. fallen to the southerners and have been seized, Kim answers that he has thought about it and Shtykov says that the Korean Government and then these points were taken back? that they want to receive credit. wants to receive not only planes, but also to have Kim answers that they are taking into ac- Stalin answers that it is possible to do that a joint share aviation society and to build a count that the southerners can send their own and asks for what period they wish to receive railroad. people into the [North Korean] army, and that credit. Stalin answers that it is possible to do this. they are taking the necessary measures. Kim Kim answers that if credit will be given in As concerns the construction of the railroad, we reported that there was a clash with the southerners the amount of 50 million dollars, then it will be will review this question, but there is not a suffi- in Kangwon province at the 38th parallel. Their paid back from 1951 until 1954. cient work force in the Soviet Union for the police were not sufficiently armed at that time. Stalin asks when will credit be paid. construction of a railroad, and asks if they have a When regular units approached, the southerners Kim answers that [it will be paid] beginning work force among Koreans. retreated. with 1951 to 1954. Kim answers that they do have a work force Stalin asks—did they drive away the Stalin asks how they want to receive credit, among Koreans. southerners or did they leave themselves. at one time or in installments over the course of Kim says that in the south of Korea there are Kim answers that as a result of the battle 1949, 1950, 1951. still American troops and that intrigues against they drove away the southerners, threw them Kim answers that they wish to receive credit North Korea by the reactionaries are increasing, across the border of the country. in 1949. If this is not possible for some reason, that they have infantry troops but sea defense Stalin asks if they have a military school. then in the course of 1949 and the first half of almost does not exist. The help of the Soviet Kim answers that they do. 1950. Union is needed in this. Stalin asks if there is a pilot school. 6 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Shtykov reports that they have a training- for the reception. of the parallel. The southerners are carrying out military aviation regiment. Stalin in his turn thanks the delegation for defensive work at the 38th parallel at a faster Stalin remembers that the last time two coming and for the conversation. The conversa- tempo. I ask your order. Tunkin.27 came to Moscow, and asks, appealing to Pak tion lasted for an hour and 15 minutes. Shtykov Hon-yong, if he was the second. and translator Kim I.M. took notes. [Source: AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Pak Hon-yong confirms this. papka 11, listy 136-138.] Stalin says that Kim and Pak have both [Source: Archive of the Foreign Policy of the filled out and that it is difficult to recognize them Russian Federation, (hereafter AVP RF), Fond Document III: now. 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 10-20; all Ciphered telegram from Gromyko28 to Kim says that they have a military school, translations by Kathryn Weathersby.] Tunkin at the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, but no military academy and that among the 11 September 1949 officer of the Korean army there is no one Document II: who has completed a military academy. He asks Ciphered Telegram from You must meet with Kim Il Sung as soon as permission to send Korean officers to the Mili- Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 3 September 1949 possible and try to illuminate from him the fol- tary Academy of the USSR for training. lowing additional questions: Stalin asks wasn’t there such permission. On September 3 the personal secretary of 1. How do they evaluate the South Korean Kim answers that there was not. Kim Il Sung, Mun Il (a Soviet Korean24), came to army, [its] numbers, arms and fighting capacity? Stalin says that it is possible to permit it. me and at the commission of Kim Il Sung reported 2. The condition of the partisan movement Kim says that they do not have any more that they had received reliable information that in in the south of Korea and what real help they think questions. the near future the southerners intend to seize the they will receive from the partisans. Chong Chun-taek asks if it will be possible part of the Ongjin peninsula25 which is located to 3. How do the society and people regard the to send Soviet specialists to Korea and Korean the north of the 38th parallel, and also to bombard fact that northerners will be the first to begin an specialists for practical training in production the cement plant in the city of Kaisiu.26 attack? What kind of real aid can be given by the technology to the USSR. In connection with this, Mun Il said, Kim Il population of the south to the army of the north? Stalin answers that they have already spo- Sung asks permission to begin military operations 4. Are there American troops in the south of ken on that question. Soviet specialists may be against the south, with the goal of seizing the Korea? What kind of measures, in the opinion of sent to Korea and Korean specialists may be Ongjin peninsula and part of the territory of South Kim Il Sung, can the Americans take in case of an received in the USSR. Korea to the east of the Ongjin peninsula, approxi- attack by the northerners? Stalin asks where the Koreans get cotton. mately to Kaesong, so as to shorten the line of 5. How do the northerners evaluate their Kim answers that they want to receive cot- defense. possibilities, i.e. the condition of the army, its ton from the Soviet Union. Last year they re- Kim Il Sung considers, Mun said, that if the supplies and fighting capacity? ceived already 3,000 tons. international situation permits, they are ready to 6. Give your evaluation of the situation and Stalin says, joking, that we ourselves want move further to the south. Kim Il Sung is con- of how real and advisable is the proposal of our to receive cotton from Korea. vinced that they are in a position to seize South friends. Stalin asks if they have trade relations with Korea in the course of two weeks, maximum 2 Clarifications are demanded in connection other countries: with Japan, China, . months. with the questions they raised in conversations on Kim answers that they have such relations I asked [Mun] to transmit to Kim Il Sung that August 12 and September 3, 1949. with China, but China is at war and therefore they this question is very large and serious, it is neces- Immediately telegraph the results of the cannot conduct regular trade [with China]. sary to think it through carefully and that I there- conversation. Stalin asks—and what about with other fore urgently recommend to Kim Il Sung not to be countries? in a hurry and not to take [any measures] while [Source: AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Kim answers that they have not traded with there is no decision on this question. Papka 11, list 45.] other countries. They conduct trade with Hong Kim Il Sung will probably raise this question Kong, but unofficially and on a case by case again soon. Document IV: basis. It has been established that the [North] Kore- Ciphered telegram from Tunkin to Soviet Stalin asks aren’t there trading societies ans truly did seize an order to the commander of Foreign Ministry (in reply to telegram of among them of their own traders. troops on the Ongjin peninsula to begin artillery September 11), 14 September 1949 Kim Il Sung answers that such a society fire on the cement plant in Kaisiu on September 2 exists. This society conducts trade in the main at 8:00 and to destroy it. From the order it is clear [He reports that he had meetings with Kim Il with Hong Kong, with the city of Dalny23 and that the southerners consider this plant to be Sung and Pak Hon-yong on September 12 and 13 with China. military. The period indicated in the order has about the questions raised in the telegram of Stalin says that it is necessary to have such past but so far there has been no shelling. The September 11 and gives their response--K.W.] a society, there is nothing wrong with it. The northerners have taken the necessary measures in 1. [Information about South Korean army, national exists; among the bourgeoi- case of firing on the plant. providing many figures--K.W.] sie there are, apparently, also good people, it is Regarding the intentions of the southerners 2. [Information about partisan units in South necessary to help them. Let them trade and to seize part of the Ongjin peninsula to the north Korea, numbering 1,500-2,000 men--K.W.] Kim deliver goods, there is nothing bad in this. I do of the 38th parallel, we have only indications [of thinks they should not count on substantial help not have questions. this] from deserters from the south. from the partisans, but Pak Hon-yong has a dif- Stalin, turning to Vyshinsky, asks if he has There have not been any serious incidents at ferent opinion. He thinks the help [from parti- questions. the 38th parallel since August 15. Small ex- sans] will be significant. At any rate, they hope Vyshinsky answers that he doesn’t have changes of fire have taken place, [there have been] that the partisans will help in actions against the any. instances of artillery firing on the territory of communications of the enemy and that they will Hong Myong-hui thanks Comrade Stalin North Korea on the Ongjin peninsula, tresspassing occupy the main ports of South Korea, though COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 7 they will not be able to do this at the beginning of discipline, the training of the officers and troops, able that the north begin a civil war now. Given the campaign, maybe later. and also in its moral-political relations. the present internal and external situation a deci- 3. With regard to the question of how the In the northern army there are a number of sion about an attack on the south would be correct population will regard the fact that the northerners insufficiencies: insufficient number and weak only in such case as the northerners could count will begin a civil war, Kim Il Sung oscillates. preparation of pilots, insufficient number of ships, on ending the war quickly; the preconditions for During the conversation on September 12 he large caliber arms are unprepared for military it are not there. definitely stated that if the northerners begin operations, insufficient military supplies. But if the indicated partial operation were military actions, this will produce a negative The proposal of Kim Il Sung amounts to the crowned with success and did not lead to civil impression in the people and that it is politically following: at the beginning to strike the South war, then in this case the northerners, while disadvantageous to them to begin it. In connec- Korean army on the Ongjin peninsula, to destroy having won strategically, would lose politically tion with this he recollected that during the con- the two regiments located there, to occupy the in many regards. Such an operation would be versation between Mao Zedong and the Korean territory of the peninsula and the territory to the used to accuse the northerners of trying to inflame representative Kim Il29 in the spring of this year east of it, for example to Kaidzio, and then to see a fratricidal war. It would also be used for the Mao stated that in his opinion the northerners what to do further. After this blow the South purpose of further increasing American and in- should not begin military action now, since in the Korean army may become demoralized. In this ternational interference in Korean affairs in the first place, it is politically disadvantageous and in case move further to the south. If the South interests of the south. the second place, the Chinese friends are occu- Korean army is not demoralized as a result of the We propose that under the indicated condi- pied at home and cannnot give them serious help. Ongjin operation, to seal the borders seized, to tions to begin the partial operation conceived by The thinking of Kim Il Sung amounts to waiting shorten in that way the line of defense approxi- Kim Il Sung is inadvisable. until the conclusion of the main [military] opera- mately by one third. tions in China. It is not possible to hurry with the operation [Source: AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, In the conversation on September 13 Kim Il on the Ongjin peninsula. [It is necessary] to wait Papka 11, listy 46-53.] Sung, under the clear influence of Ho Ka-i (a until additional arms arrive from the Soviet Union. Soviet Korean, secretary of the Central Commit- Meanwhile [we must] consolidate the defenses Document V: tee of the Labor Party,30 who participated in the on the remaining portions of the 38th parallel. Politburo decision to confirm the following second conversation in order to translate), de- Kim Il Sung admits the possibility of the directive to the Soviet ambassador clared that the people will welcome an armed Ongjin operation turning into a civil war, but he in Korea, 24 September 1949 attack by the northerners and that if they begin hopes that this does not happen, since the military actions they will not lose politically southerners, in his opinion, do not dare to attack Copies to Malenkov,34 Molotov,35 because of this. Later in the course of the conver- other portions of the 38th parallel. Gromyko, Shtykov, Beria,36 Mikoyan,37 sation Kim Il Sung stated that if a civil war is Our formulations. Kaganovich,38 Bulganin39. drawn out, then they will be in a politically The partial operation outlined by Kim Il Commission Comrade Shtykov to meet with disadvantageous position.31 And since under Sung can and will probably turn into a civil war Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong and, strictly present conditions it is impossible to count on a between north and south. There are more than a adhering to the text given below, to the rapid victory, he does not propose to begin a civil few supporters of civil war in the leading circles following: war, but only to secure the Ongjin peninsula and of both the north and the south. Therefore, in In connection with the questions raised by a portion of the territory of South Korea to the east beginning this partial operation it is necessary to you in conversation with me on August 12 of this of this peninsula, for example to Kaidzio. calculate that it might be the beginning of a civil year, I received an order to transmit to you the They consider that in case of a civil war the war. Is it advisable to the north to begin a civil opinion of Moscow on the questions touched on population of South Korea will be sympathetic war now? We propose that this is not advisable. by you. Your proposal to begin an attack by the toward the northern army and will help it. In the The northern army is insufficiently strong to Korean Peoples’ Army on the south calls forth the case of successful military actions they hope to carry out successful and rapid operations against necessity of giving a precise evaluation of the organize a number of uprisings in South Korea. the south. Even taking into account the help military as well as the political sides of this 4. According to official data, there are 500 which will be rendered to the northern army by question. American military advisers and instructors in the partisans and the population of South Korea it From the military side it is impossible to South Korea. According to secret service infor- is impossible to count on a rapid victory. More- consider that the Peoples’ Army is prepared for mation, which needs confirmation, there are 900 over, a drawn out civil war is disadvantageous for such an attack. If not prepared for in the neces- American military advisers and instructors and the north both militarily and politically. In the sary manner, the attack can turn into a prolonged 1500 soldiers and security officers in South Ko- first place, a drawn out war gives the possibility military operation, which not only will not lead to rea. In case of a civil war in Korea, the Ameri- to the Americans to render corresponding aid to the defeat of the enemy but will also create cans, in the opinion of Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon- Syngmann Rhee. After their lack of success in significant political and economic difficulties for yong, can: send Japanese and Chinese [soldiers] China, the Americans probably will intervene in North Korea, which, finally, cannot be permitted. to the aid of the southerners32; support [the South Korean affairs more decisively than they did in Since at present North Korea does not have the Koreans] from the sea and air with their own China and, it goes without saying, apply all their necessary superiority of military forces in com- means; American instructors will take immediate strength to save Syngmann Rhee.33 Further, in parison with South Korea, it is impossible to part in organizing military actions. case of a drawn out civil war the military casual- acknowledge that a military attack on the south is 5. The North Korean army numbers 97,500 ties, suffering and adversity may elicit in the now completely prepared for and therefore from men (including the air force and coastal defense population a negative mood toward the one who the military point of view it is not allowed. units). The army has 64 tanks, 59 armored cars, began the war. From the political side, a military attack on 75 airplanes. The police force in the north num- Moreover, a drawn out war in Korea could the south by you is also not prepared for. We, of bers 23,200 men. Kim considers that the northern be used by the Americans for purposes of agita- course, agree with you that the people are waiting army is superior to the southern army in its tion against the Soviet Union and for further for the unification of the country and in the south technical equipment (tanks, artillery, planes), its inflaming war hysteria. Therefore, it is inadvis- they, moreover, are waiting for liberation from 8 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the yoke of the reactionary regime. However, ister of Pak Chong-jo,40 Yi Chu- Southern Korea. Further Kim said that he himself until now very little has been done to raise the Yon. The trade representative of the PRC Vyn Shi cannot begin an attack, because he is a commu- broad masses of South Korea to an active struggle, Chzhen41 attended the luncheon. On our side in nist, a disciplined person and for him the order of to develop the partisan movement in all of South attendance were myself and the advisers of the Comrade Stalin is law. Then he stated that if it is Korea, to create there liberated regions and to embassy Ignatiev and Pelishenko. The luncheon now possible to meet with Comrade Stalin, then organize forces for a general uprising. Mean- took place in a friendly, warm atmosphere. Kim he will try to meet with Mao Zedong, after his while, only in conditions of a peoples’ uprising Il Sung, Pak Hon-yong and also the Chinese trade return from Moscow. Kim underscored that Mao which has begun and is truly developing, which representative in their toasts expressed a feeling Zedong promised to render him assistance after is undermining the foundations of the reaction- of love and gratitude toward the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the war in China. (Apparently ary regime, could a military attack on the south personally toward Comrade Stalin for the libera- Kim Il Sung has in mind the conversation of his play a decisive role in the overthrow of the South tion [of Korea from Japanese rule] and for the representative Kim Il with Mao Zedong in June Korean reactionaries and provide the realization selfless assistance to both the Korean and Chinese 1949, about which I reported by ciphered tele- of the task of the unification of all Korea into a people. gram.) Kim said that he also has other questions single democratic state. Since at present very Kim Tu-bong shared his impressions of his for Mao Zedong, in particular the question of the little has been done to develop the partisan move- trip to the USSR for the 70th birthday of Comrade possibility of the creation of an eastern bureau of ment and prepare for a general uprising in South Stalin. In his account he repeatedly underscored the . He further stated that on all these Korea, it is also impossible to acknowledge that the great interest of the in Korea and questions he will try to meet with Comrade from a political side an attack by you on the south the numerous wishes for quick unification of the Shtykov and to secure through him a meeting has been prepared. country. with Comrade Stalin. As concerns a partial operation to seize During the luncheon Kim Il Sung and the The advisers of the embassy Ignatiev and Ongjin peninsula and the region of Kaesong, as Chinese trade representative, who was sitting Pelishenko, avoiding discussing these questions, a result of which the borders of North Korea next to him, many times enthusiastically con- tried to switch the discussion to a general theme, would be moved almost to Seoul itself, it is versed with each other in Chinese. From indi- then Kim Il Sung came toward me, took me aside impossible to view this operation other than as vidual phrases it was possible to understand that and began the following conversation: can he the beginning of a war between North and South they were speaking about the victory in China and meet with Comrade Stalin and discuss the ques- Korea, for which North Korea is not prepared about the situation in Korea. After the luncheon, tion of the position in the south and the question either militarily or politically, as has been indi- in the reception room Kim Il Sung gave advice of aggressive actions against the army of Rhee cated above. and orders to his ambassador to China Yi Chu- Syngmann, that their people’s army now is sig- Moreover, it is necessary to consider that if Yon about his work in China, and moreover, nificantly stronger than the army of Rhee military actions begin at the initiative of the while speaking in Korean, Kim several times said Syngmann. Here he stated that if it is impossible North and acquire a prolonged character, then phrases in Russian about how Yi would act boldly to meet with Comrade Stalin, then he wants to this can give to the Americans cause for any kind in China, since Mao Zedong is his friend and will meet with Mao Zedong, since Mao after his visit of interference in Korean affairs. always help Korea. to Moscow will have orders on all questions. In view of all that has been stated it is Then, after Yi Chu-Yon left, Kim, address- Then Kim Il Sung placed before me the necessary to acknowledge that at present the ing the advisers Ignatiev and Pelishenko in an question, why don’t I allow him to attack the tasks of the struggle for the unification of Korea excited manner, began to speak about how now, Ongjin peninsula, which the People’s Army could demand a concentration of maximum effort, in when China is completing its liberation, the lib- take in three days, and with a general attack the the first place, to the development of the partisan eration of the Korean people in the south of the People’s Army could be in Seoul in several days. movement, the creation of liberated regions and country is next in line. In connection with this he I answered Kim that he has not raised the the preparation of a general armed uprising in said: question of a meeting with Comrade Stalin and if South Korea in order to overthrow the reaction- “The people of the southern portion of Korea he raises such a question, then it is possible that ary regime and successfully resolve the task of trust me and rely on our armed might. Partisans Comrade Stalin will receive him. On the question unifying all Korea, and secondly, to further will not decide the question. The people of the of an attack on the Ongjin peninsula I answered strengthen in every way the Peoples’ Army of south know that we have a good army. Lately I do him that it is impossible to do this. Then I tried to Korea. not sleep at night, thinking about how to resolve conclude the conversation on these questions the question of the unification of the whole coun- and, alluding to a later time, proposed to go home. [Source: AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, try. If the matter of the liberation of the people of With that the conversation was concluded. Papka 11, listy 75-77.] the southern portion of Korea and the unification After the luncheon Kim Il Sung was in a of the country is drawn out, then I can lose the trust mood of some intoxication. It was obvious that Document VI: of the people of Korea.” Further Kim stated that he began this conversation not accidentally, but Ciphered Telegram from Shtykov to when he was in Moscow, Comrade Stalin said to had thought it out earlier, with the goal of laying Vyshinsky, 19 January 1950 him that it was not necessary to attack the south, out his frame of mind and elucidating our attitude in case of an attack on the north of the country by to these questions. Strictly secret. I report about the frame of mind the army of Rhee Syngmann, then it is possible to In the process of this conversation Kim Il expressed by Kim Il Sung during a luncheon at go on the counteroffensive to the south of Korea. Sung repeatedly underscored his wish to get the the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK. On But since Rhee Syngmann is still not instigating advice of Comrade Stalin on the question of the January 17 the minister of foreign affairs of the an attack, it means that the liberation of the people situation in the south of Korea, since [Kim Il DPRK Pak Hon-yong held a lunch attended by a of the southern part of the country and the unifica- Sung] is constantly nurturing his idea about an small circle of persons, on the occasion of the tion of the country are being drawn out, that he attack. departure of the Korean ambassador Yi Chu- (Kim Il Sung) thinks that he needs again to visit Yon to the Chinese Peoples Republic. At the Comrade Stalin and receive an order and permis- [Source: AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, luncheon from the Korean side were Kim Tu- sion for offensive action by the Peoples’ Army for Papka 11, listy 87-91.] bong, Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-yong, deputy min- the purpose of the liberation of the people of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 9

Document VII: and DPRK. Port Arthur, also called by its Japanese name, Dairen. Ciphered telegram from Stalin to Shtykov, 5. A major portion of the records on Korea in the 24. A Soviet citizen of Korean nationality. Over a 30 January 1950 Foreign Ministry archive in Moscow are requests from hundred “Soviet Koreans” were sent to North Korea North Korea for assistance in training workers in virtu- 1945-47 to assist the Soviet occupation command. In ally every branch of economic and cultural activity and addition to serving as translators, several occupied high 1. I received your report. I understand the Soviet arrangements for fulfilling these requests. The positions in the government of the newly created North dissatisfaction of Comrade Kim Il Sung, but he level of technological dependency of North Korea is Korean state. must understand that such a large matter in regard one of the most significant ways in which DPRK 25. A peninsula on the western coast of Korea, the to South Korea such as he wants to undertake relations with Moscow differed from Soviet relations southernmost portion of which lies below the 38th needs large preparation. The matter must be with its satellite states in Eastern Europe. parallel and consequently was part of the Republic of organized so that there would not be too great a 6. One of the main arguments of “revisionist” accounts Korea in 1949. risk. If he wants to discuss this matter with me, of the war is that North Korea could have acted on its 26. Transliteration of the Russian spelling of the Korean place name. then I will always be ready to receive him and own in attacking South Korea because it was only loosely tied to the Soviet Union. See, e.g., Bruce 27. Grigorii Ivanovich Tunkin, charge d’affaires of the discuss with him. Transmit all this to Kim Il Sung Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2, The Soviet embassy in Pyongyang, formerly chief of the 1st and tell him that I am ready to help him in this Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, NJ: Far Eastern Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. matter. Princeton University Press, 1990), 325-349, 445-448. 28. In 1949 A.A. Gromyko was first deputy minister of 2. I have a request for Comrade Kim Il Sung. 7. As a former senior South Korean officer remarked foreign affairs of the USSR. The Soviet Union is experiencing a great insuffi- many years after the war, “if Kim really wanted to get 29. Kim Il was Chief of the Political Administration of ciency in lead. We would like to receive from the South, by far his best course would have been to do the North Korean army. He travelled to Beijing in May Korea a yearly minimum of 25,000 tons of lead. nothing. His biggest mistake was to attack us.” Max 1949 as a representative of the Central Committee of the Labor Party of Korea (the communist party) for the Korea would render us a great assistance if it Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 56. For a detailed account of politics purpose of establishing contact with the Central Com- could yearly send to the Soviet Union the indi- in the South, see Cumings, The Origins of the Korean mittee of the and conducting cated amount of lead. I hope that Kim Il Sung will War, vols. 1 and 2. negotiations about the possible return to North Korea of not refuse us in this. It is possible that Kim Il Sung 8. Ciphered telegram from Shtykov to Stalin, 4 October Korean divisions in the People’s Liberation Army. needs our technical assistance and some number 1949, AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, 30. The communist party of North Korea. of Soviet specialists. We are ready to render this list 78. 31. Echoing the words of Mao to Kim Il in May 1949. assistance. Transmit this request of mine to 9. The documents in this collection include the itinerary 32. Japanese military forces were completely demobi- comrade Kim Il Sung and ask him for me, to for Kim Il Sung’s trip to Moscow in but not lized following World War II, but in 1947 the U.S. Department of Defense began to consider rearming communicate to me his consideration on this notes of the conversations. They do, however, include a report of Kim’s conversation with Mao Zedong in Japan in order to buttress the military forces arrayed matter. May, and communications between Mao and Stalin at against the Soviet Pacific border. The Soviet Union the time of Kim’s visit to Beijing, in which Mao asked was aware of these discussions and did everything [Source: AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, for and received confirmation of Kim’s report of Stalin’s possible to obstruct the adoption of such policies through Papka 11, list 92.] position with regard to the proposed offensive action. its representative in the Far Eastern Commission. Two See the exchange of 13-14 May 1950 published in weeks after the North Korean attack on South Korea CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 60-61. MacArthur ordered the Japanese prime minister to 1. Gen. Dmitrii Volkogonov published excerpts from 10. This is the interpretation of the Russian military create a “National Police Reserve” of 75,000 men, several of these documents in “Sleduyet li etogo historian Gavrill Korotkov. See, e.g., “Secrets of the some of whom were, in fact, deployed to Korea. Be- boyat’sia?” (Should we fear this?”), Ogonyok (Small Korean War,” U.S. & World Report, 9 August tween October 2 and December 10, 1950, forty-six Flame) 26 (June 1993), 28-29. A portion of this 1993, and his statements in the documentary recently minesweepers with 1,200 Japanese military personnel collection was also released in the spring of 1993 for aired on PBS, “Messengers from Moscow,” Part II were dispatched to the eastern coast of North Korea to publication in the Russian journal Istochnik, with com- (“The East is Red”). Since Korotkov has not made clear the way for an amphibious assault by UN forces. mentary by the present author. Istochnik has not yet public the documents on which he bases his analysis, it See Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing the Sword: published the intended article, but some of the docu- is impossible to evaluate their contents. The Demilitarization of Japan (: Hamish ments were presented in full translation in K. 11. Ciphered telegram from Vyshinsky to the Soviet Hamilton), 228-42. Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Ambassador in Beijing, sending the text of a message 33. President of the Republic of Korea. Korean War: New Documentary Evidence,” The Jour- from Stalin to Mao Zedong, 14 May 1950 (AVP RF, 34. In 1949 G.M. Malenkov was deputy chairman of nal of American-East Asian Relations 2:4 (Winter Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Papka 11, Delo 3, list 106), the Council of Ministers of the USSR and in party 1993), 425-458. translation in CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 61. matters second in importance only to Stalin. 2. At the Foreign Ministry archive in Moscow these 12. See Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Early 35. In 1949 V.M. Molotov was removed from his post documents are catalogued as Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Papka Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evi- as minister of foreign affairs of the USSR but remained 11, Dela 3,4 and 5. dence.” a member of the Politburo and was Stalin’s deputy in 3. Foreign Ministry report, “On the Korean War, 1950- 13. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, the Council of Ministers. 1953, and the Armistice Negotiations,” 9 August 1966, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War 36. L.A. Beria was chairman of the Council of Minis- Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993). ters. (SCCD), Moscow, Fond 5, Opis 58, Delo 266, Listy 14. See the account of Mao’s interpreter cited in Chen 37. A.I. Mikoyan was minister of foreign trade and 122-131, in Kathryn Weathersby, trans. and intro., Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. “New Findings on the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulletin the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Colum- 38. L.M. Kaganovich was deputy premier of the USSR. 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-18. bia University Press, 1994), 85-91. 39. N.A. Bulganin was deputy chairman of the Council 4. Eleven agreements were signed in March 1949. 15. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. of Ministers. They concerned economic and cultural cooperation, 16. Soviet Ambassador to the Democratic People’s 40. Transliteration of the Russian spelling of the name. technical assistance and extension of credit to the DPRK, Republic of Korea (DPRK). 41. Transliteration of the Russian spelling of the name. commodity exchange and payments, the establishment 17. Foreign Minister of the DPRK. of a Soviet trade representative in the DPRK, condi- 18. Vice Premier of the DPRK. Kathryn Weathersby, currently a visiting scholar at the tions for the work of Soviet specialists sent to North 19. Chairman of the National Planning Commission of Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Korea and North Korean specialists sent to the USSR the DPRK. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, is for practical training in industrial/technical work, the 20. Minister of Commerce of the DPRK. writing a study of Soviet policy and the Korean War. An temporary stationing of a Soviet naval unit at a North 21. Minister of Education of the DPRK. assistant professor at in Talla- Korean port, the construction of a railway line linking 22. Minister of Communications of the DPRK. hassee, she previously presented new Russian archival a Soviet rail line to North Korean railroads, and the 23. The major trading port in northeast of evidence on that subject in CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall establishment of regular air links between the USSR 1993) and Working Paper 8. 10 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

NEW DOCUMENTS ON THE EAST GERMAN UPRISING OF 1953 Introduction and commentary by Christian Ostermann

The two documents excerpted below, ship which denied political and the jority of workers [had] developed far recently found in the archives of, respec- most basic civil rights to its citizens. By enough,” the Second SED Party Convention tively, the Russian Foreign Ministry and the 1952, the SED had won over most of the affirmed the Soviet-decreed “Construction East German Socialist Unity Party (SED)— governmental, political, and economic “com- of ” as the “main task” of party and a 24 report1 by senior Soviet manding heights” including a rapidly ex- government in the GDR.8 Economically, officials V. Sokolovskii,2 V. Semyenov,3 panding and pervasive apparatus of repres- the policy of “Construction of Socialism” in and P. Yudin4 to USSR Foreign Minister V. sion.6 At the same time the Soviets and their the GDR, closely identified with the leader- M. Molotov and Defense Minister N. A. East German client regime had maintained ship of SED General Secretary Walter Bulganin, and a 20 July 1953 report5 by the an appearance of moderation out of consid- Ulbricht, called for the construction and SED Central Committee Department “Prin- eration for their all-German objectives. expansion of heavy industry at the expense cipal Organs of the Party and Mass Organi- Following the Western rejection of the of the production of consumer goods and for zations”—provide glimpses at the internal March 1952 “Stalin note” and the signing of a hike in productivity through increased Soviet and East German evaluations of the the Bonn and European Defense Community work norms. The SED regime also inaugu- 16-17 June 1953 uprising in the German () Treaties in May 1952, the SED re- rated a ruthless collectivization drive, coerc- Democratic Republic (GDR). gime closed off the zonal border (“demarca- ing independent farmers into so-called “ag- This article presents background and tion line”) to Western Germany. The estab- ricultural production ” (LPGs). context helpful for understanding these two lishment of a “prohibited zone” along the Those who refused to join were subjected to reports, as well as additional findings on the hitherto permeable demarcation line—“Op- exorbitant state-enforced delivery quotas, 1953 uprising in the GDR based on recent eration Ungeziefer” [Operation Weed]— causing many to leave for the West. As a research by the author and others in the SED which entailed the brutal of hun- result of the disruption of the agricultural archives. The origins of the 1953 uprising dreds of zonal residents and put a halt to the system, severe food shortages occurred date back to July 1952, when the SED growing flow of refugees, foreshadowed an throughout in the spring of Second Party Convention adopted a policy end to the priority that all-German concerns 1953. Finally, the forced “Construction of of forced socialization and militarization of had enjoyed.7 Socialism” prescribed a campaign against the GDR. In the immediate postwar years, Abandoning any pretense of modera- the private sector in trade and industry, spear- the Soviet Union had managed to install and tion and claiming that “the political and headed by prohibitive taxes for private en- consolidate in power in its occupation zone economic conditions as well as the con- terprises. By April 1953, small business in Germany a brutal communist dictator- sciousness of the working-class and the ma- owners had been precluded from receiving

The Report to the Soviet Leadership lyzed in this memorandum, partly as a result of a recognizing the Soviet Union’s dominating in- lack of factual material at the current time, and fluence in countries of people’s , in- Top Secret also due to the fact that the given issues have been cluding in the GDR. This is demonstrated by the Copy no. 1 already widely publicized in general terms in the coinciding aggression in both Soviet press. and GDR on the eve of the Bermuda conference To Comrade V.M. Molotov In any case, it is clear that 17 June was the so- of three Western states; c/ the Americans and the To Comrade N.A. Bulganin called “X-day”, that is, the day of open aggression Adenauer-Ollenhauer clique took into account against the democratic sector in GDR, by fascist the disenchantment among the workers and other and other organizations, working primarily under laborers with the situation in GDR, stemming On the events of 17-19 June 1953 in the leadership of American intelligence. from the errors made by the CC SED and the SCC and GDR and certain conclusions from these The setting of “X-day” for 17 June as the day [Soviet Control Commission] during their imple- events. of aggression by the fascist elements was, it seems, mentation of the policy of so-called “accelerated due to the following reasons: a/the announcement construction of socialism.” Adenauer intended to The following memorandum is a prelimi- by the CC SEPG [Central Committee of the So- exploit this disenchantment to strengthen his nary report on the events of 17-19 June in eastern cialist Unity Party of Germany, known by the position before the upcoming Bundestag elec- Berlin and the GDR, on the reasons behind the German acronym SED; hereafter, SED] Politburo tions in August-September of this year; d/ clearly, disorders, and on several practical conclusions on 9 June of this year, of the new political and the provocation of by the Western states that can be drawn from the given events. As of economic direction of GDR, the enactment of and the government of Adenauer was intended to yet, we have not been able to come to a thorough which would have foiled any chances of the turn the Soviet Union away from its present understanding of the underlying problems, since somewhat significant support for the fascist ag- course in its relations with GDR. the investigation of the arrested participants of gression by the populace of the GDR; b/ the This memorandum contains three main parts: the disturbances is still at the beginning stage. American effort to stave off further growth, within I. The course of events in the GDR on 17-19 June; The question of the events of 17 June, which a broad range of social circles in Western Europe, II. The Economic problems facing the GDR in constitute a great international provocation, pre- of opposition to the aggressive policies of USA, light of the events of 17-19 June; III. A few pared in advance by three Western states and and its effort to stem the rise in Western Europe of conclusions and recommendations. their accomplices within the West German mo- a consensus with the Soviet Union and the accom- continued on page 17 nopolistic capital, has not been thoroughly ana- panying movement towards on the basis of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 11 ration cards, forcing them to buy food at the pression, the regime embarked on an inten- ened its confrontation with the churches overpriced state stores. Adding to the strains sified battle against the churches which by and, on May 28, decreed a raise in industrial on the socio-economic fabric of the GDR, and large had remained bastions of opposi- work norms by 10 percent. reparations and Soviet-decreed militariza- tional thinking. The deteriorating political and economic tion put a heavy financial burden on the East By early 1953, the situation within the situation and the ruthless repression in East German economy.9 GDR was in many ways approaching a state Germany, however, ran counter to the “peace “The power of the State,” Ulbricht had of “civil war.” Despite sealing off the de- offensive” propagated by the new Soviet triumphantly declared at the convention, marcation line, East Germans were fleeing leadership in the wake of Stalin’s death on 5 would be the main instrument in enforcing the country by the tens of thousands, 15,000 March 1953 and occasioned an intense inter- the “Construction of Socialism.”10 In par- to 25,000 per month. All over the country, nal debate in Moscow over German policy ticular, an extremely brutal system of crimi- symptoms of dissatisfaction, and in late April and May 1953. Disagreements nal justice—climaxing in the “Law for the strikes were apparent in larger industrial came to the fore at the session of the Protection of People’s Property” in October plans as well as in the “bourgeois” parties.12 Presidium of the Soviet Council of Minis- 1952—intensified the “class struggle” to an Yet the SED leadership remained obstinately ters, which attempted to “analyze the causes unprecedented degree. Even minor viola- committed to the “Construction of Social- which had led to the mass exodus of Ger- tions of the law, such as anti-regime state- ism,” reacting to the growing crisis by self- mans from the GDR to and to ments (“agitation for boycott”) or economic delusion and fanaticism: a politburo com- discuss measures to correct the unfavorable “crimes” like black market purchases, were mission on the refugee problem, established political and economic situation existing in punished with prolonged imprisonment and in September 1952, argued that the problem the GDR.”15 At the meeting, according to led to 7,775 arrests just in the first three could be overcome by “measures in the still fragmentary evidence, chief months of 1953.11 Even several prominent ideological field.”13 Economic Lavrenti Beria, seconded by Premier Georgi SED members fell victim to the regime’s and, “enemy operations” were blamed for M. Malenkov, is said to have opposed the search for scapegoats for the mounting eco- the increasing economic difficulties, and if further development of socialism in the GDR, nomic crisis. In December 1952, Dr. Karl anything, prompted even harsher repression which was reportedly favored by Nikita S. Hamann, minister for Trade and Procure- on the part of the regime. By February 1953, Khrushchev, Molotov, and Deputy Foreign ment, was arrested, followed by Foreign a SED Central Committee working group Minister . Possibly better Minister a month later; which had reviewed the policy of “Con- informed through intelligence channels on within the SED also led to the arrest struction of Socialism” acknowledged cer- the grave situation in East Germany, and of politburo member and other tain difficulties but called for an intensifica- most certainly with an eye to challenge prominent East German communists. Con- tion of existing policies.14 Underestimating Molotov in his own domain, Beria appears currently with an increase of political re- the growing crisis, the Government height- to have argued in favor of a united, neutral,

The Report to the SED Central Committee of their policy and to revive again the anti-Soviet completely taken by surprise by the provocation, feelings among the population. With the publica- failed to mobilize broad segments of the working ANALYSIS OF THE PREPARATION,THE tion of the politburo communique of 9 June 1953, class for a unified and offensive appearance against OUTBREAK AND THE SUPPRESSION the enemies multiplied their subversive efforts the provocation and for suppression of the coup OF THE ‘FASCIST ADVENTURE’ FROM and they succeeded in developing the opinion on the 17th and 18th. Because the mass of plants 16.-22.6.53 among broad segments of the workers that the already resumed work on the 19th, the strikes, communiqué was a sign of weakness or even especially in the construction industry, where I. Short Summary Estimate bankruptcy of Party and Government, and in many workers simply went home, continued until winning quite a few adherents for the demand for 22 June 1953. In order to prevent the implementation of the punishment of the regime. the “” of the Party and Government Supported by their spy centers existing in II. Scope, Expansion, and Main Points of the and to counter the relaxation of the international the GDR and by those groups of agents smuggled Coup Attempt situation, and in order to make Berlin and the in during the uprising, and under the pretext of German Democratic Republic the starting point dissatisfaction among the population resulting 1. The hostile action in Berlin as the Catalyst of of war in Europe, hostile forces, with direct from the mistakes of the Party and regime, they the Actions in the Republic support and under the leadership of American temporarily managed to engage broad segments agencies and the peoples’ enemy and the war- of workers and employees, in particular in Berlin The hostile action in Berlin began on 6/16 mongers in Bonn, organized an attempt for a and Central Germany, for their criminal objec- with the strike of the construction workers and fascist coup in the GDR in the period from 16 tives. On 17 and 18 June 1953 it was frequently their demonstration march to the “House of Min- June 1953 to 22 June 1953. Besides the long- possible only after the intervention of Soviet istries”. standing efforts of their agencies and contacts in units to reestablish law and order and to resume The rallying points were the construction the GDR and their daily propaganda attacks by work. In a number of cases, strikes and demon- sites: Friedrichshain Hospital and Stalinallee. radio, leaflets and printed press, etc., [these strations in some plants could be prevented by the The strike and the ensuing provocations hostile forces] increased their subversive activi- decisive appearance of party members and offi- were finally organized during a steam ship cruise ties following the death of Comrade Stalin and cials in agreement, and, in part, workers’ defense on 13 June 1953. Hostile organizers of the action they especially attempted to shatter the confi- units were established. on June 16th and 17th from the Greater Berlin dence in the Soviet Union and in the correctness Generally, however, the Party, which was continued on page 21 12 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN democratic and bourgeois German state, changes indicated in the 2 June 1953 resolu- focus attention on the countryside, crucially although evidence on his precise views at tion, the New Course included a general neglecting the worsening situation in the this point remains sketchy. 16 amnesty for all East German refugees, assis- large industrial cities. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership was tance to small and medium-size private en- The most revealing aspect of the reac- united in its concern over the deteriorating terprises, more liberal policies on interzonal tion among urban labor as reflected in the situation in the GDR. A June 2 communiqué travel and residence permits, an easing of the newly accessible SED documents is the un- by the Presidium of the in campaign against the Protestant Church, and equivocal and almost immediate Moscow, entitled “On measures for the re- the re-issuance of ration cards to the middle politicization of the workers’ demands. The covery of the political situation in the Ger- classes. Paradoxically, the only segment of new documents bear out an integral connec- man Democratic Republic,” acknowledged the population which seemed to have been tion between political and economic de- that the mass exodus to the West of East excluded from the concessions of the “New mands: Reporting the reception of the New Germans of all professions and backgrounds Course” was the working class: the arbi- Course among workers, the SED-dominated created “a serious danger for the continued trarily-imposed higher work norms remained “Free German Federation of Unions” confi- political existence of the German Demo- in force. dentially informed the politburo three days cratic Republic,” and called for an end to The sudden announcement of the “New before the uprising that the “negative discus- forced collectivization and the war on pri- Course” shocked party members and the sions” [i.e. the workers’ demands] were not vate enterprise, for the revision of the heavy East German population. Reports from local limited to a revocation of the norm increase; industry plan, and for the relaxation of po- party officials to the SED Central Committee they included demands for the resignation litical-judicial controls and regimentation. Department “Principal Organs of Party and and punishment of those responsible for the It ordered the termination of the coercive Mass Organizations” under mistakes; to many, the SED had gone bank- measures against the Protestant Church and reveal with great candor the widespread dis- rupt and the Central Committee and regime denounced the “cold exercise of power” by appointment and disbelief, the utter confu- had proved incapable of leadership. Many the Ulbricht regime. Significantly, though, sion and unrest, among both party members discussions evidenced such slogans as “Get it did not explicitly demand an abrogation of and the public. Contrary to the politburo’s rid of the SED bosses” and “Get rid of the controversial raised work norms. Re- expectations, to many in and out of the party, socialism.” 28 flecting the influence of KGB head Beria, the communiqué signaled the SED’s final Despite signs of unrest and sporadic who had apparently favored a more drastic bankruptcy and the beginning of its demise.21 strikes in early June, SED headquarters re- reversal in Moscow’s German policy, the Many party functionaries who had commit- mained steadfast. Underestimating the re- resolution expressed the necessity to “put ted themselves to the “Construction of So- sentment throughout the country, the SED the tasks of the political battle for national cialism” could “not comprehend that the politburo confirmed the controversial norm reunification and the conclusion of a peace party leadership had made such decisive increases on 13 June 1953, fueling labor treaty at the center of attention of the Ger- mistakes which necessitated this decision,”22 dissatisfaction. By then, however, the pro- man people,” and stipulated that “in the felt betrayed and “panicky;”23 others called tests had developed their own dynamic. As future the determination of the entire politi- for Ulbricht’s resignation; many simply left a report from the files of the former Ministry cal situation for this or that time period has the party. 24 for State Security () details, that same to take into consideration the real conditions The popular reaction, as it shines through day, during a routine plant retreat cruise on within the GDR as well as the situation in these reports, was even less ambiguous. Thus, the Müggel lakes in the southeast of Berlin, Germany as a whole and the international for example, local SED officials from the workers of the construction site “Bettenhaus situation.”17 township Seehausen reported that “the entire Friedrichshain” discussed their grievances The resolution was handed to SED lead- village is in the bar, drinking to the health of and decided to get together within a couple ers Ulbricht and during a [West German Chancellor Konrad] of days with representatives of other con- three-day trip to Moscow (2-4 June 1953) Adenauer.”25 Many East Germans viewed struction sites in order take the unusual step where, as Grotewohl noted, the Soviet lead- the communiqué not only as a defeat for the of putting forward a resolution to Grotewohl, ers expressed their “grave concern about the Ulbricht regime, but clearly as a result of a fact alluded to in the SED report. situation in the GDR.”18 At the same time, Western pressure.26 With the regime’s au- The resolution (which can be found in the they received promises of substantial aid thority eroding by the hour, the SED leader- Grotewohl Papers) decried the 10 percent and relief in reparation payments which ship was particularly alarmed by the precari- norm increase as “a great hardship” for the complemented the replacement of the old ous situation in the rural areas. Expecting the workers. Comparing themselves to the large- Soviet Central Commission (SCC) by a new return of large landowners who had fled to estate farmers and private entrepreneurs Soviet High Commission for German af- the West and misinterpreting the halt to the whose possessions would be restored, the fairs. After having made “a bad impression most extreme excesses of collectivization, workers called for a repeal of the norm in Moscow”19 (Grotewohl), and following collectivized farmers displayed “signs of increase on the construction site. Ending on several days of intense discussion with the unrest,” and many felt that “the LPGs would a threatening note, the workers demanded East German leadership in Berlin (5-9 June be abandoned and hence their work would that “in view of the highly charged mood of 1953), the SED politburo, on 11 June, pub- serve no purpose.”27 Within a few days, the the entire workforce [Belegschaft]” lished the famous communiqué announcing LPG system was on the verge of complete Grotewohl was “to respond to these grave the “New Course.”20 In addition to the collapse, causing the party headquarters to issues immediately in a satisfactory man- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 13 ner” and they “expected your statement no stration at the Strausberger Platz at 7 a.m. the everywhere: Where are the pro- later than at noon tomorrow.”29 next day. Just a few hours later, several vocateurs?”33 Based on the myth of an ex- Headed by the plant’s union representa- thousand demonstrators were protesting in ternal provocation, the SED leadership ex- tive, Feltling, the four-man delegation front of the “Haus der Ministerien,” the pected that a massive propaganda drive was marched to Grotewohl’s office where they GDR government headquarters in the enough to cope with the crisis. handed the resolution to Grotewohl aides Wilhelmsstraße. Posing a more immediate Throughout the night of and the Ambreé and Plaschke who, while accom- threat to the regime, others headed for the early morning of June 17, the news of the modating some of their grievances, tried party headquarters in the Wilhelm-Pieck Berlin strikes and demonstrations spread their best to convince the workers that the Street.31 like a wildfire throughout the GDR. Early in norm increase was necessary. Later, in- There the politburo had gathered for its the morning of June 17, workers’ assemblies forming Grotewohl’s personal aides, regular Tuesday meeting. It is still unclear in most workshops decided to go Tzschorn and Eisermann, they pointed out how well-informed the politburo was about on strike and march downtown. From all that some responsibility lay with the “dicta- the developments in the streets of Berlin. East Berlin districts and surrounding sub- torial enforcement” of the norm increase by Under pressure from the marchers, the polit- urbs, crowds were marching on the “Haus SED Berlin district official Baum, a well- buro, after hours of deliberations, decided to der Ministerien.” By 8 a.m., the number of known hard-liner who “underestimated the revoke the forced norm increase, blaming protesters in front of the building had appar- situation” and “merely portrayed it as work the developments on the cold-blooded man- ently reached 15,000; by 9 a.m., the number of the enemy, without recognizing that his ner in which individual ministries had imple- had increased to more than 25,000. Accord- not acknowledging the workers’ justified mented the measure and on hostile provoca- ing to estimates by West , by demands only amplified the enemy’s oppor- teurs who had sowed confusion into the 9:40 a.m. 60,000 people were crowding the tunities for action.” Tzschorn related to ranks of the workers. An increase in produc- streets, headed in the direction of the minis-

Grotewohl that the workers would go on tivity was to be only voluntary. The revoca- tries. The few People’s Police officers which strike if he did not respond satisfactorily, by tion of the forced norm increase, however, the regime had ordered to the scene were 7 a.m. Adding in short-hand to his memo to came too late to satisfy the protesters’ de- soon overcome. Between 10 a.m. and 11 Grotewohl, Tzschorn, however, noted that mands. So did the earlier appearance of a.m., 80 to 100 demonstrators apparently according to Baum, “this was a larger opera- Minister and Professor Rob- managed to break the security barriers for tion apparently controlled from West-Ber- ert Havemann, who had tried in vain to calm the first time and enter the government build- lin. Strikes have taken place today already the crowds in front of the government head- ings, visibly demonstrating that the People’s on several construction sites. In doing so, quarters. Only in the early afternoon did the Police, State Security, and army had been they again and again demand a decision by demonstration slowly disperse, with a large overpowered and put on the defensive. Events prime minister Grotewohl.” Underestimat- crowd heading back to the Stalinallee. in East Berlin were mirrored by develop- ing the explosiveness of the situation and Clashes and demonstrations, however, per- ments throughout the GDR: According to a misleading Grotewohl on the true origins of sisted until late evening.32 recent estimate, more than 500,000 people the workers’ dissatisfaction, Tzschorn ad- Later that night, the Berlin “Parteiaktiv” in over 350 East German cities and towns vised Grotewohl against personally speak- (the most trusted Berlin SED party members marched in defiance of the regime, in some ing to the workers.30 and activists) met in the Friedrichsstadtpalast. cases raiding and party offices.34 Instead of a high government official, a Demonstrating unity and determination, the The Sokolovskii-Semyenov-Yudin and union leader and fifteen agitators appeared entire politburo, headed by Grotewohl and SED reports provide interesting numbers for at the Friedrichshain construction site in the Ulbricht, appeared before the group of nearly the June 17 demonstrations. Generally coin- early hours of 16 June 1953, apparently sent 3,000 people. Responding to the day’s events, ciding with the numbers in the SED report to persuade the workers to accept the norm Grotewohl and Ulbricht acknowledged mis- and Western accounts, the Soviets estimated increase. In this highly charged atmosphere, takes by the party leadership and criticized that by 9 a.m. about 30,000 people (SED the hospital director ordered the gates closed, the “cold administering” and police mea- report: 25,000) were demonstrating outside leading the workers to believe—probably sures. Despite these insights, the SED lead- the GDR government buildings. Overall mistakenly—that they would be arrested. ership continued to gravely miscalculate the participation in the demonstrations was esti- Within a short time, the news had spread to situation: “Yes, mistakes were made,” mated at 66,000 people. According to So- the Block 40 construction site in the Stalin Ulbricht told the Berlin party members, but viet accounts, 80,000 out of 200,000 work- allee (a major avenue in the heart of East now the task was to “take to heart correctly ers went on strike that day. Berlin), where workers organized a demon- and draw the right conclusions from the Despite the growing signs of unrest, the stration in support of their fellow workers. lesson which we received today. Tomorrow SED leadership was completely taken by After breaking down the hospital gates, a even deeper into the masses! (...) we are surprise by the degree of opposition appar- few hundred workers marched downtown, moving to the mobilization of the entire ent throughout the GDR. Faced by the threat picking up in number as they passed through party, up to the last member! (...) We are now of a general strike, (East) Berlin police head the streets of Berlin. Apparently, the march- getting to the point that tomorrow morning Waldemar had asked, in vain, for ers managed to take over two soundtrucks all party organizations in the plants, in the Soviet military support as early as June 16. on the way, allowing them to disseminate residential areas, in the institutions will start Ulbricht apparently secretly conferred with their calls for a general strike and a demon- to work in time and that one is watchful State Security (Stasi) chief 14 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN and the head of the East German military later, the SED leaders were informed that The report confirms that GDR state security forces ( [KVP]), Moscow had ordered the declaration of mar- organs had been informed as early as June 14 Heinz Hoffman, in the early morning hours tial law in East Berlin as of 1 p.m. Eventu- of plans for strikes against the norm in- of June 17 about the deployment of KVP ally, martial law was declared in about 167 creases. Despite warnings by the Soviets units. Since their reliability and preparation (of 217) urban and rural districts.35 about the “seemingly serious nature of the was questionable, this was held out as a last According to eyewitness accounts, So- disorders that had taken place in the city” resort. About 10 a.m., the politburo met in viet tanks had entered East Berlin’s outskirts and the necessity “to be highly prepared” the party headquarters “House of Unity” but in the early morning hours of June 17, during a meeting with politburo members on were, by 10:30 a.m. ordered by Soviet High initially without making any moves to pro- the evening of June 16, the SED leadership Commissioner Semyenov, who had effec- tect government buildings. Not until shortly “did not believe the situation to be so seri- tively assumed control of government power, before noon did Soviet military vehicles close ous” as to warrant serious measures and to proceed to the Soviet headquarters in in on government headquarters. Within an “evaluated the situation in the GDR rather Karlshorst. Precluded from the decision- hour, the Soviet tanks managed to reestab- optimistically.” While Karlshorst had alleg- making process, politburo members were lish control around the government head- edly alerted its regional military authorities finally sent out to major cities in an effort to quarters, not without committing a during the day, Ulbricht “could not think of restore political control. Ulbricht, among the demonstrators on the nearby anything better” than to call the first regional Grotewohl, Zaisser, and Herrnstadt remained Potsdamer Platz. Despite the declaration of party secretaries to Berlin “for instruction,” in the Soviet High Commission headquar- martial law, the demonstrations and riots leaving the regional party organization with- ters. According to the Herrnstadt papers, continued into the night, and, in fact, for out leadership in the critical hours of June Semyenov at one point confronted them several days. 17. According to the Sokolovskii- with the news that “RIAS is broadcasting The Sokolovskii-Semyenov-Yudin re- Semyenov-Yudin report, the Soviets also that there is no government any more within port of reflects the Soviets’sense of informed Ulbricht, Grotewohl, Herrnstadt the GDR.” Sitting down with his Soviet exasperation and frustration with the SED and Zaisser during the June 16 meeting of comrades, Semyenov allegedly remarked leadership, which they severely blamed for their decision to send troops into Berlin that “well, it is almost true.” A few hours misreading and mishandling the situation. which, however, they opposed. This ac-

COLD WAR “FLASHPOINTS”: , in 1956 and 1968, respectively, the . NSA, working closely with THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE rise of and crackdown on Solidarity in Po- CWIHP, plans similar conferences in Ger- land in 1980-81, and the of 1989. many, Poland and Hungary in 1995-1996. One of the more unusual resources avail- Each of these topics will be the focus of The Archive, in a project supported by able to scholars of the Cold War is the an international conference organized in col- CWIHP, is also overseeing the creation of an National Security Archive, a non-govern- laboration with local institutions. The first of electronic database of declassified docu- mental, non-profit library and publisher of these, looking back at the Prague Spring, ments released from the former Soviet bloc. declassified documents based in Washing- took place in the Czech capital in April 1994. Incorporating bibliographic data and brief ton. Now in its 10th year, the Archive has Co-sponsored by the Institute of Interna- synopses in English of each document, the built a reputation as the world’s largest tional Relations (IIR) in Prague and the Cold database is intended to keep researchers up- repository of declassified records obtained War International History Project (CWIHP), to-date on what is currently available from under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act the conference drew over 90 scholars and the “other side” of the Cold War. Informa- (FOIA). These materials, covering topics in former officials from a dozen countries. One tion from the database, as well as other NSA contemporary U.S. foreign and national se- of the key publications emerging from the and CWIHP materials, will soon be featured curity policy ranging from the Berlin and conference will be an English-language docu- on the Archive’s World Wide Web site on Cuban Missile Crises to the Iran-Contra mentary reader featuring a number of the the Internet, due to go on-line later this year. Affair to non-proliferation and intelligence most important documents compiled and For further information on the Archive policies, are published on microfiche and edited by members and associates of the and its projects, contact: other formats, and are also available in the former Czechoslovak government commis- Archive’s reading room. sion originally appointed in 1990 to analyze Malcolm Byrne With the end of the Cold War, the the events of 1967-1970, and published by Director of Analysis Archive initiated the Openness in Russia The New Press/W.W. Norton. (Previous The National Security Archive and Eastern Europe project to provide assis- NSA/New Press anthologies of declassified The Gelman Library, Suite 701 tance on issues of documentary access in the documents and interpretive essays have ex- 2130 H Street, N.W. former Soviet bloc countries. A subset of amined the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Iran- Washington, D.C. 20037 the project, the “Flashpoints” collection, is Contra Affair, and U.S. policy toward South- (202) 994-7000 (voice) currently gathering new materials on sev- ern .) Two of the editors, Drs. Vaclav (202) 994-7005 (fax) eral crises of the Cold War in Eastern Eu- Kural and Jaromir Navratil, both of the IIR, [email protected]. rope: the East German uprising of 1953, the were major organizers of the conference and Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czecho- are the authors of a volume in Czech on the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 15 count contradicts evidence according to personally gave instructions from cars with remained cautious when developments came which the East Germans had asked for So- loudspeakers to the participants in the disor- to a head in Berlin on June 16-17. While viet military support earlier that day—a re- ders near the home of the GDR government generally supportive of the popular demands quest which the Soviets initially refused.36 on the border of the Soviet sector. There is and reporting on the protests in a very sym- Sokolovskii and Semyenov might have been also information from the GDR provinces of pathetic manner, RIAS did not issue a call trying to cover up their own inadequacies in American agents from West Berlin and West for a general strike as demanded by a work- handling the situation. Germany sent there.”37 ers’ delegation. Indeed, the Sokolovskii- To a lesser extent, naturally, the criti- This perception is reflected in the report Semyenov-Yudin report confirmed that cism of Berlin’s handling of the demonstra- Semyenov, Sokolovskii and Yudin sent to “RIAS in its broadcasts recommended that tions is also reflected in the July 20 SED Molotov and Bulganin on June 24. Accord- the insurgents submit to the orders of Soviet report. The SED, the report argued, was ing to the report, the uprising was “prepared officials and not to clash with Soviet forces.” “completely taken by surprise by the provo- by [the] three Western states and their ac- According to internal SED analyses at the cation,” a circumstance which was ascribed complices within the West German monopol- height of the uprising, RIAS broadcasts to the “widespread euphemistic reporting” capitalistic capital,” by “fascist” and other during the first days of the crisis were “very on popular dissatisfaction by local party organizations “working primarily under the general,” and SED officials took satisfac- officials and the fact that “the Central Com- leadership of American intelligence.” On tion in the fact that “the enemy is still lacking mittee did not immediately react to the events June 17, it stated, “American planes ap- detailed information.”38 The radio station’s on June 16 and thus left the Party unpre- peared over various parts of the Soviet sector initial emphasis on caution and restraint, pared.” Consequently, “until the afternoon of Berlin, from which leaflets were dropped contributing to a large degree to the relax- hours of the 17th, the district leadership was calling on the population to participate in the ation of the tense situation in the city, was by and large left to its own devices.” strikes and the unrest, and to work to over- clearly recognized by GDR authorities.39 Given the initial perception by throw the Government of the GDR.” In the Only later did an internal SED study on “The Grotewohl and his advisers that the strikes same vein, the SED report argued that the Role of the Hostile Broadcasting during the and demonstration had been “controlled from uprising “under the direct participation and Events in Berlin” blame RIAS broadcasts the West,” it is not surprising that the Soviet leadership of American agencies” was an for creating the “impression” that “the strikes representatives in Germany (who were attempt at a “fascist” coup d’etat. of the construction workers [in East Berlin] largely dependent on their SED sources) and Yet the Sokolovskii-Semyenov-Yudin were becoming a broad movement among the politburo suspected that the popular up- report, written only a few days after the the entire population.”40 rising was a “counter-revolutionary coup” height of the demonstrations, reveals that RIAS’ cautious policy during the upris- inspired by the West. Ulbricht had announced the Soviet representatives realized that the ing was indicative of the overall response by the line in his speech before the “Parteiaktiv” SED’s policy of “accelerating the construc- the Eisenhower Administration. At a meet- on the night of June 16, and certainly the tion of Socialism” as adopted at the Second ing of the National Security Council on June almost parallel flaring up of riots and dem- Party Conference and the ensuing supply 18, CIA director Allen W. Dulles pointed onstrations throughout the country tended to shortages had caused growing dissatisfac- out that, “the United States had nothing create the impression (or confirm SED-lead- tion among the working middle class and whatsoever to do with inciting these riots.”41 ers in their ideological preconceptions) that constituted the “prime causes of the disor- While acknowledging that the brutal sup- this could only be a systematically prepared ders.” Even the SED report acknowledged, pression of the popular uprising by Soviet action by the West. There is evidence that in conformity with the “New Course,” that military might afforded the United States an Semyenov and Marshall Sokolovskii, Chair- dissatisfaction among the population had “excellent propaganda opportunity”42 and man of the Soviet Chiefs of Staff and deputy resulted from the “mistakes of Party and could be viewed as a “sign of real promise,” defense minister who had been sent to the Government.” the Eisenhower Administration initially took Soviet army headquarters in Karlshorst on No evidence, indeed, has so far emerged no steps to escalate the crisis. Faced with June 17, accepted (and passed on to Mos- which would support the allegation of West- disappointment and resentment throughout cow) GDR Interior Ministry reports which ern instigation of the uprising. Contrary to Germany about the weak western response, alleged a “very active organizational role of the Eisenhower Administration’s “roll-back” the U.S. government later, in July and Au- the American military in the disorders in rhetoric and its interest in “psychological gust, initiated a large western aid program Berlin.” As Semyenov and Sokolovskii put warfare,” neither the United States nor any which exacerbated tensions in the GDR and it in a June 19 cable to Moscow, “[t]he other western government was prepared for displayed Western sympathy for the plight people arrested testify that American offic- or actively working toward an uprising in of the East Germans.43 The uprising, an ers personally selected and gathered resi- East Germany or a major intervention be- internal U.S. government memorandum later dents of West Berlin in large groups and hind the . Although the Ameri- judged, “began as spontaneous manifesta- gave them instructions to organize disorders can radio station in Berlin, Radio In the tions of dissatisfaction... [I]t is generally in East Berlin, the arson of buildings etc. As American Sector (RIAS), was waging an agreed that the American-controlled radio a reward, the American officers promised effective propaganda campaign against the station RIAS played an important role in money, and for the people who were the SED regime and was later credited with spreading the riots from East Berlin into the most active—a three month vacation in a helping to spread the uprising from East zone and that these riots were then further vacation home, etc. American military people Berlin throughout the country, U.S. officials stimulated by the American food pro- 16 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN gram.”44 deaf ears.” Consequently, Sokolovskii, limited to June 17 or to East Berlin.46 Charges of Western involvement not- Semyenov, and Yudin recommended “to re- withstanding, within the SED the party po- lieve comr. Ulbricht of his duties as deputy 1. The report is located in the Archive of Foreign Policy litburo, and especially Ulbricht, were widely prime minister of the GDR” and “to liquidate of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; it was blamed for misreading the depth of the the currently existing position of General obtained by Vladislav M. Zubok of the National Secu- rity Archive and translated by Danny Rozas. The crisis and the popular reaction to the policy Secretary of the CC SED, replacing it with archival reference is Fund 06, Opis 12a, Papka 51, Delo of the “Construction of Socialism.” The several CC secretariat posts.” 301, Listy 1-51. self-criticism and the climate of openness Developments within the SED polit- 2. Marshall V.D. Sokolovskii, since 1949 Chief of the which accompanied the SED espousal of buro came to a head on July 8 when the final Soviet General Staff and since 1952 Deputy Defense Minister, had arrived in Berlin at the height of the June the “New Course” and which had many East draft commission report was considered. By 1953 crisis. Germans demanding the resignation of the now, politburo members , Elli 3. Vladimir Semyonovich Semyenov, since 1946 Po- government, also inspired challenges to Schmidt, Ackermann and East Berlin mayor litical Adviser to the Soviet Military Administration in Ulbricht’s leadership within the Central had joined the ranks of Germany; since 1953 head of the Soviet High Commis- sion in Germany, located in Berlin-Karlshorst. Committee. At the 14th Central Committee Herrnstadt and Zaisser. During the contro- 4. Pavel A. Yudin had replaced Semyenov as Chairman Plenum, quickly summoned for a midnight versial session, Zaisser supported a replace- of the Soviet Control Commission (SCC) on 21 April session on June 21, criticism of Ulbricht’s ment of Ulbricht by Herrnstadt. According 1953; named Deputy Soviet High Commissioner in leadership erupted. “In some ways, what we to the handwritten minutes of the meeting in June 1953. 5. Abt. Leitende Organe der Partei und der have let happen is worse than some severe the Grotewohl papers, Zaisser argued that Massenorganisationen, “Analyse über die Vorbereitung, defeats which the working-class has suf- Ulbricht “had to be kept out of the party den Ausbruch und die Niederschlagung des fered at the hands of its enemies,” Central apparatus. The apparatus in the hands of faschistischen Abenteuers vom 16.-22.6. 1953” [Study Committee member la- W.U. is a catastrophe for the party.” Ulbricht of the Instigation, Outbreak and Crushing of the Fascist Adventure of 16-22 June 1953], 20 July 1953, Stiftung mented. Led by Stasi head Zaisser and apparently managed to avoid immediate steps “Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der , the editor of the party against him. Arguing that “I don’t think I ehemaligen DDR” im Bundesarchiv [Foundation “Ar- organ “,” the opposition have to be the first secretary,” Ulbricht prom- chives of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the group sought to oust Ulbricht from his posi- ised to reveal his views at the next CC Ple- Former GDR], henceforth SAPMO-BArch, DY 30 J IV 2/202/15. Obtained from the SED archives in Berlin by tion as head of the powerful party secre- num. Crucially, the final adoption of the Christian Ostermann and translated by Helen Christakos. tariat. The opposition to Ulbricht within the commission report was postponed.45 6. On the establishment of the security apparatus in the politburo took the form of a commission, The next day, Grotewohl flew to Mos- GDR see now Norman M. Naimark, ‘To Know Every- formally established to prepare the basic cow at Soviet orders. There, he and other thing and To Report Everything Worth Knowing’: Building the East German , 1945-1949 documents for the 15th CC Plenum. In its Communist party leaders were informed of (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center report, the commission called for a restruc- Beria’s arrest, signaling a shift in the corre- for Scholars, Working Paper No. 10, 1994). turing of the leadership. lation of forces in favor of the hard-liners 7. Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle, Untergang auf The Sokolovskii-Semyenov-Yudin re- around Molotov and Gromyko. This proved Raten. Unbekannte Kapitel der DDR-Geschichte [De- cline in Installments. Unknown Chapters of GDR His- port reveals the degree to which Ulbricht’s to be of momentous significance for the tory] (München: Bertelsmann, 1993), 30. position was challenged between mid-June German situation, for Beria’s fall under- 8. Beschluß der 2. Parteikonferenz [Decision of the and mid-July, not only by his intra-party mined the position of Zaisser, Ulbricht’s Second Party Conference], Dokumente der rivals but also by his Soviet protectors. It is most powerful challenger. Once again as- sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands [Docu- ments of the Socialist Unity Party], vol. 4 (Berlin: possible, yet still uncertain, that their indict- sured of Soviet support, Ulbricht went on the Staatsverlag der DDR, 1954), 73. ment of the SED leader reflected the bal- offensive at the July 14 politburo meeting 9. On the latter point, see Torsten Diedrich, Der 17. ance of power in Moscow at that moment or when he fired the Minister of Justice, Max Juni 1953 in der DDR. Bewaffnete Gewalt gegen das at least the strong influence of those forces Fechner, who had advocated a more lenient Volk [The 17 June 1953 in the GDR. Military Might Against the Populace] (Berlin: Dietz, 1991) around Beria who opposed Ulbricht and the treatment of the popular opposition. On . See footnote 8. policy he represented. Ulbricht, the report 18, Ulbricht forced Zaisser to resign as head 11. Mitter and Wolle, Untergang, 47. explicitly stated, was the “initiator and the of the Stasi. Five days later, Herrnstadt and 12. The best account of the refugee problem is Helge primary author” of the policy of “the con- Ackermann were expelled from the polit- Heidemeyer, Flucht und Zuwanderung aus der SBZ/ DDR 1945/1949-1961. Die Flüchtlingspolitik der struction of socialism, regardless of any buro. Signifying his increasing power, Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis zum Bau der Berliner difficulties,” which, as the reports observes, Ulbricht had the 15th CC Plenum restore him Mauer [Flight and Immigration from the Soviet Zone/ was implemented “without the accompani- to the position of “First Secretary” of the GDR 1945/1949-1961] (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1993); but ment of corresponding organizational and SED a few days later. By mid-July, as the also see Valur Ingimundarson, “Cold War Misperceptions: The Communist and Western Re- technical measures and political work among SED report indicates, Ulbricht had survived sponses to the East German Refugee Crisis in 1953,” [the] workers.” By implication, it was the leadership crisis. Journal of Contemporary History 29:3 (1994), 463-81 Ulbricht who was blamed by the Soviets for Both documents thus constitute signifi- 13. Quoted in Mitter and Wolle, Untergang, 35. failing to pay attention to the dissatisfaction cant new evidence on the Soviet and East 14. Ibid., 42. 15. Editor’s note 12, stenographic protocol, CPSU CC and sporadic strikes, for “sloppily” and re- German perspective of the 1953 crisis, and, Plenum, 2-7 July 1953, “Delo Beria,” TsK luctantly implementing the Soviet-decreed given their different origins and dates, illu- KPSS 2 (1991), 144, quoted in Hope M. Harrison, The course reversal, thereby causing the an- minate the evolution of the crisis which Bargaining Power of Weaker Allies in Bipolarity and nouncement of the New Course to fall “on clearly—as both documents show—was not Crisis: The Dynamics of Soviet-East German Rela- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 17 tions, 1953-1961 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Micro- SOVIET REPORT of the populace and increasingly often to rely on films International, 1994), 48. continued from page 10 management and administrative methods vis-a- 16. Harrison, The Bargaining Power, 48-52, James vis members of SED, using the harmful methods Richter, Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany I. The course of events in the GDR widely employed within the CC SED Secretariat During the Beria Interregnum, Cold War International on 17-19 June. History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper No. 3 (Wash- as a guide. In a number of instances, SED district and regional committees completely supplanted ington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for 1. On the eve of aggression. Scholars, 1992), 13-22; Vladislav M. Zubok, Soviet government organs, bringing under their author- Intelligence and the Cold War: The “Small” Commit- ity police operations, arrests, the day-to-day ad- tee of Information, 1952-53, CWIHP Working Paper Soon after the SED Party conference /July ministration of enterprises, etc. No. 4 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Interna- 1952/ and as a result of the new direction adopted All these, as well as other unhealthy devel- tional Center for Scholars, 1992), 16-17; Gerhard Wettig, at this conference towards “accelerating the con- opments, mentioned in the Soviet Government “Sowjetische Wiedervereinigungsbemühungen im struction of socialism” in the GDR, there began to resolution of 6 June, were the prime causes of the ausgehenden Frühjahr 1953? Neue Aufschlüsse über arise in GDR serious and ever-increasing inter- ein altes Problem” [Soviet Reunification Efforts in Late disorders and agitations that took place in the ruptions in the supply of goods of basic necessity, GDR on 17-19 June. Spring 1953? New Evidence on an Old Problem], and in particular fat, meat, and sugar; in winter Deutschland Archiv 25:9 (1992), 943-58; Gerhard Already, long before 17 June, in certain Wettig, “Zum Stand der Forschung über Berijas 1952-53 there were also serious interruptions in areas in the GDR there were sporadic worker Deutschlandpolitik im Frühjahr 1953” [On the State of the supply of heat and electricity to the cities. strikes within a few enterprises, directed against Research on Beria’s German Policy in the Spring of This led to the rise of dissatisfaction, most nota- increases in output norms, which were being 1953], Deutschland Archiv 26:6 (1993), 674-82. bly within the less well-to-do sectors of the popu- instituted in accordance with government and 17. The decree, “Über die Maßnahmen zur Gesundung lace. In December and January-February 1952 isolated GDR ministries’ directives, without the der politischen Lage in der Deutschen Demokratischen there were isolated incidents of small and short- Republik,” released in 1989, is printed in Beiträge zur accompaniment of corresponding organizational lived workers’ strikes within a few enterprises; and technical measures and political work among Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 32:5 (1990), 651- these, however, did not catch the attention of CC 54. workers. The initiator and the primary author of 18. Quoted in Rolf Stöckigt, “Ein Dokument von SED and SCC organs. In January-March 1953, as the policy to increase output norms was [SED großer historischer Bedeutung vom Mai 1953” [A Docu- a part of the new “austerity regime” a number of General Secretary Walter] Ulbricht, who, in a ment of Great Historical Importance of May 1953], privileges and preferential treatments, enjoyed number of public speeches, rather actively stressed Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 32:5 by German workers since 1945, and in many the importance of these measures. The CC SED (1990), 649. cases earlier, were revoked with the active par- did not pay attention to these short-lived strikes 19. Ibid. ticipation of SCC /the revocation of railroad 20. Wilfriede Ott, “Dokumente zur Auseinandersetzung and only under heavy pressure from SCC an- passes, the changes in sick leave policy; the nounced, on 8 June, sloppily formulated direc- in der SED 1953,” Beiträge zur Geschichte der revocation of additional vacation time for sanato- Arbeiterbewegung 32:5 (1990), 655-67; Nadja Stulz- tives on the inadmissibility of overreaching dur- Herrnstadt, ed., Rudolf Herrnstadt. Das Herrnstadt- rium stays; the cut-backs in disability insurance ing the course of the campaign to raise output Dokument. Das Politbüro der SED und die Geschichte for working women turned housewives and so norms; this, however, was not accompanied by des 17. Juni 1953 [Rudolf Herrnstadt: The Herrnstadt on/. Further decreases in prices of consumer any organizational measures on the part of the File. The SED Politburo and the History of 17 June goods did not take place since spring of 1952. On party CC, and the announcement, for the most 1953] (: Rowohlt, 1990), 62-81. See also the contrary, ration coupon prices for meat were part, fell on deaf ears. Helmut Müller-Enbergs, Der Fall Rudolf Herrnstadt. increased by 10-15% under the pretext that the Tauwetterpolitik vor dem 17. Juni [The Herrnstadt quality of meat products had increased. All this, 2. Events in Berlin on 16-19 June Case. Thaw Policy before 17 June] (Berlin: Linksdwuck, as well as the increase in the price of jam and 1991); Wettig, “Sowjetische Wiederverein- igungsbemühungen,” 947-50; Wilfried Loth, Stalins artificial honey /a product used widely by low- On 14 June the state security organs of the ungeliebtes Kind. Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wollte paid workers/, brought about dissatisfaction GDR and the SED city committee of Berlin [Stalin’s Unwanted Child. Why Moscow Did Not Want among workers, which was further aggravated by received information on plans to strike against the GDR] (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1994), 209ff. the party’s and government’s failure, following the increase of productivity norms for construc- 21. Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und the 2nd SED conference, to take any steps to tion workers in Berlin, in particular, on the Massenorganisationen [Department “Principal Organs improve the situation of the bulk of workers, with of Party and Mass Organizations”], Stellungnahmen Stalinallee construction site. However, they did the exception of the July 1952 wage increases for not deem this information to be of any importance der Parteiorgane nach dem 9. bzw. 11. 6. 1953: Analyse ITR, as well as for qualified workers in the five der SED Kreisleitung Wernigerode, 11.6.1953 [Re- and did not report of this to the leadership of CC ports of Party Organs after June 9 resp. 11 June 1953: main branches of industry. SED and SCC. The events that followed were Analysis of the SED District Leadership, 6 June 1953], This was joined by the measures taken by completely unexpected to the leadership of GDR. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30 IV 2/5/526. the CC SED, as part of their mistaken policy of In the evening of 15 June the construction 22. Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und liquidating the petit and middle bourgeoisie of workers in Berlin announced categorical demands Massenorganisationen [Department “Principal Organs both city and country, which in some places took to repeal the increase in the productivity norms, of Party and Mass Organizations”], Stellungnahmen the rather ugly forms of insular administrative der Parteorgrane nach dem 9. bzw. 11. 6. 1953: [Bericht]: of which they [the workers] were informed with- planning and mass repressions directed also at out any prior explanations through a withholding K[reis]L[eitung]Wanzleben, 12.6.1953 [Reports of the workers. In addition, the petit-bourgeoisie’s dep- Party Organs after June 9 resp. 11 June 1953: Report, of corresponding sums from their paychecks. District leadership Wanzleben, 12 June 1953], SAPMO- rivation of ration coupons for fat, meat and sugar The Berlin organization of SED and the magis- BArch, DY 30 IV 2/5/526. was particularly hurtful, given the absence of trate of East Berlin did not react in any way to 23. Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und these products in the consumer market. these demands. Massenorganisationen, Stellungnahmen der Functionaries of the SED and of the State As came to be known later, agents from Parteorgrane nach dem 9. bzw. 11. 6. 1953: apparatus, under the influence of the decision that West Berlin and as yet unknown traitors from the Stimmungsbericht aus , 12.6.1953, SAPMO- emerged from the 2nd conference of the SED “on BArch, DY 30 IV 2/5/526. GDR trade unions were actively involved in the construction of socialism, regardless of any inciting the ranks of the workers. 24. See, e.g., Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und difficulties,” started to lose contact with the bulk Massenorganisationen,continued Tagesbericht on page 57 Nr. VI [Daily Re In the morning of 16 June, two thousand out 18 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN of a total of 35-40 thousand construction workers Berlin became more difficult. At 20.00 an ex- in the city on 17 June, though they did not rule out in Berlin struck in the city centre. They had a traordinary session of the most active members of the possibility of a slight increase in unrest as strike committee, which maintained ties with the Berlin SED organizations was held, where, in compared to 16 June. They evaluated the situa- West Berlin. The construction workers decided the presence of the entire CC SED Politburo, tion in GDR rather optimistically. We pointed to march to the GDR Statehouse, located on Ulbricht and Grotewohl gave speeches on the new out to the GDR leadership that it is necessary to Leipzigerstrasse, right on the border between the political course of the party and government. The be highly prepared and we proposed that detach- Soviet sector and the Western sector of Berlin. mood of the active party members, according to ments of German barracks-based police from The construction workers were joined on the members of the Politburo, was good. However, and Oranienburg be called out, which way by large groups of West Berlin provoca- the GDR leadership said not a word of the strikes they did by the morning of 17 June. teurs, carrying placards directed against the gov- that were taking place in the city, and gave no During the day of 16 June we sent a warning ernment, with demands for the resignation of the indication as to what course the active party telegram to our regional representatives inform- GDR government that had made mistakes, as members ought to take in the near future. During ing them of the unrest in Berlin and recommend- well as with demands for the lowering of prices this time crowds of West Berliners, consisting ing that they take urgent preventive and prepara- by 40% in the commercial stores of KhO mostly of youth, began to arrive on city railcars tory steps to tackle unrest in the regions of GDR. [Konsum-Handels-Organisation]. Crowds of and other means of transportation as well as on We advised the friends /Ulbricht/ to also warn the onlookers also joined the demonstration, so that foot. A crowd of some 4-5 thousand people regions about this through CC SED channels, but there were gathered some 5 thousand people at moved in the direction of the Friedrichstadtpalast they could not think of anything better than to call the GDR Statehouse. where a session of the active members of the party the first secretaries of regional committees to Having learned of the demonstration and of was taking place, thus creating a possible danger Berlin on 17 June “for instruction,” and as a the workers’ demands, the CC SED Politburo that the members of the CC SED Politburo could result, during the unrest of 17 June the regions decided, at a session that was taking place at the become hostages. At the same time, in the centre were left with practically no top party leaders. time, to repeal the increase in the productivity of the city at Stalinallee, a crowd of West Berlin- At about 7 o’clock in the morning of 17 norms and sent the CC Politburo member ers numbering some 2 thousand began throwing June, in East Berlin and in many cities in the [Heinrich] Rau to meet with the workers. How- rocks at the monument of comr. Stalin, and calling western and southern parts of GDR, there took ever, Rau and other government members were for the overthrow of the GDR government. The place simultaneous mass strikes that turned into not allowed to speak by the provocateurs, who were also shouts by isolated provocateurs, calling demonstrations, which, in a number of cities / drowned them out with shouts that [GDR Pre- for the killing of . Berlin, Magdeburg, , and others/, in turn mier Otto] Grotewohl or [GDR President The GDR police, acting on their instructions, became riots. Wilhelm] Pieck should speak to the workers. The did not actively intervene in these events. The The provocateurs were not able to call out a announcement concerning the repeal of the pro- measures that we undertook (the dispatch of po- general strike in Berlin. However, according to ductivity norm increase was made over a loud- lice reserves to the Friedrichstadtpalast), were preliminary figures, on 17 June 80 thousand speaker. Upon hearing this announcement, the enough to disperse the crowd that was moving in workers, out of a total number of 200 thousand, construction workers began to disperse, but the the direction of Friedrichstadtpalast, as well as the did strike. In addition, the largest enterprises West Berlin provocateurs began to agitate them mob at Stalinallee. Following this, various groups participated in the strike: the Stalin electrical that they should not settle for simply a repeal of of provocateurs and bandits, principally from machinery factory, the “Bergman-Borzig” fac- the increase in norms, but should demand a West Berlin, took to rioting in various places in tory, the Soviet enterprises of “Siemens-Planya,” decrease in the old norms, as well as lower of the Soviet sector of Berlin, overturning automo- cable factories, and others. prices in KhO, the resignation of the GDR gov- biles, looting shops and apartments of SED activ- After stopping work, many workers pro- ernment and the holding of all-German elec- ists on Stalinallee, stopping street traffic, trying to ceeded in columns towards the city centre to tions. The majority of construction workers break into the [natural] gas plant and other impor- Straussbergerplatz, where, the day before, the were not taken up by these provocations and, tant city enterprises. These acts of outrage were provocateurs called a general city meeting. At after a short period of time, dispersed from the carried out by groups that together numbered 7:30 about 10 thousand people gathered at this Statehouse. A small number of construction approximately 1.5-2 thousand people. plaza, who proceeded in separate columns to- workers was led by the West Berlin provocateurs Late in the evening of 16 June, we met with wards the GDR Statehouse, carrying banners to nearby pubs and restaurants where they were the leadership of CC SED (Grotewohl, Ulbricht, “Down with the government,” “We demand a served vodka while being encouraged towards [secret police chief Wilhelm] Zaisser, [SED Polit- decrease of norms,” “We demand a decrease of new actions. buro member Rudolf] Herrnstadt). We turned prices at KhO by 40%,” “We demand free elec- During the day of 16 June, there was a their attention to the seemingly serious nature of tions.” marked increase in the activity of small groups of the disorders that had taken place in the city, At 9 in the morning a crowd of 30 thousand provocateurs in various parts of East Berlin, pointing out that the slogans thrown out by the people gathered outside the GDR Statehouse, a carrying out anti-democratic agitation amongst provocateurs at the end of the day calling for a significant part of which was made up of West the populace. In a number of enterprises in East general strike were finding a positive response Berlin residents, who were the main organizers of Berlin and in GDR a slogan was sent forth from within the enterprises of East Berlin and in some the provocations. West Berlin calling for an immediate strike in other places in GDR, and also pointing out that it The insurgents were able to break through solidarity with the construction workers of Ber- is necessary to take the most decisive measures to the line of steadfast policemen, who did not use lin, as well as a slogan calling for a general strike maintain order in the city on 17 June, since one weapons during this time, and after throwing on 17 June. In the evening of 16 June an extra could expect a massive influx into East Berlin of rocks at them, they broke into the Statehouse edition of the evening paper “Dernbend” was provocateur bands from West Berlin. We in- where a was committed. The police published in West Berlin, with calls for a general formed our friends of our decision to send Soviet security force of the Statehouse was reinforced, strike in the Eastern zone of Germany. Solidarity forces into Berlin. Our friends announced that and at the time of the attack numbered 500 men. strikes started to spread throughout a number of they did not believe the situation so serious as to The Statehouse was recaptured only upon the enterprises towards the day’s end on 16 June. warrant such extraordinary measures, and that, in arrival of the Soviet forces, in concert with which, In the evening of 16 June the situation in their opinion, one should not expect serious unrest by the way, the German police, having been COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 19 partially beaten by the crowd, actively partici- based police, which created a threat of a takeover against the insurgents. This seemed to have a pated in the reestablishment of order. of government buildings and other important highly sobering effect, after which unrest in the At the same time, in the region of places by the insurgents. In view of this, at city quickly abated. By the evening order was Aleksandrplatz (the centre of Berlin) large col- around 10:30 a.m. we evacuated the members of established in the city. umns of demonstrators came together from the the CC SED Politburo and several members of Overall, approximately 66 thousand people, regions of Pankov, Vaisenzee, and Köpenich (the the GDR government to the buildings of the including some 10 thousand West Berliners, took Soviet sector of Berlin). Supreme of the USSR in Germany, part in the street demonstrations in East Berlin on The crowds of demonstrators, with the ac- located in Karlshorst. 17 June. In addition to the workers, the demon- tive participation of provocateurs, besieged the In view of the unrest that had taken place in stration included artisans, merchants, and other CC SED building, the Berlin Polizeipresidium, Berlin, in the morning of 17 June the city commit- members of the petit bourgeoisie. the main telegraph, the city trade-union adminis- tee of SED showed confusion. The city commit- During the course of the day on 17 June, tration and other buildings. At the Aleksandrplatz tee showed practically no leadership to the re- there appeared over various parts of the Soviet and in the region, the demonstrators built gional committees. At 10 o’clock in the morning sector of Berlin American planes, from which barricades and obstructions. Windows were the members of the SED city committee secre- were dropped leaflets containing calls to the smashed in a number of GDR government build- tariat, including the first secretary Endretsky, population to participate in the strikes and the ings. headed for the most important city enterprises so unrest, and to work to overthrow the Government At Potsdammerplatz, on the sector border, as to prevent any strikes from taking place there. of GDR. On the sector border mobile loudspeak- the insurgents had an exchange of fire with the The staff of the Central Soviet of the SNM [Union ers appeared on several occasions over which the people’s police and 7 policemen were disarmed. of German Youth], the regional party committees insurgents were given orders. After the deploy- The provocateurs also organized a pogrom and 200 members of the city party school were ment of guards on the sector border, several large of the bookstore “International book” and of the also sent to the city enterprises. Although the groups of provocateurs and hooligans from West central department store “KhO” on active members were able to avert strikes in a Berlin broke through to the Soviet sector. In the Aleksandrplatz, set fire to the already half-empty number of enterprises, their expedition to the streets Braunekstrasse and Bernauerstrasse, these department store Kolumbushaus on enterprises during the time of the unfolding of bands started an exchange of fire with the Ger- Potsdamerplatz, looted the cinema “Defa” and a street unrest, as well as their failure to call on the man police, as a result of which there were number of other public buildings. There was also party members to go to the streets in order to casualties. looting of stores in other parts of the city. defend the democratic government, resulted in [a In the evening of 17 June, the American The crowds of insurgents moved through situation such] that the central streets of the city radio station RIAS in its transmissions recom- the city, chanting hostile slogans and singing were esentially in the hands of the better orga- mended that the insurgents submit to the orders of fascist songs. Numerous groups of provocateurs nized opposition. While, it is true that in a number Soviet officials, and not clash with Soviet forces. penetrated through to the city enterprises, to call of places SED activists bravely joined in hand-to- On 18 June in Berlin, under the presence of workers to strike. Most importantly, they tried to hand skirmishes with the insurgents, they were the military situation, many factories continued stop the main city electrostation Klingenberg, as beaten by the mob. to strike. In a number of places there were well as a second large electrostation Rummelsburg Due to these reasons, the control of the attempts to resume the demonstrations and to and a [natural] gas plant. However, the workers situation in the city was essentially passed to the form picket lines of strikers, which were sup- of these enterprises showed a high degree of hands of Soviet organs. The second-rank mem- pressed by the decisive actions of the German consciousness and organization, having estab- bers remaining in the SED city committee were, police and, in part, by the Soviet forces, which lished their picket lines around the plant build- for the most part, occupied in gathering informa- secured all points of importance in the eastern ings, thus not allowing the provocateurs through. tion by request of the CC. part of the city. In the relations between the Detachments of the people’s police tried In the SED city committee, the channels of populace and the Soviet military there was [a] everywhere to put up resistance against the ban- receiving communiqués from places were badly significant feeling of alienation; in fact, not until dits and the hooligans, however, as a result of organized, as a result of which, the city commit- 22 June did the party organize any campaign to their small numbers and inadequate weapons, tee was not informed of the actual situation in the reestablish friendly ties between the populace they were to a great extent overrun and dispersed. enterprises. At 12 o’clock the members of the and our military. The number of police in Berlin on hand was secretariat of the city committee returned to the By 19-20 June the strikes in Berlin began to completely inadequate for putting down more or city committee building and until 3 o’clock were decline sharply and normalcy was established. less serious unrest (a total of 4,940 men, not busy with “formulating arguments” of propa- However, amidst the striking workers in the en- counting the border police). An analogous situ- ganda for the populace. In addition, the city terprises there could be observed a feeling of ation took place in other large cities in GDR. committee took the necessary measures to insure bitterness. There were numerous instances of During the course of the day, reinforce- the continuous operation of the electrostation, enemy agents and provocateurs working in the ments from Potsdam, -on- and other water supply, city transport, [natural] gas plants, enterprises. SED and SNM continued to act population centers of the Republic, numbering and the trade network. irresolutely and weakly, mostly making use of two thousand men in total, were brought into The Presidium of the people’s police of lower functionaries. The SED city committee, as Berlin. In addition, certain units of the German Berlin (V. Schmidt) managed rather effectively well as the CC SED, began to send its staff to the barracks-based police, numbering 2,200 men, the people’s police, which functioned smoothly. factories on a large scale on 19 June, though even were also brought in. Of all of these, 3,660 were The main role in the dispersion of the dem- on that day, in accordance with the directives of stationed along the border with West Berlin, the onstrations and in the liquidation of street unrest Ulbricht, they limited themselves to holding small crossing of which was prohibited for both ve- in Berlin was played by the Soviet forces. It meetings, afraid that in large worker meetings the hicles and pedestrians by the order of Soviet should be noted that in the beginning the insur- party functionaries would encounter opposition military commanders. gents acted rather provocatively against our and would be whistled [booed]. On 19 June we While our forces were not undertaking any troops—they climbed on top of tanks, threw called the entire SED city committee of Berlin to active steps to stop the unrest, the demonstrators rocks at the troops, and so on. At the meet with us, and in no uncertain terms made were able to resist the people’s and the barracks- Polizeipresidium building our forces opened fire clear to them that there must be an immediate and 20 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN unswerving move to send all party forces on by the Soviet Union through A/O “Vismut”. CC with the goal of bringing into its ranks new hand in Berlin to the factories, so as to assure a 6. To determine the between personnel, including the . To reduce corresponding change in the mood of the work- the GDR mark and the ruble in financial dealings the number of Secretariat members from 11 per- ers. between the USSR and GDR, so as to reflect the sons to 5 persons. actual buying power of the mark and the ruble. To liquidate the currently existing position [Ed. note: Other sections of Part I of the report 7. To make it the primary goal of CC SED of General Secretary of CC SED, replacing it examined “The situation in other cities in GDR and the Government of the GDR to seriously with several CC Secretarial posts. on 17-19 June”; “The demonstrators’ and strik- improve the living standards of workers in public 10. To hold the IV Party Convention of SED ers’ slogans and demands”; “The workers’ and private enterprises of the GDR, as well as to in the next 3-4 months, in which the questions of mood”; “The behavior of other groups of people. undertake wide-ranging political action among the party’s role in the establishment of the new The Intelligentsia. The Rural Areas. The Church”; workers, focusing on improving their relations direction would be discussed. During this con- and “The Party. Party apparatus. Party bloc. with the party. vention to seriously renew the ranks of the CC, so Social Organizations.” Part II examined “The 8. In light of the recent misdirection of CC as to include a greater number of younger person- Economic Problems Facing the GDR in Light of SED in their methods of governing by taking over nel, who have excelled in their work with the the Events of 17-19 June.”] government and administrative organs, [it is nec- working classes, working peasants, as well as the essary] clearly to separate the functions of the intelligencia. To radically renew the ranks of the III. A few conclusions and recommendations Government of the GDR and the CC SED, giving CC SED Politburo, purging it of members who do the CC SED the power of oversight on solely the not demonstrate the necessary capabilities re- With regard to the above-stated, we think it most important questions of the State and its quired of leaders of the party and of the State in appropriate to undertake the following measures citizenry. To focus the attention of CC SED on these times. in order to correct the situation in the GDR: carrying out political campaigns among the popu- 11. To carry out a special investigation of lace and on smoothening out intra-party opera- the work of the professional unions and to make 1. To firmly and consistently carry out the tions by introducing broader intra-party democ- decisive changes in the ranks of the leaders of new political course, as outlined in the Soviet racy, criticism, and self-criticism from top to corresponding organs, as well as to introduce Government Resolutions of 6 June 1953 on the bottom. new regulations that would radically change the normalization of the political situation in the Correspondingly, it is necessary: role of the professional unions in step with the GDR. a) to reorganize the Government of the GDR requirements of the new direction. 2. To undertake immediate steps to radi- with the goal of strengthening and reducing the 12. To reexamine the ranks, the organiza- cally improve the food supply for the population size of government apparatus both centrally and tion and the distribution of the people’s police of of the GDR by providing it with corresponding at its branches, by consolidating a number of the GDR, to arm it with modern weapons, includ- aid from Soviet Union and other people’s demo- scattered ministries and departments into larger ing armored transports and armored vehicles, and cratic countries. With regard to this, one should ministries and departments; with communications equipment, as well as to bear in mind that so far the forms of assistance, b) to liquidate the Ministry of State Security create, drawing from the ranks of current detach- including the additional shipments ordered by [KGB] of the the GDR, by merging into the ments of barracks-based police, mobile detach- the Soviet Government on 24 June, have been Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR; ments of sufficient readiness and strength as to be limited to food rations and to minimal commer- c) to relieve comr. Ulbricht of his duties as able to maintain order and peace in the Republic cial trade in the “KhO” stores during the 3rd deputy prime minister of the GDR, so as to enable without the help of the Soviet military. quarter of this year. him to concentrate his attention on work within To reorganize the currently existing army 3. In order to create a stable economy in the the CC SED; corpus of the GDR into a national guard-type Republic and to improve the standard of living of d) to elevate the role of the Chamber of the army, along the lines of the one existing in West- the citizens of the GDR so as to match that of the People to that of an active Parliament of the ern Germany. citizens of West Germany, to examine the ques- Republic, that would debate and legislate the laws 13. To give the SNM organization the char- tion of discontinuing the shipment of goods in of the Republic, establish commissions, debate acter of a broad-based non-party organization of the form of reparations to the Soviet Union and inquiries and demands voiced by its deputies, etc. youth, using the experience of earlier German Poland and discontinuing the shipment of goods To forbid the passage of any resolutions, that youth organizations. To make changes in the to USSR as payment for currently operating are in effect laws, bypassing the Chamber of the leadership ranks of the Central Soviet of the Soviet enterprises in the GDR, as of the second People of the GDR; Union of German Youth (SNM). half of 1953, so as to use these goods to improve e) to call an extraordinary session of the 14. To change the character of the diplo- GDR foreign trade and to provide for the domes- Chamber of the People of the GDR, as a vehicle matic delegation in the Soviet Union from the tic needs of the Republic. for the Government of the GDR to report on its GDR, and their assignments. To strengthen cul- To continue the reparation payments in work as well as on its past mistakes, and afterward tural and technical ties between the GDR and the [deutch]marks, in amounts that would ensure a reorganizing the ranks of the Government, letting Soviet Union. To reduce vacations and sanato- normal activity of A/O “Vismut”. go the less capable and less popular ministers, and rium trips of SED functionaries to the Soviet 4. To examine the question of sharply re- bringing in the more popular persons to ministe- Union and other countries, and increase the vaca- ducing the GDR’s financial responsibility in the rial positions, drawing more widely from among tions and sanatorium trips of prominent members maintenance of Soviet occupation forces in Ger- representatives of other parties. of German intelligencia, workers, members of many. 9. To restrict the functions of the Secretariat other parties, as well as tourists. 5. To transfer, on favorable terms, the owner- of CC SED to tasks such as the supervision of the 15. In order to raise the international pres- ship of all remaining Soviet industrial, trade and execution of CC Politburo decisions, organiza- tige of the GDR and the authority of the GDR transport enterprises, including the bank and the tional questions, selection of personnel, place- government in the eyes of the German populace, -Baltic Insurance Company, to the ment and education of personnel, as well as to to have the new government, chosen by the Cham- GDR, using the payment received for these en- questions of party related political campaigns ber of the People, make an official visit to Mos- terprises primarily as future expenditures made among the masses. To reorganize the Secretariat cow. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 21

16. After the changes in the military situa- SED REPORT grew to 25,000 by 8:40 am. By 10:45 am, parts tion in East Berlin, to hold it unwise to continue from page 11 of the VP were disarmed at the Potsdamer Platz. to maintain the border of East Berlin with West construction sites, especially from the Stalinallee, On the Marx-Engels Platz various figures re- Berlin open, until the commandants of West participated in it. The Party and labor union volted, calling for fascist violence. Nothing was Berlin take the necessary steps to guarantee that organizations did not know anything about this. done by even those participants in the demonstra- agents and provocateurs, who carry out subver- The agitation for the strike built on the dissatis- tion, who had gone along in the belief that they sive activities against GDR in East Berlin, are no faction existing among the workers (schematic, had to put pressure behind their economic de- longer sent from West Berlin. administrative norm increase, bad organization mands, to the burning of red flags, the raiding of With regard to this, to establish, in the im- of work, shortages in professional uniforms, tools, HO-shops [state-owned Handels-Organisation mediate future, a system of permanent and tem- etc.). shops—ed.], and the destruction of cars as well as porary visas to allow the crossing of the border The signal given on 6/15 for the planned the beating up of FDJ members [Free Democratic between East and West Berlin, however, making strikes was underestimated by the Party and the Youth—ed.]. The resolute action by the Soviet sure not to create unnecessary difficulties and, in union, and was not responded to with sufficient units suppressed the fascist provocation and general, considering the interests of the German determination. Thus, on 6/16, developed the brought the people off the streets. A part of the population. strike of the construction workers, beginning at demonstrators realized the great danger for peace 17. To entrust the Commanding Group of the hospital construction site, and quickly spread- [that] had been caused by the fascist provocation. Soviet occupational forces in Germany to im- ing to other construction sites by the sending out With the declaration of martial law, panic-buy- prove the distribution of Soviet forces, keeping in of delegations and groups of provocateurs. ing, provoked by the enemy, began in all districts mind the lessons learned during the events of 17 The hostile slogans: “Resignation of the of Berlin. June, and, in particular, to see that the necessary Government”, “General Strike”, “Free Elections”, While in almost all large plants, with few number of tank detachments are quartered in (so-called “Berlin demands”) were carried into exceptions, at least a part of the workers had set Berlin. the demonstration by West Berlin instigation down their work, the administrations continued [signature] [signature] [signature] groups which were coming in by large numbers; to work. Serious occurrences only happened in (V.Sokolovskii) (V.Semyenov) (P.Yudin) in many plants, however, the strike and the dem- the requisition office. Thus, for example, the onstrations on the 17th had already begun with entire requisition office in Friedrichshain went these slogans. At the same time, the instigators on strike on 6/17 and 6/18. The strike leadership 24 June 1953 organized delegations to the other plants which consisted of seven workers. In the center district iskh st-0024 appealed to the workers’ solidarity and called for of the city, 121 people at the city council did not the support of the strikers. The riots on Tuesday go to work on 6/18, 87 alone from the requisition [Source: Fund 06, Opis 12a, Papka 5, Delo 301, 6/16 by fascist rowdy groups on the Stalinallee, office. In a number of plants, the workers refused Listy 1-51, Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian on the Alexanderplatz, and in front of the govern- to start working on 6/18, unless the arrested had Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; document ob- ment buildings and the clashes between partici- been set free, and the Soviet tanks had been tained and provided by Vladislav M. Zubok, pants of party conventions [Parteiaktiv-tagungen] withdrawn. The resumption of work in many National Security Archive; translated by Danny in Friedrichstadtpalast with these groups, at the plants was made dependent on whether those Rozas.] intersection of Friedrichs Street—“Unter den plants were working again which had initiated the Linden” and at the other places, were not recog- strike. This was particularly evident in nized as signals for the prepared fascist riots on Weissensee, in the plant “October 7”; this also Wednesday [June 17], and their spreading became evident in the queries of a number of throughout the Republic. plants about the situation in the Stalinallee. In a number of Berlin districts, certain plants operated as organizational centers of the strike. [Ed. note: Additional sections of Part II of the In Lichtenberg, it was “Fortschritt I,” in Köpenich report discuss events in other regions and cities the dockyard and the cable-manufacturing plant, of the GDR, outside Berlin, during the revolt. in Weissensee the plant “7 October,” and in Part III covers statistical evidence on the strike’s Treptow the EAW. These centers drew in the impact in various areas of the economy. Part IV other plants into the movement, by sending del- examines the causes of the revolt, and the conduct egations there and threatening the workers who of various organizations, classes, and govern- were willing to keep on working. ment and party organs during the events.] In KWO [Kraftwerk ost], the strike ema- nated from the copper press shop. What elements [Source: Stiftung “Archiv der Parteien und took on the leadership in the action, is proven by Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR” an example from the H7 Köpenich, where the im Bundesarchiv (Foundation “Archives of the former SS-Obersturnmbannfuehrer Hülse stood Parties and Mass Organizations of the Former out. GDR), Berlin, DY 30 J IV 2/202/15; document A part of the plants went on strike under the obtained and provided by Christian Ostermann, pressure of the fascist provocateurs. Thus, West Hamburg University and National Security Berlin provocateurs invaded the RFT Stern and Archive; translation by Helen Christakos.] terrorized the workers. Already by 8:20 am on 17.6 [17 June], 8,000 demonstrators were in front of the House of Ministries, and broke through the barriers of the VP [Peoples’ Police]. Because of the continuous incoming flow from the districts, the number 22 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN NEW EVIDENCE ON THE

THE YELTSIN DOSSIER: leadership, the Presidium of the Central Com- Soviet political-military decision making SOVIET DOCUMENTS mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet process. Usually, models of decision-mak- ON HUNGARY, 1956 Union (CC CPSU). About one-fifth are ing processes distinguish between senior resolutions passed by the party Presidium, and junior actors: lower-level actors collect by Janos M. Rainer and about a third are reports, recommenda- information, make recommendations, pre- tions, and memoranda, made by the mem- pare analyses, implement decisions, while During a November 1992 visit to bers of the Presidium and the Secretariat; authority rests at the higher level, where , Russian President Boris Yeltsin more than two-thirds of the documents actu- decision-makers ostensibly have an over- handed to Hungarian President Arpad Goncz ally reached the Presidium. Close to 40 view over often conflicting information and a dossier of Soviet archival materials related percent of the Soviet documents emanated interests.3 to the 1956 Hungarian . The from the Foreign Ministry, and three-fourths The 1956 Soviet documents primarily documents contained in the file, consisting of these consist of reports from the Soviet concern the functioning of the higher level of 299 pages, have now been published in embassy in Budapest. (party presidium, secretariat, government), Hungarian translation in two volumes,1 and One striking feature of the documents is but rather one-sidedly. Some 80 percent of also made available in Russian archives.2 that they hint at how conspicuously concen- the documents are inputs: primary, to a large For Hungarians as well as for scholars trated power and decision-making were, es- extent “unprocessed” information—local worldwide, these materials have tremen- pecially in some key areas, at the highest reports, analyses made on the lower level or dous significance—quite aside from their levels of the Soviet system during the crisis. outside the decision-making mechanism. political import as a Russian gesture toward It is quite characteristic that a discussion Consequently, the direct mechanism of creating a new relationship between Mos- between the counselor of the Soviet embassy higher level decision-making cannot be cow and Budapest after the collapse of the in Budapest and a vacationing head of de- evaluated. The collections contain the ma- Soviet Union. Until the , Soviet po- partment of the Hungarian Communist Party jor party Presidium resolutions on Hungary, litical history could be studied only with the appeared on the agenda of a Presidium meet- but these resolutions, unfortunately, are sophisticated analytical tools of ing in Moscow. (True, it was agenda item 32 merely authoritative instructions given to Kremlinology and oral history. Now, how- only and also, the head of department in subordinate executive organs. Not one docu ever, at least a minor, and perhaps a grow- question was a personal friend of Kadar’s.) continued on page 24 ing, portion of this history can be analyzed Among the Soviet using traditional historical methods. documents are eight re- SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON Still, one must acknowledge that al- ports sent by the head of 24 OCTOBER - though these materials answer many ques- the KGB, General Ivan tions posed by historians and the interested , to Presidium of the 1. Report from Soviet Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs public over the years, they have not radi- CPSU CC after the revolt Perevertkin, 24 October 1956 cally altered the general picture of 1956; erupted on October 23, and none of the documents contains anything 11 accounts on the crush- SPECIAL FOLDER Top Secret that could be called a sensation. The Yeltsin ing of the Revolution and dossier does, however, provide some new the fighting after the So- The Ministry of Internal Affairs reports on the situation on the information, enhance our understanding of viet invasion on Novem- Soviet-Hungarian border as of 8:00 a.m. In accordance with the several important aspects of the events, con- ber 4 transmitted by the decision of the Minster of Defense Marshal Zhukov, Soviet troops firm some earlier unverified assumptions or Minister of Defense, Mar- crossed the Hungarian border. In all there were 128 rifle divisions hypotheses, and help to clarify a number of shal Gyorgi Zhukov. Per- and 39 mechanized divisions, which began to enter Hungary at 2:15 details. Certainly they are significantly haps because of their ur- at the points Csop, Beregovo, and Vylok. Separate units gave more useful than the previously published gency and because they necessary help to the Soviet Army. The whole border was guarded documentation in providing a window into were prepared for the Pre- in order to permit us to violate state borders with impunity. The crossing of troops over the border continues. There have been no the minds of key Soviet officials, and in- sidium on short notice, incidents on the border. [...] sights into how they functioned, in the midst they are very short. of a serious crisis. This review of the (Signed) Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Since the Soviet documents transferred types of materials con- Perevertkin by Yeltsin were chosen in an unclear man- tained in the Yeltsin pack- ner, in the absence of thorough research in age points, alas, to one of (Source: Fond 89, Perechen 45, Dokument 7, Center for the Storage and full access to the Moscow archives their shortcomings: the of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow; translation there is no way of knowing whether the lack of documentation of by Johanna Granville. ) selection contains the most important ones. the process of decision- * * * * * The quantity is unquestionably consider- making at the highest level able—115 documents—as they cover events in Moscow. Two basic 2. Mikoyan-Suslov Report, 24 October 1956 of only one-and-a-half years, from April features of the documents 1956 until July 1957, and also high-level, emerge when one seeks to Top secret with the majority originating from the top use them to decipher the Making Copies Prohibited HUNGARIAN CRISIS, 1956 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 23

IMRE NAGY, forward. He did not immediately go over to (the “Special Corps” [“Osobii Korpus”]) HESITANT REVOLUTIONARY the side of the revolution. already stationed in Hungary under General There were several key moments of Lashchenko) on October 23? To be sure, he by Johanna Granville hesitation on Nagy’s part. Why, for ex- didn’t sign the actual letter of invitation, but ample, did Nagy forbid the Hungarian Army two days later (October 25), Nagy himself In the beginning stages of the Hungar- to resist the Soviet tanks on October 23-24? was reported to have “requested an increase ian revolt of 23 October-4 November 1956, Why wasn’t Nagy as bold as Polish leader in Soviet troops operating in Budapest.”5 Imre Nagy’s behavior was oddly hesitant. Wladislaw Gomulka, who days earlier had One possible explanation is that Nagy Having written several times to Moscow in told Khrushchev frankly: Turn your tanks was still dependent on Soviet tutelage. He the summer and early fall of 1956 to be around now, or we’ll fight you. Even when didn’t want to upset the Russians again, after readmitted into the Hungarian Workers’ Nagy finally confronted Andropov on No- they had readmitted him into the party and Party, he was loathe at first to break ranks vember 1 at a 7 p.m. session of the Hungar- the Politburo. His friend Imre Mezo, the completely with the Soviet Communist Party ian Council of Ministers, he was jittery and Budapest Party Secretary who was killed on and to declare Hungary’s neutrality. The unsure of his own authority. In a telegram to October 25, had told him that Erno Gero, documents below have been selected to con- Moscow, Andropov wrote: “Nagy in a rather still First Secretary, wanted to goad him into vey the confusion of the time, particularly nervous tone informed all those present that some premature move, and then slap him from the perspective of Soviet Minister of earlier that morning he asked the Soviet down for good.6 He didn’t really start to Defense Marshal Georgii Zhukov and KGB Ambassador why Soviet troops had crossed break away until October 28, the day he Chief in trying to restore order the Hungarian border and were penetrating issued an amnesty to any street fighters who under firm communist control. Fighting, Hungarian territory. Nagy ‘demanded’ an would peacefully surrender their weapons.7 begun on the night of 23-24 October 1956, explanation of this. He spoke as if he were In the document below, Serov describes continued until October 30, two days after calling me to witness the fact that he was with some relief on October 29: “After the Nagy announced a cease-fire. At 6:15 a.m. registering a . During this time he announcement of the government declara- on November 4, the second, more massive, kept looking at Zoltan Tildy as if wishing to tion on the radio, about amnesty to the stu- Soviet intervention was launched. The pace receive his support.”1 Indeed, three days dents who had participated in the demon- of events seems to have prodded Imre Nagy earlier, as the second document reprinted stration, the armed started to lay down their below reveals, Nagy ac- weapons.”8 THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION, tually had a slight heart Nagy also edged only cautiously to ex- 4 NOVEMBER 1956 attack from nervous ex- pand the government to include non-com- haustion; Suslov gave him munists. On October 26, Malenkov asked CIPHERED TELEGRAM some medicine.2 Nagy, “What kinds of parties do you want to And why, on Octo- have participate in the new government?” FROM BUDAPEST ber 23, did Nagy wait so Nagy replied, “We are not talking about long to go out and address parties as such; we are talking about indi- OUT OF SEQUENCE the crowds who were call- vidual candidates to represent the People’s ing his name? Why Democracy.” And he presented the pro- We arrived at the scene after some delay; due to weather couldn’t he give a more posal of bringing in non-Comunists as the conditions, we were unable to land at the airport near Budapest. We stirring speech on that “only alternative”; any other policy would landed 90 kilometers to the north. We stopped by the corps critical night of October result in a “loss of contact with the workers headquarters for orientation, and from there, in an armored person- 23-24? He had no micro- and students.”9 nel carrier with comrades [KGB chief Ivan] Serov and [Gen. phone, it’s true, but the In fact, Khrushchev actually thought it Mikhail S.] Malinin, we set off for the city. We were accompanied words themselves were possible that he and Tito (supposedly the by tanks, because there was shooting in Budapest at this time and hopelessly out of touch national communist independent of Soviet casualties on both sides, including Soviet soldiers and officers. with the temper of the influence) could “work on” Nagy, and per- In Buda small groups of people watched the movement of our column calmly; some looked anxious, others greeted it with a rowdy crowd. “Elvtar- suade him to support the new Kadar govern- smile. The roads approaching the city and in the city were full of sak!” [Comrades!] he ment after the November 4 intervention. Soviet tanks and other materiel. called them.3 We will Perhaps if everything had gone according to On the streets together with the Soviet troops were Hungarian continue “the June way” the plan worked out between Khrushchev patrols. In contrast to Buda, where it was calm, there was continu- (the “New Course” re- and Tito at Brioni on , from 7 ous shooting in Pest between isolated groups of provocators and forms promulgated by the p.m. to 5 a.m., the Soviet leadership would individuals and our machine-gunners, beginning at the bridge and communist government in never have felt compelled to deport Nagy to extending to the Ministry of Defense building, as well as toward the 1953).4 Rumania, put him on trial, and eventually Central Committee building. Our men did more of the shooting; to Why didn’t Nagy protest execute him (in June 1958). This secret solitary shots we replied with salvos. In the Ministry of Defense we met the ministers of defense and when Erno Gero, then agreement between Khrushchev and Tito state security, as well as a group of Central Committee members— First Secretary of the Hun- was not known until the Yugoslav and So- [Istvan] Kovacs, Zoltan Vas, and others, who were authorized to garian Workers’ Party, viet Communist Party archives were opened continued on page 29 invited in Soviet troops after the collapse of the Soviet Union in continued on page 27 24 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

YELTSIN DOSSIER representative of the CPSU CC from the Pact, who commanded the invasion contributed from page 22 mid-’50s. Beside gathering information force from ) (11 reports). ment describes the discussions, participants, he occasionally made recommendations These are the most important of the contributors, and differences of opinion at too, and in crisis situations his reports Soviet documents: 28 reports in which the the Presidium meetings. Instead, one re- reached the party Presidium. Between 29 members of the party’s top leadership or peatedly encounters such euphemistic April 1956 and 14 October 1956 only their “special subordinates” observe, ana- phraseology as “V szootvetsztvii sz four out of Ambassador Andropov’s ten lyze, act, and negotiate. True, they did so obmenom mnyenyijami”, “sz ucsotom known reports got there. At the end of “only” in Budapest, but at least they are obmena mnyenyijami”, “na osznove September 1956, Andrei Gromyko, the shown in action. Moreover, some key as- szosztojascsevoszja obmena mnyenyijami” deputy minister of foreign affairs, had to pects of the second and third missions can be —“in accordance with,” “in regard to,” and summarize Andropov’s communications cross-checked with the wealth of Hungarian “based on” the discussion.4 Yet we have no to the Presidium, when the crisis was party and state documents released in recent real data on debates, no minutes of the becoming apparent.7 Otherwise, years.9 deliberations of the top Soviet leaders.5 Andropov prepared his reports for the The normal and extraordinary political By contrast, among the declassified Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the “De- decision-making levels of the party leader- U.S. government records on the Hungarian partment” of the Central Committee ship received supplementary information crisis, both published and in archives, re- (meaning the division responsible for from other parts of the intertwined party- searchers readily find numerous documents contact with the foreign Communist par- state organs, most importantly autonomous describing policy debates, including detailed ties).8 organs of force such as the army and KGB. minutes of National Security Council dis- b. Other embassy personnel worked The reports of the extraordinary level cussions, as well as serious analytical pa- on the lower level, gathering information contain numerous errors, mistakes, and faults, pers prepared by the NSC and various intel- on special areas of interest to the leader- especially during and immediately after the ligence agencies.6 Whether comparable ship and maintaining personal contacts Revolution. Persons and locations cropped documentation exists on the Soviet side, but with other sources (primarily with party up which remained in obscurity for the So- remains off-limits, or whether such items of figures who had been in Moscow but viet leaders. They received the biased and/ Presidium transcripts on the crisis do not were not part of the top leadership), and or panic stricken information above all on exist, was not clarified in the materials de- their reports usually reached the medium street atrocities written by the usual Hungar- livered by Yeltsin. In any event, the result level only. ian informants, especially Hungarian state is that the crucial factors which determine In crisis situations intelligence was el- security officers.10 On the other hand the top-level decision-making can be analyzed evated to a special level, and on such occa- Soviets also manipulated the news, only by inference. sions the party Presidium sent its own mem- Andropov, Serov, and Zhukov in particular. An additional problem is that the So- bers as plenipotentiary envoys to the place of The last-named, for example, made no dis- viet documents only treat the Hungarian crisis to conduct personal inspections, as- tinction between the fighting civilian insur- issue in a very narrow sense—the context of sessments, and, on occasion, negotiations. gents and the Hungarian army—which never the international situation makes but a dim Usually they attempted to maintain secrecy. fought in mass—when describing resistance appearence. Important issues like the Suez The envoys contacted local leaders first and to the second Soviet intervention after No- crisis, U.S. behavior, the problems of the collected information. Then they made rec- vember 4. This exaggeration of the true East-Central European allies, barely receive ommendations for decision to Moscow and proportions of resistance was used to justify mention. sometimes had the right to take local action, the immense scale of the Soviet interven- Still, while all these issues require fur- evidently on the basis of consultation with tion. ther thorough research, even the selected the center. Four such extraordinary delega- Thus, the Soviet documents must be documents permit an illuminating explora- tions visited Hungary between the summer handled with great circumspection as far as tion of the thinking, terminology, priorities, of 1956 and the end of that year: facts are concerned. Contemporary readers and particular style of conduct between the 1. , 7-14 June 1956 (1 will be astounded by the raw, coarse nature leadership of the and report); of the reports, which were frequently written Moscow’s East European satellites at this 2. , 13-21 July 1956 (6 in primitive party jargon. Hardly camou- juncture of the Cold War, as well as of the reports); flaged orders and instructions are confus- Soviet style of information gathering and 3. Mikoyan, Suslov, Serov, and Gen. ingly intermingled with niceties, “com- crisis management. In “normal circum- Mikhail Malinin (Deputy Chief of Staff radely” good advice, and partylike state- stances,” the Soviet leadership gathered in- of the Soviet Army, who might have ments. Mikoyan obviously differed in this formation on the satellites through two in- arrived earlier), 24-31 October 1956 (10 sense from Malenkov and Serov, not to ner official channels: reports); mention Andropov. One finds hardly any a. The higher level, represented by 4. Suslov, Boris Aristov, Georgi trace of contrary opinions from the Hungar- the ambassador, whose scope of author- Malenkov and Serov (who was prob- ian side concerning important questions, with ity included keeping in touch with top ably on location continuously from Oc- the exception of Imre Nagy during the Revo- local party leaders. The Soviet ambas- tober 24), and Marshal I.S. Koniev lution. While differing Hungarian views sador was at the same time the local (Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw were noted in the phase of Soviet informa- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 25 tion gathering, once decisons were taken tion initially appeared manageable. It was decision however, could hardly have been Moscow’s representatives paid little atten- obvious from the Mikoyan group’s report made by this point. Yet, Mikoyan signaled tion to them. that Erno Gero, the Stalinist Hungarian party the limits of compromise: “From our part we The above caveats and limitations not- leader, was at odds with the reformer Imre warned them that no further concessions can withstanding, the following observations can Nagy, who had been recently included in the be made, otherwise it will lead to the fall of be offered regarding Soviet decisions and leadership. Yet on , Khruschev the system...the withdrawal of Soviet army the Hungarian Revolution, based on the docu- informed the leaders of other Warsaw Pact will lead inevitably to the American troops ments provided by Yeltsin: allies in Eastern Europe that there was a marching in. Just like earlier we still think it 1. Since the summer of 1956, as the anti- “total unity of opinion” within the Hungar- possible that the Soviet soldiers will return Stalinist opposition gained strength, the So- ian leadership.13 to their bases shortly after law and order will viet leadership observed the Hungarian cri- 4. The Soviets looked upon the Hungar- have been restored.”16 sis with great worry. They saw the solution ian leadership, especially Imre Nagy, with 7. The Soviets’ short-term interest was to the crisis in leadership changes (Rakosi’s distrust from the very beginning of the crisis. to quell the exceedingly tense Hungarian dismissal) and reserved forceful oppressive The Hungarian party leaders simply did not situation. So long as they saw a hope for this, measures as a last resort only. In July 1956, wait for Moscow when they reshuffled per- they countenanced political concessions Soviet representative Mikoyan reported that sonnel on October 23, even though there was which were earlier considered to be serious “as a result of the Hungarian situation there an expressed demand for this. This is how right wing deviations. Perhaps they feared is an atmosphere of uneasiness prevailing in Imre Nagy became prime minister. Later, unintended or unclear consequences of an our Central Committee and in the ranks of party leader Gero was dismissed by the outright invasion, or an escalation of fight- the Socialist camp, which is due to the fact, Soviets, but the new government list was ing that might lead to the involvement of that it cannot be permitted for something compiled by the Nagy group, although Suslov American troops. On October 28, the Sovi- unexpected, unpleasant to happen in Hun- and Mikoyan were present. The Soviets ets agreed to an armistice and the withdrawal gary. If the Hungarian comrades need it, our demanded adherence to the “norms of the of their military units from Budapest with- Central Committee is ready to give them a empire” even in crisis situations. out the military elimination of the centers of helping hand by giving advice or else, in 5. The Soviet documents suggest that armed insurgents. They accepted a sentence order to put things right.”11 October 26 was a turning point. On one in Imre Nagy’s draft program which pro- 2. Although the Soviet leaders received hand, this is when Imre Nagy’s policy of posed negotiations for the later withdrawal serious signals about the further exacerba- searching for a political solution was formu- of Soviet troops, contingent upon “the So- tion of tensions in Hungary, they were dis- lated. Earlier, it was thought that Nagy viet Union’s exclusive decision.”17 Yet, no tracted by crises in other locations (Poland, “hesitated” right until October 28, when he far-reaching formal agreement was con- Suez). Evidently, in assessing the Hungar- declared the armistice. He decided that a cluded with Imre Nagy. At the most, there ian situation, they did not think in terms of new political, conciliatory line was needed was an informal accord along the lines of the social movements, but only in the context of by October 26. He gained support for this October 26 “principles.” There was no men- more or less narrow political factions (party from popular pressure coming from below tion in them about a multi-party system leadership vs. enemy/opposition). A Politi- and the actions of the party opposition. This (only the inclusion of politicians from other cal Committee, authorized on the highest change was supported by Kadar with some parties in the government), no mention about level, was functioning in Budapest, and it reservations.14 the troop withdrawal or about Hungary’s was expected to “resist” any threat to com- 6. Mikoyan and Suslov recommended renunciation of the Warsaw Pact. munist rule. Khrushchev’s comments on the that the Presidium accept the Imre Nagy 8. The Soviet Union’s readiness for Hungarian events at the October 24 Pre- line. Instead of military measures, they compromise was related to long-term inter- sidium meeting in Moscow reflect this atti- thought that concessions were needed to ests as well. After 1945, and particularly tude. The day before, there had been a mass “win over the workers’ masses” and ap- after the outbreak of Cold War tensions, it demonstration of hundreds of thousands in proved reshuffling the government by in- was Moscow’s fundamental interest to have the streets of Budapest and an armed upris- cluding “a certain number of petty bourgois politically and militarily loyal and stable ing had broken out. But Khrushchev said he democrat” ministers (meaning persons from leaderships in the neighboring countries. “does not understand what comrade Gero, the previous coalition parties). The only The limits of these alignments were some- comrade Hegedus and the others are do- thing they reported on the Hungarian leader- times wider, sometimes tighter. In 1956, at ing.”12 ship was that the “majority” of it was solid the time of de-Stalinization, they momen- 3. The first extraordinary Soviet on-site and “non-capitulationist.” However, they tarily seemed to expand. The Soviets saw report during the decisive stage of the crisis reported on “Imre Nagy’s vacillations who their long-range interests secured in three gave a remarkably optimistic evaluation of because of his opportunistic nature doesn’t institutions: First, an undivided, potent Com- the situation, judging that the size of the know where to stop in giving concessions.”15 munist party leadership or other political October 23 demonstration and the armed Although there is no direct evidence for centre; second, a strong and firm state secu- uprising which erupted that night had been this conclusion, it is conceivable that this rity service; and third, a loyal and disci- “overestimated” by the Hungarians. In Mos- analysis might have triggered the prepara- plined military leadership. The shaking of cow, where attention was still focused on tions in Moscow for a second military inter- even one of the three could provoke Soviet resolving the Polish party crisis, the situa- vention. A final, unambiguous political political meddling, and if the symptoms ap- 26 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN peared simultaneously this could produce For the time being we shall not make an open Fax: 322-3084 Moscow’s radical military intervention. The move against Nagy, but the reactionary turn 2. [Ed. note: See documents in Fond 89 in the Tsentr Khranenia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD) 22 October 26-28 compromise did not directly will not receive our acquiescence.” [Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Docu- contradict Moscow’s long-range interests 11. Although the CPSU CC Presidium’s ments] and Fund 059a in the Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki (only the initiation of negotiations was men- resolutions are very terse, the three-fold Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVP RF) [Archive of Foreign tioned rather than actual Soviet troop with- method of implementing the basic political Policy of the Russian Federation] in Moscow.] 3. Arthur J. Alexander, “Modeling Soviet 23 drawal), which could momentarily reinforce decision is clearly outlined. Military mea- Decisionmaking,” in Jiri Valenta and William Potter, structures in charge of securing Soviet inter- sures were above all Zhukov’s responsibil- eds., Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security (Lon- ests (especially the most important one from ity, and then the task of Marshal Konev, who don: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 9-22. the Soviet perspective, the party leader- came to Hungary after November 1. Interna- 4. E.g., the 31 October 1956 Resolution of the CC CPSU, document no. II/12., The Yeltsin Dossier, 70, 72. ship). tional preparation, such as informing the 5. Based on the experience and documents of the 9. Nagy probably well understood this. allies was undertaken by Khrushchev him- Hungarian leadership it is possible that records like But he could not and did not want to think self, as well as by Malenkov and Molotov minutes were not made. According to Soviet experts, entirely in the terms of the neighboring (the details of these consultations, including the head of Department of the General Department of the CC CPSU prepared short summaries about the . Thus he tried to consolidate the negotiations with the Chinese in Mos- participants, contributors and the opinion voiced at the aforementioned institutions on the basis cow, with the Poles in Brest, and with Tito in Presidium meetings. of popular demands, but the pressure of the Brioni, are available24). 6. For a representative collection of declassified U.S. revolutionary masses and his own personal- And finally, the establishment of a new government documents on the 1956 crisis, see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United ity made him transgress this boundary. On political center in Hungary required the most States (FRUS), 1955-1957, vol. 25, Eastern Europe October 29 and 30 the Soviet envoys saw a participants. Four members of the Secre- (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), Hungarian party leadership which appeared tariat began to draft and assemble the neces- esp. 259-581. to be falling apart and losing control of sary documents on , most impor- 7. Gromyko summary of 17 September 1956, attached to CPSU CC protocol P43 of 27 September 1956, The events. The other functioning center, the tantly, a declaration of the new Hungarian Yeltsin Dossier, 42-44. government, did not interest them. Nagy government (prepared in Moscow).25 Only 8. Missing pages, 28-29, n. 7. had a key position there and he was not Brezhnev remained of this team at the No- 9. From the time of the second mission, see Mikoyan’s trusted unconditionally, and the inclusion vember 1 meeting of the Presidium, but there speech at the meeting of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (HWP) Central Committee, 18 July 1956. Magyar (on October 27) of “petty bourgeois ele- is a mention of Serov, who stayed in Orszagos Leveltar (Hungarian National Archives - Mol) ments” (i.e., a multiparty coalition) in the Budapest.26 It was his job (along with MDP-MSZMP Iratok Gyujtemenye (Collection of Pa- government only strengthened this impres- Andropov) to secure the personnel for the pers of the HWP and the HSWP) 276/52/35 o.e. pp. 17- sion.18 new local political center and to deliver the 28; and Mikoyan’s report, 18 July 1956, Missing pages, 59-65. From the time of the third mission see the records Though popular demands and senti- key people to Moscow. The key person was of the October 26 meeting of the HWP Central Commit- ments were of basic interest for Nagy, they Janos Kadar, but this is an entirely different tee (excerpt) and the record of the October 27-28 did not fit into the thinking of the empire. story. meeting of the HWP Political Committee, “From the On October 29 and 30, the reports of documents of the leading organs of the party and the government 23 October 1956-4 November 1956,” pub- 1. The following two volumes published the Soviet Moscow’s observers implied the collapse lished by Ferenc Glatz, Historia 4-5 (1989), 32-40. documents related to 1956: Eva Gal, Andras B. Hegedus, of the institutional system in Hungary vital Mikoyan and Suslov were not present at the Central Gyorgy Litvan, and Janos M. Rainer, eds., A “Jelcin 19 Committee meeting, but reported about it. See Mikoyan to Soviet interests. Simultaneously, the dosszie.” Szovjet dokumentumok 1956-rol. (Budapest: to CC CPSU, n.d., and Mikoyan and Suslov to CC outbreak of the Suez war and the fact that the Szazadveg Kiado-1956-os Intezet, 1993). [“The Yeltsin CPSU, 26 October 1956, Missing pages, 106-113. Dossier”. Soviet documents on 1956; hereafter: The Americans gave clear signals of non-inter- Mikoyan took part in the Political Committee meeting, Yeltsin Dossier]; and Vjacseszlav Szereda and vention20 gave the preparation of a second but there are no such documents among those we Alekszandr Sztikalin, eds., Hianyzo lapok 1956 received. intervention an external green light. On tortenetebol: Dokumentumok a volt SZKP KB 10. See, e.g., Serov’s reports of 28 and 29 October October 30, the Mikoyan group explicitly Leveltarabol (Budapest: Mora Ferenc Konyvkiado, 1956, The Yeltsin Dossier, 54-55, 62-64, or the discus- 1993). (Zenit konyvek) [Missing pages from the history referred to a political and military decision sion of lieutenant- Strarovtoi with AV (State of 1956. Documents from the archives of the old Central to be taken soon, in relation to which “com- Security) Major Vig, report dated 31 October 1956, The Committee of the Communist Party; hereafter: Missing Yeltsin Dossier, 76-81. rade Konev”—the Soviet Marshal who com- pages]. See also Janos M. Rainer, “1956—The Other 11. See Mikoyan to CC CPSU, 14 July 1956, Missing manded the Warsaw Pact unified forces— Side of the Story. Five Documents From the Yeltsin pages, 40. File,” The Hungarian Quarterly 34:129 (Spring 1993), “will have to proceed to Hungary without 12. The 24 October 1956 Moscow meeting, published 100-114. The Bulletin thanks Rainer for granting per- delay.”21 The following day Mikoyan and by Tibor Hajdu in Az 1956-os Magyar Forradalom mission to draw on that article. Tortenetenek Akademiai Dokumentacios es Suslov returned to Moscow. For further information on new publications and Kutatointezete Evkonyv I. 1992. [The Yearbook of the 10. The Moscow evaluation is shown sources related to the events in question, contact the Documentation and History Institute of the 1956 Hun- Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolu- clearly by the CPSU CC Presidium’s tele- garian Revolution] (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1992), tion, which publishes an annual compendium/yearbook gram to the Italian communist party leader, 153. [Ed. note: See the English translation by Mark (1956: Evkonyv) and serves as a center for scholarly Kramer in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.] Palmiro Togliatti, on October 31: “We agree research activities in Budapest: 13. The 24 October 1956 Moscow meeting, ibid., 155. with your assessment that the Hungarian As 1956-os Magyar Forradalom 14. Mikoyan-Suslov to CC CPSU, 26 October 1956, Tortenetenek Dokumentacios es Kutatointezete situation is moving towards a reactionary Missing pages, 109-110. H-1074 Budapest, Dohany u. 74. direction. We are informed that Nagy is 15. Ibid., 112-13. Hungary 16. Ibid., 112. playing a double game and is under the Tel.: 322-3620, 322-4026, 322-5228 increasing influence of reactionary forces. 17. Historia 4-5 (1989), 37. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 27

18. Mikoyan-Suslov report, 29 October 1956, The temporarily located. It was from Szolnok from the Warsaw Pact that caused the Soviet Yeltsin Dossier, 60-61; Mikoyan-Suslov report, 30 Oc- that Kadar’s associate Ferenc Munnich an- Union to intervene for the second time, on 4 tober 1956, Missing pages, 125-126. 19. Serov to Mikoyan and Suslov, 29 October 1956, nounced the establishment of the new gov- November 1956. But Imre Nagy was too The Yeltsin Dossier, 62-64. ernment at 5 a.m. on November 4. This was hesitant to make such a bold move without 20. See telegram from State Department to U.S. Em- the final clue to Imre Nagy that he had been warrant. Clearly, Nagy only broke ranks bassy in Moscow, 29 October 1956, FRUS, 1955-57, betrayed; he fled to the Yugoslav Embassy with the USSR in this way after it was vol 25, 328. 21. Mikoyan-Suslov report, 30 October 1956, Missing an hour later. Kadar did not actually return to obvious that additional Soviet troops were pages, 126. Budapest until at 6:10 a.m.)11 entering Hungary, not just departing.17 22. Telegram to Soviet ambassador in Rome for Two months later, on 11 January 1957, Furthermore, the documents suggest that Togliatti, 31 October 1956, The Yeltsin Dossier, 69. Tito told Firiubin that during the Hungarian Soviet leaders most familiar with the Hun- 23. 31 October 1956 resolution, CC CPSU, The Yeltsin Dossier, 70, 72. “events” the “reaction raised its head” in garian situation (e.g. Mikoyan, Suslov, 24. See Janos Tischler, “Reports by the Polish Ambas- Yugoslavia, “especially in Croatia, where Zhukov, Aristov) had begun to conclude sador and the telegrams to the Polish Embassy in the reactionary elements openly incited mem- that Nagy—however loyal he was to them— Budapest during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution,” in bers of Yugoslav security organs to vio- was losing control of the population. As Tortenelmi Szemle 10 (1992), 73; Khrushchev Remem- bers, trans. and ed. by (Boston: Little, lence.” He said, “I didn’t want to complicate early as October 27, KGB chief Ivan Serov Brown, 1970), 461-64; see also Veljko Micunovic, Tito our [Yugoslav-Soviet] relations in any wrote to Moscow from Budapest: “It is sig- kovete voltam, Moszkva 1956-58 [I was Tito’s Ambas- way.”12 And Kadar told Andropov on 8 nificant that proclamations have appeared sador. Moscow, 1956-1958] (Budapest: Interart, 1990), November 1956, “I noticed that the around town, in which Imre Nagy is de- 128-37. 25. Kadar government declaration, 4 November 1956, Yugoslavs are trying to save Nagy not be- clared a traitor and [rehabilitated non-com- The Yeltsin Dossier, 87-93, esp. editor’s note on 92-93. cause they need him, but because of their munist politician] Bela Kovacs named as a 26. CPSU CC resolution, protocol P50/I, 1 November fear that through Nagy some undesirable candidate for Prime Minister. It is being 1956, The Yeltsin Dossier, 76. things for them can occur.”13 suggested that demonstrations be organized 18 Janos M. Rainer, a scholar at the Institute for the Moreover, the writer and Nagy sup- in Kovacs’ honor.” [emphasis added] History and Documentation of the 1956 Hungarian porter, Tamas Aczel, wrote that Nagy, after Three days later, Mikoyan and Suslov Revolution in Budapest, has published numerous works conversations with the Yugoslavs in their sent a telegram to Moscow which reveals on the 1956 events and is working on a biography of embassy, apparently sketched out a declara- their doubt in Nagy’s ability even to control Imre Nagy. tion of his resignation as prime minister and his own armed forces. They wrote: “the his pledge to support the Kadar government, peaceful liquidation of this hotbed [of insur- IMRE NAGY but the other members of his entourage would gents] is almost out of the question [pochti continued from page 23 not support his intentions.14 iskliuchena]. We are going to achieve the 1991. On November 4, after Nagy and This suggests that the Soviet leaders liquidation of it by the Hungarian armed twelve other Hungarian leaders took refuge thought Nagy was basically malleable, and forces. There is only one fear: the Hungarian in the Yugoslav Embassy, the Soviet Am- could be persuaded to support them. The army has taken on a wait-and-see attitude. bassador in , N. P. Firiubin, sent a documents from the CPSU Central Commit- [zanimala vyzhidatel’nyiu pozitsiiu] Our telegram to Moscow at 4:30 p.m.: tee archive are full of statements about Nagy’s military advisers say that relations of the essential loyalty to Moscow and the commu- Hungarian officers and generals with Soviet Kaldelj [a reference to Yugoslav Vice nist cause. Erno Gero told Ambassador officers in the past few days has deteriorated Premier and leading official of the Andropov on 12 October 1956 that he was further. There isn’t the same kind of trust as Yugoslav CP Eduard Kardelj] reported “firmly convinced that Nagy was not ex- there used to be. It might happen that Hun- that they contacted Imre Nagy as it had ploiting those forces which sought to rip garian units sent to put down the insurgents been agreed with Khrushchev ... It is Hungary away from the USSR and from the will unite with them, and then it will be still not clear whether or not Imre Nagy entire socialist camp,” since he was not an necessary for to once made the declaration [about Hungary’s “”; he simply had “dan- again undertake military operations....”19 withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact] in gerous ideas.”15 Zoltan Vas, Rakosi’s close Later in this same telegram, Mikoyan the name of the government in friend and Politburo member, said: “Nagy is and Suslov disclose their assumption that Budapest. If he made this declaration, not an anti-Soviet person, but he wants to they could deceive Nagy as to their own then they, the Yugoslavs, will try to build socialism in his own way, the Hungar- wait-and-see attitude: “We intend to declare have him announce publicly that he ian way.”16 [predpologaem zaiavit’] today to Imre Nagy made this declaration under the pres- Khrushchev’s decision—with Kadar’s that the troops are leaving according to our sure of the reaction. They also intend full support—to execute Nagy came only agreement, that for now we do not intend to to negotiate with Nagy, to get him to later, as Nagy’s obstinacy in captivity grew, bring in any more troops on account of the make an announcement that he sup- and as Malenkov joined forces with Molotov fact that the Nagy government is dealing ports the government headed by Kadar and other Stalinists to try to oust Khrushchev with the situation in Hungary. We intend to in Szolnok.10 [emphases added] in 1957. give instructions to the Minister of Defense Perhaps as a credit to Soviet propa- to cease sending troops into Hungary, con- (Szolnok is a city 65 miles southeast of ganda, many people, some scholars included, tinuing to concentrate them on Soviet terri- Budapest, where Kadar’s “Revolutionary mistakenly believe it was Nagy’s bold dec- tory. As long as the Hungarian troops oc- Workers’ and Peasants’ Government” was laration that he would withdraw Hungary cupy a nonhostile position, these troops will 28 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN be sufficient. If the situation further deterio- attack on the street fighters that had been planned by the 1956, #1059-1060, TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 25. rates, then, of course, it will be necessary to Hungarian Defense Ministry and the military sub-com- 11. Information from Zhukov to the CC CPSU, TsKhSD, mittee of the Hungarian Central Committee. Daniel F. f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, l. 27. reexamine the whole issue in its entirety. Calhoun, Hungary and Suez, 1956: An Exploration of 12. Information from Fiubin in Belgrade, 11 January We do not have yet a final opinion of the Who Makes History (Lanham, MD: University Press of 1957, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 4, l. 43. situation—how sharply it has deteriorated. America, 1991), 331. Zoltan Tildy, formerly President 13. Information from Andropov in Budapest, 8 No- After the session today at 11 o’clock Mos- of the Hungarian Republic and Secretary General of the vember 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 1-3. Smallholders Party, had been named deputy prime min- 14. Valerii Musatov, “SSSR I Vengerskie Sobytiia cow time, the situation in the Central Com- ister by Nagy on October 27 after Tildy was released 1956 g.: Novye Akhivnye Materialy,” Novaia mittee will become clear and we will inform after eight years of detention in May 1956. Noveishaia Istorii 1 (Jan. 1993), 18. you. We think the swift arrival of Comrade 2. Information from Mikoyan in Budapest, 27 October 15. Information from Andropov in Budapest, 12 Octo- Konev is essential.”20 Marshal I.S. Konev 1956, Tsentr Khranenia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii ber 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 2, l. 76. (TsKhSD) [Center for the Preservation of Contempo- 16. Information of Andropov from Budapest, 14 Octo- was the Soviet commander-in-chief of the rary Documents], f. 89, per. 45, dok 9, l. 3. ber 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 2, l. 89. Warsaw Pact’s armed forces, who would 3. Calhoun, Hungary and Suez, 1956, 229. 17. Ciphered telegram from Yu. V. Andropov in lead the invasion of Hungary days after that 4. Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, Budapest, 1 November 1956, AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. message was sent. NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 141. 6, d. 5 , ll. 17-19. 5. Information of Mikoyan and Suslov from Budapest, 18. Information fom Serov in Budapest, 27 October Once Imre Nagy realized the Soviet 25 October 1956, AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, l. 9. 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 2, l. 132. Kovacs, the leaders’ deception, he did break ranks en- 6. Calhoun, Hungary and Suez, 229. former Secretary General of the Smallholder Party, had tirely, declaring Hungary’s neutrality and 7. Aleksander Stykalin and Elena Orekhova, been rehabilitated in August 1956 and appointed Min- withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact—some- “Vengerskie Sobytiia 1956 Goda I Pozitsiia SSSR (Po ister of Agriculture by Nagy on October 27. Materialam TsKhSD)” Slavianovedenie: Otdelnyi Ottisk 19. Information of Mikoyan and Suslov, 30 October thing no other East European leader had the (Moscow, Russia, 1994). Charles Gati also pinpoints 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89. per. 45, dok. 12, l. 3. courage to do. October 28 as “Nagy’s first turning point.” Hungary 20. Ibid. and the Soviet Bloc, 128. 1. Ciphered telegram from Yu. V. Andropov in 8. Information of Serov about the situation in Hungary Johanna Granville is asst. professor of political science Budapest, 1 November 1956, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki on 29 October 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 11, l. at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, PA. Cur- Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVP RF) [Archive of Foreign 1. rently a Fulbright Scholar (1994-95), she is conducting Policy of the Russian Federation], fond [f.] 059a, opis 9. Information of Mikoyan from Budapest to the CC research in the Communist Party and Foreign Ministry [op.]. 4, papka [p.]. 6, delo [d.] 5, list [l.] 17-19. Later, CPSU, 26 October 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 2, l. 98. archives in Moscow. it is true, on October 28, at 5:30 a.m. Nagy called off an 10. Telegram from Firiubin in Belgrade, 4 November

IMRE NAGY, aka “VOLODYA”— adopted them from Malenkov, after the latter 4 November 1956, Nagy was forced out of A DENT IN THE ’S HALO? was safely ousted from the prime power by a massive Soviet intervention, and ministership. Nagy, author of the 1953 “New ultimately, at 5 a.m. on 16 June 1958, after a by Johanna Granville Course,” was Khrushchev’s political kins- secretly-staged , Khrushchev had man, the epitome of communist new think- him executed, to show other East European When dropped the ing for his time. leaders just how far he would permit liberal other shoe with his “Secret Speech” at the In Western history texts, Nagy has be- reforms in the Soviet bloc to go. But Imre Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, come a genuine hero and tragic figure. As Nagy, it was said, despite the political set- not only did he expose Stalin’s crimes, he former KGB chief wrote backs it would bring him, was always ready also created a public image of himself as a bitterly, Nagy acquired in death a “martyr’s to speak the truth, to refuse to perform self- patron of “different paths to socialism” that halo.” A professor of agricultural economy criticism (“samokritika”). would later prove hard to uphold.1 All over and long-time member of the Hungarian Indeed, Machiavelli’s admonition Eastern Europe, the “little Stalins”—Matyas Academy of Science, Nagy, we know, was seemed to address Nagy perfectly: “The Rakosi in Hungary, Antonin Novotny in something of a “bookworm,” an idealist man who neglects the real to study the ideal Czechoslovakia, Boleslaw Bierut in Poland, mixed up with ruthless politicians of Matyas will learn how to accomplish his ruin, not his and their like2—watched fearfully, won- Rakosi’s ilk. Although ostensibly a harm- salvation. Any man who tries to be good all dering how far de-Stalinization would go. less theorist, Nagy was repeatedly the victim the time is bound to come to ruin among the Meanwhile, their opponents, who had criti- of Moscow power plays.3 In 1955, in con- great number who are not good.”4 cized Stalinist policies, suddenly rose in nection with the new anti-Malenkov coali- To be sure, Nagy’s refusal to recant did popularity and stature. tion, he lost the prime ministership and was not always bring him ruin—not at first. It The Hungarian leader Imre Nagy was accused of “right-wing deviationism.” His earned him the respect of his people, espe- one such critic. Having served briefly as shining moment came when he led a reform- cially the members of the Petofi Circle, a Hungary’s prime minister (July 1953-March ist communist surge to power and regained literary-intellectual group with strong na- 1955), Imre Nagy had become famous for the prime minister’s post, and still more tionalist leanings.5 As KGB Chairman Ivan his censure of the pace of collectivization, briefly, after some hesitation, became the Serov reported to Moscow from Budapest his expertise in agrarian reform, and advo- leader of a doomed popular nationalist revolt three months before the Hungarian revolt, cacy of greater producton of consumer against the Soviet Union, during the two- “The young people in the Petofi Circle say goods. These were, of course, the same week span of the Hungarian Revolution, that Petofisti are also communists, but they policies that Khrushchev advocated, having from October 23 to November 4, 1956. On continued on page 34 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 29

DOCUMENTS ON HUNGARY gency, and for guarding important installations party. Fights took place in the square between the continued from page 23 (railroad stations, roads, etc). fascist and democratic elements. The whole crowd lead the operation for liquidating the riots in the The Hungarian comrades, especially Imre dispersed peaceably, but then began to regroup in city. There is a field headquarters there, which Nagy, approved of the use of more Hungarian various places in the city and the events well- works in contact with the Hungarians. It should military units, , and state security units for known to you began. be noted that during a telephone conversation the purpose of lightening the burden of the Soviet During Imre Nagy’s reply, Gero retorted with Gero from the corps headquarters, in reply to troops and to emphasize the role of the Hungar- that they were looking for Imre Nagy before the our question about the situation, he answered that ians themselves in the liquidation of the riots. The meeting and couldn’t find him. Nagy said that if there is both an improvement and deterioration in majority of the workers did not participate in the they had appeared before the crowd earlier and the situation, and that the arrival of Soviet troops riots, and it is even said that the workers in announced the changes in the leadership before in the city has a negative effect on the disposition Chepel, who had no weapons, drove off the or during the meeting, then the events would not of the inhabitants, including the workers. provocators, who wanted to incite them to riot. grown complicated. The other comrades met this After a conversation with military person- However, some of the workers, especially young assertion of Imre Nagy’s with silence. nel, during which we heard the preliminary re- ones, did take part in the disturbances. To our question: is there unity in the Central ports of the Soviet military command and the One of the most serious mistakes of the Committee and Politburo in the face of the events command of the Hungarian armed forces, which— Hungarian comrades was the fact that that, before that have taken place? Everyone answered in the after closer familiarization—turned out to be 12 midnight last night, they did not permit anyone affirmative, however Gero made a remark that rather exaggerated in a pessimistic way, we to shoot at the participants in the riots. more voices are being heard against his election stopped by the Central Committee of the Hungar- The Hungarians themselves are taking mea- as first secretary of the Central Committee, think- ian Workers’ Party, where we conversed with sures, and we gave them additional advice with ing that he is responsible for this whole thing. To [Erno] Gero, Imre Nagy, Zoltan Santo, and respect to the organization of workers’ fighting this remark, Imre Nagy said that it is necessary to [Andras] Hegedus, who informed us about the squads at the factories and in the regional com- make a correction; this concerns neither the Polit- situation in the city and the measures they had mittees of the party and about the arming of such buro, neither the Central Committee members. taken to liquidate the riots. squads. Such voices, rather, are being heard from below. We had the impression that Gero especially, They had already made such a decision, but He cited the letter received from the secretary of but the other comrades as well, are exaggerating they didn’t carry it out, because they couldn’t one of the factory party committees, protesting the strength of the opponent and underestimating deliver weapons at the factories, fearing that the the choice of Gero as first secretary. To our their own strength. At five o’clock Moscow time opponent would intercept them. Measures were question, may we report to our Central Commit- the situation in the city was as follows: taken to provide for the delivery of weapons tee that the Hungarian comrades are mastering All the hotbeds of the insurgents have been today with the help of our armored personnel the situation and are confident that they will deal crushed; liquidation of the main hotbed, at the carriers. Radio addresses by prominent party and with it, they answered in the affirmative. radio station, where about 4,000 people are con- government leaders, as well as other public lead- Gero announced that he hadn’t slept for two centrated, is still going on. They raised a white ers, were organized. Gero, Imre Nagy, and Zoltan nights; the other comrades: one night. We prear- flag, but when the representatives of the Hungar- Tildy have already spoken. Istvan Dobi, Hegedus, ranged to meet with these same comrades at eight ian authorities appeared, they presented as a Sakasics, Kadar, Zoltan Santo, Marosan, and o’clock in the evening. We have the impression condition of surrender the removal of Gero from Ronai will be speaking. Appeals by the Womens’, that all the Central Committee members with his post, which of course was rejected. Our com- Youth, and Trades Unions will be published. whom we met related well, in a friendly manner, mand is setting for itself the task of liquidating Today not a single newspaper was pub- to our appearance at such a time. We said the this hotbed tonight. It is significant that the Hun- lished, only a bulletin. It has been arranged to purpose of our arrival was to lend assistance to garian workers here, above all the state security have at least one newspaper published tomorrow. the Hungarian leadership in such a way as to be personnel, put up a violent resistance to the insur- It has also been arranged to announce to the without friction and for the public benefit, refer- gents and tolerated defeat here only due to the public that all citizens who fail to surrender ring especially to the participation of Soviet troops exhaustion of ammunition and the attack on them weapons within the next 24 hours will be accused in liquidating the riots. The Hungarian citizens, by a fresh battalion of Hungarian troops who of a criminal offense. esepcially Imre Nagy, related to this with ap- mutinied. We are not broadcasting the information proval. The comrades express the opinion that the about the changes in the leadership of the party Hungarian army conducted itself poorly, although and government, since the embassy has already A. MIKOYAN the Debrecen division performed well. The Hun- reported it. While conversing with the Hungarian M. SUSLOV garian sailors, who patrolled the banks of the comrades, we did not touch on that issue. One Dunai [Danube] River, also performed well, es- gets the feeling that these events are facilitating [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian pecially, as already noted, state security troops the unity of the Central Committee and Politburo. Federation (AVP RF) F. 059a, Opis 4, Papka and employees. When we asked Imre Nagy when and how he 6, Delo 5, Listy 1-7; translation by Johanna Arrests of the instigators and organizers of joined in the struggle with the opponents of the Granville.] the disturbances, more than 450 people, are being party, he replied that he started to take action in carried out. The exposure and arrest of the insti- the struggle yesterday at six o’clock in the evening, * * * * * gators continues. not by the summons of the Central Committee, The task has been set to complete the liqui- but because the youth in the meeting demanded 3. Mikoyan-Suslov Report, 27 October 1956 dation of the remaining individual groups hiding that he go there and speak to them, which he did. in buildings. Due to the fact that a turning point in He thinks the majority of the crowd of al- Today we participated for more than three the events has occurred, it has been decided to use most a hundred thousand people approved of his hours in a Politburo meeting, where we discussed more boldly the Hungarian units for patrolling, appeals, but many groups of fascist elements government appointments and the present situa- for detaining suspicious elements and people hollered, whistled, and screamed, when he said tion. [Antal] Apro was chosen to be the deputy violating the introduction of a state of emer- that it was necessary to work together with the chairman of the Council of Ministers and, in 30 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN actuality, he will be the first chairman because all tion: can we increase the number of Soviet troops? the rest of the deputies are “non-party people” We declared that we had reserves, and how- I hereby forward a letter from the Hungarian and less strong. Apro was a member of the ever many troops were needed, we would provide Government to: Directory, a member of the Military Commis- them. The Hungarian comrades were very glad to sion, and has behaved himself very well these hear this. “The Council of Ministers of the Soviet Socialist past few days. Apro suggested taking a number of actions Republics The candidacy of [Iosef] Siladi for the post in order to organize the further struggle and for of Minister of Internal Affairs was turned down, bringing the city back to order. Apro informed us, Moscow because politically he was not very reliable, and that a significant “surrender” of weapons had Munnich was chosen instead. For the post of begun; “700 rifles have been accepted.” Apro On behalf of the Council of Ministers of the Minister of Defense the former deputy minister also informed us that on the periphery, the situa- People’s Republic of Hungary I appeal to the of rear units Janza Karoi was chosen. He is a tion was already stabilizing, but Kadar and Government of the Soviet Union to send Soviet communist, reliable, and a worker. Hegedus looked skeptical. troops in order to put an end to the riots that have The candidacy of Laszlo Kardas for the post The Hungarian comrades started to arm the broken out in Budapest, to restore order as soon of Minister of Culture was also turned down. party core [aktiv]. It was decided to draw the as possible, and to guarantee the conditions for Chosen instead was [Gyorgy] Lukacs, who is a armed party members into the staff of the city peaceful and creative work. famous philosopher, and although he makes a lot police. It was also decided to assign the military 24 October 1956 of mistakes in philosophy, is very reliable politi- censors to the radios and newspapers. It was Budapest cally and authoritative among the intelligentsia. suggested to the ministers that they ensure that the Prime Minister of the People’s Republic In order to strengthen the government from ministries and enterprises function smoothly. of Hungary Andras Hegedus” anti-party elements, Zoltan Tildy was chosen to Comrade Kadar informed us that the new be Minister without Portfolio. Zoltan is a famous candidate to the Politburo [Geza] Losonczy and 28.X.56 [28 October 1956] Andropov public leader. Comrade Imre Nagy suggested the new secretary to the Central Committee, that Zoltan Tildy not be selected because he [Ferenc] Donath, who spoke yesterday in a doesn’t get along well with Bela Kovacs. How- capitulationist manner at the Politburo meeting, [Source: AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, l. 12; ever, that was not acceptable. announced his disagreement with the Central translation from The Hungarian Quarterly 34 Characteristically, at night there appeared Committee’s policies and announced his resigna- (Spring 1993), 104.] proclamations in the city, in which Nagy was tion. Several members of the Central Committee declared the chairman and Bela Kovacs was [CC] called Donath a traitor of the working class. * * * * * recommended as Premier. There was a sum- Imre Nagy was not at this meeting, because mons to hold a demonstration in their honor. he was busy with negotiations with the assigned 5. KGB Chief Serov Report, As instructed by the Central Committee, ministers, and also because of “acute overexer- 28 October 1956 Nagy called Bela Kovacs who lives outside the tion” he had a heart attack. Nagy was in a faint city, and asked him: would he join the govern- state in his office, and the Hungarian doctor didn’t Send to the CC CPSU ment? Kovacs accepted, and said that he was know what to do, so Suslov gave him medicine A. Mikoyan invited to the meeting, but if he attended, he [“validol”] which brought Nagy back to normal. would speak out against the demonstrators for Nagy thanked him. the government. Considering that Losonczy and Donath were To Comrade Mikoyan, A.I. The Minister of State Farms is the non- closely associated with Nagy, and since Nagy was party specialist Ryabinskii. not at the meeting, the Politburo decided to post- I am reporting about the situation on 28 Characteristically all of these candidates pone making a final decision, and for the time October 1956. were voted on unanimously and Nagy did not being move on to work outside of the CC. 1. From the network of agents, which has object to the repacement of individual candi- We invited Kadar and Nagy to have a heart- contact with the insurgents, doubt is arising about dates. to-heart talk with us this evening in an unofficial whether to continue the struggle. The more The Hungarian comrades in conversations capacity. active part of the opposition wants to continue with us declared, that they consider the new fighting, but says, however: if we do stop for a government appropriate and politically capable (Signed) Mikoyan and Suslov while, we must still keep our weapons in order to of working. Imre Nagy especially emphasized attack again at an auspicious moment. this. Oct. 27, 1956 2. On 27 October, an agent of friends of the The formation of this government was an- writer [Ivan] Boldizsar [a journalist member of nounced on local radio at 12 noon Hungarian [Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 9; transla- the democratic opposition—J.G.] met with the time. tion by Johanna Granville.] leaders of the opposition group. The agent sounded We had the impression that as a whole the the alarm about the meeting that was going on in new government is reliable and in the social * * * * * connection with the street fighting. The other sense more authoritative. participants at the meeting decided to support the Comrade [Antal] Apro gave a paper about 4. Andropov Report, 28 October 1956: new government and expressed their intention of the military situation in assured tones. He in- calling the insurgents and persuading them to formed everyone, by the way, that in the hospital Budapest, October 28, 1956 stop the fighting. are about three thousand injured Hungarians, 3. In many regions local organs and party and of those 250 people died. The figure of In code Top Secret workers dispersed, and then established various others killed or wounded is unknown. Not to be copied “revolutionary” national and other committees, In connection to the unpeaceful situation in Sent from Budapest Urgent which are beginning their “activities” disarming the provinces, comrade Kadar asked the ques- the security organs. For example, the revolution- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 31 ary committee in organized a meeting in M. Suslov the morale of the operative staff declined. front of the building of the Ministry of Internal 29.X-1956 On the evening, 28.X [28 October], the Affairs, and they forced the workers to lay down MVD held a meeting. [Ferenc] Munnich called their arms and they tortured those who protested. To Comrade MIKOYAN, A.I. the anti-government demonstration “a meeting On the same day, a battalion of To Comrade SUSLOV, M.A. of workers for the satisfaction of their justified was disbanded and spread out among the build- demands.” Fascist elements joined this move- ings by this revolutionary committee. In the town I am reporting about the situation according ment and tried to use it for the overthrow of the of Zalaegerseg, the revolutionary committee dis- to the circumstances on 29 October. government. He said the employees of the secu- armed the security organs, and the officials were 1. There were negotiations during the night rity organs honestly did their duty in the stuggle driven out of the regional limits. These facts with the groups fighting in the region round the with the hostile elements. Then he informed apply to other regions as well. There are also Corwin theater, Zsigmund street, Sen Square and them that an extraordinary court would be orga- examples of actions to the contrary. For example, Moscow Square to surrender their weapons. nized, whereby those responsible for in some regions, a national militia comprised of Toward evening agreement was reached. communists and attacking government and so- students, youth, and private soldiers of the na- Some small armed groups that had come to cial institutions would be tried. tional army are restoring back order in the cities. Budapest from other cities were identified. After this meeting morale declined drasti- 4. In the city of Budapest after yesterday’s The Soviet military command is taking ac- cally. Several employees left work and never meeting of the new Ministry of Internal Affairs, tion to liquidate them. came back. regional apparatuses of security and police began 2. According to information from the MVD In the city a leaflet apeared of names of the to renew their work. To avoid provocation the [Ministry of Internal Affairs], on 27-28 October “revolutionary committee of students” with a employees of the security organs are dressed in in several cities prisoners were freed from pris- summons to kill the employees of the security police uniforms. ons, including criminals, around 8,000 people in organs. 5. An organized observation of the Ameri- all. Some of these prisoners are armed with The police on duty are stimulating this mood, can embassy confirms that the employees of the weapons taken from the security guards. The declaring that there are traitors in the security embassy are leaving the city with their things. ammunition was obtained by attacking military organs, and they are angry that the employees of The Americans Olivart and West in a conversa- depots. the security organs have started to wear police tion with one of the agents of our friends said if After the government declaration was made uniforms. the uprising is not liquidated in the shortest pos- on the radio about amnesty to students who The Dep[uty]. Minister of Internal Affairs sible time, the UN troops will move in at the participated in the demonstration, the armed Hars came to our adviser, wept, and stated that the proposal of the USA and a second Korea will take groups started to lay down their weapons. employees of the security organs are considered place. 3. The situation in several cities can be traitors, and the insurgents are considered revolu- 6. This morning on Budapest radio there characterized in the following way: the popula- tionaries. He conversed with Comrade Kadar on was a speech by an active participant in [Joseph] tion is stimulated against the communists. In this issue. However, he did not get a comforting Ertovi’s group of criminals, who was arrested in several regions the armed people search in the answer. the military editorial board who said that he is apartments of communists and shoot them down. The leader of the internal troops of the MVD summoning the youth to lay down their weapons, In the factory town of Csepel (near Budapest) Orban told our adviser that he will collect the since the new government under Nagy is a guar- there were 18 communists killed. When in buses officers and will break through to the USSR. The antee of the fulfillment of the people’s demands. travelling between cities, the bandits do checks former deputy of the MVD Dekan stated that the They asked Ertovi why he wrote on a leaflet and prominent communists are taken out and provocateurs are arranging the massacre of the “Temporary Revolutionary Government”? To shot. employees of the security organs and their fami- that Ertovi replied that it was because at that time In the town of Debrecen the regional com- lies. The bandits are ascertaining the addresses of they had not recognized the government, but that mittee went underground, contacted the military the employees. Dekan intends to create a brigade now he wouldn’t sign it that way, because the unit and asked for support. This data is confirmed composed of the employees and with weapons present government is legitimate. by telegrams that arrived at the Council of Min- advance to the Soviet border. If they don’t get that In the city of Budapest today everything is isters from the leaders of the “revolutionary com- far, then they will fight underground as partisans peaceful, except isolated strongholds of mittees.” The workers’ council in Miskolc sug- and beat the enemies. streetfighters. However, there are three hotbeds, gested that the employees of the security organs The employees of the central apparatus where insurgents have dug in positions. lay down their weapons and go away. Three stopped work and went home, declaring that they employees, including the Deputy Director of the are undisciplined and do not have the right to SEROV department, Mayor Gati, would not comply with meet with the agency. On the periphery the the demands. The employees of the security security organs also stopped working, since the Transmitted by special line organs were all hanged as a group. In the town of local powers dismissed them. 28.X.56 [28 October 1956] Keskemet, a crowd decided to punish a commu- The regional administration in the city of nist in the square. The commander of the Hungar- Sobolcs (40 employees) left for Rumania. The [Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok 10; trans- ian military unit went up in an airplane and with employees of the Debrecen regional administra- lation by Johanna Granville with Mark Doctoroff.] a machine gun dispersed the crowd. tion went to the Soviet border in the region of The commander of the Hungarian troops Uzhgorod and asked the border guards to let them * * * * * stationed in the town of Gyor alerted a regiment into the USSR. On the border with Czechoslova- in order to restore order in the city. When order kia a large group of employees have gathered, 6. KGB Chief Serov,Report, was restored he moved to the neighboring city waiting for a permit to enter that country. 29 October 1956 with the same objective. When he returned to In connection with the situation created in Dier, he had to restore order once again. the MVD in the evening, I intend to call a meeting Send to CC CPSU 4. In connection with the decision of the with Munnich to elucidate his opinion in relation A. Mikoyan government to abolish the state security organs, to the further sojourn of our employees, in the 32 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN light of the dispersal of the security organs and Hungarian units sent against the insurgents could rized to conduct negotiations with Comr. Tito. the further coordination of our work. join these other Hungarians, and then it will be necessary for the Soviet forces to once more 3. Provide Comr. Zhukov with an account of SEROV undertake military operations. the exchange of opinions at the Presidium of the 29.X.56 Last night by the instructions of Imre Nagy, CC CPSU session, [instruct him] to prepare a Andropov was summoned. Nagy asked him: is it plan of measures [plan meropriatii], in connec- [Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 11; trans- true that new Soviet military units are continuing tion to the events in Hungary, and to inform the lation by Johanna Granville.] to enter Hungary from the USSR. If yes, then CC CPSU. what is their goal? We did not negotiate this. * * * * * Our opinion on this issue: we suspect that 4. Inform Comrs. Shepilov, Brezhnev, this could be a turning point in the change in Furtseva, and Pospelov on the basis of the ex- 7. Mikoyan-Suslov Report, 30 October 1956 Hungarian policy in the [UN] Security Council. change of opinions at the CC Presidium to pre- We intend to declare today to Imre Nagy that the pare essential documents and submit them to the The political situation in the country is not troops are leaving acording to our agreement, that CC CPSU for review. getting better; it is getting worse. This is ex- for now we do not intend to bring in any more pressed in the following: in the leading organs of troops on account of the fact that the Nagy govern- SECRETARY OF THE CC the party organs there is a feeling of helplessness. ment is dealing with the situation in Hungary. The party organizations are in the process of We intend to give instructions to the Minis- ******** collapse. Hooligan elements have become more ter of Defense to cease sending troops into Hun- insolent, seizing regional party committees, kill- gary, continuing to concentrate them on Soviet To point VI of protocol 49 ing communists. The organization of party vol- territory. As long as the Hungarian troops occupy Top Secret unteer squads is going slowly. The factories are a nonhostile position, these troops will be suffi- Special Folder, Extraordinary stalled. The people are sitting at home. The cient. If the situation further deteriorates, then, of railroads are not working. The hooligan students course, it will be necessary to reexamine the To the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade and other resistance elements have changed their whole issue in its entirety. We do not yet have a tactics and are displaying greater activity. Now final opinion of the situation—how sharply it has Quickly visit Comrade Tito and relay the not all them are shooting, but instead are seizing deteriorated. After the session today at 11 o’clock following: institutions. For example, last night the printing Moscow time, the situation in the Central Com- “In connection with the created situation in office of the central party newspaper was seized. mittee will become clear and we will inform you. Hungary we would like to have a meeting with The new Minister of Internal Affairs sent We think it is essential that Comrade Konev come you incognito on the night of November 1 or on 100 fighters who accosted more than 200 people, to Hungary immediately. the morning of November 2. We agree to come but did not open fire, because the CC advised not to Belgrade for this purpose or another point in to spill blood. That was late at night. Imre Nagy [Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per 45, Dok. 12; trans- Yugoslavia or Soviet territory according to your was sleeping in his apartment, and they, appar- lation by Johanna Granville.] wishes. Our delegation will consist of Comrs. ently did not want complications with Nagy, Khrushchev and Malenkov. We await your reply fearing that opening fire without his knowledge * * * * * via Comr. Firiubin. would be an occasion for the weakening of the leadership. 8. “Resolution of the Presidium of the N. KHRUSHCHEV” They [the “hooligan elements”—J.G.] oc- Central Committee About the Situation in cupied the regional telephone station. The radio Hungary” (Protocol 49) of 31 October 1956 If Tito is not in Belgrade, then give Comr. station is working, but it does not reflect the [Eduard] Kardelj [Deputy Head of the Yugoslav opinion of the CC, since in fact it is located in Workers of the World, Unite! Strictly secret Government] or [Aleksandar] Rankovic other peoples’ hands. Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Yugoslav Minister of the Interior and Deputy The anti-revolutionary newspaper did not CENTRAL COMMITTEE Prime Minister] the original text for immediate come out, because there were counterrevolution- transferral. ary articles in it and the printing office refused to Extract from Minutes No. 49/VI taken on the Send a report on the carrying out of your print it. October 31, 1956 meeting of the Presidium of task. An opposition group in the region around the CC the Corwin theater had negotiations with Nagy [Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 15; trans- for the peaceful surrendering of their weapons. About the situation in Hungary lation by Johanna Granville.] However, as of the present moment the weapons have not been surrendered, except for a few * * * * * hundred rifles. The insurgents declare that they 1. In accord with the exchange of opinions at will not give them up until the Soviet troops leave the session of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, Draft telegram to Italian Communist Leader Hungary. Thus the peaceful liquidation of this Comrs. Khrushchev, Molotov, and Malenkov are Palmiro Togliatti on the question of the hotbed is impossible. We will achieve the liqui- empowered to conduct negotiations with the rep- situation in Hungary,” 31 October 1956, dation of these armed Hungarian forces. But resentatives of the CC of the U[nited] W[orkers’] CPSU CC Protocol 49 there is just one fear: the Hungarian army has P[arty] of P[oland]. occupied a wait-and-see position. Our military Workers of the World, Unite! advisors say that relations between the Hungar- 2. Confirmed is the text of the telegram to the Top Secret ian officers and generals and Soviet officers in Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade for Comr. Tito Communist Party of the Soviet Union the past few days has deteriorated. There is no (Enclosed). In the event of an affirmative reply, CENTRAL COMMITTEE trust as there was earlier. It could happen, that the Comrs. Khrushchev and Malenkov are autho- No P 49/69 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 33

an invitation to the inner cabinet meeting of the decision immediately. They sent notes with a To Comrade Shepilov (M[inistry] of F[oreign] Council of Ministers of the H[ungarian] P[eople’s] similar content to every embassy and diplomatic A[ffairs]) and to Comrade Vinogradov R[epublic]. Imre Nagy, who chaired the meeting, mission in Budapest. Extract from Minutes No. 49, taken at the Octo- informed the participants in a rather nervous tone Note: we have information that, at the insti- ber 31, 1956 meeting of the Presidium of the CC that in the morning he had addressed the Soviet gation of the Social Democrats, the workers of all Ambassador in connection with the Soviet troops the enterprises in Hungary have declared a two- Draft of a telegram to be sent to Comrade Togliatti crossing the Hungarian border and advancing week strike, demanding the withdrawal of Soviet towards the heart of the country. Nagy “de- troops from Hungary. 1.11.56 The CC approves the attached text of a manded” an explanation in that matter. The way telegram to be sent to Comrade Togliatti in con- Nagy said all this suggested that he expected me Andropov nection with the Hungarian situation. to affirm that he had really expressed his protests to me. Also, he kept looking at Zoltan Tildy all [Source: AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, ll. 17- Secretary of the CC along, as if expecting support. 19, translation from The Hungarian Quarterly 34 Tildy behaved with dignity. He spoke im- (Spring 1993), 108-110.] ********************* mediately after Imre Nagy, in a tone that was much friendlier and calmer. He said that if the * * * * * To Paragraph 69 of Minutes No. 49 Soviet troops continued their advance on Top Secret Budapest, there would be a scandal and the Gov- 10. Zhukov report on the situation in ernment would be forced to resign. Tildy would Hungary as of 12 noon, 4 November 1956 ROME like to prevent the workers’ anger turning against the Soviet Union. For Comrade TOGLIATTI Tildy said that he insisted that the Soviet At 6:15 on Nov 4, Soviet troops began to troops—at least those which are not stationed in conduct the operation for restoring order and In your evaluation of the situation in Hun- Hungary under the terms of the Warsaw Pact—be rehabilitating the government of the People’s gary and of the tendencies of development of the withdrawn without delay. Democracy of Hungary. Acting according to an Hungarian Government toward a reactionary Kadar supported Nagy; Haraszti and Ferenc earlier thought-out plan, our units mastered the development, we are in agreement with you. Erdei spoke very nervously and in a manner most stubborn points of the reaction in the prov- According to our information, Nagy is occupying unfriendly to us. Dobi remained silent. inces, as they existed in Dier, Miskolc, Debrecen, a two-faced position and is falling more and more After they spoke I offered my views—in and even in other regional centers in Hungary. under the influence of the reactionary forces. For keeping with the instructions I had received. In the course of the operation Soviet troops the time being we are not speaking out openly Nagy immediately replied that although he ac- occupied the most important communication cen- against Nagy, but we will not reconcile ourselves cepted that my statement was good, it did not ters, including the powerful, radio broadcasting with the turn of events toward a reactionary answer the Hungarian Government’s question. station in Solnok, the depots of military supplies debauche. Nagy proposed that, since the Soviet Gov- and weapons, and other important military objec- ernment had not stopped the advance of the tives. Your friendly warnings regarding the possi- Soviet troops, nor had it given a satisfactory The Soviet troops operating in Budapest, bility of the weakening of the unity of the collec- explanation of its actions, they confirm the mo- having broken the resistance of the insurgents, tive leadership of our party have no basis. We can tion passed that morning regarding Hungary’s occupied the Parliament building, the Central firmly assure you that in the complex interna- giving notice of cessation of Warsaw Pact mem- Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party, and tional situation our unani- bership, a declaration of neutrality, and an appeal even the radio station in the region near the mously [yedinodushno] evaluates the situation to the for the guarantee of Parliament building. Also seized were three and unanimously takes appropriate decisions. Hungary’s neutrality by the Four Great Powers. bridges across the Dunai [Danube] River, joining In the event that the Soviet Government stopped the eastern and western parts of the city, and the CC CPSU the advance of the Soviet troops and withdrew arsenal of weapons and military supplies. them beyond its own borders with immediate The whole staff of the counterrevolutionary [Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 14; trans- effect, (the Government of the Hungarian People’s government of Imre Nagy was in hiding. Searches lation by Johanna Granville, Mark Doctoroff, Republic will form a judgment on compliance on are being conducted. and in The Hungarian Quarterly 34 (Spring 1993), the basis of the reports of its own armed forces) One large hotbed of resistance of the insur- 107.] the Hungarian Government would withdraw its gents remains in Budapest around the Corwin request to the United Nations, but Hungary would Theater in the southern-eastern part of the city. * * * * * still remain neutral. Erdei and Losonczy strongly The insurgents defending this stubborn point supported this reply by Nagy. Tildy’s reponse were presented with an ultimatum to capitulate. 9. Andropov Report, 1 November 1956 was affirmative but more reserved, while Kadar’s In connection with the refusal of the resisters to reaction was reluctant. Dobi remained silent. surrender, the troops began an assault on them. One hour later the Embassy received the The main garrisons of the Hungarian troops CODED TELEGRAM note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declar- were blockaded. Many of them gave up their Top Secret ing that since a strong Soviet Army force had weapons without a serious fight. Instructions Not to be copied crossed the border that day and had entered Hun- were given to our troops to return the captured garian territory against the firm protest of the insurgents to the command of Hungarian officers From Budapest Hungarian Government, the Government was and to arrest the officers who were assigned to Priority leaving the Warsaw Pact with immediate effect. replace the captured ones. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Em- With the objective of not allowing the pen- Today, on November 1, at 7 p.m. I received bassy to notify the Soviet Government of this etration of Hungary by the hostile agency and the 34 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN escape of the resistance leaders from Hungary, “VOLODYA” NKVD (Commissariat of Internal Affairs)— our troops have occupied the Hungarian airports continued from page 28 in 1933 and continued in that capacity until and solidly closed off all the roads on the Austro- don’t want to copy Russian methods....If we 1941. Having emigrated to the USSR in Hungarian border. The troops, continuing to Petofists are ‘Martovtsists’ [March people] 1929, Nagy established contacts among the fulfill the assignment, are purging the territory of (of the 1848 revolution), then Imre Nagy is Hungarian émigré community, encouraging Hungary of insurgents. our new .”6 Even Rakosi, who them to speak candidly with him. One of the G. ZHUKOV was shipped off to Moscow for “treatment” documents below states that in 1939 Nagy in July 1956 (he remained in the USSR until provided the names of 38 Hungarian politi- 4 November 1956 his death in 1971), acknowledged Nagy’s cal émigrés for “cultivation” (“razrabotka”), popularity. Intending to discredit him after and in another document, he listed 150 Sent to Khrushchev, Bulganin, Malenkov, Suslov, his arrest by Soviet forces, Rakosi wrote to names—not just Hungarians, but also Aus- etc. the CPSU Politburo: “Nagy at the present trians, Germans, Poles, Bulgarians, and Rus- time is undoubtedly the most popular [fig- sians. Of the total number of people upon [Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 23; trans- ure]. The whole imperialist camp supports whom Nagy is reported to have informed, 15 lation by Johanna Granville.] him, as well as the influential Yugoslavians. were “liquidated” (shot) or died in , All the Hungarian anti-socialist forces stand according to KGB archivists’ calculations.9 7 YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS behind him.” “Volodya,” his NKVD superiors wrote, is a “ANNALS OF ” SERIES And yet, certain puzzles in the history of “qualified agent” who shows great “initia- PUBLISHES FIRST TWO BOOKS Nagy’s career have remained. For one thing, tive” and “an ability to approach people.” Matyas Rakosi, who was the most powerful The story of how these materials came The first two books in a Yale University Press man in postwar Hungary, could not stand to light is a story that has more to do with series (“Annals of Communism”) based on newly- him. Rakosi was responsible for Nagy’s accessible Russian archives have appeared: Harvey Soviet, Hungarian, and communist party Klehr, , and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, complete expulsion from the Hungarian politics amidst the revolutionary upheavals The Secret World of American Communism (New Workers’ Party (HWP) in November 1955— of the late 1980s and early 1990s than with Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); and Lars T. not the Russians (an example of the East historical or scholarly investigation. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, and Oleg V. Khlevniuk, eds., European “tail” wagging the Soviet “dog”).8 Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936 (New Haven, Three of the documents printed below CT: Yale University Press, 1995). Rakosi, dubbed “Stalin’s best disciple,” and were found in late 1988 in the KGB archives. The series is based in large measure on docu- by others the “Bald Murderer,” or even less Of course, as in many cases when KGB ments from the Russian Center for the Preservation and reverently, “Asshead,” had so effectively materials are released, it was for a concrete, Study of Documents of Recent History (RTsKhIDNI), created his own in Hun- headed by K.M. Anderson, formerly known as the political purpose. KGB head Kryuchkov Central Party Archives and site of most records of the gary that he could shake his little finger and had sent the incriminating Nagy dossier to CPSU CC through 1952. According to Yale Univer- that person would be no more. Gorbachev on Friday, 16 June 1989—a date sity Press (where the executive editor of the project is Given Rakosi’s hatred of Nagy, why that is, as party ideologues were wont to say, Jonathan Brent), the series is currently envisioned to wasn’t Nagy—rather than Laszlo Rajk— run at least 18 volumes, including the following titles no coincidence. On that same day, several (and authors/editors): Anti-Government Opposition branded the first Hungarian “Titoist agent” hundred thousand Hungarians gathered in under Khrushchev and Brezhnev (, in Stalin’s sanguinary witch-hunt that swept Heroes’ Square in downtown Budapest, and V.A. Kozlov); History of the Soviet System, Eastern Europe from 1949 to 1952, and cost many more watched on nationwide televi- 1920-1989 (S.V. Mironenko, V.A. Kozlov, American editor to be announced); The Diary of , the lives of Traicho Kostov (), Rudolf sion, as Nagy and several other leaders of the 1933-1949 (Ivo Banac, F.I. Firsov); The Katyn Massa- Slansky and V. Clementis (Czechoslova- 1956 revolt who had been tried and executed cre (Anna M. Cienciala, N.S. Lebedeva); Georgi kia), and the freedom of Wladislaw Gomulka by Moscow were praised (and the 1956 Dimitrov’s Letters to Stalin, 1933-1945 (F.I. Firsov, (Poland)? Why was Nagy not chosen, who revolution, previously branded officially as American editor to be announced); Lenin’s “Secret” Archive (, Y.I. Buranov); The Assassina- was too gentle for the post of Minister of the a “counterrevolutionary uprising,” lauded tion of (V.P. Naumov, American editor to Interior, rather than Rajk, who did occupy as a whole) and given a ’ reburial in be announced); Soviet Politics and Repression in the that post? a daylong ceremony that was the highpoint (J. Arch Getty, O.V. Naumov); The Communist Or why, for that matter, was Imre Nagy, of what would turn out to be Hungary’s rush International during the Repression of the 1930s (Wil- liam Chase, F.I. Firsov); Soviet Social Life in the 1930s whom Rakosi called a milquetoast away from communist rule. (Lewis Siegelbaum, A.K. Sokolov); Voice of the People: (“miagkotelyi”), even offered such plum jobs In his letter, Kryuchkov made his inten- Peasants, Workers, and the Soviet State, 1918-1932 as Minister of the Interior or Minister of tions clear: Let’s publish these documents (Jeffrey Burds, A.K. Sokolov); The Church, the People, Administrative Organs? about Nagy’s sordid NKVD intrigues—it and the in Soviet Russia, 1917-1932 (Gre- gory Freeze, Leonid Vaintraub); The Russian Revolu- Obviously, it appears, someone was pro- might defuse the Nagy cam- tion, 1917-1918 (Mark Steinberg, Daniel Orlovsky, tecting him “at the center” (in Moscow). The paign and the Hungarian reform movement G.Z. Ioffe); of the Romanovs (Mark translated Russian archival documents in general. In fact, the hardline Kryuchkov, Steinberg, V.M. Khrustalyov); The Last Diary of printed below suggest one possible explana- who was later one of the soberer and shrewder Tsarina Alexandra Feodorovna ( Massie, V.A. Kozlov). tion—that Imre Nagy, codename “Volodya,” of the August 1991 coup plotters, correctly For further information contact Yale University had actually volunteered to become an in- perceived the developments in Hungary as a Press, POB 209040, New Haven, CT 06520-9040. former for the Soviet secret police—the threat to communist rule and to Hungary’s OGPU (Unified State Political Directorate)— status as a Warsaw Pact ally. (And there is COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 35 another, more personal twist: Kryuchkov were declassified in Moscow in May 1992, information in historical context. Rumors had himself served as Third Secretary in the in particular a comprehensive “reference” had circulated about Imre Nagy among the Soviet Embassy in Budapest in October- (“spravka”) on Nagy compiled by I. émigré community even in the 1930s and November 1956, and had personally wit- Zamchevskii (Director of the 5th European ’40s. V.N. Merkulov, the deputy director of nessed what he undoubtedly considered Division of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign the People’s Committee of State Security Nagy’s treachery to the Soviet and commu- Affairs) a month after the Hungarian (Zamnarkom GB), who was shot in 1953 in nist cause—perhaps he still carried a grudge, “events,” perhaps partly in preparation for a connection with the Beria affair, had sent or at least a vivid sense of Nagy’s impor- probable trial of Nagy, although at the time information about Nagy’s NKVD work to tance as a historical symbol.) efforts continued—through Yugoslav, and Malenkov in 1941 (see document below). In Since these archival documents, albeit later Rumanian officials, among others—to 1985, Janos Kadar told Gorbachev that Nagy authentic, were selected specifically to dis- persuade Nagy to support the Kadar govern- had been “Beria’s man.” Someone in Hun- credit Nagy and undermine political trends ment. This material contains further details gary must have known of Nagy’s connec- in Hungary in 1989, scholars should cer- about Nagy’s actions that were considered tions.15 tainly be cautious in evaluating them, and it compromising or dubious. To give one Moreover, given the “kto koro?” [who is possible that with fuller access to the example, when Nagy left Hungary in late from whom?; who wins, who loses?--ed.] archives additional research by scholars— 1929 for the USSR to attend the Second atmosphere of the 1930s in the Soviet bloc, not archivists or bureaucrats—may yield a Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party with arrests and executions occurring in more balanced assessment of Nagy’s NKVD as a delegate, he brought with him his assis- concentric spirals, one was almost com- activities. tant, identified as an agent-provocateur pelled to inform on others for survival, al- Ironically, the initial search for Soviet named Tirier. He introduced Tirier to his though even that didn’t guarantee one’s archival materials on Nagy may have been Russian colleagues as “the most trustworthy safety. Foreigners were especially vulner- triggered by a 1988 inquiry from Hungarian party man” (“parttiets”). But upon his re- able, because they were, as Russians say, reformist political figures, who had requested turn to Hungary, Tirier betrayed to the Hun- “not ours” (“ne ”). So for a foreign that all documents pertaining to Nagy’s sen- garian police all the Hungarian delegates Comintern member, to be an NKVD agent tence and his activities while in the Soviet who had attended that Congress (except for was a mark of prestige and trustworthiness. Union be declassified. But it was a compli- Nagy, who—luckily in this case—ended up One’s loyalty to communism was measured cated endeavor; Imre Nagy was a Soviet staying in Moscow for fifteen years). When by the number of people one either recruited citizen. There is no sign in the archives that Tirier was caught, Nagy tried to defend him, (“zaverboval”) or informed on (“donosil”). he ever lost his Soviet citizenship, although, taking his side against the other Hungarian Many Comintern members had close ties of course, he had to have had Hungarian communists.12 with the NKVD or the GRU citizenship as well. Other compromises Nagy made tend to (“Glavrazvedupr,” or Main Intelligence Evidently Gorbachev opted not to uni- be forgotten. In 1949, Nagy twice appealed Administration) of the General Staff of the laterally disclose the Nagy file, and just as to the Hungarian Central Committee, criti- Comintern. At the time, there was nothing Kryuchkov and other Soviet hardliners ex- cizing the party’s position on the “peasant unusual in this; it was almost a given. pected, the Hungarian leaders were loathe to question” and advocating the delay Twenty years later, East European lead- disclose the explosive information. When (“zatiagivanie”) of collectivization. For this ers, even in their home countries, were still the documents were unveiled during an in- Nagy was expelled from the Politburo tem- vulnerable, especially as the de-Stalinization ter-party consultation in the summer of 1989, porarily, until early 1951. This time he did process came to an end. When he did shift and the topic of Nagy’s NKVD connections not hesitate to perform “samokritika” in his loyalties and struggled on the same side was raised, R. Nyers, then the chairman of order to be readmitted. He was also placed as the Hungarian insurgents in October- the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party in charge of crop collection briefly, thus November 1956, Imre Nagy took a heroic (HSWP), demanded that the issue be agreeing to carry out the exact policies to step indeed. In the end, in June 1958, Nagy dropped.10 Meanwhile, Karoly Grosz, the which he objected.13 Also in 1951, Nagy— did not compromise. He died for his beliefs. HSWP General Secretary, broke the news to along with other Politburo members—with As two of his countrymen, Miklos Molnar a plenum of the HWSP Central Committee, others—signed the note proposing Janos and Laszlo Nagy, put it: “If his life was a which endorsed Grosz’s proposal that the Kadar’s arrest, thus authorizing extremely question mark, his death was an answer.”16 facts not be published. brutal beatings.14 Only in February 1993, when So, Imre Nagy, “Agent Volodya,” also 1. Stalin’s death in March 1953, of course, was the beginning of “de-Stalinization.” Khrushchev’s Febru- Kryuchkov’s secret 1989 letter to Gorbachev had “his hands soaked in blood,” to some ary 1956 Secret Speech to the 20th CPSU Congress was published in the Italian paper La Stampa, extent, had “given false information,” and was, in a sense, the beginning of the end of that process. did Gros agree to give an interview to the [helped to] “sentence innocent men to death,” Expression drawn from , The Rivals (NY: Hungarian newspaper Nepszabadsag the as Tito had said of Matyas Rakosi and his , 1971), 245. 2. The Polish Communist leader Bierut dropped dead following month, confirming the authentic- henchmen. from a heart attack soon after Khrushchev’s “Secret ity of the documents, that Nagy did indeed While the extent of Nagy’s past activi- Speech.” inform on his comrades in the 1930s and ties as a “chekist” is surprising, given the 3. One Soviet diplomat called Nagy a “malicious early .11 “martyr’s halo” he acquired after his depos- muddlehead” (“zlonamerennyi putanik”). I. Zamchevskii, “About Imre Nagy and his Politics with Additional damaging materials on Nagy ing and death, one must interpret this new 36 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the Yugoslav Leaders,” Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki REPORTS ON AGENT “VOLODYA”: press. Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVP RF) [Archive of Foreign RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS ON IMRE NAGY In the course of the KGB’s work on archival Policy of the Russian Federation], fond [f.] 077, opis materials dealing with the repression in the USSR [op.] 37, papka [p.] 191, delo [d.] 39, list [l.] 86. Also Documents provided and translated by in the second half of the thirties to the beginning Daniel F. Calhoun, Hungary and Suez, 1956: An Ex- Johanna Granville of the , documents were uncovered that ploration of Who Makes History (Lanham, MD: Uni- shed a light on the earlier, not well-known activi- versity Press of America, 1991), 57. 4. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, chap. 15. KGB Chief Kryuchkov’s Report, 16 June 1989 ties of Nagy in our country. From the indicated 5. The Petofi Circle was an organization of Hungarian documents it follows that, having emigrated to communist intellectuals founded in 1955. Sandor SPECIAL FILE the USSR in 1929, Nagy from the very beginning, Petofi was a revolutionary poet during the 1848 revolt Of Special Importance of his own initiative, sought out contact with the against . (Lajos Kossuth was the Hungarian security organs and in 1933 volunteered to be- revolutionary leader in the 1848 uprising.) To the CC CPSU come an agent (a secret informer) of the Main 6. “Notes of Ivan Serov,” 26 July 1956, Tsentr Committee of State Security KGB of the USSR Administration of the security organs of the Khranenia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD) June 16, 1989 NKVD. He worked under the pseudnym [Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Docu- ments], f. 89, per. 45, dok. 4, l. 2. “Volodya.” He actively used Hungarian and other 7. Letter of Rakosi to Khrushchev, 15 December 1956, “About the Archive Materials Pertaining to Imre political emigres—as well as Soviet citizens— TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, l. 80. Nagy’s Activities in the USSR” for the purpose of collecting data about the people 8. “Expressed opinions at the Hungarian Politburo who, for one reason or another, came to the Session, July 13, 1956,” TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 3. The data we received show that the full-scale attention of the NKVD. We have the document “There were 13 Hungarian comrades present—Polit- campaign of the opposition forces in Hungary that proves that in 1939 Nagy offered to the buro members and candidate members, as well as connected with the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy, NKVD for “cultivation” 38 Hungarian political comrade Mikoyan A. N. On July 13, 1956 at 3 p.m...he the former leader of the Hungarian government emigres, including Ferenc Munnich. In another participated in the Politburo session, which continued for four hours....About Nagy, Mikoyan said it was a during the period of the 1956 events, is aimed at list he named 150 Hungarians, Bulgarians, Rus- mistake to expel him from the party, even though he discrediting the whole path traversed by the Hun- sians, Germans, and Italians that he knew person- deserved it, given his behavior. If he were in the party, garian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), under- ally, and with whom in case of necessity, he could he could be forced to be expedient. The Hungarian mining the party’s authority and present leader- “work.” On the basis of the reports by Nagy— comrades made their work harder on ship, and stirring up unfriendly feelings toward “Volodya”—several groups of political émigrés, themselves....”[emphasis added] the USSR among the Hungarian people. consisting of members of Hungarian, German, 9. Most of these documents are still classified. They The opposition organizations demand a full and other Communist parties, were sentenced. are located in the personal files for Imre Nagy in the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy. He has acquired the They were all accused of “anti-communist,” “ter- KGB archive and among the Comintern documents kept at RTsKhIDNI (Russian Center for the Preserva- halo of a martyr, of an exceptionally honest and rorist,” and “counterrevolutionary” activities (the tion of Contemporary Documents). See Valerii principled person. Special emphasis in all this cases of the “Agrarians,” “Incorrigibles,” “The Musatov, “Tragediia Nadia,” Novaiia Noveishaia Istorii uproar about Imre Nagy is placed on the fact that Agony of the Doomed,” and so on). In one of the 1 (Jan. 1994), 167. Also Kuz’minev, “If We Do Not he was a “consistent champion against ,” documents (June 1940) it is indicated that Nagy Close Our Eyes” [“Yesli Ne Zakryvat’ Glaza”], “an advocate of democracy and the fundamental “gave material” on 15 arrested “enemies of the Literaturnaia Rossiia 51:1507 (20 December 1991), restoration of socialism.”In a whole series of people,” who had worked in the International 22-23. publications in the Hungarian press, one is made Agrarian Institute, the Comintern, and the 10. Musatov, “Tragediia,” op. cit., 166. to think that Nagy, [solely] as a result of Soviet All-Union Radio Committee. The activities of 11. Ibid. 12. I. Zamchevskii, “About Imre Nagy and his Politics pressure, was accused of counterrevolutionary “Volodya” led to the arrest of the well-known with the Yugoslav Leaders,” 4 December 1956, AVP activities, sentenced to death, and executed. The scholar E. Varga, and of a whole series of Hun- RF, f. 077, o. 37, p. 191, d. 39, l. 82. opposition is trying to raise Nagy on a pedestal garian Communist Party leaders (B. Varga-Vago, 13. Ibid.; also Calhoun, Hungary and Suez, 62, and and make him a symbol of the “struggle for G. Farkas, E. Neiman, F. Gabor, and others). A Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, democracy, progress, and the genuine indepen- part of these were shot, a part were sentenced to NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 129. dence of Hungary.” various terms in prison and exile. Many in 14. Musatov, “Tragediia Nadia,” 169; also Calhoun, In the HSWP leadership, there is no united 1954-1963 were rehabilitated. Hungary and Suez, 61-2. opinion as to the extent Imre Nagy should be From the archival materials it does not fol- 15. Valerii Musatov, “SSSR I Vengerskie Sobytiia 1956 g.: Novye Akhivnye Materialy,” Novaia rehabilitated. Deciding above all to strengthen low that Nagy was an employee of the NKVD by Noveishaia Istorii 1 (Jan. 1993), 5. their influence in the party and society, I. Pozsgai, force. Moreover, in the documents it is directly 16. Miklos Molnar and Laszlo Nagy, Imre Nagy: M. Sjures, and I. Horvat sometimes openly flirt indicated that “Volodya” displayed considerable Reformateur ou Revolutionnaire (Geneva: Librarie E. with the opposition in praising the services and “interest and initiative in his work and was a Droz, 1959), 217-18. dignity of Imre Nagy. K. Grosz, R. Nyers, M. qualified agent.” Jasso and others, in advocating his legal rehabili- Taking into account the nature and direction Johanna Granville is assistant professor of political tation, believe that this full-scale campaign of of the wide-scale propagandistic campaign in science at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, unrestrained praise for Nagy will strike at the Hungary, it would probably be expedient to re- PA. Currently a Fulbright Scholar (1994-95), she is conducting research in the Communist Party and For- HSWP and at Soviet-Hungarian relations. There port to the General Secretary of the Hungarian eign Ministry archives in Moscow. are many mid-level and especially senior Hungar- HSWP and K. Gros about the documents that we ian communists who are very critical of such a have and advise them about their possible use. campaign. Widespread among them is the opin- ion, founded on the stories of several party veter- Chairman of the KGB V. KRYUCHKOV ans, that the behavior of Imre Nagy in the 1920-30s in Hungary and the USSR was not as irreproach- [Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 82.] able, as is being suggested to the Hungarian popu- lation, which is under the control of the opposition’s * * * * * COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 37

In his work “Volodya” shows great interest Vladimir Iosifovich. Nagy’s OGPU Enlistment, 4 September 1930 and initiative, a qualified agent. Through “Volodya” the counterrevolutionary group the Enclosed: the abovementioned OBLIGATIONS “Agrarians” was exposed and liquidated. Deputy of the People’s Committee of Internal I, the undersigned, employee of the Department (Signed) MATUSOV, Affairs of the USSR of the OGPU (last name) Nagy (first name) Deputy Director of the 1st Dept, 4th Dept, 1st Imre () Iosofovich in the course of Administration, Captain of State Security (Signed) MERKULOV service, or after being discharged, presently com- mit myself to keep in the strictest secret all II. II. information and data about the work of the OGPU and its organs, not to divulge it in any form nor to From the Deputy Director of the 4th Dept R E F E R E N C E share it even with my closest relatives and friends. GUGB of the NKVD I will be held accountable for any failure to carry USSR about the agent of the 1st Division of the out my responsibilities according to Article 121 to the Commissar of State Security 3 rank, 3rd Administration of the NKGB USSR of the Criminal Code. Comrade Karutskii “Volodya” Order of the OGPU of April 3, 1923, No. 133, etc. RVS USSR of July 19, 1927 has been declared to R E P O R T ______, born in 1896, in the me. town of Kaposvar (Hungary), Hungarian by I report that on the night of the 4-5th of nationality, a citizen of the USSR, member of the Signature: Nagy Imre Iosofovich March of 1938 the agent of the second division HCP (b) since 1918. At present he works in the 4 September 1930 “Volodya” Nagy, Vladimir Iosifovich was ar- All Union Radio Committee. He was recruited as rested by the 11th Dept of the UNKVD of the an agent in 1933. In 1936 during the inspection NOTE: The present document must be kept in Moscow region. of his party documents “Volodya” was expelled the personal file of the employee. from the HCP, and in 1939 again readmitted. In “Volodya” was recruited on 17 January 1933 readmitting him to the party by the Party Board [Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok 79.] and during all that time gave valuable material KPK of the CC HCP, he was reprimanded for the about the anti-Soviet activities of a number of fact that he did not get the Comintern’s consent * * * * * people from the Hungarian political émigré com- for his wife’s trip to Hungary in 1935. munity. Report on Nagy’s Arrest by the NKVD, In the journal “Uj Hang” [New Sound] in Hun- 10 March 1938 Recently “Volodya” actively cultivated the garian” No. 2 for the year 1939, “Volodya” in his fundamental objective of the intelligence case article expressed doubt that the Hungarian prole- REFERENCE “The Incorrigibles” including: BAROS V., tariat at the present time was faithful to the MANUEL S., MADZSAR, TEGDAS, and a num- socialist cause. About the intelligence work of the agent of the ber of others. 1st division of the 4th Department of the First In 1937-1938 “Volodya” gave a number of mate- Administration. Volodya was recruited without a prelimi- rials about the anti-Soviet activities of FARKAS nary check in the 8th department of the GUGB, and VAGO. In subsequent materials about “VOLODYA” and remained under arrest for 4 days. When we “Volodya” the following people were arrested asked on what grounds was “Volodya” arrested, and convicted: MANUEL, LUBARSZKII, “Volodya” Nagy Vladimir Iosofovich, born they freed him on 8 March of this year. DUBROVSZKII, BARON, KRAMER, and in Hungary in 1896, by nationality Hungarian MADZSAR. was excluded from the HCP (Hungarian Com- I report this information by your orders. munist Party) (Imre Nagy); the case under inves- “Volodya” also informed us about the tigation at KPK and KPV has been in service Director of the 2nd Division of the 4th Depart- anti-Soviet activities of the people pres- since 1918, works as a non-salaried employee of ment of the GUGB ently arrested: STEINBERG, STUKKE, the Hungarian journal “Uj Hang” [New Sound]. Captain of State Security SUGAR, POLLACSEK, KARISKAS, He was recruited on January 17, 1933. He has Signed) ALTMAN FRIEDMAN. cultivated mostly Hungarian political émigrés. 10 March 1938 At present “Volodya” is cultivating a 1. According to “Volodya’s” data, a group [Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per 45, Dok 80, 2.] group of anti-Soviet-minded former Hun- of 4 people was exposed and liquidated. garian political emigres. MANUEL, BAROS, KRAMMER, and others * * * * * who underwent the case of the “Incorrigibles.” Director of the 1st Division of the 3rd Adminis- Information on Agent “Volodya,” June 1941 tration ofthe USSR First Lieutenant of State 2. At the present time he is cultivating a Security counterrevolutionary group of Hungarians, com- To the CC Hungarian Communist Party (HCP) posed of: VARGA E., GABOR F.I, SLOSSER To Comrade Malenkov (Signed) Sverdlov K., BOLGAR E., VARGA S.E., GERREL, “ “ June 1941 [day of the month left blank] LUKACS and others who underwent the intelli- Upon the inquiry of the Administration of Cadres gence case of the “Restorers.” of the CC of the (HCP) of 19 April 1940, No. 275/ [Source: TsKhSD, F 89, Per. 45, Dok 81,.] c we are sending reference material about Nagy 38 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

POLISH OCTOBER The PUWP leadership reassessed the “not an example of normal relations.” He contnued from page 1 political situation in the country at the Polit- argued that “Polish-Soviet relations is a great Poland, a critical link in the Kremlin’s post- buro meeting of 1 and 2 October 1956, problem” which had to be “normalized” in war security scheme in Europe. By October shortly after the First Secretary, Edward order to “forestall anti-Soviet manifesta- 1956, Soviet cadres, many chosen because Ochab,5 returned from a visit to China.6 The tions.” Gomulka stressed that the “Polish of their Polish background, dominated the agenda of this meeting included concerns raison d’être as well as the fact that we are senior levels of the .2 about Gomulka’s views on the developing also building socialism demanded The transformation of the Soviet sys- crisis. The leadership asked First Secretary that...future relations [with the Kremlin] be tem after Stalin’s death affected the satellite Ochab to meet with Gomulka and to invite devoid of conflicts.” states of East Europe in different ways. The the former leader of the wartime Polish At this point, Gomulka clashed with Kremlin, Nikita S. Khrushchev in particu- Workers Party (PWP) to a Politburo meet- Rokossowski over the Soviet-Polish rela- lar, followed and attempted to influence the ing.7 The decision had been unavoidable tionship under Stalin. Gomulka added that, pace and nature of the changes throughout and the logical continuation of Gomulka’s “today no one questions that in the past these the region with varying degrees of success. long series of official and secret talks with relations were unfair...Why did we in fact By October 1956, the de-Stalinization de- individual Politburo members since April pay reparations for the Germans[?] It was bate in Poland focused on the potential 1956. explained that a certain section of German return of Wladyslaw Gomulka3 to the lead- At the Politburo meeting of October 8 territory went to Poland, but we were not in ership of the Polish United Workers Party and 10, in preparation for Gomulka’s ap- fact allies of the Germans during the war...Our (PUWP). However, Gomulka, who had spent pearance at the next Politburo meeting, the government representatives at the time signed the summer of 1956 securing his place on leadership outlined four reasons for the cri- such an agreement. I would never have the Politburo by gaining the confidence of sis in the PUWP: 1) “a lack of unity in the signed such an agreement and I would never almost all the Central Committee members, Politburo”; 2) “a lack of connections be- have agreed to this...Comrade Rokossowski as well as the Soviets, made his return to the tween the leadership and the Party activ- knows about this...(Comrade Rokossowski: PUWP conditional. He stubbornly insisted ists”; 3) “a lack of authority among the No one has returned to this matter, except that Khrushchev complete what he had be- leadership”; and 4) “With regard to the you).” gun in 1954: the withdrawal of Soviet spreading of anti-Soviet tendencies there is, Gomulka also called for the majority of officers and advisers from the Polish Armed aside from the propaganda of the enemy, an the Politburo to unite under his leadership. Forces and security apparatus. Gomulka unfair situation in the relations between the On the existence of factions in the Party, also demanded the removal of Soviet Mar- PPR [Polish People’s Republic] and USSR Gomulka stated: “I do not see these factions shal Konstanty Rokossowski4 from the (such as the question concerning the price of or splinter groups. Party members and, PUWP Politburo. coal, the highest officer cadres in the army above all, those in the leadership simply Three days in October 1956 resolved often do not know the , do cannot voice their views, especially if those four outstanding and interrelated conflicts not have Polish citizenship, and the Soviet views differ with other Party leaders. A of the de-Stalinization period in Poland. ambassador8 interferes in the internal affairs ‘group’ must have its own distinctive plat- First, the bitter and divisive struggle for of the country).” The leadership also de- form...Where are those anonymous groups? political power within the PUWP Central cided: “To turn to the USSR and to the Since when have Communists adopted such Committee was settled. The fractured Cen- relevant generals who hold positions in the a stance? If you want to lead a Party of one tral Committee was nearly unanimous in army with a proposition that they adopt and a half million members...[you must real- selecting Gomulka First Secretary of the Polish citizenship. Soviet officers who do ize that] there comes a time when the differ- PUWP. Second, the Soviet threat to inter- not speak Polish [are] to become advisers, ences within the leadership may divide the vene militarily in the affairs of the Polish and in their place promote Polish officers. Party. We must approach the Party organi- Party ended with a compromise agreement Comrade Rokossowski will conduct talks zations with our differences and have a genu- on the part of the CPSU leadership and the with them and announce the result.”9 ine debate about them.” PUWP leadership. Third, the new PUWP Gomulka decided to attend the next Gomulka concluded his remarks to the leadership managed to mobilize significant Politburo meeting, which was held on Octo- Politburo with the following admonition: elements of Polish society to rally in support ber 12. It was his first Politburo meeting “Comrades, you have failed to notice the of Gomulka, if not the PUWP, and thus since the campaign against the “rightist- climate prevailing among the working class frustrate the growing animosity directed by nationalist deviation” of 1948-1949. He and the nation...Everything that has so far segments of Polish society against the party- told the leadership, among other things, that been done...was wrong...It is possible to rule state. Finally, all the factions in the PUWP the Party continued to experience difficul- a nation without enjoying its trust, but such used the Soviet threat to rally their support- ties because of “errors committed in the rule can only be maintained with bayonets. ers and Polish society. The discourse of past” and as a result of the “strong pressure Whoever chooses that option also chooses thus confirmed the demographic exerted by hostile and alien tendencies” in the path of universal calamity. We cannot transformation of the PUWP throughout the PUWP. Gomulka stressed that the prob- return to the old methods. Our current diffi- Poland and ended the tight grip on the lead- lem of Soviet advisers in Poland’s security culties stem from the Party’s weakness, from ership of the PUWP held by the former apparatus needed to be “untangled” and that our inconsistency.” Communist Party of Poland (CPP) cadres. the Soviet control of the Polish military was He invited the leadership to recommend COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 39 to the Central Committee his appointment to and Ochab. The mandate of the special AnastasMikoyan, Molotov, Defense Minis- the PUWP Politburo: “I do not have enough commission, which excluded the leading ter, Marshal I.S. Zhukov, the commander of strength to take up the challenges of active hardliners, was to prepare a list of candidates the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Konev, and the work and present conditions do not encour- for the new PUWP Politburo, Secretariat, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, General age one to do so. However, a peculiar and Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Antonov, arrived in Warsaw at about 7 a.m. political situation has arisen and one simply The special commission met during the break. on the 19th. Khrushchev later recalled in his cannot escape its consequences. This is why When the Politburo meeting resumed, memoirs: “We learned from our ambassa- I shall not refrain from political Ochab announced the decisions that had dor [in Warsaw] that the tensions which had activities...Until now you have prevented been taken: 1) the Politburo would be lim- been building up had boiled over...Some me from doing so, but should you change ited to nine members; 2) the new Politburo Poles were criticizing Soviet policy toward your minds today I will not say no. I would would include Gomulka, Zawadzki, Poland, saying that the treaty signed was like to emphasize that...I consider my views Cyrankiewicz, Loga-Sowinski, Roman unequal and that the Soviet Union was tak- to be correct and I will not retreat. I will be Zambrowski,17 Adam Rapacki, Jerzy ing unfair advantage of Poland...We had appealing to the Party leadership and even to Morawski, Stefan Jedrychowski, and Ochab; further reason to worry when certain ele- Party organizations throughout the country. 3) the Secretariat would include Gomulka, ments began to protest the fact that the I will make my doubts known. I am a Zambrowski (who was removed from the Commander in Chief of the Polish Army stubborn person. I would like you to know Secretariat by Khrushchev at the 6th PUWP was Marshal Rokossowski...The situation this.”10 Ochab agreed to nominate Gomulka Plenum of March 1956,18) , was such [that] we had to be ready to resort as well as some of his closest political allies Witold Jarosinski, and Ochab. Fourteen to arms.” The Soviet leader added: “the for membership in the Politburo at the 8th members voted for the first proposal, with Soviet Union was being reviled with abusive PUWP Plenum, which was set to take place only Rokossowski and Józwiak opposed. language and the [Polish] government was on October 17. Thirteen members voted on the second pro- close to being overthrown. The people ris- The debate over the 8th Plenum contin- posal, which was opposed by Rokossowski, ing to the top were those whose mood was ued at the Politburo meeting of October 15. Józwiak, and Zenon Nowak. During the anti-Soviet. This might threaten our lines of The leadership concluded that “there would discussions concerning the elections to the communication and access to Germany be no keynote speech and Comrade Ochab’s Secretariat, it was also decided to add Jerzy through Poland. Therefore, we decided to introductory remarks would merely present Albrecht and Wladyslaw Matwin to the list take certain measures to maintain contact the situation within the Politburo.” They of candidates. Józwiak opposed Matwin, with our troops in the German Democratic also decided to hold another Politburo meet- and Rokossowski opposed Matwin and Republic...We decided to send a delegation ing and to postpone the 8th Plenum until Albrecht. The commission excluded from to Poland and have a talk with the Polish October 19. More important, the Politburo the Politburo and Secretariat those persons leadership. They recommended that we not agreed to add Gomulka and his allies, Marian most closely associated with the Soviets, come. Their reluctance to meet with us Spychalski, , and Ignacy Loga- namely, Józwiak, Franciszek Mazur,19 Zenon heightened our concern even more. So we Sowinski, to the leadership. Nowak, and Rokossowski.20 decided to go there in a large delegation.”22 The Politburo then ordered that a press Panteleimon K. Ponomarenko, the So- Khrushchev’s dramatic encounter with release be issued for October 16 to announce viet ambassador in Warsaw, informed Ochab Ochab, Cyrankiewicz, Zawadzki, publicly the planned return of Gomulka to on the evening of October 18 that the CPSU Zambrowski, and Gomulka at Warsaw air- the leadership, and October 19 as the date for Politburo had decided to send a delegation to port, began on an angry note. Document No. the 8th Plenum. Finally, the Politburo de- Warsaw in order to discuss the situation in 1 below provides the fullest and earliest cided to hold elections at the next meeting to the PUWP and the country. Ponomarenko account to date of the events that transpired decide the Politburo and Secretariat mem- added that Moscow was alarmed by the on the tarmac of Warsaw’s military airport: bership that would be presented to the 8th growing anti-Soviet manifestations in Po- Gomulka’s briefing to the PUWP Politburo Plenum. The debate in the Politburo was land. Ochab immediately gathered the Po- some two hours after the CPSU and PUWP heated. Rokossowski and three of his allies litburo to meet with Ponomarenko at the delegations met. The first meeting with the in the Politburo—Witold Józwiak,11 Zenon Central Committee. They suggested to Soviets had lasted until about 9 a.m. The Nowak,12 and Wladyslaw Dworakowski13— Ponomarenko that the Soviet delegation ar- Poles and the Soviets agreed that the 8th attacked the other voting members of the rive during the second or the third day of the Plenum would begin that morning in order Politburo for trying to exclude them from Plenum. Only Rokossowski was of the for Gomulka and the others to be elected to the leadership. Shortly before the meeting opinion that the Soviet delegation should be the Central Committee, but that no further ended, Rokossowski warned: “I view the met before the Plenum. Ponomarenko agreed decisions would be taken by the Plenum holding of elections in this situation as de- with Rokossowski and informed the Polish until the meeting with the Soviets had ended. sertion.”14 leaders that a Soviet delegation, headed by At the Politburo meeting on October 17, Khrushchev, would arrive in Warsaw shortly DOCUMENT NO. 1 a “leadership-search” commission was es- before the 8th Plenum was to begin on the tablished. It included Gomulka and three morning of October 19.21 Protocol No. 129 Meeting of the Politburo on 19, 20 and 21 other senior Politburo members: Józef The CPSU delegation, which included October 1956 15 16 Cyrankiewicz, , Khrushchev, , (during a pause in proceedings at the VIII 40 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Plenum) resolution to these affairs will only strengthen the The Politburo agrees to the following press anti-Soviet campaign. I would like for the com- Comrade [Eugeniusz] Stawinski: We have al- communiqué: rades to voice their views on this matter: interven- ways directed ourselves with great affection to- tion or the conditions under which to continue the wards the Soviet Union, but to achieve a com- On 19 October at 10:00 am the proceedings of the talks.” plete consolidation with the country we cannot VIII Plenum began. After the meeting was accept concessions. opened by comrade Ochab, and the agenda ac- Comrade Zawadzki: Comrade Wieslaw’s posi- cepted, comrades Wladyslaw Gomulka, Marian tion is correct. We do not see our situation, Comrade Jedrychowski: All concessions will be Spychalski, Zenon Kliszko, and Loga-Sowinski including the personnel decision taken by the interpreted to mean that the CC [Central Commit- were added to the Central Committee so that they Politburo, as a menacing upheaval in the country tee] of our Party does not operate freely and that could take part in the discussions as fully fledged leading to a break in Polish-Soviet relations. Yet the changes are dictated by the Soviet delegation. members. the decision not to change the position of the Politburo has to be taken with certain cautions in Comrade [Hilary] Chelchowski: I am of the Comrade Wieslaw [Wladyslaw Gomulka’s war- order not to intensify the situation. I also propose, opinion that it was incorrect for the Politburo to time pseudonym] informed the Politburo about in connection with the situation in Warsaw, to remove comrades [Zenon] Nowak and the meeting at the airport with the Soviet delega- issue an appeal, signed by the Politburo and com- Rokossowski. Let us think of what we are doing. tion. “Talks like this I have never held with party rade Wieslaw, to the Enterprise Council, to stu- comrades. It was beyond comprehension. How dents, about the arrival of the Soviet delegation in Comrade Ochab: It was very painful to hear can you take such a tone and, with such epitaphs, the common interest of the state and nation. comrade Khrushchev. I did not deserve such turn on people who in good faith turned to you? treatment. I would also like comrade Rokossowski Khrushchev first greeted, above all, comrade Comrade Zambrowski: The situation in the coun- to explain the situation in the army. Rokossowski and the generals; underlining— try is tense. I am on the side of what was said by these are people on whom I depend. Turning to comrade Wieslaw. Do not make any changes in Comrade Rokossowski: I feel that there are us, he said [in Russian]: ‘The treacherous activ- the Politburo’s propositions. I am opposed to the certain insinuations being directed at me. I do not ity of Comrade Ochab has become evident, this issuing of an appeal. Let the Plenum decide. feel any guilt. I did not give the army any alarm number won’t pass here!’ You needed a lot of signals. I simply ordered, in any case with the patience not to react to such talk. The entire Comrade Rokossowski: Comrade Wieslaw gave agreement of comrade Ochab, that one military discussion was carried out in this loud tone, such us an objective assessment, but you can see that battalion from Legionowo be put on alert in order that everyone at the airport, even the chauffeurs, there are reasons why the Soviet comrades talk to ensure the security, from possible enemy provo- heard it. like this, and why comrade Khrushchev vehe- cation, for the unexpected arrival of the Soviet I proposed that we drive with them to Belve- mently exploded. I am of the opinion that four delegation.23 dere Palace and speak calmly. I told them that comrades should go to the discussions and listen above all else we had to open the Plenum. They to the arguments of the Soviet comrades. More [Source: AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 12, teczka 46a, would not agree to this. At Belvedere Palace the cold bloodedness. It is unnecessary to aggravate str. 66-68; translated from the Polish by L.W. talks had a similar tone. They told us that we the situation. Gluchowskii.] actually spat in their faces because we did not agree to meet with the delegation before the Comrade Witold [Jozwiak]: I am of the opinion The long-awaited 8th Plenum began at Plenum. They are upset with us because the that we should leave the Politburo in its old 10 a.m. Ochab opened the gathering with a Politburo Commission proposed a new list of composition and co-opt only comrades Wieslaw brief statement and added: “I shall limit members to the Politburo without a number of and Loga-Sowinski. comrades who are supporters of a Polish-Soviet myself in this introduction to a report on the union; namely, comrades Rokossowski, [Zenon] Comrade Gierek: I am of the opinion that the latest decisions of the Politburo.” He an- Nowak, Mazur, Jozwiak. I explained to them decisions of the Politburo are correct and we nounced that the Politburo had decided to that we don’t have such tendencies. We do not cannot overturn them. It is not pleasant to listen include Gomulka, Spychalski, Kliszko, and want to break the alliance with the Soviet Union. to such malicious language. Loga-Sowinski in the Central Committee. It came to a clash. Comrade Khrushchev said [in Ochab continued: “the Politburo proposes Russian]: ‘That number won’t pass here. We are Comrade [Zenon] Nowak: I agree with comrade serious changes to its composition, for the ready for active intervention.’ Gomulka. Let the Soviet comrades calmly ex- number of its members to be limited to nine [Here Gomulka quotes his own remarks to plain what they want. in order to secure unity and greater effi- Khrushchev:] I understand that it is possible to talk in an aggressive tone, but if you talk with a Comrades Nowak, Roman: I support in full the ciency, and proposes the election of Com- revolver on the table you don’t have an even- resolutions of the Politburo. rade Wladyslaw Gomulka for the post of handed discussion. I cannot continue the discus- First Secretary.”24 sions under these conditions. I am ill and I cannot Comrade Rapacki: We cannot continue talks Ochab appealed to the Plenum for “re- fill such a function in my condition. We can under the threat of intervention and under the sponsibility and wisdom” and declared: “We listen to the complaints of the Soviet comrades, charge that we are less worthy than those com- are meeting here in a difficult political situ- but if decisions are to be made under the threat of rades from the old leadership who were not se- ation.” He told the delegates: “I would also physical force I am not up to it. My first step in lected to form the new composition. I am for like to inform you, Comrades, that a delega- Party work, which I am taking after a long break, maintaining the decisions of the Politburo. tion of the Presidium of the Central Commit- must be interrupted. I don’t want to break off Polish-Soviet Comrade Dworakowski: We have to do every- tee of the CPSU, composed of Comrades friendship. I believe what we propose will thing so as not to disturb our friendship with the Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and strengthen the friendship. Any other form of Soviet Union and we have to concede. Molotov arrived in Warsaw this morning. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 41

The delegation wishes to conduct talks with After the first Soviet encounter with Rokossowski’s exclusion from the new Po- our Politburo.” Ochab suggested that the Gomulka, Khrushchev must have been reas- litburo. Gomulka continued to call for Plenum accept Gomulka and his colleagues sured that the newly proposed PUWP First Rokossowski’s return to the Soviet Union. into the Central Committee and that the Secretary was not hostile to the Soviet Union. The Soviets continued to press Gomulka on proceedings be delayed until 6 p.m.25 Khrushchev used the occasion to gauge the Rokossowski issue, but the Poles would A number of the Central Committee Gomulka’s views on a variety of matters. As not budge. Khrushchev later argued: “The members demanded to know more details. he later put it: “our embassy informed us people of Warsaw had been prepared to Helena Jaworska interjected and demanded that a genuine revolt was on the verge of defend themselves and resist Soviet troops to know why it was necessary to adjourn the breaking out in Warsaw. For the most part entering the city... A clash would have been Plenum. Ochab quickly explained: “It arises these demonstrations were being organized good for no one but our enemies. It would be out of the necessity to conduct talks with the in support of the new leadership headed by a fatal conflict, with grave consequences delegation of the Presidium of the CPSU, Gomulka, which we too were prepared to that would have been felt for many years to which is already in Warsaw.” Michalina support, but the demonstrations also had a come.”34 He added: “With Poland in par- Tatarkówna-Majkowska wanted to know dangerously anti-Soviet character.” The ticular, I always tried to be sympathetic to who would represent the Polish delegation Soviet leader added that Gomulka held “a flare-ups of anti-Soviet sentiment. Sympa- during the discussions with the Soviets and position which was most advantageous for thetic in the sense that you have to remember proposed that a new Politburo be elected to us. Here was a man who had come to power history and that czarist Russia was a party to take part in the talks. Her motion was on the crest of an anti-Soviet wave, yet who Poland being carved up among the Ger- rejected. Romana Granas asked Ochab to could now speak forcefully about the need to mans, the Austrians, and the Russians. That outline the agenda of the Politburo’s meet- preserve Poland’s friendly relations with the left its stamp on the Polish .”35 ing with the Soviets. Ochab abruptly re- Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist The Soviet-Polish talks at the Belve- plied, “Soviet-Polish relations,” and called Party.”30 dere Palace began at about 11 a.m. on Octo- for an immediate vote on the Politburo’s Ochab confirmed that Khrushchev ber 19 and ended at 3 a.m. on October 20. decision to readmit Gomulka and the others manifested a sympathetic attitude towards The talks included Khrushchev, Mikoyan, to the Central Committee.26 The Plenum Gomulka: “Basically our Soviet friends Molotov, and Kaganovich on the Soviet unanimously accepted Ochab’s proposition. wanted to make Gomulka First Secretary.” side, and Gomulka, with fourteen members The old Politburo and Gomulka were also He continued: “At one point Khrushchev of the PUWP Politburo, on the Polish side.36 empowered to conduct talks with the CPSU said to [Gomulka]: we bring you greetings. Three separate documentary accounts of the delegation. The debate barely lasted half an Presumably they thought Gomulka would talks between the CPSU-PUWP delegates at hour before the Plenum was adjourned. The put the country in order and was the one to the Belvedere Palace are presented here. Polish delegation returned to the Belvedere stake their bets on...But Gomulka...displayed The first two accounts of the Soviet- Palace to meet again with the Soviets.27 considerable toughness of character during Polish confrontation are extraordinary. While the 8th Plenum met to debate those difficult talks.”31 Documents No. 2 and No. 3 below are the Gomulka’s return to the Central Committee, The turning point came when “Gomulka recently discovered notes of the October 19- Khrushchev held a meeting with his gener- made an anxious but sincere declaration,” as 20 meeting taken by two Polish participants: als at the Soviet embassy. The CPSU First Khrushchev characterized it. The CPSU Gomulka and Zawadzki.37 These are rough Secretary stated in his memoirs: “Marshal First Secretary added that Gomulka acknowl- notes, but they give us the fullest account to Konev and I held separate consultations edged: “Poland needs friendship with the date on the range of topics discussed by the with Comrade Rokossowski, who was more Soviet Union more than the Soviet Union Soviets and the Poles at the Belvedere Pal- obedient to us but had less authority than the needs friendship with Poland. Can it be that ace. Gomulka appears to have been inter- other Polish leaders.28 He told us that anti- we failed to understand our situation? With- ested in only keeping a short record of the Soviet, nationalistic, and reactionary forces out the Soviet Union we cannot maintain our Soviet comments. Zawadzki, on the other were growing in strength, and that if it were borders with the West. We are dealing with hand, made more detailed notes and endeav- necessary to arrest the growth of these coun- our internal problems, our relations with the ored to include comments made by a wider terrevolutionary elements by force of arms, Soviet Union will remain unchanged. We range of participants on both sides. he was at our disposal; we could rely on him will still be friends and allies.” According to to do whatever was necessary to preserve Khrushchev, Gomulka “said all this with DOCUMENT NO. 2 Poland’s socialist gains and to assure such intensity and such sincerity that I be- Poland’s continuing fidelity and friendship. lieved his words...I said to our delegation, ‘I Wladyslaw Gomulka’s Notes38 That was all very well and good, but as we think there is no reason not to believe Com- 1/ Ochab opens the meeting—[then] Gomulka—[then] Mikoyan [outlines Soviet con- began to analyze the problem in more detail rade Gomulka.’ ”32 The Soviet leader added: cerns]. [Mikoyan speaks:] [Poland is a] and calculate which Polish regiments we “We believed him when he said he realized neighbouring country—[there is] a tradition of could count on to obey Rokossowski, the we faced a common enemy, Western meetings, [and Soviets are sensitive about the] situation began to look somewhat bleak. Of ...We took his word as a promis- international situation. Our [Polish] tone in re- course, armed strength far exceeded sory note from a man whose good faith we jecting a reception for the Soviet delegation. that of Poland, but we didn’t want to resort to believed in.”33 Sounded a great alarm for them. Alliance be- the use of our own troops.”29 The next contentious point concerned tween states is a matter for their [Soviet] concern, 42 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Warsaw Pact—NATO Pact. On what do they thrown out all of the sudden. Do Soviet officers their orders for coal from Poland to the USSR. [Soviets] base the difficulty of our situation, imperil [Polish] sovereignty? If you consider the Issue of uranium mining—as of Spring we [Poles] they’re not exactly sure. Ochab did not inform Warsaw Pact unnecessary—tell us. Anti-Soviet have not responded.51 The Soviet Union experi- them about the situation in Poland. American propaganda does not meet any resistance [in Po- enced [economic] losses no smaller than Poland. radio: he [Mikoyan] cites [apparently from land]. The Soviet Union passed on to Poland major American news reports].39 Well then [Mikoyan People who are guilty of nothing continue to be military secrets, which included a lot of expendi- adds]: are these reports true [and] are there removed from the [PUWP] leadership—how [are tures on education, and so on. [All] for the taking. objective issues which could divide us? the Soviets] to understand this? Does this not He [Mikoyan] cites Comrade Gomulka’s letter to Economic discussion. From Poland they need mean that it [changes in the PUWP Politburo] is Stalin from 1948.52 About the excess amount of nothing. [On the] question of coal reparations. levelled against the Polish-Soviet friendship[?] in high positions, [and] that national nihil- They [Soviets] agreed to decrease the quota of How will the removal of Rokossowski be under- ism characterizes some Jewish comrades. That coal [from Poland]. From 1959, [they will] not stood by the [Polish] nation, how will this be he [Mikoyan] considers it correct to decrease the take Polish coal for their commodities. Letter interpreted abroad? Everyone will understand it congestion [of Jews in the PUWP]. [Mikoyan from [Otto] Grotewohl40 regarding the quota of as a blow to the alliance. adds] That now he [Gomulka] will be pulled to coal. Spring economic conference [in Soviet Is what Comrade Gomulka says, true, or is it just the top by the Jews and then again they will drop Union]—resolutions [were] not kept. They [So- words? I [Gomulka] am returning to work under him.53 He [Mikoyan] cites an article by Gomulka viets] will not have enough ore and cotton for an anti-Soviet slogan. They [Soviets] do not from on the matter of the Polish- Poland. criticize us—[Jerzy] Morawski, [Wladyslaw] Soviet alliance.54 Are we [Poles] holding to that Iron ore works in Poland.41 They decided to Matwin [are main targets].49 [For the Soviets] [correct] line? No. Today anyone can write deliver it to Poland, no reply as yet [from the The question is not about people, but what kind of anything they want about the Soviet Union. Even Poles]. Factory—credits of 2,200 million rubles politics is hiding [behind the proposed] personnel in capitalist countries the government finds a way for the investment. They will deliver all their changes. The atmosphere [in Poland] is anti- to ensure that the press does not offend a friendly secret wartime production [methods], patents, Soviet and the organizational decisions are anti- state. Today, the Poles are starting what the licenses. [And] Brand new airplanes with Soviet Soviet. Poland is not a Bulgaria or Hungary— Yugoslavs have finished. About the unrestricted licenses.42 together with us [USSR] it’s the most important [Polish press] campaign against the Soviet Union. They could come to an arrangement so that [country in the region]. In what way does the The Soviet Union does not deprive Poland of its we did not have to supply ships. They would be Soviet Union infringe on [Poland’s] sovereignty? sovereignty. Maybe the Warsaw defense pact is satisfied. [On the Polish] Army—Soviet officers In Khrushchev’s discussions [with] Tito about the unnecessary? Then we [Poles] should discuss made it [a] high calibre [force]. [On the Polish] satellites [of Eastern Europe]—Tito banned the this matter. Press, [concerning] what it wrote about [Yugoslav] press from writing on the People’s Issue of the abrupt removal of a group of Khrushchev’s meeting [with the PUWP Central Democracies as [if they were] satellites. Without comrades from the [PUWP] Politburo, who are Committee in March 1956]—Jewish matter.43 us [Poland] it is not possible to organize a defense seen in the eyes of the [Polish] nation as support- Their [Soviet] appointments in the Republics. against imperialism. ers of the friendship with the Soviet Union. The Cites my [Gomulka’s] letter to Stalin.44 What do issue of Comrade Rokossowski—[is a] major they [Soviets] want—friendship. [Source: Gomulka Family Private Papers; trans- political issue. 1/ war—dangerous, lated from the Polish by L.W. Gluchowski] [For the Soviets] There remain only some 2/ to isolate Polish reactionaries, minor unresolved differences with Tito. With the 3/ we belong to a common socialist camp—no Chinese, we [Soviets] have complete understand- one would forgive us if we broke apart. DOCUMENT NO. 3 ing on every issue. Comrade Ochab said that at [There is a] Wide-spread threat to the [Polish] this [Eighth] Plenum, Comrades Morawski and government. [Stanislaw] Mikolajczyk.45 We Aleksander Zawadzki’s Notes50 Matwin will be removed [from the PUWP Secre- [Poles] do not appreciate the dangerousness of Meeting with Comrades Khrushchev, Mikoyan, tariat], but now they are being put forward [to join the situation. Reading from my [Gomulka’s] Molotov, Kaganovich on 19 X 56. the leadership]. (Ochab interrupted and said that article of 1948 [on Soviet-Polish unity].46 Will he too is being removed [from the post of First a wedge not be forced between Poland and the Comrade Mikoyan [says] that the [PUWP] Secretary]). The NATO camp wants us [Poles] to Soviet Union today? Do we support this [wedge] Politburo has shown itself to be inhospitable in argue with the Soviet Union, [to] divide [us]. Tell in our [current] position? Why do we tolerate [its] dealings with the Soviet side. Standing issues us [Soviets], where are the differences between anti-Soviet propaganda [in Poland]? include relations between the parties, about the us—what do you [Poles] want[?] In Yugoslavia there are no voices in the press boundaries of the [socialist] camp, and issues 2) Comrade Ochab—that he believes Com- against Soviet Union. [The] Voices from our between our states. rades Morawski and Matwin are good, etc. and is press [read:]—Stalinism is . Let the dogs Our countries are allies, against [whom]? NATO. for keeping them [Zawadzki leaves space here, bark. From our [PUWP] Party they [Soviets] do not possibly to add something later]. What frightens them [Soviets]? It’s not [about] have the real information. Ochab says that the 3) Comrade Gomulka—He said to himself insults, as much as the threat of us [Poles] losing situation is complicated, but he does not say what that he would never return to Party work. Now he power. The article by [Jerszy] Putrament47 [for the problem is. American Radio is providing sees that he must. The issue of [Poland’s contin- example] about the amoral position of the details about the situation in the [PUWP] Party ued] friendship [with the Soviet Union] is [also] USSR.48 The Poles are beginning what the leadership—(Mikoyan reads [apparently from the opinion of the entire [PUWP] collective [lead- Yugoslavs have repudiated. They [Soviets] have American radio reports]). What can separate us? ership]. [But] that which now exists in the [PUWP] anxiety for these reasons. The slogan of the 1) Economic issues. We [Soviets] need nothing Politburo cannot continue. The [old] Politburo youth: away with Rokossowski, is a blow from Poland. The Polish side is also unilaterally was not in the position to take control of the against the army. How are we to reconcile presenting [the arguments of] the Soviet side situation [in Poland]. The resolutions of the [Soviet-Polish] friendship with the demand to without the facts—[such as the] issue of coal Seventh Plenum [of July 1956] were in fact recall officers, Soviet officers[?] They can’t be quotas. From 1959, they [Soviets] are ending correct — [but] a section of the Politburo mem- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 43 bership understands it differently. [Especially] the situation—it is about a struggle for power Rejoinder by Soviet comrades, that the The issue of .55 Some [PUWP] [inside the PUWP]. The work [of those engaged [PUWP] Politburo should not remove itself from comrades took the position to just wait [and do in the struggle] went along the lines of a critique, the desires of the First Secretary. nothing]. to smear everything and everyone [opposed to He [Gomulka] believes that a Politburo com- them].58 We excluded one person from the Party [Source: Zawadzki Papers, AAN, KC PZPR; posed of 9 persons will be sufficient. But, even and there was uproar.59 The mood in the country translated from the Polish by L.W. Gluchowski with this new composition [it may not be [Poland] is being organized. About the list with with ] enough]—Comrade Ochab represents opinion the composition of the new [PUWP] Politburo— calling for harsh measures against the [Polish] it was made public without the Politburo’s deci- Another account of the October 19-20 press and this [too] will not help... The root of the sion (Ochab explains that he gave permission...). Soviet-Polish meeting was presented by problem [is] in the material condition of the He [Nowak] does not think that the new list of Gomulka to the Chinese on 11 January 1957. working class, but there are other [causes as Politburo members will solve the situation. well]. As to Comrade Molotov’s question [ap- 8) Comrade Cyrankiewicz—He declares his It is a refined version of the Soviet-Polish parently about the attacks on Stalin in Poland], he position toward the USSR. —To remove every- confrontation of October 1956, exclusively [Gomulka] replies: and “you too”—[reminding thing that adversely impacts the issue of [the from the Polish perspective. Document No. Molotov of] Khrushchev’s [secret] report [to the Soviet-Polish] friendship. —That the greeting 4 below allowed Gomulka to make his case, Twentieth CPSU Congress] on Stalin. [On] the today at the airport is contradictory to everything albeit to a private audience, that the Soviet- issue of coal [Gomulka says]—there are many that was settled at the July [1955] Plenum of the Polish confrontation of October 1956 was questions and we [the Poles] have not answered CPSU60 about the mutual relations between our his—and therefore a Polish—victory. This them all. Other matters [include]: irregularities countries. That we have to deal with the issue of document also provides us with a glimpse of in the [Polish] organs of security. Many innocent strengthening the Party and the leadership. the Chinese reaction to the October events in people were arrested, tormented. The issue of [Cyrankiewicz is] Against Comrade [Soviet] advisers attached to the [Polish] security Rokossowski, for banging his fist on the table. — Poland, especially to ’s under- [apparatus] and their recall [to the Soviet Union]. (Comrade Khrushchev: where are you headed standing of the Soviet Union’s place in the The issue of the [Soviet] Advisers and their with this? You are either naive, or you pretend to international communist movement.62 responsibility [while in Poland]. And, that be...). At this point, 9:00 [p.m.], Comrade Zawadzki told me [Gomulka]: how can we Gomulka vehemently protests against the move- DOCUMENT NO. 463 [Poles] make them [Soviet advisers] accept re- ment of Soviet and Polish tanks—[which brings sponsibility [for their actions]. I [Zawadzki] had about] sharp clashes with the Soviet comrades. apparently told this to Comrade Gomulka this Comrade Khrushchev—that in Germany [there Secret [Handwritten] [past] May.56 That the Soviet comrades should is] a huge Soviet army... Comrade Mikoyan—go NOTES not fear that [our] planned changes would weaken ahead, do it, but you will assume a great respon- from the completed discussions of 11 and 12 the friendship [between the Soviet Union and sibility in front of the Party, the nation and the January 1957 between the delegates of the Poland]... In their reply to the Soviet comrades, brother countries! (directed at Gomulka).61 Again, Chinese People’s Republic [ChPR] and Poland. the Yugoslav comrades were right, in 1948, in about the list of new Politburo [members]...[and answering to the letter by Stalin and Molotov, its] distribution in Warsaw. The Chinese side in the discussions included: that they knew their [own] people well, and that 9) Comrade Khrushchev. 1) regarding the Comrades Zhou Enlai, He Long, Wang Dongxing, experience has shown that they had, and they [Soviet] advisers—that rather reluctantly they and the ambassador of the ChPR in Poland, Wang continue to have today, the support of the will give it to us [Soviets will concede]. That he Pinga. [Yugoslav] nation. In a letter they [Yugoslavs] [Khrushchev] feels pained by the position of From the Polish side participants included: stated... [again Zawadzki leaves some space] Comrade Gomulka on the issue of the advisers. Comrades Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, Zawadzki, 4) Comrade Zambrowski. That the Soviet That the Soviet Union saw it as its duty [to send Ochab, Zambrowski, Rapacki, [Stefan] comrades have introduced discord among us in advisers to Poland]. He [Khrushchev] admits Naszkowski, and Poland’s ambassador to the the Politburo.57 that they [Soviets] travelled here with the purpose Chinese People’s Republic, [Stanislaw] Kiryluk. 5) Zawadzki (attached points). [It is not of telling us their views, interpretations, and to clear what he means here] influence us... But we [the Poles] will not enter- First sitting on day 11.I.1957 at 1500 hrs. 6) Comrade Jozwiak—Here [in Poland] one tain anything. Very determined concerning the [Comrade Gomulka] can feel [the presence of] an enemy, who acts issue of Comrade Rokossowski. [Soviets con- (...) cunningly and [is] deeply [rooted]. That there is cerned] That this is how Gomulka has come [to Fundamentally correct resolutions had been ac- no one in the Politburo who is opposed to democ- join] the leadership of the [Polish] Party, with cepted at our VII Plenum [of July 1956], but they racy. But that hostile elements are active [in the such a position. remained unfulfilled because our leadership and Party]. He agrees that our leadership was not 10) Comrade Molotov, that we [the Poles] many lower structures in the Party were para- leadership at all. The issue of Soviet officers—he of course have to take responsibility [for our lyzed. The primary deficiency of the VII Plenum, [Jozwiak] told the First Secretary [Ochab] why problems], but that they [the Soviets] have to take however, was its inability to steer the Polish- we want to send them [Soviet officers] back. That responsibility for the larger issue of the [socialist] Soviet relationship back to a position of equality at a Politburo meeting four comrades, O[chab], camp. and sovereignty. This deeply preyed on the G[omulka], Z[awadzki], C[yrankiewicz], were 11) Rokossowski, what kind of circum- country. Many comrades in the Party leadership asked [to select the new Politburo], they pro- stances do I find myself in. came to the conclusion, in order to avoid a dan- posed the obvious Politburo members. He 12) Comrade Ochab. There are social forces, gerous situation in the country, that it was time to [Jozwiak] was opposed [to the new Politburo], which are active...That all the comrades in the regulate Polish-Soviet relations. This situation and so was one more comrade. He mostly means Politburo are good. [It’s] just that we [in the was well known to the CPSU leadership, but the Comrade Rokossowski. Polish Party] did not want to hinder Comrade Soviet comrades decided firmly at the time to 7) Comrade Zenon Nowak—The nature of Gomulka [in his role] as the First Secretary. oppose actively this tendency. The result was 44 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN that on the day before the VIII Plenum opened, The subsequent talks were somewhat calmer. On the next day, the Soviet delegation flew the Soviet embassy communicated to us that a Comrade Mikoyan reported the perspective of the back to Moscow. This time, the farewell at the delegation, which did in fact arrive, will present Soviet delegation. He said that the Soviet Union airport was more normal. The news of the Soviet itself in Poland on the very day the Plenum has certain military forces on GDR [German delegation’s visit to Poland, including the inci- opens. The Soviet comrades also turned to the Democratic Republic] territory and is concerned dent at the airport, spread throughout Warsaw then First Secretary, comrade Ochab, to comrade that changes by us after the VIII Plenum might with the speed of light. It was said that the Soviet Cyrankiewicz, and to me, even though I was not lead to a difficult situation, with a loss of commu- comrades argued with our Politburo. This raised a CC member at the time, to demand that we nications to those military forces, especially if the level of tensions in an already tense atmo- clearly state our views on his matter. With one Poland wants to break away from the bloc uniting sphere. Rumors also spread, even before the voice we asked the Soviet comrades not to come our states. We explained to the Soviet comrades Soviet delegation had arrived, that there were and not to meet with us on the day the VIII that the changes would allow for the strengthen- plans to seize the state. Workers at their enter- Plenum opened; maybe later, on the next day, or ing of our cooperation and not to its weakening prises were mobilized and put on a state of readi- even later, so that it would not make our work (about which they were well informed; and that no ness by the Warsaw Provincial Party Committee. more difficult. Despite our position, the Soviet one alive among us wants to break away). The Rumors spread to the effect that Rokossowski’s comrades told us through their ambassador that Soviet comrades were threatening a brutal re- army was planning, together with the Soviet they will arrive on the day of the Plenum and that sponse because they concluded we should not army, to fight the , etc. they expect Party and Government leaders to make changes to the CC PUWP Politburo, except The above examples weighed heavily on the greet them at the airport. We understood this to to include comrade Gomulka. The Soviet com- subsequent resolution of the situation in the Party be a dictate and a threat to us personally. Not rades pointed out that there are real communists in and in Poland. The PUWP Politburo decided to wanting to aggravate this delicate situation, the Poland, who take a correct position, and therefore inform the Plenum about the better half of the whole PUWP Politburo decided to greet the we are obliged to support them. It was an attempt results of the talks with the Soviet delegation. We CPSU delegation. And here came the incidents to split the Party leadership into groups. put the whole affair this way: the Soviet com- that weighed very heavily on the subsequent At this time, we received reports that the rades were very concerned to ensure that their course of events and the work of the Plenum. The Soviet army stationed in Poland began to march communications with their army in the GDR Soviet comrades, especially comrade on Warsaw. As to our question about what this were not damaged. The Politburo was able to Khrushchev, immediately caused a scene at the means, the Soviet comrades explained that it was convince the Soviet comrades that nothing will airport. There were many Soviet generals who part of some military exercise planned a long time stand in the way of their cooperation with us and served in the Polish Army, as well as Marshal ago. We explained to the Soviet comrades that, the GDR. In response to the many questions put Konev, at the airport. Khrushchev first greeted notwithstanding the facts, in the eyes of Polish to us by workers at different enterprises, we tried the Soviet generals and Marshal Rokossowski, society this military exercise will be understood to justify the trip made by the Soviet comrades, completely ignoring members of the PUWP Po- as an attempt to put pressure on the Government we tried to defend their position, and we will litburo and the Government. Next, he approached and Party. We demanded the return of the Soviet continue to keep secret our talks. Shortly after the Polish delegation. He gestured his finger to armored units to their bases. The Soviet comrades this came the first incidents from Hungary, which comrade Ochab like a lout and began to threaten told Marshal Rokossowski, who was taking part added to the causes of our internal difficulties. [in Russian]: “That number won’t pass here.” in the discussions, to transmit to Marshal Konev (...) We accepted all of this very calmly. We did not the wishes of the PUWP Politburo, to halt the want the Soviet generals and their chauffeurs to military exercises, which of course did not hap- Comrade Zhou Enlai thanks comrade Gomulka see any public display because we knew the harm pen. Smaller units of the Polish armed forces for his extensive information about the situation that this could bring. The Soviet comrades, right were also moved in the direction of Warsaw, on in Poland. It appears that the position taken by the there at the airport, demanded a postponement of the orders of Marshal Rokossowski, who, when PUWP during the October events was correct. Its the Plenum. This was exactly at the moment asked, admitted: “I wanted to secure selected correctness is based on the fact that the Polish when every CC member waited for the Plenum to positions in Warsaw.” Of course, Rokossowski comrades resorted to Marxist-Leninist principles open. We asked the Soviet comrades if they did not inform the PUWP Politburo about his in their work. The Communist Party of China would come to the Belvedere Palace, where we orders, merely confirming, after we asked about [CPCh] supported the decision of the Polish Party resumed the discussions. it, that he had given the orders. from the beginning, when the VIII Plenum made Khrushchev’s first words were as follows: The talks with the Soviet delegation went on its decision. The main decision was taken by the “We have decided to intervene brutally in your for the whole day. The atmosphere was very Polish comrades. The CPCh simply played a affairs and we will not allow you to realize your unpleasant, inhospitable. Our side was calm but stabilizing role. The relations between fraternal plans.” We immediately thought that if someone determined. Near the end of the talks, now calmly, parties, Zhou Enlai said, ought to be based on puts a revolver on the table we will not talk. We comrade Khrushchev explained: “It doesn’t mat- -. Relations between socialist asked if they wanted to arrest us. Khrushchev ter what you want, our view is such that we will countries ought to be based on equal rights. explained that he did not say anything of the sort, have to restart the intervention.” We again as- The Soviet Union, in its declaration of 30 only that the CPSU had decided to intervene. sured the Soviet comrades that their fears con- October [1956], recognized that cooperation must Since the comrades were waiting in the hall for cerning Poland’s departure from the bloc of so- be based on equality. The CPCh supported this the Plenum to begin, we explained that we cannot cialist states was groundless. We will respect the position and we have always tried to work in agree to postpone the Plenum, but after the offi- wishes of the Party and we will build socialism support of it. As Marxists we ought to know how cial opening of the Plenum we will return to the according to our will. to learn from mistakes. In the Polish-Soviet talks with them. The Soviet comrades eventually We were given further information concern- relationship in the past there was a lot of inequal- agreed. After we opened the Plenum, and added ing the continued advance of the Soviet army in ity. Now this has been corrected. We are of the certain members to the CC, we gave no indica- the direction of Warsaw; Soviet tanks ran over a opinion that the PUWP should avoid public discus- tion about the atmosphere at the meeting, adding number of people. Soviet warships also entered sion of the situation which transpired with the only that we are going to continue our talks with our territorial waters. Again, we tried to inter- CPSU because it could damage our camp. It is the Soviet comrades. vene, but the Soviet comrades did not listen. also correct that the PUWP did not ignite nation- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 45 alist sentiments. Your tactics allowed for the The entire Soviet delegation returned to were elected to the Politburo by the Central regulation of difficult problems without a public Moscow at 6:45 a.m. on October 20. Committee in a secret ballot: Cyrankiewicz discussion, of which the imperialists could have The 8th Plenum resumed proceedings (73 votes of 75 votes); Gomulka (74); taken advantage. In our declaration of 29 Decem- at 11 a.m. that same day. The details of the Jedrychowski (72); Loga-Sowinski (74); ber [1956] we underlined that antagonistic and debates have been available since 1956 and Morawski (56); Ochab (75); Rapacki (72); non-antagonistic disputes should be resolved by various methods. I support the position of com- it is not necessary to relate them here. Zambrowski (56); and Zawadzki (68). rade Gomulka, Zhou Enlai said, about equality Gomulka’s long speech to the Plenum, broad- Rokossowski only received 23 votes and and sovereignty, but the leading role of the Soviet cast to the nation on state radio, set the tone failed to get elected. The following were Union must be remembered. The leading role of of the debate. He uncompromisingly con- elected to the Secretariat: Albrecht (73); the Soviet Union is the main point, while equality demned Stalinism and its political and eco- Gierek (75); Gomulka (74); Jarosinski (74); and errors are points of less value. Comrade Mao nomic consequences in Poland. The sub- Matwin (68); Ochab (75); and Zambrowski Zedong in his talks with comrade Kiryluk cor- stance of Gomulka’s speech was not signifi- (57). In an open ballot, the CC unanimously, rectly underlined that relations between our coun- cantly different from the programme he had and without a show of hands, elected tries ought to be like relations between brothers, outlined to the Politburo on October 12.65 Gomulka to the post of First Secretary.69 and not like the relations between a father and a son, like the past the relations between the USSR He attacked the attempts to blame imperial- Polish state radio ceased its normal pro- and Poland. For our part, we told the CPSU that ist forces for the Poznan revolt and de- gramming on October 21 at 10:27 p.m. and their position regarding the relations with frater- manded that the Party learn from the bitter broadcast the election results to the nation. nal parties is not always correct. But we do not lesson taught by the working class.66 The Warsaw press immediately issued an believe this ought to be spoken of in public, so we Gomulka also demanded an investigation extra edition and distributed the announce- do not weaken the USSR. It is not necessary to into the illegal activities of the security appa- ment to the thousands of workers and stu- return to the errors. The main point at this time is ratus. Gomulka’s “Polish road to socialism” dents who waited in anticipation for the the leading role of the CPSU and to unite again called for relations between the PUWP and results of the 8th Plenum. The front page of against our enemies. CPSU to be based on equality, but also declared: “Today we have a (...) Warsaw, 16.I.1957 assumed that the Polish People’s Republic leadership capable of implementing the Protocols by: Kiryluk St. could not weaken its formal ties to the Sovi- programme worked out after the 7 and 8 Krazarz K. ets. Plenum. This leadership is capable of get- 7 copies The controversy over Rokossowski was ting the support of the toiling masses of the the most animated part of the debate at the whole country.”70 Within the next few days [Source: AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 107, tom 5, str. 8th Plenum. The Marshal explained his an almost endless stream of letters poured 83, 85-88, 93-95; translated from the Polish by position thus: “The army has not received into the Central Committee from individual L.W. Gluchowski.] any decision from the leadership that there Party activists as well as from Party-directed should be no movements of units and even if institutions. The overwhelming majority of The Soviet delegation decided to let the such a decision were received it would take the Party rank-and-file approved of the deci- PUWP Central Committee deal with several days to implement it. Comrades are sions taken by the Plenum and wrote ap- Rokossowski and his future status in the aware that this is the time when the army provingly of Gomulka’s election to the post Polish Party. The Soviet-Polish confronta- conducts tactical exercises...Indeed Soviet of First Secretary. tion of October 1956 ended peacefully. The forces were moving. They were conducting On October 22 Ponomarenko handed Polish delegation was given permission to autumn maneuvers...They were moving in Gomulka a short letter from the CPSU First continue with the 8th Plenum. The unity of the direction of Lódz and ...I asked Secretary. Document No. 5 below is Polish society against Soviet armed inter- Marshal Konev...that the eastward move- Khrushchev’s written response to Gomulka’s vention, as well as its overwhelming support ment of the [Soviet] Northern [Army] Group request that Soviet officers be removed from for a communist leader who gained should stop and the units return to their the Polish Army. Khrushchev also agreed to Khrushchev’s trust, ensured that sanity pre- bases...That is all I know.”67 The Party found a new institution attached to the Pol- vailed. The Poles had thereby managed to leaders remained sensitive to Khrushchev’s ish Committee for Public Security to repre- avoid the tragic fate that would soon befall accusations of anti-Soviet passions in Po- sent the KGB. the Hungarians. The joint Soviet-Polish land and shielded Rokossowski from mount- communiqué of 20 October 1956 declared: ing attacks at the Plenum. DOCUMENT NO. 5 “The debates were held in an atmosphere of The elections to the Politburo at the 8th Party-like and friendly sincerity. It was Plenum began at 5:30 p.m on October 20. SECRETARY CENTRAL COMMITTEE agreed that a delegation of the PUWP Polit- Ochab attempted to soften the blow over PUWP Comrade W. GOMULKA buro would go to Moscow in the nearest Rokossowski’s removal from the Politburo future to discuss with the Presidium of the 1. During comrade Ochab’s stay in Mos- with the following statement: “I would just cow, on his way to China, comrade Ochab, in his CPSU problems of further strengthening the like to point out briefly that not to nominate political and economic cooperation between 11 September [1956] conversation with the Cen- someone does not by any means indicate a tral Committee of the CPSU, transmitted the the PPR and the Soviet Union, and to further lack of confidence...Comrade view of the CC PUWP that it was now time to consolidating the fraternal friendship and Rokossowski’s case is simply one of the abolish the institution of Soviet advisers attached 64 coexistence of the PUWP and the CPSU.” many personnel matters.”68 The following to the Committee for Public Security of the PPR.71 46 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

At the same time, comrade Mikoyan told com- More important, Khrushchev put the lic policy disputes and presented their reso- rade Ochab that the position of the Polish com- Polish question to rest in Europe for almost lution in dramatic form.78 The discussions, rades corresponds with the main line of the 25 years, until the rise of “Solidarity” in as reflected in the documents, either by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 1980-81. The significance of the “Polish Polish, Soviet, or Chinese leaders, indicate In connection with this, the Presidium of the October” for Soviet international politics, that Stalin’s influence over the international CC CPSU has decided to recall all Soviet advi- sers that have been sent, at the time at the request and for the Khrushchev years in particular, communist movement continued to reso- of the Polish Government, to assist the work of was overshadowed by the thaw in East-West nate long after his death. the PPR organs of security.72 relations following Stalin’s death and eclipsed During the same conversation, comrade by the tragedy of Budapest in November 1. See the excellent study on the repression of the Polish Ochab transmitted the view of the CC PUWP 1956. The Soviet invasion of Hungary and officer corps by Jerzy Poksinski, “TUN” Tatar-Utnik- about the need, after the institution of Soviet Nowicki: Represje wobec oficerów Wojska Polskiego the ruthless suppression of the popular upris- w latach 1949-1956 [Repression against officers of the advisers is abolished, to create new forms of ing permanently stained Khrushchev’s post- Polish Army, 1949-1956] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo collaboration between the organs of security of Stalin achievements. Previous research on ‘Bellona’ [‘Bellona’ Publishers], 1992). See also a the USSR and Poland, with the aim to create a Poland’s de-Stalinization crisis tended to collection of documents on the Polish military counter- new representative office of the USSR Commit- intelligence agency: Zbigniew Palski, ed., Agentura 76 tee for State Security attached to the PPR Com- emphasize Polish domestic politics. But Informacji Wojskowej w latach 1945-1956 [The Mili- mittee for Public Security.73 Khrushchev’s intervention in October 1956 tary Information Agency, 1945-1956] (Warsaw: Instytut The CC CPSU, in principle, agrees with may come to be viewed as the most signifi- Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk [Insti- such a position and is ready to consider this cant foreign policy victory of the Khrushchev tute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences], 1992). On the Polish security apparatus see question when concrete proposals are received years. The PUWP was the first ruling Party in Andrzej Paczkowski, “Aparat bezpieczenstwa w latach from the CC PUWP. the former Soviet bloc to undergo an exten- odwilzy: causus Polski” [The Security Apparatus Dur- 2. According to the requests made by the sive de-Stalinization campaign. Khrushchev ing the Thaw: Polish Casus]” (Mimeographed). Polish Government, and in accordance with agree- thus helped to guide the first transformation 2. The total number of Soviet officers remaining in the ments between our governments, there is a cer- Polish Army as of 1 May 1956 was 76, 28 of whom were of the modern Polish state. In spite of the tain number of Soviet officers and general offic- generals, 32 colonels, 13 lieutenant colonels, 2 majors, ers still posted together with personnel of the PUWP’s subsequent neglect of ideological and 1 captain. This was a considerable decline from the Polish Army. matters over the next thirty-three years, it 712 Soviet officers who served in the Polish Army was still able to implement some of the most between July 1952 and March 1953 (67% to 73% of the The CC CPSU believes that if in the opinion total number of colonels and lieutenant colonels respec- of the CC PUWP there is no longer a need for the extensive political reforms of any socialist tively in the Polish Army, which included 41 general remaining Soviet officers and general officers on state in the region. And Poland’s negotiated officers). Yet Soviet officers (excluding Rokossowski) the staff of the Polish Army, then we agree in transition to multi-party democracy in 1989 continued to occupy many of the leading military posi- advance on their being recalled.74 We ask you to was one of the smoothest in central Europe. tions, including deputy minister of defence and Chief of the General Staff. For details see the documentary prepare the proposals about how this could be If the second and current transition succeeds solved when the delegation from the Politburo of study by Edward Jan Nalepa, Oficerowie Radzieccy w in consolidating democratic governance in the CC PUWP arrives in Moscow.75 Wojsku Polskim w latach 1943-1968 (studium Poland, Khrushchev may have to be given historyczno-wojskowe), Czesc I i II (zalaczniki) [Soviet some of the credit for the role he played in Officers in the Polish Army, 1943-1968 (A Military SECRETARY CENTRAL COMMITTEE CPSU History Study), Part I and II (Appendices)] (Warsaw: establishing the parameters for the consoli- Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny [Military History In- N. KHRUSHCHEV dation of a stable, workable, and strategi- stitute], 1992). I am preparing a working paper on cally secure Polish state between Germany Soviet military policy in Poland between 1943-1959 for 22 October 1956 and Russia. The “Polish October” was also the Stalin Archives Project of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto. “Khrushchev’s October.” [Unsigned. Above the date and handwritten in 3. Communist Party of Poland (CPP) member and The most striking common feature of union activist from 1926; thrice arrested and twice Polish it reads: “Handed to me personally by the documents presented here is the degree to sentenced for communist activity. Studied at the Lenin C[omrade] Ponomarenko” and initialled by which many issues of public policy are also International School in Moscow 1933-36; imprisoned Gomulka.] in Poland 1936-39, thus escaping the Great and articulated as conflicts between human be- the liquidation of the CPP by the Comintern in 1938; [Source: AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 112, tom 26, s. ings.77 There appears to have been little joined the Polish Workers Party (PWP) in 1942; PWP 176-177; translated from the Russian by L.W. interest in the structural causes of conflict General Secretary 1943; deputy premier of the Provi- Gluchowski.] among the communist leaders of this period. sional Government and of the Government of National Unity, and Minister of the until Conflict between communist states, and es- January 1949. Dismissed from the Politburo at the Gomulka held his victory speech on pecially conflict between fraternal commu- August-September 1948 Plenum, when he was accused October 24 outside the Palace of Culture in nist parties, is often discussed as if it were a of “rightist-nationalist deviationism,” but still elected Warsaw. Over 300,000 people gathered to struggle between individual leaders, who to the CC at the First PUWP (Unification) Congress in December 1949; expelled from the PUWP in 1949; hear the First Secretary, the largest meeting made correct or incorrect policy choices. arrested in 1951; released in 1954; PUWP First Secre- of its kind in Poland until the visit of Pope The discussions outlined in the these docu- tary from October 1956 to December 1970. John Paul II in 1979. No other First Secre- ments, about the need to reconstitute dra- 4. Marshal of the Soviet Union. Evacuated to Russia in tary in the history of the PUWP ever re- matically the exploitative relationship be- 1915; took part in the Bolshevik revolution; military officer arrested during the ; released in ceived such an outpouring of popular sup- tween the Soviet Union and its Soviet bloc 1941 and appointed to rank of general; promoted to port. Gomulka appeared on the balcony, allies, mirrored the style and the tone per- Marshal in the during World War II; sent to surrounded by the new Politburo. fected by Stalin, who often personalized pub- Poland by Stalin after the war. On 5 November 1949 he COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 47 was made a citizen of Poland, Marshal of Poland, 1948-80 member PUWP Central Committee; 1950-54 22. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Minister of National Defense, and member of the CC PUWP Secretary; 1950-56 member of the PUWP Polit- Last Testament [hereafter The Last Testament], trans. PUWP; joined the Politburo in May 1950; deputy buro; 1952-68 deputy premier; 1964-71 head of the and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and premier in 1952. Expelled from the Politburo and CC Central Committee of Party Control; 1969-71 head of Co., 1974), 199-200. in October 1956; recalled to the USSR on 13 November the Chief Board of Supervision; 1971-77 ambassador to 23. The Soviet Northern Army Group was situation in 1956, where he served as a deputy minister of national Moscow. some 35 garrisons in northern and western Poland. defense. 13. 1948-59 member of the PUWP Central Committee; They were part of two armored and mechanized divi- 5. 1949-50 first deputy defense minister and chief 1952-56 member of the PUWP Politburo; 7 July 1944 sions located near Borno-Sulinowo in Western political officer of the Polish Armed Forces; 1950-56 to 7 December 1954 Minister of Public Security; 1954- Pomerania and Swietoszów in Lower , and in- Secretary PUWP; March-October 1956 First Secretary 56 Minister of State Farms. cluded a number of tactical air force groups stationed PUWP. 14. “Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia throughout Poland. In October 1956, the Northern 6. Ochab travelled to Beijing via Moscow in September 15 X 1956 r., nr. 126,” AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 12, Army Group was commanded by General S. Galicki to attend the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Commu- teczka 46a, s. 37-56; and “Protokól z posiedzenia Biura (who had served in the Polish Army from 1943 to 1946) nist Party. In Moscow, Ochab informed Khrushchev Politycznego z dnia 12 X 1956 r., nr. 126,” AAN, KC and, his chief of staff, General Stognev. that Gomulka would be joining the leadership. Ochab PZPR, paczka 15, tom 58, str. 189. Information passed on to the PUWP Central Com- also told the Soviets that the PUWP Central Committee 15. Member of the Polish (PSP); during mittee from October 19 to 26 indicated that on October wanted the Soviet advisers attached to the Committee the war a member of the sup- 19 many units of the Northern Army Group had left for Public Security to leave Poland. In China, Ochab ported by the London government-in-exile; arrested by their garrisons and were moving in several columns sought Beijing’s support in the event the CPSU and the Nazis in 1941 and sent to Auschwitz. 1945-48 PSP towards Warsaw. General Galicki had already moved PUWP could not come to an agreement. For further general secretary; supported the union of PSP with his headquarters to Leczyca near the city of Lódz. details see his interview with Teresa Toranska, Oni: PWP; 1948-75 member of PUWP Central Committee; Soviet air force units, spotted at various military air- Stalin’s Polish Puppets, trans. by Agnieszka 1948-71 member PUWP Politburo; 1947-52 Prime ports in Poland, and Soviet naval units at their base in Kolakowska (London: Collins, Harvill, 1987), 66-72; Minister; 1952-54 deputy premier; 1954-70 Prime Min- Swinojscie as well as those near Gdansk were put on and Andrzej Werblan, “Czy Chinczycy uratowali ister; 1971-72 head of the Council of State (head of alert. Furthermore, from October 18 to 21, the Polish Gomulka? [Did the Chinese Rescue Gomulka?]” state); 1972 until his death in 1989 head of the Polish coastline was patrolled by Soviet aircraft. General I. Polityka 26 October 1991. National Peace Council. Turkiel, the Soviet commander of the Polish Air Force 7. “Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia 1 16. CCCP member from 1922; in the USSR during the (returned to the Soviet Union in November 1956), also I 2 X 1956 r., nr. 122,” Archiwum Akt Nowych [Archive war, where he was one of the organizers of the Union of gave an order to halt all flights by Polish warplanes and of Modern Records] (AAN), Warsaw, KC PZPR, paczka Polish Patriots (UPP). The UPP was founded in Mos- the Aerial Club. The Soviets, on the other hand, were 15, tom 58, str. 167-169. cow in 1943; it marked the beginning of the future granted an unlimited right to conduct flights over Polish 8. Panteleimon Kondrat’evich Ponomarenko was Ex- communist government in Poland. 1943-44 deputy airspace. It was also reported that Soviet units in the traordinary Ambassador of the USSR to Poland from 7 chief political officer in the Polish Army; member of Belorussian and Kiev regions were placed on a state of May 1955 to 28 September 1957. He joined the VKP(b) the Politburo from 1943; 1949-51 head of the Central military readiness. [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] in 1925; Council of Trade Unions; 1951-52 deputy premier; During the afternoon of October 19, Khrushchev, worked with Malenkov in the CC apparatus 1938; First head of the Council of State from 1952 until his death after he was pressed by Gomulka, gave Rokossowski Secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party; mem- in 1964. the authority to issue instructions to Marshal Konev to ber CC VKP(b) and CC CPSU 1939-61. 17. Secretary of the Lódz CPP Committee before the halt the movement of the Northern Army Group toward 9. “Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia 8 war; spent the war in the USSR, where he was member Warsaw. However, Soviet units were reported moving i 10 X 1956 r., nr. 124,” AAN, KC PZPR [CC PUWP], of the UPP and a political officer in the Polish Army. as late as October 23. Smaller, more specialized units, paczka 15, tom 58, str. 172-174. 1944-48 Secretary of the PWP Central Committee; were brought to Warsaw in secret to protect strategic 10. “Nieautoryzowane Wystapienie tow. Wieslawa na 1948-64 member of the PUWP Central Committee; installations. This included officer cadets from the posiedzeniu Biura Politycznego w dniu 12 pazdziernika 1948-63 member of the PUWP Politburo; 1947-54 and Liaison Officer School in Zegrze, who were stationed 1956 r.,” AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 12, teczka 46a, str. 1956-63 Secretary of the PUWP; 1947-55 member of on October 19 in the garages on Klonowa street, oppo- 29-36; and “Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego the Council of State; 1955-56 minister of State Control; site the Belvedere Palace. These troops were probably z dnia 12 X 1956 r., nr. 125,” AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 1963-68 vice-president of the Chief Board of Supervi- part of the system set up by Rokossowski to protect the 15, tom 58, str. 187-188. The full text of Gomulka’s sion. Accused of in 1963 and removed Soviet delegation in Warsaw. presentation to the Politburo on 12 October has been from Party posts; expelled from the PUWP during the For further details on the movement of Soviet reprinted in an important collection of documents by anti-Jewish and anti-intellectual purges of March 1968. military forces in Poland at this time see Jerzy Poksinski, Jakub Andrzejewski [Andrzej Paczkowski], ed., 18. I am preparing a complete translation of the “Wojsko Polskie w 1956 r. — problemy polityczne (1) Gomulka i inni: Dokumenty z archiwum KC 1948-1982 proceedings of the PUWP’s Sixth Plenum of March i (2) [The Polish Army in 1956 — Political Problems (1) [Gomulka and Others: Documents from the CC Ar- 1956 (including Khrushchev’s long presentation to the and (2)]” (Mimeographed); and “Wojskowe aspekty chives, 1948-1982] [hereafter Gomulka i inni] (Lon- Plenum) for a discussion of Soviet cadre policies in pazdziernika 1956 r. [Military aspects of October 1956]” don: ‘Aneks’, 1987), 89-96. Poland from 1954 to 1956. It will be the subject of a Polska Zbrojna [Armed Poland], 203 (18-20 October 11. CPP member before the war; during the war chief forthcoming CWIHP Working Paper. 1991). of staff of the People’s Army. The People’s Army was 19. 1915-30 in Russia and the Soviet Union; took part 24. Quotations from the 8th Plenum are taken from the trained by the Soviets and modelled after the Soviet in the and Civil War; VCP(b) mem- extensive report of the proceedings published in a partisan brigades. 1945 commander of the Polish mili- ber; 1930 sent to Poland, where he was arrested and special issue of the PUWP’s theoretical journal, Nowe tia; 1945-48 member of the PWP Politburo; 1948-59 sentenced to six years’ imprisonment; spent World War Drogi [New Roads] 10 (October 1956), 14. member of the PUWP Central Committee; 1948-56 II in the Soviet Union; 1945-59 member of the PWP and 25. Ibid. member of the PUWP Politburo and head of the Central PUWP Central Committees; 1948-51 deputy member 26. Ibid., 15-16. Commission of Party Control; 1955-56 deputy pre- of the PUWP Politburo; 1950-56 PUWP Secretary; 27. Ochab again returned to the Plenum at 6 p.m. on mier; 1949-52 president of the Chief Board of Supervi- 1951-56 member of the PUWP Politburo; 1957-65 October 19 and presented a brief report to the Central sion and member of the State Council; 1952-55 minister ambassador to Prague. Committee: “I would like to inform you, Comrades, of State Control. 20. “Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia that conversations between our Politburo and the Sovi- 12. 1924-38 CPP functionary and Central Committee 17 X 1956 r., nr. 127,” AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 12, ets, which were conducted in a forthright manner, have member from 1932; 1942 arrested by the Nazis and sent teczka 46a, str. 57-65; and “Protokól z posiedzenia lasted several hours. They concern the most fundamen- to a labour camp; 1945 liberated and joined the Soviet Biura Politycznego z dnia 17 X 1956 r., nr. 127,” AAN, tal problems of the relations between our countries and army. Returns to Poland in 1947; PWP Provincial KC PZPR, paczka 15, tom 58, str. 190. our Parties...Since our Soviet comrades unexpectedly Committee Second Secretary in Poznan then Provincial 21. “Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia had to take the decision to fly to Warsaw and they are Committee First Secretary in ; 1947-48 head 18 X 1956 r., nr. 128,” AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 15, tom anxious to return as soon as possible, we would like to of the PWP Central Committee cadres department; 58, str. 192. continue our talks tonight and the Politburo recom- 48 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN mends that the Plenum be adjourned till tomorrow eksploatacji rudy uranowej — i Zalaczniki,” AAN, KC ment). Morawski was to oversee the departments of morning.” Ibid., 16. PZPR paczka 112, tom 26, str. 643-661. Propaganda, Press and Radio, and Culture and Science. 28. Molotov described Rokossowski’s appointment 42. See [in Russian] “Pismo N. Chruszczowa do Wl. He also gained control of the All-Polish Committee of thus: “Before appointing Rokossovsky to Poland I Gomulki z 13 kwietnia 1957 r. Dot. Uzbrojenia Wojsa the National Unity Front, the Party commission respon- went there and told the Poles we would give them one Polskiego i produkcji nowoczesnej broni w Polsce oraz sible for education, and the editorial board of Zycia of our experienced generals as minister of defense. naruszenia tajemnej produkcji broni w Polsce,” AAN, Partii [Party Life]. Matwin, Morawski and Albrecht— And we decided to give them one of the best— KC PZPR, paczka 112, tom 26, str. 223-225. the so-called “Young Secretaries”—thus acquired the Rokossowski. He was good-natured, polite, a tiny bit 43. This is a reference to articles by Leszek Kolakowski, daily management of Party propaganda, , cul- Polish, and a talented general. True, he spoke Polish “Antysemici—Piec tez nienowych I przestroga [Anti- ture, education, and the youth-wing of the Party. badly, stressing the wrong syllables. He wasn’t happy Semitism—Five old theses and admonition],” Po Prostu “Protokól z posiedzenia Sekretariatu KC w dn. 21 III about going there, but it was very important for us that [Plain Speaking], 22 (27 May 1956), and especially 1956 r., nr. 96,” AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 15, tom 58, he be there, that he put everything in order. After all, Edda Werfel (her husband, Roman Werfel, was editor- str. 50-51. we knew nothing about them.” See Albert Resis, ed., in-chief of Nowe Drogi [New Paths] from 1952 to 1959, 50. The commentaries in the text and the notes are Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics. Conver- the leading organ of the PUWP Central Committee; he mine. The original document can be found among the sations with Felix Chuev (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, was also editor of Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune] for Zawadzki papers, AAN, KC PZPR. 1993), 54. two months in March 1956), “Skad i dlaczego nastroje 51. “Notatka z rozmowy polsko-radzieckich z 22 29. Khrushchev, The Last Testament, 203. antyinteligenckie [From where and why the anti-intel- pazdziernika 1956 r w sprawie eksploatacji rudy 30. Ibid., 205. lectual mood]?” Po Prostu, 25 (17 June 1956). Edda uranowej — i Zalaczniki,” AAN, KC PZPR paczka 31. Ochab in Toranska, Oni, 77-78. Werfel attacked the call in the PUWP, supported by 112, tom 26, str. 643-661. 32. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Khrushchev at the Sixth Plenum of March 1956, to 52. See “Ostatni spór Gomulki ze Stalinem [Gomulka’s Tapes [hereafter The Glasnost Tapes], trans. “promote new [read: Polish] cadres” at the expense of last dispute with Stalin],” ed. by Andrzej Werblan, Dzis and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav W. Jews. 6 (1993). Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1990), 115. 44. Gomulka’s letter to Stalin was written on 14 53. Reference to Zambrowski, who, as a leading mem- 33. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. and , after his December 9 meeting with ber of the so-called “Pulawy” group (the reformers) in ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., Stalin, Molotov and Beria. The letter was recently the PUWP, is largely credited with ensuring Gomulka’s 1970), 205. published in Poland. See “Ostatni spór Gomulki ze entry into the Politburo by withdrawing his support for 34. Ibid., 203. Stalinem [Gomulka’s last dispute with Stalin],” ed. by Ochab. 35. Khrushchev, The Glasnost Tapes, 116. Andrzej Werblan, Dzis, 6 (1993). 54. See “Ostatni spór Gomulki ze Stalinem,” ed. by 36. The following PUWP Politburo members missed 45. Reference to the “threat” posed by the former Werblan, Dzis 6 (1993). the Soviet-Polish meeting: , who resigned premier of the Polish government in London during the 55. For details see chapter eleven (on the Seventh from the Politburo on 9 October 1956; Dworakowski, war. In 1945 he signed a pact with the communist Plenum) of my Ph.D. dissertation, “The Collapse of who was apparently ill; and Mazur, who was on vaca- government in Poland, resulting in the Provisional Gov- Stalinist Rule in Poland: The Polish United Worker’s tion in the Soviet Union. Mazur flew to Moscow on ernment of National Unity. Faced with arrest after the Party from the XX CPSU Congress to the VIII CC October 13 and did not return to Poland until Novem- rigged elections of 1947, he escaped to the West. PUWP Plenum, February-October 1956” (McMaster ber 6. It has been suggested that Mazur went to the 46. See Gomulka, “Na fundamentach jednosci stanie University, 1994), especially the section on “The De- Soviet Union to play the role of Hungary’s János Kádár gmach socjalizmu” [On the foundations of unity stands mocratization Campaign,” pp. 150-152. See also in the event the Soviets decided to “invade” Poland. the structure of socialism], Glos Ludu [The People’s “Stenogram VII Plenum KC PZPR z dni 18-20, 23-25 See also the comments by (the second Voice] 328 (28 November 1948). I 26-28 VIII 1956 r.,” AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 70, tom. highest ranking member of the PUWP Politburo during 47. Writer and editor, prominent advocate of socialist 25-27, str. 498-1471. the Stalin years who resigned his posts in May 1956 realism in literature. 1945-50 Polish ambassador to 56. The PUWP Politburo delegated Zenon Nowak and and was expelled from the Party in 1957) on Mazur in Paris. In 1956 he was a member of the PUWP Central Mazur to meet with Gomulka on 9 May 1956. On the Toranska, Oni, 263-264; and the interview with Antoni Committee and Secretary of the Party organization at next day, Gomulka held talks with Mazur and Zawadzki. Skulbaszewski (the second highest ranking Soviet of- the Polish Union of Writers. During the Sixth Plenum 57. For further details see Zambrowski’s account of the ficer in Polish military counter-intelligence until 1954) of March 1956 he made a passionate appeal against anti- meeting in his “Dziennik [Journal],” ed. by Antoni in Michal Komar and Krzysztof Lang, “Mysmy juz o Semitism. Zambrowski, Krytyka [Criticism], 6 (1980), 72-73. tym mówili, prosze Pana... [We have already talked 48. Putrament wrote in Warsaw’s largest daily, “Sedno Mikoyan and Kaganovich attempted to spit the PUWP about this, sir...],” Zeszyty Historyczne [Historical sparwy” [The essence of the matter], Zycie Warszawy leadership by focusing the blame for past “errors” Papers] 91 (1990), 182, fn. no. 5. [Warsaw Life] (19 October 1956), that “the decisive, during the Stalin years in Poland on the Jews in the 37. I would like to express my gratitude to Andrzej nodical problem for People’s Poland” concerns the Polish leadership. Werblan and the editorial board of Dzis [Today] for future of the self-governing workers’ councils: “all 58. Nowak, a leader of the so-called “Natolin” group allowing me to include both documents in this article. those who will not agree in Poland either to counter- (hardliners) in the PUWP, is making reference to the The original Polish texts, with an introduction by revolution, nor to a return to an ‘exceptional state’ attacks against him at the Seventh Plenum, where some Werblan, will be published in the April 1995 edition of [Stalinism], must know: socialism in Poland will be of his comments were struck from the record because Dzis. The Gomulka text was edited by Werblan and the founded either by the working class or not at all.” In they were deemed anti-Semitic. Zawadzki text was edited by Józef Stepnia. The , on October 20, the Soviet correspondent in 59. This is a reference to the dismissal of Jakub Berman original texts used many abbreviations. Warsaw wrote, under the title “Anti-socialist perfor- from the Politburo. 38. The commentaries in the text and the notes are mances in the columns of the Polish press,” the follow- 60. An account of the Soviet July Plenum of 1955 can mine. The original document was made available by ing: “Over the last few days in the Polish press an ever be found in testimony of Seweryn Bialer, Hearings Gomulka’s son, Ryszard Strzelecki-Gomulka, and be- increasing number of articles have been published which before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judi- longs to the family. sound off about the repudiation of the road to social- ciary, U.S. Senate, Second Session, on the Scope of 39. On the role of Radio Free Europe and the foreign ism.” Putrament’s article is one of the two mentioned in Soviet Activity in the United States, pt. 29, pp. 1561-63 correspondents in Warsaw who reported on the Octo- the Pravda piece. and 1573. ber events to the West see Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, 49. At the PUWP Secretariat meeting of 21 March 1956, 61. recently wrote: “The Soviet Wojna w Eterze [War on the Air], Tom 1 [Vol. 1] Ochab took control of the Organization department and ambassador to Poland, Ponomarenko, reported in May (London: Odnowa [Restoration], 1986), ch. 15. the central Party aktiv. Mazur retained control of the [1956] of that year that, since the Twentieth Party 40. 1949-1964 President of the German Democratic territorial apparat. Matwin acquired the Party’s youth [CPSU] Congress of 1956, the Polish [United] Work- Republic. organization. Control of the industrial sector was trans- ers’ Party had been ‘seething’. Khrushchev, Mikoyan, 41. Gomulka is not clear, but he is probably referring ferred to Gierek. The departments of Education, Party Bulganin, Molotov and Kaganovic decide to fly to to the Soviet offer to help build a factory in Poland to History, and Social Services went to Albrecht, including Warsaw on the eve of the Polish party’s Central Com- enrich uranium ore. See “Notatka z rozmowy polsko- responsibility for Nowe Drogi, Trybuna Ludu, and the mittee plenum. Ochab, Gomulka and other Polish radzieckich z 22 pazdziernika 1956 r w sprawie Party commission which supervised the (Parlia- leaders protested, but Khrushchev and the others re- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 49 solved to go nevertheless. According to the notes January 1995) with the following information concern- tion in Poland until early 1959 with a staff of 3 Soviet Mikoyan kept, the discussion at a meeting in the Belve- ing Soviet NKVD/KGB advisers in Poland in 1945- officers. dere Palace following the plenum was stormy. Gomulka 1959: NKVD officers worked with the Polish security 74. In 1957 some 23 Soviet officers remained in the and the other Polish leaders wanted non-interference in apparatus from its inception in July 1944, but their Polish Army, including 13 generals. This figure dropped their party’s affairs, a definition of the status of Soviet official status at that time is still unclear. It is apparent to 9 in 1958 (5 generals) and to 2 in 1959, including a troops in Poland, a reduction in the number of Soviet that there had been connections between the NKVD General and Brigadier General. Two Soviet officers advisers, and the recall of Soviet Marshal Rokossowski (and SMERSH) and Poland’s Bureau of Public Secu- remained in Poland until 1968: General Jerzy as Polish Minister of Defence. rity (BPS). Bordzilowski, who was Chief of the General Staff and Khrushchev, Bulganin and Molotov responded On 10 January 1945 the PWP Politburo decided to deputy minister of defense from 1954 to March 1968; belligerently, shouting “you want to turn your faces to ask Moscow to send advisors to Poland, which was the and Lieutenant General Michal Owczynników, who the West and your backs to us...you’ve forgotten that we beginning of the preparations for the construction of a commanded the Military Technical Academy from have our enormous army in Germany.” Emotions grew security apparatus west of the River Wisla. On 20 1954 to 1957 until he became the deputy of the Main heated. Mikoyan’s notes continue: ‘During this con- February 1945 the USSR State Defence Committee Inspectorate of Schools attached to the Higher Officer versation one of the Polish comrades handed Gomulka (GOKO) issued order no. 7558ss to comply with the School until March 1958. Between November 1956 a note. Gomulka requested that they be ordered back to request. and November 1957 some 56 Soviet officers, including their stations. We exchanged glances and Khrushchev Gen. I.A. Serov was officially appointed on 1 28 generals, left the Polish Army. ordered Konev to stop the tanks and send them back to March 1945 to be the NKVD advisor to the Ministry of 75. The meeting took place on 18 November 1956. their stations’.” Public Security (MPS). The appointment was a formal- 76. A noteworthy exception is the study by Marcin The citation for Mikoyan’s notes reads: “APRF ity since Serov had been the GOKO special plenipoten- Kula, Paryz, Londyn, i Waszyngton patrza na [Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii], ‘Special File,’ tiary for the Polish territories since the summer of 1944 Pazdziernik 1956 r. w Polsce [Paris, London, and Notes of Khrushchev’s conversation in Warsaw, May (working behind the front which was at the Wisla). Washington look at the Polish October] (Warsaw: 1960, No. 233.” See Volkogonov, Lenin: A New At the same time, an “Advisers Aparat” (Aparat Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Biography, trans. and ed. by Harold Shukman (New Doradcy) was opened. This Aparat was made up of 1992), based on Western diplomatic archives. See also York: The Free Press, 1994), 48-482 and 509 endnote Soviet officers attached to the MBP, the Provincial Robert Los, “Pazdziernik 1956 roku w perspektywie no. 13. Bureau(s) of Public Security (PBPS) and District stosunków polsko-radzieckich [October 1956 From the 62. Khrushchev met with leaders of the Soviet bloc Bureau(s) of Public Security (DBPS). Their exact Perspective of Polish-Soviet Relations]” (Unpublished (excluding Poland and Hungary) on 24 October 1956 to numbers are not known, but it is likely that it exceeded Doctoral Dissertation, University of Lódz, 1993). Two discuss the situation in Poland and Hungary. 300 persons. Advisers at the MPS—called the Senior important Polish language studies are Zbyslaw Khrushchev’s report on the Polish events and the So- Adviser—were subordinated to the NKVD formations Rykowski and Wieslaw Wladyka, Polska próba: viet-Polish confrontation at the Belvedere Palace was stationed in Poland. This included above all the 64th Pazdziernik ’56 [The Polish Attempt: October ’56] recorded by Jan Svoboda, secretary to A. Novotny, Rifle Division of the NKVD Internal Security Corps, (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie [Literary Publish- First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. established in October 1944 and stationed in Poland ers], 1989); and a splendid social history by Pawel I am grateful to Professor Tibor Hajdu, Institute of until spring 1947. Machcewicz, Polski Rok 1956 [The Polish Year 1956] History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, for After 1947 the situation “normalized”. The NKVD (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza ‘Mówia Wieki’ [The sending me a copy of the document (written in Czech), military units were withdrawn and only the Adviser Printing House ‘Mówia Wieki’], 1993), based on the which he found in the Prague archives (Archiv UV with his officers and technical staff remained. Around archives of Poland’s ministry of internal affairs. KSC, 07/16). According to Professor Hajdu (letter 1950 the advisers at the DBPS levels were pulled out 77. Archival documents covering this period that have dated 10 March 1995), Svoboda accompanied Novotny and only those at the MPS and PBPS (1 to 2 advisers been published include Gomulka i inni; and Andrzej because the Czech First Secretary did not understand each) levels remained. In 1953 there were a total of Garlicki, Z Tajnych Archiwów [From the Secret Ar- Russian. The document does not mention who attended approximately 30 advisers at the MPS and about 25-30 chives] (Warsaw: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza ‘BGW’ the meeting, but a former Russian diplomat who first at the PBPS levels. In September 1956 the CC PUWP [The Polish Printing House ‘BGW’], 1993). wrote about this matter mentioned that Liu-Sao-Tsi of Politburo decided to ask Moscow for the advisers to 78. Cf. Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, and Oleg V. China was there, Hajdu wrote. return to the Soviet Union, which occurred after Gomulka Khlevniuk, eds., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 1925- The Chinese thus heard both versions of the came to power. 1936 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Belvedere Palace meeting. When Gomulka was pre- Soviet Advisers (Head, at the Ministry of Public senting his version of events to the Chinese, however, Security) after Serov were: Gen. N.N. Selivanovskii he did not know that Khrushchev’s version, which (27 April 1945 to 1946); Col. S.M. Davidov (1946 to L.W. Gluchowski completed his Ph.D. in 1992 at King’s portrayed the Soviets as the victors, had already been 17 March 1950); Col. M.S. Bezborodov (17 March College, University of Cambridge. He is currently reported to Beijing. 1950 to 10 April 1953); Gen. N.K. (10 April Assistant Professor in the Peace and Conflict Studies 63. I would like to thank János Tischler, Research to 20 July 1953); Col. S.N. Lialin (20 July 1953 to Programme and the Department of Political Science, Fellow, Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian September 1954); Col. G.S. Ievdokimenko (September and Research Fellow at the Centre for Russian and East Revolution, Budapest, for bringing this document to 1954 to April 1959; Ievdokimenko became adviser to European Studies, University of Toronto. Dr. my attention. the Committee for Public Security after the MPS was Gluchowski is completing a book-length manuscript on 64. Text of the communiqué in the PUWP daily, dissolved on 7 December 1954 and finally disbanded on the Polish crisis of October 1956, based in part on his Trybuna Ludu (20 October 1956). 13 November 1956). The preceding list of Soviet dissertation, “The Collapse of Stalinist Rule in Poland: 65. Nowe Drogi 10 (October 1956), 21-46. advisers in Poland comes from Nikita V. Petrov of the The Polish United Worker’s Party from the XX CPSU 66. On the Poznan revolt see Jaroslaw Maciejewski and “” group in Moscow. Congress to the VIII CC PUWP Plenum, February- Zofia Trojanowicz, eds., Poznanski Czerwiec 1956 72. As of June 1956 six Soviet colonels remained in the October 1956,” and recent research conducted at the [Poznan’s June 1956] (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Polish Committee for Public Security and the Ministry Archive of Modern Records (AAN [Archiwum Akt Poznanskie [Poznan Publishers], 1990); and Maciej of Internal Affairs. Nowych]) in Warsaw and the Central Military Archives Roman Bombicki, Poznan ’56 (Poznan: Polski Dom 73. Until October 1956 Soviet advisers in the Polish (CAW [Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe]) in Rembartów, Wydawniczy “Lawica” [The Polish Publishing House Army totalled about 50 (51 in May and 50 in July 1956). Poland. “Lawica”], 1992). After October 1956 the Soviet advisers were renamed 67. Nowe Drogi 10 (October 1956) 20. “Military Consultants”. In January 1957 some 29 So- 68. Ibid., 149. viet Military Consultants remained in the Polish Army. 69. Ibid., 157-158. This figure was reduced to 12 by the end of the year. In 70. Trybuna Ludu, 21 October 1956. 1958 the figure dropped to 6 Soviet Military Consult- 71. Andrzej Paczkowski, Institute of Political Studies ants (2 at the General Staff, 1 in the Artillery, 1 in the Air at the Polish Academy of Sciences, who has conducted Force, and 2 at the Military Technical Academy). extensive research in the Polish Ministry of Internal However, the Chief Soviet Military Adviser (Lieuten- Affairs archives, provided me (in a letter dated 10 ant General Sergei Chernisev) also continued to func- 50 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

KHRUSHCHEV’S MEETING At the Presidium meeting on October 24 ately leaked to Polish officials earlier in the continued from page 1 (and later in his memoirs), Khrushchev de- day; and Soviet naval vessels had begun 1956. A shorter version was originally scribed how the Soviet Union actively tried holding conspicuous maneuvers in waters discovered by Tibor Hajdu of the Institute to prevent Gomulka from regaining his lead- near Gdansk.8 Despite these various forms of History of the Hungarian Academy of ership post.5 On October 19, as the 8th of pressure, the Polish authorities stood their Sciences in Budapest and published in Hun- Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee was ground, and the meeting ended without any garian in 1992.1 Although the document getting under way, a delegation of top Soviet firm agreement. The official communique below is the most important item to emerge officials paid a surprise visit to Warsaw. The merely indicated that talks had taken place thus far, other materials in Prague are also delegation included Khrushchev, Vyacheslav and that Polish leaders would be visiting well worth consulting. In addition to files Molotov, , Lazar Moscow sometime “in the near future.”9 In left from the top organs of the former Czecho- Kaganovich, and Anastas Mikoyan, as well every respect, then, the negotiations proved slovak Communist Party (Komunisticka as the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw less than satisfactory from the Soviet stand- strana Ceskoslovenska, or KSC), which are Pact, Marshal , and 11 other point. all now housed at the Central State Archive, high-ranking Soviet military officers. In a After the Soviet delegation returned to numerous items pertaining to the military hastily-arranged meeting with Gomulka and Moscow on October 20, the PZPR Central aspects of the 1956 crises can be found in other Polish leaders, the CPSU delegates Committee reconvened and promptly elected the Czech Military-Historical Archive expressed anxiety about upcoming person- Gomulka first secretary and dropped (Vojensky historicky archiv).2 nel changes in the PZPR and urged the Poles Rokossovskii and several other neo-Stalinist The summary report below was pre- to strengthen their political, economic, and officials from the PZPR Politburo. That sented by the KSC leader, Antonin Novotny, military ties with the Soviet Union. For their same day, an editorial in the CPSU daily to the other members of the KSC Politburo part, Gomulka and his colleagues sought Pravda accused the Polish media of waging on 25 October 1956.3 The report is undated, clarification of the status of Soviet troops in a “filthy anti-Soviet campaign” and of try- but it must have been drafted and hastily Poland and demanded that Soviet officials ing to “undermine socialism in Poland.”10 revised in the late night/early morning hours pledge not to interfere in Poland’s internal These charges prompted vigorous rebuttals of October 24-25 by Jan Svoboda, a top aide affairs.6 Gomulka repeatedly emphasized from Polish commentators. Strains be- to Novotny. Svoboda was responsible for that Poland “will not permit its independence tween the two countries increased still fur- composing many of Novotny’s speeches to be taken away.” He called for the with- ther as tens of thousands of Poles took part in and reports in the mid-1950s. drawal of all or most of the Soviet Union’s 50 pro-Gomulka rallies in Gdansk, , The document recounts a meeting of “advisers” in Poland and insisted that Mar- and other cities on October 22. Even larger top Soviet officials who belonged to the shal Konstantin Rokossovskii, the Polish- demonstrations, involving up to 100,000 Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Presidium, born Soviet officer who had been installed as people each, were organized the following as the Politburo was then known. The Poland’s national defense minister in No- day in Poznan, , Lodz, Bydgoszcz, session was convened at Nikita vember 1949, be removed along with other Kielce, and elsewhere. In the meantime, Khrushchev’s initiative on the evening of top Soviet officers who were serving in the joint meetings of workers and students were 24 October 1956, at a time of acute tension Polish army. The Soviet delegation re- being held all around Poland, culminating in with (and within) both Poland and Hungary. sponded by accusing the Poles of seeking to a vast rally in Warsaw on October 24 at- Until a day or two before the meeting, get rid of “old, trustworthy revolutionaries tended by as many as 500,000 people. Al- Khrushchev’s concerns about Eastern Eu- who are loyal to the cause of socialism” and though these events were intended mainly as rope focused primarily on Poland, where a of “turning toward the West against the So- a display of unified national support for the series of events beginning with the June viet Union.”7 new Polish leadership in the face of external 1956 clashes in Poznan, which left 53 dead During the heated exchanges that en- pressure, some of the speakers expressed and hundreds wounded, had provoked anxi- sued, Gomulka was suddenly informed by open hostility toward the Soviet Union. The ety in Moscow about growing instability one of his aides that Soviet tank and infantry growing anti-Soviet mood was especially and rebellion.4 In early October one of the units were advancing toward Warsaw. The noticeable at a large rally in Wroclaw on most prominent victims of the Stalinist Polish leader immediately requested that the October 23, which nearly spun out of con- purges in Poland in the late 1940s, Soviet forces be pulled back, and Khrushchev, trol. Wladyslaw Gomulka, had triumphantly re- after some hesitation, complied with the re- As tension continued to mount, Soviet gained his membership in the Polish Com- quest, ordering Konev to halt all troop move- leaders began to contemplate a variety of munist party (PZPR) and seemed on the ments. Although Khrushchev assured economic sanctions and military options. verge of reclaiming his position as party Gomulka that the deployments had simply None of these options seemed the least bit leader. Khrushchev and his colleagues been in preparation for upcoming military attractive, however, as Khrushchev empha- feared that if Gomulka took control in War- exercises, the intended message was plain sized to his colleagues during the meeting on saw and removed the most orthodox (and enough, especially in light of other recent October 24: “Finding a reason for an armed pro-Soviet) members of the Polish leader- developments. The existence of Soviet “plans conflict [with Poland] now would be very ship, Poland might then seek a more inde- to protect the most important state facilities” easy, but finding a way to put an end to such pendent (i.e., Titoist) course in foreign in Poland, including military garrisons and a conflict later on would be very hard.” policy. lines of communication, had been deliber- Rokossovskii had warned Soviet leaders at COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 51 the outset of the crisis that the Polish army convince Hungarian officials that far-reach- chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal would almost certainly put up stiff resis- ing security precautions were needed to cope Vasilii Sokolovskii, who specified that the tance against outside intervention. More- with growing unrest; but, as one of the top bulk of the Soviet troops in Hungary were to over, Khrushchev and his colleagues were Soviet officers later reported, “the leaders of be used in “establishing control over the aware that Polish officials had begun dis- the [Hungarian] party and members of the most important sites in the capital and in tributing firearms to “workers’ militia” units [Hungarian] government did not adopt the restoring order,” while others were to “seal who could help defend the capital, and that measures called for by the urgency of the off Hungary’s border with Austria.”17 Gomulka had ordered troops from the Polish situation. Many of them were simply inca- Having finally received due authoriza- internal affairs ministry to seal off all areas pable of evaluating the state of things realis- tion, Lashchenko was able to set to work in Warsaw that might be used as entry routes tically.”13 As a result, the violent upheavals almost immediately. The troops under his by Soviet forces.11 on October 23 quickly overwhelmed the command had been preparing since early Khrushchev’s reluctance to pursue a Hungarian police and security forces and June to undertake large-scale operations military solution under such inauspicious caused widespread panic and near-paralysis aimed at “upholding and restoring public circumstances induced him to seek a modus among senior Hungarian officials. order” in Hungary.18 In accordance with a vivendi with Gomulka whereby Poland The subsequent course of events on the plan code-named “Kompas,” the Soviet would have greater leeway to follow its own evening of October 23-24 has long been forces in Hungary had been placed on in- “road to socialism.” By the time the CPSU obscure, but the confusion is partly cleared creased alert in mid-October, and were Presidium meeting opened on October 24, up by Novotny’s report and a few other new brought to full combat alert on October 22- the prospects for a solution of this sort ap- sources.14 It is now known, for example, 23 at the behest of the Soviet General Staff. peared much brighter than they had just a that despite the growing turmoil in Budapest, Hence, when the mobilization orders ar- day or two earlier. At the mass rally in the Hungarian Communist party leader, Erno rived from Moscow on the night of the 23rd, Warsaw on the 24th, as Novotny mentions in Gero, did not even mention what was going the response on the ground was swift, de- his report, Gomulka adopted a far more on when he spoke by phone with Khrushchev spite dense fog that hampered troop move- conciliatory tone in his keynote speech. The late in the afternoon on October 23. Gero’s ments. By the early morning hours of the Polish leader emphasized the need for evasiveness during that conversation was 24th, thousands of soldiers from the USSR’s strengthened political and military ties with especially peculiar because he had already two mechanized divisions in Hungary (the the Soviet Union, and he condemned those transmitted an appeal for urgent military so-called “special corps”) had entered who were trying to steer Poland away from assistance to the military attache at the So- Budapest, and they were soon joined by the Warsaw Pact.12 He also urged Poles to viet embassy. The Soviet ambassador, Yurii thousands more Soviet troops from a mecha- return to their daily work and to refrain from Andropov, immediately telephoned the com- nized division based in Romania and two holding any further rallies or demonstra- mander of Soviet troops in Hungary, Gen- divisions (one mechanized, one rifle) from tions. This speech gave Khrushchev greater eral Pyotr Lashchenko, and relayed the ap- the Transcarpathian Military District in reason to hope that a lasting compromise peal; but Lashchenko responded that he could .19 All told, some 31,500 Soviet with Gomulka would be feasible. Although not comply with the request without explicit troops, 1,130 tanks and self-propelled artil- no one in Moscow could yet be confident authorization from Moscow.15 Andropov lery, 380 armored personnel carriers, 185 air that the strains with Poland were over, the then cabled Gero’s plea directly to Moscow defense guns, and numerous other weapons worst of the crisis evidently had passed. and followed up with an emergency phone were redeployed at short notice to Budapest Yet even as the situation in Poland call warning that the situation had turned and other major cities as well as along the finally seemed to be improving (from desperate. Andropov’s intervention, as Austrian-Hungarian border. Two Soviet Moscow’s perspective), events in Hungary Novotny reports, prompted Khrushchev to fighter divisions, totaling 159 planes, were had taken an unexpected and dramatic turn contact Gero by phone for the second time ordered to perform close air-support mis- for the worse. On October 23, the day before that evening. Khrushchev urged Gero to sions for the ground forces; and two Soviet the CPSU Presidium met, a huge demonstra- send a written request for help to the CPSU bomber divisions, with a total of 122 air- tion was organized in downtown Budapest Presidium, but the Soviet leader soon real- craft, were placed on full alert at airfields in by students from the Budapest polytechnical ized, after the brief conversation ended, that Hungary and the Transcarpathian Military university who wanted to express approval events in Budapest were moving too fast for District. of the recent developments in Poland and to him to wait until he received a formal Hun- For the task at hand, however, this array demand similar changes in their own coun- garian request (which, incidentally, did not of firepower was inadequate. The interven- try. By late afternoon the rally had turned arrive until five days later).16 On behalf of tion of the Soviet Army proved almost wholly violent, as the protesters and Hungarian se- the full CPSU Presidium and Soviet govern- ineffectual and even counterproductive. curity forces exchanged fire near the city’s ment, Khrushchev, according to Novotny, Gero himself acknowledged, in a phone main radio station. The shootings precipi- authorized the Soviet defense minister, Mar- conversation with Soviet leaders on October tated a chaotic rebellion, which was much shal Georgii Zhukov, to “redeploy Soviet 24, that “the arrival of Soviet troops into the too large for the Hungarian state security units into Budapest to assist Hungarian troops city has had a negative effect on the mood of organs to handle on their own. Soviet “ad- and state security forces in the restoration of the residents.”20 Soviet armored vehicles visers” and military commanders in Hun- public order.” Khrushchev’s directive was and artillery were sent into the clogged streets gary had been trying since early October to promptly transmitted to Lashchenko by the of Budapest without adequate infantry pro- 52 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN tection, and thus became easy targets for and of course Khrushchev. They were later cover the situation there at even greater youths wielding grenades and Molotov cock- joined by the defense minister, Marshal length than he did with Poland. tails. Although Hungarian soldiers were Georgii Zhukov, by the Soviet ambassador Novotny’s report, as will become evi- supposed to operate alongside Soviet units, to Poland, Pantaleimon Ponomarenko, by a dent below, was composed hastily and was troops from the Hungarian state security leading CPSU ideologist, , and intended merely as a detailed summary of forces, police, and army proved incapable by a senior Chinese official, Liu Xiaoqui. the meeting rather than a polished, minute- of offering necessary support, and some The only members of the Soviet Presidium by-minute transcript. For clarity’s sake, the defected to the side of the rebels. As a result, who were absent on October 24 were Anastas translation in some places is slightly smoother the fighting merely escalated. By mid- Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov, both of whom than the original document, which is often afternoon on the 24th, at least 25 protesters had traveled to Budapest earlier that day to rough and ungrammatical; but overall, the had been killed and more than 200 had been monitor the situation first-hand. Their top- translation seeks to capture the flavor and wounded. The mounting vio- style of the original. The original lence, as Soviet observers in Hungarian Scholar’s Comments manuscript is full of misspelled Budapest reported back to Mos- and titles, which have cow, “caused further panic Tibor Hajdu of the Institute of History in Budapest, who, like Mark been corrected in the translated among senior Hungarian offi- Kramer, found the record of the 24 October 1956 Moscow meeting text. In the few instances in which cials, many of whom fled into in the Prague archives, contributed the following comment to the these mistakes are especially glar- underground bunkers that were CWIHP Bulletin: ing, they have been mentioned in unsuitable for any work.”21 the annotations. The annotations The events of October 23- Unfortunately, the official Soviet record of the meeting was not serve two more important func- 24 were still very much under available—though it was first mentioned in a series of articles by tions as well: (1) to identify way as the CPSU Presidium retired Soviet ambassador V. Musatov—so I sought and located a acronyms, terms, and proper convened. These events copy in the Prague archives. The minutes by Jan Svoboda, names that may not be familiar to marked the start of a full- Novotny’s secretary (who accompanied his boss to Moscow as the some readers, and (2) to elabo- fledged revolution in Hungary latter didn’t understand enough Russian to follow a conversation), rate on and provide greater con- that culminated in a much focus on the long speech by Khrushchev and don’t reveal whether text for certain issues to which larger and more effective in- the others were merely listening to him or made at least some signs Novotny adverts. tervention by the Soviet Army of agreement. We may presume the lack of real debate as Khrushchev This introduction has al- on November 4. refers only to the sole dissenting opinion Ulbricht thought he could ready touched upon the most sig- * * * * afford. (Notably Ulbricht was severely criticized not only by nificant points in Novotny’s re- Not surprisingly, the tur- Khrushchev but at home also at the following session of the SED port, but it is worth briefly men- moil in Eastern Europe domi- CC.) tioning a few other items in the nated all other issues when What makes Khrushchev’s speech particularly interesting is document that are of particular Soviet leaders gathered on the sharp distinction between his commitment here to avoid if at all interest. October 24. Unlike at regular possible the use of Soviet military power in Poland and Hungary, First, the report implies meetings of the CPSU Pre- and all his later public announcements, including his memoirs. He that Khrushchev’s order to use sidium, which involved only lays the blame on Gero and Andropov for the military intervention, Soviet troops against the demon- Soviet participants, citing their heavy responsibility. Yet, after only a few days, he strators in central Budapest on Khrushchev invited the lead- became in full agreement with Ulbricht and Andropov about the October 23-24, though issued on ers of the “fraternal” East Eu- necessity for a Soviet military crackdown—well-known events behalf of the whole CPSU Pre- ropean Communist parties compelled him to change his mind. sidium, was made by Khrushchev (other than the Polish) to at- himself, perhaps in consultation tend the session on October 24. As things secret dispatches from the scene, which were with one or two others. Nothing in Novotny’s turned out, only Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, declassified by the Russian government in report suggests that the Presidium actually and East Germany were actually represented November 1992, make an invaluable comple- met on the 23rd to decide what to do. If at the meeting. Along with Novotny, Viliam ment to Novotny’s report.22 Khrushchev did indeed feel free to act on Siroky and Antonin Zapotocky attended The CPSU Presidium meeting, accord- behalf of the whole Presidium himself, this from Czechoslovakia. A complete list of ing to Novotny, provoked relatively little may suggest that his political authority was the Bulgarian and East German participants bickering or disagreement. Khrushchev used more firmly consolidated at the time than is provided in Novotny’s report. The full the occasion to inform his East German, has usually been thought. and candidate members of the CPSU Pre- Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian counterparts Second, the document reveals that sidium and members of the CPSU Secre- about recent developments in both Poland Khrushchev recommended that the Hungar- tariat who took part included Kaganovich, and Hungary. Although the meeting initially ian authorities lie about the timing of the Molotov, Bulganin, Aleksei Kirichenko, was designed to forge a common position Hungarian Central Committee plenum on Georgii Malenkov, Maksim Saburov, Le- vis-a-vis Gomulka and other Polish leaders October 23-24. He urged them to claim that onid Brezhnev, Nikolai Shvernik, Elena who had been defying Moscow, the pressure the plenum was held after Soviet troops Furtseva, Dmitrii Shepilov, Pyotr Pospelov, of events in Hungary forced Khrushchev to entered Budapest, whereas of course the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 53 opposite was the case. For unexplained that the measures being taken would not have an near future.30 reasons, however, the Hungarian leadership adverse effect on Poland’s relations with the Typically, at plenary sessions of the PZPR did not succeed in making this claim until Soviet Union and the CPSU. On the question of CC the majority of speakers would express their several days later. why so many changes occurred in the [PZPR] wish for friendship with the USSR and other Politburo, Comrade Gomulka said that the com- states of people’s democracies. Third, the document indicates that lead- rades who had not been reelected to the Politburo The opinion of the CPSU CC is that in the ers in Moscow were well aware that had lost the confidence of the party masses. The case of Poland it is necessary to avoid nervous- Mikoyan’s and Suslov’s views of the situa- Soviet comrades are very worried because the ness and haste. It is necessary to help the Polish tion in Hungary were much less alarmist [Polish] comrades who were removed from the comrades straighten out the party line and do than the reports they had been receiving Politburo were known to the Soviet party as old, everything to reinforce the union among Poland, from Andropov. This divergence is obvious trustworthy revolutionaries who were faithful to the USSR, and the other people’s democracies. when one compares the recently declassi- the cause of socialism. Among them is also Poland is in a catastrophic economic situa- fied cables (see the reference above), but it is Comrade Rokossovskii, who is of Polish origin tion. There is a shortfall of 900,000 tons of grain. 28 interesting that Soviet leaders themselves but never gave up his Soviet citizenship. Coal mining is in very bad shape also. After the While the CPSU CC delegation was in Po- 20th CPSU Congress, Poland adopted the same noticed this discrepancy from the outset. land, certain maneuvers of the Soviet Army took social measures as in the USSR, but did not have Finally, it is worth reeemphasizing that place on Polish territory, which displeased Com- sufficient means to carry them out. That is why the report confirms what has long been sus- rade Gomulka. The discussions between the Comrade Ochab turned to the CPSU CC delega- pected about the Polish crisis, namely, that delegations ranged from being very warm to tion with a request for a loan. When Comrade the likelihood of encountering widespread rude. Gomulka several times emphasized that Khrushchev remarked that perhaps the USA armed resistance was one of the major fac- they would not permit their independence to be would give them a loan, [Ochab] answered that tors that deterred Soviet military interven- taken away and would not allow anyone to inter- Poland would ask for a loan from the USA but he tion. Khrushchev acknowledged this in his fere in Poland’s internal affairs. He said that if he doubts that the USA would give them one. Com- memoirs, and Novotny’s account amply were leader of the country, he could restore order rade Khrushchev surmised that Comrade Ochab very promptly. The representatives of the PZPR was answering hastily on the spur of the moment. bears it out.23 explained the arguments and factors that had led Comrade Khrushchev said that the GDR * * * * to the current situation in Poland. These were and CSR had asked the CPSU CC to resolve the very unpersuasive and seemed to be outright problem with Polish coal at the highest level. But Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, fabrications. For example, Comrade Gomulka [Khrushchev] believes it would be inappropriate 24 October 1956, tried to convince the Soviet delegation that most to do that at this time because it would unneces- on the Situation in Poland and Hungary of the blame should be placed on the presence of sarily exacerbate the affair and lead to disputes 50 Soviet security advisers in Poland and of many and polemics between fraternal parties about this On 24 Oct. 1956 I [Novotny] attended a generals and other senior officers in the Polish matter, which the Poles, even with the best of meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPSU. Com- army who still hold Soviet citizenship. intentions, cannot do much about. rades from the MSP Central Committee, the SED In addition, [Gomulka] said that Poland’s Comrade Gomulka’s speech will not be pub- Central Committee, the BKS Central Committee, obligation to supply coal to the USSR at exces- lished in the USSR because it would have to be and the RDS Central Committee also were in- sively low prices had caused the difficult eco- accompanied by commentaries that would lead, 24 vited to take part. But the only ones who were nomic situation. Comrade Khrushchev empha- in turn, to further disputes and polemics, which actually present were the comrades from Ger- sized to the Polish comrades, referring to several would be highly undesirable. It is necessary to many, namely Ulbricht, Grotewohl, and Stoph, concrete examples, that on various occasions in help Poland. The USSR is willing to provide the and the comrades from Bulgaria—Zhivkov, the past, this had not been true. necessary grain. All possible measures will be 25 Yugov, and Damyanov. After the CPSU CC delegation returned to taken to ensure that by 1958, or at the very latest Comrade Khrushchev began by informing Moscow, an official letter was dispatched to the by 1959, the USSR will no longer be dependent everyone about the situation in Poland and Hun- PZPR CC from the CPSU CC saying that it was on Polish coal. Most likely the USSR will also gary. He said that originally the Presidium of the up to the Polish side to decide whether to send the agree to the loan request. CC CPSU wanted to inform the fraternal parties Soviet advisers and the generals with Soviet Later on, before the meeting ended and after about the situation in Poland and about the out- citizenship immediately back to the USSR. the main discussions, Comrade Ponomarenko come of the negotiations between the CPSU CC A delegation from the PZPR was invited to delivered a report about a political rally today by 26 and the PZPR CC. But in the meantime impor- meetings in the USSR along party lines [po workers in Warsaw. Comrade Gomulka gave a tant events had happened in Hungary. That is stranicke linii]. On 23 Oct. 1956 Comrade speech there.31 There were more than 150,000 why he deemed it necessary to inform us about Gomulka told the CPSU CC that he would accept people. the situation there as well. the invitation and that he would arrive after 11 Among other things, Comrade Gomulka In essence, this is what he said: Nov. 1956. Comrade Gomulka also asked Com- said that the PZPR CC had received a letter from When serious reports came in from Poland rade Khrushchev to have the Soviet forces return the CPSU CC which stated that it was up to the that far-reaching changes were expected in the to their camps, as he had been promised.29 From Polish side how to resolve the matter of the Soviet top party posts of the PZPR, the CC CPSU the telephone conversation between Comrade security advisers. He expressed his view that the decided to send a delegation to Poland. Gomulka and Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade presence of the Soviet advisers in Poland at this The delegation negotiated mainly with Com- Khrushchev got the impression that Comrade time was in Poland’s interests.32 This was greeted rades Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, Jedrychowski, Gomulka was attempting to earn the confidence with wide and loud applause. 27 Ochab, and the foreign minister. of the CPSU CC. He further emphasized that the presence of All these comrades, especially Gomulka, On this occasion the two sides arranged that Soviet troops on Polish territory was necessary sought to defend everything that was happening a long-planned exchange of delegations between because of the existence of NATO and the pres- in Poland. They assured the Soviet delegation Trybuna Ludu and Pravda would take place in the ence of American troops in West Germany.33 54 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

And this view, too, was greeted with loud and Uzhgorod.37 The redeployment of the units was were wounded. The unrest has been confined to long applause. slow and difficult because of dense fog. In an Budapest so far. Everywhere else, in the cities He condemned all those who want, by means effort to protect at least Comrade Gero, an ar- and the villages, there is calm. The workers from of demagogic talk, to undermine trust in the mored car was sent to Budapest. The vehicle the Csepel factory defended themselves with Polish army, which is under the exclusive com- passed right through Budapest without the slight- bare hands against armed bandits. mand of the Polish government and the PZPR est resistance. The other troop formations of the In Hungary after a decision by the govern- CC.34 He appealed to the crowd to finish the rally Soviet army did not arrive until 24 Oct. 1956 at ment, an “action group” of five [akcni petka] was and commit themselves to work for the good of 4:00 a.m., when the sessions of the MSP CC set up to suppress the uprising. It consists of Bata, the Polish people. plenum were already over in Budapest. Piros, Kovacs, Emerich, and Zoltan Vas, who in It was the view of Comrade Khrushchev Comrade Khrushchev recommended to Com- the past spoke out very strongly against the MSP that this speech by Comrade Gomulka gives rade Gero that he tell everyone that the plenum of leadership and now is centrally involved in orga- hope that Poland has now adopted a course that the MSP CC had not taken place before the nizing the fight against the bandits.45 The group will eliminate the unpleasant state of affairs. He demonstration was suppressed. It turned out that consists entirely of people who were not elected said that finding a reason for an armed conflict this did not happen. As was expected, a new to the [Hungarian] Politburo. now would be very easy, but finding a way to put politburo was elected at the plenum. It included On the morning of 24 Oct. 1956, Nagy spoke an end to such a conflict would be very hard. some members from the previous politburo: Apro, on the radio.46 He called for order, and he signed Hegedus, Gero, and Kadar.38 It also had new a decree establishing a military tribunal which is On the Situation in Hungary members: Imre Nagy, Kobol (the head of the 1st authorized to pass immediate sentence on anyone department of the CC MSP, who recently spoke who puts up resistance. Generally, the bandits are Comrade Khrushchev said he does not un- out strongly and sharply against the politburo), spreading the word that Nagy has betrayed the derstand what Comrades Gero, Hegedus, and Gaspar, Szanto (the head of the institute for cul- uprising. others are doing.35 There were signs that the tural ties with foreigners), Marosan (a persecuted He spoke again later on in a similar vein. He situation in Hungary is extremely serious. That but good comrade), Kiss (the chairman of the also mentioned that the Hungarian government did not prevent Comrades Gero and Hegedus KSK), and Kallai (the head of the department of had asked Soviet troops to enter Budapest. from continuing to spend time by the sea. And as culture of the CC MSP).39 Selected as candidates In his third speech on the radio today, he said soon as they returned home they left on a “trip” were: Losonczy (a journalist who was very active that the positive thing the students had begun was to Yugoslavia. in campaigning against the leadership of the party) being abused by the bandits to foment turmoil and When Comrade Khrushchev talked by phone and Ronai (chairman of the NS).40 shoot people. He appealed for order and urged on 23 Oct. 1956 with Comrade Gero, whom he In the new politburo there are three people people to give up their arms by 1:00 p.m. summoned for a consultation, Comrade Gero who were persecuted in the past and have now A delegation from the CPSU CC Presidium told him that the situation in Budapest is bad and been rehabilitated. Among the old members not was sent to Hungary this morning; it included for that reason he cannot come to Moscow. elected [to the new body] are: Hidas, Szalai, Mikoyan, Suslov, and Serov.47 As soon as the conversation was over, Com- Mekis, Kovacs, Revai, Acs, Bata (a candidate), During the meeting of the [Soviet] Pre- rade Zhukov informed [Khrushchev] that Gero and Piros (also a candidate).41 sidium, those comrades informed the Presidium had asked the military attaché at the Soviet Those elected to the secretariat were: Gero by telephone about the situation [in Hungary]. embassy in Budapest to dispatch Soviet troops to (1st secretary), Kadar, Donath (director of the They said that Comrades Mikoyan and Suslov suppress a demonstration that was reaching an Institute of Economics), Kobol, and Kallai.42 had attended the [Hungarian] Central Committee ever greater and unprecedented scale. The Pre- Among them are three persecuted comrades. Of meeting. The situation, in their view, is not as dire sidium of the CC CPSU did not give its approval the old members of the secretariat, those who as the Hungarian comrades and the Soviet ambas- for such an intervention because it was not re- were dismissed were: Szalai, Egri, Veg, and sador have portrayed it. Budapest itself is more quested by the highest Hungarian officials, even Kovacs.43 or less calm. Resistance is limited to certain when Comrade Gero had been speaking earlier Within the government, Nagy has been se- rooftops and house balconies, from which the with Comrade Khrushchev. lected as chairman of the Council of Ministers and enemy is shooting. The internal security forces Shortly thereafter, a call came through from Hegedus as first deputy chairman of the Council respond quite freely to each of their shots, which the Soviet embassy in Budapest saying that the of Ministers. creates the impression of a battle. One can expect situation is extremely dangerous and that the There were no longer any demonstrations in that by morning there will be total calm. The intervention of Soviet troops is necessary. The Budapest on the evening of 24 Oct. 1956. Near the Soviet embassy let itself be encircled and pro- Presidium authorized Comrade Khrushchev to Danube there were several groups of bandits. tected by 30 tanks. discuss this matter by phone with Comrade These consisted of groups of 15-20 people armed Among the Hungarian leadership, both in Gero.36 with pistols and weapons seized from soldiers. the party and in the state, there is an absolute unity As it turned out, Comrade Khrushchev in- Resistance is still occurring on certain street cor- of views. formed Comrade Gero that his request will be ners, roofs, and balconies. On several streets there There is no doubt that Nagy is acting coura- met when the government of the HPR [Hungar- were barricades. The bandits temporarily occu- geously, emphasizing at every opportunity the ian People’s Republic] makes the request in pied two railway stations and one of the two radio identity of his and Gero’s views. Gero himself writing. Gero responded that he is not able to stations. The bandits wanted to tear down the had told the Soviet comrades that protests against convene a meeting of the government. Comrade statue of Stalin. But when they were unsuccessful his election as 1st secretary were occurring. But Khrushchev then recommended that Hegedus in this task, they seized a welder’s torch and cut Nagy had emphasized and reemphasized that call such a meeting in his capacity as chairman of the statue to pieces, and then disposed of the those protesting against him did not include even the Council of Ministers. Although that had not whole thing. a single member of the Central Committee. Only happened as of today, the situation developed in The Hungarian internal security forces per- certain individuals were behaving that way. such a way that Comrade Zhukov was given formed very well, but suffered most of the casual- In Budapest roughly 450 people have been orders to occupy Budapest with Soviet military ties from among the 25 dead and 50 wounded.44 arrested. In response to a question from Comrade units located on Hungarian territory and in Also, one Soviet officer was killed and 12 soldiers Ulbricht about whether it is known who is leading COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 55 the uprising, Comrade Khrushchev said that ac- have full stomachs, the listening is not so bad. polityczne w Polsce Ludowej (Warsaw: Instytut cording to reports the insurgents had set up their It is necessary to improve ideological and Podstawowych Problemow Marksizmu-Leninizmu, headquarters in the Hotel Astoria. This had been propaganda work and to bolster the quality of the 1983), 80-114. For a brief but useful account of the captured by Soviet troops. It appears that the work of the party and state apparatus geared crisis by a Russian historian, see Aleksandr Orekhov, “Obschestvenno-politicheskii krizis 1956 goda v Pol’she groundwork for preparing a coup was organized toward managing the economy. (genezis i razvitie sobytii),” in Yu. S. Novopashin, ed., by writers and was supported by students. The Politicheskie krizisy i konflikty 50-60-kh godov v population as a whole has reacted passively to 1. Tibor Hajdu, “Az 1956. oktober 24-i moszkvai Vostochnoi Evrope: Sbornik stat’ei (Moscow: Insti- everything, but has not been hostile toward the ertekezlet” [The 24 October 1956 Moscow meeting], in tute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies, 1993), 10-55. USSR. Az 1956-os Magyar Forradalom Tortenetenek 5. Further details about these efforts are available from Comrade Khrushchev recommends that we Akademiai Dokumentacios es Kutatointezete Evkonyv numerous other sources in both Poland and Russia. I. 1992. [The Yearbook of the Institute for the History See, e.g., Rykowsi and Wladyka, Polska proba, 232- not cover the situation in Hungary in our press and Documentation of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution] until the causes of everything have been well 234. Additional citations are provided below and in the (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1992), 149-56. article by Leo Gluchowski in this issue of the CWIHP clarified. 2. Among many examples of the latter are “Zabezpeceni Bulletin. The representatives of the fraternal parties klidu na uzemi CSR a statnich hranic s Mad’arskem,” 6. “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Varshave,” No. who were present joined the discussion. All of Report from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of 233 (Special Dossier — Strictly Secret), October 1956, them expressed support for the stance of the the Czechoslovak General Staff, and Lieut.-General in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii/Osobaya CPSU CC Presidium. Jaroslav Dockal, chief of operations, 29 October 1956 papka. The rest of this paragraph is based both on this Comrade Ulbricht emphasized in his speech (Top Secret), in VHA Praha, Fond Ministra narodni source and on Novotny’s report. obrany (MNO) CSR, 1956, Operacni sprava Generalniho 7. Ibid. that in his view the situation had arisen because stabu cs. armady (GS/OS), 2/8-39b; “Souhrn hlaseni we did not act in time to expose all the incorrect 8. Comments by , former PZPR CC operacniho dustojnika Generalniho stabu cs. armady,” Secretary, in Teresa Toranska, ed., Oni (London: Aneks, opinions that had emerged in Poland and Hun- Notes from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of 1985), 148. gary. He assumed that it would behoove each the Czechoslovak General Staff, to the KSC Central 9. “Komunikat o naradach Biura Politycznego KC party to give a response in the press to certain Committee (Top Secret), 27 October 1956, in VHA PZPR i delegacji KC KPZR w Warszawie,” Trybuna incorrect opinions. Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS, 2/8-49b; “Zprava o Ludu (Warsaw), 20 October 1956, p. 1. Comrade Khrushchev recommended that opatrenich k zesileni bojove pohotovosti vojsk,” Re- 10. “Antisovetskaya kampaniya v pol’skoi presse,” they think about the problems in greater depth. port from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Pravda (Moscow), 20 October 1956, p. 1. Czechoslovak General Staff, and Lieut.-General Evzen We must realize that we are not living as we were 11. Jacek Kuron, Wiara i wina: Do i od komunizmu Chlad, chief of the Main Logistical Directorate, to the (Warsaw: BGW, 1990), 119. See also Wlodzimierz during the CI [], when MNO Collegium (Top Secret), 31 October 1956, in Mus, “Czy grozila interwencja zbrojna? Spor generalow only one party was in power. If we wanted to VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS 2/8-49b; and o Pazdziernik 1956,” Polityka (Warsaw) 42 (20 Octo- operate by command today, we would inevitably “Rozkaz k provedeni vojenskych opatreni na hranicich ber 1990), 14. create chaos. It is necessary to conduct propa- s Mad’arskem,” from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, 12. “Przemowienie towarzysza Wladyslawa Gomulki,” ganda work in each party, but we cannot permit chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, to the 2nd Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 25 October 1956, 1, which this to turn into polemics between fraternal par- Military District in Trencin (Strictly Secret), 28 Octo- appears under the banner headline “Ponad 300 tysiecy ties because this would lead to polemics between ber 1956, in VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS, 2/8- warszawiakow na spotkaniu z nowym kierownictwem 2b. Another very useful document on military issues is partii.” nations. The plenum of the CPSU CC in Decem- “Stav Mad’arske lidove armady a priciny jejiho ber will discuss ideological questions and, a bit 13. Lieut.-General E. I. Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v rozkladu,” Report compiled by KSC CC Department ogne Budapeshta” (Part 1), Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal later, the question of how to raise living stan- No. 14 for the KSC CC Politburo, 9 April 1957, in SUA 10 (October 1993), 24-25. dards, particularly the faster construction of apart- Praha, Archiv Ustredniho Vyboru (Arch. UV) KSC, 14. Two other new sources that help dispel some of the ments as one of the basic prerequisites for boost- Fond (F.) 100/3 — Mezinarodni oddeleni UV KSC confusion about what happened on the night of 23-24 ing living standards. The extent to which pa- 1954-1962, Sv. 110, Archivna jednotka (A.j.) 371 October are: Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne tience is required can be seen from the recent case 3. “Projednani zpravy A. Novotneho o jednani na UV Budapeshta” (Part 1), pp. 22-30; and “TsK KPSS,” in Zaporozhe.48 Here 200 people refused to work KSSS na mimoradne schuzi politickeho byra UV KSC,” Memorandum from Marshal Georgii Zhukov, Soviet 25 October 1956, in SUA Praha, Arch. UV KSC, F. 02/ because those responsible for guiding the work of minister of defense, and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, 2 — Politicke Byro UV KSC 1954-1962, Sv. 120, A.j. chief of the Soviet General Staff, 24 October 1956 the factories, including party functionaries, union 150. (STRICTLY SECRET — SPECIAL DOSSIER) to the leaders, and the top manager, did not do anything 4. The events of 1956 in Poland have been covered CPSU Presidium, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 85- to induce the employees to work to the limit. Did extensively, though often unevenly, by Polish histori- 87. they refuse to work because some ideological ans and scholars. For a sample of the literature as well 15. Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta” matters were unclear to them or because they as official reports, see Zbyslaw Rykowski and Wieslaw (Part 1), p. 25. were opposed to the Soviet regime? No, they Wladyka, Polska proba Pazdziernik ‘56 (Krakow: 16. The written request, dated 24 October 1956 and refused because basic economic and social issues Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989); Sprawozdanie z prac signed by then-prime minister Andras Hegedus, was Komisii KC PZPR powolanej dla wyjasnienia przyczyn had not been resolved. Ideological work itself transmitted by Andropov in a ciphered telegram on 28 i przebiegu konfliktow spolecznuch w dziejach Polski October. See “Shifrtelegramma” (Strictly Secret — will be of no avail if we do not ensure that living Ludowej, special issue of Nowe drogi (Warsaw), Sep- URGENT), 28 October 1956, from Yu. V. Andropov, standards rise. It is no accident that the unrest tember 1983, see esp. pp. 21-32; Benon Dymek, ed., in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, L. 12. occurred in Hungary and Poland and not in Pazdziernik 1956: Szkice historyczne (Warsaw: 17. Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta” Czechoslovakia. This is because the standard of Akademia Nauk Spolecznych, 1989); Bogdan (Part 1), 27. living in Czechoslovakia is incomparably higher. Hillebrandt, ed., Ideowopolityczne kontrowersje i 18. Ibid., 24-25. In the USSR more than 10,000 members of the konflikty lat 1956-1970 (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk 19. “TsK KPSS,” Memorandum from Marshal Georgii CPSU were rehabilitated and more than a million Spolecznych, 1986); Grzegorz Matuszak, Kryzysy Zhukov, Soviet minister of defense, and Marshal Vasilii spoleczno-polityczne w procesie budowy socjalizmu w were released from prison. These people are not Sokolovskii, chief of the Soviet General Staff, 24 Octo- Polsce Ludowej (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk Spolecznych ber 1956 (STRICTLY SECRET — SPECIAL DOS- angry at us [in Czechoslovakia] because they see PZPR, 1986); Jan Ptasinski, Wydarzenia poznanskie SIER) to the CPSU Presidium, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, we have done a lot to raise the standard of living czerwiec 1956 (Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1986); D. 484, Ll. 85-87. This memorandum lays out in detail in our country. In our country they also listen to and Antoni Czubinski, “Kryzys polityczny 1956 roku the complexion and assignments of the Soviet ground the BBC and Radio Free Europe. But when they w Polsce,” in Antoni Czubinski, ed., Kryzysy spoleczno- and air forces. 56 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

20. “Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta,” Cable from A. 30. Trybuna Ludu was the main daily newspaper of the novembre 1956) (Paris: Centre d’Etudes Avancees du Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, 24 Polish Communist party, and of course Pravda was the College de l’Europe Libre, 1957), 265-266. October 1956 (STRICTLY SECRET), in AVPRF, F. main daily of the CPSU. 47. Unlike Mikoyan and Suslov, Ivan Serov was not a 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 2. 31. For the text of this speech, see “Przemowienie member of the CPSU Presidium. At the time he was the 21. “Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta,” Cable from A. towarzysza Wladyslawa Gomulki,” 1. head of the State Security Service (KGB). Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, 25 32. This is not quite what Gomulka said, though it is not 48. Zaporozhe is an industrial city on the Dniepr River October 1956 (STRICTLY SECRET), in AVPRF, F. inconsistent. He stated that “the question of whether we in southeastern Ukraine. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 8. need Soviet specialists, and for how long we will need 22. These documents have been published in both their help, will be for us to decide alone.” Mark Kramer, a researcher at the Center for Foreign Hungarian and the original Russian. See the two- 33. Actually, what Gomulka said was that the continued Policy Development at and the Rus- volume Hungarian collection Jelcin-dosszie Szoviet presence of Soviet troops on East German territory sian Research Center at Harvard University, is a fre- dokumentumok 1956 rol. (Budapest: Dohany, 1993); would be in accord with Poland’s vital interests. quent contributor to the CWIHP Bulletin. and Hianyzo Lapok: 1956 tortenetebol: Dokumentumok 34. This statement was a reply by Gomulka to those in a volt SZKP KP Leveltarabol (Budapest: Zenit Poland and elsewhere who argued—accurately, as new Konyvek, 1993). A few of the documents had already evidence has confirmed—that real command of the been published in Russian in “O sobytiyakh 1956 goda Polish army at the time lay with Moscow not with v Vengrii,” Diplomaticheskii vestnik (Moscow) 19-20 Warsaw. (15-31 October 1992), 52-56. Subsequently, most of 35. At the time Erno Gero was the first secretary of the the others were published in Russian with detailed Hungarian Communist party, and Andras Hegedus was annotations in a three-part series: “Vengriya, aprel’- the Hungarian prime minister. oktyabr’ 1956 goda: Informatsiya Yu. V. Andropova, 36. At this point, the report begins misspelling Gero’s A. I. Mikoyana i M. A. Suslova iz Budapeshta”; name as Gore and continues to write it that way through “Vengriya, oktyabr’-noyabr’ 1956 goda: Iz arkhiva the rest of the document. TsK KPSS”; and “Vengriya, noyabr’ 1956-avgust 1957 37. Uzhgorod is the Ukrainian town along the border g.,” all in Istoricheskii arkhiv (Moscow) 4, 5, and 6 with Hungary and Czechoslovakia. (1993), 103-142, 132-160, and 131-144, respectively. 38. Antal Apro was the deputy prime minister; Janos 23. The relevant passage in Khrushchev’s memoirs is Kadar succeeded Gero a few days later as head of the RESEARCH IN MOSCOW N. S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, 5 vols. (typescript, Hungarian Workers’ Party. Moscow, 1965-1970), Vol. IV: Vzaimootnosheniya s 39. New names mentioned here include Jozsef Kobol, sotsialisticheskimi stranami, “O Pol’she,” pp. 20-28. whose is misspelled in two different ways in Scholars needing research per- 24. MSP, SED, BKS, and RDS are the Czech acro- this report; Sandor Gaspar, who was a close ally of formed in the Russian archives may nyms (as of October 1956) of the Hungarian, Bulgar- Nagy; Zoltan Szanto, who was a close friend of, and contract with students at the Research ian, and Romanian Communist parties, respectively. senior official under, Nagy (Szanto fled with Nagy to the SED is the German acronym for the East German Yugoslav embassy in November 1956); Gyorgy Center “Archival Conversion” at the Communist party. It is interesting that Hungarian Marosan, who was a close friend of Kadar (the two were Historical Archives Institute (HAI) of Communist leaders were invited, even though they did in prison together) and a Party secretary; Karoly Kiss, the Russian State University for the Hu- not end up taking part. who was the head of the Party Control Commission manities in Moscow. For further infor- 25. Svoboda here misspells the name of two of the East (KSK is the Czech acronym); and Gyula Kallai, who German officials: , writing it as Stopf; and was foreign minister from 1949 to 1951, when he was mation please direct inquiries to: Otto Grotewohl, writing it as Grottewohl. Walter arrested (and subsequently was in prison with Kadar). Ulbricht, the third East German official, was then head 40. The references here are to Geza Losonczy, a leading Prof. Alexander B. Bezborodov of the SED; Grotewohl was prime minister; and Stoph critic of the Rakosi regime; and Sandor Ronai, a former Historical Archives Institute (HAI) was defense minister. The three Bulgarian officials Social Democratic leader. were: the Communist party leader, ; the 41. All those mentioned here had been close allies of Russian State University for the prime minister, Anton Yugov; and the president, Georgi Rakosi: Istvan Hidas was deputy prime minister; Bela Humanities Damyanov. Szalai was director of central planning; Jozsef Mekis FAX: (7-095) 432-2506 or 26. PZPR is the Polish acronym for the Polish United was an economic policy adviser; Istvan Kovacs was the (7-095) 964-3534 Workers’ Party. Budapest party secretary; Jozsef Revai was the chief 27. Gomulka, Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Stefan party ideologist; Lajos Acs was a party functionary; Telephone: (7-095) 921-4169 or Jedrychowski, and were top Polish Col.-General Istvan Bata was minister of national de- (7-095) 925-5019 Communist party officials; the Polish foreign minister fense until October 27; and Laszlo Piros was minister of at the time was Adam Rapacki, who later became internal affairs. (Piros’s surname is misspelled “Byros,” Scholars may also address inquir- known for the so-called Rapacki Plan for conventional and Mekis’s is misspelled “Mikes.”) in central Europe. Here, as elsewhere, 42. The only new name mentioned here is Ferenc ies regarding possible collaboration for Svoboda misspells the names of both Jedrychowski Donath, a close friend of Nagy who had been persecuted research in Russian archives to the: and Cyrankiewicz, using a hybrid of Czech and Polish under Rakosi. spellings. 43. The only new names mentioned here are Gyula Egri Institute of Universal History 28. The reference here is to Konstantin Rokossowski, (misspelled as Egre) and Bela Veg, who had also been who attained the rank of Marshal of the USSR in the a candidate member of the politburo. Leninsky prospekt 32-a Soviet Army. As noted in the introduction above, 44. These casualty figures include only Hungarian 117334, Moscow, Russia Rokossowski had been installed as defense minister troops and security forces; they do not refer to deaths FAX: (7-095) 938-2288 and commander-in-chief in Poland in 1949 while re- and injuries among the protesters. See Malashenko, Telephone: (7-095) 938-1009 taining his status as a top Soviet officer. The resent- “Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta” (Part 1), p. 29. ment that many Poles felt toward Rokossowski (and 45. Zoltan Vas (whose name is misspelled as Vess Zolt) toward other Soviet officers who served in high-level was another close ally of Nagy; like Zoltan Szanto, Vas command posts in the Polish army) led to the Soviet fled with Nagy to the Yugoslav embassy in November marshal’s ouster at the 8th PZPR plenum. 1956. 29. According to Gomulka’s speech on October 24 46. For the text, see “Discours de Imre Nagy du 24 (“Przemowienie towarzysza Wladyslawa Gomulki,” octobre 1956,” in La Revolution Hongroise vue par les 1), the pull-back of the Soviet forces was to be com- Partis Communistes de l’Europe de l’Est: Presentation pleted within two days, that is, by the 25th. Quotidienne par les Organes Officiels (23 octobre-15 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 57

1953 EAST GERMAN UPRISING 34. Mitter and Wolle, Untergang, 105. officially visiting Berlin at the time. See Eleanor L. continued from page 17 35. Hagen, DDR, 772-73; Mitter and Wolle, Untergang, Dulles, Berlin: The Wall is Not Forever (Chapel Hill, 104. NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), 14-17. port No. 6], 14 June 1953, SAPMO-BArch, NL 90/435. 36. Hagen, DDR, 106. 42. State Department to HICOG Bonn, 17 June 1953, 25. Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und 37. Semyenov and Sololovskii, telegram to Molotov 762B.00/6-1753, RG 59, NA. Massenorganisationen, Tagesbericht Nr. VI [Daily Re- and Bulganin, 19 June 1953, quoted in Harrison, The 43. See Christian Ostermann, The United States, The port No. 6], 14 June 1953, SAPMO-BArch], DY30 IV Bargaining Power, 85. East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of 2/5/526. 38. Abteilung Presse und Rundfunk, “Zweite Analyse , Cold War International History Project Work- 26. Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und über die Sendungen von RIAS und NWDR am 18. 6. ing Paper No. 11. Massenorganisationen, Stellungnahmen der 1953” [Second Analysis of the Broadcasts of RIAS and 44. Lewis Merchant, 9 November 1953, NA, RG 59, Parteiorgane nach dem 9. bzw. 11. 6. 1953: Beriocht NWDR], 18 June 1953, SAPMO-BArch, J IV 2/202/ Lot 55D371, Box 8. über die Aufnahme des Kommuniques der Sitzung des 14. 45. Handschriftliche Aufzeichnungen in Anlage zum Politbüros des ZK der SED v. 9.6.1953” [Reports of the 39. “Über die Lage am 17.6.1953 in Groß-Berlin und Sitzungsprotokoll 49/53 [Handwritten notes enclosed Party Organs after June 9 resp. 11 June 1953: Report on der DDR,” 17 June 1953, SAPMO-BArch, J IV 2/202/ with minutes of Politburo session No. 49/53], 8 July the reception of the communiqué of the politburo ses- 14. 1953, SAMPO-Barch DY 30J IV 2/2/303. sion of the SED CC of 9 June 1953], SAPMO-BArch, 40. “Die Rolle des feindlichen Rundfunks bei den 46. Indeed, one of the most interesting findings is the DY 30 IV 2/5/526. Ereignissen in Berlin” [The Role of Hostile Broadcasts fact that riots, demonstrations and strikes continued for 27. Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und During the Events in Berlin], 21 June 1953, SAPMO- at least four weeks following June 17. Massenorganisationen, Stellungnahmen der BArch, NL 90/437. Parteiorgane nach dem 9. bzw. 11. 6. 1953: Durchsage 41. Memorandum of Discussion at the 150th Meeting Christian F. Ostermann (National Security Archive), der Kreisleitung Seehausen [Reports of the Party Or- of the National Security Council, 18 June 1953, For- recipient of the 1995 Harry S. Truman Institute gans after June 9 resp. 11 June 1953: Report of the eign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, VII, Dissertaion Year Fellowship, has done research in U.S. District Leadership in Seehausen, 11 June 1953,] 1587. This view is corroborated by a telegram from and German archives and is currently completing a SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/5/526. HICOG Berlin to the Secretary of State, 17 June 1953. dissertation on U.S.-GDR relations. The author thanks 28. FDGB-Bundesvorstand, Vertrauliche Information Reporting on the day’s events the cable concluded that Norbert Finzsch, Thomas A. Schwartz and John L. Nr. 21, 13.6.1953, SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/5/543. “to best our knowledge, no American involved.” Gaddis for their support. 29. [Resolution], VEB.-Industriebau, Baustelle: 762B.00/6-1753, Record Group 59, National Archives. Bettenhaus Friedrichshain, SAPMO-BArch NL 90/ “American observers,” however, “mingled freely” 437 among the rioters. See CIA “Comment on East Berlin 30. “Notiz” [Memorandum] by Tzschorn, 15 June Uprising,” 17 June 1953, Box 3, C.D. Jackson Records, ADDENDUM 1953, SAPMO-BArch NL 90/437; “Betrifft: Empfang Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. Officers einer Delegation von Bauarbietern aus der Stalinallee of HICOG Berlin’s Eastern Affairs Division “mingled The previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin durch die Genossen Plaschke und Tzschorn” [Re: Re- with groups” of demonstrators and “talked to bystand- ception of a Delegation of the Construction Workers ers” during a brief visit (3-4:30 PM). No attempt was (Issue #4, Fall 1994), inadvertently omitted from the Stalinallee by the Comrades Plaschke and made by East German police to “keep persons obvi- the name of the translator of the KGB docu- Comrade Ambreé on 15 June 1953], 25 June 1953, ously American away from discussion groups.” HICOG SAPMO-BArch NL 90/437. ments concerning Niels Bohr published on Berlin to Secretary of State, 16 June 1953, 762B.00/6- pages 50-51, 57-59. It was Mark H. 31. Mitter and Wolle, Untergang, 90-91. 1653, RG59, NA. One of these observers was the sister 32. Hagen, DDR, 53. of CIA chief Allen Dulles, Eleanor Dulles, who was Doctoroff. The Bulletin regrets the omis- 33. Hagen, DDR, 55-56. sion.

YELTSIN DECREE ON DECLASSI- ported by the Russian Federation’s Ministry publication of an official collection of FICATION for Atomic Energy, Ministry of Defense, archival documents on the history of the OF SOVIET NUCLEAR HISTORY Federal Counter-Intelligence Service, For- creation of nuclear arms in the USSR DOCUMENTS eign Intelligence Service, and the State Tech- over the period up to 1954. nical Commission under the President of the 3. Control over the fulfillment of the Russian Federation, on the publication of an present ukaz is entrusted to the Govern- Ukaz of the President of the Russian official collection of archival documents on mental Commission for the Joint Solu- Federation: the history of the creation of nuclear arms in tion of Problems of Nuclear Arms. the USSR over the period up to 4. The current ukaz comes into ef- On the Preparation and Publication 1954 and the declassification of the corre- fect from the day of its publication. of an Official Collection of Archival sponding archival documents. Documents on the History of the 2. That the Government of the Russian President of the Russian Federation B. Creation of Nuclear Arms in the USSR Federation is: Yel’tsin —— —within one month to form a working Moscow, the Kremlin With the goal of recreating an objective group of the Governmental Commission for 17 February 1995 picture of the establishment of a domestic the Joint [kompleksnomu] Solution of Prob- # 160 atomic industry and of the history of the lems of Nuclear Arms for the study of archi- —— creation of nuclear weapons in the USSR, val documents connected with the history of [From Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 1 March 1995, I DECREE: the creation of nuclear arms in the USSR, p. 14; item provided and translated by 1. The acceptance of the suggestion and the development of a proposal for their David Russel Stone, Yale University] of the Russian Academy of Sciences and declassification. the State Archival Service of Russia, sup- —to provide for the preparation and 58 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN NEW EVIDENCE ON THE

USING KGB DOCUMENTS: negotiations. The famous proposal for end- superpower intelligence services sponsored THE SCALI-FEKLISOV CHANNEL ing the crisis, which Robert Kennedy later by Crown Publishers, Inc.4 IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS recalled as having made his brother “for the To understand better what can be learned first time hopeful that our efforts might pos- from these documents, it is helpful to revisit by Alexander Fursenko sibly be successful,” had not come from him, the standard account of the role of the Scali- and but rather had come out of the blue from Feklisov channel in the resolution of the Scali. Scali, who was also present in Mos- Cuban Missile Crisis. From the time that former State Depart- cow, vigorously disputed Feklisov’s ac- According to the traditional version, ment official Roger Hilsman revealed in count.2 Scali received a call at his Washington office 1964 that ABC News television correspon- Feklisov’s surprising assertion3 and from Feklisov on Friday, October 26. Scali dent John Scali had served as an intermedi- Scali’s immediate rejection of this revision- had been meeting off and on with this Soviet ary between the U.S. and Soviet govern- ist history posed three questions for students Embassy official for over a year. From the ments at the height of the Cuban Missile of the crisis: FBI, which Scali had alerted from the outset Crisis, scholars have had to consider the role a) Did the Soviet government use the about his meetings with Feklisov, the jour- that Scali and his contact, Aleksandr Feklisov KGB to find a way out of the crisis on 26 nalist learned that this man was no ordinary (alias Fomin), played in the resolution of the ? diplomat. Aleksandr Feklisov (“Fomin”) was conflict.1 Until 1989, it was generally as- b) Did Feklisov act on his own or did the KGB Resident, or chief of station, in sumed that the Kremlin had used Feklisov, Scali suggest a settlement for his own gov- Washington. On this particular Friday, with a KGB officer based at the Soviet Embassy ernment to consider? the likelihood of US military action against in Washington, to float a trial balloon at the c) What effect, if any, did the Scali- Cuba seemingly mounting, Feklisov asked most dangerous moment of the Cuban Mis- Feklisov meetings have on the endgame of for an urgent meeting with Scali. Scali sug- sile Crisis because meaningful communica- the Cuban Missile Crisis? gested the Occidental Restaurant near the tion between the two governments had Materials consulted in the archives of Willard Hotel. The lunch was set for 1:30 ground to a halt. the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service, the p.m. But at a conference of scholars and new name for the of “When I arrived he was already sitting former officials in Moscow in January 1989, the KGB), resolve some, though not all, of at the table as usual, facing the door. He Feklisov argued that Western historians had these questions. Documents on the Scali- seemed tired, haggard and alarmed in con- gotten his role in the crisis all wrong. The Feklisov meetings have been opened as part trast to the usual calm, low-key appearance Kremlin, he said, had not injected him into of a multi-book project on the history of the continued on page 60

Russian Foreign Ministry Documents previously published but were of lesser import substantial addition to our documentary base and On the Cuban Missile Crisis than those already obtained.] some contribution to our understanding of the The 21 documents initially released com- crisis. Introduction by Raymond L. Garthoff prise selections from six categories of material. These materials expand on the earlier re- First are three cables from, and one message to, leased messages between President Kennedy and Among the new archival materials on the Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseyev in Ha- Prime Minister Khrushchev. There are, however, Cuban Missile Crisis recently made available by vana sent shortly prior to or during the crisis; no materials on Foreign Ministry evaluations or the Russian government are the first batch of second are seven cables sent from Ambassador other interagency deliberations in Moscow, in diplomatic documents, a selection of 21 docu- in Washington and one to him, contrast to the extensive releases of comparable ments totaling 147 pages; extensive translations also all prior to or during the crisis, and one from materials by the United States. of these materials (as well as of two other docu- Soviet official Georgii Zhukov, also sent from Some of the Foreign Ministry documents ments released from the former CPSU Central Washington; third are one message from Ambas- have been lightly sanitized, and a number of them Committee archives) follow this introduction. sador Valerian Zorin, Soviet representative to the are only excerpts, but excisions are not noted While certainly welcome, this represents only United Nations in New York, and one to him (and except where there is an internal blank space in a about twenty percent of a file of 734 pages of to Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily ) paragraph. Documents are not identified by their Foreign Ministry (MID) documents declassified from Moscow; fourth are two messages from original designators (such as telegram numbers), in the fall of 1991 and in early 1992. Moreover, Foreign Minister Gromyko to Moscow just before nor by their Foreign Ministry archive file loca- many documents remain classified. Still, it is an the crisis broke; fifth are three messages from tions. important step forward. to Moscow reporting on First Deputy The precrisis reports of Ambassadors The documents were acquired through the Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan’s negotiations Alekseev and Dobrynin help to set the stage, but efforts of the author and of the National Security with Prime Minister Fidel Castro and other Cuban they do not add much to what has been known. Archive (NSA), a non-governmental, privately- leaders as the crisis was being ended; and finally, Gromyko’s cabled report of his meeting with funded research institute based at George Wash- the sixth is a single message from Deputy Foreign President Kennedy (detailed in his memoir) is not ington University in Washington, D.C. [Ed. Minister Kuznetsov after his meeting with Presi- included, but his account of the discussion of note: Shortly before presstime, a second group of dent Kennedy on 9 , in effect closing Cuba in his meeting that same evening with declassified Foreign Ministry documents reached the post-crisis diplomatic negotiations. A few of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and a message NSA; however, these consisted mostly of previ- these have been released earlier, in particular one giving Gromyko’s evaluation of the situation on ously-published Kennedy-Khrushchev corre- on Mikoyan’s talks with Castro. Nonetheless, October 19, are included. Both are quite reveal- spondence and other materials that were not they are all of interest and together they make a continued on page 63 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 59

“DISMAYED BY THE ACTIONS OF communist leader from 1953 to 1971, was requirements of Soviet domestic constitu- THE SOVIET UNION”: not merely a Soviet puppet, but, since the ents and forces (elites, bureaucratic services, Mikoyan’s talks with Fidel Castro and late 1950s, made his needs and agendas propaganda and ideology, latent public opin- the Cuban leadership, November 1962 increasingly present in the minds of the ion). In the events leading to the Cuban Kremlin policy-makers. As Hope Harrison missile crisis, the considerations stemming by Vladislav M. Zubok has convincingly shown, there are substan- from this axis had a part at least as important tial reasons to analyze Soviet-GDR ties not as the interests and concerns flowing from The talks between Anastas I. Mikoyan, only as a relationship of submission and the dynamic of U.S.-Soviet relations.3 member of the CC CPSU Presidium, and the subservience, but also as a relationship in The Historic-Documentary Department revolutionary leadership of Cuba in Havana which at times “the tail wagged the dog far of the Foreign Ministry had declassified on 3-12 November 1962, were a lesser more than the West realized.”1 Similarly, documents on the Soviet-Cuban talks, like known, but nonetheless dramatic episode in new Russian archival documents presented many others related to the Cuban missile the story of the Cuban missile crisis, and also by Kathryn Weathersby have disclosed in crisis, in late 1991. But officials of the marked a watershed in the history of rela- new detail how North Korean leader Kim Il Department withheld them (in a manner that tions between the Soviet superpower and Sung was also able to press his militant unfortunately has become a recent pattern), one of its closest non-European allies. agenda on an even stronger Soviet leader, allowing only a few to have a peek at them at Thanks to declassified documents from , with disastrous consequences, their discretion. One of them, Sergei U.S. archives, researchers have begun to in the run-up to the Korean War.2 Khrushchev, gives a dramatic, albeit short appreciate the significance and nuances of The documents on the Mikoyan-Castro description of Mikoyan’s visit in his Rus- U.S.-West German, U.S.-Iranian, and other talks from the Archive of Foreign Policy of sian-language book, Nikita Khrushchev: key patron-client relationships that were vi- the Russian Federation (AVPRF) in Mos- Crises and Missiles.4 Some were also made tal to American conduct during the Cold cow, published in this issue of the CWIHP available to the makers of television docu- War. But until very recently, the existence Bulletin, reveal that for Nikita Khrushchev mentaries, or published in Russian. Now and importance of parallel commitments and his colleagues in the CC CPSU Pre- they have become available to scholars, with and influences on Soviet foreign policy were sidium (Politburo), the Soviet-Cuban “axis” copies available for research at the National often grossly underestimated. New East- also acquired a life of its own, beyond the Security Archive in Washington, D.C., and bloc archival evidence, however, has cor- bipolar dimensions of the Cold War. This translations of the minutes of the post-crisis roborated suspicions that, to take one key alliance influenced Kremlin decision-mak- Soviet-Cuban talks follow this article. example, , the East German ing processes far more than the needs and continued on page 89

THE “LESSONS” OF THE CUBAN of Cuba was lifted).3 So peripheral Warsaw Pact during the crisis, the events of MISSILE CRISIS FOR WARSAW was the alliance to the Soviet Union’s han- October 1962 did have important effects on PACT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS dling of the crisis that it was not until long the alliance, particularly on the nuclear com- after the matter had been resolved that the mand-and-control arrangements that were by Mark Kramer Soviet Prime Minister, Anastas Mikoyan, established in the mid-1960s. This article bothered to inform the East European gov- will draw on recent disclosures from the The role of the Warsaw Pact in the ernments about the Soviet Union’s motives East German, Czechoslovak, Polish, and Cuban Missile Crisis was negligible. All for deploying and withdrawing the missiles.4 Hungarian archives to show how the Cuban evidence suggests that the Soviet Union That the Warsaw Pact was of only mar- missile crisis influenced Warsaw Pact nuclear neither consulted nor even informed its East ginal significance during the Cuban Missile operations. No definitive judgments about European allies about the installation of Crisis hardly comes as a great surprise. In this matter are yet possible because the most medium-range and tactical nuclear missiles 1962 the Pact was still little more than a crucial documents are all in Moscow, and in Cuba before the deployments were re- paper organization and had not yet acquired the archival situation in Russia is still highly vealed by the U.S. government.1 Nor did the a meaningful role in Soviet military strat- unsatisfactory.7 Nevertheless, enough evi- Soviet leadership consult its Warsaw Pact egy.5 Moreover, the crisis was far outside dence has emerged from East-Central Eu- allies about the removal of the missiles. the European theater, and East European rope to permit several tentative conclusions. Although the Pact declared a joint military leaders had resisted Soviet efforts to extend The article will begin by briefly re- alert on 23 October 1962 (the day after the alliance’s purview beyond the continent. viewing the “lessons” that the Cuban Mis- President John F. Kennedy’s televised rev- Despite fears that the showdown over Cuba sile Crisis offered for Soviet nuclear weap- elation of the Soviet missile deployments), might spark a NATO-Warsaw Pact confron- ons deployments abroad. It will then delin- the alert had no more than a symbolic impact tation in Berlin, the situation in Germany eate the command-and-control arrangements and was carried out solely at Moscow’s remained calm throughout the crisis.6 Hence, that were set up in the mid-1960s for War- behest.2 The joint alert was formally can- the standoff in the was a matter saw Pact nuclear operations, and examine celled on 21 November 1962, the same day for the Soviet Union to handle on its own, the East European states’ unsuccessful ef- that the Soviet Union ended its own unilat- not a matter for the Warsaw Pact. forts to alter those arrangements. The article eral alert (and a day after the U.S. naval Despite the near-irrelevance of the continued on page 110 60 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

KGB DOCUMENTS ships bound for Cuba are not carrying dent remained hopeful that the Kremlin continued from page 58 any armaments. You will declare that would ultimately accept the October 26 pro- that he presented.” Thus Scali described in the United States will not invade Cuba posal as the basis for a resolution of the a 1964 television broadcast how this meet- with its troops and will not support crisis. Indeed, Kennedy’s response to ing opened. Scali said that Feklisov feared any other forces which might intend to Khrushchev offered to accept the implicit that war would begin soon, and was so invade Cuba. Then the necessity for terms of October 26 and ignored the Turkish concerned that he volunteered a way out of the presence of our military special- issue raised in Khrushchev’s letter of the the stalemate.5 ists will be obviated.10 27th. The crisis ended the next morning, He asked, according to Scali’s notes, Sunday, October 28, with the Kremlin’s what Scali “thought” of a three-point propo- By itself the Khrushchev letter did not public announcement of a deal—a with- sition: promise anything except that future Soviet drawal of Soviet missiles in exchange for a a) The Soviet missiles bases would be ships would carry non-military cargoes. But U.S. guarantee not to invade Cuba—that dismantled under United Nations supervi- when the letter was coupled with what Scali seemed to incorporate much of what John sion. had relayed from Feklisov, the Kennedy ad- Scali and Aleksandr Feklisov had discussed. b) Fidel Castro would promise never to ministration believed it had received an ac- Both men were proud of their accomplish- accept offensive weapons of any kind, ever. ceptable offer from the Kremlin. Rusk in- ment. c) In return for the above, the United structed Scali to contact Feklisov to make KGB records suggest that neither the States would pledge not to invade Cuba.6 clear that the U.S. found a basis for agree- traditional version nor Feklisov’s revision is Feklisov was confident that if U.S. Am- ment in his offer. entirely accurate. Feklisov’s cables to Mos- bassador to the United Nations Adlai Sometime between 7:30 and 7:45 p.m. cow from October 26 and October 27 and Stevenson “pursued this line,” Soviet UN on Friday evening, Scali and Feklisov met at evidence of how the KGB handled them ambassador Valerian Zorin “would be in- the Statler Hotel, near the Soviet Embassy. In suggest strongly that the Soviet government terested.” As if to give some weight to his a very brief meeting Scali conveyed his mes- did not initiate the proposals that Scali pre- proposal, Feklisov noted that the Cuban sage: He was authorized by the highest au- sented to Rusk on the afternoon of October delegate to the UN had already made a thority to say that there were “real possibili- 26. similar proposal in a session of the Security ties in this [proposal]” and that “the represen- Feklisov’s cables, moreover, paint a Council but that it had been met with si- tatives of the USSR and the United States in different picture of his relationship with the lence. Feklisov asked that Scali run this New York can work this matter out with [UN American journalist. The KGB Resident con- proposal by his contacts at the State Depart- Secretary General] and with each sidered him an intelligence contact, with ment and then gave the journalist his home other.” Feklisov listened carefully, then re- whom he could exchange political informa- telephone number, to be sure he could be peated the proposal to be sure that he under- tion. In his cable to Moscow on October 26, reached at any time.7 stood the ’s offer correctly. Feklisov felt he had to introduce Scali to the Scali rushed this proposal to the State Unsure of Scali, he asked repeatedly for KGB. “We have been meeting for over a Department. Roger Hilsman, State’s direc- confirmation that Scali spoke for the White year,” he wrote. This statement, of course, tor of Intelligence and Research, and Secre- House. Finally, Feklisov added that it was would not have been necessary had Moscow tary of State Dean Rusk were extremely not enough for there to be inspection of the already considered Scali a channel to the interested in it. Rusk considered this to be dismantling of Soviet missiles, it would be U.S. government. In previous cables Feklisov the first concrete offer from the Soviet lead- necessary for UN observers to observe the had referred to Scali only using a codename. ership for ending the crisis. The letters al- withdrawal of U.S. forces from the southern This was the first time he introduced him and ready exchanged by Khrushchev and United States. This idea went beyond Scali’s mentioned his position with ABC News. Kennedy had only brought about a harden- instructions, so he demurred. Feklisov’s cable describing his first ing of each side’s position. So long as the The situation changed the next day, meeting with Scali on October 26 is almost Soviets refused to discuss removing the October 27, which U.S. veterans of the Mis- a mirror image of the account that Scali gave missiles, there seemed to be no peaceful sile Crisis describe as “Black Saturday.” Just Rusk. In Feklisov’s version, Scali is the one way out of the deepening crisis.8 as the ExComm was discussing a formal who is fearful of war. After assuring Feklisov Transcripts of the ExComm [Executive response to the Khrushchev letter and the that the U.S. was planning air strikes and an Committee of the National Security Coun- Feklisov proposal, a second message arrived amphibious landing on Cuba in the next 48 cil] meeting of October 279 confirm that the from Moscow, which this time immediately hours, Scali asked if the United States at- Kennedy administration interpreted the “of- publicized the communication. Khrushchev tacked Cuba, “would West Berlin be occu- fer” from the KGB representative as an had upped the ante. Now he demanded that pied?” Feklisov reported that he had replied elaboration of a more general proposal con- the U.S. dismantle its Jupiter missile bases in defiantly that all heaven and earth might fall tained in a private letter from Khrushchev before he went ahead with any deal upon NATO if the U.S. were to attack Cuba. that arrived late in the afternoon of October that would strip Cuba of Soviet missiles. “At the very least,” he said, “the Soviet 26, in which the Soviet leader had written: Scali was sent to see Feklisov to register the Union would occupy West Berlin.” Feklisov U.S. government’s strong disapproval of the added that given the size of Soviet conven- We, for our part, will declare that our new terms. Although Feklisov defended his tional forces on the line dividing East and government’s new position, the KGB Resi- West Germany, the situation would be very COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 61 difficult for the West. And to make matters whatever reason, forgotten the balance of In following the course taken by this worse, he expected the crisis to unify the his historic conversation with Scali.13 important telegram, we see that it could not entire Socialist bloc, including China. Per- The SVR record on the second Scali- have played any role in shaping Khrushchev’s haps for dramatic effect, Feklisov assured Feklisov meeting of October 26 is less con- letter of October 26, which proposed a U.S. his American interlocutor that the Cubans, troversial. The account that Feklisov cabled guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba and especially Castro, were ready to die like to Moscow differs little from what the Ameri- as a means of resolving the crisis, or even in heroes.11 can journalist reported to the State Depart- influencing the letter of October 27 that Feklisov’s report to the KGB Center ment. Feklisov reported that Scali, who had asserted a parallel between U.S. bases in creates the impression that the direction taken initiated the meeting, laid out a formula that Turkey and the Soviet missile installations by the discussion depressed Scali even fur- could be the basis for negotiations between in Cuba. ther. “A horrible conflict lies ahead,” Scali Stevenson and Zorin at the UN. The only Feklisov’s telegram arrived in Moscow said after hearing what the Soviet response difference between the Feklisov and Scali well after (nearly a full day) Khrushchev had would be to the use of American military accounts is that whereas Feklisov described sent his letter of October 26 to Kennedy. force against Cuba. According to Feklisov, this as a new American proposal, Scali re- Because it was not expected that Feklisov Scali fell into such a state of anxiety that he layed to the State Department that Feklisov would act as a channel for resolving the began to muse about possible ways out of the had responded energetically to word of for- crisis, this telegram was not given priority conflict. “Why couldn’t Fidel Castro give a mal U.S. interest in the Soviet proposal first treatment. After deciphering and summariz- speech saying that he was prepared to dis- mentioned at the Occidental Restaurant.14 ing the telegram, which took the usual hour, mantle and to remove the missile installa- After this second meeting with Scali, the FCD sent the telegram to the Secretariat tions if President Kennedy gave a guarantee Feklisov sent a long cable to Moscow, de- of the KGB, which was the headquarters not to attack Cuba?” Scali is reported to have tailing both of his conversations with Scali. staff of the Chairman, Semichastny. Inex- asked.12 In retrospect, it seems odd that at a time plicably, the telegram sat in Semichastny’s What is most significant about the ver- when the Kremlin was hungry for any news office for another four hours before the Chair- sion that Feklisov cabled to Moscow is that about U.S. intentions, Feklisov would have man decided to send it to Foreign Minister the KGB resident did not take Scali’s musings waited so long to inform Moscow as to what Andrei Gromyko. This delay was so long as a formal U.S. offer. Instead of grasping John Scali was telling him. Feklisov was that by the time the Ministry of Foreign this as a proposal, Feklisov told Scali that accustomed to cabling his superiors at all Affairs received a copy of the Feklisov cable, what he was saying sounded a lot like some- hours. And he had approximately five hours Khrushchev had already sent his second, thing already proposed by the Cubans in the between the end of the lunch and his next October 27 letter to Kennedy referring to the Security Council, which had been ignored discussion with Scali to tell KGB Center that Jupiters in Turkey.17 by U.S. Ambassador Stevenson. Although something was going on. In his memoirs, The Scali-Feklisov meeting on October Scali responded that he could not recall any Feklisov has explained this gap by saying 27 looms even less significant in Russian American rejection of a similar Cuban pro- that he did not expect anything to come of his records. Again Khrushchev could not have posal, he said he was convinced that such a discussion with Scali. Indeed, he writes that seen it in time to affect his strategy toward demarche at this time by Castro would meet he did not even bother to mention the meet- the Americans. Feklisov sent a short report with a positive reaction from U.S. civilian ing to the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoli after Scali scolded him for Khrushchev’s and military circles. Dobrynin, until 4 p.m. Then, just as he was new position on resolving the missile crisis. Scali’s confidence surprised Feklisov, in the midst of giving this report to Dobrynin, This cable did not reach the Chairman of the who began to wonder whether indeed Scali Feklisov received Scali’s request for a sec- KGB until 4:40 p.m. on October 28. might know something about the White ond meeting. Not only did Feklisov have to Semichastny’s reaction was to forward the House’s negotiating strategy. When Feklisov leave the embassy before completing his letter to the Foreign Ministry, where it ar- inquired as to exactly who might be inter- briefing for Dobrynin but he had to put off rived at 7 p.m. Moscow time, an hour after ested in this kind of proposal, Scali avoided cabling Moscow until returning from the Khrushchev had publicly accepted the giving any names. This was as far as he Statler Hotel.15 Kennedy administration’s terms for ending would go. As Scali and Feklisov parted, the There was soon to be as much confusion the crisis.18 KGB officer concluded that despite having in Moscow over what Feklisov was doing as The KGB materials substantiate claims taken an interesting turn, the meeting itself in Dobrynin’s embassy. The KGB had no that for the Kremlin the Scali-Feklisov meet- had been inconclusive. warning that its representative in Washing- ings were a sideshow that played no part in It is also significant that in his memoirs, ton had established, albeit unwittingly, a the U.S.-Soviet endgame of October 26-28. Feklisov does not mention anything about channel to the Kennedys. When Feklisov’s Although of less consequence in light of this having discussed a political solution with long cable arrived in Moscow at 2:20 p.m., information, it is nevertheless interesting to Scali at the first October 26 meeting. In fact, Saturday, October 27 (Moscow time was consider the contradiction between the con- Feklisov categorically denies that he or Scali eight hours ahead of EST), the chief of the temporaneous accounts by Feklisov and Scali made any attempts to formulate a way out of First Chief Directorate (FCD), the foreign of their meetings on October 26. Did Feklisov the crisis at that time. Here the evidence intelligence division of the KGB, forwarded violate KGB procedure and present a com- from the SVR archives contradicts Feklisov’s this telegram directly to the chairman of the pletely unauthorized settlement formula? Or, memoirs and suggests that Feklisov has, for KGB, Vladimir Semichastny.16 at the other extreme, did Scali use the KGB 62 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN resident to test some ideas that had occurred made after each of his meetings with the KGB officer. and Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 185-88. to him as perhaps the best way of averting 2. The was one of a series of five 11. Feklisov to KGB Center, 26 October 1962, Delo conferences between 1987 and 1992 involving, at first, 116, T.1, SVR Archives, Moscow. nuclear disaster? U.S. scholars and former officials, who were later joined 12. Ibid. The KGB documents suggest that in by Soviet and then Cuban counterparts. The confer- 13. Feklisov, Za Okeanom u Na Ostrovye, 223-25. the heat of discussion, with the fear of war ences were organized by James G. Blight, initially at 14. Feklisov to KGB Center, 27 October 1962, Delo hanging over their heads, Scali and Feklisov Harvard University’s Center for Science and Interna- 116, T.1., SVR Archives; John Scali, Report of 27 tional Affairs and later at Brown University’s Center for October 1962 Meeting, Cuban Missile Crisis Collec- fastened on a revival of a formula for ending Foreign Policy Development. For the Feklisov-Scali tion, National Security Archive. the crisis that, among others, UN Secretary exchange, see Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and 15. Feklisov, Za Okeanom u Na Octrove, 225. There is General U Thant had been suggesting since David A. Welch, eds., Back to the Brink: Proceedings of a problem with Feklisov’s chronology. Scali’s call October 24.19 Because of the possibility the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, actually came later than 4 or 5 p.m.. Unless his meeting January 27-28, 1989 (Lantham, MD: University Press with Dobrynin actually occurred three hours later than that Feklisov and/or Scali mischaracterized of America, 1992), 112-14; 117-18. Feklisov elaborated he said, Feklisov should have had enough time to brief their first meeting on October 26, it may on his testimony in his memoirs, Za Okeanom i Na the Soviet ambassador and to send a cable to Moscow. never be possible to resolve the central Ostrovye (Moscow: DEM, 1994), 222-40. After returning from the second meeting, Feklisov contradiction between their respective 3. It appears that Feklisov first made this assertion to a continued to wait before sending Moscow any word on Russian scholar in 1987. A year later, Georgi Kornienko, his meetings with Scali. The long cable was not sent claims. However, the determination of who had been the Counsellor in the Soviet Embassy at until approximately midnight, four hours after Feklisov which man actually proposed this plan is the time of the Missile Crisis, told Raymond Garthoff and Scali parted. At a September 1994 conference in less important than the fact that, although that on 26 October 1962 the Embassy had been confused Moscow, entitled “The Caribbean Crisis in the Ar- the Kremlin was completely in the dark, by Feklisov’s account of his first meeting with Scali. chives of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Cuba Neither Kornienko nor the ambassador, Anatoli and the United States,” Dobrynin and Feklisov argued John F. Kennedy was convinced that Dobrynin, was sure whether it had been Scali or Feklisov over the reasons for the delays in sending a KGB cable Feklisov spoke for the Soviet government, who had made the proposal. See Garthoff’s revised on the Scali meetings. Feklisov alleged that he waited and indeed for Khrushchev personally. edition of Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis to give Dobrynin the opportunity to sign the cable; but As we now know, President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1989), 80-81. A 1988 when the latter stubbornly refused to do so, he sent it article by Garthoff was the first published account of the anyway. The former Soviet ambassador rejected this decided not to use the Scali-Feklisov chan- Scali-Feklisov channel to raise doubts as to whether account, saying that Feklisov had not needed his signa- nel to settle the crisis. On the night of Feklisov had been authorized by the Kremlin to make ture to send a KGB cable. October 27, JFK sent his brother Robert to his proposal. See Raymond L. Garthoff, “Cuban Mis- 16. Spravka on Feklisov’s October 26 telegram on Dobrynin to offer a face-saving deal to sile Crisis: ,” Foreign Policy 72 (Fall Scali, Delo 116, T. 1., SVR Archives. 1988). 17. Ibid. Khrushchev. In addition to pledging not to 4. Thus far, Crown has four books under contract. Each 18. Spravka on Delivery of Scali report of 27 October invade Cuba, Kennedy offered a secret un- book will be written by a team. The Fursenko/Naftali 1962, ibid. dertaking to remove Jupiter missiles from study of the and Cuba, 1958-1963, will be 19. U Thant, “Statement in the Security Council,” 24 Turkey. Nevertheless, the story of the Scali- the first book in the series. It will be followed by a October 1962, in Andrew W. Cordier and Max history of Soviet intelligence penetration of the British Harrelson, eds., Public Papers of the Secretaries-Gen- Feklisov backchannel remains significant government by John Costello and Oleg Tsarev; a study eral of the United Nations, VI: U Thant, 1961-1964 as a prime example of how governments can of KGB-CIA operations in Berlin by George Bailey, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 237- misinterpret each other, especially in the Sergei Kondrashev, and David Murphy; and a history of 240. grip of a crisis. Soviet intelligence operations in the United States by and . Alexandr A. Fursenko is the Vice President of the St. 5. ABC news special of 13 . Transcript, Petersburg branch of the Russian Academy of Sci- 1. broke the story of John Scali’s Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, National Security ences; Timothy J. Naftali is Assistant Professor of role in the Cuban missile crisis on 4 August 1964. It Archive. History, University of Hawaii at Manoa. was reported that Look magazine was about to publish 6. Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (New York: J. B. an excerpt from Roger Hilsman’s forthcoming book on Lippincott Company, 1966), 177-79. In their first public foreign policymaking in the Kennedy years that named accounts, both Scali and Hilsman misremembered the Scali as an intermediary between the U.S. and Soviet details of the proposal. They had Khrushchev giving the governments at the climax of the missile crisis. Just as pledge to keep Cuba free of offensive weapons, not Hilsman’s piece was to appear in print, John Scali Fidel Castro. This flawed version of the “Soviet” pro- discussed his meetings with the Soviet KGB official, posal gained wide currency when Graham T. Allison “Mr. X,” on an ABC news special of 13 August 1964. featured it in his influential Essence of Decision: Ex- Transcript, Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, National plaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, Security Archive, Washington, D.C. U.S. News & 1971), 260, 263. For Scali’s confidential description on World Report carried an article about Hilsman’s rev- 26 October 1962 of what he had just heard from Feklisov, elation in its 17 August 1964 issue. Hilsman’s excerpt which confirms Abel’s and Salinger’s accounts, see finally appeared in the 25 August 1964 issue of Look. “John Scali’s notes of first meeting with Soviet embassy A few months later, in its 25 edition, counselor and KGB officer Alexandr Fomin, October Family Weekly published Scali’s “I Was the Secret Go- 26, 1962,” Document 43 in Laurence Chang and Peter Between in the Cuban Crisis.” Pierre Salinger, Hilsman Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A and Robert Kennedy all attested to the importance of National Security Archive Documents Reader, (New the Scali channel in autobiographical books: With York: New Press, 1992), 184. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966), 274- 7. Ibid. 280; To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy 8. Hilsman, To Move A Nation, 217-19. in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: 9. Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, Doubleday & Co., 1967), 217-223; and Thirteen Days: President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Cu- A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: ban Missile Crisis Meetings, 27 October 1962, John F. W.W. Norton & Co., 1969), 90-91. Salinger’s With Kennedy Library, Boston, MA. Kennedy quoted directly from notes that John Scali had 10. Khrushchev to Kennedy, 26 October 1962, in Chang COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 63

FOREIGN MINISTRY DOCUMENTS not, however, include the reports on Dobrynin’s to 7 January 1963, by contrast, is completely continued from page 58 delivery to Robert Kennedy on October 29 of a omitted, apart from Kuznetsov’s subsequent fi- ing. Gromyko not only had obtained no hint of draft written agreement, and its sharp rejection in nal meeting with the president on 9 January 1963. the American discovery of the missiles, he re- another meeting on October 30. This negotiation settled the issues of dismantling ported that from all available information, in- The reporting on Mikoyan’s talks in Cuba, and withdrawal of the missiles, bombers, and cluding Soviet intelligence (referred to by the while not complete, does give the main discus- warheads, and verification of the withdrawal of usual circumlocation as information received sions in considerable detail. Incidentally, apart missiles and bombers by measures, “through unofficial channels”) and from other from Mikoyan’s efforts to persuade Castro to but was unable to formulate agreed terms for countries (which would include Cuba), “the acute- agree to the withdrawal of Soviet IL-28 bombers assurances against a U.S. invasion of Cuba and ness of the anti-Cuban campaign in the United from Cuba and his reassurances on Soviet sup- eventually left it to rest on the presidential state- States has somewhat abated,” and that under port on other matters, both Mikoyan and Castro ments. Kuznetsov’s account of his meeting with prevailing conditions “a military adventure against discussed aspects of the crisis itself that shed light Kennedy not only deals with Cuba (including the Cuba is almost inconceivable.” Notwithstanding on earlier Soviet and Cuban thinking and actions. question of the Soviet military presence remain- his own knowledge of the secret missile deploy- Both, for example, had clearly concluded by ing there, a diplomatic dialogue on which contin- ment underway, he even said, “Everything that October 27 that an American attack on Cuba was ued into April 1963) but also with the subject of we know about the position of the USA govern- imminent—although they drew different conclu- a nuclear test ban. A test ban was then being ment on the Cuban question permits the conclu- sions on what the Soviet Union should do about discussed in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchanges, sion that the situation in general is completely it. While not all statements made in that exchange some of which (those messages in November and satisfactory.” How did he think the United States were necessarily accurate, it is of interest to note December 1962 that also dealt with the Cuban would react when it found out about the missiles? that Mikoyan said, in answer to a Cuban question, crisis) have been declassified and released by the And this evaluation followed his meetings with “speaking frankly, we [the Soviet leaders] had two governments. Kennedy and Rusk. not thought at all about the bases in Turkey” as a It is not my purpose here to try to summarize Dobrynin’s cables on his meetings with tradeoff until the Americans, specifically Walter or even note the many interesting matters on Robert Kennedy on October 23, 27, and 28—or, Lippmann in a newspaper column on October 25, which these documents throw light. The specific rather, the excerpts that have been released— had raised the matter. He also did not disclose to points I have raised, as well as my references to help to clarify these important exchanges. Among Castro—who had found the idea of a tradeoff some aspects of the subject not dealt with, are other things, they make clear that there was not repugnant—the secret understanding reached with only illustrative. These documents, and others merely a statement by Kennedy, but “an under- Kennedy on the withdrawal of the missiles from that should follow, will undoubtedly add to our standing” on withdrawing the American Jupiter Turkey. understanding. So, too, will the long overdue missiles in Turkey, but also that it had to be kept The reporting on the extensive U.S.-Soviet forthcoming two volumes of the Foreign Rela- in “strict secrecy.” The material released does negotiations in New York from 29 October 1962 tions of the United States series dealing with Cuba in 1962-63.

Telegram of Soviet Ambassador to Cuba that this carries a great danger for Cuba, since it other public figures demand of the Kennedy A.I. Alekseev to the USSR Ministry of gives the most reactionary anti-Cuban authorities administration the revival of the Monroe Doc- Foreign Affairs (MFA), 7 September 1962 in the USA an opening at any moment to organize trine, establishment of a sea and air blockade of a provocation and unleash aggressive actions Cuba, the bringing into force of the Treaty of Rio Recently, the ruling circles of the USA have against Cuba. de Janeiro, and the military occupation of Cuba. noticeably activated a policy of provocation In regard to the above two last actions under- Following the signing in Moscow of the against Cuba; military preparations and its politi- taken by the USA, the government of Cuba came Soviet-Cuban communique in which the agree- cal isolation. Nearly every day, the air space and forward with corresponding official declarations ment of the Soviet government to provide assis- territorial waters of Cuba are violated by Ameri- signed by Fidel Castro. Both of these declara- tance in strengthening its armed forces is noted, can airplanes, submarines and ships trying to tions were circulated as official documents to the Kennedy in a public statement on September 4 establish permanent control over the territory of UN. The goal of these declarations is to attract the pointed to the defensive nature of Cuba’s military Cuba and diverting passenger and transport ships attention of the appropriate international organi- preparations and noted that Soviet military spe- bound for Cuba. The landing of counter-revolu- zations and all of world public opinion to the cialists are in Cuba to teach the Cubans how to use tionary bands of spies and arms has been in- provocational and far-reaching acts of the USA, defensive equipment presented by the Soviet creased. to unmask the aggressive schemes of the United Union. Several USA press agencies, comment- The constant acts of provocation are carried States in relation to Cuba, and to ward them off. ing on that part of Kennedy’s statement, under- out from the territory of the USA base at In these declarations the government of Cuba line the evidence of that the fact the president of Guantanamo, most often in the form of shooting precisely makes the point that the anti-Cuban the USA obviously preferred an attempt to calm at Cuban patrols. Especially noteworthy among actions and schemes of the USA presents a threat down those circles in the USA which are support- all these provocations are far reaching acts like not only to Cuba, but to the whole world. ing quick, decisive actions against Cuba. Along the August 24 shelling of the hotel in which The series of provocations is now accompa- with this, in Kennedy’s statement there are con- mainly live Soviet specialists, and also the lies nied by a whipped up, broad anti-Cuba campaign tained insinuations of purported aggressive Cu- published by the Kennedy Administration about in the USA press, striving with all its might to ban schemes regarding influence on the Ameri- the alleged August 30 attack, in international convince the population of the United States of can continent and a threat to use “all necessary waters, on an American airplane from two small the alleged presence in Cuba of large contingents means” to “defend” the continent. Cuban ships. In the USA government’s an- of Soviet troops and of the fact that Cuba has According to certain information, the USA nouncement, it is noted that in the event of a turned into a military base of “world Commu- State Department through its ambassadors noti- repeat of “an incident of this type,” the armed nism” which presents a grave threat to the USA fied the governments of Latin American coun- forces of the United States “will take all neces- and all Latin American countries. Under this tries that they can expect changes in the situationiin sary retaliatory measures. It is entirely evident pretext, the press, certain American senators and continued on next page 64 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

FOREIGN MINISTRY DOCUMENTS tic reaction. The realization of Kennedy’s visit to to take part in any international forums at which continued from previous page Mexico, following which he was to have quickly there is a possibility to expose the aggressive visited Brazil too (this visit was put off to the last character of ; they are in the Caribbean basin “if Castro’s government months of the year), served the goals of determin- strengthening Cuba’s ties with African and Asian does not come to its senses.” More probably, in ing the likelihood of attracting these two countries countries, etc. the near future the USA, using the pretext of an to the anti-Cuban plans of the USA. The Cuban leadership believes, however, allegedly growing threat to the Western hemi- Until now none of the attempts of the USA to that the main guarantee of the development of the sphere, will embark on a long process of increas- attract Brazil and Mexico to its anti-Cuban adven- under conditions of possible ing the pressure on governments of the Latin- tures has had any success. direct American aggression is the readiness of the American countries and will probably convene a Under pressure from the USA, in a majority Soviet government to provide military assistance meeting of foreign ministers of the member- of Latin American countries the local authorities to Cuba and simultaneously to warn the USA of countries of the OAS to work out supplementary are applying the harshest measures aimed at for- that fact. From this position, the joint Soviet- sanctions against Cuba. One can also assume bidding or tightly limiting visits of any groups or Cuban communique about [Ernesto “Che”] that the most wildly aggressive powers in the individuals to Cuba, and also their contacts with Guevara’s visit to Moscow was greeted by the USA (the Pentagon, the Cuban external counter- Cuban delegations in third countries. People who Cuban leaders and the vast majority of the Cuban revolution, and others) will continue to exert visit Cuba or make contact with Cuban delega- people with great enthusiasm and gratitude. The pressure on Kennedy in order to realize the most tions in third countries are subject to arrest, re- Cuban leadership and Fidel Castro himself sug- decisive actions against Cuba. pression, investigations upon return to their home- gest that these warnings will help to prevail those The campaign of anti-Cuban hysteria has land. The USA does not lack means for organiz- forces in the USA which are warning of the been conveyed via American propaganda to Latin ing broad and loud provocations against Cuban outbreak now of a world conflict, and are staving American countries too. There the publication of delegations taking part in international quorums, off a direct attack American attack on Cuba in the articles and transmissions of radio programs of as took place recently in and Jamaica. near future. anti-Cuban and anti-Soviet content is constantly Referring to the decision taken at the meet- In our opinion, in the near future the ruling encouraged, while the external Cuban counter- ing at Punta-del-Este about the exclusion of Cuba circles of the USA will continue to expand the revolution and local reaction put constant pres- from the OAS, the USA is undertaking all mea- attacks on Cuba by all the above-mentioned sure on the governments of those countries, con- sures to deny Cuba participation in any organiza- means: provocations, the propaganda campaign, duct loud demonstrations and terrorize individu- tions connected with the inter-American system. military preparations, actions of the domestic als and organizations which speak out in defense In particular, they recently undertook an attempt counter-revolution, political isolation, and so of the Cuban revolution, and by means of bribery to secure the exclusion of Cuba from the Pan forth. Their success in drawing the Latin Ameri- and blackmail get a range of people who have American Health Organization (PAHO). The can countries into their aggressive actions will visited Cuba to make anti-Cuban statements, and unlawful denial of Cuba’s application to join the most depend on the positions of the governments so forth. so-called Latin American Free Trade Association of Mexico and Brazil. Simultaneously, the USA continues actively is another example. In response to the American We also suggest that the question of direct to conduct purely military preparations, aimed at policy towards Cuba of provocation, military American actions against Cuba will be decided repressing possible centers of the national-lib- threats, and political isolation, the Cuban govern- by the correlation of forces in American ruling eration movement in Latin American, and, given ment is intensifying its efforts on strengthening its circles which have differing approaches to ques- the appropriate circumstances, the Cuban revo- own armed forces, struggling with the internal tions of war and peace in the present period, and lution itself. This is shown by such facts as the counter-revolution, unmasking before world pub- the struggle between them on these issues. organization by the United States of schools for lic opinion the aggressive designs of the USA, and The mood of the overwhelming majority of instruction in methods of street-fighting and anti- broadening its anti-American propaganda in Latin the Cuban people is defiant, and regardless of the partisan struggle in many Latin American coun- America. At the end of August, taking into reality of the threat of intervention, no panic or tries (in Panama, Peru, Colombia, Equador, Bo- account the activization of provocative actions by fear before the threat which is hanging over Cuba livia, and others); continuing intensive instruc- the USA and the possible increase in the unleash- is observed in the masses of the people. The tion of Cuban counter-revolutionaries in camps ing of counter-revolutionary bands and manifes- American provocations make possible an ever- located on the territory of the USA, in Puerto tations of domestic counter-revolution, preven- tighter unity of the Cuban workers and raise the Rico and in several Central American countries; tive arrests were carried out in the country and political consciousness of the masses. many inspection trips to these bases, schools, strengthened control was established over many Regarding the provocations, the influence and camps by responsible American military registered [known] counter-revolutionary ele- of the Soviet Union in Cuba has grown as never officials and the heads of the Cuban counter- ments and the places where they gather. before, and our cooperation with the Cuban lead- revolution, including Miro Cardon; unflagging The Cuban leaders are paying serious atten- ers has been strengthened even more. efforts of the USA aimed at strengthening the tion to the question of strengthening the devotion In the interest of future productive work unity of the external Cuban counterrevolution to the revolution of the cadres of its diplomatic with our Cuban friends it would be desirable to and unity in the action of counter-revolutionary missions, particularly in Latin American coun- receive from you for dispatch to the Cuban lead- organizations active in Cuba itself, etc. tries; they are taking every opportunity, as was the ers information which we have about the plans of At the same time, the USA is actively con- case with their presentation at the Latin American the USA government toward Cuba. tinuing to conduct its efforts towards the political Free Trade Association, to widen the sphere of isolation of Cuba, particularly in Latin America. their activity in Latin America; they are strength- 7.IX.62 ALEKSEEV The USA is concentrating on putting pressure on ening their connections with the Latin American the governments of Mexico and Brazil, which peoples by inviting to Cuba society delegations [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy of the Rus- continue to express their support for the principle and individual Latin American officials; in timely sian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, copy cour- of non-interference and self-determination of fashion and aggressively, they speak at interna- tesy of National Security Archive (NSA), Wash- peoples. This pressure is applied through eco- tional organizations, unmasking the aggressive ington, D.C.; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] nomic means, and also by exploiting the domes- schemes and actions of the USA; they are striving COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 65

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba According to a dispatch by the Chairman of countries of Latin America and [Secretary of Alekseev to the USSR MFA, 11 September the Institute for Agricultural Reform C.R. [Carlos State Dean] Rusk which concluded yesterday 1962 Rafael] Rodriguez, the crews of Japanese fishing proceeded, according to information which we boats who are now in Cuba, citing the danger, received, amidst sharp disagreements. A particu- TOP SECRET posed the question of leaving for their homeland larly big conflict arose around the text of the Making Copies Prohibited right after the first attack on Havana. communique. The reception which was sched- Copy No. 1 C.R. Rodriguez announced that he had just uled for 6 p.m. yesterday in honor of the partici- spoken with Fidel Castro, who optimistically pants in the meeting ended in confusion—most of CIPHERED TELEGRAM evaluates the developing situation and asserts the guests had left, when at 11 p.m. the ministers that the Americans, following N.S. Khrushchev’s finally appeared, having been unable to agree on In a conversation with me on September 11 conversation with Udall and the publication of the text of the communique. of this year, [Cuban Defense Minister] Raoul the TASS dispatch, will have to reject attempts to The draft of the communique which Rusk Castro, noting the publication in the Soviet press organize direct aggression against Cuba. proposed was subjected to significant changes, of the TASS report, announced that it had been F. Castro, according to Rodriguez, with great primarily as a result of the criticism from the met with great enthusiasm by the Cuban leader- enthusiasm greeted these acts as a manifestation Mexican, Brazilian and Chilean representatives. ship as timely and well-argued. Castro said that of genuine friendship for Cuba from the Soviet There were changes along three main lines, de- this report will be regarded by the whole Cuban government and personally from N.S. spite the fact that the USA got the “tough mea- people and supporters of the Cuban Revolution in Khrushchev, and expressed for this his sincere sures” it was after. other countries as a reliable shield against the thanks. First, on trade—the USA did not manage to aggressive intrigues of the American imperial- Rodriguez recounted that the TASS decla- secure recommendations for a total cut-off of ists. ration had been received with great enthusiasm in trade with Cuba. The three countries mentioned Castro also asserts that the thesis put forth in the factories, in peoples’ estates, establishments above put up strong resistance to that recommen- the report allows opponents of direct intervention and military units, where demonstrations and dation, warning, by way of objection, that this in the United States itself—including Kennedy— meetings are spontaneously conducted as a sign would create a precedent which could be used in to put up more decisive resistance to pressure of gratitude to the Soviet Union. the future by the USA—in particular against from the aggressive forces. Regarding this, he, Rodriguez believes that the publication of those countries’ trade with the Soviet Union and nonetheless, is allowing a sharp increase in anti- the TASS dispatch increases the authority of the other Socialist countries. Chile, which has the Soviet propaganda in the USA and in countries Soviet Union in the eyes of the Cuban and other most intensive trade with Cuba, was noteworthy under its influence. Latin American peoples and helps those not in- for its insistence on its right to trade with Cuba. Raoul Castro believes that N.S. significant elements which are attracted to the Second, regarding so-called measures of Khrushchev’s conversation with [U.S. Secretary unruliness of the revolutionism of our Chinese security. The USA tried in the communique to of the Interior Stewart] Udall on the Cuban ques- friends understand the difference between a truly single out the Caribbean Basin region as the most tion, during which the government of the USA revolutionary policy and a policy of revolution- “threatened” by Cuba and in need therefore of its was warned without any hint of propaganda about ary phrases. own separate organizational measures. As is all the consequences which could result from its In Rodriguez’ opinion, in Cuba for a long known, even on the eve of the meeting plans were treacherous actions towards Cuba, is even more time already Chinese representatives have had no put forth for the creation inside the OAS of an important. In Castro’s opinion, the public an- opportunities to cultivate any Cuban leaders, but independent regional organization for the Carib- nouncement, as a consequence of this warning, the publication of the Soviet-Cuban communi- bean Basin with a membership of 10 countries. will force the USA ruling circles to search for que and the TASS dispatch once and for all However, at the meeting Colombia and Venezu- new means of strangling the Cuban revolution. undermines the ground beneath their feet and ela, in particular, came out against such an orga- Castro considers as very important the part guarantees the unshakability of Cuban-Soviet nization, even though they were mentioned among of the announcement which deals with the Ameri- friendship. the members of such an organization; seeing the can bases around the USSR, and also the USA’s opposition to the idea from Brazil, Chile, and Sixth and Seventh fleets in foreign waters and its 11.IX.62 ALEKSEEV Bolivia, [they] feared being isolated from the rest effort to convince public opinion that this is the of the countries of South America if they had inalienable right of the USA. [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- agreed to be included in an organization of the The use of this line of argument to explain tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] countries of Central America, the governments of Soviet assistance to Cuba will be very easy for which had long before recommended themselves ordinary Latin Americans and for the people of * * * * * as lackeys of the USA. For the same reason the USA itself to understand. Mexico refused to participate in such an organi- Raoul Castro asserts that in the course of the Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the zation. For a general understanding of Mexico’s developing situation the Americans are trying to USA Anatoly F. Dobrynin to the USSR position, we should note that precisely at her isolate Cuba from the Latin American countries MFA, 4 October 1962 insistence the phrase (the end of the second para- and to intensify the small-scale provocations graph of the communique, as transmitted by against Cuba allegedly carried out by irrespon- TOP SECRET TASS) about recognition of the principle of non- sible elements of the Cuban counter-revolution, Making Copies Prohibited interference in relations between Latin American the apparent shelling of populated areas and for- Copy No. 1 countries. eign ships bound for Cuban ports from the sea. Third, the USA attempt to formulate a point Today’s pirate attack on Cuban and English CIPHERED TELEGRAM expressing a hope for a quick establishment of a ships in the Caribbean area, in Castro’s opinion, Cuban government in exile also did not receive is aimed at frightening certain capitalist countries the necessary support from the biggest Latin and to give the governments of NATO a pretext The meeting in Washington on the question American countries. to forbid its ships to visit Cuban ports. of Cuba between the Foreign Ministers of the According to information received from sev- 66 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN eral participants in the meeting, Rusk put much 4.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN among the population of Cuba itself; in the same pressure on the meeting. The point of the com- way the recognition of an exile government by munique about trade with Cuba, which elicited [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- the United States “would confuse” the issue of the the most disagreement, was accepted only after tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] American base at Guantanamo, depriving the Rusk, referring to the mood in the USA Con- USA of the formal right to demand of Castro’s gress, threatened to cut off all American assis- * * * * * government recognition of Cuba’s obligations tance to countries which would refuse to accept re: the agreement about that base. that point. In addition to this, Rusk and Kennedy Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the 4. In spite of all the importance of the Cuba informed the participants in the meeting about USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, 18 issue, it is not the main issue for the USA. The the unilateral measures which the government of October 1962 West Berlin issue at present remains sharpest and the USA itself is now considering regarding a most fraught with dangers. maximum limitation on the use of ships of vari- TOP SECRET ous countries in trade with Cuba. Making Copies Prohibited 18/X-62 A.DOBRYNIN As indicated by certain information which Copy No. 1 we are now reconfirming, the following mea- [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; sures were named: CIPHERED TELEGRAM translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] 1. American ports will be closed to ships of those countries of which even a single ship On October 15-16 a closed briefing (i.e. * * * * * would bring arms to Cuba. In essence, this is “instructional meeting”) for editors and leading directed entirely against the USSR and socialist observers of American newspapers, radio, and Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister A.A. countries. television was held at the State Department. Ac- Gromyko to the CC CPSU, 19 October 1962 2. Ships of all countries will not be allowed cording to information which we received, the into ports of the USA and will not be allowed to USA policy toward Cuba occupied a major place TOP SECRET take on any cargo for the return voyage, if in the in the work of the meeting. The essence of the Making Copies Prohibited past they carried goods to Cuba from the coun- statements of Kennedy, Rusk, Taylor, and Martin Copy No. 1 tries of the “Soviet-Chinese” bloc. This refers (aide to the Secretary of State) on this topic is equally to cargos of military supplies and those summarized as follows: CIPHERED TELEGRAM of consumer goods. I. “Don’t joke about the idea of American 3. No cargo belonging to the government of intervention in Cuba,” because such intervention the USA (for example, big shipments for “assis- would unavoidably prompt serious counter-mea- To the CC CPSU tance programs) may be carried on foreign ships, sures from the USSR, if not directly aimed at the Everything which we know about the posi- if ships of the same owners are used for the USA, then in other regions of the world, particu- tion of the USA government on the Cuban ques- shipment of goods to Cuba. This point is directed larly in West Berlin; for many years [interven- tion allows us to conclude that the overall situa- against “non-communist” countries and allies of tion] would complicate the mutual relations of the tion is completely satisfactory. This is confirmed the USA, many of whom have now reluctantly USA with the countries of Latin America, Asia, by official announcements of American officials, given in to American pressure. and Africa, and overall would create more prob- including Kennedy, in his discussion with us on 4. No American-flag ships or ships the lems than it solved. October 18, and all information which reaches us owners of which are American citizens (although 2. At present Cuba is a political problem, and via unofficial channels and from representatives ships may sail under a different flag, as is often not a problem of security of the USA; thus, politi- of other countries. done) are allowed to ship goods to or from Cuba. cal, economic and other means are needed to solve There is reason to believe that the USA is not Overall, this is a continuation of the prior it, rather than military. preparing an intervention in Cuba and has put its unyielding line of the Kennedy Administration Proceeding from this, the USA intends to money on obstructing Cuba’s economic relations towards the tightening up of the economic block- achieve the greatest possible political, economic, with the USSR and other countries, so as to ade of Cuba, which is viewed here as one of the and moral isolation of Cuba from other Latin destroy its economy and to cause hunger in the most effective means in the struggle with the American countries and other countries of the country, and in this way creating dissatisfaction Castro government and the increase in assistance “,” and also hinder the provision of among the population and prompting an uprising to him from the Soviet Union. assistance to Cuba from Socialist countries in all against the regime. This is based on a belief that The first reaction to the meeting in Wash- possible ways (short of, however, a sea blockade). the Soviet Union will not over a long period be ington diplomatic circles is summarized as fol- All this, in the calculations of the USA able to provide Cuba with everything it needs. lows: although the USA didn’t get everything it government, should cause serious economic and The main reason for this American position wanted, the decisions of the meeting will be used political complications for Cuba and ultimately is that the Administration and the overall Ameri- by the Kennedy Administration to the maximum (not in the coming weeks and months but in the can ruling circles are amazed by the Soviet Union’s degree for the long-term isolation of Cuba from next year or two) lead to the outbreak there of courage in assisting Cuba. Their reasoning is the countries of Latin America; for the strength- mass dissatisfaction and to huge anti-government thus: The Soviet government recognizes the great ening of all aspects of the struggle against the demonstrations. The USA’s concrete course in importance which the Americans place on Cuba Castro government. It is revealing that Kennedy this case will depend on the situation. and its situation, and how painful that issue is to today signed a declaration, accepted by the Ameri- 3. At the present time the USA has no plans the USA. But the fact that the USSR, even can Congress, to the effect that the USA can use to create “a provisional Cuban government in knowing all that, still provides such aid to Cuba, troops in order to “prevent the spread of Cuban exile,” since in view of the mixed nature of the means that it is fully committed to repulsing any Communism to the American continent.” At the Cuban emigration it would be hardly possible to American intervention in Cuba. There is no same time he signed a Congressional bill, giving form a sufficiently authoritative government and single opinion as to how and where that rebuff him the right to call up 150,000 reserves. in any case such a government, created on foreign will be given, but that it will be given—they do territory, could not count on broad popularity not doubt. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 67

In these last days the sharpness of the anti- Rusk said that he does not agree that Cuba Cuban campaign in the USA has subsided some- On October 18 a conversation with Rusk cannot present a threat to the USA. Cuba without what, while the sharpness of the West Berlin took place. the Soviet Union, he declared, is one thing; a question has stood out all the more. Newspapers Rusk, continuing my conversation with Cuba where “Soviet operators” run things is bleat about the approaching crisis vis a vis West Kennedy, touched on the Cuba issue. He said, something different. Berlin, the impending in the very near future that President Kennedy considers that issue very The USA government and he, Rusk, are signing of the agreement with the GDR, and so important, that it carries great significance for the baselessly scaring the American people with “So- on. The goal of such a change in the work of the USA, since it concerns the security of the West- viet operators,” I answered. The Soviet Union is propaganda machine is to divert somewhat pub- ern hemisphere. As the President said, the USA providing assistance to Cuba in only a few areas, lic attention from the Cuba issue. All this is not has no intention of intervening with its own including whatever we can do to strengthen its without the participation of the White House. armed forces in Cuba. But the USA proceeds defensive capability. The Cuban themselves are Even the rumor to the effect that the Soviet from the fact that everything that is happening in running everything on Cuba, and the USA knows Union has made it known that it can soften its Cuba is of a defensive nature and will not turn that perfectly well. position on the Cuban issue if the West will soften Cuba into an attack platform against the USA and The situation has rapidly worsened, declared its own position in West Berlin was basically the countries of Latin America. Rusk, since July of this year. Before July the intended to mollify the public vis a vis Cuba. Besides this, Rusk announced, the USA, in situation caused no alarm. But from July, Soviet The wide publication of the results of an defining its position on the Cuban issue, as an- weapons have flowed into Cuba. So far it seems, election survey conducted here by the Gallup nounced by the President in his conversation with according to U.S. Government data, that these are (sic) Institute showing that the vast majority of us, proceeds also from the fact that Cuba will not defensive weapons. But it is unclear how the Americans are against an American intervention undertake actions aimed at foisting its system and situation will develop in the future. in Cuba serves this same goal. In this regard, we regime on the other countries of Latin America. Besides this, declared Rusk, according to have to note that the leadership of the institute in The government of the USA places ex- precise data in American possession, the Cuban the past traditionally were more sympathetic to tremely high significance on these two condi- regime continues to actively carry out subversive Republicans. Therefore, its publication in this tions. It would be hoped that neither the first, nor work against a number of Latin American coun- case deserves special attention. This was not the second, would take place. tries. done without the encouragement of the White As far as the domestic regime on Cuba is I said that the Cubans should have come to House either; in this way a nudge was given to the concerned, the USA decisively views it as a conclusions about their own defense from the extremist groups in Congress which support ex- regime which contradicts the interests of security intervention on Cuba by the immigrant riff-raff treme measures. in the . organized by the Americans and financed by Also deserving of attention is the fact that Having heard Rusk out, I said that the Cuban them. They came to such a conclusion, deciding Congress has now “gone on recess.” This sug- issue had been caused by the hostile policy of the to strengthen their own defense capability. July gests that the pressure on Kennedy from the USA towards Cuba. The USA for some reason has no significance here. Cuba represented no extreme groups in Congress will be less during believes that it must dictate to the Cubans the sort threat to the USA either before July, or after July. the recess. of domestic regime that should exist in Cuba, and As far as the declarations regarding subver- The position of the USA allies, particularly the social structure under which the Cubans should sive work by the Cubans is concerned, I can only the British, also played a role. They did not live. But on what basis is the USA trying to say that these declarations are in contradiction support calls for the unleashing of aggression appropriate for itself the right to dictate to the with the information which we possess. against Cuba, although they equally approved of Cubans how to conduct their internal affairs? All the same, declared Rusk, in July some other anti-Cuban steps of the USA. There is no such basis, and such a basis cannot be. kind of sudden change took place. And that It is not possible, of course, to be completely Cuba belongs to the Cubans, not to Americans. sudden change significantly complicated the situ- insured against USA surprises and adventures, Perhaps, I declared, Rusk can tell me, whither ation. even in the Cuba issue; all the same, taking into the principles of the UN Charter in American Regarding the issue of the Cubans’ subver- account the undeniable objective facts and the policy towards Cuba? They’re not there. The sive activities, said Rusk, the USA government corresponding official public statements, and also actions of the USA are in flagrant contradiction has irrefutable proof of the assistance provided the assurances given to us that the USA has no with these principles. The USA is undertaking by them to various subversive groups in Latin plans for intervention in Cuba (which undeniably steps to cause hunger in Cuba. The actions which America, up until the present day. For the gov- commits them in many respects), it is possible to it is undertaking towards this end unmask the ernment of the USA there is nothing to discuss. It say that in these conditions a USA military ad- USA policy even more clearly. The Cubans, with knows for sure that the Cubans provide such help venture against Cuba is almost impossible to ever more decisiveness, are speaking out and will and are carrying out subversive work against a imagine. continue to speak out in defense of their country number of Latin American countries. and will strengthen its defenses. Rusk expansively spoke of the “community 19/X-62 A. GROMYKO The Soviet Union is helping Cuba. It is of interests” of the countries of the Western trying to provide the Cubans with grain, and help Hemisphere. Not mentioning the “Monroe Doc- to put its economy on a sound footing. This can trine,” he essentially tried to defend it, stressing [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- not present any danger to the USA. Soviet the solidarity of the countries of the Western tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] specialists are helping Cuban soldiers to master Hemisphere and the community of interests of certain types of defensive weapons. This can’t their security. * * * * * present any threat to the USA either. Overall, so I said that in the policy of the USA and in far as the declaration that Cuba may present a Rusk’s considerations regarding Cuba the coun- Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister threat to the security of the USA and countries of tries somehow get lost, while the discussion is Gromyko to the CC CPSU, 20 October 1962 Latin America is concerned, such declarations about the hemisphere. But in this hemisphere are evidently intended for naive people. Even there are sovereign countries. Each one of them Americans themselves don’t believe it. has a right to decide its own internal affairs upon 68 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN consideration by its people. Cuba is one of these every day American generals and several minis- in 1956. sovereign states. ters speak about it. I deflected this effort to introduce an anal- Besides that, I declared, if Rusk’s reasoning Regarding Iran, I said to Rusk that we posi- ogy and I briefly pointed out the groundlessness and the entire conception which the USA gov- tively view the agreement between the Soviet of such an analogy. ernment defends were to be applied to Europe Union and Iran that foreign missile bases will not Rusk said that he did not agree with our and to Asia, then no doubt the conclusions which be built on Iranian territory. But Rusk will not, interpretation of the question and rejection of the would flow from that would not please the USA. apparently, deny that the Iranian Army is led by analogy. It comes out that the Americans consider them- American military advisers, that Turkey has had He then began to speak on the subject of the selves to have a right to be in a number of such bases for a long time, that the territory of policy of the Soviet Union after the Second World countries of Europe, Asia, and other regions of Japan has become an American military base, the War, partly trying to tie these musings with the the world, if sometimes they don’t even ask them territory of England and a number of other coun- Cuban issue and partly with the issue of Ameri- about this, while certain others can not even tries have been military springboards of the USA can foreign military bases. respond to an appeal for assistance in providing for a long time. About the same could be said He said that “in the Stalinist period” the its own people with bread and strengthening its about many other countries. Soviet Union conducted a foreign policy which security in the face of a threat of intervention. Rusk declared that—whether I believe him forced the USA to create its bases overseas and to With such a conception the Soviet Union cannot or not—that’s something else, but he categori- deploy its forces there. He gave an alleged agree. It is hoped that the USA government too cally asserts that besides the territory of the USA example—Korea and the Korean peninsula. He will more soberly approach the entire Cuban itself, American missiles and atomic weapons are said, that before the events in Korea the USA in issue and will reject a hostile policy toward in only three countries. fact did not have a single division up to strength. Cuba. Here I said: without a doubt, of course, At that time the USA practically did not have a If the USA government has some sort of England is among those countries? battleworthy army available. But the situation claims toward Cuba, for instance, financial, then Yes, declared Rusk, England is one of them. changed because of the Korean War. Before this it can bring them up with the Cubans at negotia- He didn’t name the others. there was such a thing as the , tions aimed at settling them, and the Cubans, as As far as Japan is concerned, declared Rusk, which also played a definite role in the change in is known, are prepared for this. I categorically assert that neither missiles, nor the American policy. All this is reflected, said Yes, declared Rusk, but nonetheless Cuba nuclear weapons of the USA are in Japan. They Rusk, in the armament program. has violated the peace on the continent, nonethe- don’t have any of those weapons in South Korea He again began to speak about the influence less, beginning in July, the situation has taken a either, if, of course, the actions of North Korea of the “Stalinist policy” on the policy and actions dangerous turn. The Soviet Union appeared in will not make it necessary to change that situation. of the Western powers. The Western powers, Cuba. A large quantity of Soviet weapons ap- In general, declared Rusk, the significance including the USA, cannot but take that into peared in Cuba. All this has complicated the of American foreign military bases is greatly account even now. situation. exaggerated, and they don’t deserve it. In several Responding to these statements of Rusk, I No matter how often Rusk repeats, I de- countries, in actual fact there are not such bases, stressed that the Secretary of State of the USA clared, the assertion about some sort of turn of while you, Rusk said, believe that there are. In had drawn an extremely depressing and one- events in July, about the danger allegedly ema- particular, the Scandinavian countries are among sided picture of the foreign policy of the USSR in nating from Cuba, in actuality, the situation those countries. the postwar period, including during the Stalin remains simpler. The Cubans want Cuba to Responding to that, I said, that in certain period. No doubt Rusk, like other U.S. officials, belong to them, and not to the USA. countries maybe there are not today, physically, will not deny a great historical fact: besides the Maybe Rusk will reject the presence of the those or other types of weapons. You, Americans, fact that the army of the Soviet Union routed the USA, the presence of American military bases know better. But the USA has military agree- Hitlerite army and as a powerful avalanche moved and numerous military advisers in such countries ments with those countries which include an ob- into Western Europe, it was not used contrary to like Turkey, , Japan, not even speaking ligation to let these types of American weapons the alliance agreements and had stopped follow- about such countries as England, , and a into the country at any time. This is hardly ing the defeat of Hitler’s Germany. And in that number of other countries of Western Europe, different from the practical existence of American situation, if the Soviet Union, the Soviet govern- and also Asia and Africa. It appears that the USA military bases in such countries, especially con- ment, had had expansionist intentions, it could can have military bases in these countries, con- sidering that certain types of weapons may at the have occupied all of Western Europe. But the clude with them military agreements, while the present time be delivered very quickly. Soviet Union had not done that and had not Soviet Union can not even provide assistance in Rusk did not respond to that statement, and started to do it. That already by itself is an support of the Cuban economy and for the overall it was evident that precisely that is the eloquent answer to the attempt to cast doubt on strengthening of the defense capability of Cuba. situation in several of the participants in the mili- the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and on its Rusk said that the Soviet Union is exagger- tary blocs of the Western powers. actions in the postwar period. ating the significance of American foreign mili- And so, I declared, the Americans have no You know, I declared to Rusk, that our CC tary bases, believing that the USA has bases even grounds to reproach Cuba and the Cubans for and the Soviet government, at the initiative of in Pakistan, and practically in Iran. In many steps of a purely defensive character, and, more- N.S. Khrushchev, have taken a number of foreign countries, on the territory of which, in your over, to conduct toward Cuba a hostile and ag- policy steps which earlier had not been taken. opinion, there are American military bases, in gressive policy. Cuba simply wants to be inde- You are familiar, no doubt, with that which has actuality there are none. Iran, for example, pendent. That which the Cubans do to strengthen been done in the foreign policy of the USSR recently took a big step forward towards the their country and its independence—that doesn’t regarding the condemnation of Stalin’s Cult of Soviet Union. Overall, the significance of our present a danger to anyone, all the more to such a Personality. You know, in particular, about the bases is inflated. great power like the USA. Any assertions about signing of the Austrian State Treaty, which was To this statement I answered in such a way, the existence of such a danger are just absurd. evaluated positively throughout the world and that the USA foreign military bases—this is a Rusk said that the USA is interested in Cuba which helped to make possible an improvement subject which is pretty well known, practically just as the Soviet Union was interested in Hungary of the situation in central Europe. But we cat- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 69 egorically reject any attempts to generalize or to Cuba, and that that greatly alarms the USA gov- passing touched on Kennedy’s declaration, made draw conclusions about Soviet foreign policy in ernment and Americans. in the conversation with us, about the fact that the the postwar period, which USA government offi- Rusk further said, wouldn’t it be possible to USA has no intentions to intervene in Cuba (with cials make with the intent, apparently, of white- consider the issue of increasing the number of a reservation regarding the threat to the security washing its own policy, in this case towards Security Council member-countries from 11 to of the USA and the countries of Latin America). Cuba. 13, that is, in other words, increasing the number Rusk’s reasoning revolved mostly around a circle Rusk did not challenge the declaration re- of non-permanent members from six to eight. of questions related to Soviet assistance to Cuba, garding the capability of the Soviet army to From his comments it was clear that he was primarily arms. occupy all of Europe, if the Soviet Union had talking about a change in the membership of the By Rusk’s behavior it was possible to ob- striven for that after the rout of Hitler’s Germany. UN and introducing into the membership corre- serve how painfully the American leaders are Nor did he challenge the significance of the sponding changes. suffering the fact that the Soviet Union decisively foreign policy steps of the Soviet Union intro- I said that the step Rusk had mentioned was has stood on the side of Cuba, and that the Cubans duced after the condemnation of the cult of per- impossible to implement, simply because the are conducting themselves bravely and confi- sonality of Stalin. More to the point, he let it be PRC—one of the permanent members of the dently. Kennedy managed to hide his feelings understood that in general he shares these thoughts, Security Council—is not participating in the work better. But he too, when he spoke about Cuba, although he did not make any direct comments. of the UN because of the policy of the U.S. formulated his ideas with emphasis, slowly, ob- However, he at this point started to talk Government. Without the PRC, I declared, we viously weighing every word. It is characteristic about the fact that the USA, at the end of the war, will not agree even to consider that issue. that Rusk, during our entire conversation with and also in the first postwar period to the greatest Rusk in fact did not challenge our declara- Kennedy, sat absolutely silently, and red “like a extent conducted itself well. It, declared Rusk, tion, understanding that the step he had recom- crab.” In the conversation with him later he had not tried to use the advantage which it had at mended was not realistic in view of our objec- couldn’t hide his feelings very well. that time vis a vis its monopoly possession of the tions. Here he noted that China, evidently has atomic bomb. more than a few problems, including internal, 20.X.62 A. GROMYKO I let him know that that, apparently, had not economic ones. been so much because the United States had In response I said that they have certain [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- wanted to conduct itself well, as that the atomic difficulties, but the food situation had now sig- tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] bomb at that time could not play a decisive role in nificantly improved and was not as difficult as it the serious standoff of the leading powers. was portrayed by certain organs of the American * * * * * Rusk did not challenge this declaration, but press. all the same expressed the thought that the USA Rusk touched on the question of the Chi- Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the had had an advantage at that time in its possession nese-Indian border conflict. He asked what is USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, of the atomic bomb and that it had not even tried going on there and why did the argument arise? 22 October 1962 to use it politically. I said, that the argument, as is well known to In this connection he brought up the Baruch Rusk, was caused by mutual territorial claims in Plan, saying that he was wondering why the the border region. The Soviet government be- TOP SECRET Soviet Union had not associated itself with the lieves that the sooner the sides come to an agree- Making Copies Prohibited . ment on a mutually acceptable basis, the better. I Copy No. 1 I gave an appropriate answer and briefly set let Rusk know that our discussion of this issue CIPHERED TELEGRAM forth our position. I stressed the point that the apparently would hardly help the matter. Baruch Plan was a one-sided plan, advantageous Rusk agreed that yes, of course, this was an TOP PRIORITY only to the USA, that it had not even envisioned issue between the two countries—the PRC and the destruction of nuclear weapons, rather, under —but that nonetheless there is some old a screen of allegedly international control had left agreed boundary, which, considering everything, At 6 in the evening Washington time Secre- this weapon at the practical disposal of the USA, is the correct border line. tary of State Rusk invited me to his place. and even on the territory of the USA. Evidently, Rusk’s own goal was to let us Rusk said that he had a commission from the Rusk did not go into details and limited know that the government of the USA looks president to send via me a personal presidential himself to the above comments about the Baruch favorably on the Indian position. But he spoke message to N.S. Khrushchev /to be sent sepa- Plan. about that as if offhandedly, obviously not want- rately/, and also to provide for information the Suddenly Rusk jumped to the issue of the ing to create the impression that the USA was text of the president’s address to the American Communist ideology and the influence of the greatly interested in that issue. He also jokingly people, which he intends to deliver at 7 this Soviet Union on other countries. He tried to observed that the Chinese-Indian border conflict evening on radio and television /transmitted by assert that the main reason of all the complica- is, excuse me, the only issue on which the posi- TASS/. tions in international affairs is that the Soviet tions of the PRC and correspond. Rusk warned then that at this time he has Union by some or other means influences the With this, the conversation, which had con- instructions not to answer any questions on the situation in other countries, inspires dissatisfac- tinued with some difficulty for about two hours, text of both documents and not to comment on tion with the existing regimes and so on. He also ended. Further there was a conversation on the them. complained because the USA does not assert German Question, the contents of which are “These documents, he added, speak for them- such influence and cannot assert it, since it does submitted separately. selves.” not enter into its political plans. Vis a vis this A short general evaluation of this conversa- Rusk was told that the actions of the USA reasoning he again returned to Cuba, but basi- tion with Rusk: Rusk tried again to stress, obvi- government cannot be justified by the absolutely cally repeated what he had said earlier. He ended ously at Kennedy’s behest, that the USA gives unconvincing motives which are not grounded in his argument by commenting again that July had great importance to the Cuban issue and consid- the factual situation and to which the president brought a change for the worse to the events in ers it the most painful for the USA. He only in refers, and that these actions have a downright 70 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN provocative character, and that all responsibility [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; thrown down by the Soviet Union to the USA in for possible grave consequences of the afore- translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] the form of military deliveries to Cuba. Regard- mentioned actions of the United States will be ing this, insofar as up to now a direct military entirely on the American administration. * * * * * attack by the USA on Cuba is not on the table (the I also expressed surprise that neither the President, as is known, also persistently stressed president nor Rusk found it necessary to have an Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the this during the meeting with A.A. Gromyko), open talk on all the questions raised in the ad- USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, Kennedy evidently is counting on the Soviet dress, with A.A. Gromyko, with whom they met 23 October 1962 Union in this case not responding with military only a few days ago, while now the USA admin- actions directly against the USA itself or by istration is seeking with artificial means to create delivering a blow to their positions in West Ber- a grave crisis. The Soviet Union fears no threats TOP SECRET lin. As a result, in Kennedy’s thinking, the United and is prepared to meet them in an appropriate Making Copies Prohibited States will succeed in establishing at least in part way, if the voice of reason would not triumph in Copy No. 1 the correlation of forces which existed in the the governing circles of the USA. world before July, that is before the announce- Rusk did not respond. He was clearly in a CIPHERED TELEGRAM ment of our military deliveries to Cuba, which nervous and agitated mood, even though he tried delivered a serious blow to the USA’s positions to conceal it. At that the meeting came to an end. as the leader of the capitalist world and even more Then almost all ambassadors /except socialist/ Following Kennedy’s speech on the Cuban constrained their freedom of action on issues like were summoned to the State Department, and issue yesterday, a broad campaign was deployed the one in West Berlin. they have been given, by groups, the text of the here, called forth in order to impart to the devel- Kennedy apparently believes that a further president’s address with corresponding com- oping situation even more extraordinariness and demonstration by the United States of indecisive- mentaries by the senior officials of the State seriousness than was done in Kennedy’s speech ness and lack of will to risk a war with the Soviet Department. itself. Union for the sake of its positions would unavoid- Before I left, Rusk noted that there is no In a briefing conducted by the USA Ministry ably lead to an even quicker and more serious plan, so far, to publish the personal letter of of Defense yesterday evening, [Secretary of De- undermining of their positions around the globe. Kennedy to N.S. Khrushchev, but overall this fense Robert S.] McNamara categorically de- 2. That which Kennedy said yesterday in his cannot be excluded. clared that the USA will not stop short of sinking appeal to the American people and the complex Soviet ships which are bringing “offensive types” of measures which were announced in this con- 22.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN of weapons to Cuba, if those ships will refuse to nection by the USA government in fact touch not obey the demands of American warships. only upon Cuba alone or our deliveries of weap- [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; It is reported that the President’s official ons to it, or even our missiles for Cuba. More to translation by Vladislav M. Zubok.] proclamation about the introduction into force of the point, it is a decision connected with a certain measures to assert a quarantine on the delivery to risk and determined by a whiff of adventurism, to * * * * * Cuba of offensive types of weapons will be pub- try to bring to a stop now the development of lished before the end of the day today or tomorrow events in the whole world, which are generally Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba morning after the formal agreement with other disadvantageous to the USA. Alekseev to the USSR MFA, 22 October 1962 members of the Organization of American States. In this regard, some information which we For the practical implementation of the quaran- have just received by confidential means and tine in the area of Cuba, there has been assembled, which we are now reconfirming, may be interest- TOP SECRET according to the reports of military observers, ing. According to this information, prior to the Making Copies Prohibited around 450 military ships, more than 1,200 air- President’s decision a hot discussion was con- Copy No. 1 planes and around 200 thousand soldiers. ducted recently in the government regarding the Almost without interruption, the commen- future foreign policy course of the USA follow- CIPHERED TELEGRAM taries which are broadcast on radio and televi- ing the appearance of information about the de- sion—and also the commentaries which appeared liveries of Soviet missiles to Cuba. [Attorney in today’s morning newspapers—are directed to- General] R. Kennedy, McNamara, Rusk, Chief Regarding the threats of the USA toward wards supercharging the atmosphere and predic- of the CIA [John] McCone, and the Chairman of Cuba, we remain in constant contact with Fidel tions of an early “test of force,” as soon as the first the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted that since Castro and Raoul Castro. Soviet ship approaches Cuba (we broadcast simi- the status quo in the world had changed, and had The Cuban command gave an order for full lar commentaries via TASS). changed not to the benefit of the USA, as a result mobilization of the army and occupation of de- An analysis of the public statements which of the well-known development of the Cuban fensive positions. Besides telegraphic dispatches Kennedy has made, his message to N.S. events, in particular the open deliveries of Soviet of information agencies and Kennedy’s speeches, Khrushchev, and also the statements of officials weapons to Cuba. The issue is not the weapons our friends have no other information. who are close to the White House and the State themselves, insofar as they do not have much We will quickly inform you of all new facts. allow us to make, as it is presented to us, a significance from a purely military point of view, We are taking steps to ensure security and preliminary conclusion that the measures which rather it is that great political loss which the the organization of a duty roster in Soviet insti- have been undertaken by the Kennedy Adminis- Kennedy government suffered in the eyes of the tutions. tration in regard to Cuba are the product of a range whole world and particularly of its American Please issue an order to the radio center to of domestic and foreign policy considerations, the allies and neighbors when it (the USA govern- listen to us around the clock. most important of which, apparently, are the fol- ment) turned out to be not in a position—for the lowing. first time in the history of the USA—to prevent 22.X.62 ALEKSEEV I. To try to “take up the gauntlet” of that “the penetration and establishment of influence” challenge which Kennedy believes has been by another great power, the USSR, in the Western COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 71

Hemisphere itself. What then of the obligations time. Brazil and Mexico are also departing from Besides this, taking into account the future of the USA in other parts of the world? And all their previous positions after having been subject development of events and as a means of putting this is happening at a moment—as asserted by to strong pressure from the USA, which is assert- extra pressure on the USA government, it is representatives of the military brass—when ing that the Soviet missiles now threaten the Latin possible that it would make sense to undertake America for the time being still has an advantage American countries too. The decision of the such measures as, for instance, calling back from over the Soviet Union in nuclear missiles, an Organization of American States which was just the USA Soviet theatrical collectives and Soviet advantage which is gradually being liquidated by accepted (transmitted via TASS) in fact in sup- students (sending for them a special airplane), the successes of Soviet weapons, and now also by port of the course of action of the USA shows that which should show to the Americans the serious- the creation of a missile base in Cuba in direct the Kennedy administration is succeeding in bind- ness of our intentions in regard to the events in proximity with the USA. This means, the Ameri- ing the governments of these countries to its will Cuba. can chiefs of staff maintain, that time is not under conditions of the prewar psychosis which However, in our opinion it is not necessary waiting, if the Kennedy government really in- has now been created in the USA. We should, it’s to hurry on all the above measures, since an tends to prevent a further disadvantageous devel- true, note that Brazil, Mexico and Bolivia ab- extreme aggravation of the situation, it goes with- opment of events. stained from the vote on the paragraph which out saying, would not be in our interests. It would In Berlin also, the USA is constantly on the envisaged the application of force. make sense to use also the desire of neutral states, defensive, which does not add to the 4. On the domestic political plane, Kennedy and not only them, to find a way to settle the Administration’s prestige. The latest meetings obviously is counting on his last step to pull the current conflict. Such moods are clearly felt not with A.A. Gromyko (this argument was attrib- rug out from under the legs of the Republicans, only at the UN, but also among the diplomatic uted to Rusk) strengthened the President’s and whose leadership in recent days officially an- corps here. Rusk’s belief that the Soviet Union seriously nounced that they consider the Cuban issue a Overall, here in Washington the tension intends to sign a with the GDR, with fundamental issue of the election campaign, hav- around this situation continues to grow. It seems all the consequences that will flow from that for ing in essence accused the administration of inac- as if the Americans themselves are beginning to the USA. This, almost unavoidably will bring tivity on that issue. worry a lot, anticipating the arrival in Cuba of the about a crisis at the end of the year, since the USA However, it is necessary to stress that the first Soviet ship (many people are expressing this will not withdraw its forces from West Berlin. events connected with Kennedy’s announcement question directly to the Embassy) and how this Wouldn’t it be better then to try to force the Soviet yesterday obviously have overtaken the signifi- first “test of strength” will end. This atmosphere Union to retreat by “striking a blow on the Cuban cance of electoral considerations and that these of tense waiting entered a new phase with the issue [“—no close quotation mark—ed.], which considerations now are moving to the background. publication just now of the President’s official gives more benefits to the USA than the Berlin Overall, the impression is being created proclamation which announces the entering into question, if the moods of public opinion and that, reserving a certain possibility not to let the force of the ban on delivering “offensive weap- geographic and military-strategic factors are taken matter lead to an open military confrontation— ons” to Cuba as of 14 hours [2 p.m.] (Greenwich into account[?] Precisely on the Cuban issue it is this can be seen in his proclamation in general Mean Time) on 24 October. best for President Kennedy to take a firm position form by the readiness which he expressed to and to “demonstrate his character.” This ap- continue “peace negotiations” with the Soviet 23.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN proximately was the basic argument of those side on settling controversial issues, including government representatives who support a more the Cuban issue and several other questions— [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- hard-line course of action (several of them specu- Kennedy at the same time consciously and suffi- tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] lated also that the President maintains the opinion ciently provocatively is aiming towards an abrupt that the Soviet government apparently does not aggravation of relations with the Soviet Union in * * * * * particularly believe in the President’s steadfast- accord with the above-mentioned considerations. ness following the failure of last year’s incursion In this regard it is as if this time he is ready Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the in Cuba). It follows, evidently, to recognize that to go pretty far in a test of strength with the Soviet USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, the supporters of this course for the time being Union, hoping that in the location of the conflict 24 October 1962 have taken the upper hand in the USA govern- (Cuba) which was chosen by him, the President, ment. the USA has a greater chance than the USSR, and TOP SECRET 3. Having created the extraordinary situa- that in the final analysis the Soviet government Making Copies Prohibited tion around Cuba, the Kennedy administration is will refuse to increase the military power of Copy No. 1 hoping that in that situation it will be able quickly Cuba, not wishing to let a major war break out. to get from its NATO allies and from the Latin Under these conditions it is seen as expedient, CIPHERED TELEGRAM American countries support for its course to- while observing the necessary precautions, to at wards the full isolation of Cuba from the “free the same time review certain steps which would Late in the evening of October 23, R. world,” and the ultimate overthrow of the current demonstrate the resolve of the USSR to give an Kennedy came to visit me. He was in an obvi- government of Cuba. In this regard it should be appropriate rebuff to the USA and which would ously excited condition and his speech was rich in noted that although the West European and Latin make the USA vulnerable to the possibility of repetitions and digressions. R. Kennedy said American diplomats express alarm about the pos- actions which we may take in response. In approximately the following. sible consequences of realizing in practice the particular, as it seems to us, it would be possible I came on my own personal initiative with- announced “quarantine” of Cuba, they express, to review the question of hinting to Kennedy in no out any assignment from the President. I consid- as a rule, confidence that their governments un- uncertain terms about the possibility of repres- ered it necessary to do this in order to clarify what der current conditions will not be able to deviate sions against the Western powers in West Berlin exactly led to the current, extremely serious de- from support for the USA. In particular, it be- (as a first step, the organization of a blockade of velopment of events. Most important is the fact came known to us that the Chilean representative ground routes, leaving out for the time being air that the personal relations between the President in the Organization of American States received routes so as not to give grounds for a quick and the Soviet premier have suffered heavy dam- an instruction to support the USA proposals this confrontation). age. President Kennedy feels deceived and these 72 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN feelings found their own reflection in his appeal or, speaking directly, a heavy blow to everything contacting you via the confidential channel, if, as to the American people. in which he had believed and which he had strived it appears, even the Ambassador, who has, as far From the very beginning, continued R. to preserve in personal relations with the head of as we know, the full trust of his government, does Kennedy, the Soviet side—N.S. Khrushchev, the Soviet government: mutual trust in each other’s not know that long-range missiles which can the Soviet government in its pronouncements personal assurances. As a result, the reaction strike the USA, rather than defensive missiles and the Soviet ambassador during confidential which had found its reflection in the President’s which are capable of defending Cuba from any meetings - have stressed the defensive nature of declaration and the extremely serious current sort of attack on the approaches to it, have already the weapons which are being delivered to Cuba. events which are connected with it and which can been provided to Cuba[?] It comes out that when You, for instance, said R. Kennedy to me, told still lead no one knows where. you and I spoke earlier, you also did not have me about the exclusively defensive goals of the Stressing with great determination that I reliable information, although the conversation delivery of Soviet weapons, in particular, the reject his assertions about some sort of “decep- was about the defensive character of those weap- missile weapons, during our meeting at the be- tion” as entirely not corresponding to reality and ons deliveries, including the future deliveries to ginning of September. I understood you then as as presenting the actions and motives of the Soviet Cuba, and everything about this was passed on to saying that we were talking only about /and in the side in a perverted light, I asked R. Kennedy why the President. future, too/ missiles of a relatively small range of the President - if he had some sort of doubts - had I categorically responded to R. Kennedy’s action for the defense of Cuba itself and the not negotiated directly and openly with A. A. thoughts about the information which I had re- approaches to it, but not about long range mis- Gromyko, with whom there had been a meeting ceived from the government, stressing that this siles which could strike practically the entire just a few days ago, but rather had begun actions, was exclusively within the competence of the territory of the USA. I told this to the President, the seriousness of the consequences of which for Soviet government. Simultaneously, his thoughts who accepted it with satisfaction as the position the entire world are entirely unforeseeable. Be- of “deception” were rejected again. Further, in of the Soviet government. There was a TASS fore setting off on that dangerous path, fraught calm but firm tones I set forth in detail our declaration in the name of the Soviet government with a direct military confrontation between our position on the Cuban issue, taking into account in which it was clearly stated that all military countries, why not use, for instance, the confiden- the Soviet government’s latest announcement on deliveries to Cuba are intended exclusively for tial channels which we have and appeal directly to Cuba, N.S. Khrushchev’s letter in response to the defensive goals. The President and the govern- the head of the Soviet government. President, and also other speeches and conversa- ment of the USA understood this as the true R. Kennedy said the President had decided tions of N.S. Khrushchev. position of the USSR. not to address A. A. Gromyko about this for the I particularly stressed the circumstance that, With even greater feelings of trust we took following two reasons: first, everything which the as far as is known to me, the head of the Soviet the corresponding declarations /public and con- Soviet minister had set forth had, evidently ac- government values the warm relations with the fidential/ of the head of the Soviet government, cording to the instructions of the Soviet govern- President. N.S. Khrushchev recently spoke about who, despite the big disagreements and frequent ment, been expressed in very harsh tones, so a that in particular in a conversation with [U.S.] aggravations in relations between our countries, discussion with him hardly could have been of Ambassador [to Moscow Foy] Kohler. I hope the President has always trusted on a personal much use; second, he had once again asserted the that the President also maintains the same point of level. The message which had been sent by N.S. defensive character of the deliveries of Soviet view, - I added. On the relationships between the Khrushchev via the Soviet ambassador and weapons, although the President at that moment heads of our governments, on which history has [Kennedy adviser Theodore] Sorensen, about knew that this is not so, that they had deceived him placed special responsibility for the fate of the the fact that during the election campaign in the again. As far as the confidential channel is con- world, a lot really does depend; in particular, USA the Soviet side would not do anything to cerned, what sense would that have made, if on the whether there will be peace or war. The Soviet complicate the international situation and worsen highest level - the level of the Minister of Foreign government acts only in the interests of preserv- relations between our countries, had made a Affairs - precisely the same is said, although the ing and strengthening peace and calls on the great impression on the President. facts are directly contradictory[?] To that same United States government to act this way too. All this led to the fact that the President point, added R. Kennedy, long ago I myself in fact Stressing again the basic principles of our policy believed everything which was said from the received the same sort of assurances from the on which we will insist without any compromises Soviet side, and in essence staked on that card his Soviet ambassador, however, all that subsequently (in the spirit of our declaration and N.S. own political fate, having publicly announced to turned out to be entirely not so. Khrushchev’s response letter), I simultaneously the USA, that the arms deliveries to Cuba carry - Tell me, - R. Kennedy said to me further - expressed the hope that the USA government a purely defensive character, although a number [do] you, as the Soviet ambassador, have from show prudence and refrain from taking any ac- of Republicans have asserted to the contrary. your government information about the presence tions which can lead to catastrophic consequences And then the President suddenly receives trust- now in Cuba of around half a dozen (here he for peace in the whole world. worthy information to the effect that in Cuba, corrected himself, saying that that number may R. Kennedy, after repeating what he had contrary to everything which had been said by not be entirely accurate, but the fact remains a already said about the President’s moods (around the Soviet representatives, including the latest fact) missiles, capable of reaching almost any this time he cooled down a bit and spoke in calmer assurances, made very recently by A. A. Gromyko point in the United States? tones), said that the President also values his during his meeting with the President, there had In my turn I asked R. Kennedy why I should relations with N.S. Khrushchev. As far as the appeared Soviet missiles with a range of action believe his information, when he himself does not future course of actions is concerned, then he, R. which cover almost the entire territory of the want to recognize or respect that which the other Kennedy, can not add anything to that which had USA. Is this weapon really for the defensive side is saying to him. To that same point, even the been said by the President himself, who stressed purposes about which you, Mr. Ambassador, A. President himself in his speech in fact had spoken all the seriousness of the situation and under- A. Gromyko, the Soviet government and N.S. only about some emplacements for missiles, which stands with what sort of dangerous consequences Khrushchev had spoken? they allegedly had “observed,” but not about the all this may be connected, but he can not act in any The President felt himself deceived, and missiles themselves. other way. deceived intentionally. He is convinced of that - There, you see - R. Kennedy quickly put I once again set forth to him our position in even now. It was for him a great disappointment, forth, - what would have been the point of us the above-mentioned spirit. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 73

Saying goodbye, already at the door of the the-clock broadcasts to Cuba—24 hours in Span- Armed Forces at the highest state of military Embassy, R. Kennedy as if by the way asked what ish and 12 hours in Russian. readiness. Commanders and military councils of sorts of orders the captains of the Soviet ships We support the suggestion of the State Com- military regions, groups of troops, Air Defense bound for Cuba have, in light of President mittee for Radio and Television Broadcasting of districts and fleets are ordered to delay the dis- Kennedy’s speech yesterday and the declaration the Council of Ministers about increasing the charge of soldiers, sailors and sergeants in the last which he had just signed about the inadmissabil- radio transmissions from Moscow to Cuba. year of service, troops of the strategic rocket ity of bringing offensive weapons to Cuba. It is possible to increase Soviet radio trans- forces, Air Defense forces, and the submarine I answered R. Kennedy with what I knew mission to Cuba partly on the basis of a redistri- fleet; to cancel all leaves, and to increase military about the instructions which had been given ear- bution of radio transmitters, which relay pro- readiness and vigilance in all units and on every lier to the captains: not to obey any unlawful grams from Moscow to foreign countries, and ship. demands to stop or be searched on the open sea, also by using certain radio stations, which work At the present time commanders of the as a violation of international norms of freedom on the jamming of foreign radio transmissions. Armed Forces together with local party organs of navigation. This order, as far as I know, has not At the present time, one third of the entire Soviet work on explaining to military men the Declara- been changed. radio transmitting capability is used to jam for- tion of the Soviet government. In detachments, R. Kennedy, having waved his hand, said: I eign broadcasts to the USSR. The Ministry of on ships, in military schools and in military don’t know how all this will end, for we intend to Communications of the USSR has no reserve institutions the Declaration of the USSR govern- stop your ships. He left right after this. radio stations. ment was listened to collectively on the radio, Overall, his visit left a somewhat strange We request agreement. talks, meetings and gatherings are taking place, impression. He had not spoken about the future where members of military councils, command- and paths toward a settlement of the conflict, Deputy Head, Department of Agitation and Pro- ers and heads of political organs speak. In the making instead a “psychological” excursion, as if paganda for Allied Republics, CC CPSU country’s Air Defense units, Secretaries of the he was trying to justify the actions of his brother, Sakhalin regional CPSU committee (comrade the President, and put the responsibility for his (signed) (A. Egorov) Evstratov), the Khabarovsk provincial commit- hasty decision, in the correctness of which they tee (comrade comrade Klepikov), Berezovsk City and he, evidently, are not entirely confident, on Instructor of the Department Party Committee (comrade Uglov) spoke. In the us. military regions special leaflets with the text of We think that in the interests of the affair it (signed) (V. Murav’ev) the Declaration of the Soviet government were would be useful, using this opportunity to pass on published and transfered by air to far-away de- to the President, through R. Kennedy, with whom 24 October 1962 tachments and garrisons. I could meet again, in confidential form N.S. All servicemen passionately approve of the Khrushchev’s thoughts on this matter, concern- Handwritten at bottom of page: policies of the USSR government, support addi- ing not only the issues which R. Kennedy had tional measures which it has undertaken and touched on, but a wider circle of issues in light of I report to the State Committee for Radio which are aimed at maintaining the troops in the the events which are going on now. and Television Broadcasting (Comrade state of maximum military readiness. At the Kharlamov) Nov. 24 that from Nov. 25 the amount same time Soviet soldiers express readiness to 24.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN of radio broadcasts to Cuba will be increased. fulfill without delay every order of the Mother- land aimed at the crushing defeat of the American [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- (signed) A. Egorov aggressors. tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] (signed) Murav’ev Captain Padalko and Captain Sorkov, pilots of the Second Independent Air Defense Army, * * * * * [Source:F. 5, Op. 33, D. 206, L. 133, Center for and senior technical lieutenants Aziamov and the Storage of Contemporary Documentation Ovcharov declared: “At this alarming hour we Report to CPSU Central Committee From (TsKhSD), the former CPSU CC archives, Mos- are at the highest state of military readiness. If the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, cow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] American adventurists unleash a war, they will 24 October 1962 be dealt the most powerful crippling blow. In * * * * * response to the ugly provcation of the warmon- CC CPSU ger, we will strengthen even more our vigilence Report to CPSU Central Committee From and military preparedness, we will fulfill without The State Committee for Radio and Televi- Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii delay any order of the Soviet government.” sion Broadcasting of the Council of Ministers of and A. Epishev, 24 October 1962 The announcement of the Soviet Govern- the USSR asks permission, in light of the aggres- ment received broad support among soldiers, sive American actions against Cuba, to increase Secret sergeants and sailors due to be discharged from from October 25 of this year the amount of radio Copy No. 1 the Armed Forces. They all declare that they will broadcasts from Moscow to Cuba up to 10 hours serve as much as required in the interests of the per day. At the present time these transmissions CC CPSU strengthening of the preparedness of the troops. are conducted every day for two hours. Private (415th Air Force Com- On questions relating to the strengthening of We report on work undertaken in connec- bat Air Wing), prematurely released into the radio broadcasting to Cuba, the State Committee tion with the announcement of the Soviet govern- reserves, returned to his base, gave back his consulted with Comrade Puerta, the leader of ment about the aggressive actions of American documents and announced, “At such a troubling Cuban Radio, who is now present in Moscow. imperialism against the Cuban republic. time, my responsibility is to be at my military The State Committee for Radio and Televi- The Ministry of Defense, fulfilling the Coun- post, and to defend the interests of the Mother- sion Broadcasting also reports that the USA, cil of Ministers decision of 23 October 1962, has land with a weapon in my hands.” starting October 23 of this year, organized round- taken supplementary measures to support the Many senior soldiers, striving with all their 74 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN strength and knowledge to the increase in mili- Making Copies Prohibited of “irrefutable” evidence of the presence in Cuba tary readiness, declare their willingness to re- Copy No. 1 of nuclear-missile arms. We classified this ma- main for additional service. After a meeting of neuver as an attempt to deflect the Security Coun- the 15th Division of the Moscow District Air CIPHERED TELEGRAM cil away from the essence of the case, particularly Defense Forces 20 soldiers reported with a re- from the aggressive actions of the USA, which quest to enlist for addional service. Following On 25 October in the Security Council, had violated the UN Charter and which had the example of Communists Sergeant Kaplin and Stevenson, speaking first, read out Kennedy’s created a threat to peace. Junior Sergeant Afanas’ev, 18 soldiers who had answer to U Thant’s appeal, in which Kennedy In response to Stevenson’s attempts to pose been discharged from the 345th anti-aircraft de- welcomes U Thant’s initiative and directs to us questions about whether we are placing tachment of the Bakinsk District Air Defense Stevenson quickly to consider with U Thant the nuclear weapons in Cuba we referred to the Forces requested permission to remain in the issue of conducting negotiations towards a settle- corresponding situation in the TASS announce- army. ment to the situation which has been created in the ment of 11 September /the texts of our speeches After the declaration of the Soviet govern- Caribbean Sea region /the text of Kennedy’s re- were transmitted by teletype/. ment, at the bases and on the ships there was a sponse was transmitted via teletype/. The attempts of the USA representative to strengthened desire of individual soldiers to de- From our side we made public Comr. N.S. turn the Council into a tribune for base propa- fend Cuba as volunteers. On just one day in the Khrushchev’s response to U Thant on his appeal, ganda met no support from other members of the 78th motorized infantry training division of the which was transmitted to U Thant before the Council. Ural Military District, 1240 requests to be sent to opening of the session. The representative of the UAR, [Gen. the Cuban Republic were received. At a meeting During the meeting and after it, representa- Mahmoud] Riad, and the representative of Ghana, of the 300 and 302nd detachment (sic) of the tives of many African and Asian countries ap- [Alex] Quaison-Sackey, noted the important sig- Second Independent Air Defense Army of the proached us, noting the exceedingly important nificance of U Thant’s appeal and the responses Air Defense Forces the decision was made about significance for the preservation of peace in the of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy, the readiness of the entire unit to leave for Cuba. Caribbean Sea region and in the whole world of stressing that as a result of that exchange of In response to the directions of the Soviet the message from the head of the Soviet govern- messages a new situation had been created in the government relating to the aggressive actions of ment. Council. Riad and Quaison-Sackey proposed the American government, military personnel Stevenson’s speech at today’s session, re- suspending the session so as to allow all the heighten their vigilence and increase their per- gardless of his attempts to assert once again that interested sides, with the participation of U Thant, sonal responsibility for the maintenance of mili- Cuba has at its disposal an offensive weapon, and to conduct the necessary negotiations, having in tary readiness. In the 3rd Corps of the Air that this creates a danger for the Western hemi- mind that the Council sessions will be resumed Defense Forces of the Moscow Military District, sphere, had in essence a defensive character. He depending on the result and process of the nego- soldiers work at night in fulfillment of daytime made a declaration as if the USA had not sought tiations. norms. In the 201st anti-aircraft detachment of a pretext to raise the Cuban issue, that the USA did That proposal was supported by the Chilean the Ural Military District there has been a signifi- not object to deliveries to Cuba of a defensive representative, [Daniel] Schweitzer. cant reduction in the time required for mainte- weapon, and that everything which they are trying The proposal of the UAR and Ghana was nance work on military equipment. so hard to do is to implement “limited” actions. accepted without objections by the Security Coun- As an expression of the unprecedented trust Being in no position to disprove our accusations cil. When the adopted decision was announced, of the individuals of the Armed Forces in the of a violation by the USA of the UN Charter, I, as the Chairman of the Council, stressed that the CPSU there is a strengthened desire among front- Stevenson declared that the USA could not slow Security Council could be convened by the Chair- line soldiers to join the ranks of the Party and the down implementation of the planned measures in man of the Council depending on the course of . Following the declaration of the expectation of a Soviet veto in the Security Coun- the negotiations. In this way, no votes were taken Government of the USSR, the number of appli- cil. He said further that the USA had come to the on any of the proposed resolutions /ours, the cations to join the Party and the Komsomol grew. Security Council even before the Organization of American proposal, and the neutral one/, and they During the explanation of the declaration of the American States had started to work and had remained in the Security Council file. x/ the Soviet Government, no sorts of negative given its approval for the “quarantine” measures. We received your [word deleted—ed.] manifestations were noted. Stevenson tried to present the matter as if he was after it had already basically been decided that in We are reporting for your information. talking not about unilateral measures of the USA, relation to the start of negotiations between the but about the agreed actions of the Organization interested sides consideration of the issue in the (signed) R. MALINOVSKII of American States. Security Council is not ending, and that the issue (signed) A. EPISHEV In our speech we showed the lack of founda- remains on the Security Council agenda, more- tion of all of these assertions by Stevenson, stress- over, the Council sessions may be resume at any 24 October 1962 ing that, as the discussion in the Security Council time depending on the course of the negotiations had confirmed, the USA had no sort of justifica- between the interested sides. At the present time, [Source: F. 5, Op. 47, D. 400, Ll. 69-71, TsKhSD; tions for the aggressive actions which it had as we understand it, it would be premature to raise translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] undertaken, which had created a threat of thermo- the issue at the XVIIth session of the General nuclear war. We pointed out that the aggressive Assembly, insofar as the issue as before is on the * * * * * path down which the USA had set had met a rebuff Security Council agenda and we will always have from the side of the peoples and the majority of the possibility to demand that it be raised in the Telegram from the Soviet representative to UN members. Precisely this has now prompted Assembly if the possible new consideration by the United Nations, Valerian Zorin, to the the USA to give its agreement to enter into nego- the Security Council will end without result. USSR MFA, 25 October 1962 tiations. We ridiculed the maneuver which After the session U Thant informed us that Stevenson had made at the session in showing the he intends to begin negotiations with us, the photographs which had been fabricated by Ameri- Cubans, and the Americans tomorrow, 26 Octo- Top Secret can intelligence which had been assigned the role ber. He will meet with each delegation individu- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 75 ally. We will report our thoughts about this An analogous declaration was made in the name At the same time it is not possible to exclude meeting in supplementary fashion. of the Organization of American States, which, that the general American plan of actions really evidently, is aimed at giving that fact extra “legal may include the implementation of such an over- 25.X.62 V. ZORIN force”/. In their declarations there is made a flight, especially if the adventurist moods of pretty clear hint to the effect that the mentioned certain members of the circle which is close to the ———————— “fact” gives the USA government “a foundation” President are taken into account. In this regard x/ Having in mind “Your telegram” to take further, more serious measures against we should note that judging by certain informa- Cuba. tion, disagreements about participation in the [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; At the same time, among journalists who are negotiations in the UN are now growing in the translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] close to the White House, State Department and USA government, since this is connected with Pentagon conversations about the possibility of dragging out the time and a weakening of the * * * * * implementing at the earliest possible time a mass acuteness of the moment, and means that the overflight of American aviation in the area where difficulty of taking “decisive measures” against Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the the missile platforms are deployed, with a pos- Cuba unavoidably would grow. USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, sible commando raid, have received wide circu- 27 October 1962 lation. Several of them in this regard express the opinion that an ultimatum to the Cuban govern- 27.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN ment itself to disassemble the missile platforms TOP SECRET in a very short time might precede such an over- [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- Making Copies Prohibited flight. As before, the real possibility of an immi- tion by Mark H. Doctoroff] Copy No. 1 nent incursion in Cuba is being asserted, but the theme of a bombardment of the missile bases has * * * * * CIPHERED TELEGRAM now moved to the fore. The wide circulation and the certain orienta- For Dobyrnin’s 27 October 1962 Cable tion of similar conversations under conditions of His Meeting with Robert F. Kennedy, During the entire day of 26 October in broad- when, practically speaking, censorship has been see accompanying box casts of American radio, television, and in press introduced on reports concerning Cuba, and when reports, in accord with instructions from above, it constant instruction of journalists is going on, * * * * * is being ever more firmly asserted that in Cuba leads to the thought that these conversations are the construction of missile bases is being contin- inspired by the government itself. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s ued under a forced tempo, and that the missiles Facilitating the circulation of these types of Instructions to the USSR Ambassador to the themselves are being brought to operational readi- moods and rumors, the USA government, evi- USA, 28 October 1962 ness. dently, is trying to show its determination to Toward the end of the day, the State Depart- achieve at any price the liquidation of the missile Making Copies Prohibited ment representative White and the Secretary to emplacements in Cuba with the aim of putting on the President for questions of the press, [Pierre] that issue the maximum pressure on us and on CIPHERED TELEGRAM Salinger, made official declarations about that. / Cuba.

ANATOMY OF A CONTROVERSY: leader Nikita S. Khrushchev arrived Saturday blackmail. The U.S. president elected to transmit morning demanding that the United States agree this sensitive message through his brother, Attor- Anatoly F. Dobrynin’s Meeting to remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey in ney General Robert F. Kennedy, who met in his With Robert F. Kennedy, exchange for a Soviet removal of missiles from office at the Justice Department with Soviet am- Cuba. The letter struck U.S. officials as an bassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Saturday, 27 October 1962 ominous hardening of the Soviet position from That meeting has long been recognized as a the previous day’s letter from Khrushchev, which turning point in the crisis, but several aspects of by Jim Hershberg had omitted any mention of American missiles in it have been shrouded in mystery and confusion. Turkey but had instead implied that Washington’s One concerned the issue of the Jupiter missiles in If the Cuban Missile Crisis was the most pledge not to invade Cuba would be sufficient to Turkey: U.S. officials maintained that neither dangerous passage of the Cold War, the most obviate the need for Soviet nuclear protection of John nor Robert Kennedy promised to withdraw dangerous moment of the Cuban Missile Crisis Castro’s revolution. the Jupiters as a quid pro quo, or concession, in was the evening of Saturday, 27 October 1962, On Saturday evening, after a day of tense exchange for the removal of the Soviet missiles when the resolution of the crisis—war or peace— discussions within the “ExComm” or Executive from Cuba, or as part of an explicit agreement, appeared to hang in the balance. While Soviet Committee of senior advisers, President Kennedy deal, or pledge, but had merely informed Dobrynin ships had not attempted to break the U.S. naval decided on a dual strategy—a formal letter to that Kennedy had planned to take out the Ameri- blockade of Cuba, Soviet nuclear missile bases Khrushchev accepting the implicit terms of his can missiles in any event. This was the version of remained on the island and were rapidly becom- October 26 letter (a U.S. non-invasion pledge in events depicted in the first published account of ing operational, and pressure on President exchange for the verifiable departure of Soviet the RFK-Dobrynin meeting by one of the partici- Kennedy to order an air strike or invasion was nuclear missiles), coupled with private assur- pants, in Robert F. Kennedy’s Thirteen Days: A mounting, especially after an American U-2 re- ances to Khrushchev that the United States would Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, posthu- connaissance plane was shot down over Cuba speedily take out its missiles from Turkey, but mously published in 1969, a year after he was that Saturday afternoon and its pilot killed. Hopes only on the basis of a secret understanding, not as assassinated while seeking the Democratic nomi- that a satisfactory resolution to the crisis could be an open agreement that would appear to the nation for president. While Thirteen Days de- reached between Washington and Moscow had public, and to NATO allies, as a concession to picted RFK as rejecting any firm agreement to dimmed, moreover, when a letter from Soviet continued on page 77 76 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

EXTRAORDINARY necessary to mention his name, but he did it). the answer should be given by the Government of I responded that in the Embassy no one Cuba. WASHINGTON besides me knows about the conversation with Tell U Thant that in our opinion, his journey him yesterday. R. Kennedy said that in addition to Cuba with a group of accompanying officials SOVIET AMBASSADOR to the current correspondence and future exchange would have a positive significance. of opinions via diplomatic channels, on important Telegraph upon implementation. Quickly get in touch with R. Kennedy and questions he will maintain contact with me di- tell him that you passed on to N.S. Khrushchev rectly, avoiding any intermediaries. [handwritten] the contents of your conversation with him. N.S. Before departing, R. Kennedy once again 28. X [illegible initials, presumably Khrushchev sent the following urgent response. gave thanks for N.S. Khrushchev’s quick and Gromyko’s] The thoughts which R. Kennedy expressed effective response. at the instruction of the President finds under- Your instructions arrived here 1.5 hours af- [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- standing in Moscow. Today, an answer will be ter the announcement via radio about the essence tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] given by radio to the President’s message of of N.S. Khrushchev’s response. I explained to R. October 27, and that response will be the most Kennedy that the tardiness was caused by a delay * * * * * favorable. The main thing which disturbs the of telegrams at the telegraph station. President, precisely the issue of the dismantling Coded telegram from Soviet official Georgy under international control of the rocket bases in 28.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN Zhukov, 1 November 1962 Cuba—meets no objection and will be explained in detail in N.S. Khrushchev’s message. [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; TOP SECRET Telegraph upon implementation. translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] Making Copies Prohibited Copy No. 1 * * * * * [handwritten] CIPHERED TELEGRAM (A. Gromyko) Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s Instructions to the USSR representative at I am reporting about a meeting with [White [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; trans- the United Nations, 28 October 1962 House press secretary Pierre] Salinger on 31 lation by Mark H. Doctoroff] October. I. Salinger requested that I pass on to N.S. * * * * * In relation to the information which you Khrushchev that Kennedy is thankful to him for received about U Thant’s conversations with the the decision which he made to dismantle and Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the Cuban representative [Garcia] Inchaustegi, you remove the missiles, and expresses his confi- USA Dobrynin to USSR MFA, must be guided by the following: dence that the agreement which was reached, 28 October 1962 First. You must declare to U Thant that built on mutual trust, will open the way to the orders have been given to the Soviet officers in resolution of other ripe problems. “The President Cuba to take down the emplacements which the does not want to portray the matter as if we won TOP SECRET Americans characterize as offensive weapons. a victory over the USSR,” said Salinger. His Making Copies Prohibited Declare also that by itself, it goes without saying version for the press is exactly reflected in [New Copy No. 1 that any type of work related to the creation of York Times correspondent James] Reston’s ar- such emplacements has already ceased. ticle of 29 October. Kennedy declared to the CIPHERED TELEGRAM Second. Also inform U Thant about the members of the government that it makes no Soviet government’s agreement to his proposal sense to try to use the situation that developed to R. Kennedy, with whom I met, listened very that representatives of the International Red Cross Khrushchev’s detriment. In this spirit, Rusk attentively to N.S. Khrushchev’s response. Ex- be allowed to visit the Soviet ships bound for conducted talks with 50 of the most prominent pressing thanks for the report, he said that he Cuba in order to confirm that on them there are and trusted observers in the USA and allied would quickly return to the White House in order none of the types of weapons about which the countries. to inform the President about the “important President and government of the USA show con- 2. Kennedy, in Salinger’s words, is now response” of the head of the Soviet government. cern, calling them offensive weapons. In this extremely preoccupied with somehow disarming “This is a great relief,” R. Kennedy added fur- regard it is intended that the stated representatives his adversaries, who are asserting that he has once ther, and it was evident that he expressed his will be conveyed to both Soviet ships and to the again “fallen into a trap...” “We must, he said, no words somehow involuntarily. “I,” said R. ships of neutral countries. You must inform U matter what, publish evidence that the missiles Kennedy, “today will finally be able to see my Thant, for his personal information, that on those have been dismantled and taken away. Let it be kids, for I have been entirely absent from home.” Soviet ships which at the present time are bound representatives of the UN or of the Red Cross, let According to everything it was evident that for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. it be observation photos taken from the air, it is all R. Kennedy with satisfaction, it is necessary to Stress that the Soviet government has taken the same to us. In this regard we are not demand- say, really with great relief met the report about all these steps so as not to step on the negotiations, ing access to the missiles themselves, they really N.S. Khrushchev’s response. which have begun on U Thant’s initiative, be- are secret. We must publish evidence that they In parting, R. Kennedy once again requested tween him and the representatives of the USSR, are no longer on the launching pads and that they that strict secrecy be maintained about the agree- USA, and Cuba, aimed at liquidating the danger- have been taken away. ment with Turkey. “Especially so that the corre- ous situation which has developed. 3. Kennedy, in Salinger’s words, as in the spondents don’t find out. At our place for the As far as the issue of the possibility of U past is under strong pressure from the “right- time being even Salinger does not know about it” Thant’s journey to Cuba with a group of aides and wingers,” who are condemning him for the fact (It was not entirely clear why he considered it experts is concerned, it goes without saying that that he, for the first time in the history of the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 77

Western hemisphere has given a guarantee for the CONTROVERSY permanent preservation of a “Communist pre- continued from page 75 serve” by the shores of the USA. In order to withdraw the Jupiters, this was also the first deflect these attacks, Kennedy must receive evi- public indication that the issue had even been dence to the effect that Castro has no “offensive” privately discussed. weapons. With Dobrynin obviously unable to publish 4. Kennedy, as Salinger asserts, believes his own version—he remained Moscow’s am- that achieving a resolution to the Cuban crisis bassador in Washington until 1986, and Soviet “will open a completely new epoch in Soviet- diplomats were not in the habit of publishing tell- American relations,” when mutual trust will be- NEW RUSSIAN LAW all exposés prior to glasnost—the first important come the “basis of everything.” One of the first AND THE Soviet account of the event to emerge was con- issues to be resolved can and must be the issue of ARCHIVAL SITUATION tained in the tape-recorded memoirs of deposed a test ban. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, which were 5. Regarding a meeting between Kennedy On 25 January 1995 the Russian parlia- smuggled to the West and published in 1970 and Khrushchev, before the Cuban crisis a major- ment passed a “Federal Law on Information, (after Khrushchev’s death, additional installments ity of members of the government spoke out Information Systems, and the Protection of saw print in the West in 1974 and 1990). The against such a contact, although it had been Information.” It was signed into law by account of the RFK-Dobrynin meeting in publicly stated that Kennedy will meet with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 20 February Khrushchev Remembers, in the form of a para- Khrushchev if he comes to the General Assem- 1995 and was published in Sobranie phrase from memory of Dobrynin’s report, did bly. Kennedy himself had doubted that this Zakonodatel’stva Rossiskoi Federatsii 8 (20 not directly touch upon the secret discussions meeting will bring any sort of positive results. February 1995), pp. 1213-1225. concerning the Jupiters, but did raise eyebrows “Now, - said Salinger - the situation has The lengthy, 25-article law covers a wide with its claim that Robert F. Kennedy had fretted changed. The Cuban crisis showed that the issues range of topics, and much of it has no direct to Dobrynin that if his brother did not approve an on which the improvement of Soviet-American bearing on the archives. In a few places, attack on Cuba soon, the American military might relations depends must be resolved urgently. however, especially Article 13 (“Guarantees of “overthrow him and seize power.” The second Therefore, it is will be necessary to review the the Provision of Information”), the law does volume of Khrushchev’s memoirs (Khrushchev position in relation to a meeting in light of the have a direct--and, unfortunately, highly Remembers: The Last Testament), published post- results of the settlement of the crisis. We were too negative--bearing on the archives. Points 1 and humously in 1974, touched only briefly on the close to war for it to be possible to forget about 2 of Article 13, which entitle “organs of state Robert Kennedy-Dobrynin meeting, but included this and to allow ourselves to delay even longer in authority” to restrict access to “information the flat statement (on p. 512) that “President reaching a resolution to the problems which have resources pertaining to the activities of these Kennedy said that in exchange for the withdrawl become urgent. However, the President still does organs,” effectively leave the individual state of our missiles, he would remove American mis- not have a prepared decision about the expedi- ministries and agencies with full discretion siles from Turkey and Italy,” although he de- ency of a meeting and about the issues which over their own archives. scribed this “pledge” as “symbolic” since the should be considered. We still have to think This provision may be consistent with rockets “were already obsolete.” about that.” legislation passed in the spring of 1994, but it Over the years, many scholars of the Cuban 6. Salinger, like other interlocutors in Wash- runs counter to suggestions that the archival Missile Crisis came strongly to suspect that Rob- ington, avoided touching on the German ques- holdings of the various ministries and state ert Kennedy had, in fact, relayed a pledge from tion. He mentioned in passing only that “even in agencies be gradually transferred to the his brother to take out the Jupiters from Turkey in respect to Berlin we have always stressed our auspices of the State Archival Service of exchange for the Soviet removal of nuclear mis- respect for the opposing point of view.” Russia (Rosarkhiv). It also seems to run siles from Cuba, so long as Moscow kept the 7. Salinger stressed that even with all the counter to the decree that Yeltsin issued last swap secret; yet senior former Kennedy Admin- “shortcomings” of Kennedy and Khrushchev’s September, which was published in the istration officials, such as then-National Security Vienna meeting, it had given a positive result, at previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin (Fall Advisor McGeorge Bundy and then-Secretary of least insofar as on the basis of the agreement that 1994, pp. 89, 100). State Dean Rusk, continued to insist that RFK had been achieved there the problem had It is difficult to say how strictly the law had passed on no more than an informal assur- been settled, which prompted confidence that it is will be enforced, but it seems to be one further ance rather than an explicit promise or agree- possible to develop our relations on the basis of indication that the proponents of archival ment. trust. For precisely this reason Kennedy had openness are losing ground, at least for now. The first authoritative admission on the U.S. withdrawn the forces from . side that the Jupiters had actually been part of a “The Cuban crisis undermined this develop- --Mark Kramer “deal” came at a conference in Moscow in Janu- ment of relations, but Khrushchev’s wise deci- ary 1989, after glasnost had led Soviet (and then sion may put the development of Soviet-Ameri- Cuban) former officials to participate in interna- can relations onto a basis of mutual trust,” said tional scholarly efforts to reconstruct and assess Salinger. the history of the crisis. At that meeting, former 8. Salinger asked me to pass on to N.S. Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen (and Khrushchev his personal thanks for the hospital- the uncredited editor of Thirteen Days) admitted, ity which had been given to him in Moscow. after prodding from Dobrynin, that he had taken it upon himself to edit out a “very explicit” XI.I.62 G. ZHUKOV reference to the inclusion of the Jupiters in the final deal to settle the crisis. [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- Now Dobrynin’s original, contemporane- tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] ous, and dramatic cable of the meeting, alluded to 78 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN in some accounts by Soviets (such as Anatoly He asked me what offer the United States power. The American army could get out of Gromyko, son of the late foreign minister) with was making, and I told him of the letter that control.’” special access, has been declassified and is avail- President Kennedy had just transmitted to able at the archives of the Russian Foreign Min- Khrushchev. He raised the question of our remov- [Khrushchev Remembers, intro., commentary, istry. It is reprinted in translation below, along ing the missiles from Turkey. I said that there and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. with relevant excerpts from the other publica- could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970; tions mentioned above. The Dobrynin cable’s made under this kind of threat or pressure, and that citation from paperback edition, New York: Ban- first publication in English, a copy obtained by in the last analysis this was a decision that would tam, 1971), pp. 551-52] the Japanese television network NHK, came last have to be made by NATO. However, I said, year in an appendix to We All Lost the Cold War, President Kennedy had been anxious to remove * * * * * a study by Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, those missiles from Italy and Turkey for a long whose commentary is also excerpted. period of time. He had ordered their removal Sorensen’s “Confession”: some time ago, and it was our judgment that, * * * * * within a short time after this crisis was over, those ...the president [Kennedy] recognized that, missiles would be gone. for Chairman Khrushchev to withdraw the mis- Robert F. Kennedy’s (edited) Description I said President Kennedy wished to have siles from Cuba, it would be undoubtedly helpful peaceful relations between our two countries. He to him if he could say at the same time to his I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin about wished to resolve the problems that confronted us colleagues on the Presidium, “And we have been 7:15 P.M. and asked him to come to the Depart- in Europe and Southeast Asia. He wished to move assured that the missiles will be coming out of ment of Justice. We met in my office at 7:45. I forward on the control of nuclear weapons. How- Turkey.” And so, after the ExComm meeting [on told him first that we knew that work was con- ever, we could make progress on these matters the evening of 27 October 1962], as I’m sure tinuing on the missile bases in Cuba and that in only when the crisis was behind us. Time was almost all of you know, a small group met in the last few days it had been expedited. I said that running out. We had only a few more hours—we President Kennedy’s office, and he instructed in the last few hours we had learned that our needed an answer immediately from the Soviet Robert Kennedy—at the suggestion of Secretary reconnaissance planes flying over Cuba had been Union. I said we must have it the next day. of State [Dean] Rusk—to deliver the letter to fired upon and that one of our U-2s had been shot I returned to the White House.... Ambassador Dobrynin for referral to Chairman down and the pilot killed. That for us was a most Khrushchev, but to add orally what was not in the serious turn of events. [Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of letter: that the missiles would come out of Tur- President Kennedy did not want a military the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: New Ameri- key. conflict. He had done everything possible to can Library, 1969), 107-109.] avoid a military engagement with Cuba and with Ambassador Dobrynin felt that Robert the Soviet Union, but now they had forced our * * * * * Kennedy’s book did not adequately express that hand. Because of the deception of the Soviet the “deal” on the Turkish missiles was part of the Union, our photographic reconnaissance planes Khrushchev’s Description resolution of the crisis. And here I have a confes- would have to continue to fly over Cuba, and if sion to make to my colleagues on the American the Cubans or Soviets shot at these planes, then The climax came after five or six days, when side, as well as to others who are present. I was we would have to shoot back. This would our ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, the editor of Robert Kennedy’s book. It was, in inevitably lead to further incidents and to escala- reported that the President’s brother, Robert fact, a diary of those thirteen days. And his diary tion of the conflict, the implications of which Kennedy, had come to see him on an unofficial was very explicit that this was part of the deal; but were very grave indeed. visit. Dobrynin’s report went something like this: at that time it was still a secret even on the He said the Cubans resented the fact that we “Robert Kennedy looked exhausted. One American side, except for the six of us who had were violating Cuban air space. I replied that if could see from his eyes that he had not slept for been present at that meeting. So I took it upon we had not violated Cuban air space, we would days. He himself said that he had not been home myself to edit that out of his diaries, and that is still be believing what Khrushchev had said— for six days and nights. ‘The President is in a why the Ambassador is somewhat justified in that there would be no missiles placed in Cuba. grave situation,’ Robert Kennedy said, ‘and does saying that the diaries are not as explicit as his In any case, I said, this matter was far more not know how to get out of it. We are under very conversation. serious than the air space of Cuba—it involved severe stress. In fact we are under pressure from the peoples of both of our countries and, in fact, our military to use force against Cuba. Probably [Sorensen comments, in Bruce J. Allyn, James G. people all over the globe. at this very moment the President is sitting down Blight, and David A. Welch, eds., Back to the The Soviet Union had secretly established to write a message to Chairman Khrushchev. We Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference missile bases in Cuba while at the same time want to ask you, Mr. Dobrynin, to pass President on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27-28, proclaiming privately and publicly that this would Kennedy’s message to Chairman Khrushchev 1989 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, never be done. We had to have a commitment by through unofficial channels. President Kennedy 1992), pp. 92-93] tomorrow that those bases would be removed. I implores Chairman Khrushchev to accept his of- was not giving them an ultimatum but a state- fer and to take into consideration the peculiarities * * * * * ment of fact. He should understand that if they of the American system. Even though the Presi- did not remove those bases, we would remove dent himself is very much against starting a war Accounts of Former U.S. Officials: them. President Kennedy had great respect for over Cuba, an irreversible chain of events could the Ambassador’s country and the courage of its occur against his will. That is why the President McGeorge Bundy: people. Perhaps his country might feel it neces- is appealing directly to Chairman Khrushchev for sary to take retaliatory action; but before that was his help in liquidating this conflict. If the situation ... Later [on Saturday], accepting a proposal from over, there would be not only dead Americans continues much longer, the President is not sure Dean Rusk, [John F.] Kennedy instructed his but dead Russians as well. that the military will not overthrow him and seize brother to tell Ambassador Dobrynin that while COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 79 there could be no bargain over the missiles that a pistol to Khrushchev’s head and say, “Mr. people themselves established and maintained had been supplied to Turkey, the president him- Chairman, launch those missiles or we’ll blow [their system]. “The OAS resolution is a direct self was determined to have them removed and your head off!” violation of the UN Charter,” I added, “and you, would attend to the matter once the present crisis ...In framing a response [to Khrushchev’s as the Attorney General of the USA, the highest was resolved—as long as no one in Moscow second letter of Saturday, October 27], the presi- American legal entity, should certainly know called that action part of a bargain. [p. 406] dent, Bundy, McNamara, Bobby Kennedy, and I that.” met in the Oval Office, where after some discus- R. Kennedy said that he realized that we had ...The other part of the oral message [to Dobrynin] sion I suggested that since the Jupiters in Turkey different approaches to these problems and it was was proposed by Dean Rusk; that we should tell were coming out in any event, we should inform not likely that we could convince each other. But Khrushchev that while there could be no deal the Russians of this so that this irrelevant question now the matter is not in these differences, since over the Turkish missiles, the president was de- would not complicate the solution of the missile time is of the essence. “I want,” R. Kennedy termined to get them out and would do so once the sites in Cuba. We agreed that Bobby should stressed, “to lay out the current alarming situation Cuban crisis was resolved. The proposal was inform Ambassador Dobrynin orally. Shortly the way the president sees it. He wants N.S. quickly supported by the rest of us [in addition to after we returned to our offices, I telephoned Khrushchev to know this. This is the thrust of the Bundy and Rusk, those present included Presi- Bobby to underline that he should pass this along situation now.” dent Kennedy, McNamara, RFK, George Ball, to Dobrynin only as information, not a public “Because of the plane that was shot down, Roswell Gilpatrick, , and pledge. Bobby told me that he was then sitting there is now strong pressure on the president to Theodore Sorensen]. Concerned as we all were with Dobrynin and had already talked with him. give an order to respond with fire if fired upon by the cost of a public bargain struck under Bobby later told me that Dobrynin called this when American reconnaissance planes are flying pressure at the apparent expense of the Turks, and message “very important information.” over Cuba. The USA can’t stop these flights, aware as we were from the day’s discussion that because this is the only way we can quickly get for some, even in our own closest councils, even [Dean Rusk as told to Richard Rusk, As I Saw It information about the state of construction of the this unilateral private assurance might appear to (New York: Norton & Co., 1990), pp. 238-240] missile bases in Cuba, which we believe pose a betray an ally, we agreed without hesitation that very serious threat to our national security. But if no one not in the room was to be informed of this * * * * * we start to fire in response—a chain reaction will additional message. Robert Kennedy was in- quickly start that will be very hard to stop. The structed to make it plain to Dobrynin that the Dobrynin’s Cable to the Soviet Foreign same thing in regard to the essence of the issue of same secrecy must be observed on the other side, Ministry, the missile bases in Cuba. The USA government and that any Soviet reference to our assurance 27 October 1962: is determined to get rid of those bases—up to, in would simply make it null and void. [pp. 432-44] the extreme case, of bombing them, since, I ...There was no leak. As far as as I know, repeat, they pose a great threat to the security of none of the nine of us told anyone else what had TOP SECRET the USA. But in response to the bombing of these happened. We denied in every forum that there Making Copies Prohibited bases, in the course of which Soviet specialists was any deal, and in the narrowest sense what we Copy No. 1 might suffer, the Soviet government will un- said was usually true, as far as it went. When the doubtedly respond with the same against us, orders were passed that the Jupiters must come CIPHERED TELEGRAM somewhere in Europe. A real war will begin, in out, we gave the plausible and accurate—if in- which millions of Americans and Russians will complete—explanation that the missile crisis had die. We want to avoid that any way we can, I’m convinced the president once and for all that he Late tonight R. Kennedy invited me to come sure that the government of the USSR has the did not want those missiles there.... [p. 434] see him. We talked alone. same wish. However, taking time to find a way The Cuban crisis, R. Kennedy began, con- out [of the situation] is very risky (here R. Kennedy [from McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: tinues to quickly worsen. We have just received mentioned as if in passing that there are many Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years a report that an unarmed American plane was shot unreasonable heads among the generals, and not (New York: Random House, 1988] down while carrying out a reconnaissance flight only among the generals, who are ‘itching for a over Cuba. The military is demanding that the fight’). The situation might get out of control, President arm such planes and respond to fire with irreversible consequences.” Dean Rusk: with fire. The USA government will have to do “In this regard,” R. Kennedy said, “the presi- this. dent considers that a suitable basis for regulating Even though Soviet ships had turned around, I interrupted R. Kennedy and asked him, the entire Cuban conflict might be the letter N.S. time was running out. We made this very clear to what right American planes had to fly over Cuba Khrushchev sent on October 26 and the letter in Khrushchev. Earlier in the week Bobby Kennedy at all, crudely violating its sovereignty and ac- response from the President, which was sent off told Ambassador Dobrynin that if the missile cepted international norms? How would the today to N.S. Khrushchev through the US Em- were not withdrawn immediately, the crisis would USA have reacted if foreign planes appeared over bassy in Moscow. The most important thing for move into a different and dangerous military its territory? us,” R. Kennedy stressed, “is to get as soon as phase. In his book Khrushchev Remembers, “We have a resolution of the Organization possible the agreement of the Soviet government Khrushchev states that Robert Kennedy told of American states that gives us the right to such to halt further work on the construction of the Dobrynin that the military might take over. overflights,” R. Kennedy quickly replied. missile bases in Cuba and take measures under Khrushchev either genuinely misunderstood or I told him that the Soviet Union, like all international control that would make it impos- deliberately misused Bobby’s statement. Obvi- peace-loving countries, resolutely rejects such a sible to use these weapons. In exchange the ously there was never any threat of a military “right” or, to be more exact, this kind of true government of the USA is ready, in addition to takeover in this country. We wondered about lawlessness, when people who don’t like the repealing all measures on the “quarantine,” to Khrushchev’s situation, even whether some So- social-political situation in a country try to im- give the assurances that there will not be any viet general or member of the Politburo would put pose their will on it—a small state where the invasion of Cuba and that other countries of the 80 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Western Hemisphere are ready to give the same ing this question. Then I told R. Kennedy that the very least, Kennedy suggested that he thought assurances—the US government is certain of president’s thoughts would be brought to the that Soviet retaliation was likely. Such an admis- this.” attention of the head of the Soviet government. I sion was still damaging to compellence. It seems “And what about Turkey?” I asked R. also said that I would contact him as soon as there likely that Kennedy was trying to establish the Kennedy. was a reply. In this regard, R. Kennedy gave me basis for a more cooperative approach to crisis “If that is the only obstacle to achieving the a number of a direct telephone line to the White resolution. His brother, he made clear, was under regulation I mentioned earlier, then the president House. enormous pressure from a coterie of generals and doesn’t see any unsurmountable difficulties in In the course of the conversation, R. Kennedy civilian officials who were “itching for a fight.” resolving this issue,” replied R. Kennedy. “The noted that he knew about the conversation that This also was a remarkable admission for the greatest difficulty for the president is the public television commentator Scali had yesterday with attorney general to make. The pressure on the discussion of the issue of Turkey. Formally the an Embassy adviser on possible ways to regulate president to attack Cuba, as Kennedy explained deployment of missile bases in Turkey was done the Cuban conflict [one-and-a-half lines whited at the beginning of the meeting, had been greatly by a special decision of the NATO Council. To out] intensified by the destruction of an unarmed announce now a unilateral decision by the presi- I should say that during our meeting R. American reconnaissance plane. The president dent of the USA to withdraw missile bases from Kennedy was very upset; in any case, I’ve never did not want to use force, in part because he Turkey—this would damage the entire structure seen him like this before. True, about twice he recognized the terrible consequences of escala- of NATO and the US position as the leader of tried to return to the topic of “deception,” (that he tion, and was therefore requesting Soviet assis- NATO, where, as the Soviet government knows talked about so persistently during our previous tance to make it unnecessary. very well, there are many arguments. In short, if meeting), but he did so in passing and without any This interpretation is supported by the such a decision were announced now it would edge to it. He didn’t even try to get into fights on president’s willingness to remove the Jupiter seriously tear apart NATO.” various subjects, as he usually does, and only missiles as a quid pro quo for the withdrawal of “However, President Kennedy is ready to persistently returned to one topic: time is of the missiles in Cuba, and his brother’s frank confes- come to agree on that question with N.S. essence and we shouldn’t miss the chance. sion that the only obstacle to dismantling the Khrushchev, too. I think that in order to with- After meeting with me he immediately went Jupiters were political. “Public discussion” of a draw these bases from Turkey,” R. Kennedy to see the president, with whom, as R. Kennedy missile exchange would damage the United States’ said, “we need 4-5 months. This is the minimal said, he spends almost all his time now. position in NATO. For this reason, Kennedy amount of time necessary for the US government revealed, “besides himself and his brother, only to do this, taking into account the procedures that 27/X-62 A. DOBRYNIN 2-3 people know about it in Washington.” exist within the NATO framework. On the Khrushchev would have to cooperate with the whole Turkey issue,” R. Kennedy added, “if [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, trans- administration to keep the American concession Premier N.S. Khrushchev agrees with what I’ve lation from copy provided by NHK, in Richard a secret. said, we can continue to exchange opinions be- Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost Most extraordinary of all is the apparent tween him and the president, using him, R. the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer- agreement between Dobrynin and Kennedy to Kennedy and the Soviet ambassador. “However, sity Press, 1994), appendix, pp. 523-526, with treat Kennedy’s ultimatum as “a request, the president can’t say anything public in this minor revisions.] and not an ultimatum.” This was a deliberate regard about Turkey,” R. Kennedy said again. R. attempt to defuse as much as possible the hostility Kennedy then warned that his comments about * * * * * that Kennedy’s request for an answer by the next Turkey are extremely confidential; besides him day was likely to provoke in Moscow. So too was and his brother, only 2-3 people know about it in Lebow and Stein comment, Dobrynin’s next sentence: “I noted that it went Washington. We All Lost the Cold War (excerpt): without saying that the Soviet government would “That’s all that he asked me to pass on to not accept any ultimatum and it was good that the N.S. Khrushchev,” R. Kennedy said in conclu- The cable testifies to the concern of John and American government realized that.” sion. “The president also asked N.S. Khrushchev Robert Kennedy that military action would trig- Prior meetings between Dobrynin and to give him an answer (through the Soviet am- ger runaway escalation. Robert Kennedy told Kennedy had sometimes degenerated into shout- bassador and R. Kennedy) if possible within the Dobrynin of his government’s determination to ing matches. On this occasion, Dobrynin indi- next day (Sunday) on these thoughts in order to ensure the removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, cates, the attorney general kept his emotions in have a business-like, clear answer in principle. and his belief that the Soviet Union “will undoubt- check and took the ambassador into his confi- [He asked him] not to get into a wordy discus- edly respond with the same against us, some- dence in an attempt to cooperate on the resolution sion, which might drag things out. The current where in Europe.” Such an admission seems of the crisis. This two-pronged strategy suc- serious situation, unfortunately, is such that there illogical if the administration was using the threat ceeded where compellence alone might have is very little time to resolve this whole issue. of force to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw failed. It gave Khrushchev positive incentives to Unfortunately, events are developing too quickly. its missiles from Cuba. It significantly raised the remove the Soviet missiles and reduced the emo- The request for a reply tomorrow,” stressed R. expected cost to the United States of an attack tional cost to him of the withdrawal. He re- Kennedy, “is just that—a request, and not an against the missiles, thereby weakening the cred- sponded as Kennedy and Dobrynin had hoped. ultimatum. The president hopes that the head of ibility of the American threat. To maintain or the Soviet government will understand him cor- enhance that credibility, Kennedy would have rectly.” had to discount the probability of Soviet retalia- I noted that it went without saying that the tion to Dobrynin. That nobody in the government Soviet government would not accept any ultima- was certain of Khrushchev’s reponse makes tums and it was good that the American govern- Kennedy’s statement all the more remarkable. ment realized that. I also reminded him of N.S. It is possible that Dobrynin misquoted Rob- Khrushchev’s appeal in his last letter to the ert Kennedy. However, the Soviet ambassador president to demonstrate state wisdom in resolv- was a careful and responsible diplomat. At the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 81

CASTRO’S SPEECH munity be prepared to go to war to be the Soviet’s sophisticated knowledge of continued from page 1 defend any socialist country, then we military matters. Still, he quarreled with the a portion of the speech, and made it avail- had absolutely no right to raise any Soviet leaders over the political aspects of able to us for publication.1 That portion questions about something that could Operation (the Soviet for concerns the Missile Crisis, which Cubans represent a potential danger. the missile emplacement). He sought a call the October Crisis. The statement not public announcement of the decision prior to only constitutes President Castro’s most Subsequently (and earlier, in his meetings the completed installation of missiles for extensive remarks about the 1962 confron- with Mikoyan), the Cuban leader has said two reasons. First, he judged that such a tation, but also provides his reflection on the that he understood the missiles also could be statement would itself have a deterrent ef- episode only five years after it occurred.2 an immediate deterrent to a U.S. invasion. fect against a U.S. invasion, by effectively This document is usefully read in conjunc- But here he presented the idea that Cuba committing the Soviet Union to Cuba’s de- tion with notes taken by the Soviet ambassa- would be on the front line of the struggle fense. Second, publication of the Cuban- dor to Cuba, Aleksandr Alekseev, during between East and West.4 Soviet agreement would strengthen Cuba’s meetings immediately after the crisis be- Prior to 1962, Cuba had sought admis- “moral” defense in the United Nations and tween Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas sion to the Warsaw Pact, but had been re- in the forum of international public opinion. Mikoyan and Cuba’s principal leaders. buffed. Castro’s rationale for accepting the Keeping the operation secret, he argued in Translated excerpts from both documents missiles provided a formulation that would 1968, required are printed below. Taken together, the docu- enable Cuba to claim de facto membership ments provide a deeper understanding of the in the Pact. It was placing itself in harm’s the resort to lies which in effect meant to nature and roots of the Cuban-Soviet rela- way for the benefit of socialist countries, and waive a basic right and a principle.... tionship between the crisis and the August so it had the right to expect reciprocal pro- Cuba is a sovereign, independent coun- 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. tection from the Pact in the event of an try, and has a right to own the weapons Those six years were the defining mo- attack. that it deems necessary, and the USSR ments of both the Cuban revolution and the By May 1962, Cuba expected and feared to send them there, in the same light that remaining 23 years of the Cuban-Soviet a U.S. military invasion. Cuban leaders rea- the United States has felt that it has the relationship. It is notable, then, that just soned first that the Kennedy Administration right to make agreements with dozens of eight months prior to the 1968 invasion, would not be content to accept blithely the countries and to send them weapons that Castro provided his party’s leadership with outcome of the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs they see fit, without the Soviet Union such an extensive review of Cuban-Soviet invasion. They viewed Cuba’s January 1962 ever considering that it had a right to ties, starting with the Missile Crisis. To suspension from the Organization of Ameri- intercede. From the very outset it was a appreciate the significance of this speech, it can States as a justification for and prelude capitulation, an erosion of our sover- is necessary first to review Cuba’s perspec- to an invasion.5 Importantly, their fears eignty....9 tive on the Missile Crisis. were reinforced by the development of a major U.S. covert action, codenamed Op- While the world breathed a sigh of relief Cuba’s Perspective on the Crisis eration Mongoose, and other American mili- when Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced tary preparations.6 Approved by President on 28 October 1962 that the Soviets would Until recent years, Cuba had been John Kennedy at the end of November 1961, dismantle and remove the missiles in ex- largely excluded from or marginalized in Operation Mongoose became the largest CIA change for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba, analyses of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was operation until . Though the Castro was enraged. “We were profoundly seen as no more than the stage on which the program was never fully implemented, the incensed,” he reported to the Central Com- U.S.-Soviet confrontation brought the world United States did train and support thou- mittee in 1968. The basis and acuteness of to the brink of nuclear war. But new infor- sands of Cuban exiles, many of whom en- Cuba’s anger are evident in the conversa- mation about Cuba’s role indicates that a gaged in repeated acts of sabotage on the tions Castro had with Mikoyan in early No- full appreciation of the event can only be island, including the destruction of facto- vember 1962, immediately after gained by examining Cuba’s goals and fears ries, the burning of fields, the contamination Khrushchev’s decision. prior to the crisis and its actions during the of sugar exports, and the re-supply of counter- First, there was the matter of consulta- crisis.3 revolutionaries in the Escambray Moun- tion. Cuba learned about the Soviet decision Early in his speech, Castro asserted that tains.7 Cuban intelligence had infiltrated the at the same moment the United States did, by when a Soviet delegation (headed by the exile groups and had captured several of the hearing Khrushchev’s announcement on Ra- Uzbek party chief Sharif Rashidov) pro- saboteurs. While Cuba was not privy to the dio Moscow on the morning of October 28. posed the installation of ballistic missiles in closely held Mongoose planning documents, Mikoyan argued to Castro on November 3 Cuba in May 1962, it had a reasonably accurate picture of the that there had been no time to consult with extent of the operation.8 the Cuban leader, especially in light of a We saw it as a means of strengthening This was the context in which the Cu- letter Castro had sent to Khrushchev on the socialist community...and if we were ban leaders accepted the Soviet proposal to October 27 (it was written on October 26, proposing that the entire socialist com- install missiles. Castro acknowledged that completed in the early hours of October 27, he placed great faith in what he perceived to and was received in the Kremlin very late on 82 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the 27th). In that letter, the Cuban leader and an even greater number in . But predicted that U.S. military strikes, and con- Cuban leaders did want to retain other weap- Finally, Cuba perceived it was nothing ceivably an invasion, were likely to occur in onry that the United States was demanding more than a pawn in Soviet calculations. the next 24 to 72 hours (that is, possibly 10- the Soviet Union withdraw. Most important Castro’s comments to Mikoyan about this 12 hours after the Kremlin received the were IL-28 bombers, which were obsolete confuse the sequence of events, but the source letter). In order to protect Cuba, Mikoyan but capable of carrying a nuclear payload. of the anger and disillusionment is clear. He contended, the Soviet Union had to act Castro explained in 1968 that said on November 3: swiftly, without consulting Cuba. But, Castro retorted, the formula worked out between they were useful planes; it is possible And suddenly came the report of Kennedy and Khrushchev seemed to be based that had we possessed IL-28s, the Cen- the American agency UPI that “the So- on a secret letter the Soviet leader had sent to tral American bases [from which Cuban viet premier has given orders to Soviet the U.S. president on October 26, prior to exiles were launching Mongoose at- personnel to dismantle missile launch- receiving the Cuban leader’s assessment.10 tacks] might not have been organized, ers and return them to the USSR.” Our Cuba thus felt aggrieved at being ignored. not because we would have bombed the people could not believe that report. It Second, Castro was angry over the bases, but because of their fear that we caused deep confusion. People didn’t Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement itself. might. understand the way that the issue was Why, he demanded of Mikoyan, did the structured—the possibility of removing Soviets not extract anything more substan- Mikoyan recognized their importance. missile armaments from Cuba if the tial from the United States that would in- On November 5, Mikoyan told the Cuban U.S. liquidated its bases in Turkey. crease Cuban security and defend Cuba’s leadership that “Americans are trying to honor? On October 28, the Cuban leader had make broader the list of weapons for evacu- In 1992, the Cuban leader intimated that this articulated five points that he stated should ation. Such attempts have already been initial confusion hardened into anger during have been the basis of an agreement, includ- made, but we’ll not allow them to do so.”13 his six-week trip to the Soviet Union, in ing a cessation of U.S. overflights and a “To hell with the imperialists!” Castro early 1963, after Khrushchev inadvertently withdrawal from Guantanamo Naval Base.11 approvingly recalled Mikoyan saying, if they informed Castro that there had been a secret At a minimum he expected that the Soviets added more demands. Nevertheless, Castro understanding between the United States could have forced the United States to meet lamented in 1968, “some 24, or at most 48 and Soviet Union for the removal of U.S. with Cuba to discuss the five points face to hours later...Mikoyan arrived bearing the missiles from Turkey. This seemed to con- face. That would have at least recognized sad news that the IL-28 planes would also firm his suspicion that the protection of Cuban sovereignty. Instead, the Soviets have to be returned.”14 (Castro’s memory Cuba was merely a pretext for the Soviet seemed oblivious to Cuban sovereignty, even may be in error here: according to the declas- goal of enhancing its own security.16 Here agreeing to an internationally sponsored in- sified Soviet records of the Mikoyan-Castro were the seeds of true discontent. spection of the dismantling of the missiles conversations, Mikoyan conveyed The lessons were clear to Castro, and on Cuban soil without first asking Cuba’s Moscow’s decision to withdraw the these were what he attempted to convey to permission. bomber’s, to Castro’s evident fury, in a the Central Committee in 1968. The Soviet Third, there was the issue of Cuba’s meeting on November 12.15) From the Cu- Union, which casually trampled on Cuban vulnerability, which had several elements. ban perspective, Cuba was even more vul- sovereignty and negotiated away Cuba’s The Cuban leadership interpreted the agree- nerable than before the Missile Crisis be- security, could not be trusted to look after ment as a Soviet capitulation to U.S. threats, cause the hollowness of Soviet protection Cuba’s “national interests.” Consequently, and correctly understood at the time what was exposed and key weaponry was being Cuba had to be vigilant in protecting itself was made explicit only twenty years later: taken away. and in maintaining its independence. that the Soviet Union was unwilling ulti- Castro also was concerned that the U.S.- mately to put itself at risk to protect Cuba.12 Soviet accord would weaken Cuba inter- Significance of the January 1968 Speech “We realized,” Castro said to the Central nally and encourage counter-revolution and Committee, “how alone we would be in the perhaps challenges to his leadership. He Castro’s 12-hour speech came at the event of a war.” In the same vein, he de- remarked to Mikoyan on 3 November 1962: conclusion of the first meeting of the Central scribed the Soviet decision to remove all but Committee since the Cuban Communist 3,000 of its 42,000 military personnel from All of this seemed to our people to Party was founded in October 1965. The Cuba as “a freely granted concession to top be a step backward, a retreat. It turns out main purpose of the session was to conduct off the concession of the withdrawal of the that we must accept inspections, accept a “trial” of 37 members of the party, who strategic missiles.” the U.S. right to determine what kinds of were labelled the “micro-faction.” Though The Cubans saw the Soviet soldiers weapons we can use....Cuba is a young the designation “micro” was intended to more as a deterrent to potential U.S. aggres- developing country. Our people are diminish their importance, there was little sion—a kind of tripwire that would involve very impulsive. The moral factor has a doubt that the attack against them was filled the Soviet Union in a Cuban-U.S. conflict— special significance in our country. We with high drama and potentially high stakes than as a necessary military support. Cuba were afraid that these decisions could for the Cuban revolution. had more than 100,000 soldiers under arms provoke a breach in the people’s unity.... The meeting began on January 23, and COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 83 was presided over by Raoul Castro, the on the history of Cuban-Soviet relations, the artistic community.18 This was also a Minister of the Armed Forces and the party’s which was quite critical of the Soviet Union, period when Havana was awash in graffiti second secretary. All of the proceedings, be kept secret when the micro-faction trial and juvenile vandalism, which leaders asso- except Fidel Castro’s speech, were promi- itself had been made so public? (Indeed, ciated with a growing “” movement. nently reprinted in the Cuban Communist despite our repeated requests, the bulk of the On the other hand, Castro apparently Party newspaper Granma.17 speech is still secret, and the only portion believed he had to “educate” the Central Most prominent among the 37 was that has been declassified is the portion Committee about the errors of the micro- Anibal Escalante, who was well known in pertaining to the missile crisis.) Recent faction, and demonstrate to party leaders Cuba. The leader of the Popular Socialist interviews we conducted in Havana with that the purge was warranted. He could not Party (which was the communist party) be- former officials make clear that there were be certain how popular Escalante was with fore 1959, he also headed the Integrated three motives for keeping the speech from the members of the Central Committee, be- Revolutionary Organizations in 1961, which the public. cause it was such a nascent and diverse was the party created to mesh Castro’s July First, there was a concern that the United group. He thus sought to avoid party dis- 26th Movement, the Revolutionary Direc- States would interpret such direct Cuban unity by convincing the leaders that the torate, and the Popular Socialist Party into criticism of the Soviet Union as a visible purge was necessary to protect Cuban na- one unit. What made the attack on Escalante sign of rupture between Cuba and its bene- tionalism, which was the ultimate source of and his cohorts especially dramatic was that factor. Cuban leaders, quite mindful of the legitimacy. Castro did this, one former they were charged with adhering to criti- 1965 Dominican Republic invasion, did not official remarked, by explaining that “the cisms of the Cuban Communist Party that want to encourage U.S. hawks to attempt platform of the micro-faction would in fact had been voiced by Moscow-oriented com- military attacks against the island. The mi- turn us into a Soviet satellite.” This not only munist parties in Latin America. Moreover, cro-faction trial, after all, focused on alleg- would have subverted Cuban national iden- they were accused of meeting with officials edly errant individuals and avoided impli- tity, but would have been a grave error, of the Soviet embassy in Havana, of provid- cating the Soviet Union directly. because—as he argues in the section of the ing these officials (one of whom was alleg- Cuban leaders were also worried about speech on the Missile Crisis—the Soviet edly the KGB station chief) with false infor- internal disunity. On the one hand, they did Union was untrustworthy. mation about Cuba, and of encouraging the not want to encourage the Cuban public to Third, by keeping the speech secret, Soviet Union to apply economic sanctions seize on the speech as a sign that Cuba Castro sent a message to the Soviet Union against Cuba. In effect, their purge could be disavowed all aspects of Soviet socialism. that while Cuba profoundly disagreed with it interpreted as a direct rebuff to the Soviet There was considerable cultural ferment in over several issues, there was still the possi- Union. Cuba at the time, and Cuban leaders were bility of accommodation. Had the Cuban Why, then, would Fidel Castro’s speech feeling besieged by increasing criticism from made his criticisms public, it

FIDEL CASTRO, GLASNOST, S. Khrushchev, E. Primakov and many other During our meetings, I told him about our AND THE CARIBBEAN CRISIS people who were involved in the events of discussions with the Americans, and asked 1962 to attend the conference. him if he thought it would be a good idea for by The Moscow conference turned out to the Cubans to join the process in order to be particularly interesting thanks to the par- present the maximum amount of reliable In October 1987, Harvard University ticipation of an authoritative Cuban delega- information about this dramatic episode in hosted a symposium on the Caribbean Cri- tion led by Sergio del Valle, a member of the Cuban and world history. sis (or Cuban Missile Crisis) in which Rob- Cuban government who in 1962 had been the Fidel thought for a moment, stroking ert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Theodore Cuban army chief of staff. This article de- his beard with a familiar gesture. Then he Sorensen, and other prominent veterans of scribes how this unprecedented Cuban in- said: “It is not only a good idea, but it is a the Kennedy Administration took part; I volvement in an East-West historical inves- necessity. There are so many myths and was one of three Soviets who also partici- tigation became possible, and Fidel Castro’s puzzles about those events. We would be pated, along with Fyodor Burlatsky and personal role in that decision. On 7 Novem- able to help, to give information about the Sergo Mikoyan. At the conclusion of that ber 1987, only a few weeks after the Harvard events in which we were immediate partici- interesting discussion it was agreed to ad- discussions, the Soviet Union celebrated the pants. But nobody has invited us.” vance a step further the historical study that 70th anniversary of the October Socialist Then I requested an invitation for the had been jointly launched.1 Revolution. Foreign delegations were led by Cubans to the Moscow conference. Fidel The next “round” of this study was held the “first persons,” and Fidel Castro was promised to send a delegation and he deliv- in Moscow in January 1989.2 The Soviet among them. At that time I was a deputy ered on his word. More than that. He Political Science Association and the Insti- chairman of the CPSU Central Committee positively responded to the idea to hold a tute of World Economy and International department responsible for relations with “third round” in Cuba, and indeed a confer- Relations invited U.S. former officials and Cuba, and I had an opportunity to talk with ence was held, with Fidel’s active participa- scholars, and on the Soviet side A. Gromyko, the Cuban leader several times in his resi- tion, in Havana in January 1992.3 A. Dobrynin, A. Alexeev, O. Troyanovsky, dence, the mansion at the Leninskie Gory. continued on page 87 84 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN would have been far more difficult to over- challenge because it claimed to be the model quent months, in speeches critical of the come the tensions with the Soviet Union. for developing socialism in Latin America, Soviet model of socialism and world revolu- These tensions were reaching their peak and the Cuban was less advanced tion, and supporting Ché Guevara’s Novem- in January 1968. In a public speech on than that in some other countries. Moreover, ber 1966 expedition to Bolivia, which was January 2, the Cuban leader blamed the the Cuban revolution had succeeded largely opposed by the Bolivian Communist Party.24 Soviet Union for an inadequate delivery of without the support of the Popular Socialist Guevara had left Cuba in 1965, but he sent a fuel that he asserted would require a stricter Party. To some extent the ideological prob- message to the Tricontinental Conference in rationing of gasoline.19 What the Soviets lem could be obscured by treating Cuba as which he declared that through “liberation had done was to increase supplies only mod- an exception, especially during the period struggles” in Latin America, “the Cuban estly from the previous year, and well below that it was not ruled by a communist party. Revolution will today have a task of much what the Cubans needed to pursue their But the issue became more critical after greater relevance: creating a Second or a ambitious plan of producing a ten million October 1965, when the Cuban Communist Third ....”25 In August 1967, at the ton sugar harvest by 1970. This plan was an Party was formally established as the ruling first meeting of the Organization for Latin element in their goal of achieving some party. American Solidarity—which was created independence from the Soviet Union. That came three months before a major by the Tricontinental Conference—Cuba ar- The Soviet action came after Premier international meeting of revolutionaries in ranged for nearly all of the delegations to be Alexsei Kosygin visited Cuba in July 1967, Havana, the Tricontinental Conference. Until dominated by non-communist revolution- on his way back to Moscow from a then, Soviets believed they had papered over ary movements. Later in the year, it point- meeting in New Jersey with President its differences with Cuba on the matter of edly chose to absent itself from a Soviet- Lyndon Johnson. The Castro-Kosygin meet- armed struggle by resolving at a December organized preparatory meeting of world com- ing reportedly was quite tense, in part be- 1964 meeting of Latin American communist munist parties in Budapest.26 cause Cuba disagreed with Soviet aspira- parties that while armed struggle was a valid The trial of the micro-faction thus came tions for a detente with the United States. It means of achieving socialism, the appropri- at what seemed to be a critical juncture for is likely, also, that Kosygin approvingly ate means were to be assessed by each com- Cuba in its relationship with the Soviet Union. conveyed a U.S. message that Cuba should munist party. Cuba, moreover, agreed to In March 1968, Castro focused his revolu- desist from supporting revolutionary guer- deal only with the established communist tionary fervor on Cuba itself, and asserted rilla movements in Latin America.20 parties in Latin America.21 that the masses had become complacent, Cuba’s support for these movements Then the Tricontinental Conference up- believing “that we were defended.” But “the had been a source of friction between the set the fragile peace. While it was fully only truly revolutionary attitude,” he ex- two countries for most of the period after the endorsed by the Soviet Union, which hoped horted, “was always to depend on ourselves.” Missile Crisis. It raised several problems for the conference would undermine China’s He then announced that he was eliminating the Soviet Union. One was ideological, and influence with revolutionary movements the private ownership of small businesses: in this context it is worth noting that Cuban (and which it apparently did), the Soviets “we did not make a Revolution here to affairs in the CPSU Central Committee were were taken aback by the barely veiled criti- establish the right to trade.”27 handled in part by the department respon- cisms of its allegedly weak support for North Was this a prelude to a fundamental sible for ideology. The Soviet Union be- Vietnam. The conference also created a new break with the Soviet Union? In fact, by lieved that socialism could evolve peace- organization, headquartered in Havana, to Cuba had actually begun a rap- fully in Latin America, and would come support armed revolutionary activity prochement with the Soviet Union, which about through united front alliances spear- throughout the world, and the organization’s was evident in a softer tone in Castro’s headed by the established communist par- executive secretariat had only three repre- speeches about international affairs. Then ties. It was critical in their view to appreciate sentatives from communist parties—Cuba, in August, Cuba refused to condemn the that Latin America was not ripe for revolu- and North Korea, all of whom Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. While tion, because it had an underdeveloped pro- were critical of the Soviet Union.22 In a call communist parties in many countries roundly letariat. To be sure, there were some differ- for armed struggle in every Latin American criticized the Soviet Union, Castro excori- ences within the Soviet leadership about country, Castro concluded the conference ated the Czech Communist Party for moving whether any support should be given to by fervently criticizing the Latin American its country “toward a counterrevolutionary guerrilla movements, and there were differ- communist parties: situation, toward and into the ences even among the Latin American com- arms of imperialism.”28 Though it came munist parties about the support that should if there is less of resolutions and possi- several days after the invasion, and carefully be granted to movements within their re- bilities and dilemmas and it is under- avoided endorsing the invasion, Castro’s spective countries. In the mid-1960s, for stood once and for all that sooner or later speech was viewed in Moscow as a welcome example, the Venezuelan Communist Party all or almost all people will have to take contrast to the widespread reproach the So- developed a close alliance with the main up arms to liberate themselves, then the viet Union was receiving. In 1969, Soviet guerrilla movement there. The Argentine hour of liberation for this continent will trade with Cuba began to increase dramati- Party, in contrast, was firmly opposed to be advanced.23 cally, and within four years Cuba became a support for any guerrilla movements. member of the Council of Mutual Economic Still, Cuba posed a frontal ideological Castro reinforced these views in subse- Assistance (), the Soviet-domi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 85 nated trading bloc of socialist countries. Cuba. Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge: The January 1968 speech, then, ap- 3. Much of the information has been derived from two Harvard University Press, 1989), 108; Cole Blasier, major conferences—held in Moscow in 1989 and in The Giant’s Rival: The USSR and Latin America (Pitts- pears to have given the Cuban leadership Havana in 1992—which brought together former burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 126. the freedom to choose a closer relationship policymakers and scholars from the United States, 13. See record of Mikoyan-Castro conversation, 5 with the Soviet Union. By asserting Cuban Soviet Union and Cuba, and included President Castro, November 1962, Russian Foreign Ministry archives. independence, Castro could accept the kind as well as from documents declassified through the 14. The correspondence between Kennedy and efforts of the National Security Archive. See James G. Khrushchev over the removal of the IL-28s is reprinted of ties that would have appeared to make Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans in Problems of Communism, Special Edition, Spring Cuba less independent. and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2d ed. 1992, 77-96. Also in this issue see: Philip Brenner, It is impossible to know whether this (New York: Noonday Press of Farrar Straus and Giroux, “Kennedy and Khrushchev on Cuba: Two Stages, Three sort of calculation prompted his speech. In 1990). James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Parties.” Welch, Cuba on the Brink (New York: Pantheon, 15. For an English translation of the November 12 January 1968, the Cuban leadership may 1993); Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow minutes, and of Mikoyan’s ciphered telegram to Mos- not have had a clear sense of where they Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27- cow summarizing it, see Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and were taking their country. The internal 28, 1989, eds., Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight and Gen. William Y. , : U.S. and debate during the following two or three David A. Welch, CSIA Occasional Paper No. 9 (Lanham, Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis MD: University Press of America, 1992); Philip Brenner, (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), 189-99. months—which undoubtedly engendered “Thirteen Days: Cuba’s Perspective on the Missile 16. Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 224- the March closure of small businesses— Crisis,” in James A. Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile 225. proved to be critical for the future direction Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); 17. Granma, International Edition (English), 4 and 11 of the Cuban revolution. Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban February 1968. Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Docu- 18. Lourdes Casal, “Cultural Policy and Writers in With hindsight, it seems that Cuba had ments Reader (New York: The New Press, 1992). Cuba,” in Philip Brenner, William M. LeoGrande, few options left. It had experienced a major 4. This formulation was the same he provided in an Donna Rich, and Daniel Siegel, eds., The Cuba Reader: rift with China by 1966. The October 1967 interview five months after the crisis. See Claude The Making of a Revolutionary Society, (New York: death of Guevara in Bolivia convinced sev- Julien, “Sept Heures avec M. Fidel Castro,” Le Monde, Grove Press, 1989), 508-509. 22 and 23 March 1963. 19. Granma, International Edition (English), 7 January eral Cuban leaders that armed struggle was 5. Indeed, the Soviets similarly assessed the suspen- 1968, 2-3. not going to be a viable means of building sion. See Blight and Welch, On the Brink (2d ed.), 238. 20. Yuri Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance: 1959-1991 revolutionary alliances in Latin America. 6. On pre-crisis U.S. military planning and covert (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), While the Soviet Union continued to trade actions against Cuba, see James G. Hershberg, “Before 88. ‘’: Did Kennedy Plan a Military 21. D. Bruce Jackson, Castro, the Kremlin and Com- with Cuba despite its fierce independence, Strike Against Cuba?” in Nathan, ed., The Cuban munism in Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Kosygin’s visit may have been a warning to Missile Crisis Revisited, 237-80. Notably, former Sec- Press, 1969), 28-29; Jacques Lévesque, The USSR and Castro that the Soviet Union would not give retary of Defense Robert McNamara observed in 1989 the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategi- Cuba any more rope with which to wander that were he a Cuban leader in 1962, he would likely cal Perspectives, 1959-77, trans. Deanna Drendel have assessed that U.S. actions portended an invasion. Leboeuf (New York: Praeger, 1978), 102-104. away from the fold. Indeed, Soviet techni- See Allyn, Blight, and Welch, Back to the Brink, 7. 22. Lévesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution, cians were recalled during the spring of McNamara argued, though, that despite Cuba’s reason- 119-121. 1968.29 able conclusion, the United States never intended a 23. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, These factors thus impelled Cuba to- military invasion. “The Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian and 7. Operation Mongoose was devised as a total plan for Latin American Peoples,” A Staff Study, 89th Cong., ward a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, low intensity conflict. It also included propaganda 2nd Sess., 7 June 1966, p. 93. and the decision to do so coincided with the operations through an off-shore radio station and eco- 24. For exemplary speeches, see Martin Kenner and micro-faction trial and Castro’s speech. In nomic pressure that was implemented through the for- James Petras, eds. Fidel Castro Speaks (New York: choosing to join the fold, Cuba would try to mal establishment of the U.S. embargo in February Grove Press, 1969), 171-213. On Guevara’s problems 1962. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the operational chief of with the Bolivian Communist Party, see El Diario del do it on its own terms, determined to protect the project, had proposed a very detailed plan of action Ché en Bolivia (Havana: Editora Politica, 1987), esp. its sovereignty and to be the principal guard- that foresaw U.S. pressure leading to a general uprising the introduction by Fidel Castro, xvii-xviii, and 47, 51, ian of its national interest. That determina- that would ultimately require a direct U.S. military 53, 337. tion clearly grew out of its experiences invasion. See Chang and Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban 25. John Gerassi, ed., Venceremos! The Speeches and Missile Crisis, 1962, Documents 5 and 7. Writings of Ernesto (New York: Simon during the Missile Crisis and in the prior 8. Fabian Escalante Font, Cuba: la guerra secreta de la and Schuster, 1968), 420. five years of tense relations with the Soviet CIA (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 1993). 26. Lévesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution, Union. It is in understanding these terms 9. Castro made a similar case in 1992. See Blight, Allyn 130-131. with which Cuba established its ties to the and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 205-210. Notably, 27. Kenner and Petras, eds., Fidel Castro Speaks, 233, President Kennedy understood the matter of secrecy in 277. Soviet Union that the January 1968 speech the same light, asserting that whoever revealed the 28. Granma International Edition (English), 25 August makes an important contribution to the his- missiles first would be able to set the terms of debate. 1968. tory of the Cold War. See Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of 29. Domínguez, To Make the World Safe for Revolu- Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 382. Also tion, 75. 1. The full text of the Missile Crisis portion of the see McGeorge Bundy and Theodore Sorensen’s com- speech will be published in James G. Blight and Philip ments in Allyn, Blight and Welch, Back to the Brink, James G. Blight is Senior Research Fellow at the Brenner, The October Crisis: Fidel Castro, Nuclear 20-21. Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown Uni- Missiles, and Cuban-Soviet Relations (Lanham, MD: 10. The Castro-Khrushchev correspondence was re- versity, and has organized several conferences and co- Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming). printed in Problems of Communism, Special Edition, authored several books on the Cuban Missile Crisis; 2. At the time, Castro was First Secretary of the Spring 1992, 37-45, and in Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Philip Brenner chairs the Department of International and Commander-in-Chief Cuba on the Brink, 474-491. Politics, School of International Studies, American of the Cuban Armed Forces. He was referred to as 11. Revolucion, 29 October 1962. University, and has written several studies on Cuban Commander Castro. Today he is also President of 12. Jorge I. Domínguez, To Make the World Safe for affairs. 86 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

The October Crisis: concession. remember exactly? Was it the Red Cross thing? Excerpts of a Speech by Fidel Castro We recall perfectly well how we assumed CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ: He went [Translated from Spanish by the Cuban the always unpleasant initiative of making a state- to the extreme of proposing that the international Council of State] ment—at my suggestion—that would create the vessel be brought to Mariel, saying that because right atmosphere, trying to justify the action by it was an international vessel it would no longer MEETING OF THE saying that the planes were obsolete, etc. All of be Cuban territory, and the UN supervisors could CENTRAL COMMITTEE which was done in consideration for public opin- be on board the vessel and could supervise the OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA ion, to protect the people from the trauma of operation. It was then that Raul woke up and said, PALACE OF THE REVOLUTION another blow of that nature, since we were seri- “Look, why don’t you dress them up in sailor HAVANA ously concerned—and, in our view, rightly so suits?” (LAUGHTER), referring to the interna- , 1968 given those circumstances—over the pernicious tional supervisors. YEAR OF THE HEROIC GUERRILLA effects of a chain of such blows on the confidence COMMANDER RAUL CASTRO: These and the consciousness of the people. And, I people think that I said that because I had been MORNING SESSION repeat, given that under the circumstances we dozing; I actually woke up at that point and came were profoundly incensed, we saw that action as out with that, have them bring those people on COMMANDER FIDEL CASTRO: In the a mistake, in our opinion there had been a series their vessel, dressed up as Soviet sailors, but early hours of [this] morning we stopped while on of mistakes, but the extent of our overall confi- leaving us out of the whole mess. It is true that I the topic of the reply sent to the Soviet Govern- dence, and that deposited in the Soviet Union and was falling asleep, but I was not that far gone. ment in response to their letter attempting to find its policies, was still considerable. COMMANDER FIDEL CASTRO: That justifications in alleged alarms, and purporting So the planes went too. Together with the was it. insinuations of a nuclear strike in the sense that planes—and that is something that they had re- ———— we had advised the USSR to attack the United quested, the issue of the missiles—they requested COMMANDER FIDEL CASTRO: We had States.1 the withdrawal of the Soviet problems with the translators and there were These issues were made perfectly clear in brigades stationed in Cuba. Let me add here, in occasions when some of the things we said were that letter. Later there was another long letter case anyone is unaware of it, that at the time of the badly translated and there was even one point containing the same points of view, and though missile issue, there were over 40,000 Soviet troops when poor Mikoyan got furious. It was over some couched in more diplomatic terms, so to speak, stationed in Cuba. The imperialists must also phrase or other. answering each of the items in Khrushchev’s have known that, but they never declared the Anyway, those deliberations—as well as letter one by one.2 amount, they limited themselves to speculative some of the others—were characterized by total At that time, we also received Mikoyan’s figures, which revealed their interest in reducing and complete disagreement. Needless to say, we visit. Mikoyan’s visit was also taken down....No, the amount, perhaps due to possible effects on have the highest opinion of Mikoyan as an indi- Mikoyan’s visit was not taken down in short- public opinion. vidual, as a person, and he was always favorably hand; there were notes on Mikoyan’s visit. U In fact, anyone who reads Kennedy’s state- inclined toward Cuba, he was Cuba’s friend, and Thant’s visit was the one that was taken down in ments, his demands, will notice that he did not I think he still is a friend of Cuba; I mean, he did shorthand. It is a real pity that the discussions include those divisions, which were not offensive quite a bit for us. That is why he always received with Mikoyan were not taken down in shorthand, or strategic weapons, or anything of the sort. We from us a certain deferential treatment. because they were bitter; some of the incidents in must note that the withdrawal of the mechanized It was during those days that it gradually the meeting were anecdotal. brigades was a freely granted concession to top became evident that we were totally correct—as Initially, after we explained to him our stand- off the concession of the withdrawal of the stra- was, unfortunately, so often the case throughout points, we had him clarify what was going to tegic missiles. that whole process—about the imperialists’ atti- happen with the IL-28 planes, and he vouched We argued heatedly, firmly, were against tude vis-a-vis the concessions. This could be that no, the IL-28s would not leave Cuba. Then, this. He said that it would not be carried out seen as low-flying aircraft increased their con- if I remember correctly, I asked him, “But what if immediately but gradually, and we reiterated that stant and unnecessary daily flights over our bases, they demand their withdrawal, what will you we were against it and insisted on our opposition. military facilities, airports, anti-aircraft batteries, do?” He answered, “then to hell with the imperi- I am explaining all this for the sake of subsequent more and more frequently; they harbored the alists, to hell with the imperialists!” issues, so that you can understand how all this fits hope, after the October [Cuban Missile] Crisis, of Then some 24, or at most 48 hours later, he into the history of our relations with the Soviet demoralizing the Revolution and they fell on us, arrived at the meeting—those famous meetings Union. We flatly rejected the inspection issue. hammer and tongs, with all their arsenal of propa- at the Palace of the Revolution—Mikoyan ar- That was something we would never agree to. ganda and with everything that might demoralize rived bearing the sad news that the IL-28 planes We told him what we thought about that gross, our people and our army. would also have to be returned.3 insolent arbitrary measure, contrary to all prin- We had agreed not to shoot; we agreed to That was really unpleasant, but the situation ciples, of taking upon themselves the faculty of revoke the order to fire on the planes while the was such that, with the missiles withdrawn, we deciding on matters under our jurisdiction. And talks were under way; but made it clear that we were on the verge of another problem over the when it was remarked that the agreement would did not consider those talks conclusive at all. I planes. It would have made sense to have had it fall flat—an agreement that we were completely believe we were totally right on that; had we acted out over the missiles, but not over the IL-28 at odds with—we said that we could not care less differently, we would still have their aircraft planes—they were useful planes: it is possible and that there would simply be no inspection. flying low over us and—as we would sometimes that had we possessed IL-28s, the Central Ameri- That gave rise to endless arguing and counter- say—we would not even be able to play baseball can bases might not have been organized, not arguing, and they actually found themselves in a here. because we would have bombed the bases, but of very difficult situation. I think that at this point The demoralizing effect began to manifest their fear that we might. What we were most Raul made a joke that caused quite a commotion itself in the fact that the anti-aircraft gunners and concerned about then was avoiding a new impact in the atmosphere of that meeting. I think it was the crews at the air bases had begun to draw on public opinion as regards a new blow, a new when we were discussing expedients. Do you caricatures reflecting their mood and their situa- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 87 tion, in which they depicted the planes flying 6. In 1968, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez had ministerial CASTRO AND GLASNOST above them, the Yanquis sticking their tongues rank and was involved in foreign commerce. He had continued from page 83 out at them, and their planes and guns covered been an official of the Cuban communist party (which with cobwebs. And we realized once again to was called the Popular Socialist Party) before the 1959 After discussing all the logistical and revolution, and had served in the government of what extent the men who were supposed to be organizational problems related to the Fulgencio Batista (as part of a ) in 1944, project, the Cuban leader began to recall very experienced in struggling against the impe- and headed the Institute for Agrarian Reform from rialists were actually totally oblivious to imperi- 1962-64. In the 1970s he became a Vice President of those troubled days of October 1962 when alist mentality, revolutionary mentality, our Cuba and a member of the Political Bureau of the Cuban the fate of the humanity was played out in the people’s mentality, and the ultra-demoralizing Communist Party. game between Moscow, Washington, and effects of such a passive—more than passive, Havana. And even though Castro repeat- cowardly—attitude. edly spoke on this topic later, that conversa- So we warned Mikoyan that we were going tion contained a series of statements and to open fire on the low-flying planes. We even did him that favor, since they still had the ground- judgments that shed some light on the devel- opment and outcome of the 1962 crisis, and to-air missiles and we were interested in preserv- CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS ing them. We visited some emplacements and on Fidel Castro’s perspective on it: asked that they be moved given that they were The Cold War International His- not going to shoot and we did not want them “I Know Something About The Caribbean destroyed, because we were planning to open fire tory Project offers a limited number of Crisis” on the planes. fellowships to junior scholars from the We recall those days because of the bitter former Communist bloc to conduct (Notes from a conversation with Fidel Castro, decisions that had to be made. from three months to one year of archi- 5 November 1987) val research in the United States on 1. [Ed. note: Castro is here alluding to his exchange of topics related to the history of the Cold Some Details and Specifics of the correspondence with Khrushchev of 26-31 October Crisis Situation. 1962 (esp. Castro’s letters of October 26 and 31 and War. Recipients are based at the Insti- Khrushchev’s letter of October 30), first released by tute for European, Russian and Eur- In October [1962] the American planes be- the Cuban government and published in the Cuban asian Studies at George Washington gan low flights above the Soviet launching sites Communist Party newspaper Granma on 23 Novem- University in Washington, D.C. Ap- ber 1990, and published as an appendix to James G. for the nuclear intermediate range missiles and Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba On plicants should submit a CV, a state- the anti-aircraft launchers. At that time the anti- the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet ment of proposed research, a letter of aircraft missiles had the range of more than 1,000 Collapse (New York: Pantheon, 1993, 474-91.] nomination, and three letters of recom- meters. Paired ground-to-air launchers were used 2. [Ed. note: It is not clear what lengthy letter Castro mendation; writing samples (particu- for protection of those anti-aircraft launchers, but is referring to here, or whether it has been made they could not provide effective protection. We available to researchers: a lengthy letter reviewing the larly in English) are welcomed, though gave an order to add hundreds of additional anti- crisis and its impact on Soviet-Cuban relations, dated not required. Applicants should have a 31 January 1963, from Khrushchev to Castro was working ability in English. Preference aircraft launchers to protect those launchers. Ad- ditional launchers were in the Cuban hands. That released at the 1992 Havana conference.] will be given to scholars who have not 3. Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan arrived in way we wanted to protect the Soviet nuclear and Havana on 2 November 1962. The first meeting with previously had an opportunity to do anti-aircraft missiles that were deployed in Cuba. the Cuban leader was on November 3. By the account research in the United States. Low overflights by the American planes repre- here, Mikoyan notified the Cubans on about November sented a real threat of an unexpected attack on 5 or 6 that the IL-28s would be removed. Declassified Send applications to: those objects. At my meeting with the Com- contemporary documents, however, including mander-in-chief of the Soviet forces in Cuba Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence and Castro- Mikoyan conversation minutes, suggest that Mikoyan Jim Hershberg [Gen. I. A. Pliyev] I raised the question of the informed Castro about Moscow’s acquiescence to Director serious danger that the American overflights rep- Kennedy’s demand to remove the IL-28s only on Cold War International History resented. That meeting occurred on the 25th or November 12. the 26th. I told him that the Cuban side could not Project (CWIHP) 4. It is not clear to what Castro is referring. Central allow the American planes to fly at such low American bases were used for training Cuban exiles in Woodrow Wilson International altitudes over the Cuban territory any more. I 1960 and 1961, and for launching the Bay of Pigs Center for Scholars even sent a letter [dated October 26] to Khrushchev invasion. There is evidence that plans also were made 1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W. about that. In that letter I told the Soviet leader for creating a Nicaraguan and Costa Rican base, but there is not clear evidence on whether they were used. Washington, D.C. 20560 about my concern with the situation that had See Fabian Escalante Font, Cuba: la guerra secreta de FAX: (202) 357-4439 developed. I said that we should not allow the la CIA (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 1993), Americans to deliver a first strike at the Soviet 180; Warren Hinckle and William Turner, Deadly objects in the Cuban territory, we should not Secrets (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992), allow the repetition of the events that led to the 165-166. World War II. At that time the crisis situation 5. In fact, U.S. estimates were never more than half of already existed. that number. See Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: On the day when the American planes ap- The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House, 1991), 308. Also see “‘Soviet peared again, we gave orders to all Cuban anti- Military Buildup in Cuba,’ 21 October, 1962,” in Mary aircraft batteries to fire. The planes were driven S. McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Mis- off by the defensive fire. However, not a single sile Crisis, 1962 (Washington: Central Intelligence plane had been shot down. Later on the same day Agency, 1992; HRP 92-9), 258. 88 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

[October 27] a spying plane, U-2, appeared in the The American leaders, Kennedy in particu- happen if the Americans demanded a withdrawal air above the island. We don’t know any details, lar, reacted to the Soviet statements very nega- of the planes and the Soviet troops. He told me but it happened so that the plane was shot down tively. They thought they were deceived. then: “To hell with Americans!” by a Soviet anti-aircraft missile over the eastern We, however, never denied the presence of However, in 24 hours the Soviet planes and part of the country. the Soviet missiles in Cuba. In all their public the majority of the troops were withdrawn from I don’t know in what manner they reported statements Cuban representatives stated that the Cuba. We asked why that had been done. The that to Khrushchev and to the General Staff of the question of presence of weapons in Cuba was a troops had been withdrawn without any compen- Soviet armed forces, however, I doubt that the sovereign business of the Cuban people, that we sation from the American side! If the Soviet order to shoot down the plane was given by the had the right to use any kind of weapons for the Union was willing to give us assistance in our Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in Cuba defense of the revolution. We believed that those defense, why did they agree to withdraw the [Pliyev]; that decision was most probably made statements of the Soviet leaders did harm to the troops, we were asking. At that time there were by the commander of the anti-aircraft missiles, or prestige of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the six regiments with 42,000 military personnel in even by a commander of one of the batteries. general public, since at the same time you al- Cuba. Khrushchev had withdrawn the troops Khrushchev, however, accused us of shooting lowed U-2 flights over the Cuban territory that from Cuba even though it was not required by the down that plane in his letter. took pictures of the missiles stationed there. Soviet-American agreement. We disagreed with To be sincere, it was possible that we were At that time the question of the withdrawal such a decision. In the end, as a concession to us to blame since we opened fire at the American of the Soviet missiles had not been raised yet. the decision was made to keep one brigade in planes first, because we were so decisively against However, the aggravation of the situation forced Cuba. The Americans knew about that brigade the American overflights. But the biggest mis- Khrushchev to make that decision. We, on our from the very beginning, but they did not discuss take probably was that you, having installed part, thought that Khrushchev had rushed, having it. those missiles, still allowed the Americans to fly made that decision without any consultation with Many years later, in 1979, before the Non- over the launching sites. Those overflights were us. We believe that the inclusion of the Cuban aligned Conference [in Havana in September nothing else but preparation for a sudden Ameri- side in the negotiations would have made it pos- 1979] American Senator [Frank] Church an- can invasion of Cuba. I cannot blame the Soviet sible to get bigger concessions from the Ameri- nounced that a Soviet brigade was deployed in comrade who shot the U-2 for what he did be- cans, possibly including the issue of the Ameri- Cuba. Then our Soviet comrades suggested that cause I understand his psychological condition can base in Guantanamo. Such rush resulted in we rename it into a training center. We were very well. He saw that the Cubans opened fire at the fact that we found out about the Soviet- against it. However, before we had a chance to the American planes, and he decided to fire a American agreement from the radio. Moreover, send our response, a [Soviet] statement had been missile at the U-2. I heard that many years later the first statement said that American missiles made that denied the American Senator’s claim he was decorated for that act. would be withdrawn only from Turkey; in the and said that there was a Soviet military training It is interesting that the former Soviet Am- second the mentioning of Turkey was dropped. center in Cuba. bassador in Cuba, [Aleksandr] Alekseev, wrote When I visited the Soviet Union in 1963, At the time of the crisis President Kennedy in his memoirs that I was trying to avoid the Khrushchev read several letters to me. The was under a great pressure, but he defended the collision. For the sake of historical objectivity I American letters were signed by Thompson, but official Soviet position. However, when he was must say that that was not so. In my letter to the real author was Robert Kennedy. In shown the photos of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev after we had deployed the anti-air- Khrushchev’s response he spoke about the mis- he had to agree that the Soviets lied to him. craft batteries and mobilized our people to repel siles in Turkey and Italy. There were certain On the question of nuclear warheads in the aggression I expressed my hope that we threats in Kennedy’s letter. In particular, he Cuba I can tell you that one day during the crisis would be able to preserve peace. I wanted to wrote that if the Russians did not accept their I was invited to a meeting at the quarters of the show Khrushchev that I was not in an aggressive proposals, something would have happened. In Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Cuba at which all mood. At the same time I wanted to inform him response to that Khrushchev stated that some- the commanders of different units reported on about my concern with the possibility of an Ameri- thing would have happened indeed if the Ameri- their readiness. Among them was the com- can first strike, not even excluding a possibility of cans undertook any actions against Cuba in disre- mander of the missile forces, who reported that a nuclear strike against Cuba. gard of the agreement, and that that something the missiles had been in full combat readiness. At the same time I suggested to the Soviet would have been incredible in its scale. That Soon after the Reagan administration came Commander-in-Chief in Cuba [Pliyev] to dis- meant that if the Americans had dared to violate to power an American emissary, Vernon Walters, perse the nuclear warheads, so that they would the agreement, a war would have begun. came to Cuba. We talked extensively about all not have been completely destroyed in case of an Probably Khrushchev did not anticipate that aspects of our relations, and in particular, he American attack. And he agreed with me. the interpreter who read the originals would have raised the question of the October crisis. Trying One more question concerned the public mentioned Italy, but the original letter mentioned to show how informed he was, he said that, statements made by the Soviet leadership and the the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey and Italy. according to his sources, nuclear warheads had coverage of the events in the organs of mass Later I asked the Soviet side to give explanations not yet reached Cuba by the time of the crisis. I media. I sent two emissaries to Moscow [on 27 of that issue, but they told me that the agreement don’t know why he said that, but according to the August-2 September 1962—ed.]—I think they mentioned only Turkey. Soviet military, the nuclear missiles were ready were Che Gevara and [Emilio] Aragones—who We couldn’t help being disappointed by the for a fight. had to propose that Khrushchev make public the fact that even though the Soviet part of the agree- I don’t know what Khrushchev was striving military agreement between the USSR and Cuba. ment talked only about the missiles in Cuba and for, but it seems to me that his assurances about Publicly the Soviet leaders claimed that there did not mention other types of weapons, particu- the defense of Cuba being his main goal notwith- were no offensive weapons in Cuba. I insisted larly IL-28 planes, subsequently they had been standing, Khrushchev was setting strategic goals that we should not allow the Americans to specu- withdrawn on the American demand. When for himself. I asked Soviet comrades about that late with the public opinion, that we should make Mikoyan came to Cuba, he confirmed to us that many times, but nobody could give me an answer. the agreement public. However, Khrushchev the agreement only provided for the withdrawal Personally, I believe that along with his love for declined. of the Soviet missiles. I asked him what would Cuba Khrushchev wanted to fix the strategic COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 89 parity in the cheapest way. When the Soviet amine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and was in progress between Cuba and the comrades proposed to us to deploy the nuclear Wang, 1989; Noonday Press of Farrar Straus and Giroux, People’s Republic of China.10 The continu- 1990). missiles in Cuba I did not like the idea, but not ing pressure of the United States for more because of the military risk; because from the 2. On the 1989 Moscow conference, see Blight and Welch, On the Brink (1990 ed.). Soviet concessions indeed corroborated this political point of view we would have been seen 3. On the 1992 Havana conference, see James G. impression. as a Soviet military base in Latin America. We Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on Mikoyan was Khrushchev’s closest were ready to accept the risk of an American the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet military invasion of Cuba in order to avoid the Collapse (New York: Pantheon, 1993). friend and most loyal ally. As had his political harm to the prestige of the Cuban revo- predecessor—Stalin dispatched Mikoyan on lution. But at the same time we understood that Georgy K. Shakhnazarov was formerly a senior official a delicate mission to Mao in January 1949— the Soviet Union needed that measure to ensure in the International Department of the Central Commit- Khrushchev frequently used Mikoyan as a their own security. We knew that we had suf- tee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and an adviser to Soviet leader . troubleshooter and personal diplomatic em- fered a big political damage at the very time issary: to Hungary (October 1956), to West when we were dreaming about a revolution in all Germany (March 1958), to the United States Latin America, but we were ready to make sac- MIKOYAN’S TALKS (January 1959), and to talk to the anti- rifices for the Soviet Union. continued from page 59 I cannot take the credit for the resolution of Khrushchev demonstrators during the The documents lend credence to the Novocherkassk riots in south Russia (June the crisis. More likely, I believe, the major role reminiscences of the historic participants— belongs to Khrushchev who caused that crisis by 1962). Important from the Cuban viewpoint, Nikita Khrushchev, Fidel Castro, former his stubbornness, and then resolved it. I did not Mikoyan had been the last in the Soviet know what was the real correlation of forces at Soviet Ambassador in Cuba Aleksandr leadership who belonged to the “old guard” 5 that time, how many missiles did Khrushchev Alekseev. They reveal that the fraternity of the Bolshevik revolutionaries. He had have. Khrushchev told me that after the missiles between Cuba and the USSR was badly known all great revolutionaries of the cen- would have been deployed in Cuba, Kennedy fractured. While the Kremlin leadership, tury, from Lenin to Mao Zedong. And he would have to swallow it, and that later the faced with a severe danger, preferred was the first to embrace the Cuban revolu- Soviet leader was going to introduce the Fleet in geostrategic pragmatism to ideological com- the Baltic Sea (probably a mistake in the notes— tion after his trip to Cuba in February 1960, mitments, the Cuban revolutionaries sprung at a time when the Kremlin still felt ambigu- should say “introduce the Baltic Sea Fleet”). I up in fierce defense of their national sover- thought that Khrushchev’s actions were too risky. ous about the Cuban revolution and its young, eignty and revolutionary “legitimacy.” From I believe that it was possible to achieve the same non-Marxist leaders. Castro, for all his goals without deploying the missiles in Cuba. To the Soviet perspective, that of a superpower, anger, let Mikoyan know on November 3 defend Cuba it would have been sufficient to the most important fact was that Castro had, that he remembered his role. Khrushchev send six regiments of Soviet troops there, be- in his letter to Khrushchev of October 26, sometimes said, Castro joked, that “there is cause the Americans would have never dared to advocated a preemptive nuclear strike against a Cuban in the CC CPSU. And that this open military activities against the Soviet troops. 6 the United States if it invaded Cuba. This Cuban is Mikoyan.” Now I understand that the actions under- notion, considered dangerous and irrespon- taken by Khrushchev were risky, if not to say What both sides felt and understood sible in Moscow, became an excuse com- during the talks was no less important than irresponsible. Khrushchev should have carried pletely to exclude Cuba from the U.S.-So- out a policy like the one Gorbachev is carrying their “formal” written content. For the third viet secret talks to resolve the crisis. Some out now. However, we understand that at that time, since the Stalin-Tito split (1948) and time the Soviet Union did not reach the parity of the Soviet leaders, gathered at the height the Sino-Soviet quarrel (since October 1959), which it has now. I am not criticizing Khrushchev of the crisis on 27 October 1962 at Novo- there was an open conflict of perspectives for pursuing strategic goals, but the choice of the Ogarevo governmental near Moscow, and interests between the USSR and another timing and the means for achieving the goals was may even have feared that the Cubans, like communist regime. And both sides were not good. 7 Ulbricht, could push them all over the brink. fully aware of this. Fidel Castro said (as When I [Shakhnazarov] said that Ameri- John J. McCloy, a representative of the cans had to and did abide by the agreement quoted to Mikoyan by Ernesto “Che” Kennedy Administration, told Mikoyan, in Guevara): “The United States wanted to reached during the Caribbean crisis throughout New York on November 1, that “he was the whole period after the crisis, Castro responded: destroy us physically, but the Soviet Union reassured by the presence of Russian offic- yes, indeed, it was so. That is why I don’t think has destroyed us de jure [iuridicheskii; ju- I have a right to criticize Khrushchev. He had his ers [in Cuba during the crisis]. The Cubans ridically, legally] with Khrushchev’s let- own considerations. And it really doesn’t make could open fire without thinking ... But the ter”11 it is not clear whether this comment 8 much sense to replay the history guessing what Russians would think first.” Khrushchev referred to Khrushchev’s letter of October could have happened if... himself was forced to explain to Kennedy 27, with its offer to swap Soviet missiles in Fidel Castro supported the idea of publish- that the Cuban leaders were “young, expan- Cuba for U.S. missiles in Turkey, or his ing memoirs of the participants of those events sive people—in a word, Spaniards.”9 and added that he would be willing to take part in letter to Kennedy of October 28, agreeing Mikoyan’s trip was triggered by without consulting Castro beforehand to the discussions of the subject himself. “I know Alekseev’s cables from Havana. The Soviet something about the Cuban crisis,” he said with withdraw the Soviet missiles from Cuba ambassador alerted the Soviet leadership a smile. under UN inspection. But in any case, both that Moscow’s actions had endangered So- actions enraged and offended Castro, who 1. The organization and results of the 1987 Cambridge viet-Cuban friendship. Khrushchev was reminded Mikoyan, on November 4, that conference are described in James G. Blight and David particularly upset to learn that a rapprochment A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reex- after the Spanish-American war (1898), when 90 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the United States “liberated” Cuba from Soviet Union’s help. “Come what may,” he heroes, before a revolutionary situation in colonial rule, Washington also did not invite concluded. “We have the right to defend our Latin America became ripe, and the camp of Cubans to a and Congress dignity.” Mikoyan could only plead plain- socialism has not yet grown to full capabili- passed the Platt Amendment (1901), which tively that he didn’t “understand such a ties to come to your rescue.” [November 5] denied Cuba an independent foreign policy.12 sharp reaction,” and failed to convince Castro In spite of the U.S. geostrategic prepon- On November 3, in a one-to-one meet- or his colleagues to soften their adamant derance, Mikoyan said that Kennedy “took a ing with Fidel (Alekseev interpreted), rejection of inspection then or in a second step in our direction,” because his pledge of Mikoyan absorbed Castro’s first angry as- meeting that evening which Castro skipped, non-intervention against Cuba “is a conces- sault and lived up to his thankless mission. leaving others in the leadership, notably sion on their part.”17 Until this episode, the When he left Moscow, Ashkhen Tumanian, Ché, to denounce bitterly the Soviet stand. Kennedy Administration had argued that his wife of forty years, was dying in the Still another tense moment in the talks Cuba for the United States was analagous to Kremlin hospital. He learned about her came on November 12 after Khrushchev, Hungary for the USSR—part of its security death during the first, tensest conversation yielding to Kennedy’s pressure, made a new zone.18 Mikoyan’s words make one think with Castro.13 concession to the United States—agreeing that this comparison had also been important Only on the second day of talks, No- to withdraw from Cuba Soviet-made IL-28 in Kremlin thinking: while the USSR crushed vember 4, did Mikoyan fully present the medium-range bombers in exchange for the the Hungarian revolt in 1956, defending its Soviet side’s arguments. He defended lifting of the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba. zone, the United States had not yet managed Khrushchev’s claim that the outcome of the Unlike the missiles, the bombers had been to do the same to the Cuban revolution. Cuban Missile Crisis was not a surrender to transferred into Cuban ownership, and Mikoyan’s next argument revealed Washington’s demands, but a Soviet-Cuban Khrushchev took pains to “clear” this new Moscow’s fervent desire to preserve its cre- “victory,” because a military attack against deal with Castro before expessing his “great dentials as the center of the world revolu- Cuba was prevented without slipping into a satisfaction” to Kennedy.14 For Mikoyan, tionary movement, particularly in the face of nuclear war. To win over the furious Castro, this second mission was no less difficult the challenge from Beijing. Mikoyan pressed Moscow’s messenger was ready to stay in than the previous one. Castro interrupted the the analogy between Khrushchev’s settle- Cuba for an indefinite time. “If my argu- Soviet interlocutor with questions full of ment of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Lenin’s ments would seem insufficiently convinc- scorn and skepticism or just stopped listen- defense of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), ing for you,” he said, “tell me about it, I will ing altogether. At one point, after hearing “an infamous peace” between revolutionary think how to get my point across to you, I Mikoyan’s lengthy defense of the IL-28 Russia and Kaiser Germany aimed at saving will try to bring new arguments.” Mikoyan’s concession, he agitatedly cut off his visitor’s the Bolshevik regime at all costs. In fact, the lengthy arguments and explanations on No- speech with the words: “Why are these argu- dialogue between Mikoyan and the Cuban vember 4 and the afternoon of November 5 ments being cited? You should say outright leaders revealed two starkly different per- finally elicited an expression of gratitude what the Soviet government wants.”15 spectives: between the Kremlin’s unwill- from Castro and an emotional, if grudging, The sequence of Mikoyan’s arguments ingness to challenge frontally American he- declaration of “unshakeable” respect for and allows us to look into mentality of the Krem- gemony in the Western hemisphere, and “complete trust” in the Soviet Union. lin leaders. Beneath the veneer of ideologi- Havana’s determination to blow this hege- But the Cuban leader and his comrades cal phraseology lay the hard core pragma- mony to pieces through a revolutionary of- were soon infuriated anew when, only min- tism of superpower statesmen who had tested fensive. utes later, Mikoyan tried to convince them to the waters of globalism and reached its lim- Castro and particularly Ché Guevara accept a United Nations inspection of the its. Argument number one was that the linked the future of the Cuban revolution to dismantling of the strategic missiles based in survival of the Cuban regime in an area the growth of the international revolutionary Cuba—or at least their loading onto Soviet where the correlation of forces was so ad- movement in Latin America. In a passionate ships in Cuban ports—arguing that such a verse constituted “a great success of Marx- outburst on November 5, with Fidel Castro process would strengthen the sympathetic ist-Leninist theory.”16 Mikoyan stopped absent, Ché told Mikoyan that Latin Ameri- position of UN Secretary-General U Thant short of telling the Cubans that understand- can communists and revolutionaries were and remove any pretext to continue the ing between Kennedy and Khrushchev was “baffled by the actions of the Soviet Union.” American blockade. Castro, acutely aware the sine qua non for the survival of the The developments especially frustrated Ché, that Khrushchev had accepted the principle Cuban revolution. But he admitted that the he explained, because, “We are deeply con- of a UN inspection without informing him, American proximity to Cuba and the U.S. vinced in the possibility of seizing power in bought none of it. “A unilateral inspection,” Navy’s huge preponderance otherwise would a number of Latin American countries, and he told Mikoyan, “would affect monstrously have ensured Cuba’s subservient place within practice shows that it is possible not only to the moral spirit of our people.” Saying he Washington’s sphere of influence. “Com- seize, but to maintain power in a number of spoke for the whole Cuban people, Castro munications between us and Cuba are over- countries, given specific [Cuban] experi- firmly rejected any international inspection extended. We cannot use our Air Force and ence and the assistance of socialist coun- of Cuba—unless a comparable inspection Navy in case of [a U.S.] blockade of Cuba.” tries, first of all the Soviet Union.” But, he took place in the United States—and told [November 4] “If Cuba were located in lamented, the Soviet “bargaining” with the Mikoyan that if such a position endangered place of , we would have shown United States and its “open retreat” before peace, Cuba could defend itself without the them.” [November 5] “You were born like American demands had led to de facto rec- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 91 ognition of all Latin America as a U.S. tion of Latin American revolutionary move- which made people in the Kremlin think sphere of influence, and discouraged na- ment could be stemmed by generous Soviet “that he spoke not all that he knew.” “Until tionalistic “petit bourgeoisie” from allying assistance. the end of [mid-term] Congressional elec- with radical forces against the omnipotent For historians of the Cuban Missile Cri- tions,” on November 6, asserted the Soviet Gringos from El Norte. “It seems to me,” sis, the most interesting parts of the docu- messenger, “Kennedy did not want to speak concluded Che, “... that one should expect a ments are where Mikoyan gave the Cubans about the Soviet missiles in Cuba. He did not decline of the revolutionary movement in his version of the recent dramatic events. want to aggravate [U.S.-Soviet relations]. Latin America.” He also stressed that in the Though this version was obviously tailored But two senators from the Republican Soviet handling of the missile crisis had to Cuban sentiments and to Mikoyan’s spe- party”—clearly alluding to Kenneth Keating already produced “a crack” in the “unity of cific tasks, there is considerable overlap, of New York and Everett Dirksen of Illi- the socialist camp.” Both he and Mikoyan sometimes almost verbatim, between nois—“learned about the fact of deployment knew that this meant factional splits in many Mikoyan’s story and the story later told by of strategic missiles in Cuba, therefore radical groupings in Latin America and a Khrushchev in his memoirs.22 So all the Kennedy hastened to take initiative in his shift of some of them to the PRC’s wing. more intriguing and credible are details that hands...We did not have information with In response, Mikoyan reminded the are missing in the Khrushchev’s version. respect to how he was going to act.” Cubans of , a young Bol- First, the documents hint at what possible A book on the hidden intelligence as- shevik (“although he was repressed, I think countermeasures the Kremlin contemplated pects of the Cuban Missile Crisis is being co- he was a good person”) who in 1918 also against the U.S. attack against Cuba. The authored now by American and Russian preferred to promote even conclusions must have been bleak, as he historians, and I hope they will comment on at a risk of sacrificing Soviet power in explained to Castro on November 4. “We Mikoyan’s assertions.23 It has become Russia. “We practically had no armed forces, could not retaliate by a blockade of an Ameri- known that CIA Director John McCone had but those comrades [like Bukharin] wanted can base, for instance, in Turkey, since we do concluded by the late summer of 1962 that to die heroically, reject Soviet power.” not have another outlet into the Mediterra- Soviets had decided to transport nuclear- “Study Lenin,” he lectured the Cubans. “One nean. We could not undertake similar steps capable missiles to Cuba, though most CIA cannot live in shame, but one should not in , nor in England, nor in Japan. We analysts discounted the likelihood of this allow the enemy to destroy oneself. There is do not have sufficient capabilities for a possibility.24 Yet, the Kremlin almost cer- an outcome in the art of diplomacy.” Krem- counter-blockade.” tainly erred in conflating the suspicions of lin apparatchiks would repeat this same Mikoyan and Khrushchev (in his letters some U.S. intelligence officials with litany of prudence time and again, when to Castro before and after the visit) sang the Kennedy’s awareness of the missiles. In this they had to deal with radical regimes in the same tune when they explained to the Cu- case, it seems, Khrushchev’s belief that the Third World later in the 1960s and 1970s. bans the reasons for Soviet secrecy and their U.S. president knew about the Soviet instal- Mikoyan reminded the Cubans that misplaced hopes to the missiles. lation of nuclear missiles in Cuba but for since 1961, Soviet-Cuban economic rela- The most eyebrow-raising aspect of domestic tactical reasons preferred to wait tions were trade in name only: the Cubans Mikoyan’s explanation deals with the ques- until after the elections to deal with them were getting everything, including weap- tion of what the Kremlin believed Kennedy stands out as one of the most remarkable ons, free of charge. “We do not pursue any knew and was about to do before the breakout example of wishful thinking in the entire commercial or national interests in Cuba,” of the crisis. Of course, the standard version history of the Cold War. he told Castro. “We are guided exclusively of events in most accounts has it that Kennedy In another interesting sidelight, the tran- by the interests of internationalism.”19 He and his advisers did not obtain hard evidence scripts of the Mikoyan-Cuban talks indicate pointed out to Castro that the Kremlin, aware of the missile deployment until a U.S. U-2 that the issue of Berlin was not the main of the American “plan to strangle Cuba reconnaissance plane photographed sites in cause for the Soviet gamble in Cuba, but a economically,” had “without any requests Cuba under construction on 14 October sideshow. Berlin was also the most serious from your side” decided “to supply to you 1962—but Mikoyan told a different story. bargaining chip the Soviets had, but they armaments, and in part military equipment U.S. intelligence, said Mikoyan, “worked hesitated to use it during the for free.” The Soviets had also covered the badly,” but “in mid-September [1962] the and bargaining in late October. Mikoyan Cuban balance of payment ($100 million) Americans seemed to receive information mentioned only in passing to the Cubans on “in order to foil the Kennedy plan, designed about the transfer of Soviet troops and strate- November 4 that “countermeasures were to detonate Cuba from within.”20 If the gic missiles to Cuba.” In Mikoyan’s version, possible in Berlin,” adding that the Soviets American blockade of Cuba continued, presented on November 4, the initial source used the Berlin asset in a disinformation Mikoyan warned, “then the Soviet Union of this scoop was not the U-2 flights but West campaign in September-October, to distract would not have enough strength to render German intelligence [Bundes- American attention from Cuba. In fact, one assistance, and the Cuban government would nachrichtendienst]. Only then, he said, “the passage from that conversation suggests that fall.”21 American government sent planes to the air this disinformation backfired, making the Mikoyan and Khrushchev evidently ex- space of Cuba to carry out the aerial-photo- Kremlin believe that the Kennedy adminis- pected that these pragmatic arguments would reconnaissance and establish the sites of tration was interested to postpone not only carry the day with the Cuban leadership, and missile deployment.” Kennedy, said the discussion on Berlin, but also secret talks that the danger of a pro-Beijing reorienta- Mikoyan, spoke nothing about Soviet troops on the Soviet strategic buildup in Cuba, until 92 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN after the Congressional elections. As program, including food, equipment, con- 12. The U.S. Congress passed the Platt Amendment in Mikoyan related to the Cubans, “Through sumer goods, and weapons. Castro, when March 1901, as an attachment to the Army Appropria- tions Bill. It authorized the U.S. President to occupy confidential channels Kennedy addressed a his dreams of Latin American revolutions Cuba until a Cuban constitution would provide guaran- request to N.S. Khrushchev that he would were shattered, sought to fulfill his “interna- tees that no “foreign power” would be ever permitted to not aggravate the situation until after the tionalist duty” in other lands, and found gain a foothold on Cuban soil. Castro referred to this Congressional elections and would not set pretexts to restore the revolutionary dignity particular clause of the Platt Amendment as a constraint on Cuban sovereignty. He referred to it at the confer- out [immediately] then to solve the Berlin of Cuba, tarnished during the Cuban Missile ence in Havana in January 1992: “We were told: either issue. We responded that we were ready to Crisis, in Angola (1975) and Ethiopia (1977- you accept the Platt Amendment, or there is no indepen- wait until the end of the elections, but right 78). Even then the Brezhnev leadership, dence. No country in the world would accept that kind afterwards would proceed to the solution of who remembered Castro’s outbursts in 1962, of amendment in its constitution, because it gives the right to another country to intervene to establish peace...” the Berlin quesion. When the Americans was reluctant to make full use of the Soviet Cuba on the Brink, 331, 341. learned about the transportation of strategic leverage on the Cuban regime. 13. Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev, 378-79. weapons into Cuba, they themselves began 14. The text of Khrushchev-Kennedy correspondence to get loud about Berlin. Both sides were 1 See Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete regarding this thorny issue on 6, 11, 12, and 13 Novem- ber 1962 is in Problems of Communism 42 (Spring talking about the Berlin crisis, but simulta- ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1992), 77-92. neously believed that the crux of their policy 1958-1961,” Cold War International History Project 15. Transcript of conversation between A.I. Mikoyan in the present moment was in Cuba.” Working Paper No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow and Fidel Castro, 12 November 1962, translation in Did Mikoyan’s mission prevent a So- Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1993), Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Re- viet-Cuban split? There is no categorical passim, quotation on 4. 2. For illustrations, see Weathersby’s article in the count the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition q, answer to this question. Castro had accepted current CWIHP Bulletin as well as her CWIHP Work- 1994), 191-99; see also ciphered telegram, A. Mikoyan Soviet assistance, but not Soviet arguments. ing Paper and article in CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), to CC CPSU, 12 November 1962, in ibid., 189-90. The Cuban leader and his comrades thought as well as her documentary essay, “The Soviet Role in 16. Castro-Mikoyan talks, 4 November 1962. 17. Mikoyan-Castro talks, November 4 and 5. primarily of the revolutionary “legitimacy” the Early Phase in the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence,” The Journal of American-East Asian Rela- 18. See, e.g., the Rusk-Gromyko meeting of 18 October of their regime in Latin America. After the tions 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-58. 1962 published elsewhere in this issue. Cuban missile crisis, the “honeymoon” in 3. This factor has begun to impress even those scholars 19. Castro-Mikoyan conversation, 12 November 1962. Soviet-Cuban relations ended and was trans- who had previously analyzed the origins of the Cuban 20. Castro-Mikoyan conversation, 4 November 1962. 21. Castro-Mikoyan conversation, 12 November 1962. formed into a marriage of convenience. This Missile Crisis through the prism of the bipolar confron- tation and the dynamics of the balance of strategic 22. For Khrushchev’s recollections of the crisis, in had both immediate and long-term conse- forces, and who firmly believed that “the factor of the English, see Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., Khrushchev quences. For instance, Mikoyan’s trip had a Cuban revolution” was of no importance in Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970), direct impact on Khrushchev’s ongoing cor- Khrushchev’s decision to deploy Soviet medium-range 488-505; Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, respondence with Kennedy. In his letter of missiles in Cuba. 4. Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev: Krizisi i and Co., 1974), 509-514; Khrushchev Remembers: The November 22, the Chairman admonished raketi. Vzgliad iznutri, vol. 2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1994), Glastnost Tapes, 170-83. the U.S. president to put himself into Castro’s 388-90. 23. Timothy Naftali from the University of Hawaii and shoes, “to assess and understand correctly 5. “Memuari Nikiti Sergeevicha Khruscheva: Karibskii Alexander Fursenko from the Russian Academy of Sciences are on a contract of Crown publishers to write the situation, and if you like psychological Krizis,” Voprosii Istorii 7 (1993), 89-110; Castro and Alekseev comments quoted in James G Blight, Bruce J. this story. Fursenko has a first-time access to the mate- state, of the leaders of Cuba... and this striv- Allyn and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, rials from the Archive of the President of Russian ing [for independence] must be respected.”25 the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Federation and the archives of the KGB [not Federal In all probability, Khrushchev addressed Pantheon, 1993), 88-99. Counterintelligence Service or FSK] that are being declassified specifically for this project. these words not so much to Kennedy (who 6. See Castro to Khrushchev, 26 October 1962, in Granma (Havana), 23 November 1990, English trans- 24. McCone’s predictions are documented in Mary S. had not the slightest desire to heed them), but lation reprinted in Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile to Castro, who on November 3 received the Brink, 481-82. Crisis (Washington, D.C.: CIA History Staff, 1992), copies of all previous Khrushchev-Kennedy 7. Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev: Krizisi i esp. 51-52, 59-60, 67-68, 77-79, reproducing McCone cables of 7, 10, 13, and 16 September 1962; see also correspondence on the settlement of the cri- raketi, vol. 2, 355-357, 360-362, 364; Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov, trans. and ed., Khrushchev comments of Ray Cline, Cuba on the Brink, 125-26. sis. From then on the Soviet leadership, in Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston: Little. Brown, 25. Problems of Communism 42 (Spring 1992), 108 order to placate their “friends,” had to for- and Co., 1990), 170-183; “Memuari Nikiti give and overlook much in Castro’s interna- Sergeevicha...,” 108; Brezhnev, according to his aide, Vladislav M. Zubok is a research fellow at the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. His book Inside tional behavior, and also had to carry the Andrei M. Alexandrov-Agentov, was “trembling” at the thought of a nuclear exchange, A.M. Alexandrov- the Kremlin’s Cold War, co-authored with Constantine burden of this behavior. In immediate impli- Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva [From Kollontai Pleshakov, will be published by Harvard University cation, because the Cubans rejected inspec- to Gorbachev] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodniie otnosheniia, Press. tions in any form on their territory, Soviet 1994), 174. military and naval personnel had to comply 8. Quoted by Mikoyan in his meeting with Cuban leaders, 5 November 1962. with humiliating procedures of aerial in- 9. Khrushchev to Kennedy, 22 November 1962, pub- spection imposed on them by the Ameri- lished in Problems of Communism 42 (Spring 1992), cans, something for which they could not 108. forgive Khrushchev even decades later. For 10. See Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev, 378. 11. Castro was quoted to this effect by Ernesto “Ché” the next three decades, the Soviet economy Guevara during Mikoyan’s meeting with Cuban lead- was burdened with a multi-billion Cuban aid ers on 5 November 1962. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 93

Mikoyan’s Mission to Havana: Cuban-Soviet Negotiations, November 1962

[Ed. note: To preserve the flavor of the Russian that in those days when a serious danger arose, defense...[Ellipsis in original.] documents, the original grammar and punctua- our whole people sensed a great responsibility for And suddenly—concessions...[Ellipsis in tion have been retained in some cases where they the fate of the motherland. Every nerve of the original.] conflict with normal English practice.] people was strained. There was a feeling that the Concessions on the part of the Soviet Union people were united in their resolve to defend produced a sense of oppressiveness. Psychologi- Cuba. Every Cuban was ready to repel the cally our people were not prepared for that. A Document I: aggressors with arms in hand, and ready to devote feeling of deep disappointment, bitterness and “And suddenly — concessions....” — their lives to the defense of their country. The pain has appeared, as if we were deprived of not The First Castro-Mikoyan Conversation, whole country was united by a deep hatred of only the missiles, but of the very symbol of 3 November 1962 USA imperialism. In those days we did not even solidarity. Reports of missile launchers being arrest anyone, because the unity of the people was dismantled and returned to the USSR at first so staggering. That unity was the result of consid- seemed to our people to be an insolent lie. You NOTES OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN erable ideological work carried out by us in order know, the Cuban people were not aware of the A.I. MIKOYAN and FIDEL CASTRO to explain the importance of Soviet aid to Cuba, agreement, were not aware that the missiles still to explain the purity of the principles in the policy belonged to the Soviet side. The Cuban people This morning a two-hour conversation took of the USSR. did not conceive of the juridical status of these place between comrade A.I. Mikoyan and Fidel We spoke with the people about the high weapons. They had become accustomed to the Castro, where I [Soviet Ambassador to Cuba patriotic objectives we were pursuing in obtain- fact that the Soviet Union gave us weapons and Aleksandr Alekseev] was also present. ing arms to defend the country from aggression. that they became our property. We said that the strategic weapons were a guaran- And suddenly came the report of the Ameri- 3 November 1962 tee of firmness for our defense. We did not can [news] agency UPI that “the Soviet premier ... classify the arms as defensive and offensive, has given orders to Soviet personnel to dismantle Unfortunately, A.I. Mikoyan said, some dif- insofar as everything depends on the objectives missile launchers and return them to the USSR.” ferences of opinion have arisen between the lead- for which they are used... [Ellipsis in original.] Our people could not believe that report. It ership of the Republic of Cuba and our leader- Speaking of psychological questions, we caused deep confusion. People didn’t understand ship. Ambassador Alekseev has informed us would like to underline that the Cuban people did the way that the issue was structured—the possi- about these differences, and about the speech by understand us. They understood that we had bility of removing missile armaments from Cuba Fidel Castro on 1 November 1962, in which the received Soviet weapons, that Cuban defense if the USA liquidated its bases in Turkey. latter explained to the Cuban people the position capacities had increased immeasurably. Thus, I was saying, Fidel Castro continued, that in of the revolutionary government. when Kennedy attempted to frighten us, the Cu- the post-revolutionary years we have carried out The CC CPSU, Mikoyan emphasized, had ban people reacted very resolutely, very patrioti- much ideological work to prepare people for sent me to Cuba to discuss in the most frank way cally. It is hard to imagine the enthusiasm, the understanding socialist ideas, marxist ideas. These all the unclear questions with the Cuban com- belief in victory with which the Cubans voluntar- ideas today are deeply rooted. Our people admire rades. Judging by the welcome at the airport, the ily enlisted themselves into the army. The people the policies of the Soviet government, learn from Cuban leaders consider this a useful meeting. I sensed enormous forces inside themselves. Aware the Soviet people to whom they are deeply thank- came here to speak to you sincerely and openly. of the real solidarity of the Soviet government ful for invaluable help and support. But at that And now it seems to me that it would be useful if and people, Cubans psychologically felt them- difficult moment our people felt as if they had lost you, comrade Fidel Castro, tell me frankly what selves to be strong. The Soviet Union’s solidarity their way. Reports on 28 October that N.S. the questions are that worry you. Only by speak- found its material embodiment, became the ban- Khrushchev had given orders to dismantle mis- ing frankly is it possible to assure complete con- ner around which the forces and courage of our sile launchers, that such instructions had been fidence and mutual understanding. As we agreed people closely united. given to Soviet officers and there was not a word before, after this conversation a meeting will be In observing Soviet strategic arms on their in the message about the consent of the Cuban organized with the secretaries of the National territory, the people of Cuba sensed an enormous government, that report shocked people. CDR [Committees for the Defense of the Revo- responsibility to the countries of the socialist Cubans were consumed by a sense of disap- lution] leadership in order to discuss all the issues camp. They were conscious that these mighty pointment, confusion and bitterness. In walking in detail. weapons had to be preserved in the interests of the along the street, driving to armed units, I ob- In response Fidel Castro said that the Cuban whole socialist camp. Therefore, regardless of served that people did not understand that deci- leadership was glad to see A.I. Mikoyan in Cuba the fact that USA planes were continuously vio- sion. once again, and to speak with him about ques- lating our air space, we decided to weaken the Why was that decision made unilaterally, tions that are important for both sides. We are anti-aircraft defense of Havana, but at the same why are the missiles being taken away from us? aware, joked Fidel Castro, that N.S. Khrushchev time strengthen the defense of the missile loca- And will all the weapons be taken back? — these once said: “there is a Cuban in the CC CPSU and tions. Our people proudly sensed their role as a were the questions disturbing all the people. this Cuban is A.I. Mikoyan.” We can speak to defender of the socialist countries’ interests. Anti- In some 48 hours that feeling of bitterness you, Fidel Castro continued, very frankly. We aircraft gunners and the soldiers protecting the and pain spread among all the people. Events profoundly trust the Soviet Union. missile locations were full of enthusiasm, and were rapidly following one another. The offer to Regarding the questions that caused some ready to defend these at the price of their own withdraw weapons from Cuba under the condi- differences, as we explained it to our people, I lives. tion of liquidating bases in Turkey was advanced [Castro] would like to say the following. The tension of the situation was growing, on 27 October. On 28 October there came the These questions are motivated, first of all, and the psychological tension was growing also. order to dismantle the missiles and the consent to by psychological factors. I would like to stress The whole of Cuba was ready for an inspection. 94 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

We were very worried by the fact that the tion that the threat of aggression was so critical, the leadership held a meeting. For the question of moral spirit of our people had declined sharply. that there was no time for consultations. Cuba worries us a lot. We felt it necessary to re- That affected their fighting spirit too. At the ... establish mutual trust because trust is the basis of same time the insolent flights of American planes Then for half an hour A.I. Mikoyan dis- everything, the basis of really fraternal relations. into Cuban airspace became more frequent, and cussed the issues about which Fidel Castro had We understood that no correspondence can suf- we were asked not to open fire on them. All of talked, but these explanations were interrupted by fice to explain completely the misunderstanding this generated a strong demoralizing influence. an incoming report about the death of Mikoyan’s of those days. Therefore the CC CPSU decided The feeling of disappointment, pain and bitter- wife. The transcript of this part of the conversa- to send me to Cuba in order to explain to our ness that enveloped people could have been used tion will be transmitted with the notes of the next friends the Soviet position and to inform them on by counter-revolutionaries to instigate anti-so- conversation. other subjects that may be of interest to them. We viet elements. Enemies could have profitted know, - Mikoyan continued, - that if we explain because the legal rules about which we had been 3.XI.62 ALEKSEEV everything frankly then you, our brothers, will speaking with the people were being forgotten. understand us. Comrade Mikoyan made the The decision was made without consultation, [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, ob- observation that he, naturally, had no intention to without coordinating it with our government. tained and translated by NHK television, copy put pressure [on Cuba], that his task was to Nobody had the slightest wish to believe it, provided by Philip Brenner; translation by explain our position. Being acquainted with the everyone thought it was a lie. Vladimir Zaemsky.] Cuban comrades, - A.I. Mikoyan said, - I’m ... confident that they will agree with it. It is cer- Since then our people began to address very * * * * * tainly possible that even after our explanations sensitively the matter of sovereignty. Besides, there will remain some issues about which we after the current crisis the situation remained Document II: shall still have different points of view. Our task juridically constant, as the “status quo” did not “It was necessary to use the art of diplomacy” is to preserve mutual trust which is needed for change: — The Second Castro-Mikoyan Conversation, really friendly relations with Cuba, for the future 1. The blockade organized by the USA 4 November 1962 of Cuba and the USSR and the whole world administration is still in place. The USA contin- revolutionary movement. ues to violate the freedom of the sea. Yesterday comrade Fidel Castro explained 2. The Americans seek to determine what MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION very frankly and in detail that the Cuban people weapons we can possess. Verification is being had not understood everything regarding the most organized. The situation is developing in the A.I. MIKOYAN with Fidel CASTRO, [Cuban recent actions of the Soviet government. Com- same direction as it is or was in Morocco, Guinea, President] Oswaldo DORTICOS TORRADO, rade Fidel Castro also spoke on the issues which Ghana, Ceylon and Yemen. [Defense Minister] Raul CASTRO, Ernesto worry the Cuban leadership. He underlined the 3. The USA continues to violate Cuban GUEVARA, Emilio ARAGONES and Carlos role of the psychological factor which has special airspace and we must bear it. And moreover, the Rafael RODRIGUEZ significance in Cuba. Several particularities of consent for inspections has been given without the psychological mold of Cubans have formed asking us. 4 November 1962 as a result of the historical development of the All of this seemed to our people to be a step country. And, as comrade Fidel Castro was backward, a retreat. It turns out that we must A.I. MIKOYAN transmitted to the Cuban saying, it is very important to take this into accept inspections, accept the right of the USA to leaders cordial fraternal regards on behalf of the account. determine what kinds of weapons we can use. Presidium of the CC CPSU and N.S. Khrushchev. In New York, said Mikoyan, I learned the Our revolution rests firmly on the people. A He said that the Central Committee of the CPSU substance of the speech by comrade Fidel Castro drop in moral spirit can be dangerous for the feels admiration and respect toward Cuban lead- on 1 November. Certainly I could not perceive cause of revolution. ers, who from the very beginning of their struggle completely the speech insofar as the American The Soviet Union consolidated itself as a demonstrated courage and fearlessness, confi- press frequently distorts the substance of the state a long time ago and it can carry out a flexible dence in revolutionary victory in Cuba, readiness statements made by Cuban leaders. But even on policy, it can afford maneuvering. The Soviet to devote all their forces to the struggle. We are the basis of the American press interpretation I people readily understand their government, trust proud of the victory achieved by the Cuban revo- understood that it was a friendly speech pro- it wholeheartedly. lution against interventionists on Playa Giron nounced by comrade Fidel Castro underlining the Cuba is a young developing country. Our [Giron Beach, Bay of Pigs]. Cuban revolutionar- great significance of friendship between the So- people are very impulsive. The moral factor has ies demonstrated such a potent spirit of resistance viet Union and Cuba, mentioning the broad aid a special significance in our country. that it inspires admiration and proves that the rendered by the Soviet Union to Revolutionary We were afraid that these decisions could Cubans are always ready to fight until victory is Cuba. He also said that there were some differ- provoke a breach in the people’s unity, under- achieved. Cuban leaders have shown great cour- ences in views between us, but those differences mine the prestige of the revolution in the eyes of age, intrepidity, and firmness in dangerous days. had to be discussed on the level of parties and Latin American peoples, in the eyes of the whole The CC CPSU admires the readiness of the Cuban governments, not massive rallies. Those words world. people to stand up. We trust Cuban leaders as we of Fidel Castro, testifying sentiments of friend- ... do ourselves. ship and trust toward our country, were reaf- It was very difficult for us to explain the In the course of the Cuban events our party firmed by the welcome reception on my arrival to situation to the people. If the decisions had been and government were acting having in mind to do Havana. The very tone of the conversation with taken in another way, it would have been easier. whatever was necessary to make [the situation] comrade Fidel Castro was imbued with a sense of If a truce were suggested first and then the issues better for Cuba. When Ambassador Alekseev fellowship and trust. were coordinated, we would have been in a better informed [us] about the opinion of comrade Fidel I’m confident, continued Mikoyan, that the position. Castro, that there are some differences between existing mutual trust between us will always be Comrade A.I. Mikoyan made an observa- our parties, we were very pained. Immediately all there notwithstanding some differences of opin- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 95 ion. The American press spreads a lot of conjec- consultations on diplomatic forms of struggle in possibilities for maneuvering, for flexibility in tures regarding the aim of my trip to Cuba. They order to determine how to act in common. foreign policy. The Soviet people easily under- are writing that I went to Havana allegedly in Comrades, I would like to begin by asking stands similar decisions of its government. order to apply pressure on Cuban leaders, in order you to say, what steps of the Soviet government The mentioned facts represent a danger for to “pacify” them, as [U.S. negotiator John] have caused misunderstanding and differences, the revolutionary process, for the Cuban revolu- McCloy had stated to the American newspapers. in order to give you the necessary explanations. tion itself. About my conversation with McCloy I can tell True, yesterday comrade Fidel Castro already Here is the summary of the questions eluci- you in detail afterward, but first of all I would like narrated much about this. But I would like to ask dated by me in the conversation yesterday with to answer the main questions. both comrade Fidel Castro and all of you to raise comrade Mikoyan. We didn’t touch on the issue As I have already stated before my departure all those questions that you are interested in. of the assessment of the international situation. I from New York, the Soviet government was made the observation that at the most critical supporting the five points put forward by com- F.CASTRO. My colleagues are aware of the moment it had appeared that we had no under- rade Fidel Castro. The demand on liquidation of substance of our conversation yesterday, but in standing of preceding steps. For example, the the US Guantanamo base is a just and correct order to summarize the questions which are im- objective of placing strategic armaments in Cuba demand. I had no plans to speak publicly in New portant for us let me repeat them briefly. As was not clear enough for us. We could not York, but when I read in the American press the comrade Mikoyan has already said, recent events understand where is the exit from that compli- speculation about the objectives of my trip, I have considerably influenced the moral spirit of cated situation. By no means were we thinking decided to voice that statement in order to make our people. They were regarded as a retreat at the that the result could be a withdrawal of strategic my position completely clear. Using radio, Ameri- very moment when every nerve of our country armaments from Cuban territory. can propaganda is trying to embroil Cuba [in had been strained. Our people is brought up in the Yesterday comrade Mikoyan partly ex- conflict] with the Soviet Union, is trying to sting spirit of trust in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, plained some issues but the conversation was Cubans to the quick. It’s natural. Because the many people do not understand the linkage be- interrupted by the tragic news of the spouse of enemy can’t behave differently. He always acts tween the Cuban events and the issue of the A.I. Mikoyan. like this. But the enemy must be repulsed. liquidation of American bases in Turkey. The By decision of the CC CPSU, my task in- unexpected withdrawal of Soviet missiles with- A.I. MIKOYAN asks: Perhaps the Cuban cludes explaining our position to Cuban leaders out consultations with the Cuban government has comrades want some other questions to be an- within my abilities and capacities, so that no produced a negative impression upon our people. swered? doubts are left. We also want to discuss new The Soviet Union gave its consent for inspections problems that arise in front of our two countries. also without sending a notification to the Cuban DORTICOS makes the observation that in It is not a part of my task at all to put pressure on leadership. It is necessary to take into account the the summary offered by Fidel Castro there have Cuban leaders. That is an impudent conjecture of special delicacy of our people which has been been generalized all the questions that have caused American propaganda. Our interests are united. created as a result of several historic develop- differences, but he asks [Mikoyan] to explain, We are marxist-leninists and we are trying to ments. The “Platt amendment,” imposed by the why N.S. Khrushchev has accepted Kennedy’s achieve common objectives. We discussed the Americans upon Cuba, played a particular role in offer to make a statement of nonaggression against current situation at the CC CPSU and came to a this regard. Using the Platt amendment the United Cuba under the condition of removing Soviet decision that there was no complete relaxation of States of America prohibited the Cuban govern- missiles from Cuba, though the Cuban govern- tensions yet. ment from deciding by itself questions of foreign ment had not yet given its view in this regard. On the military side we can observe a con- policy. The decisions were made by the Ameri- siderable decrease in danger. I can add for myself cans behind the back of the Cuban people. Dur- A.I. MIKOYAN asks if there are more ques- that in essence currently the danger has abated. ing the current crisis there was also an impression tions. But the diplomatic tension still exists. Plans for that important issues, concerning all of us, were military assault have been frustrated. discussed and resolved in the absence of Cuban C.R. RODRIGUEZ says that his question is A victory was gained regarding prevention representatives, without consultations with the related to that formulated by Dorticos. It is not of a military assault. But still we are facing even Cuban government. The USA imperialists un- clear what does the Soviet Union regard as a larger tasks on the diplomatic field. We must dertook a series of aggressive measures against victory, whether its substance consists in the achieve a victory over the diplomatic tension, the Republic of Cuba. They set up a naval military success or the diplomatic one. We were too. blockade of our country, they try to determine considering that for the time being it is impossible What does that victory mean? How do we what kind of armament we can have and use. to speak about victory insofar as the guarantees understand it? I’ll explain later. Systematically they violate Cuban air space and on the part of the USA are ephemeral. I would like to do whatever is necessary to elevate these violations of the sovereignty of the ensure that you understand us correctly. I’m not Cuban Republic into a prerogative of the USA A.I. MIKOYAN says that he will give the in a hurry and if you don’t object, I’ll stay in Cuba administration. most detailed answer to all the questions raised by as long as necessary to explain all the aspects of There is the question of inspections. True, comrade Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders in our position. I think, first of all, we must consider inspections are a sore subject for us. We cannot order to make the Cuban comrades understand us those issues where some differences have ap- take that step. If we agree to an inspection, then completely. Therefore I will have to speak for a peared. I’ll do my best to help you understand us. it is as if we permit the United States of America long time. Later, when you bring forward your We must consider all these questions and decide to determine what we can or cannot do in foreign opinions and perhaps ask some other questions, I what can be done jointly to ensure the success of policy. That hurts our sovereignty. would like to say some more words. If my the further development and future of the Cuban In conclusion I said that we are a young arguments seem to you not convincing, please revolution. country, where a revolution has recently tri- notify me, I will think over what to do in order to At the moment of critical military danger we umphed, so we can’t carry out such a flexible make you understand me, I will try to put forward had no opportunity for mutual consultations, but policy as does the Soviet Union because they are new arguments. now we have good possibilities for thorough a consolidated state and on that ground they have The main issue, the issue of prime impor- 96 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN tance, is why have we decided to withdraw the had worsened. This deterioration was caused by Cuban leadership. strategic missiles from the Cuban territory. Ap- pressure on the part of the Americans and large The main condition for the success of this parently you agree that this is the main question. expenses for defensive needs. We were afraid that plan was to carry it out secretly. In this case the If there is no understanding over this issue, it is the worsening of the situation could be the result Americans would find themselves in a very diffi- difficult to comprehend other questions. of the implementation of the [American] plan for cult position. Our military people said that four Being in Moscow I did not realize that this the economic suffocation of Cuba. The CC CPSU months were necessary to implement that plan. question would be asked. Previously it had not discussed the situation in Cuba and decided, with- We foresaw that the delivery of armaments and arisen. out your request—you are very modest and try not Soviet troops to Cuban territory would take a half The fate of the Cuban revolution has always to disturb us by requests—to undertake some of the preparatory period. Measures were also been important for us, especially beginning from measures in order to strengthen our help to Cuba. thought out in order to prevent the unleashing of the moment when Fidel Castro declared the If before you were receiving part of the weapons global nuclear war. We decided to work through objective of constructing socialism in Cuba. So- on credit and only a portion of armaments free of the UN, to mobilize international public opinion, cialist revolution in Latin America should de- charge, now we decided to supply you gratis with to do everything in order to avoid a world colli- velop and strengthen. When we received the weapons and partly with military uniforms—100 sion. We understood that the Americans could news that had defeated the counter-revolution- thousand sets in two years—and equipment. We use a blockade. It appeared to be the most ary landing on Playa Giron it naturally made us saw that the Cuban trade representatives, who dangerous thing if the USA imperialists block- happy, but to some extent it worried us, too. were participating in the negotiations, were feel- aded the supplies of fuel to Cuba. They could Certainly, it was foolish on the part of the Ameri- ing themselves somewhat uneasy. They were abstain from limiting food deliveries to Cuba, cans to organize such an invasion. But that fact short of more than 100 million dollars to some- while demagogically declaring that they do not indicated that they would try again to organize an how balance the budget. Therefore we accepted want to doom the Cuban people to famine, and at aggression against Cuba, that they would not all their proposals in order to frustrate the plan of the same time prevent supplies of weapons and tolerate the further development and strengthen- Kennedy designed for [causing] an internal ex- fuel to Cuba. And Cuba, who doesn’t have her ing of socialist Cuba. It is difficult for them to plosion in Cuba. own energy resources, can’t survive without fuel. reconcile with the existence of Cuba which is The same thing can be said regarding food Our communications with Cuba are very stretched. constructing socialism in the immediate proxim- and manufactured goods. In order to alleviate the We are separated by enormous distances. There- ity of their borders. economic situation in Cuba we sent there articles fore transportation to Cuba is very difficult. We This event worries us, as we were realizing and food worth 198 million rubles. Speaking very can’t use our Air Force or Navy forces in case of that the Americans would not give up their at- frankly, we have been giving to you everything a blockade of Cuba. Therefore we had to use such tempts to suffocate the Cuban revolution. And without counting. means as political maneuvering, diplomacy, we indeed, the American imperialists began elabo- According to my point of view, we have had to utilize the UN. For example, we could not rating two parallel plans. The first one consisted entered a new stage of relations which nowadays blockade American bases in Turkey in response of an attempt at the economic suffocation of the has a different character. Indeed, during the first because we have no other exit to the Mediterra- Republic of Cuba in order to provoke discontent stage there was some semblance of mutually nean. We could not undertake such steps neither inside the country, to provoke famine and to beneficial trade. Currently those supplies are part in Norway, nor in England, nor in Japan. We do achieve the collapse of the new regime due to of clearly fraternal aid. not have enough possibilities for counter-block- pressure from within, without military interven- I recall, that after his trip to trip to Bulgaria ade. Counter-measures could be undertaken in tion. The second plan foresaw preparation of an [14-20 May 1962—ed.], that, N.S. Khrushchev Berlin. intervention with the participation of told us that while staying in that country he was Our plans did not include creation of our Latinamerican mercenaries and with the support thinking all the time of Cuba, he was worried that base here, on the American continent. In general, of the United States of America. This plan the Americans would organize an intervention in the policy of constructing bases on foreign terri- envisaged invasion as the means to deal the final Cuba with the aid of reactionary governments of tories is not a correct one. Such a policy was blow and to kill the revolutionary regime, if the Latin America or would carry out a direct aggres- carried out in the time of Stalin. There was our economic hardships weaken it from inside. After sion. They do not want to permit the strengthen- base in Germany which was created on the ground the defeat on Playa Giron the American imperi- ing of Cuba, and the defeat of Cuba, N.S. of our right as conqueror. Currently our troops in alists proceeded to the execution of those plans. Khrushchev said to us, would deliver a very Germany are quartered there according to the The victory of the revolution in Cuba is a powerful blow upon the whole world revolution- Warsaw Pact. Under treaty there was our naval great success of marxist-leninist theory, and a ary movement. We must frustrate the plans of the base in Finland. We also had a base in Port Arthur defeat of the Cuban revolution would mean a two American imperialists. in order to defend our eastern borders from Japan. or three times larger defeat of the whole socialist It was at that time when there appeared a plan All these bases were liquidated. Right now we camp. Such a defeat would throw back the that carried great risk. This plan placed huge don’t have any bases on foreign territories. Nev- revolutionary movement in many countries. Such responsibility on the Soviet government insofar ertheless there are our troops in Poland in order to a defeat would bear witness to the supremacy of as it contained within it the risk of a war which the ensure communications with our forces in Ger- imperialist forces in the entire world. That would imperialists could unleash against the Soviet many, and Soviet troops are quartered in Hun- be an incredible blow which would change the Union. But we decided that it was necessary to gary in order to protect us from the side of correlation of forces between the two systems, save Cuba. At one time N.S. Khrushchev related Austria. We do not need bases in Cuba for the would hamper the development of the interna- that plan to us and asked us to think it through very destruction of the United States of America. We tional revolutionary movement. We were and seriously in order to make a decision in three days. have long-range missiles which can be used di- are considering to be our duty, a duty of commu- We had to think over both the consequences of its rectly from our territory. We do not have plans to nists, to do everything necessary to defend the implementation, what to do during different stages conquer the territory of the USA. The working Cuban revolution, to frustrate the imperialist of its execution, and how to achieve Cuba’s salva- class of that country is stupefied by capitalist plans. tion without unleashing a nuclear war. It was propaganda. Besides, such a plan would contra- Some time ago our comrades informed us decided to entrust our military with elaborating dict our theory. We can use the long-range that the economic situation in the country [Cuba] their considerations and to discuss it with the missiles only to deliver a retaliatory blow, with- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 97 out landing troops on USA territory. Nevertheless, the Americans managed to take a tion of what to do in the created situation we The objective of bringing Soviet troops and photo of the missiles in the firing position. received the communication from comrade Castro, strategic weapons to Cuba consisted only in Kennedy didn’t want to speak about Soviet mis- it was on Sunday, that an aggression against Cuba strengthening your defense potential. It was a siles in Cuba until the end of the Congressional would be unleashed in the next 24 hours. From deterrence plan, a plan designed to stop the impe- elections. He did not want to strain relations. But other sources we were in possession of informa- rialist play with fire regarding Cuba. If the two Republican senators [a clear reference to tion that the USA aggression would begin in 10- strategic armaments were deployed under condi- Sens. Kenneth Keating of New York and Everett 12 hours. Despite the fact that these were sepa- tions of secrecy and if the Americans were not Dirksen of Illinois—ed.] learned about the fact of rate sources, the information corresponded. Un- aware of their presence in Cuba, then it would the strategic missiles placed in Cuba and there- til the moment of the start of the USA aggression have been a powerful means of deterrence. We fore Kennedy hastened to take the initiative into against Cuba remained 10-12 hours. It was proceeded from that assumption. Our military his hands, or else he would be hardpressed. We necessary to use the art of diplomacy. Had we not specialists informed us that strategic missiles can had no information on how he intended to act. been successful in this regard there would have be reliably camouflaged in the palm forests of The United States of America organized been unleashed a war. We had to use diplomatic Cuba. maneuvers in the area of Vieques Island [in the means. We were following very intently the trans- Caribbean], naming them “Ortsac,” i.e., Castro, Kennedy was making statements that he had portation of troops and strategic weapons to Cuba. if you read it backwards. But those maneuvers nothing against the stationing in Cuba of Soviet Those sea shipments were successful in July and could appear to be not an exercise, but a sea cover weapons, even troops, but that placing strategic August. And only in September the Americans for a strong blow against Cuba. At that moment, weapons in Cuba was evidence of preparations learned about the transport of those forces and when Kennedy made a statement and announced for an assault against the USA. Therefore the means. The USA intelligence worked badly. We [on October 22—ed.] the decision of declaring a USA would defend itself. Considering that the were surprised that Kennedy in his speeches was blockade against Cuba, we didn’t know if the missiles had been discovered and were no longer speaking only about Soviet military specialists, Americans were really carrying out maneuvers or a means of deterrence we decided that for the sake but not Soviet troops. At the very beginning he were preparing for a direct attack upon Cuba. of saving Cuba it was necessary to give an order really was thinking so. Then we understood that On 28 October in the morning [presumably to dismantle and return the strategic missiles to he was not saying everything he knew, and that he this refers to Moscow time, which would mean the Soviet Union and to inform Kennedy of this. was holding back in order not to complicate the the evening of 27 October in Washington—ed.] You agreed with the withdrawal of strategic mis- [Congressional—ed.] election campaign for him- we received reliable reports of preparations for an siles from Cuba while leaving there all the other self. We let the Americans know that we wanted attack against Cuba. Indeed we were aware of the kinds of armaments. We managed to preserve all to solve the question of Berlin in the nearest fact that the Americans had interrupted their the forces and means which are necessary for the future. This was done in order to distract their maneuvers because of a hurricane. The maneu- defense of the Cuban revolution even without attention away from Cuba. So, we used a diver- vers did not resume when the hurricane went strategic missiles which had been a means of sionary maneuver. In reality we had no intention away but the American combatant ships remained deterrence, but they were discovered and there- of resolving the Berlin question at that time. If, in the same area in direct proximity to Cuba. N.S. fore lost their significance. We have enough comrades, the question of Berlin is of interest to Khrushchev rebuked Kennedy for declaring a powerful missiles that can be used from our you, I can give you the necessary information. blockade around Cuba. We strongly opposed the territory. Since Kennedy agreed with the retain- Kennedy addressed N.S. Khrushchev American attempts to assume the right to deter- ing of Soviet troops in Cuba, the Cubans kept through confidential channels and made a request mine what weapons Cuba can use and what powerful armaments and anti-aircraft missiles, not to aggravate the situation until the end of the armaments it may not possess. And then the so we consider that he [Kennedy] also made a elections to Congress [on 6 November 1962— Americans decided to carry out a direct aggres- concession. ed.], and not to proceed to the Berlin issue. We sion. Their plan consisted of two parts. Wishing The statement of Kennedy about non-ag- responded that we could wait until the end of the to free themselves from the threat of a blow from gression against Cuba on the part of the USA and elections [campaign], but immediately after them the strategic missiles, they decided to liquidate latinamerican countries also represents a conces- we should proceed to the Berlin issue. When the the launchers in Cuba with the help of conven- sion. If we take into account these reciprocal Americans learned about the transport of strate- tional warhead missiles and immediately after concessions and all other factors, we will see that gic weapons to Cuba they themselves began that land troops on Cuban territory in order to a big victory has been gained. Never before have crying a lot about Berlin. Both sides were talking liquidate centers of resistance as soon as possible. the Americans made such a statement. That is about the Berlin crisis, but simultaneously be- It would have been impossible for us in these why we decided that the main objective—salva- lieved that at that given moment the essence of circumstances not to repulse the aggression of the tion of Cuba—had been achieved. There would their policy was located in Cuba. USA. This assault would mean an assault upon not be an assault against Cuba. There would not By mid-September the Americans appar- you and us, as far as in Cuba there were situated be a war. We are gaining more favorable posi- ently received data regarding the transport to Soviet troops and strategic missiles. Inevitably, tions. Cuba of Soviet troops and strategic missiles. I nuclear war would be unleashed as a result of Indeed, it was necessary to send the draft of have already spoken about this fact with comrade such a collision. Certainly we would destroy our decision to Cuba in order to have consulta- Fidel Castro. The American intelligence was not America, our country would be strongly dam- tions with you, to receive your consent and only the first in obtaining that information, it was West aged too, but we have a larger territory. Cuba then announce it. It would have been done in this German intelligence who gave that information would have been destroyed first. Imperialists way if there were normal conditions. In his letter to the Americans. The American administration would do their best to liquidate Cuba. Fidel Castro informed us that an inevitable ag- sent planes to the air space of Cuba for aerial The objective of all the measures under- gression was expected in 24 hours. By the mo- photography and the ascertainment of the de- taken by the Soviet Union was the defense of ment when we received it and were discussing the ployment areas of the strategic missiles. N.S. Cuba. It was necessary to determine our line of situation, only 10-12 hours were left before ag- Khrushchev gave the order to place the missiles conduct. The loss of Cuba would mean a serious gression. If we had tried to send you our draft we into vertical position only at night, but to main- blow to the whole socialist camp. And exactly at would have had to encode the document, transmit tain them in a lying-down position in the daytime. the moment when we were pondering the ques- it by radio, decipher it, translate it into Spanish. 98 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

All of this could take more than 10 hours and such in case of war. True, they have certain political letter to Khrushchev, N.S. Khrushchev wrote to a consultation would not have made sense by that significance but we don’t pay them special im- Kennedy and simultaneously with my letter an time. It would be too late. It could happen in such portance, though we will seek their liquidation. answer from Kennedy to Khrushchev arrived. a way, that the answer would be received, but From your statements I see now that the After all, why is Kennedy already speaking about Cuba itself would have ceased to exist, a war Cubans were regarding this demand as if it was the Soviet proposal about dismantling, etc., in his would have been unleashed. It was a critical some sort of exchange. There are USA bases not response of 27 October to Khrushchev’s message moment. We thought our Cuban friends would only in Turkey, but also in England and other of 26 October, if it was not directly said in the understand us. Moreover we knew from the cable European countries. But nowadays these bases confidential message from Khrushchev of 26 from Fidel Castro that the Cuban leadership was do not have decisive importance insofar as the October? Negotiations began at night, after the aware of the direct threat of assault. At that long-range strategic missiles, aimed at Europe, message from Kennedy. Consequently, it was moment the main objective consisted of prevent- can quickly destroy them. not possible to consider inevitable an attack against ing an attack. We thought, the Cuban comrades us. When I was writing to N.S. Khrushchev I would understand us. Therefore, we made the F. CASTRO. There is a question, on which didn’t know that Khrushchev was writing to decision to act immediately, but without paying we are insufficiently informed. Kennedy and Kennedy—to Khrushchev. It seems due attention to the psychological factor, about On 26 October the Soviet government sent to me that on 27 October, at that time, there was which comrade Fidel Castro spoke here. Kennedy a letter without a word about Turkey. no unavoidable threat of attack. The principle of Regarding the possibility of a truce at that On 27 October we learned about Turkey from the agreement had already been found. It seems to moment, mentioned by the Cuban comrades, the broadcasts of Soviet radio. The American media me that there was available time for consulta- Americans would not take such a step in those expressed some surprise because this problem tions. conditions. There are a lot of revanchists in the had not been raised in the message of the 26th. Pentagon, and Kennedy is a deterrent element What is it, a false communication or were there A.I. MIKOYAN. In his answer of 27 Octo- with respect to them. The Americans would have two letters of 26 and 27 October? We have ber Kennedy was formally responding as if only burst into Cuba. We had no time. Certainly, it received one letter that coincided with the docu- to the confidential message of the 26th, but prac- was a decision that created some difficulties for ment transmitted by Moscow radio. tically he was answering both this one and chiefly you, the Cuban people. the message from Khrushchev of the 27th, openly Let us compare the situation at the present A.I. MIKOYAN. There were two letters. transmitted by radio, though there was no direct time and the situation before the crisis. Before the The letter of the 26th was not published. The reference in Kennedy’s message. All the mes- crisis the Americans were preparing an interven- letter of 27 October was published. But the sages between Khrushchev and Kennedy and tion against Cuba. Now they have committed content of the letter of 27 October covers the everything received from him confidentially were themselves not to attack Cuba. It is a great questions raised in the letter of the 26th. The given to comrade Fidel. I’m a participant of all success. Certainly, the events also had negative question of Turkey was not raised at the begin- the meetings, I’m aware of everything, but if you consequences, especially as American propa- ning. Later this issue was included. You have all want me to do it, I’ll check all the documents that ganda was trying suit their own ends by using the correspondence on this issue. If there is such I have with me and tomorrow I’ll complement my some facts and distorting them. But that is a necessity, we can check it. information. inevitable. These are the costs of events that have crucial importance. Our task is to eliminate the F. CASTRO. Here is the letter of 26 Octo- F. CASTRO. I agree with comrade negative consequences of the recent events. ber, whose text, as it seemed to me, is identical to Mikoyan’s suggestion. Comrade Dorticos is correct when he asks the other letter at my disposal, which was re- why did we give our consent to Kennedy’s mes- ceived from the transmission of A.I. MIKOYAN. So, let’s pass to the next sage on non-aggression against Cuba without the and TASS. It seemed to me that one letter has not question. concordance of the Cuban government. But it been published. To many Cubans it seems that instead of our was exactly our consent (and nothing else) that demand for the liquidation of American bases in ensured some truce for a certain time. A.I. MIKOYAN. If you want, we can check. Turkey it would be better to put the question of One cannot perceive nihilistically all agree- the liquidation of the base in Guantanamo. Such ments and commitments, although sometimes F. CASTRO. For all that, when did Kennedy a demand seems tempting from the Cuban politi- these agreements and commitments are impor- accept the proposal of N.S. Khrushchev and prom- cal and practical points of view. But from the tant only during a certain time, until conditions ise guarantees not to attack Cuba? Wasn’t it in point of view of military and practical interests of change. So they keep their importance until the response to the letter of 26 October? What did he Cuba we could not put the question in this way. If situation changes. say then? the question were raised about withdrawal from We were asked about our demand on the Cuba of all kinds of armaments, then the liquidation of American bases in Turkey. C.R. RODRIGUEZ. There were secret let- [Guantanamo] question would be raised. There Speaking frankly, we were not thinking about ters. are no nuclear weapons at Guantanamo. But we bases in Turkey at all. But during discussion of did not have intentions of taking away all the the dangerous situation we received information A.I. MIKOYAN. Comrades, all the docu- armaments from Cuba. The Guantanamo base from the United States of America, including an ments have been given to you. does not have a huge real significance insofar as article by [columnist Walter] Lippmann [in the the Americans can transfer their forces to Cuba Washington Post on October 25], where it was F. CASTRO. On 27 October Kennedy gave without difficulties due to the geographical situ- said that the Russians could raise the question of guarantees not to attack Cuba, if the Soviet gov- ation of the USA and Cuba. Indeed, it was not liquidating the USA bases in Turkey. They were ernment removed its offensive weapons. The possible to lose all our armaments in Cuba. If we speaking about the possibility of such a demand impression is growing that it was in response to were to raise the question of Guantanamo base inside American circles. This question was dis- [Khrushchev’s] letter of 26 October. That is an liquidation in exchange for withdrawal of Soviet cussed in the USA. Turkish bases do not have important question. It was decided urgently, weapons from Cuban territory in general, that great importance for us. They will be eliminated without consultations. Apparently, before my would undermine Cuba’s defense capability. We COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 99 can’t do that. You know that in the message from sovereignty. tries, the USA did not insist on this form of N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy there was said that Another example. An agreement to create an control and it was necessary to seek other mea- “we want to create confidence among Cubans, international verification commission was sures so that the Americans could be convinced confirming that we are with them and we do not achieved in Geneva [in 1954] during the discus- that it had been done. He said that they were relieve responsibility for rendering help to the sion of the Indochina issue. The proposal was aware of dismantling work, but they were afraid Cuban people.” made by representatives of the Soviet Union, that the missiles could be hidden in Cuban for- China, and other countries. The proposal was also ests. They need to be sure that those weapons are F. CASTRO. But we are speaking only supported by the leader of the Democratic Repub- removed from Cuban territory. I asked him about about strategic missiles. Such an act would have lic of Vietnam comrade , who was other forms of verification that he had in mind. political rather than military significance. We directly concerned. Currently both Ho Chi Minh McCloy answered that, in their opinion, an aerial were looking for an exit from that situation. It and the king of Cambodia ask to preserve that inspection could be used for this aim, but that it seems to us that it was possible to create a more international verification commission. In this was necessary for Cuba to agree to verification difficult atmosphere for the Americans by rais- case there is no question of limiting the sovereign from airspace. I resolutely said in response that ing such a question as the liquidation of the rights neither of Vietnam nor Cambodia. such a method is out of the question because it Guantanamo base. Further. Between India and Pakistan in the was damaging Cuban sovereign rights. I added area of Kashmir is working an international veri- that it wasn’t worth going on with the discussion A.I. MIKOYAN. If the Americans had fication commission without infringing on their of that issue—we categorically rejected such a accepted such an offer, and they could do so, we sovereign rights. method and stressed our reluctance even to con- would have had to leave Cuba. We could not Several years ago we proposed [in May vey that proposal to the Cubans. afford it. 1955—ed.] to the Americans and English to cre- We knew that the American planes had been Now I’ll pass to the issue of inspections. If ate jointly international verification posts on rail- flying over the territory of Cuba and had carried we had made a statement declining inspections, way junctions, in large ports, and along highways. out air photography. I told McCloy that on the the Americans would have taken it for our desire In due time [in the 1957 Rapacki Plan—ed.] we basis of that aerial photography Americans could to swindle them and their intervention would also suggested to organize international verifica- be convinced of the fact that work on the disman- have become a reality. We declared that we tion in the zone covering 800 kilometers on both tling of the missiles had already begun. He agree to inspections. What we are speaking sides along the demarcation line in Germany. In answered me that air photography reflected the about is not a broad inspection, but a verification the event of the acceptance of this suggestion, a process of dismantling work, but that was not all, of the sites, known to the Americans due to aerial part of our territory, Poland, and Hungary would because in their view there were delays in dis- photography and which have been locations of have been controlled. And such an act, under the mantling. McCloy underlined that for Americans the strategic missile launchers. The objective condition of voluntary acceptance of the commit- it was very important to be sure of the removal of would have been to verify if the missiles had ments, would not have undermined the sovereign the missiles from Cuban territory. Then they really been dismantled and their embarkation rights of the states. would not have doubts of missiles being hidden in really accomplished; verification of the areas A similar example is the creation of an inter- the forests. He added that the information is where the missiles had been assembled could be national commission in Laos in order to verify needed to be convinced of the missiles’ with- carried out in one day and verification of load- compliance of the 1962 agreement, in particular, drawal. Meanwhile the Americans do not seek ing—in several days. It was not a question of any to verify the withdrawal of foreign troops from any secret information, they are worried by the permanent or general inspection. It was said that Laos and a ban on the introduction of weapons. question of whether the missiles have been with- representatives of neutral countries would carry [Laotian Prince] Souvanna Phouma did not object drawn. out a verification only once. We were not decid- to such a verification. Communists of Laos and I could not, continued A.I. Mikoyan, go on ing this question instead of you. Cuban issues are Vietnam allowed international control, commu- discussing that issue with McCloy, but I was solved by the Cuban leadership only. But, being nists of India didn’t object to international verifi- aware that military consultants, a general and a owners of that kind of weapon, we stated our cation. Poland agreed to verify the withdrawal of colonel, had been sent from the Soviet Union to consent for verification of dismantling and load- American troops and the troops of Ho Chi Minh. [Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily] Kuznetsov. I ing. We believed that after coordinating with And it was done with the consent of comrade Ho hope, the issue will be further examined. you, you would accept this suggestion. But we Chi Minh and the Laotian communists. There is another method which I didn’t could not decide it instead of you. I’m giving you all these examples because mention to the Americans, but I can explain it to We were assuming that it was possible to when we, on the basis of the above mentioned you. The process of dismantling and loading of give consent to verification by representatives of experience, were thinking about you, we didn’t the strategic weapons can be photographed and neutral countries of the dismantling and with- pay due attention to that psychological factor, these documents can be used in order to achieve drawal of the missiles — doing all of this without about which we learned here from comrade Fidel the declared objective. hurting Cuba’s sovereignty. Certainly, no state Castro. In principle everything is correct, but not How is the verification at sea carried out? It would bear violation of its sovereignty. But in all that looks good in principle can be applied to a is done at a considerable distance from territorial particular cases sovereign governments also per- concrete situation. waters. Observers examine vessels and give their mit some limitation of their actions, owing to Everything I’m talking about I’m saying not consent for further travel. voluntary agreements. Now we are not speaking to gain a change of the international stand of On 1 November, during my conversation about those cases when foreign powers impose Cuba, but in order to explain to you the motives with McCloy, I said nothing to the Americans their will over other countries. which guided us. It is unthinkable that I might try regarding the fact that we were looking for ways I can give examples how our state and other to exercise any pressure. to keep our promise and give the Americans the countries voluntarily limit their actions while During the conversation with McCloy in opportunity to be certain that the dismantling and preserving their sovereign rights. For example, New York I touched on the question of verifica- carrying away of the missiles had really been sovereignty of a host-country does not apply to tion of the dismantling of our missiles. McCloy done. We are doing that in order not to contradict the territory of foreign embassies. In this case we said that insofar as Cuba was objecting to verifi- your statement objecting to control on Cuban see a limitation of actions without limitation of cation organized with the help of neutral coun- territory. During the conversation McCloy told 100 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN me that the Cubans could try to prevent the tion: in port and at sea. We didn’t want to hurt it was necessary to check it. I asked why the USA withdrawal from Cuba of the strategic missiles. your sentiments and therefore responded that we recruits Cuban counter-revolutionaries to their He added that the Cubans had 140 thousand agree to verification at sea, but not in port. This armed forces. He prevaricated for a long time soldiers and Soviet troops are only 10 thousand. issue, chiefly, has importance for you. But seek- trying to explain it by the necessity of teaching Regarding the first remark I told him that it was ing to make your situation easier, we agreed to those people English. He was cunning and eva- nonsense, because Fidel Castro himself had an- Red Cross verification at sea. sive. Then he declared that Cuba represents “a nounced that he was not objecting to the with- Having returned from Havana, U Thant told source of revolutionary infection.” Stevenson drawal of the Soviet strategic missiles. Certainly, me in New York that you do not agree to verifi- said that the USA would like to find a possibility I didn’t dispute his data on the numbers of the cation in port although, in his opinion, it was for settling the Cuban issue, but Cuba is afraid of troops. more comfortable to do it in port. U Thant is the USA and the USA is afraid of Cuba. We By the way, he said that the U-2 plane had ready to choose the corresponding staff. He has didn’t discuss this question any more. But there been shot down over Cuban territory [on 27 available two ships. On other details of this issue is an impression that a possibility exists to reach October —ed.] by Russian missiles, though anti- I lack information. Comrade Kuznetsov is in an agreement—in the form of a declaration or aircraft launchers, in his opinion, could be oper- charge of them. some other form—between Cuba and Central ated by the Cubans. I neither confirmed, nor It’s still necessary to dwell on the issue American countries pledging not to carry out disputed, this observation of McCloy. concerning U Thant’s plan and verification. subversive work and not to attack each other. During the crisis U Thant behaved himself Comrade Fidel Castro was right saying that F. CASTRO. These planes are flying at the decently, even well. It’s hard to demand anything it was necessary to maneuver on the issues of altitude of 22 thousand meters and the limit of our more from him. He treated both us and Cuba with international policy. It is easier for the Soviet artillery is lower. Therefore it’s understandable sympathy, but his situation is not easy at all. We Union than for Cuba to do so, especially when that in this case the anti-aircraft missiles were have received the “U Thant plan,” of guarantees, American propaganda complicates your possi- used. that had been sent to everybody. This plan bilities for maneuvers. Firmness should be com- seemed interesting to us and useful for Cuba. bined with flexibility while you carry out a policy. A.I. MIKOYAN. I didn’t engage in further What do we see positive in it? Nowadays it is a necessary thing for marxist- discussion with him of this issue. If the UN observation posts are created in diplomats. It is wrong to say that we are more We insist on immediate lifting of the quar- Cuba, the southern seacoast of the USA and in the liberal than others. We are firm, but we display antine. If you want us to finish the withdrawal of Central American countries then attempts of flexibility when it is necessary. strategic missiles from Cuba as soon as possible, preparation for aggression against Cuba would The revolution in Cuba has enormous im- I said to McCloy, then give the vessels access to be quickly unmasked. In this way it will be portance not only for the Cuban people, but for Cuba because there are not enough steamships in possible to suppress rapidly any aggression at- the countries of Latin America and the whole Cuba right now to withdraw the equipment and tempts against Cuba. I’m assessing this issue world. The revolution in Cuba must develop and personnel. It could be done before the official from the point of view of international law. It’s strengthen. Therefore it is necessary to use ma- agreement, in order to accelerate the evacuation. not excluded that a similar agreement can be neuvers, to display flexibility in order to ensure McCloy responded that he was ready to give violated, but it must not happen under normal victory. orders in practice not to carry out examination of conditions. Really, a victory has been gained over Ameri- the vessels. The verification will be completely This issue is also interesting from another cans and here is why. If we have a look at the formal, as happened during the encounter of the point of view. There is the Organization of whole thing retrospectively, the question is being tanker “Bucharest” with American ships. A American States (OAS). The Americans try to raised—if it has been a mistake to send strategic question was asked by radio about the character use the OAS as a cover in order not to allow a UN missiles to Cuba and to return them to the Soviet of the cargo and the “Bucharest” without exami- inspection. If the Americans had accepted UN Union. The CC CPSU considers that there was no nation continued its journey to Cuba. Nobody inspection it would mean that Latin American mistake. The strategic missiles have done their stopped the ship, nobody came on its deck. issues are resolved at the UN bypassing the OAS. part. Cuba found itself at the center of interna- I objected to this kind of verification also. Briefly, we positively assess U Thant’s plan. He tional politics and now when their job is done, Then we passed to other issues. [U.S. delegate to said that Fidel Castro also had a positive attitude when they have been discovered, they can’t serve the United Nations Adlai] Stevenson told me that toward his plan, but I don’t know if comrade Fidel any more as means of deterrence. They are the Americans had accepted [UN Secretary Gen- Castro really has such an opinion. withdrawn. But the Cuban people keep powerful eral] U Thant’s proposal. I reproached them and U Thant told me that representatives of arms in their hands. There is no other country in made the observation that U Thant was suggest- Latin-American countries, to whom he had spo- Latin America which is so strong militarily, which ing not to withdraw weapons and to lift the ken, took a favorable view of his plan. I asked has such a high defense potential as Cuba. If there blockade. We accepted U Thant’s suggestion what was the USA position and U Thant informed is no direct aggression on the part of the USA, no about verification on the part of the Red Cross. [me] that the Americans had called it an OAS group of Latinamerican countries has the possi- In general it is necessary to note that the issue without outlining their own attitude. But I bility to overpower Cuba. cargo transportation to Cuba represent an interest managed to clear up this question during the Let us try to understand, of what does our for you, not us. You are receiving the goods. We conversation with McCloy. At first McCloy and victory consist. Let’s compare situations in June incur considerable losses. Steamships are obliged Stevenson said that there was not a “U Thant and now, in November. The Americans have to wait at sea. We were forced to agree to the Red plan.” Then they admitted their knowledge of the virtually forgotten the Monroe doctrine. Kennedy Cross verification in order to reduce our losses. plan, but declared that the USA opposes any does not mention it any more and, you know, the Such a verification is better than the American verification procedures on their territory. Monroe doctrine has been the basis of American one. This organization does not have any politi- McCloy said they could pledge their word imperialism in Latin America. Previously Ameri- cal or state character. Vessels that can be used for that all the camps for mercenary training in Cen- cans were declaring that they would not tolerate such verification, are not American but neutral tral America had been liquidated or were in the a Marxist regime on the American continent. and Soviet. process of liquidation. I asked McCloy if it had Now they are committing themselves not to at- U Thant suggested two options for verifica- been done in all countries. McCloy answered that tack Cuba. They were saying that foreign powers COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 101 could not be present on the American continent tions including economic issues. messages from N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy and in whatever form. They know about the Soviet It was decided to have another meeting in the I would like to say that Kennedy in his letter of 27 military in Cuba, but do not speak of the Monroe Presidential Palace at 14 hours [2 pm—ed.] on 5 October, which attracted your attention, formally doctrine. November. is answering the confidential message of N.S. Cuba found itself in the center of interna- Ambassador Alekseev was also present on Khrushchev of 26/X [26 October], but in essence tional political events. The United Nations Or- the Soviet side. he is simultaneously responding to Khrushchev’s ganization is engaged in the Cuban issue. U letter of 27/X [27 October], which had been Thant practically backs Cuba and comes out Recorded by V. Tikhmenev published even before the aforementioned re- against the USA policy. And you remember that sponse from Kennedy and in which we had raised previously it was not possible to obtain support [signature] the question of dismantling the ground launchers for Cuba at the UN. World public opinion has in Cuba under the condition of liquidating the been mobilized and even some nations who were [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, ob- American base in Turkey. You have been given previously against Cuba. tained and translated by NHK television, copy all the correspondence between N.S. Khrushchev In the USA there are hysterics, but in their provided by Philip Brenner; translation by and Kennedy except for one confidential mes- souls many people understand the fairness of the Aleksandr Zaemsky slightly revised.] sage from Kennedy of 25 October, which is not Cuban demands. connected to the issue of dismantling and only In the end, the prestige of the socialist camp * * * * * accuses us of denying the fact of the construction has strengthened. It defended peace, though the of ground launchers for special equipment in USA was rapidly sliding down toward war. Document III: Cuba. We can read it out and then give you the People have united in order to resist Ameri- “I don’t understand such a sharp reaction” translation. (The letter is read out.) can plans aimed at unleashing a war, and simul- —The Third Castro-Mikoyan Conversation, taneously the Soviet policy was carried out in the 5 November 1962 (afternoon) FIDEL CASTRO. Thank you. Now this framework of settling the issues by peaceful issue is clear to me. means. The immediate threat of military attack MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION A.I. MIKOYAN. I’ll continue. Having against Cuba is gone. I believe it is moved aside received that message we answered it on 26 for several years. A.I. MIKOYAN with Fidel CASTRO, Oswaldo October through confidential channels. In that It is necessary now to fix that success on the PORTICOS, Raul CASTRO, Ernesto letter there were no concrete proposals yet. We diplomatic field, so that Cuba—a beacon of GUEVARA and Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ were speaking only about the necessity to elimi- Latin American revolution—could develop more nate the threat of an assault against Cuba. The rapidly in every respect and give a decisive 5 November 1962 letter included only the idea of seeking an agree- example for mobilizing other peoples for struggle. ment. We didn’t receive an answer from Kennedy Our support becomes more and more ac- A conversation between A.I. Mikoyan and on the 26th. There was no answer on the morning tive. We are helping you as our brothers. More the same composition of the Cuban leadership, as of 27 October either. We came to the conclusion possibilities have been created. on the previous occasion, took place on 5 Novem- that the Americans were actively preparing for an Americans are obliged to take Cuba into ber, at the Presidential palace. The conversation attack, but were preferring not to disclose their account, to solve issues, regarding Cuba, with lasted 2 hours 30 minutes. plans before world public opinion. Therefore, in our participation. We are not speaking about During the previous meeting F. Castro asked order to tie the Americans’ hands, we decided to Russia [sic—ed.] as such, but as a country of comrade Mikoyan a question which showed his send Kennedy a new letter and publish it in the socialism. Socialism, which you are also merito- doubts as if we had not given him all the messages press. That was the letter of 27 October, known riously representing, became a decisive factor of from N.S. Khrushchev to president Kennedy. He to you, where the demand for the liquidation of international policy. American propaganda is asked how the statement of Kennedy of 27 Octo- the American bases in Turkey was advanced. We repeating over and over again about a diminish- ber could be explained, insofar as there was al- published this letter very quickly, even before the ing of Cuba’s prestige. Just to the contrary ready a reference to our consent to dismantle American ambassador received its text. Our Cuba’s prestige has been undoubtedly strength- ground launchers for special equipment. objective was to forestall the Americans and ened as a result of recent events. Comrade Mikoyan answered Castro that all frustrate their plans. Only then we received a In conclusion A.I. Mikoyan apologized to confidential letters from N.S. Khrushchev had message from Kennedy. It was sent on the the Cuban comrades for having tired them out. been given to the Cuban comrades and the open evening of 27 October. We received it on 28 Joking he adds that the only compensation is that messages are known to them from the media. No October toward the morning (the time difference he is worn out too. So there is complete equality. other letters have been sent from N.S. Khrushchev [between Washington and Moscow—ed.] must He suggests to set the time of the next to Kennedy, said Mikoyan. be taken into consideration). This letter by its meeting. In order to render the trend of developments form seemed to be an answer to the confidential more precisely, A.I. MIKOYAN suggested, to message from N.S. Khrushchev of 26 October, F. CASTRO asked, if it was possible, to answer that question during consecutive conver- but in effect it was the response to the letter of 27 discuss Soviet policy regarding the Berlin issue. sation, that is on 5 November, after looking through October. On 28 October in the morning, having the whole correspondence on this issue once more. received the letter from comrade Fidel Castro, A.I. MIKOYAN answered that he would do In the conversation [on 5 November], A.I. and having at our disposal other data about prepa- so, and also would discuss the exchange of letters MIKOYAN said that the correspondence between rations for an attack literally in the nearest hours, between the CPSU and communist parties of N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy had been looked N.S. Khrushchev made an open radio statement India and China on the issue of conflict between through again, and the motives, which had that the Soviet officers had received orders to India and China. He can explain our plans in the prompted Kennedy to refer to our consent about dismantle and evacuate the strategic missiles. As sphere of disarmament, on the ceasing of tests of the dismantling of the missiles, had been deter- you understand, there was no time for consulta- hydrogen weapons, and answer all other ques- mined. You are aware of the content of all the tions with the Cuban government. By publishing 102 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the messages we had the possibility to send them tions in the USA. These decisions are testimony letter from N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy of 27 quickly to Cuba, but we could not wait for an to the firm resolution of the Soviet Union to October. In those two documents there is the real answer because it would take a lot of time to defend Cuba. They help to understand correctly basis for the decision announced in the letter of 28 encode, decipher, translate, and transmit them. the policy of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I October. So, Kennedy’s letter of 27 October Acting in this way, we were proceeding repeat, an analysis of the USSR position can be meant acceptance of proposals by N.S. from our conviction that the most important ob- correct only with due regard for all the events and Khrushchev of 26 October consisting of his con- jective in that situation was to prevent an attack decisions both before and during the crisis. sent to evacuate from Cuba not only strategic against Cuba. I would like to underline that our We do not doubt that if all the works on the armaments, but all the weapons if the USA stops proposals to dismantle the strategic missiles and assembly of the strategic weapons had been com- threatening Cuba with an attack. Because the to liquidate the American bases in Turkey had pleted in conditions of secrecy then we would threat on the part of the USA had been the only been advanced before receiving the letter from have received a strong means of deterrence against reason that forced Cuba to arm itself. When comrade Fidel Castro of 27 October. The order American plans for attacking our country. In this Kennedy accepted this proposal (we didn’t know for the dismantling of the strategic missiles and way objectives would have been achieved which that he was accepting it), the conditions were their evacuation was given after we had received are pursued both by the Soviet government and created to develop the Soviet proposals and pre- the letter from Kennedy of 27 October and the the government of the Republic of Cuba. How- pare a declaration regarding the agreement of the letter from Fidel Castro. In our message of 28 ever, we consider that the installation of Soviet parties. The USA could have been told that the October, as you have noted, the demand for the missiles in Cuba was significant for the interests USSR was ready to dismantle the equipment but liquidation of bases in Turkey was no longer of the whole socialist camp. Even if we consider would like to discuss it with the Cuban govern- suggested. We did this because we were afraid it to be a military advantage, it was politically and ment. In our opinion the issue should have been that in spite of our proposal of 27 October the psychologically important in the struggle for the solved in this way instead of giving immediately American imperialists could assault Cuba. We deterrence of imperialism and the prevention of an order to evacuate the strategic weapons. Such had nothing else to do but to work on the main its aggressive plans. Thus, the installation of the a procedure would have lessened international task—to prevent an attack against Cuba, believ- strategic missiles in Cuba was carried out not tension and secured the possibility to discuss the ing that our Cuban friends would understand the only in the interests of the defense of Cuba, but of issue with the Americans in more favorable con- correctness of our actions, although the normal the whole socialist camp. It was done with our ditions. In this way it could have been possible procedure of coordination had not been observed. complete consent. not only to achieve a lessening of international The question was that there were 24 hours We understood perfectly well the signifi- tension and to discuss the issue in better condi- left before an assault against Cuba. It must be cance of this action and we considered it to be a tions, but also to achieve the signing of a declara- taken into consideration that we had only a few correct step. tion. [literally, “counted”—ed.] hours at our disposal We also completely agree that war must be It is only a simple analysis of previous and we could not act other than we did. And there prevented. We do not object that the measures events that does not have special importance right are results: an attack against Cuba is prevented, undertaken were in pursuit of two objectives, that now. the peace is preserved. However you are right is—to prevent an attack against Cuba and to Nowadays it is important for us to know that the procedure of consultations, which is avoid starting a world war. We completely agree what to do under the new conditions. In what way possible under normal circumstances, was not with these aims pursued by the Soviet Union. shall we seek to achieve our main goals and at the followed. Misunderstanding arose in connection with same time fight to prevent an aggression and the form of discussion of this issue. However, we preserve peace. Certainly, if in due course we F. CASTRO. I would like to respond to understand that the circumstances were demand- manage to secure a lasting peace, then we’ll have comrade Mikoyan. ing urgent actions and the situation was abnor- an opportunity to better assess the undertaken We have listened with great attention to the mal. Assessing past events, we come to the steps in light of new facts. Future results of our information and explanations offered by com- conclusion that the discussion of these sharp struggle will demonstrate the importance of rade Mikoyan. Undoubtedly all those explana- questions could be carried out in another form. today’s events. Certainly, only a little bit in this tions are very valuable because they help us to For example, the issue, which we have already struggle depends on us personally. understand better the course of events. We are discussed here, in regard to my letter in connec- We are very grateful for all the explanations thankful for the desire to explain everything to us, tion with the decision of the Soviet government given to us by comrade Mikoyan, for all the for the efforts undertaken in this regard. The and the publication of the Soviet government efforts undertaken by him in order to make us arguments, that the strategic missiles after being statement of 28 October. True, my letter bore no understand the recent events. We take into con- discovered by the enemy practically lost what- relation to issues mentioned in the messages of 26 sideration the special conditions under which it ever military significance or their significance and 27 October between the Soviet government was necessary to act. We have no doubts regard- becomes extremely small, also cause no doubts and the USA Administration. Such a letter [from ing the friendly character of our relations, based among us. Castro to Khrushchev—ed.] pursued one objec- on common principles. Our respect for the Soviet We are grateful for all these explanations tive—to inform the Soviet government about the Union is unshakeable. We know that it respects and do understand, that the intentions of the inevitability of an assault against Cuba. There our sovereignty and is ready to defend us from an Soviet government cannot be assessed only on was not a word about any minor hesitation on our aggression on the part of imperialism. Therefore, the grounds of an analysis of the most recent side. We clearly declared our resolve to fight. the most important thing now is to determine our developments, especially as the atmosphere is Besides, we didn’t say that we were expecting an joint steps. rapidly changing and new situations are created. invasion. We wrote that it was possible, but not I would like to assure you, comrade Mikoyan, The totality of adopted decisions, which became so likely. In our opinion, more probable was an of our complete trust. the basis for supplying strategic weapons and the air attack with the sole aim of destroying the signing of [the Soviet-Cuban—ed.] agreement, strategic weapons in Cuba. The basis of the A.I. MIKOYAN. I’m deeply satisfied by must be taken into consideration. It was sup- Soviet government decision of 28 October had the statement of comrade Fidel Castro. We have posed to publish that agreement after the installa- already been reflected in the message to Kennedy always been confident of our sincere friendship tion of the strategic missiles and after the elec- of 26 October and clearly manifested itself in the which nothing can disrupt. I’ll transmit word by COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 103 word your statement to the CC CPSU and I’m “Komar” [“Mosquito”] patrol boats. Stevenson international commissions or representatives of sure that it will produce gladness on the part of wrote that it would be necessary to discuss that foreign powers often operate at sea ports and that the Central Committee. issue. Immediately I told comrade Kuznetsov that fact does not limit the sovereignty of the host I would like to make a small explanation, this issue was not a subject for discussion. These country in the slightest measure. Such a possibil- very briefly. bombers have low speed and low altitude limits. ity would allow U Thant to consider accom- I agree completely with the assessment, Nor can the “Komar” patrol boats operate at great plished the decision to withdraw the strategic made by comrade Fidel Castro of his own letter. distance. Therefore those weapons are clearly missiles from Cuba. These observers would be He is interpreting it correctly. It’s a legitimate defensive. given the opportunity to visit Soviet ships, an- question raised by him—could we have made In the first Kennedy message [possibly an chored at the ports, to verify the fact of the another decision instead of [sending] instruc- allusion to Kennedy’s October 22 speech, which armaments’ removal. From my point of view that tions for dismantling the strategic weapons[?] included a reference to the bombers—ed.] the would not represent any infringement of national But we had been informed that an attack against American administration spoke about the bomb- sovereignty. Cuba would begin within the next few hours. ers, later this question fell away. Now they want Socialist countries, insofar as we are marxist- Perhaps it was really intended to deliver a blow to raise again this question. We have resolutely leninists, have to find a way of securing a unity of first of all against the strategic missile sites, but rejected such a discussion. Comrade Kuznetsov actions even in those cases when our opinions are it would be followed by a strike against Cuba. received corresponding instructions from Mos- somewhat different. Moreover, I believe, it would We had to act resolutely in order to frustrate the cow. This is nothing more than attempts to be taken into consideration that there are Soviet plan of attack on Cuba. We realize that by doing complicate the whole matter in order to create troops on Cuban territory. Therefore, our coop- this we had to sacrifice the necessity of consulta- once again a tense atmosphere and dangerous eration in the fight against imperialism must be tions with the Cuban government. situation. especially effective. You may respond to this Regarding comrade Fidel Castro’s opinion Let me specify the list sent by Stevenson. proposal [of mine] maybe not today, but tomor- that in the letter from N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy Here it is. There are mentioned: bombers, “Komar” row; in general, it seems to me that it is a mini- of 26 October, there was a promise to withdraw patrol boats, “air-to-surface” bombs and missiles, mum concession which would allow U Thant to from Cuba all the weapons and all military spe- “sea-to-surface” and “surface-to-surface” pro- present a report to the Security Council about the cialists. The Americans did not demand from us jectiles [cruise missiles—ed.]. The Americans evacuation of the missiles. In the contrary case such a step. The issue was the offensive weap- are impertinently continuing their attempts to we will inevitably hear at the Security Council ons. Perhaps comrade Fidel Castro made such a complicate the situation. that the Cubans do not permit verification to be conclusion on the basis of the phrase where a It is very important to have a document of conducted, and that the Russians are only talking withdrawal of technical specialists was men- agreement, which one can use at the UN. It can be about control. But if the Security Council is given tioned. But this implied specialists who operate carried through the UN with the help of U Thant. the opportunity to establish compliance of the strategic missiles. The fact that it regarded only But for that it is necessary to have evidence promise of N.S. Khrushchev, then the quarantine them is confirmed by all the letters, by the totality proving the dismantling and evacuation of weap- may be lifted. The stage of diplomatic negotia- of their context. They were about offensive ons. Then the situation would improve. The tions will begin. Roughly such an appeal was put weapons only. earlier it is done, the more advantageous it will be forth by U Thant during his conversation with for us. me. I ask you to discuss this proposal. I believe FIDEL CASTRO confirms, that his under- For the Americans it is better to postpone the that the solution of this problem will help create standing was just the same. solution of this question. In this case they have the definite conditions to settle the crisis situation possibility to continue the quarantine and other which had developed in the Caribbean sea. A.I. MIKOYAN. It is no coincidence that aggressive actions. We would rather help U Thant The Americans would like to delay the solu- in his answer to this letter Kennedy does not raise in order to give him a chance to report to the UN tion of this issue. Dragging it out gives them the the question of removing from Cuba all the that the Soviet side has carried out the dismantling opportunity to prolong the term of the quarantine. weapons. If such a proposal had been present in and evacuation of offensive weapons from Cuba. We told the Americans that we would be able to our letter, Kennedy would undoubtedly have We should talk about it. evacuate the weapons in 10 days. They are not in taken advantage of it. Therefore the opinion, We have resolutely rejected the American a hurry and say that it could take even a month. It outlined by comrade Fidel Castro regarding this demand for aerial inspection. Nevertheless, with is advantageous for the USA to preserve tension part, is incorrect. There is nothing of the kind in the help of air photography the Americans col- in this area. And we are standing for a lessening the letters of 27 and 28 October. lected data that the dismantling of the strategic of tension, in order to solve this question at the I would like to mention, that the Americans weapons had concluded and published that infor- Security Council. In our view, it’s difficult for are trying to broaden the list of weapons for mation by themselves. U Thant could have in- the Security Council to discuss this issue until the evacuation. Such attempts have already been formed the UN, but he needs evidence, proving end of the USA elections. The elections will be made, but we will not allow them to do so. On our the evacuation of the weapons. UN representa- held tomorrow and so it would be appropriate to part, we gave our consent only to withdraw tives must see how the evacuation is carried out think about its solution. It’s very important to strategic weapons. When I was speaking to and inform U Thant on the results of their obser- keep U Thant on our side. It seemed to me that he McCloy he told me with a smile that it would be vation mission. Then the situation will become was very satisfied by his meeting with comrade good if we removed from Cuba the anti-aircraft significantly simpler. The issue will be sent to the Fidel Castro. But if we delay the solution, the missiles, too. But those are defensive weapons, Security Council where the decisions are taken Americans will seize the opportunity for their not offensive. not only by the USA representatives. benefit. Half an hour before my departure from New I’m not insisting that you answer this ques- York, those pilferers (now we are speaking about tion right now. Maybe you can do it tomorrow. If C.R. RODRIGUEZ. So, if I understand you Stevenson) sent a letter to comrade Kuznetsov, it would be acceptable for you, why, for example, correctly, the question is about verification of saying that they supposedly had forgotten to not give consent for U Thant’s representatives to loading at the Cuban ports as a minimum demand raise questions about some kinds of weapons. verify how the weapons’ loading onto Soviet and the Americans would consider such a control They were referring to the IL-28 bombers and ships is carried out. You know that different a sufficient guarantee? Won’t they later demand 104 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN an on-site verification, in the forests? I’m afraid tion necessary to declare the verification to be explain to comrade Mikoyan that what I’m say- if we go along such route we can even reach an carried out. ing reflects the decision of the whole Cuban inspection on site, where the strategic missiles people. We will not give our consent for inspec- previously have been located. F. CASTRO. Isn’t it possible to do the same tion. We don’t want to compromise Soviet troops on open sea? and endanger peace in the whole world. If our A.I. MIKOYAN. The imperialists are not position imperils peace in the whole world, then the point. Such a verification is necessary for us. A.I. MIKOYAN. The form of loading veri- we would rather consider the Soviet side to be If the imperialists protest we can send them to fication is more suitable for U Thant. It is not free of its commitments and we would defend hell. But it’s necessary to take into consideration hurting your sovereignty either, because the veri- ourselves. Come what may. We have the right to that the support of U Thant is very important for fication will be carried out not on your territory, defend our dignity. us, and the imperialists can say what they want. but aboard our ship. We’ll send them to hell, the more so as they have O. DORTICOS. The statement voiced by already been convinced of the dismantling of the F. CASTRO. I understand very well the comrade Fidel Castro reflects our common reso- missiles with the help of air photography. If we interest in keeping U Thant on our side. But such luteness and we consider that this issue does not manage to come to an agreement over verifica- an inspection will undoubtedly have a painful deserve further discussion. tions on ships, then the UN representatives will effect on the moral condition of our people. The be able to control the process of loading also. We Americans are insisting that the agreement on A.I. MIKOYAN. I don’t understand such a will not accept any more. Indeed, appetite comes verification has been achieved by the exchange of sharp reaction to my proposal. What we were with eating, but we will resolutely oppose such a messages. And, indeed, in the letter from speaking about was not an inspection of Cuban rise of appetite, we’ll do a step forward and that’s Khrushchev to Kennedy of 28 October, it is said: territory, but a verification procedure in the ports. enough for them. We rejected inspection, we “As I informed you in the letter of 27 October, we Foreign representatives can be found in any port. didn’t allow surface verification, we won’t per- are prepared to reach agreement to enable United It does not have anything to do with aerial or mit control over dismantling. But in order to Nations representatives to verify the dismantling surface inspection. I’m saying that not to call into strengthen our position at the UN, the representa- of these means.” question your statement, but in order to explain. tives of this organization should be given the Therefore it implies representatives of the Besides the issue we have just finished dis- facts. Otherwise it will be difficult to restrain Security Council for the mission of verification cussing, we were going—according to your pro- revanchists at the Security Council. But if the of dismantling on the site. posal—to talk over a plan of joint actions. We can evacuation of weapons would be carried out and In the message of N.S. Khrushchev it is said, have such a discussion not now, but at a time verified, then we’ll obtain the lifting of the quar- that consent would obviously be needed on the convenient for you. antine. I think, we should not put the sign of part of the governments of Cuba and Turkey in equality between the UN and the American impe- order to organize control of compliance of under- F. CASTRO. On the basis of yesterday’s rialists. The matter is that the UN cannot exceed taken commitments. That means that N.S. meeting we came to the conclusion that the Soviet the limits settled by the two messages. If we Khrushchev in his letter of 28 October, is making government understood the reasons for our reso- manage to receive support from the UN, then the reference to the message of the 27th. The neces- luteness not to allow a verification of Cuban Americans would go to hell. We promised to sity of obtaining consent on the part of Cuba is territory. That resoluteness is a starting-point for allow verification of the evacuation. That verifi- mentioned there, but that is not a responsibility of us. We proceeding from the same point regarding cation can be organized by means of the UN. We the Soviet Union, insofar as the USSR has al- joint actions as well. It’s difficult to talk about didn’t pledge anything else. But if we do not ready warned in the letter of 27 October, that the them, if we have not come to an agreement on the fulfill our promise, the situation may become permission of the Cuban government is needed. previous issue. considerably complicated. Perhaps you will dis- Comrade Mikoyan is saying that the imperi- That issue is the most important from Cuba cuss this issue without our presence and at the alists could be sent to hell. now from a political point of view. The guaran- same time consider the possibilities of our further On 23 October I received a very clear letter tees are very problematic. It is not peace that we joint actions. If you find the opportunity we can where the precise position of the Soviet govern- are speaking about. But inspection is a compo- meet today. However the meeting can be held ment is explained. Kennedy’s statement is char- nent of their strategy in the struggle against the tomorrow. acterized therein as an unprecedented interfer- Cuban revolution. The American position is ence into internal affairs, as a violation of interna- weaker. The journal “Time” wrote that the dis- F. CASTRO. And what will the inspection tional law and as a provocative act. The Republic mantling was proceeding rapidly. Verification in look like? of Cuba, like all sovereign states, has the right to the ports and at sea is just the same. But verifica- reject control and decide by itself what kinds of tion in the ports is very insulting for us from the A.I. MIKOYAN. Representatives of U Thant weapons it requires. No sovereign state must political point of view and we cannot fulfill this will arrive at the port of loading. Currently there give an account of such actions. These concepts demand of the USA administration. are 4-5 ships assigned for that purpose. Then of the letter of 23 October are very precise and they’ll climb on board. They will be shown the correctly reflected our position. A.I. MIKOYAN. My proposal was regard- cargo and given corresponding information. In One more question. The formula that fore- ing not the Cuban territory, but only the Soviet this way they will be convinced that we are sees UN observers in Cuba, in the USA, Guate- ships, vessels are considered to be territory of that fulfilling our promise and will go away. That is mala and other countries seems to me a more state, whom they belong to. Such a proposal I put my understanding of this form of verification. If reasonable verification. A unilateral inspection forward on my personal behalf. Moscow did not we come to an agreement regarding this proposal, would affect monstrously the moral spirit of our entrust me to suggest it. Speaking frankly, I I’ll inform our representative to the UN and then people. We made big concessions. The Ameri- considered that insofar as such a verification did we’ll have the opportunity to settle the technique can imperialists are carrying out aerial photogra- not regard Cuban territory, but Soviet ships, it and procedure of this work. phy freely and we do not impede them due to the could be accepted. I was saying that although we I would be able to inform Moscow that we appeal of the Soviet government. It is necessary understand the Cuban position, the verification agreed to give both U Thant and the UN informa- to look for some other formula. I would like to procedures were not dangerous. I don’t under- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 105 stand your reaction to my proposal. that Fidel Castro had not been able to come on the first point, especially since that has already Our Central Committee entrusted me to because he is feeling poorly. been loudly declared by the Cuban leadership. explain in detail the Soviet position on all the Second, the publication of separate declarations issues that are of interest to the Cuban comrades, A.I. MIKOYAN expressed his sympathy in would reveal the disagreements between us on entrusted me neither to impose our opinion, nor regard to the fact that F. Castro is feeling under the this question, and that would be disadvantageous pressure you in order to obtain consent for in- weather. for both sides. spection of the Cuban territory. When I spoke about the necessity of think- O. DORTICOS. We have analyzed Com- ing through our joint positions, I did not have F. CASTRO. But verification would be rade Mikoyan’s latest proposals regarding verifi- inspections in mind. We must think about the carried out from the Cuban territory. cation of the loading of the strategic missiles on entire complex of measures, both in the sphere of the decks of Soviet ships in Cuban ports. Our diplomacy and in all other spheres, so as to satisfy A.I. MIKOYAN. No, it could be carried out opinion is thus: keeping in mind chiefly the our common interests. Whether it will be in the only aboard the ships. For that purpose Soviet maintenance of the high moral spirit of our people form of a protocol or a declaration is not so and neutral country ships could be used. The UN and, besides that, wishing not to allow the out- important. The main thing is not the form, not the representatives could live and sleep aboard those break of legal arguments in relation to the issue of points, rather it is the position from which we can steamers. the extraterritoriality of the ships, we want to give speak to U Thant and the UN. It follows that we a conclusive answer to Comrade Mikoyan. We should come to an agreement on our position, so F. CASTRO. Such a verification in the believe that it is impossible to accept that pro- as to make possible unity of actions. Concerning ports does not differ from control on ships on posal. We must refuse it, since in principle we do disagreements on the control issue, I don’t see the open sea. not allow inspections, not on Cuban territory, nor point of making a declaration on that issue and in our airspace, nor in our ports. continuing its consideration after the speech of A.I. MIKOYAN. There is no doubt that a After we have finished our consideration of comrade Fidel Castro. However, I have already verification can be carried out on open sea too, the issues which concern us, we could move to a spoken about that. I think that we will not make but does not bear relation to Cuba. consideration of our tasks in the near future. We a declaration on that topic and we will respect would like for the new steps which stand before us each other’s position, maintaining our own opin- O. DORTICOS. It seems to me that now we to be agreed with the Soviet government. We ions on this issue. should interrupt our work. We can agree upon believe that after the elections in the USA it will Concerning the proposals about inspections further meetings through Ambassador Alekseev. be possible to make a joint statement of the Soviet in the USA and other countries of the Caribbean government and the government of Cuba or to Sea, this proposals accords with the plans of U Ambassador Alekseev was also present on make separate, but simultaneous statements. Thant, we support it, and we can envisage it in the the Soviet side. The Cuban government unilaterally will de- draft of the protocol which we will propose to the clare that it opposes any surveillance of its terri- Americans. To this point it is mentioned there in Recorded by V. Tikhmenev tory, airspace and ports aimed at inspection of the a somewhat general form. I spoke about it with U [signature] dismantling and removal of “offensive” weapons. Thant, since this question seemed interesting to However, we are ready to consider U Thant’s us. Although the Americans may support such a [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, proposal about the possibility of inspection or proposal regarding to other countries, they will obtained and translated by NHK television, copy verification on Cuban territory under the condi- not allow observers at home. If you agree with provided by Philip Brenner; translation (by tion of a simultaneous inspection on the territory this point in the draft of the protocol, then it could Aleksandr Zaemsky) has been slightly revised.] of the USA, Guatemala and in other countries of occupy a place in our joint proposals. the Caribbean basin upon the coming into force of On the basis of a conversation with U Thant * * * * * an agreement on the liquidation of the conflict in I came to the conclusion that a coordinated dec- this region. Of course, we have no right to oppose laration will not satisfy the Americans and that Document IV: inspection on the open seas. That is not in our they will call for declarations from each of the “The USA wanted to destroy us physically, competence. We would like Comrade Mikoyan sides. However, form is not the main thing. It is but the Soviet Union with Khrushchev’s to understand why we oppose inspections in Cuba. necessary to coordinate our positions so that both letter destroyed us legally”— It is not just a matter of thoughts of legal proce- our and your representatives in New York could Mikoyan’s Meeting with Cuban Leaders, dure. The political side of the issue also has great act in a coordinated manner. 5 November 1962 (evening) significance. Such is our position. The draft of the document with which you The are other issues of concern to us, but we are familiar is not limited to U Thant’s plan, but Copy would not want to mix them up with the current it would still be possible to revise it. U Thant has Top Secret question. Therefore we would be glad to hear said that it would be possible to make more Comrade Mikoyan’s opinion. concrete the part of the document in which the MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION plan for the presence of the UN in the Caribbean A.I. MIKOYAN. The variant which in- Sea region is noted. U Thant, referring to such A.I. Mikoyan with Oswaldo Dorticos, Ernesto cludes inspection on ships which are being states like the USA, Cuba, and a range of other Guevara, and loaded—that is my initiative. I have already told states of Central America, believes it would be Carlos Rafael Rodriquez you that I had no authority to put forth that possible to do this. This could be done in the text. proposal. We understand your position. It seems This issue of coordinated observation by repre- to me that we have made our position clear to you. sentatives of the UN on the territory of the USA, Evening 5 November 1962 We are informing the CC CPSU and the Soviet Cuba, and other countries of Central America government about your position on this issue. As could be reflected in the protocol. In this case we far as a declaration is concerned, then I don’t see would be starting from a common position. How- After mutual greetings, Com. Dorticos said the point for either you or we to make a declaration ever, thus far we do not know your attitude to the 106 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN given document. the countries. And what is your opinion, Com- both from the territory of the USA and from the Comrade Kuznetsov, who is located in New rades? territory of the neighboring states of Cuba.” This York, asked me to find out the opinion of the type of formulation seems to give the USA the Cuban comrades. Not knowing your opinion, O. DORTICOS. I agree. Consequently we right to determine the actions of other states. Comrade Kuznetsov has been deprived of oppor- should strike article 13. tunities to speak with U Thant and the Americans. [Ed. note: Article 13 of the draft protocol A.I. MIKOYAN What are you going to do read: “The Government of the Republic of Cuba about that? They are satellites. Maybe another A.I. ALEKSEEV. This would give us the agrees to allow onto the territory of Cuba confi- editing will tie them even more. So far we have possibility to work out a common position in dential agents of the U.N. Security Council from no other version, but it is possible to think about regard to other articles of the protocol as well. the ranks of representatives of neutral states in it. The 5th article contains clauses which have a order so that they can attest to the fulfillment of similar nature. However, international law al- O. DORTICOS. We reviewed the text of the obligations vis-a-vis the dismantling and carry- lows similar formulations. protocol immediately after it was given to us, i.e., ing away of the weapons mentioned in article 9 of [Ed. note: Article 5 of the draft protocol even before the conversation with Comrade the present Protocol.” Draft Soviet-American- read: “The Government of the USA declares that Mikoyan. We have no fundamental objections. It Cuban protocol (unoffical translation), 31 Octo- the necessary measures will be taken to stop, both seems to me that in the protocol there is one ber 1962, Russian Foreign Ministry archives.] on the territory of the USA and on the territory of article about an inspection in Cuba. It would other countries of the Western hemisphere, any make sense to work out the issue of the conduct C.R. RODRIGUEZ. And change article 10. sort of underground activity against the Republic of a one-time observation both in Cuba and in the [Ed. note: Article 10 of the draft protocol of Cuba, [including] shipments of weapons and United States and in other countries of Central read: “The Government of the USSR, taking into explosive materials by air or sea, invasions by America. In view of the information which was account the agreement of the Government of the mercenaries, sending of spies and diversionists.” given by Com. Mikoyan yesterday, we believe Republic of Cuba, from its side agrees that con- Draft Soviet-American-Cuban protocol (unoffi- that we will not have any major objections to the fidential agents of the [UN] Security Council cial translation), 31 October 1962, Russian For- document. from the ranks of representatives of neutral states eign Ministry archives.] have attested to the fulfillment of obligations vis- C.R. RODRIGUEZ. I have doubts whether a-vis the dismantling and carrying away of the C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. That is so, if the proposed formula regarding the fact that the weapons mentioned in Article 9 of the present the governments of those countries will not ob- USA is obliged to secure inspections in Central Protocol.” Draft Soviet-American-Cuban proto- ject. However, Guatemala will oppose this pro- American countries is lawful. col (unofficial translation), 31 October 1962, posal. The situation will change, and the USA Russian Foreign Ministry archives.] will refuse its obligations. E. GUEVARA. That formula really causes doubts. A.I. MIKOYAN. In the 10th article some- A.I. MIKOYAN. In Kennedy’s message thing is said about Cuba? pretty much the same thought is expressed, but A.I. MIKOYAN. It is still possible to do the use of a phrase like “I am sure, that other some serious editing work. E. GUEVARA. Yes. I would like to add that countries of the Western Hemisphere will not Despite the fact that the Americans may not it seems to me that it makes sense to take into undertake aggressive actions...” Approximately accept the proposals contained in the document, account the points which we made about the in such a form. Comrade Carlos Rafael it will be advantageous for us to have a common form. The document signed by the representa- Rodriguez’s observation is just. But it is neces- position and to link it with U Thant’s plan. Even tives of three countries cannot determine the list sary to think up something. The Americans may if the Americans will be against it. The inspection of countries in which observers from the UN or say that this is an issue for each of these countries. will not be unilateral, it will be multilateral, so it the Security Council should be present. Let’s take a look at the formulation in Kennedy’s evidently doesn’t bother you. Whether or not the message. document will be accepted, it can still have great A.I. MIKOYAN. Maybe in this article significance. references should be limited to the USA and ALEKSEEV. In this message it is said that The idea belongs to U Thant. It is Cuba, and stipulate that other countries can be “I am sure that other countries of the Western possible to specify the list of countries which will included upon the agreement of their govern- Hemisphere will be ready to proceed in a similar be listed in this document. For example, Cuba, ments. So, for instance, from the direction of manner.” the USA, Guatemala and others. It seems to me Guatemala they constantly will be threatening that it makes sense to think over this issue. It aggression. It would be advisable to point out that C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. It would be would be an advantageous position. The Ameri- fact. It would be possible to ask the Security possible to propose approximately this formula- cans will be opponents of such a proposal, since Council to set the list of countries. It could do this tion: “The Security Council will undertake mea- they do not want to allow inspections on the in article 15, there where U Thant’s plan is sures so as not to allow aggression against Cuba territory of the USA. However, even our posing mentioned. We could leave the article without from the countries of the Caribbean, and also the of this issue will have great political significance. changes or note that the countries are to be deter- use of weapons and the territory of these coun- It is difficult to say how this will end, but the mined by the Security Council. It seems to me tries for the preparation of such aggression.” It struggle for acceptance of these proposals should that it is important to preserve the reference to U also would make sense to note that the “USA will bring us a victory. Thant’s plan. take upon itself the obligation that no prepara- In this way we see that the protocol does not tions will be conducted on its territory or with the prompt objections if does not speak about the C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. It would be assistance of its weapons...” It would be possible necessity of striking articles about inspections of possible to make many editorial changes here. to work out this variant. the dismantled weapons as applied to Cuba. There, So, for example, in the 3rd article it is said that where it speaks about multilateral inspection, it “the Government of the USA will restrain those A.I. MIKOYAN. Yes. This variant really is seems to me that it would be necessary to name who intend to undertake aggression against Cuba interesting. It is important to note that the USA COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 107 acts not only from its own territory. This is a very mise for them. We should use this compromise. are concerned, this inspection would refer to the important point for Cuba. It was not easy for the United States to make it. areas where camps for the training of counter- revolutionary mercenaries for aggression against DORTICOS. It is necessary to work on the ALEKSEEV. We should not miss this op- Cuba are set up. The inspection could be ex- editing of this document. We are not prepared portunity. tended to part of Florida, not touching, naturally, for this today. Here, it is necessary to think about Cape Canaveral. It is also necessary to organize the form, and also to work on the editing of this A.I. MIKOYAN. I am trying to evaluate the an inspection of camps in Puerto Rico, on the document, although we are essentially in agree- situation which flows from your positions. McCloy island of Vieques and in certain other territories, ment with this document and understand how said that he gives his word that the camps will be i.e., the inspection will touch not the entire terri- important it is to achieve success. We can work liquidated, that there will be no preparations for tory of the mentioned countries, but rather those a little bit together, significantly improving the aggression. This type of declaration has signifi- regions where these camps exist. formulation, but it makes sense to do it quicker. cance even in oral form. When the world knows, it will be uncomfortable for them not to fulfill A.I. MIKOYAN. It is immediately evident ERNESTO GUEVARA. In essence we are their promises I think, that it would be useful for that Carlos Rafael Rodriquez is a great specialist in agreement with this document. you, comrades, to think about issues of mutual on these issues. In this way we could drive the tactics. Let’s say that the USA will not agree to aggressors into a corner. It is important to find an DORTICOS. Naturally, we have to over- inspection on its territory. However, as it seems appropriate formulation. This variation repre- come certain language difficulties, too. A more to me, it would be important to organize observa- sents a big step forward. Maybe tomorrow [So- careful editing of the document evidently is tion on the territory of Guatemala, the Dominican viet officials] Bazykin and Alekseev will meet necessary in both . Republic, and certain other territories with the with some of you and confer on editorial issues. assistance of the UN representatives. It will be important to have this document imme- A.I. MIKOYAN. That is good. Our Min- It seems to me that it would be important to diately following the elections in the USA. We istry of Foreign Affairs is waiting for a commu- arrange for inspection in the countries of Central will take the initiative, and we will not allow the nication about your attitude towards this docu- America. Is Cuba interested in this? What are the Americans to capture it. Perhaps the Security ment. Com. Kuznetsov also requested a clarifi- positive and negative sides of this type of pro- Council can be convened on the 7th or 8th of cation of your position on this issue. Now we posal? I am in no way an authority on issues of November. could report about the principal agreement, ex- Central American policy, but it seems to me that cluding article 13, thoroughly editing article 5, it would be important to secure the presence of the ALEKSEEV. According to my information and bearing changes in article 3 regarding the UN there, in order to mitigate the significance in this will be done on the 6th. USA’s position in respect to the countries of this region of the OAS and the Organization of Central America. After our report about your Central American States. Comrades, have you DORTICOS objects. fundamental agreement, but the MFA and also thought about this issue? It will be easier for you our representative at the UN will be able to begin to decide, than for us. Could the following situa- GUEVARA objects. work. Maybe we could present our variant tion come to pass? They will say to us, that tomorrow. inspections of the Central American countries are A.I. MIKOYAN. U Thant told me that on 6 possible, but they cannot be realized on the terri- November the Security Council cannot be con- C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. The formula- tory of the United States of America. Would you vened: we will argue. There are protocol issues tion of article 5 bothers me. agree to that or, in your opinion, is that type of a here, and declarations, and procedures. We resolution not interesting to you, if it does not mustn’t underestimate the importance of the A.I. MIKOYAN. Yes. It encroaches on the extend to the USA? This would be important for struggle in the UN and the opinions of the mem- sovereignty of the countries of Central America, us to know in order to work out a joint tactic. It is ber states. but the governments of those countries are con- clear that the USA will figure on the list. Or ducting a very bad policy. perhaps an agreement can be reached on inspec- DORTICOS. We believe that it is possible tion in Central American countries, while the to act in the following way. Let us undertake a DORTICOS. We will try to prepare our USA will be limited only by the declaration. You thorough revision of the document, and we will variant by tomorrow. could give your answer to my questions not today, try to do it quicker. Right after we have prepared but tomorrow. it, Comrades Bazykin and Alekseev can meet A.I. MIKOYAN. Working out this docu- with our representatives in order to consider ment, we are thinking about providing for the DORTICOS. If inspections of the USA will editorial issues. security of Cuba. It seems to me that it is not be excluded, then in the same way inspections of There is information from Comrade [Carlos possible to limit the declaration about non-ag- Cuban territory will be excluded too. M.] Lechuga [Hevia], our new representative at gression to the United States only. The United the UN, regarding the fact that U Thant is inclined States of America can push other countries to- A.I. MIKOYAN. You could thoroughly to put off the convening of the Security Council. wards aggression and provide help to them in consider this issue, and then inform us of your It is possible that his session won’t even be this aggression, while remaining on the sidelines decision. week. U Thant is interested in holding bilateral itself. We have to oblige the United States to meetings before convening the Security Council. fulfill Kennedy’s promise. Com. Carlos Rafael C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. It would make Besides this, now we are entering a pretty compli- Rodriguez is entirely right. It is not of course a sense to specify the terms of the multilateral cated time: in the recent hours the USA has begun matter of these governments, rather, the impor- inspections as they apply to Cuba. It should spell to create even more tension, not only in relation tant thing is in the essence of this issue. Kennedy out the fulfillment of the obligation which the to the IL-28 bombers, but has also announced on this issue came to meet us. We demanded that Soviet Union has accepted on itself, i.e. verifica- unlimited airborne surveillence. not only the USA would give its word about non- tion of the dismantling and evacuation of the This is dangerous. We will consider what to aggression, but its allies too. This is a compro- Soviet missiles. As far as the rest of the countries do under conditions of a renewal of provocations 108 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN from the air. Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. missiles in E. GUEVARA. I think that the Soviet Turkey—ed.], and second, the open concession. policy had two weak sides. You didn’t under- A.I. MIKOYAN. You, Comrade Dorticos, It seems to me that this bears objective witness to stand the significance of the psychological factor possess trustworthy information. We told U the fact that we can now expect the decline of the for Cuban conditions. This thought was ex- Thant that it would be good if the Security Coun- revolutionary movement in Latin America, which pressed in an original way by Fidel Castro: “The cil were convened after the elections. I already in the recent period had been greatly strength- USA wanted to destroy us physically, but the said that when we withdraw the strategic missiles ened. I have expressed my personal opinion, but Soviet Union with Khrushchev’s letter destroyed and present evidence of that fact, we will be able I have spoken entirely sincerely. us legally [iuridicheskii].” to begin to speak about something else. Maybe tomorrow in the first half of the day A.I. MIKOYAN. Of course, it is necessary A.I. MIKOYAN. But we thought that you the comrades will work on editing the document, to speak sincerely. It is better to go to sleep than would be satisfied by our act. We did everything and after lunch we will organize an exchange of to hear insincere speeches. so that Cuba would not be destroyed. We see your opinions. readiness to die beautifully, but we believe that it I would also like to propose that we not E. GUEVARA. I also think so. Cuba is a isn’t work dying beautifully. publish a report about every meeting. It seems to country in which the interests of both camps meet me that there is no point in doing this today, and head on. Cuba is a peace-loving country. How- E. GUEVARA. To a certain extent you are in general it would make sense for us to come to ever, during the recent events the USA managed right. You offended our feelings by not consult- an agreement about this. to present itself in the eyes of public opinion as a ing us. But the main danger is in the second weak peace-loving country which was exposing ag- side of the Soviet policy. The thing is, you as if DORTICOS agrees with Comrade gression from the USSR, demonstrating courage recognized the right of the USA to violate inter- Mikoyan’s proposal. and achieving the liquidation of the Soviet base in national law. This is great damage done to your Cuba. The Americans managed to portray the policy. This fact really worries us. It may cause A.I. MIKOYAN. When we complete the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba as a manifes- difficulties for maintaining the unity of the so- evacuation of the missiles, many issues will be tation of aggressive intentions from the Soviet cialist countries. It seems to us that there already seen in a different light. While we still have not Union. The USA, by achieving the withdrawal of are cracks in the unity of the socialist camp. withdrawn them, we must maintain a different Soviet missiles from Cuba, in a way received the line. For that, 5-6 days are necessary. It is right to forbid other countries from making bases A.I. MIKOYAN. That issue worries us too. necessary to hold the line; otherwise they will available. Not only many revolutionaries think We are doing a lot to strengthen our unity, and accuse us of treachery. After we complete the this way, but also representatives of the Front of with you, comrades, we will always be with you evacuation, we will be able to adamantly oppose People’s Action in Chile and the representatives despite all the difficulties. overflights, the quarantine, verification by the of several democratic movements. Red Cross, violations of airspace. At that mo- In this, in my opinion, lies the crux of the E. GUEVARA. To the last day? ment the correlation of forces will change. recent events. Even in the context of all our It is necessary to get the UN on our side. We respect for the Soviet Union, we believe that the A.I. MIKOYAN. Yes, let our enemies die. must achieve more than was promised in decisions made by the Soviet Union were a mis- We must live and live. Live like communists. We Kennedy’s letter. We mustn’t underestimate the take. I am saying this not for discussion’s sake, are convinced of our victory. A maneuver is not value of diplomatic means of struggle. They are but so that you, Comrade Mikoyan, would be the same as a defeat. Compare the situation of a very important in periods when there is no war. It conversant with this point of view. year ago, and today. A year ago the presence of is important to know how to use the diplomatic Soviet soldiers in Cuba would have provoked an arts, displaying at the same time both firmness C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. Even before explosion of indignation. Now, it is as if the right and flexibility. your arrival, Comrade Mikoyan, immediately of Russians to be on this continent also is recog- after the famous decision of the Soviet govern- nized. That is good. McCloy even told me E. GUEVARA. I would like to tell you, ment was made, comrades from the editorial jokingly during a conversation that the presence Comrade Mikoyan, that, sincerely speaking, as a board of the newspaper “Popular” phoned me and of Russian officers [in Cuba—ed.] calms him consequence of the most recent events an ex- requested an interview. They wanted urgently to down. The Cubans could open fire without tremely complicated situation has been created in receive our declaration regarding the situation thinking, he observed. But Russians will think. Latin America. Many communists who represent which had developed, since the representatives of Of course, there could be objections to this re- other Latin American parties, and also revolu- the “third force” were actively opposing Soviet mark, but the psychological aspect is taken into tionary divisions like the Front for People’s Ac- policy. You know that group, it is deputy Trias. consideration. tion in Chile, are wavering. They are dismayed I gave an interview, not very long, since though I Sometimes, in order to take two steps for- [obeskurazheni] by the actions of the Soviet had been informed about the basic points in the ward, it is necessary to take a step back. I will not Union. A number of divisions have broken up. speech of Fidel Castro which should have taken in any way teach you, though I am older. You New groups are springing up, fractions are spring- place on November 1, I could not use them, and may say: it is time to consign it to the archive, ing up. The thing is, we are deeply convinced of in conclusion I observed that the development of request that we resign. the possibility of seizing power in a number of events in the coming days would show the signifi- Recently, I read Lenin. I want to tell you Latin American countries, and practice shows cance of the decisions that had been made. about this not for some sort of an analogy, but as that it is possible not only to seize it, but also to an example of Leninist logic. When the Brest hold power in a range of countries, taking into A.I. MIKOYAN. The meetings and conver- peace treaty was signed, Bukharin was working account practical experience. Unfortunately, sations with Comrade Fidel Castro had for me in the International Committee of the Party. Al- many Latin American groups believe that in the very great significance. They helped me to un- though he was repressed, I consider him a good political acts of the Soviet Union during the derstand more deeply the role of the psychologi- person. He tried, it happens, mistakenly, emo- recent events there are contained two serious cal factor for the peoples of these countries. tions had great significance for him. We were errors. First, the exchange [the proposal to swap friends (not in 1918, at that time I was working in COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 109 the , but much later). And so the understand his reaction. Perhaps I let some ability to do that. Comrade Carlos Rafael International Committee accepted a resolution in clumsiness show, spoke in some kind of tone? Rodriguez pointed out the directions of the future which it was stated that the concession in Brest No, I, it seems, gave no grounds. I said that it is struggle. I like this way of framing the issue. Of was shameful. The point of Soviet power is lost. necessary to help U Thant. It is necessary to keep course, it is foolish simply to believe Kennedy, it The comrades accepted the resolution as if re- U Thant on our side. Comrade Fidel asked an is necessary to bind him with obligations. jecting Soviet power itself. Lenin wrote about appropriate question, why not conduct the verifi- this resolution: monstrous. How is it possible for cation on the open sea. But U Thant won’t gain C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. And with stra- such a thought even to occur to a communist? anything with the assistance of this type of veri- tegic missiles? But you know, at that time we practically had no fication. Today I became a victim of Fidel’s good armed forces, but those comrades wanted to die speech, evidently because I extemporaneously A.I. MIKOYAN. We cannot defend you heroically, rejecting Soviet power. put forth my idea. An old man, I have the with these missiles. I received the possibility to shortcomings of the young. visit you, while others could not do that. We had E. GUEVARA. Yes. I see that there is no to request the agreement of , the USA to analogy here, but great similarities. E. GUEVARA. One day before that we said the overflight, and to overcome other difficulties. that there would be no inspections. Comrade They told us, for example, that we could not fly to A.I. MIKOYAN. There really is no anal- Mikoyan said that he had told McCloy that air- Canada without lead [escort?—ed.] planes. We ogy in this example. Imagine, Russia at that time borne inspections are inadmissible. had to receive visas. What could we do? That is was alone. We had no forces. There was some their right. Our Minister of Foreign Affairs sympathy from the working class of other coun- A.I. MIKOYAN. My proposal did not con- phoned the State Department and asked: Will tries, but sympathy alone doesn’t help much. cern even the shore. The subject was verification you give a visa to Mikoyan or not? Canada Cuba is powerful. You have no war. You have of our ships. Ships are sovereign territory. The delayed giving an answer, the Canadian minister the support of the socialist camp. It is true, your waters are yours, therefore we were trying to was absent, he was in New York. Other officials geographic situation is disadvantageous, com- elucidate your point of view. We didn’t touch the could not resolve that issue. Approval was granted munications are far extended. This is a weak land. We were talking about the waters. The land at 1:30 a.m., and at 3 a.m. we took off. But position. The Americans can disrupt communi- had nothing to do with it. Evidently I was naive. somehow we started talking about me. If Cuba cations and not allow the delivery of fuel to I thought that this variant was possible. Our was located in Greece’s place, we would have Cuba. We could have brought 200 million people ambassador, a young person, told me secretly: “I shown them. into the streets as a demonstration of protest. But think that the Cubans will accept this proposal.” I am satisfied by my meetings with you. The this would not have garnered any fuel for you. (To Alekseev): Don’t you speak for them. You business side is important. Basically, we have How can the blockade be disrupted? How are not a Cuban. come to an agreement on the protocol. Besides can it be broken? We have at our disposal global that, I must say that I thought that I understood the rockets. Using them would lead to nuclear war. C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. I have been Cubans, and then I listened to Comrade Ché and What do you say to this? Shall we die heroically? reading Lenin’s works for a long time. In the understood that no, I still don’t know them. That is romance. Why should revolutionaries present situation we need evaluations which cor- die[?] It is necessary to maneuver, develop the rectly reflect the situation. It is not a matter of ALEKSEEV: But Ché is an Argentinean. economy, culture, serve as an example of other feelings. These are the objective conditions in peoples of the countries of Latin America and Latin America. A.I. MIKOYAN, to Ché: Let’s meet and lead them to revolution. Lenin, in a complex In the first day of our conversations Com- talk a little. I would like to exchange some situation even agreed to the conduct of the con- rade Mikoyan spoke about two types of struggle. thoughts with you. It is not a matter of who will ference in the Prince Isles. Study Lenin. To die I think that in certain conditions the last word be victorious over whom. We must try to help heroically—that’s not enough. To live in shame belongs to the political struggle. In Latin America each other. I understood a lot. I understood how is not permitted, but nor is it permitted to give to after these events a feeling of demoralization important the psychological factor is in Latin the enemy your own destruction. It is necessary arose among the people. The nationalistic petit America. I am at your disposal. Every meeting to seek a way out in the art of diplomacy. bourgeoisie lost their faith in the possibility of is very useful for me. However you want it: one A barber comes to me in the residence with confronting imperialism. Diplomacy may change on one, two on each side, and so on. When I return a pistol, and I ask him: “You want to shave me the situation. Many people believe that if Kennedy to Moscow, I should have the right to say that I with a pistol? No, with a razor.” Or, a correspon- affirms his promises only orally, that will be understood the Cubans, but I am afraid that when dent from the newspaper “Oy” interviewed me, equivalent to a defeat. But if pressure will be I return I will say that I don’t know them, and in what a pleasant young man, also with a pistol. He applied by the Soviet Union, if Cuba will act fact I will not know them. has to take notes, but he lost his pencil. What can decisively, if we use U Thant and the neutral Our stake in Cuba is huge in both a material he write with a pistol? Do you understand me? If states to the necessary extent, if we insist on the and moral [sense], and also in a military regard. Kennedy maneuvers, dissimulates, conducts a acceptance of the demand re: verification of the Think about it, are we really helping you out of flexible policy, why don’t the Cuban comrades enemy’s territory, if we achieve acceptance of [our] overabundance? Do we have something use that weapon[?] You won’t manage to knock Fidel’s five points, we will gain a significant extra? We don’t have enough for ourselves. No, off the reaction with a pistol, the diplomatic art is victory. we want to preserve the base of socialism in Latin necessary too. An oral declaration of non-aggression defi- America. You were born as heroes, before a I was very satisfied by the conversation nitely will create a feeling of a defeat. revolutionary situation ripened in Latin America, with comrade Fidel Castro, but today I didn’t but the camp of socialism still has not grown into even know what to say regarding his reaction. A.I. MIKOYAN. I agree with Carlos Rafael its full capability to come to your assistance. We But I repeat that it was amazing. Maybe I spoke Rodriguez. Comrade Guevara evaluated the past give you ships, weapons, people, fruits and veg- foolishly, but before that I thought for a long events in a pessimistic tone. I respect his opinion, etables. China is big, but for the time being it is time. For me it has been morally difficult during but I do not agree with him. I will try during the these days. And today it was difficult for me to next meeting to convince him, though I doubt my continued on page 159 110 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

WARSAW PACT “LESSONS” Khrushchev decided not to give Castro any dural restrictions—at least for tactical mis- continued from page 59 direct jurisdiction over Soviet tactical nuclear siles—even after he received the two tele- will conclude with some observations about forces; indeed, the draft treaty on military grams “categorically” forbidding him to or- the legacy of the Cuban missile crisis for cooperation between the Soviet Union and der the issuance or use of nuclear weapons Warsaw Pact nuclear operations, a legacy Cuba, which was due to take effect once the without express authorization. On October that endured until the Pact itself collapsed in presence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba was 26 he sent a cable to Moscow in which he 1990-91. publicly revealed at the end of October, would apparently mentioned that Castro wanted have left the “military units of the two states him to prepare for a nuclear strike and that, “Lessons” of the Cuban Missile Crisis under the command of their respective gov- as a result, he had decided it was time to Several features of the Cuban missile ernments.”11 Even so, the Cuban leader’s move nuclear warheads closer to the mis- crisis were of direct relevance to subsequent message on 26 October 1962 still struck a siles (though without actually issuing them Soviet nuclear deployments in Eastern Eu- raw nerve in Moscow.12 It was a vivid to the missile units). Pliev then requested rope. The “lessons” that Soviet officials reminder of the dangers that might have that his decision be approved and that he be derived from the crisis were of course not resulted if the Soviet Union had delegated given due authority to order the preparation the only factor (or even the most important any responsibility for nuclear operations. of tactical missiles for launch if, as appeared factor) shaping the Warsaw Pact’s nuclear A related lesson about the dangers posed imminent, U.S. troops invaded the island. command structure, but they seem to have by local actors pertained to the role of the Soviet leaders immediately turned down both been of considerable influence, at least im- commander of Soviet forces in Cuba, Army- of his requests and reemphasized that no plicitly. Although Soviet leaders had been General Issa Pliev, who was chosen for the actions involving nuclear weapons were to concerned well before the Cuban Missile post because of his long-standing and very be undertaken without direct authorization Crisis about the difficulty of retaining se- close friendship with both Khrushchev and from Moscow.16 cure control over nuclear weapons and about the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Still, the very fact that Pliev sought to the danger of unauthorized actions, the cri- Malinovskii.13 At no time during the crisis have the restrictions lifted, and his seeming sis put these risks into a whole new light.8 did Pliev have authority to order the use of willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons By underscoring how easily control could either medium-range or tactical nuclear mis- if necessary, provided a sobering indication be lost, the crisis inevitably bolstered siles, but it is now known that several weeks of the risks entailed in giving discretion to Moscow’s determination to ensure strict before the crisis—in the late summer of local commanders. The risks would have centralized command over all nuclear op- 1962—Malinovskii had considered the pos- been especially acute in this instance be- erations, including nuclear operations con- sibility of giving Pliev pre-delegated author- cause there were no technical safeguards on ducted by the Warsaw Pact. ity to order the use of tactical missiles against the nuclear weapons in Cuba to serve as a One of the most disconcerting lessons invading U.S. troops if Pliev’s lines of com- fallback in case Pliev (or someone else) of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet munication with Moscow had been severed attempted to circumvent the procedural safe- perspective was the potential for nuclear and all other means of defense against an guards.17 This is not to say that it would have weapons to be misused if the aims of local invasion had proven insufficient. A written been easy for Pliev to evade the procedural actors were not identical to Soviet goals. It order to this effect was prepared on 8 Sep- limits—to do so he would have had to obtain is now known that at the height of the crisis tember 1962, but in the end Malinovskii cooperation from troops all along the chain Fidel Castro sent a top-secret cable to Mos- declined to sign it. Thus, at the time of the of command—but there was no technical cow urging the Soviet Union to launch a crisis Pliev had no independent authority to barrier per se to unauthorized actions. nuclear strike against the United States if order the use of nuclear weapons or even to Thus, one of the clear lessons of the U.S. forces invaded Cuba.9 Castro appar- order that nuclear warheads, which were crisis was the need not only to maintain ently had been led to believe that the Soviet stored separately from the missiles, be re- stringent procedural safeguards for all So- Union would be willing to go to war—and leased for possible employment. The limita- viet nuclear forces, but also to equip those risk its own destruction—in defense of Cuba. tions on Pliev’s scope of action during the forces with elaborate technical devices that Nikita Khrushchev’s response to Castro’s crisis were reinforced by two cables trans- would prevent unauthorized or accidental plea indicates that the Soviet leader had no mitted by Malinovskii on October 22 and 25, launches. This applied above all to nuclear intention of ordering the use of nuclear which “categorically” prohibited any use of weapons deployed abroad, where the lines weapons, regardless of what happened to nuclear weapons under any circumstances of communication were more vulnerable to Cuba. without explicit authorization from Mos- being severed or disrupted.18 For Khrushchev, this episode was es- cow.14 One further lesson from the Cuban Mis- pecially unnerving because he initially had The strictures imposed by the Soviet sile Crisis, which reinforced the perceived given serious consideration to providing leadership held up well during the crisis, as need for strict, centralized control over all Castro with direct command over Soviet the procedural safeguards for nuclear opera- nuclear operations, was the role that acci- forces in Cuba, including the nuclear-ca- tions proved sufficient to forestall any unto- dents played. The most conspicuous in- pable Frog (“Luna”) missiles and Il-28 air- ward incidents.15 For the most part, stance came on October 27 when an Ameri- craft.10 (Only the medium-range SS-4 and Khrushchev’s and Malinovskii’s faith in Pliev can U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot SS-5 missiles would have been left under was well-founded. Nevertheless, it is clear down over Cuba.19 The rules of engagement Moscow’s command.) As it turned out, that Pliev wanted to ease some of the proce- for Soviet troops in Cuba did not permit the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 111

WHEN AND WHY ROMANIA York for the opening of the UN General in Romania and offered the United States DISTANCED ITSELF FROM THE Assembly in the fall of 1963, a routine meet- any opportunity it wished to verify that fact. WARSAW PACT ing was arranged for October 4. Manescu (The absence of nuclear weapons accorded then arranged a private meeting with Rusk, with U.S. intelligence, and the United States by Raymond L. Garthoff attended only by an interpreter. It was the did not pursue the verification offer.) first opportunity after the crisis nearly a year In view of the sensitivity of the matter, In April 1964, the Romanian leadership earlier for the Romanian leadership to ap- any knowledge of this exchange was very issued a declaration in which it first ex- proach the United States government at this closely held in Washington, and no doubt in pressed public dissatisfaction with the War- level. Bucharest. It was not divulged to NATO saw Pact. Georghiu Dej, and after 1965 his Manescu told Rusk that Romania had governments. So far as is known, the Soviet successor Nicolae Ceausescu, increasingly not been consulted over the Soviet decision leadership did not learn of it—although that distanced themselves from the Pact and to place nuclear missiles in Cuba, and was remains to be determined from the Soviet Moscow’s leadership, although without chal- not therefore a party to the dispute. The archives. It did not “leak” in thirty years. I lenging the Soviet Union. Romania ceased Romanian government wanted the United do not know if there is today any written to participate actively in the military com- States to understand that Romania would account in either American or Romanian mand of the Warsaw Pact after 1969. All of remain neutral in any conflict generated by archives. this small slice of history has, of course, such actions as the Soviet deployment of I was told about the exchange by Dean been well known. It has not been known nuclear missiles in Cuba, and sought assur- Rusk soon after it occurred, and I recon- why Romania launched itself on that path at ances that in the event of hostilities arising firmed this account of it with him in 1990. It that particular time. Above all, seemed to me that with the col- it has not heretofore been known lapse of the Warsaw Pact, the that even earlier Romania es- overthrow of the Romanian gov- sentially repudiated its alle- ernment, and the reunification giance obligations in a secret of Europe, the matter is now approach to the United States safely history, and should be- government in October 1963, come a footnote to the historical promising neutrality in case of record. the outbreak of war. This was a It may be instructive, as stunning, unilateral breach of the well as interesting, history. For central obligation of Warsaw example, as far as I am aware no Pact alliance membership, which one has ever speculated on a Romania nominally maintained relationship between the Cuban until the very end, when the Pact Missile Crisis and the Roma- dissolved in 1991. nian actions in distancing them- What precisely happened, selves from the Warsaw Pact. It and why? The precipitating is also interesting to reflect that event was the Cuban Missile despite that crisis and other se- Crisis of October 1962. The vere trials, the two alliances did tensions generated by that crisis hold together throughout the had reverberations throughout Cold War, and with relatively Europe. No country wanted to be brought from such a situation, the Unites States would little evident concern over the risks involved, into a war over the issue of Soviet missiles in not strike Romania on the mistaken assump- even in other countries hosting nuclear weap- Cuba. But while members of NATO and the tion that it would be allied with the Soviet ons of the superpowers. Thus, remarkable Warsaw Pact dutifully gave public support Union in such a war. as was the Romanian case, it was the sole to the United States and the Soviet Union, Secretary Rusk in response indicated exception to alliance solidarity—assuming respectively, some did so with considerable that the United States would take into ac- the archives or informed officials do not trepidation. And in Bucharest, the leader- count any country that did not participate in have any other case, on one side or the other, ship decided after that crisis that it would or permit its territory to be used in military to reveal. seek to disengage itself from any automatic actions against the United States or its allies. involvement if their superpower alliance In this connection, he said that it would be Raymond L. Garthoff, a Senior Fellow at the leader, the Soviet Union, again assumed important for the United States to know Brookings Institution, is a retired Ambassa- such risks. whether there were nuclear weapons on Ro- dor and a diplomatic historian. He dis- Romanian-American relations at that manian soil, and that if the United States closed this episode from the history of the time were minimal. Nonetheless, when were given assurance that there were none, Cold War in remarks at the January 1993 Romanian Foreign Minister Corneliu that fact would be taken into account in U.S. CWIHP Moscow Conference on New Evi- Manescu asked to meet with the Secretary of targeting. The subsequently re- dence on Cold War History. State Dean Rusk, when both were in New sponded that there were no nuclear weapons 112 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN downing of American planes except those even the Romanian military was eventually of an emergency.25 After the Cuban Missile carrying out an attack.20 When the U-2 was supplied with nuclear-capable Frog-7 and Crisis, those two agreements were supplanted shot down, no one in Moscow was quite sure Scud-B missiles. In all cases, the deploy- by a much more far-reaching “Treaty Be- what had happened—Khrushchev and most ment of these delivery vehicles was well tween the Governments of the USSR and others mistakenly thought that Castro had under way by the time of the Cuban Missile CSSR on Measures to Increase the Combat ordered Soviet troops to fire at the plane— Crisis. Readiness of Missile Forces,” which was but everyone was certain that further inci- The new East European weapons were signed by Malinovskii and his Czechoslo- dents of this sort might cause the crisis to officially described as components of the vak counterpart, Army-General Bohumir spin out of control. The risks posed by “Warsaw Pact’s joint nuclear forces” and Lomsky, in December 1965.26 The treaty accidents would have been especially great were later used for simulated nuclear strikes provided for the permanent stationing of if the local commander (i.e., Pliev) had been during Pact exercises, but all nuclear war- Soviet nuclear warheads at three sites in given independent authority to order the use heads for the delivery systems remained un- western Czechoslovakia. of nuclear weapons. After all, Pliev and der exclusive Soviet control, and the deliv- This third agreement with Czechoslo- other officers based in Cuba, whose lives ery vehicles themselves would have come vakia was concluded just after the Soviet were directly at risk during the crisis, were under direct Soviet command if they had Union had worked out a similar arrangement naturally inclined to overreact to unintended ever been equipped with warheads during a with Hungary.27 The Soviet-Hungarian “provocations” from the opposing side. To crisis. Moreover, the thousands of tactical agreement was signed by Brezhnev and the the extent that such overreactions could not nuclear weapons deployed by Soviet forces Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar, and was be avoided in future crises, it was essential on East European territory were not subject kept secret from almost all other Hungarian that the consequences be minimized and to any sort of “dual-key” arrangement along officials. Much the same was true of an that further escalation be prevented. Obvi- the lines that NATO established in the mid- agreement that the Soviet Union concluded ously, it would be vastly more difficult to 1960s. Whenever Warsaw Pact exercises with Poland in early 1967.28 Only a few top regain any semblance of control if local included combat techniques for nuclear war- Polish officials were permitted to find out actors “accidentally” resorted to the use of fare (as they routinely did from early 1962 about the document. The Soviet agreements nuclear weapons. on), the decision on when to “go nuclear” with all four countries covered nuclear war- Hence, the accidents that occurred dur- was left entirely to the Soviet High Com- heads slated for use on delivery vehicles ing the Cuban Missile Crisis underscored mand.23 In every respect, then, the East belonging to Soviet troops stationed in those the need for rigid safeguards, both proce- European governments had no say in the use countries. Some of the warheads were also dural and technical, to preclude the use of of the Pact’s “joint” nuclear arsenal. intended for weapons deployed by the local Soviet nuclear weapons except in the most The exclusivity of Soviet command was armies, but in that case the delivery vehicles dire emergency. This lesson, like the others reinforced by secret agreements that the So- would have been transferred to direct Soviet that Khrushchev and his colleagues derived viet Union concluded in the early to mid- command. Under the new agreements East from the crisis, survived the change of lead- 1960s with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, European officials had no role in the use of ership in Moscow in October 1964. Al- Hungary, and Poland regarding the storage the Pact’s “joint” nuclear arsenal, nor any though altered many as- of nuclear warheads in those countries. Al- control over the reinforced storage bunkers pects of Khrushchev’s military policies, he though all the agreements were bilateral, for nuclear warheads (or even the housing was just as determined as his predecessor to they were described as coming “within the for elite units assigned to guard the bunkers). retain stringent political control over Soviet framework of the Warsaw Pact.” The first A senior East European military official nuclear forces. such agreements were signed with East Ger- later confirmed that “the procedures for the many and Czechoslovakia before the Cuban defense and protection of these special-pur- Nuclear Operations and the Warsaw Missile Crisis. The Soviet-East German pose storage centers for nuclear warheads Pact agreements, signed at various intervals in the were such that no one from our side had Nuclear weapons first became an issue early 1960s, covered some 16 storage sites, permission to enter, and even Soviet offi- for the Warsaw Pact in mid-1958 when, all of which were controlled exclusively by cials who were not directly responsible for allegedly in response to deployments by special troops assigned to the Group of So- guarding and operating the buildings were NATO, Khrushchev warned that the Pact viet Forces in Germany.24 The East German not allowed in.”29 would be “compelled by force of circum- authorities had no say at all in the location or Thus, by the late 1960s the Soviet and stance to consider stationing [tactical maintenance of these facilities, not to men- East European governments had forged a nuclear] missiles in the German Democratic tion the use of the munitions stored there. nuclear command-and-control structure for Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.”21 Soviet agreements with Czechoslovakia were the Warsaw Pact that gave exclusive say to Shortly thereafter, the Czechoslovak, East somewhat more complicated because no the Soviet Union. Even before the Cuban German, and Polish armed forces began Soviet troops had been present on Czecho- Missile Crisis, Soviet leaders had been in- receiving nuclear-capable aircraft and sur- slovak territory since the end of 1945. Two clined to move in this direction, but the crisis face-to-surface missiles from the Soviet preliminary agreements were signed in Au- greatly accelerated the trend and effectively Union.22 The Bulgarian and Hungarian gust 1961 and February 1962 entitling the ruled out anything less than complete con- armies also soon obtained nuclear-capable Soviet Union to dispatch nuclear warheads trol in Moscow. aircraft and missiles from Moscow; and immediately to Czechoslovakia in the event COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 113

Intra-Pact Debate about Nuclear however, were averse to any steps that would officials from Romania, Czechoslovakia, and “Sharing” even marginally erode the Soviet Union’s Hungary renewed their bid for “greater rights The effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis exclusive authority to order nuclear strikes, of co-determination in planning and imple- could also be felt, if only implicitly, when and it soon became clear during the meeting menting common coalition matters,” includ- the Soviet Union had to deal with com- that Soviet views on such matters would ing (by implication) the use of nuclear weap- plaints from its allies about the Pact’s nuclear prevail. As a result, the PCC communiqué ons.40 arrangements. The lack of East European simply called for both German states to As on previous occasions, however, the input proved unsatisfactory to several of the forswear nuclear weapons, proposed the cre- Soviet Union resisted whatever pressure was allied governments, who urged that they be ation of a nuclear-free zone in central Eu- exerted for the sharing of nuclear-release given some kind of role in nuclear-release rope, and advocated a freeze on all nuclear authority. In September 1966, a few months authorization. Their concerns were prompted stockpiles.34 The implication was that ar- after the Bucharest conference, the Warsaw in part by changes in Soviet military doc- rangements within the Warsaw Pact were Pact conducted huge “Vltava” exercises, trine in the mid-1960s, which seemed to best left unchanged. which included simulated nuclear strikes open the way for a nuclear or conventional That stance was reaffirmed over the under exclusive Soviet control.41 The same war confined to Europe. Under Khrushchev, next few months in a series of conspicuous arrangement was preserved in all subse- Soviet military doctrine had long been predi- Soviet declarations that “the Warsaw Pact is quent Pact maneuvers involving simulated cated on the assumption that any war in dependent on the Soviet strategic missile nuclear exchanges. Thus, well before the Europe would rapidly escalate to an all-out forces” and that “the security of all socialist signing of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear exchange between the superpowers; countries is reliably guaranteed by the nuclear put a symbolic end to the whole nuclear- but by the time Khrushchev was ousted in missile strength of the Soviet Union.”35 The sharing debate, the Soviet Union had firmly October 1964, Soviet military theorists had same message was conveyed later in the year established its exclusive, centralized control already begun to imply that a European by the joint “October Storm” military exer- over the Warsaw Pact’s “joint” nuclear forces conflict need not escalate to the level of cises in East Germany, which featured simu- and operations. strategic nuclear war.30 Under Brezhnev, lated nuclear strikes authorized solely by the Soviet military analyses of limited warfare USSR.36 In the meantime, the Soviet mo- The Lessons of the Crisis and in Europe, including the selective use of nopoly over allied nuclear weapons proce- Allied Nuclear Arrangements tactical nuclear weapons, grew far more dures was being reinforced by the series of The legacy of the Cuban Missile Crisis explicit and elaborate.31 Although this doc- agreements signed with Czechoslovakia, helped ensure that the intra-Warsaw Pact trinal shift made sense from the Soviet per- East Germany, Hungary, and Poland, as debate in the mid-1960s did not bring about spective, it stirred unease among East Euro- discussed above. The codification of exclu- any change in the alliance’s nuclear com- pean leaders, who feared that their countries sive Soviet control over nuclear weapons mand-and-control structure. Had it not been might be used as tactical nuclear battle- deployed in the other Warsaw Pact countries for the dangers that were so clearly revealed grounds without their having the slightest all but eliminated any basis for the East by the events of October 1962, Soviet lead- say in it. European governments to seek a role in the ers might have been willing to consider an The issue became a source of conten- alliance’s nuclear command structure. arrangement for the Warsaw Pact similar to tion at the January 1965 meeting of the Yet even after the Soviet Union tried to the “dual-key” system that NATO adopted. Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Com- put the matter to rest, controversy persisted When Operation “Anadyr” was first being mittee, where the assembled leaders dis- within the Warsaw Pact about the allocation planned in the late spring of 1962, cussed NATO’s plans to create a Multi- of responsibility for tactical nuclear weap- Khrushchev had toyed with the idea of giv- Lateral Force (MLF) that would supposedly ons. At a closed meeting of Pact leaders in ing Fidel Castro broad command over So- give West Germany access to nuclear-armed East Berlin in February 1966, Romania again viet tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba as well missiles. The PCC warned that if an MLF pressed for greater East European participa- as over all non-nuclear forces on the island. were formed and the West Germans were tion in all aspects of allied military planning, Ultimately, Khrushchev decided not to share included, the Warsaw Pact would have to and was again rebuffed.37 A few months or delegate any responsibility for the nuclear- resort to “defensive measures and corre- later, the Czechoslovak Defense Minister, capable weapons based in Cuba, but the very sponding steps.”32 The nature of these “cor- Army-General Bohumir Lomsky, publicly fact that the issue was considered at all responding steps” was never specified, but declared that the East European states should suggests that if the Cuban Missile Crisis had Romanian and Czechoslovak officials at the be given increased responsibility for the full not intervened, the Soviet Union might have meeting maintained that the obvious solu- range of issues confronting the Warsaw been receptive to some form of nuclear “shar- tion was for the Soviet Union to grant its Pact.38 That same week, a detailed Roma- ing” with its East European allies. Indeed, a Warsaw Pact allies a direct say in the use of nian proposal for modifications to the alli- “dual-key” arrangement for the Warsaw Pact, nuclear weapons stationed on East Euro- ance was leaked to the French Communist which would not have provided any inde- pean soil.33 The Romanians were especially newspaper, L’Humanite; the document called pendent authority to the East European coun- insistent on having responsibility shared for for, among other things, an East European tries, could easily have been justified as a all Warsaw Pact nuclear systems, including role in any decisions involving the potential response to NATO’s policy and as a useful those deployed with the various Groups of use of nuclear weapons.39 Subsequently, at means of strengthening allied cohesion. But Soviet Forces. Brezhnev and his colleagues, the July 1966 session of the PCC in Bucharest, after October 1962, when Soviet leaders 114 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN drew a number of lessons about the risks of tions by Fidel Castro—that this factor be- event that has traditionally been depicted as even sharing, much less delegating, nuclear came a paramount reason to deny any share a bilateral U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Not authority, the prospects of adopting a “dual- of nuclear-release authorization to the East only must the Cuban Missile Crisis be thought key” system for the Warsaw Pact essentially European governments. Although East Eu- of as a “triangular” showdown; its repercus- vanished. ropean officials could not have ordered the sions can now be seen to have been at least Although Moscow’s willingness to use of nuclear weapons on their own, they as great for Soviet allies, notably Cuba and share control over the Warsaw Pact’s “joint” might have inadvertently (or deliberately) Eastern Europe, as for the Soviet Union nuclear arsenal would have been sharply taken steps in a crisis that would have caused itself. constrained even before October 1962 by NATO governments to believe that a War- the lack of permissive-action links (PALs) saw Pact nuclear strike was forthcoming 1. This statement is based on a perusal of documents from the East German, Czechoslovak, and Polish ar- and other use-denial mechanisms on Soviet (regardless of what actual Soviet intentions chives. See, e.g., “Odvolanie opatreni v zavislosti s nuclear weapons, that factor alone would were). That, in turn, might have triggered a usnesenim VKO UV KSC, 25.10.62 (Karibska krize),” not have been decisive if the Cuban Missile preemptive nuclear attack by NATO. Only 25 October 1962 (Top Secret), in Vojensky Historicky Crisis had not occurred. After all, when by excluding the East European states alto- Archiv (VHA) Praha, Fond (F.) Ministerstvo Narodni Obrany (MNO) CSSR, 1962, Operacni sprava Soviet officials seriously contemplated al- gether from the nuclear-release process could Generalniho stabu cs. armady (GS/OS), 8/25. lotting partial nuclear authority to Castro in the Soviet Union avoid the unintended esca- 2. “V shtabe Ob”edinennykh Vooruzhenykh Sil stran 1962, that was long before Soviet tactical lation of a crisis. Varshavskogo Dogovora,” Pravda (Moscow), 23 Oc- weapons were equipped with PALs. The The risks posed by a “dual-key” ar- tober 1962, p. 1. For the effects of the alert from 27 October through 23 November, see the series of top- physical separation of warheads from deliv- rangement could have been mitigated if the secret memoranda to the CPSU CC Presidium from ery vehicles, as had been planned for the Soviet Union had built in extra procedural Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii and the missiles based in Cuba, was regarded at the and technical safeguards, but this in turn Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Mikhail Zakharov, 5 time as a sufficient (if cumbersome) barrier would have created operational problems for November 1962, 17 November 1962, and 24 November 1962, in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii against unauthorized actions. That approach Soviet troops who might one day have been (TsKhSD), F. 89, Opis’ (Op.) 28, Delo (D.) 14, Listy had long been used for tactical weapons ordered to use the weapons. If a future (Ll.) 1-8. deployed by Soviet forces in Eastern Eu- conflict had become so dire that Soviet lead- 3. “V shtabe Ob”edinennykh vooruzhenykh sil stran rope, and it would have been just as effica- ers had decided to authorize the employment Varshavskogo Dogovora,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 22 November 1962, p. 1. cious if a “dual-key” system had been of tactical nuclear weapons, they would have 4. See the account by the Hungarian charge d’affaires adopted—that is, if the East European armies wanted their orders to be carried out as fast as in Washington, D.C. in October 1962 (who later de- had been given control over the Pact’s possible, before the situation on the battle- fected), Janos Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpow- nuclear-capable delivery vehicles. Not un- field had changed. By contrast, East Euro- ers: The 1956 Revolution and (Stanford: Press, 1972), 137. til after the Cuban Missile Crisis was the pean political and military officials might 5. “Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya option of relying solely on the physical have been hesitant about ordering the nuclear raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym separation of warheads and delivery ve- destruction of a site in Western Europe, not predstavleniyam,” Report No. 24762s (TOP SECRET) hicles deemed inadequate. In the latter half least because the launch of nuclear weapons from Col.-General P. Ivashutin, chief of the Soviet General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate, to Mar- of the 1960s, the Soviet Union began incor- against West European targets might well shal M. V. Zakharov, head of the General Staff Military porating electronic use-denial features into have provoked retaliatory strikes by NATO Academy, 28 August 1964, in Tsentral’nyi arkhiv its strategic missiles, and the same was true against East European sites. The problem Ministerstva oborony (TsAMO), Delo (D.) 158, esp. of Soviet tactical weapons by the early to would have been especially salient in the Listy (L.) 352-353, 411-412, 423, and 400. I am grateful to Matthew Evangelista for providing me with mid-1970s. Concerns in Moscow about the case of East German officials who would a copy of this document. physical security of nuclear weapons were have been asked to go along with nuclear 6. This point is stressed in the top-secret cables adduced hardly negligible before October 1962—in strikes against targets in West Germany. in note 2 supra. part because of the possibility that requisite Thus, even though Soviet officials could 7. On the state of the Russian archives, see Mark Kramer, “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and procedures might not be followed—but it have developed a hedge against the risks that Pitfalls,” CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-39. was not until after the Cuban Missile Crisis emerged during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 8. “Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya that Soviet leaders fully appreciated the the safeguards needed for this purpose would raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym magnitude of this risk. have been extremely burdensome, depriving predstavleniyam,” pp. 332-333. 9. “Obmen poslaniyami mezhdu N. S. Khrushchevym The Cuban Missile Crisis also height- the Pact of the ability to respond in a timely i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo krizisa 1962 goda,” ened Soviet concerns about the particular manner. From the Soviet perspective, it Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR (Moscow) dangers posed by crises. To be sure, Soviet made far more sense to circumvent the prob- 24 (31 December 1990), 67-80, esp. 71-73. leaders were hardly complacent before Oc- lem entirely by eschewing any form of shared 10. Ibid., 73-75. This point was reemphasized to Castro by Prime Minister Mikoyan during their conversations tober 1962 about the need to maintain tight authority. in November 1962. See “Zapis’ besedy A. I. Mikoyana political control over nuclear operations; It is ironic that the Cuban Missile Crisis, s prem’er-ministrom revolyutsionnogo pravitel’stva indeed, the stringent centralization of nuclear which barely involved the Warsaw Pact at Kuby F. Kastro,” 12 November 1962 (Top Secret) and command was a consistent theme in Soviet all, would have had such an important long- “O besedakh A. I. Mikoyana s F. Kastro,” 20 November 1962 (Top Secret), both published in Mezhdunarodnaya military planning. Even so, it was not until term effect on the alliance. It is also ironic zhizn’ (Moscow) 11-12 (November-December 1992), after the Cuban Missile Crisis—and espe- that the actions of a third party, Fidel Castro, 143-147 and 147-150, respectively. See esp. 149. cially in light of the unexpected interven- posed one of the greatest dangers during an 11. It should be noted, however, that a decision to send COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 115

901-A4 nuclear warheads and 407-N6 bombs to Cuba claim had already been contradicted by the Soviet Planungen des Warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa: for the Frogs and Il-28s was not finalized until 8 officer who was in charge of the “central nuclear base” Eine Studie, February 1992, p. 5; for an English trans- September 1962, by which time Khrushchev may al- (i.e., the storage site for all nuclear warheads) in Cuba lation, see Mark Kramer, trans. and annot., “Warsaw ready have changed his mind about the command-and- during the crisis, Colonel Nikolai Beloborodov, who Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations control arrangements. See “Nachal’niku 12 glavnogo testified in late 1992 that “nuclear weapons could have From the East German Archives,” CWIHP Bulletin 2 upravleniya Ministerstva oborony,” 8 September 1962 been used only if the missile officers had received (Fall 1992), 1, 13-19.. (Top Secret), Memorandum from Defense Minister R. orders via their own chain-of-command from the Gen- 28. Militarisches Zwischenarchiv (Potsdam), VA- Malinovskii and Chief of the General Staff M. Zakharov, eral Staff, and only if we, the officers responsible for Strausberg/29555/Box 155. in TsAMO, “Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu ‘Anadyr’,” storing and operating warheads, had received our own 29. “Dohoda CSSR-ZSSR o vzajemnych dodavkach F. 16, Op. 3753. It is eminently possible that the special codes. At no point did I receive any signals to vyzbroje a voj. techniky v rr. 1963-1965,” in VHA nuclear-capable weapons would not have been equipped issue warheads for either the medium-range missiles or Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1960-1962, OS/GS, 26/2. with nuclear warheads if they had been placed under the tactical weapons.” See Dokuchaev, “100-dnevnyi 30. “Dogovor mezhdu pravitel’stvami SSSR i ChSSR Castro’s command. yadernyi kruiz,” 2. Beloborodov reemphasized this o merakh povysheniya boegotovnosti raketnykh voisk,” 12. “Dogovor mezhdu pravitel’stvom Respubliki Kuby point several times during an interview with the author 15 December 1965, in VHA Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, i pravitel’stvom Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh in Moscow on 28 September 1994: “No nuclear muni- 1960-1962, OS/GS, 2/16. Respublik o voennom sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi tions of any type, whether for the medium-range or the 31. See the reports on “Hungary: USSR Nuclear oborone,” undated, Article 10. tactical weapons, were ever moved (byly dostavleny) Weapons Formerly Stored in Country,” translated in 13. See Nikita S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya (Mos- out of storage during the crisis. Nor could they have U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Nuclear Pro- cow: typescript, 1966-1970), Vol. IV, “Karibskii krizis,” been moved without my knowledge.” Beloborodov’s liferation, JPRS-TND-91-007, 20 May 1991, pp. 14- esp. p. 12. I am grateful to Khrushchev’s son, Sergei, account was endorsed by General Leonid Garbuz, the 16. for providing me with a copy of the 3,600-page tran- deputy commander of Soviet forces in Cuba in 1962, in 32. “O przedsiewzieciu majacym na celu podwyzszenie script of his father’s memoirs. For an English transla- an interview that same day in Moscow. gotowsci bojowej wojska,” 25 February 1967, in tion of most of the account about the Cuban Missile 18. The exact contents of Pliev’s telegram on the 26th Centralny Archiwum Wojskowy, Paczka 6, Tom 234. Crisis, see Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost are unknown, but the numbering of telegrams that are 33. Interview with chief of the Czechoslovak General Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter and available makes clear that he sent at least two that day, Staff, Major-General Karel Pezl, in Jan Bauer, “Jaderna Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown and the second of which is the one in question. (His first munice: Asi tady byla,” Ceske a moravskoslezske Company, 1990), 170-183. telegram on the 26th, which was declassified in October zemedelske noviny (Prague), 4 July 1991, p. 1. 14. Maj.-General (ret.) V. Makarevskii, “O prem’ere N. 1992, pertained only to air defense operations against 34. See, for example, Col.-General I. Glebov, “Razvitie S. Khrushcheve, marshale G. K. Zhukove i generale I. possible U.S. air strikes.) The text of the Soviet operativnogo iskusstva,” Krasnaya zvezda, 2 April A. Plieve,” Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye leadership’s response to Pliev’s second cable is avail- 1964, pp. 2-3; and Col.-General S. M. Shtemenko, otnosheniya (Moscow) 8-9 (August-September 1994), able (see next note), and, combined with retrospective “Sukhoputnye voiska v sovremennoi voine i ikh boevaya 197. Makarevskii served for many years under Pliev’s comments by ex-Soviet officials, it suggests that Pliev podgotovka,” Krasnaya zvezda, 3 January 1963, 2-3. command. Pliev’s close friendship with Khrushchev referred to Castro’s efforts and requested authority to See also Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii et al., Voennaya and Malinovskii is overlooked in the jaundiced assess- move the warheads (though not yet authority for actual strategiya, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), 373- ment offered by General Anatolii Gribkov in Operation use). 374. This theme is also evident in “Razvitie voennogo ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cu- 19. “Trostnik—tovarishchu Pavlovu,” No. 76639 (Top iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny ban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), 25-26. Secret), 27 October 1962, reproduced in Operation po sovremennym predstavleniyam,” passim. 15 . “Komanduyushchemu gruppoi sovetskikh voisk na ANADYR, 182. See also Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear 35. See, for example, Col.-General N. Lomov, “Vliyanie o. Kuba,” 8 September 1962 (Top Secret), in TsAMO, Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Sovetskoi voennoi doktriny na razvitie voennogo “Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu ‘Anadyr’,” GSU GSh, Missile Crisis,” 46; and Pavlenko, “Bezymyannye iskusstva,” Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil 21 (Novem- F. 16, Op. 3753; reproduced in Operation ANADYR, motostrelki otpravlyalis’ na Kubu,” 4. ber 1965), 16-24. 183. For a discussion of this matter and relevant 20. Marshal V. F. Tolubko, “Glavnaya raketnaya sila 36. Cited in “Rech’ tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva,” citations, see Mark Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear Weap- strany,” Krasnaya zvezda, 19 November 1963, 1. Pravda, 25 September 1965, p. 2 (emphasis added). ons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Mis- 21. See Khrushchev’s comments on this point in 37. “Stenografische Niederschrift der Konferenz der sile Crisis,” CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 40-46, esp. Vospominaniya, Vol. IV, “Karibskii krizis,” p. 18. kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien die Staaten des 42-43, 46. 22. Army-General Yu. P. Maksimov et al., eds., Raketnye Warschauer Vertrages,” January 1965 (Top Secret), in 16. “Trostnik—tovarishchu Pavlovu,” No. 4/389 (Top voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya: Voenno- Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen Secret) from R. Malinovskii (Direktor), 22 October istoricheskii (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), 109-110. der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales 1962, reproduced in Operation ANADYR, 181. This Detailed first-hand accounts by high-ranking Soviet air Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der SED, J IV, 2/202/130. directive was reaffirmed three days later after a request defense personnel who took part in the shootdown are 38. “O zasedanii Politicheskogo konsul’tativnogo for clarification from Pliev; see Lieut.-Col. Anatolii available in “Voina ozhidalas’s rassvetom,” Krasnaya komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dokuchaev, “100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz,” Krasnaya zvezda, 13 May 1993, 2. Dogovora o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi zvezda, 6 November 1992, 2. See also Sergei Pavlenko, 23. The rules of engagement are spelled out briefly in pomoshchi,” Krasnaya zvezda, 21 January 1965, 1. See “Bezymyannye motostrelki otpravlyalis’ na Kubu the cable from Malinovskii to Pliev, as cited in also Colonel V. F. Samoilenko, Osnova boevogo soyuza: ‘stoyat’ nasmert’,” Krasnaya zvezda, 29 December Dokuchaev, “100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz,” 2. More Internatsionalizm kak faktor oboronnoi moshchi 1994, p. 4. For further discussion and relevant citations, elaborate rules are specified in documents now stored in sotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva (Moscow: Voenizdat, see Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Com- the Russian General Staff archive; see “Dokumenty po 1981), 259. mand Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 45-46. meropriyatiyu ‘Anadyr’,” in GSU GSh, F. 16, Op. 39. See, for example, Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskii, 17. In early 1994, General Anatolii Gribkov claimed 3753, D. 1, Korebka 3573. “Moguchii strazh bezopasnosti narodov,” Krasnaya that Pliev not only wanted to move several nuclear 24. Krushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. IV, “Karibskii zvezda, 13 May 1965, 3; Marshal A. A. Grechko, warheads out of storage on 26 October 1962, but had krizis,” pp. 17-18. “Nadezhnyi shchit mira i bezopasnosti narodov,” actually issued orders to that effect without authoriza- 25. “Vystuplenie glavy Sovetskoi delegatsii Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil , No. 9 (May 1965), 13; tion from Moscow. See Operation ANADYR, 63, and Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. and Marshal A. A. Grechko, “Boevoi soyuz bratskikh Gribkov comments at a 5 April 1994 meeting at the Khrushcheva na Soveshchanii Politicheskogo narodov,” Pravda, 13 May 1965, 1. (emphases added) Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., orga- Konsul’tativnogo Komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov 40. “Informacna sprava o vysledkach cvicenia nized by the Cold War International History Project. Varshavskogo Dogovora 24 maya 1958 goda,” Pravda, ‘Oktobrova Burka’,” 16-22 October 1965 (Top Secret), However, Gribkov produced no evidence to back up his 27 May 1958, p. 3. in VHA Praha, F. Hlavna Politicka Sprava (HPS), 1965, assertion that warheads were actually moved out, and in 26. Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Power in Europe, 1945- HPS 1/2. a lengthy interview with the present author in Moscow 1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 41. “Konferenz der kommunistischen und on 29 September 1994 he said he could not be certain 1970), 150-151, 487-489. Arbeiterparteien die Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages: that Pliev had given such an order. Gribkov’s initial 27. Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Militarische continued on page 160 116 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN NEW EVIDENCE ON THE

POLISH CRISIS 1993). Jaruzelski, Kania, Kiszczak, and Stephen Engelberg, “Jaruzelski, Defending continued from page 1 Rakowski were all top officials in Poland in Record, Says His Rule Saved Poland,” The 1980-81 crisis, though from a quite differ- 1980-81; Gribkov was the chief of staff of New York Times, 20 May 1992, A-9; and ent angle, will be included in my Working the Warsaw Pact; and Pavlov was the KGB John Darnton, “Jaruzelski Is Now Sorry He Paper on “The Soviet Union, Jaruzelski, and station chief in Warsaw. Gribkov’s and Ordered Martial Law,” The New York Times, the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981,” which is Pavlov’s accounts make an intriguing con- 4 March 1993, A-12. For two key interviews scheduled to be issued by the Cold War trast with the views offered by Jaruzelski, with Mikhail Gorbachev, who was a full International History Project later this year. Kania, et al., as will be discussed below. member of the CPSU Politburo in 1980-81, Appendices to the Working Paper will fea- A plethora of shorter first-hand accounts see “Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w ture many other documents I have translated and interviews with key participants have Polsce: General Jaruzelski postapil from the Russian, Polish, Czech, and Ger- appeared as well. For a sample of the count- prawidlowo,” Trybuna (Warsaw), 9 Novem- man archives. Soon thereafter, I will be less interviews with and commentaries by ber 1992, 2; and “Wywiad z Michailem putting together a book-length study and General Jaruzelski, see Novoe (Mos- Gorbaczowem: ‘Jestem inny, niz probuja collection of new materials pertaining to the cow) 38 (September 1991), 26-30; “Jaruzelski mnie przedstawic’,” Rzeczpospolita, 23 Oc- Polish crisis. obrazony: Wyrok w mojej sprawie juz tober 1992, 9. Shorter interviews with Vitalii zapadl—napisal general w liscie do Pavlov, whose memoirs are cited above, Overview of New Sources przewodniczacego komisji, posla Rzepki,” include “Dostep do wszystkiego,” Polityka Since 1989, a huge quantity of docu- Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw), 13 January 1993, (Warsaw), 8 (20 February 1993), 15; “Byly ments and memoirs about the Soviet Union’s 5; “Katastrofa byla nieuchronna,” Gazeta rezydent KGB w Warszawie: ZSRR nie role in the 1980-81 crisis have become avail- wyborcza (Warsaw), 3 December 1992, 13; chcial interwencji,” Rzeczpospolita, 10 Feb- able. An invaluable account, which ap- “Rozmawiac bez nienawisci: Wywiad ruary 1993, 7; and Leon Bojko, “A wejsc nie peared even before the Communist regime generala Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego z Adamem chcieli?” Gazeta wyborcza, 10 February in Warsaw had collapsed, is the interview Michnikem,” Gazeta wyborcza , 25-26 April 1993, 6. with the former Polish colonel Ryszard 1992, 8-11; “Oswiadczenia i przeskody Most of the top Polish officials from Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem widziana od formalne: Rozliczanie stanu wojennego,” 1980-1981, including Jaruzelski and srodka,” (Paris) 4/475 (April 1987), Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 25 November Kiszczak, have given testimony before the pp. 3-57. Kuklinski was one of five senior 1992, 2; “Ironiczny prymas historii,” Prawo Commission on Constitutional Oversight of officers on the Polish General Staff who i zycie (Warsaw), 49 (December 1992), 11; the Polish Sejm (Parliament). The hearings were responsible for drawing up plans for martial law in 1980-81. During that time he DECLASSIFIED SOVIET was also a spy for the U.S. Central Intelli- DOCUMENTS ON THE POLISH In regard to the situation in the Polish People’s gence Agency, and he was able to provide CRISIS Republic. the United States with unparalleled access 1. To endorse Comrade L. I. Brezhnev’s to all the military secrets of the Warsaw Pact Translated and annotated information about the situation unfolding in the until November 1981, when he was forced by Mark Kramer to flee. He now lives under an assumed Polish People’s Republic. name in the United States. Other indispens- CPSU CC Politburo Decision Setting Up 2. To establish a CC Politburo Commission able memoirs and first-hand accounts in- Suslov Commission, 25 composed of: clude , Stan wojenny Comrades M. A. Suslov (chairman), A. A. dlaczego (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); Wojciech Proletarians of all countries, unite! Gromyko, Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Jaruzelski, Les chaines et le refuge (Paris: Chernenko, M. V. Zimyanin, I. V. Arkhipov, L. Lattes, 1992); Stanislaw Kania, Zatrzymac Communist Party of the Soviet Union M. Zamyatin, O. B. Rakhmanin. konfrontacje (Wroclaw: BGW, 1991); Gen- CENTRAL COMMITTEE eral Kiszczak mowie . . .: Prawie wszystko To instruct the Commission to pay close TOP SECRET . . ., ed. by Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas attention to the situation unfolding in the PPR and (Warsaw: BGW, 1991); Mieczylaw to keep the Politburo systematically informed No. P210/P about the state of affairs in the PPR and about Rakowski, Jak to sie stalo (Warsaw: BGW, possible measures on our part. Suggestions in the 1991); the first interview with Rakowski in To: Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, event of necessity are to be brought before the Zanim stane przed Truybunalem: Z Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, CPSU CC Politburo. Mieczyslawem Rakowskim rozmawie Tikhonov, Ustinov, Zimyanin, Rusakov, Dariusz Szymczycha (Warsaw: BGW, Arkhipov, Kornienko, Zamyatin, Rakhmanin. 1992); Army-General A. I. Gribkov, CPSU CC POLITBURO “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis Extract from Protocol No. 210 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo nachala 80-kh godov,” Voenno-istoricheskii * * * * * on 25 August 1980 zhurnal (Moscow) 9 (September 1992), 46- CPSU CC Politburo Report “On Theses for 57; and Vitalii Pavlov, Wspomnienia ______the discussion with representatives of the rezydenta KGB w Polsce (Warsaw: BGW, POLISH CRISIS, 1980-81 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 117 began in September 1992, and six sessions “Tainy ‘temnoi komnaty’,” Moskovskie Politycznego: PZPR a “Solidarnosc,” 1980- were convened in 1992 and the first half of novosti 14 (5 April 1992), 17; and “Vladislav 1981 (London: Aneks, 1992). Yet another 1993. The transcripts of these initial hear- Achalov: Takoe vpechatlenie, chto nikto invaluable source is a multi-volume collec- ings were published, along with supporting nikogda nikogo nichemu ne uchil,” Segodnya tion of documents culled from the former documentation, in Sad nad autorami stanu (Moscow), 7 February 1995, 7. References East German Communist party and Stasi wojennego przed Komisja Odpowied- to other items of this sort can be found in my archives, which is being put out by a team zialnosci Konstytucyjnej (Warsaw: BGW, forthcoming CWIHP Working Paper. led by Manfred Wilke at the Free University 1993), Vol. 1: Oskarzenia wyjasnienia Of the vast number of Soviet and East of Berlin under the title SED-Politburo und obrona. Additional volumes cover the sub- European documents that have been released, polnische Krise 1980/1982. The first vol- sequent hearings, which for the most part including many transcripts of CPSU Polit- ume, Band 1: 1980, Working Paper No. 3 went over similar ground. Especially valu- buro meetings during the crisis, only a rela- (Berlin: Forschungsverbund SED-Staat, able are the documents collected and re- tively small number have been published, 1993) covers events through the end of 1980.2 leased by the Commission. but these have been of great importance. Another extremely useful volume, Die SED Important interviews with, and articles Two of the most valuable sets of documents, contra Polen: Die Planung der SED- by, high-ranking Soviet and East European including selected transcripts of CPSU Po- Fuhrung zur Vorbereitung einer Invasion in military officers who were involved in the litburo meetings, top-secret communications Polen 1980/81, was published by Akademie preparations for an in- between Brezhnev and Jaruzelski, internal Verlag for the same research institute in clude “Juz siedzielismy w czolgach: Z CPSU CC documents, and other items, were 1994. Valuable citations from Bulgarian generalem majorem Stanislawem Prochazka published in Polish in 1992 and 1993: documents can be found in “Eventualna rozmawia Leszek Mazan,” Polityka 37 (15 “Dokumenty ‘Komisji Suslowa’,” interventsiya sreshchu Polsha e mozhela da September 1990), 13; “Generalmajor S. Rzeczpospolita, 26 August 1993, 1, 19-20; stane ‘vtori kurvav Afganistan’,” Duma Prochazka z vojenske obrody rika: ‘Meli and “Scisle tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81,” (Sofia), 20 November 1990, 3. jsme okupovat Polsko’,” Zemedelske noviny Gazeta wyborcza, 12-13 December 1992, Unpublished Soviet and East European (Prague), 16 August 1990, 1; “Misja 10-11.1 Another source of comparable sig- documents pertaining to the 1980-81 crisis skonczona: Wywiad z generalem Wiktorem nificance is the 660-page collection of tran- vastly outnumber the ones that have been Dubyninem, dowodca wojsk bylego ZSRR scripts of all the relevant Polish Politburo published. In Warsaw, some of the most w Polsce,” Gazeta wyborcza, 14-15 March meetings during the crisis: Zbigniew valuable unpublished materials are readily 1992, 8-9; Maj.-General Vladimir Dudnik, Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura available in the main Archive of Modern Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych), which Polish leadership,” 3 September 1980 To endorse the theses for the discussion contains both Party and governmental docu- with representatives of the Polish leadership ments. Many other items, however, are still To be returned within 3 days to the CPSU CC (see attached). in the possession of the Commission to In- (General Department, 1st sector) vestigate Documents Pertaining to Martial Proletarians of all countries, unite! Law (Komisja resortowej badajacej CC SECRETARY dokumentacje zwiazana ze stanem Communist Party of the Soviet Union wojennym). Unfortunately, almost all the CENTRAL COMMITTEE Regarding point 38 of Prot. No. 213 files of the Polish Defense Ministry and TOP SECRET Internal Affairs Ministry from 1980-81 are still sealed off. In Moscow, many vital SPECIAL DOSSIER To be transmitted by the KGB in encrypted unpublished items, including numerous EYES ONLY form to the designated point. CPSU Politburo transcripts that were not published in either of the two Polish-lan- 1. To give a precise evaluation of and guage collections cited above, are available No. P/213/38 take a clear position on the agreement with the in Fond 89 at the Center for Storage of so-called “United Strike Committees” (ZKS) Contemporary Documentation (Tsentr To: Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, in Gdansk and Szczecin. Gromyko, Rakhmanin Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii, or The agreement concluded by the PPR TsKhSD). Many of these transcripts are Extract from Protocol No. 213 of the session of government, and endorsed by the plenum of cited below. Other items at TsKhSD, in the CPSU CC Politburo the PZPR CC, exacts a high political and Fond 5, Opis’ 84, as well as at the Presiden- on 3 September 1980 economic price for the “regulation” it achieves. tial Archive (Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi ______We, of course, understand the circumstances Federatsii, or APRF), the foreign intelli- in which you had to make this onerous deci- gence archive, and the military archives, are sion. The agreement, in essence, signifies the now off-limits. The documents in the Presi- On theses for the discussion with representatives legalization of the anti-socialist opposition. dential Archive, foreign intelligence archive, of the Polish leadership. An organization has emerged that aims to spread its political influence through the entire and military archives have never been acces- sible to the public, but at TsKhSD I did have continued on page 129 an opportunity to pore through many items 118 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN in Fond 5, Opis’ 84 in late 1992 and early relevant archives were opened, major differ- the turmoil was having on Polish foreign 1993. (Unfortunately, that access was ences of interpretation would persist. Never- policy and Poland’s role in the Warsaw Pact. abruptly terminated in April 1993 for rea- theless, it is clear that the profusion of docu- Brezhnev and his colleagues repeatedly con- sons discussed in my article on archival ments and memoirs since 1989 has shed far demned Solidarity for allegedly “inflaming research in CWIHP Bulletin No. 3.) Al- greater light on the Polish crisis than one ever malevolent nationalist passions” and spur- though I was not able to receive photocopies could have hoped for just five to six years ring a “dangerous rise in anti-Sovietism in of materials from Fond 5, Opis’ 84 (because ago. Poland.”5 A report prepared for the CPSU of a bureaucratic glitch), I translated verba- Politburo in mid-1981 by the Soviet ambas- tim or took extensive notes on all items I sador in Warsaw, Boris Aristov, warned that consulted. The Crisis and the Soviet Response the “powerful streams of anti-Soviet rheto- In Germany, the most important docu- ric” in Poland and the “increasing efforts by ments from the former East German Social- the West to subvert Polish socialism” would ist Unity Party (SED) archives (the Stiftung The Polish crisis started out modestly inevitably induce major changes in Poland’s Archiv der Parteien und Massen- enough, as a wave of protests against higher foreign alignments.6 Aristov acknowledged organisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, meat prices announced in July 1980; but it that “the anti-socialist forces backing Soli- Zentrales Parteiarchiv der SED), the former soon posed graver complications for Soviet darity claim they do not want to change GDR State Security Ministry (Stasi) ar- policy than any event had since the late Poland’s international obligations and alli- chives (Bundesbeauftragte fur die 1940s. The formation of Solidarity, an inde- ances,” but he insisted that such changes Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes pendent and popularly-based trade union that would be carried out nonetheless, albeit “sub- der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen soon rivaled the Communist party for politi- tly, without a frontal attack.” He empha- Republik, Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit cal power and that represented the interests sized that “the mood of anti-Sovietism is Zentralarchiv), and the military archive in of the very same working class in whose growing, especially in the ranks of Solidar- Potsdam (Militarisches Zwischenarchiv), name the party had always purported to rule, ity,” and that the “hostile, anti-Soviet forces” are being published in the series mentioned posed a fundamental challenge to Poland’s both inside and outside Solidarity “are argu- above. In addition, a large number of un- Communist system. Once the magnitude of ing that democratization in Poland is incom- published documents are worth consulting that challenge had become apparent to So- patible with membership in the Warsaw at all three of these archives, especially the viet officials, they reacted with unremitting Pact.”7 Aristov’s prediction that the crisis in first two. In the Czech Republic, two major hostility toward Solidarity. Soviet leaders Poland would bring “fundamental changes archives hold numerous documents relevant were equally dismayed by the growing po- in Polish-Soviet relations” gained wider and to the 1980-81 crisis: the Central State litical influence of Poland’s , wider acceptance among Soviet leaders as Archive (Statni ustredni archiv), which which they regarded as “one of the most time wore on. houses a vast collection of items left from dangerous forces in Polish society” and a Because of Poland’s location in the heart the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak fount of “anti-socialist” and “hostile” ele- of Europe, its communications and logisti- Communist Party and from the Czechoslo- ments.3 cal links with the Group of Soviet Forces in vak government, and the Military Historical As the crisis intensified and Solidarity’s Germany, its projected contributions to the Archive (Vojensky historicky archiv), which strength continued to grow, Moscow’s con- “first strategic echelon” of the Warsaw Pact, contains files from the Czechoslovak Gen- demnations of the Polish trade union became and its numerous storage sites for Soviet eral Staff and Ministry of Defense. The more strident, both publicly and in behind- tactical nuclear warheads, the prospect of Czech/Czechoslovak foreign ministry the-scenes deliberations. The thrust of the having a non-Communist government come archive also contains some pertinent docu- Soviet criticisms was that Solidarity and the to power in Warsaw or of a drastic change in ments, but access for now is more sporadic. church had joined ranks with “like-minded Polish foreign policy generated alarm in The materials in Berlin and Prague amply counterrevolutionary forces” to wage “an Moscow. Soviet foreign minister Andrei confirm that the top East German and openly counterrevolutionary struggle for the Gromyko spoke for all his colleagues when Czechoslovak leaders in 1980-81—Gustav liquidation of socialism” in Poland.4 Soviet he declared at a CPSU Politburo meeting in Husak and —both hoped to officials also accused Solidarity of attempt- October 1980 that “we simply cannot and bring a prompt and decisive end to the crisis ing to “seize power from the PZPR” by must not lose Poland” under any circum- through external military intervention. fomenting “economic chaos” in the country stances.8 Although Nikita Khrushchev had As even this brief review shows, the and by embarking on a wide range of other been willing in October 1956 to reach a quantity and quality of new East-bloc sources “provocative and counterrevolutionary ac- modus vivendi with the Polish leader on the 1980-81 crisis are remarkable. Highly tions.” The whole course of events, they Wladyslaw Gomulka, the situation in 1980- sensitive items are more readily available in warned, was leading toward “the collapse of 81 was totally different. Gomulka, despite this case than for any of the earlier Soviet- Polish socialism and the headlong disinte- all his heterodoxies, was a devoted Commu- East European confrontations. This is not to gration of the PZPR,” an outcome that would nist, and Khrushchev could be confident that say, however, that the task of analyzing the leave “Solidarity extremists in full control.” socialism in Poland and the Polish-Soviet Polish crisis is easy. Many aspects of the Throughout the crisis, Soviet leaders “fraternal relationship” would continue and crisis are still obscure because of insuffi- were concerned not only about the internal even thrive under Gomulka’s leadership. cient documentation; and even if all the situation in Poland, but also about the effects Brezhnev and his colleagues had no such COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 119 assurances about Poland in 1980-81. “work stoppages and other negative inci- Poland: Moreover, quite apart from the situa- dents” had “substantially increased” since tion in Poland itself, Soviet officials sus- August both in frequency and in size at It is now absolutely clear that without a pected—with good reason—that the crisis factories all around the Soviet Union, pre- vigorous struggle against the class en- would have destabilizing repercussions in sumably as a direct result of the Polish emy, it will be impossible to save social- other Warsaw Pact countries. Soon after the events.14 Similar reports continued flowing ism in Poland. The question is not historic Gdansk accords were signed in Au- into Moscow throughout 1981. The impli- whether there will be a confrontation, gust 1980, senior commentators in Moscow cations of this spill-over from Poland seemed but who will start it, what means will be began asserting that Solidarity’s “strategy of all the more dire after Solidarity publicly used to wage it, and who will gain the permanent chaos” would inspire similar de- declared its support in September 1981 for initiative. . . . The leaders of the anti- velopments elsewhere that would “threaten other “working people of Eastern Europe” socialist forces, who long ago emerged not just Poland but the whole of peace and and “all the nations of the Soviet Union” from underground into full public view stability in Europe.”9 Equally stern pro- who were seeking to establish their own and are now openly preparing to launch nouncements emanated from the chief So- independent trade unions.15 Thus, it comes a decisive onslaught, are hoping to de- viet ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, who claimed as little surprise that long before martial law lay their final push until they have that “any deviation from our revolutionary was imposed on 13 December 1981, top achieved overwhelming preponderance. teachings” in one socialist country “will Soviet officials were referring to the events . . . This means that if you fail to take entail ruinous consequences for the whole in Poland both publicly and privately as tough measures right away against the socialist world.”10 Much as Soviet and “counterrevolution and anarchy” that not counterrevolution, you will lose the only hard-line East European leaders in 1968 had only “threatened the destruction of the opportunity you still have.20 feared that the Prague Spring would be “con- country’s socialist order and alliance obliga- tagious,” so now they believed that tions,” but also posed “a direct threat to the The extent of the Soviet Union’s deter- Solidarity’s rise would set a crucial prece- security of the USSR and its allies.”16 mination to crush Solidarity via the imposi- dent and spark “anti-socialist” ferment else- By stirring Soviet anxieties about the tion of martial law is clearly evident from the where, most notably in the Soviet Union potential loss of a key member of the War- newly released transcripts of nearly two itself. In response, officials in Moscow and saw Pact and about the spread of political dozen CPSU Politburo meetings in 1980- most of the other Warsaw Pact capitals instability throughout Eastern Europe, the 81. At those sessions, Brezhnev and his promptly took steps to control and even halt Polish crisis demonstrated, as the events of colleagues repeatedly complained that Kania the dissemination of Polish newspapers and 1953, 1956, and 1968 had previously, the and Jaruzelski were proving to be “weak,” journals in their countries. Such steps had degree of “acceptable” change in the Soviet “indecisive,” “insufficiently bold,” “untrust- been recommended in a top-secret report bloc. The crisis in Poland was more pro- worthy,” and “unwilling to resort to extraor- approved by the CPSU Secretariat in De- tracted than those earlier upheavals, but the dinary measures despite our recommenda- cember 1980, which warned that “undesir- leeway for genuine change was, if anything, tions.”21 The same theme emerges from able materials” of an “anti-socialist and anti- narrower than before. Plans for the imposi- other recently opened Soviet documents, in Soviet nature” were streaming into the So- tion of martial law began almost from the which Soviet officials castigated the Polish viet Union from Poland.11 very first day of the crisis.17 Although the authorities for their “unconscionable vacil- Even more worrisome from Moscow’s plans were drafted by the Polish General lation and indecisiveness” in the face of “an perspective was the growing evidence that Staff, the whole process was supervised and open struggle for power by forces hostile to turmoil in Poland was spilling over into the moved along by the Soviet Union. The the PZPR.”22 Soviet officials were con- union republics of the USSR, especially the constant pressure that Soviet political and vinced that “the backers of Solidarity simply three and Ukraine, where pro- military leaders exerted on top Polish offi- do not believe that the PZPR leadership will tests and demonstrations in support of Soli- cials thwarted any hope that Stanislaw Kania, adopt harsh measures to put an end to their darity had begun as early as August 1980.12 the PZPR first secretary until October 1981, anti-socialist activity,” and that this was In the Russian Republic, too, there were might have had of reaching a genuine com- enabling “the counterrevolutionary forces disturbing indications of a surge of labor promise with Solidarity and the Catholic to operate with impunity in their plans to unrest inspired—directly or indirectly—by church.18 From the Soviet Politburo’s per- liquidate socialism in Poland.” It comes as the crisis in Poland. The KGB had harshly spective, any such compromise would have little surprise, then, that in private meetings suppressed three separate attempts by labor been, at best, a useless diversion or, at worst, with Polish leaders, Brezhnev and other top activists to set up an independent trade union a form of outright capitulation to “hostile” CPSU officials demanded that the Poles in Russia in the late 1970s, and ever since forces and a “sell-out to the enemies of “put an end to the strikes and disorder once then the CPSU leadership had been inordi- socialism.”19 As Brezhnev emphasized to and for all” and “rebuff the counterrevolu- nately sensitive and hostile to anything that Kania’s successor, General Wojciech tionary elements with deeds, not just with might give renewed impetus to an unofficial Jaruzelski, in November 1981, the only thing words.”23 workers’ movement.13 For that reason, the the Soviet leadership wanted was for “deci- Although the Soviet Union’s over- members of the CPSU Secretariat expressed sive measures” to be implemented as soon as whelming preference was to resolve the cri- “utter dismay” when they received a top- possible against the “blatantly anti-socialist sis through an “internal solution” rather than secret report in late 1980 which found that and counterrevolutionary opposition” in through direct Soviet military intervention, 120 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

be most suitable for invading forces, espe- crackdown.31 Soviet military planners took the option of invading Poland was necessar- cially for the Soviet airborne units that would for granted that Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces ily on the agenda in Moscow and most of the have to seize major buildings, transportation would have to intervene against the Polish East European capitals. Elaborate plans for networks, and communications facilities in army. Although Brezhnev and his colleagues a large-scale military intervention were Warsaw.28 The reconnaissance they gath- trusted the highest-ranking Polish officers drafted by the Soviet General Staff, with ered proved crucial when the Soviet General and were willing to rely on certain elite units input from Soviet officers on the Main Staff Staff modified its plans in late 1980 and of the Polish army, they were under no of the Warsaw Pact Joint Command. The 1981. Most of the revisions began just after illusions that Polish conscripts would obey operation was to be spearheaded by an ini- the “Soyuz-81” maneuvers in April 1981, orders to shoot at their fellow citizens. The tial contingent of fifteen Soviet tank and when a comprehensive new “action plan” dominant view in Moscow was that Polish motorized-infantry divisions moving in from was drafted. The final adjustments were soldiers who had been drafted in 1980 or the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic, made by mid-November. From that point on, 1981 were already “under Solidarity’s sway” Carpathian, and Belorussian Military Dis- the Soviet, Czechoslovak, and East German and would “refuse to carry out their duties tricts.24 These troops were to be accompa- forces simply “waited for a signal from Mos- and even go over to the side of the anti- nied by three Czechoslovak and East Ger- cow to move in”—a signal that never ar- socialist forces if the situation deteriorates.”32 man divisions, with at least another dozen rived.29 Soviet officials also assumed that the reli- Soviet divisions as reinforcements. The The revised planning and preparations ability of the Polish officer corps might itself Soviet Union wanted to provide a veneer of were thoroughly tested in fourteen joint mili- be problematic: multilateralism for any prospective inter- tary exercises held during the crisis, includ- vention in Poland, as was done with the ing seven bilateral maneuvers of Soviet and Some of the younger commanders and invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Polish troops. The maneuvers were designed officers [in Poland] have discussed participation of two divisions from Czecho- in part to exert pressure on the Polish leader- whether they should obey all combat slovakia and one from East Germany was ship and population and to divert Solidarity’s orders, even those calling for mass ac- deemed sufficient for that purpose. The attention from the buildup of the ZOMO tions, or should instead refuse to carry political complexities of involving troops security forces, but they also enabled Soviet out orders that would “betray the whole from either Romania or Hungary would commanders to gauge how quickly the Pol- Polish nation.” In connection with this, have been too great. Despite the harsh ish army could be “neutralized” by incoming it is clear that none of the members of criticism that Romanian and Hungarian lead- Warsaw Pact troops.30 The large number of the [Polish] command staff with whom ers had been expressing about Solidarity, bilateral exercises and meetings in 1980-81 we spoke can confidently say on whose neither country was likely to be enthusiastic was a notable contrast to 1968, when the side the [Polish] army and navy will be about an invasion. In the case of Bulgaria, Soviet Union tended to emphasize multilat- if tensions reach a climax.33 the difficulty was logistical rather than po- eral negotiations and maneuvers. This dis- litical. The authorities in Sofia strongly parity was attributable in part to the greater It is not surprising, then, that Soviet com- endorsed the plans for an invasion, but were confidence that Soviet leaders had when manders regarded the Polish army as one of not asked to contribute troops because “the dealing with Jaruzelski than they ever had in the first targets to be “neutralized” if an northward movement [of Bulgarian forces] their dealings with Alexander Dubcek. The invasion proved necessary. Nor is it surpris- would have been too conspicuous,” tipping “joint” leverage that was deemed necessary ing that Soviet leaders wanted to minimize off both the Poles and the West.25 in 1968 was of much less relevance in 1980- the Polish army’s role in the imposition of The plans for an invasion soon gave 81. Furthermore, in 1968 the Soviet Union martial law. Although top-ranking Polish rise to a number of concrete military prepa- did not yet have a permanent “Group of officers were responsible for planning the rations. As early as August 1980 the Soviet Soviet Forces” stationed on Czechoslovak martial-law operation, and although some Army was ordered to “requisition up to territory, whereas in Poland in 1980-81 the elite units from the Polish army helped carry 100,000 military reservists and 15,000 ve- Soviet Union already had a long-standing it out, most of the implementation was left to hicles from the civilian economy” and to troop presence. The USSR’s Northern Group the ZOMO and other security units. The place all regular units in military districts of Forces in Poland provided a convenient concerns that prompted Soviet leaders to and Groups of Forces adjoining Poland on focus during the crisis for both military plan- exclude Polish troops from a prospective “full combat alert.”26 Some units were ning and coercive diplomacy. invading force also meant that the army was taken off alert in February 1981, but most The Soviet Union’s efforts to maintain given only a very limited role in the martial- remained fully mobilized until the crisis close bilateral ties with the Polish army went law crackdown. was over. They were linked together by a only so far, however. Despite Jaruzelski’s vast communications network, which was persistent requests that Polish troops be in- Internal Versus External Options secretly put into place during the “Com- cluded as an integral part of an invading rade-in-Arms-80” and “Soyuz-81” exer- force (and that East German forces be ex- The fact that detailed plans for an inva- cises.27 The exercises also permitted Soviet cluded, for obvious historical reasons), offi- sion existed does not conclusively mean that commanders and military intelligence of- cials in Moscow decided early on that the Soviet troops would have intervened if the ficers to acquire detailed information about Polish army as a whole was too unpredict- Polish authorities had been unable or unwill- the routes and targets in Poland that would able to be used in a “joint” Warsaw Pact ing to impose martial law, but the evidence COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 121 suggests that at least some top officials in terparts, Gustav Husak and Todor Zhivkov, of how difficult and costly a prospective Moscow were willing to resort to force if in emphasizing that a failure to undertake invasion would be. When the issue came up necessary. As early as November 1980, decisive military action against the “coun- at a Soviet Politburo meeting in late October Soviet Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov terrevolutionary forces in People’s Poland” 1981, even hard-liners such as Ustinov and had become so disenchanted that he openly would lead to “the death of socialism in the KGB chairman, Yurii Andropov, had to questioned whether “constant pressure on Poland” and pose a burgeoning threat to the concede that “it would be impossible now the Polish leadership” would ever be suffi- whole socialist commonwealth.36 At the for us to send troops into Poland.” They and cient, and he urged that military exercises be meeting itself, Honecker offered further de- their colleagues agreed that the Soviet Union increased “to make clear that we have forces nunciations of the events in Poland, and “must steadfastly adhere to [its] line not to ready” to move in at short notice.34 Avid Husak repeatedly likened the situation to the send in troops.”39 The same position was support of a military solution also came “counterrevolutionary intrigues” in Czecho- expressed by all the members of the Soviet from Soviet allies in East Germany, Czecho- slovakia in 1968. Although these warnings Politburo on 10 December 1981, according slovakia, and Bulgaria. Documents from the had little effect on the Soviet participants— to the available transcript of the meeting, former East German and Czechoslovak ar- who still believed that the Polish authorities just three days before martial law was im- chives attest to the vigorous efforts that should be given more time “to rectify the posed. Although Andropov and Ustinov hard-line East European leaders made to situation on their own and to normalize it”— affirmed that the Soviet Union “must fortify convince the Soviet Politburo of the neces- Honecker and Husak were hardly about to [its] military garrisons in Poland” and “do sity of military intervention in Poland. In give in.37 In February 1981 they persuaded something to protect the lines of communi- particular, the East German Communist party the Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, to support cation between the USSR and the GDR” if leader, Erich Honecker, repeatedly drew par- their calls for a joint military operation to circumstances so warranted, no one at the allels with the crises of 1953, 1956, and “thwart the Polish counterrevolution once meeting dissented from Mikhail Suslov’s 1968, arguing that “the situation in Poland is and for all,” and they issued many similar view that “there can be no consideration at much worse and more dangerous” than those appeals over the next several months.38 all of sending in troops” because such a step earlier episodes.35 Shortly before an emer- Despite this aggressive campaign by “would be a catastrophe.”40 Suslov’s posi- gency meeting in Moscow of Warsaw Pact the East European proponents of military tion on this matter carried particular weight leaders in early December 1980, he joined intervention, Brezhnev and the other mem- because he was the head of a special Polit- with his Czechoslovak and Bulgarian coun- bers of the CPSU Politburo were well aware buro commission set up in late August 1980

THE SED POLITBURO the 1980s can be regarded as a prelude to the government on 30 August 1980. This AND THE POLISH CRISIS end of the whole Soviet empire. SED offi- agreement was regarded by the SED by the SED-State Research Group cials recognized this danger and did every- Politburo to be a product of counterrevo- (translated by Mark Kramer) thing in their power to forestall such a devel- lution. As seen by Honecker and his opment. Moreover, they pushed for inter- closest associates, the leadership of the Manfred Wilke, Peter Erier, Martin vention by the Warsaw Pact states in the PZPR had capitulated to the striking Goerner, Michael Kubina, Horst Laude, same way that step was taken during the workers. The SED leaders began to and Hans-Peter Muller, The SED Polit- Prague crisis of 1968. question whether and and to what extent buro and the Polish Crisis, 1980/1982, With the publication of “The SED Po- the PZPR could enforce its leading role Volume I: 1980. SED-State Research litburo and the Polish Crisis, 1980/1982, in Poland (cf.: Central Party Archives Group Working Paper No. 3/1993. Ber- Volume I: 1980,” which Prof. Dr. Manfred [ZPA] J IV 2/2 A - 2346.) The decision lin, 1993. Wilke, Peter Erler, Martin Goerner, Michael to allow freer trade unions and the right Kubina, Horst Laude, and Dr. Hans-Peter to strike was unacceptable to the Polit- During a by the president of Muller compiled in 1992 at the Free Univer- buro of the SED CC: “To construe strikes the Republic of Poland, Lech Walesa, to sity of Berlin under the auspices of the as an expression of ‘workers’ genuine the Federal Republic of Germany in early “SED-State Research Group,” documents interests’ is impermissible in our view. 1992, federal [German] president Richard are now available showing how the SED No one other than the Party itself, with von Weizscker lauded the gains that the Politburo wanted to suppress the Polish the aid of , can ex- Polish people and the Polish head-of-state people’s struggle for national self-determi- press and realize the class interests of the had made for the cause of freedom in nation and democratization. The materials, Party.” (ZPA J IV 2/2 A-2368.) Europe. “As the head of a trade union you which have never been released before, come At the end of September 1980, the overcame despotism, regained freedom for the most part from holdings of the “Polit- International Department of the SED CC for your own people, and made a decisive buro” collection in the formerly secret ar- carried out a detailed analysis of the contribution to the European revolution of chives of the SED Central Committee (CC). situation in Poland, which included, freedom.” (Press and Information Office For the SED, the drama of the “Polish among other things, a “comparative as- of the Federal Government, Bulletin No. crisis” began with the signing of the Gdansk sessment of the programs and stated de- 34, Bonn, 2 April 1992, p. 325.) In retro- Accords between the heads of the Inter- mands of the anti-socialist forces in the spect, the Polish crisis at the beginning of Factory Strike Committee and the Polish continued on page 127 122 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN to “keep a close watch on the unfolding lar information flowing into Moscow from was that no one in Moscow was certain situation in Poland.”41 Soviet intelligence agents, were crucial when whether Jaruzelski would actually follow The lack of any overt disagreement on Polish and Soviet leaders settled on the final through in the end and, if so, “what direction the question of military intervention does options for martial law in November and the events in Poland will take.” Andropov, not necessarily mean that the apparent con- early December 1981. By that point, the for example, said there were “very disturb- sensus emerged easily or spontaneously. sentiment in Moscow was so strongly in ing signs” that Jaruzelski “is abandoning the The transcript may not tell the full story. A favor of proceeding with the imposition of idea of carrying out this step” and trying “to number of former senior members of the martial law, and the plans and preparations find some way to extricate himself.” CPSU Politburo—Egor Ligachev, Nikolai were so far advanced, that it is doubtful Gromyko likewise expressed dismay that Ryzhkov, and Vadim Medvedev, among whether any gestures or concessions on “Jaruzelski is now vacillating again” and others—have recently disclosed that Soviet Solidarity’s part, no matter how dramatic, that “the Polish leadership . . . is continuing leaders sometimes gathered informally be- could have averted the crackdown.45 to relinquish its positions by failing to adopt fore Politburo sessions to iron out their As elaborate as all these preparations decisive measures.” Others at the meeting different views of highly controversial is- were, there was always some risk that the complained that Jaruzelski was in a “highly sues.42 As a rule, these informal meetings “internal solution” would encounter unex- agitated state [and] has been transformed (referred to obliquely as “exchanges of opin- pected problems. Had that been the case, it into a man who is extremely neurotic and ions”) were not included in the final tran- is far from clear what would have happened. diffident about his abilities.” These sorts of scripts of official Politburo sessions. Hence, There is no indication that the Soviet Polit- comments hardly imply great optimism. it is eminently conceivable that an unre- buro ever arrived at a final decision in 1981 At the same time, the transcript and corded preliminary meeting on 10 Decem- on whether to invade Poland if “Operation other documents confirm that Soviet leaders ber 1981 featured at least some give-and- X” (the code-name for the martial-law op- had not given up all hope as of December 10; take regarding Soviet military options vis- eration) collapsed. Most political leaders far from it. They were confident enough a-vis Poland. Nevertheless, even if that is and collective bodies tend to put off onerous about the prospects for an “internal solu- the case, it does not change the basic fact decisions until the last possible moment. tion” that they saw no need to give Jaruzelski that the consensus by the time of the formal That was certainly true of the CPSU Polit- a direct military guarantee as a hedge against Politburo session on December 10 was in buro under Brezhnev, and all evidence sug- the possible collapse of “Operation X.” There full accord with Suslov’s non-intervention- gests that the members of that body were is ample evidence, both in the Politburo’s ist stance. The outcome in this case is of inclined to defer a final decision about mili- documents and in recent first-hand accounts greater interest than the process that may tary intervention in Poland as long as pos- by senior participants, that Jaruzelski tried have led up to it. sible.46 There is no doubt that the Soviet to obtain such a guarantee but was rebuffed.49 Having set out all along to resolve the Union had serious contingency plans to “en- Jaruzelski himself has now claimed that he crisis through martial law rather than through ter and occupy Polish territory” and “neutral- did not ask for a Soviet military guarantee in direct military intervention, Soviet leaders ize the Polish army” on 13 or 14 December the lead-up to “Operation X,” but even if that did everything they could to ensure that an 1981 if the martial-law operation went disas- is so, the evidence clearly suggests that the “internal solution” would succeed. The trously awry, but there is equal reason to members of the CPSU Politburo believed he rapid expansion of Poland’s ZOMO forces believe that no decision was ever made on wanted a guarantee and that they felt they during the crisis went largely unnoticed whether those plans should be implemented.47 had to “dispel any notions that Jaruzelski thanks to the distractions provided by a long The postponement of any final decision and other top officials in Poland may have” succession of Warsaw Pact military exer- would have made perfect sense if Soviet about receiving military assistance.50 The cises and by the buildup of Soviet and allied leaders had been highly confident in Decem- Soviet leadership’s unwillingness to pro- troops along Poland’s borders. Equally ber 1981 that Jaruzelski would successfully vide Jaruzelski with a military guarantee important, Soviet military officials care- impose martial law and resolve the whole was due in part to concern that any such fully assessed the reliability of elite Polish crisis without external help; but, interest- promise might become a crutch that would army units who would eventually be re- ingly enough, the transcript from the CPSU cause the Polish leader to refrain from imple- sponsible, along with the ZOMO and other Politburo’s meeting on 10 December 1981 menting martial law as forcefully as he security forces, for carrying out the martial- suggests that no such confidence existed.48 should. “If [the Polish authorities] show any law operation. At one point, this involved a The outlook in Moscow just three days be- sign of wavering during the struggle against tour of the whole country by eighteen Soviet fore “Operation X” began was far more som- the counterrevolution or afterwards,” generals who asked detailed questions at ber than one might have expected. The Gromyko warned, “nothing will remain of each military garrison about the readiness of problem was not that Soviet leaders doubted socialist Poland.”51 Even more important, Polish commanders to perform their duty the soundness of the plans and preparations however, was the Soviet Politburo’s collec- against “counterrevolution.”43 Similarly, for martial law, which they had helped super- tive desire to avoid any decisions about diplomats at the Soviet embassy and consu- vise. On the contrary, Gromyko assured his military intervention unless events in Po- lates in Poland were ordered to monitor and fellow Politburo members that “we can ex- land unexpectedly took a disastrous turn. report back on the reliability of Polish troops pect positive results if the measures that [the This collective desire to put off a deci- and security forces in their vicinity.44 These Polish authorities] intend to carry out are sion outweighed whatever benefits the So- constantly updated assessments, and simi- indeed implemented.” The problem, instead, viet Union might have gained by extending COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 123 a military guarantee. Because serious doubts officials drew up plans for a full-scale inva- dable resistance against Soviet troops had persisted about Jaruzelski’s resolve, Soviet sion (as discussed above), but these plans been enough to deter Khrushchev in 1956, leaders might have tried to spur him into were to be implemented only if the Polish and the same calculation would have bedev- action by providing a guarantee. The fact authorities failed to restore order on their iled Soviet military commanders in 1981. that they declined to do so suggests that they own. Preparations for the imposition of Furthermore, even if Soviet forces could did not yet want to consider how they should martial law began well before Soviet mili- have subdued the country and overcome all respond in a worst-case scenario. It also tary officials started laying the groundwork resistance, they would have been faced with suggests that they had a fall-back option in for an invasion, and the “internal” option the daunting task of reviving the Polish case Jaruzelski let them down and failed to was deemed throughout to be vastly prefer- economy and political system. In the wake pursue “Operation X.” The exact nature of able to direct “fraternal assistance” from of a bloody invasion, it is inconceivable that this fall-back option was not specified at the outside. Only in a worst-case scenario, in the Polish population would have assisted or meeting on December 10, but a top aide to which the martial law operation collapsed complied with attempts at “normalization.” Jaruzelski in 1980-81, Colonel Ryszard and full-scale civil war erupted in Poland, The likely result, instead, would have been Kuklinski, and the Polish defense minister at does it seem at all likely that the Soviet an outright collapse of the formal Polish the time, Army-General , Union would have shifted toward the “exter- economy, with Soviet troops left to manage have both revealed that Soviet officials in- nal” option. factories virtually on their own. The Soviet tended, if necessary, to remove Jaruzelski In most respects, then, the Soviet Union would have been forced to embark on (just as they earlier removed Kania) and to Union’s response to the 1980-81 Polish cri- a long-term military occupation of Poland, replace him with Army-General Eugeniusz sis was very much in line with its responses with no guarantee that stability would be Molczyk, Army-General Wlodzimierz to previous East European crises. In each restored in the end. Sawczuk, a civilian like Tadeusz Grabski, or case Soviet leaders sought to effect an “in- Nevertheless, despite all these prob- some other ultra-hardline figure who would ternal solution” before taking the extreme lems and the overwhelming reluctance of have been willing to implement a full-scale step of ordering an invasion. What was Soviet leaders to undertake a costly invasion crackdown.52 Soviet leaders still preferred different about the 1980-81 case is that the at a time when they were already bogged to rely on Jaruzelski, for it would have been “internal” option proved successful and, down in Afghanistan, it still seems hard to very difficult to replace him, and a new moreover, that this success was so crucial to believe that the CPSU Politburo would have regime under a hardline successor would Soviet policy. After all, the resort to military refrained from sending in troops if the Polish probably have come under severe challenge force against Hungary and Czechoslovakia, authorities had been unwilling or unable to at home. Gromyko, Suslov, and Andropov though undertaken as a last-ditch measure sustain martial law.55 Although Andropov all expressed serious reservations about after other options had failed, did permit the claimed at the Politburo’s meeting on 10 “forcing [the Poles] to adopt one course or reestablishment and consolidation of Soviet December 1981 that the Soviet Union would another” or “pushing them too hard to adopt control over those countries, paving the way “not send in troops . . . even if Poland falls decisive measures.”53 Nevertheless, if for intensive periods of “normalization.” By under the control of Solidarity,” this state- Jaruzelski had continued to “vacillate and contrast, a Soviet invasion of Poland in De- ment was clearly an anomaly (and it is not lose his nerve” indefinitely (as Gromyko put cember 1981 would most likely have exac- apparent what Andropov’s motivations were it), the Soviet authorities planned to bring in erbated, rather than resolved, the crisis. in making it).56 At no other point during the someone else who would implement “Op- Unlike in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, crisis did Brezhnev or any top Soviet official eration X” once and for all. where Soviet troops intervened primarily display the slightest inclination to accept the The Soviet leadership’s pursuit of an against wayward Communist party leaders, permanent “loss” of Poland or to stand by if “internal solution” to the Polish crisis was the top levels of the PZPR and the highest- the martial-law operation collapsed and civil by no means a departure from its responses ranking Polish military commanders re- war broke out.57 On the contrary, the state- to previous crises in Eastern Europe. In mained loyal to Moscow throughout the 18- ment by Gromyko cited above—that the Hungary and Poland in 1956 and Czechoslo- month crisis.54 An invasion in 1981 would Soviet Union must hold onto Poland no vakia in 1968, the Soviet Union applied therefore have had to be directed against the matter what the cost—summed up the pre- pressures short of direct intervention and whole Polish population, and not merely vailing mood in Moscow very well. As one sought to work out an “internal solution” against a well-defined target at the top. The of the other members of the CPSU Politburo that would preclude the need for an invasion. prospect of encountering armed resistance in 1980-81 later recalled, “the Soviet leader- In each case, Soviet officials viewed mili- among the populace and among lower- and ship [during the crisis] believed that under tary action as a last-ditch option, to be used middle-ranking segments of the Polish mili- no circumstances must Poland be allowed to only after all other measures had failed. In tary (a la Hungary in 1956) would have leave the Warsaw Pact.”58 Brezhnev and his Poland in 1956 an internal solution that left severely complicated any Soviet invasion colleagues repeatedly affirmed that they Gomulka in power did prove feasible, plans. Poland’s population in 1981 was four would “not leave fraternal socialist Poland whereas in Hungary and later in Czechoslo- times the size of Hungary’s in 1956 and 2.5 in the lurch” and that “the socialist common- vakia all attempts to reassert Soviet control times the size of Czechoslovakia’s in 1968; wealth is indissoluble and its defense is a “from within” proved futile, leading in the and the Poles, unlike the Czechs, had a long matter not only for individual states but for end to direct Soviet military intervention. tradition of taking up arms against foreign the socialist coalition as a whole.”59 The During the 1980-81 Polish crisis, Soviet invaders. Poland’s ability to put up formi- exact same phrases were used about Czecho- 124 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

THE WARSAW PACT AND THE clared that “counterrevolutionary” forces POLISH CRISIS OF 1980-81: would gain an ever greater hold in Poland Honecker’s Call for Military Intervention unless the “healthy” Polish comrades re- Enclosure # 2 to Protocol #49 from 28.11.1980 ceived “collective assistance” from their 26 November 1980 Translated and Introduced by Mark Warsaw Pact allies. Any delay in acting, he Kramer warned, would mean “the death of socialist To the General Secretary of the CPSU CC Poland.” Honecker indicated that his plea Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev The following letter, dated 26 Novem- for an urgent meeting was supported by the ber 1980, comes from the archive of the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Communist Esteemed Comrade Leonid Ilyich! Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the former party leaders, Gustv Husk and Todor Zhivkov. In the Politburo of the SED CC we have German Democratic Republic (DDR). It is Although Honecker expressed a willingness discussed the current situation in the People’s one of many valuable documents pertaining to intervene in support of Kania, he also Republic of Poland, and have unanimously con- to the 1980-81 Polish crisis that have been seemed to have in mind the formation of an cluded that there is an urgent necessity to convene a meeting of the General and First Secretaries of collected from the East German archives by alternative group of Polish leaders who would the Communist Parties of our community of a group of researchers at the Free University be willing to carry out the harsh crackdown states. We believe that the situation developing of Berlin. These documents are now being that Soviet officials had been demanding. in the People’s Republic of Poland should be published (in the original German) in a No doubt, Honecker was aware that the So- discussed with Comrade S. Kania in order to multi-volume collection entitled SED-Po- viet Union had already begun encouraging work out collective measures to assist the Polish litburo und polnische Krise 1980/1982. The the formation of just such an alternative, friends in overcoming the crisis, which, as you item translated below is included in the first hard-line regime in Warsaw. know, has been intensifying day after day. volume (Band 1: 1980), which was pub- The sentiments expressed in the letter Unfortunately, one can already say that the lished in January 1993. Volumes covering hardly come as a surprise. East German Polish comrades’ stopover in Moscow, and the timely counsel that you gave, had no decisive 1981 and 1982 are currently in preparation. officials had been denouncing Solidarity from influence on the situation in Poland, which we The letter below was sent by Erich the moment it was formed, and Honecker had all been hoping for. Honecker, the SED General Secretary, to had never tried to conceal his desire to see the According to information we have received the General Secretary of the Soviet Com- PZPR reassert its authority by any means through various channels, counterrevolutionary munist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, during a necessary. When the Polish authorities de- forces in the People’s Republic of Poland are on tense phase of the 17-month crisis in Po- ferred taking harsh action against Solidarity, the constant offensive, and any delay in acting land. At the time, the First Secretary of the the East German leader resorted to conspicu- against them would mean death — the death of Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), ous measures of his own to spur Kania into socialist Poland. Yesterday our collective efforts Stanisaw Kania, was coming under intense action and prevent a “spill-over” of the tur- may perhaps have been premature; today they are essential; and tomorrow they would already be pressure both at home and abroad as strikes moil into the DDR. The East German media too late. escalated and the unofficial trade union launched vehement attacks against Solidar- It would obviously be appropriate if we Solidarity posed an ever greater political ity throughout the fall of 1980, and in late meet together in Moscow for a day right after the challenge to the PZPR. For the previous October the DDR imposed tight restrictions plenum of the PZPR CC, the decisions of which, three months, Brezhnev and his colleagues on travel to and from Poland. By the time in our view, will not be able to change the course had been urging the Polish authorities to Honecker sent his letter to Brezhnev in late of events in Poland in any fundamental way. take “extraordinary measures” against the November, he had ordered the whole East So far as I know, Comrades Husak and “anti-socialist opposition forces,” but Kania German border with Poland to be sealed off, Zhivkov also have been expressing their desire gave little indication that he could resort to a process that was completed by November for us to convene on an urgent basis to discuss this question. It would be best to do so next week. We such steps anytime soon. As the crisis 30. In addition, he had ordered East German believe that offering collective advice and pos- deepened and the Polish authorities failed to army units and border guards to be put on sible assistance from the fraternal countries to act, frustration and alarm in Moscow and high combat alert so they would be ready to Comrade Kania would only be to his benefit. the other East-bloc capitals, especially East take part in any “joint” actions that the War- We ask you, esteemed Leonid Ilyich, to Berlin and Prague, steadily increased. saw Pact might pursue. Honecker’s unre- understand our extraordinary fears about the situ- The extent of East Germany’s concern lenting campaign to persuade the Soviet ation in Poland. We know that you also share about the situation in Poland is immediately Union to lend “fraternal assistance” to Po- these fears. apparent from both the tone and the content land was reminiscent of the efforts that his of Honecker’s letter. The letter expresses predecessor, Walter Ulbricht, had made in With Communist greetings, “extraordinary fear” about the situation in 1968 to promote armed intervention in E. Honecker Poland and urges the Soviet Union to con- Czechoslovakia. Unlike in 1968, however, General Secretary of the SED CC vene an emergency meeting of Warsaw Pact an “internal solution” ultimately proved fea- leaders to consider the possibility of “frater- sible in Poland and thus eliminated the need nal” military intervention. Honecker de- for external military action. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 125 slovakia in . in my forthcoming Working Paper. ation of Workers,” lasted longer than the other two, No one can ever be truly certain, how- 2. See my translation of a key November 1980 Honecker- from October 1978 until it was crushed in the spring of to-Brezhnev letter and highlights from other East Ger- 1980. For further details, see Betty Gidwitz, “Labor ever, what would have happened if “Opera- man documents gathered by the Free University group Unrest in the Soviet Union,” Problems of Communism, tion X” had collapsed amid widespread vio- in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. 31:6 (November-December 1982), 25-42; “The Inde- lence and the Soviet Politburo had been 3. “O prazdnovanii pervogo maya i godovshchiny so pendent Trade-Union Movement in the Soviet Union,” forced to decide whether to send in troops. dnya prinyatiya konstitutsii 3 maya (Politicheskaya Radio Liberty Research, RL 304/79 (11 October 1979); zapiska),” Cable No. 68 (SECRET), 4 May 1981, from and Karl Schogel, Opposition sowjetischer Arbeiter The difficulty of carrying out an invasion of N. P. Ponomarev, Soviet consul-general in Szczecin, in heute (Koln: Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschaftliche Poland and of coping with its aftermath TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 6-12; “Vneshnyaya und internationale Studien, 1981). would have been so great that it would have politika PNR na nyneshnem etape (Politpis’mo),” 9 14. “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunist- changed the course of Soviet policy in East- July 1981, Cable No. 595 (TOP SECRET) from B. I. icheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O nekotorykh Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, in TsKhSD, F. 5, negativnykh proyavleniyakh, svyazannykh s ern Europe for many years to come. As it Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 21-34; and “Ob ideino-politicheskikh nedostatkami v organizatsii v oplate truda rabochikh i was, the success of Jaruzelski’s “internal kontseptsiyakh ‘reformatorskogo kryla’ v PORP sluzhashchikh,” St-233/8s (TOP SECRET), 24 Octo- solution” precluded any test of Moscow’s (Spravka),” Cable No. 531 (SECRET) 22 June 1981, ber 1980, with attached documents, in TsKhSD, F. 89, restraint and restored conformity to the So- from V. Mutskii, first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Op. 13, D. 37, Ll. 1-12. Quoted passages are from ll. 4 Poland, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 598, Ll. 116-121. and 9. viet bloc at relatively low cost. The surpris- 4. “Polozhenie v PORP posle IX S”ezda,” Cable No. 15. “Poslanie do ludzi pracy w Europie Wschodniej,” ingly smooth imposition of martial law (“stan 596 (TOP SECRET), 4 November 1981, from B. I. Tygodnik Solidarnosc (Warsaw) 25 (18 September wojenny”) in Poland also helped prevent any Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, to Konstantin 1981), 6. further disruption in Soviet-East European Rusakov, head of the CPSU CC Department for intra- 16. See, e.g., Dmitrii Ustinov, “Protiv gonki vooruzhenii bloc affairs, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 35-53. i ugrozy voiny,” Pravda, 25 July 1981, p. 4; relations during the last year of Brezhnev’s 5. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 37 zasedaniya Politbyuro “Soveshchanie sekretarei tsentral’nykh komitetov rule and the next two-and-a-half years under TsK KPSS ot 21 noyabrya 1981 goda: O prieme v kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii Andropov and Chernenko. SSSR partiino-gosudarstvennoi delegatsii PNR i ustnom sotsialisticheskikh stran,” Pravda, 5 November 1981, The lack of any major political turmoil poslanii t. Brezhneva L. I. t. V. Yaruzel’skomu,” No. 4; and “Vysokoe prizvanie i otvetsvennost’: Rech’ P37/21 (TOP SECRET), 21 November 1981, in tovarishcha M. A. Suslova,” Pravda, 15 October 1981, in Eastern Europe between 1982 and 1985 TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 27, L. 3. 2. seems especially surprising at first glance, 6. “Vneshnyaya politika PNR na nyneshnem etape 17. Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” for this was a period of great uncertainty not (Politpis’mo),” Cable No. 595 (TOP SECRET), 9 July 6-7, 17-19. only because of the post-Brezhnev succes- 1981, from B. I. Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, 18. For ample first-hand evidence of this pressure, see in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 21-34. “Dokumenty ‘Komisji Suslowa’,” 19-20; “Scisle tajne: sion in Moscow, but also because of the 7. Ibid., l. 27. See also “Voprosy vneshnei politiki na KPZR o Polsce 1980-81,” 10-11; “O nekotorykh impending successions in most of the other IX S”ezde PORP (Informatsiya),” Cable No. 652 (SE- momentakh po vnutripoliticheskoi i ekonomicheskoi Warsaw Pact countries. The last time the CRET), 10 August 1981, from Yu. Ivanov, counselor at obstanovke v Pil’skom voevodstve (Politicheskaya Soviet Union had experienced a prolonged the Soviet embassy in Poland, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, zapiska),” Cable No. 18 (TOP SECRET), 20 January D. 598, Ll. 170-176. 1981, from N. P. Ponomarev, Soviet consul-general in leadership transition, between 1953 and 8. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 29 oktyabrya Szczecin, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 1-5; 1957, numerous crises arose in the Eastern 1980 goda: Materialy k druzhestvennomu rabochemu Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala bloc: in Plzen, Czechoslovakia and in East vizitu v SSSR pol’skikh rukovoditelei,” 29 October 80-kh godov,” 53-55; Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Germany in June 1953, in Poznan in June 1980 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 31, L. Biura Politycznego, 102-107, 317-318, 451-454, and 3. 497-511; and Kania, Zatrzymac konfrontacje, esp. 73- 1956, and in Poland and Hungary in Octo- 9. Vladimir Lomeiko, “Kto zhe dolbit dyry v pol’skoi 118, 231-243. ber-November 1956. Moreover, during the lodke,” Literaturnaya gazeta (Moscow) 3 (21 January 19. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 37 zasedaniya Politbyuro 1953-56 period, all the East European coun- 1981), 14. TsK KPSS ot 21 noyabrya 1981 goda,” L. 5. tries underwent one or more changes in their 10. “Rech’ tovarishcha M. A. Suslova,” Pravda (Mos- 20. Ibid., Ll. 5-6. cow), 13 April 1981, 4. 21. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 9 aprelya 1981 Communist party leadership, just as the So- 11. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 242/61gs Sekretariata goda: 3. Ob itogakh vstrechi t.t. Andropova Yu. V. i viet Union did. By contrast, no such upheav- TsK: O nekotorykh dopolnitel’nykh merakh po Ustinova, D. F. s pol’skimi druz’yami,” 9 April 1981 als or leadership changes occurred in East- kontrolyu za rasprostraneniem pol’skoi pechati v SSSR,” (TOP SECRET), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 40, Ll. ern Europe between 1982 and 1985. This No. St-242/61gs (TOP SECRET), 22 December 1980, 2-9. See also a number of other transcripts in “Scisle with attached reports, in TsKhSD, F. 89, F. 46, D. 81, tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81,” 11. unusual placidity cannot be attributed to any Ll. 1-26. Quoted passages are from ll. 1 and 6. 22. “Polozhenie v PORP posle IX S”ezda,” Cable No. single factor, but the martial law crackdown 12. V. Stanley Vardys, “Polish Echoes in the Baltic,” 857 (TOP SECRET), 4 November 1981, from B. I. of December 1981 and the invasions of 1956 Problems of Communism 33:4 (July-August 1983), 21- Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, to Konstantin and 1968 are probably a large part of the 34, and Jean Pennar, “Demonstrations and Dissent in Rusakov of the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. ,” Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty 384/80 (17 84, D. 596, Ll. 35-53. explanation. After Stalin’s death in 1953, October 1980). 23. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 the limits of what could be changed in East- 13. “K voprosu o t.n. ‘nezavisimom profsoyuze’,” goda: 2. O besede tov. Brezhneva L. I. s Pervym ern Europe were still unknown, but by the Report No. 655-L (SECRET), 5 April 1978, from Yu. sekretarem TsK PORP tov. S. Kanei (po telefonu),” 16 early 1980s the Soviet Union had evinced its V. Andropov, chairman of the KGB, to the CPSU CC April 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. Politburo, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 18, D. 73, L. 1. The 41, Ll. 2-3. willingness and ability to use extreme mea- first attempt, in January 1978, was made by a long-time 24. Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” sures, when necessary, to prevent or reverse activist and mining engineer, Vladimir Klebanov, whose 21-22. “deviations from socialism.” “Association of Free Trade Unions of Workers” was 25. “Eventualna interventsiya sreshchu Polsha e forcefully disbanded less than two weeks after it was mozhela da stane ‘vtori kurvav Afganistan’,” Duma founded. The second attempt, in April 1978, was by (Sofia), 20 November 1990, 3. 1. See my translations of these documents in this issue Vsevolod Kuvakin, who set up a short-lived “Indepen- 26. “TsK KPSS,” Memorandum No. 682-OP (SPE- of the CWIHP Bulletin. I have translated other pub- dent Trade Union of Workers.” The third attempt, by a CIAL DOSSIER—TOP SECRET), 28 August 1980, lished and unpublished documents for the appendices group known as the “Free Interprofessional Amalgam- from M. A. Suslov, A. A. Gromyko, Yu. V. Andropov, 126 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

D. F. Ustinov, and K. Yu. Chernenko to the CPSU otnosheniya, 1994), 175, 312. In a typical comment on 53. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya Politburo, in APRF/Osobaya Papka. this matter, Ligachev reported (p. 215) that “it was a 1981 goda,” Ll. 5-7. 27. Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis normal working practice of the highest Party leadership 54. Jan B. de Weydenthal, “Martial Law and the nachala 80-kh godov,” 54. to hold special [ekstrennye] working meetings for the Reliability of the Polish Military,” in Daniel N. Nelson, 28. “Vladislav Achalov: Takoe vpechatlenie, chto members of the Politburo and the CC Secretaries on ed., Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of nikto nikogda nikogo nichemu ne uchil,” Nezavisimaya different contentious matters that came up. Usually Reliability (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1984), gazeta (Moscow), 7 February 1995, 7. such meetings were convened by the General Secretary 239-240. See also Jan B. de Weydenthal, Bruce D. 29. Maj.-General Vladimir Dudnik, “Tainy ‘temnoi himself or by someone whom he authorized to do so. In Porter, and Kevin Devlin, The Polish Drama: 1980- komnaty’,” Moskovskie novosti 14 (5 April 1992), 17; the absence of the General Secretary, the meetings were 1982 (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), esp. and “Juz siedzielismy w czolgach: Z generalem led by whoever had been designated to ‘mind the store.’ 109, 112-13, and 138-39. majorem Stanislawem Prochazka, rozmawia Leszek Such meetings differed from official sessions of the 55. Kuklinski is adamant on this point (“Wojna z Mazan,” Polityka (Warsaw) 37 (15 September 1990), Politburo in that they were not empowered to adopt narodem widziana od srodka,” 4), but it should be 13. See also “Generalmajor S. Prochazka z vojenske decrees, but would only work out recommendations that emphasized that he was no longer in Warsaw in Decem- obrody rika: ‘Meli jsme okupovat Polsko’,” Zemedelske would be affirmed later on. This practice began decades ber 1981, when Soviet leaders would have had to decide noviny (Prague), 16 August 1990, 1. ago.” whether to intervene if martial law failed. Moreover, 30. “O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov 43. Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” Kuklinski also believes that Jaruzelski (or some other podrazdelenii Voiska Pol’skogo i VMF PNR, 31. leader) could have deterred a Soviet invasion by mobi- dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan’skom poberezh’e,” 44. “O nekotorykh aspektakh raboty Pol’skikh organov lizing the army and population as Gomulka did in 1956. Cable No. 183 (TOP SECRET), 14 June 1981, from V. gosbezopasnosti po presecheniyu podryvnoi The question of whether the Soviet Union would have Zelenov, Soviet consul-general in Gdansk, in TsKhSD, deyatel’nosti oppozitsii (Informatsiya na osnove besed invaded has been a source of intense controversy both F. 5, Op. 84, D. 611, Ll. 17-19. s rabotnikami gosbezopasnosti PNR),” Cable No. 931 inside and outside Poland; for sharply conflicting views, 31. Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” (TOP SECRET), 30 November 1981, from A. Kovalev, see the items cited in the first part of this essay pertain- 22-24. first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, in ing to Jaruzelski, Kania, Rakowski, Pavlov, Gribkov, 32. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 37 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 611, Ll. 29-31; “O Dubynin, Prochazka, Gorbachev, Dudnik, and Achalov. TsK KPSS ot 21 noyabrya 1981 goda,” L. 6; and “O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov podrazdelenii 56. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Pol’skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya 1981 goda,” L. 4. Voiska Pol’skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan’skom poberezh’e,” Ll. 17-19; “O politicheskoi 57. The emphasis here is on the permanency of the na Gdan’skom poberezh’e,” L. 18. situatsii i nastroeniyakh v voevodstvakh yuzhnogo “loss.” Even Andropov’s statement suggests no more 33. “O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov regiona PNR (Politpis’mo),” Cable No. 179 (TOP SE- than a willingness to accept a temporary “loss.” podrazdelenii Voiska Pol’skogo i VMF PNR, CRET), 12 November 1981, from G. Rudov, Soviet 58. Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, in “Gorbaczow dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan’skom poberezh’e,” L. consul-general in Krakow, to the CPSU Secretariat, in o stanie wojennym w Polsce: General Jaruzelski postapil 19. TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 13-22; and “O prawidlowo,” Trybuna, 9 November 1992, 2. 34. “Scisle tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81,” 10. trevozhnykh faktakh dal’neishego davleniya na organy 59. “Sovetsko-pol’skaya vstrecha,” Pravda, 5 March 35. See, e.g., “Vermerk uber ein Gesprach des Narodnoi militsii (MO),” Cable No. 94 (SECRET), 27 1981, 1. Generalsekretars des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden May 1981, from G. Rudov, Soviet consul-general in Mark Kramer, a scholar affiliated with the Center for des Staatsrates der DDR, Erich Honecker, mit Genossen Krakow, to the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. Foreign Policy Development at Brown University Stefan Olszowski, Mitglied des und Sekretar 84, D. 611, Ll. 2-3. and the Russian Research Center at Harvard des ZK der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei,” 20 45. Komisja resortowej badajacej dokumentacje University, writes frequently on Cold War history. November 1980, in SAPMDB, ZPA, J, IV 2/2 A/2363. zwiazana ze stanem wojennym, “O planach 36. “Anlage Nr. 2 zum Protokoll Nr. 48 vom wprowadzenia stanu wojennego,” (Warsaw: unpub- 28.11.1980,” in SAPMDB, ZPA, J, IV 2/2-1868, Bl. 5. lished report, December 1990), pp. 15-47. RUSSIAN ARCHIVE SERIES 37. For the Soviet Politburo’s assessment of the 46. For a general discussion of Soviet decision-making meeting, see “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 11 during the Brezhnev era, see Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev The Russian Publications Project at the Center dekabrya 1980 goda: 1. Ob itogakh vstrechi Politburo and the Decline of Detente (Ithaca, NY: for Russian and East European Studies at the rukovodyashchikh deyatelei gosudarstv-uchastnikov Cornell University Press, 1984). University of Pittsburgh in cooperation with the State Varshavskogo Dogovora, sostoyavsheisya v Moskve 5 47. On the contingency plans, see the comments of Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), headed dekabrya 1980 goda,” 11 December 1980, Rabochaya senior officers involved in the planning: Gribkov, by S.V. Mironenko, is publishing a series of zapis’ (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 59, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh annotated archival guides to materials in GARF. Ll. 1-3. godov,” 54-55; Dudnik, “Tainy ‘temnoi komnaty’,” 17; Published volumes include Vol. 1, Stalin’s “Special 38. “‘Wir Bruderlander stehen fest’,” and “Misja skonczona: Wywiad z generalem Wiktorem Files” [Osobaya Papka], 1944-1953, which contains (Hamburg) 42 (19 October 1992), 95, 97, 99. Dubyninem, dowodca wojsk bylego ZSRR w Polsce,” descriptions of 2,237 files to Stalin from the 39. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 29 oktyabrya Gazeta wyborcza, 14-15 March 1992, 8-9. Dubynin Secretariat of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 1981 goda: 2. Ob itogakh poezdki t. Rusakova K. V. v offered similar, though less detailed, comments in a (MVD); and Vol. 2, Molotov’s “Special Files,” GDR, ChSSR, VNR i NRB,” 22 October 1981 (Top subsequent interview with Novoe vremya 27 (July 1992), 1944-1955, describing 1,720 documents to Molotov Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 48, esp. L. 5. 26-27. from the MVD Secretariat. 40. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 48. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya Future planned volumes include: Vol. 3, 1981 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol’she,” 10 1981 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol’she,” 10 Khrushchev’s “Special Files,” 1944-1959, 2,936 December 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. December 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 66, documents; Vol. 4, Malenkov’s “Special Files,” 66, D. 6, Ll. 1-11. D. 6, Ll. 1-11. 1944-1955, 6,000 documents; Vol. 5, Beria’s Special 41. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 210 zasedaniya 49. The highly controversial question of whether Files,” 1944-1953; and Vol. 6, Guide to Correspon- Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 25 avgusta 1980 goda: K Jaruzelski sought a military guarantee in December dence between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and voprosu o polozhenii v Pol’skoi Narodnoi Respublike,” 1981 is discussed in much greater detail in my forthcom- the Foreign Ministry, 1944-1959, 3,000 documents. No. P210/P (TOP SECRET), 25 August 1980, in ing CWIHP Working Paper. For further information contact: TsKhSD, F. 89, F. 42, D. 22. 50. “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 42. E. K. Ligachev, Zagadka Gorbacheva (Novosibirsk: 1981 goda,” L. 5. Russian Publications Project Interbuk, 1992), 215; N. V. Ryzhkov, i 51. Ibid. Center for Russian and East European Studies istoriya predatel’stv (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), 78-79; 52. Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” 4G12 FQ V. A. Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva: Vzglyad 4-5; and Wojciech Zaluska, “Strach generalow: Siwicki University of Pittsburgh iznutri (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), 107-108; and V. A. przed Komisja Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej,” Pittsburgh, PA Medvedev, Raspad: Kak on nazreval v “mirovoi Gazeta wyborcza, 13 May 1994, 2. Jaruzelski, too, has Tel.: (412) 648-7403/7407 sisteme sotsializma” (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye argued this point; see his Stan wojenny, 252. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 127

SED EVIDENCE count on us, on our aid, on every form of dent Carter warned Brezhnev, in a personal continued from page 121 assistance.” (Ibid.) letter on 3 December, to avoid “forcing a People’s Republic of Poland and in the CSSR On 25 November [1980] the SED Polit- solution from outside on the Polish nation.” in 1968”: “In both their essence and their buro decided to distribute “internal party Similar warnings came from other NATO goals, and also partly in their methods, there materials” on the Polish crisis. This “infor- governments and from the European Com- is a striking congruity. The only differences mation” for the district and county party munity. Even so, the press secretary for the are in the priority of demands, the concrete leaders and for the heads of the SED CC PZPR CC, Josef Klasa, explained on 4 De- plan of attack, and the timetable for the departments was clearly intended to provide cember that the “. . . Polish communists have counterrevolutionary offensive.” (ZPA J IV guidelines for agitation and propaganda in the right and the duty to ask the Soviet Union 2/2/1859, Bl. 56.) The SED was convinced case intervention was decided upon. (ZPA J and other countries for help in combatting that the opposition in Poland was seeking IV 2/2/1867, Bl. 6-16.) On 26 November, counterrevolution.” (Europa-Archiv. Se- not only reform, but the outright elimination Honecker finally appealed to Brezhnev with ries 1981, p. Z6.) of socialism. the urgent request “. . . to devise measures of On 5 December the party and state lead- This direct comparison with Prague in collective assistance for the Polish friends to ers of the Eastern military coalition gathered 1968 was the basis on which the SED Polit- permit them to surmount the crisis.” (ZPA J for their conference in Moscow. They voted buro would act thereafter, both publicly and IV 2/2-1868, Bl. 5.) In the process, Honecker against intervention in Poland at that time. privately, in its policy toward its eastern pleaded with Brezhnev for a solution to the The Polish leadership’s willingness to resort neighbors. On 30 September 1980 the SED Polish crisis from outside via the Warsaw to martial law to overcome the “counter- Politburo, backed by Brezhnev, urged the Pact states: “According to information we revolution” played a crucial role in the avoid- convocation of a meeting of the party leaders have received through various channels, ance of a military attack from outside. The of the Warsaw Pact states to consider the counterrevolutionary forces in the People’s Polish party leader Kania suggested the Polish question. (Ibid., Bl. 2.) In so doing Republic of Poland are on the constant of- imposition of a “state of war” as a solution the SED wanted to set in motion the Warsaw fensive, and any delay in acting against them to the Polish crisis: “. . . a staff set up by the Pact’s consultative mechanism according to would mean death — the death of socialist Politburo is working under the supervision the model of Prague 1968. Poland. Yesterday our collective efforts of the premier, and this staff is preparing a The Polish Supreme Court’s decision may perhaps have been premature; today full range of different measures. These on 11 November 1980 to accept the exist- they are essential; and tomorrow they would include, among other things, the question of ence of the trade union “Solidarity” in War- already be too late It would obviously be introducing a state of war in Poland. . . . saw without requiring the “PZPR’s leading appropriate if we meet together in Moscow Preparations are also under way for an op- role” to be upheld within the trade union for a day right after the plenum of the PZPR eration to arrest the most active supporters was, for the SED leadership, the point at CC, the decisions of which, in our view, will of the counterrevolution. . . . We will set up which the “capitulation” of the PZPR lead- not be able to change the course of events in special groups of the most reliable party ership had gone so far that intervention from Poland in any fundamental way.” (Ibid.) members who will, if necessary, be equipped outside could no longer be avoided. On 20 After Brezhnev reacted positively to with firearms. We have already selected November Honecker expressed his disap- Honecker’s proposal, the SED Politburo met 19,000 such party members, and we believe pointment regarding the weak behavior of on 28 November in a special session in that by the end of December there will be the PZPR leadership to the acting Polish Strausberg—the site of the GDR Defense around 30,000. . . .” (ZPA J IV 2/2 A-2368.) ambassador in the GDR, Olszowski, in the Ministry—and authorized the sending of the Even though the assembled party lead- following way: “Without a doubt this com- letter and, hence, Honecker’s suggestions. ers agreed to pursue an internal Polish solu- promise was an immense setback for every- In a session on 2 December the same body tion, the threat of intervention remained in one who was still hoping that you could decided on the composition of the SED place. As Bulgarian party leader [Todor] resolve your problems on your own.” (ZPA delegation for the meeting: Erich Honecker, Zhivkov explained: “. . . Poland must act J IV 2/2 A/2363.) From the SED Politburo’s Willi Stoph, , Heinz decisively and must rely on both peaceful point of view, the situation in Poland in the Hoffmann, and . In addition, and non-peaceful measures. . . . If that does fall of 1980 was already more dire than in the the outline of the General Secretary’s speech not happen, . . . then the Polish comrades will CSSR in 1968 under Dubcek. When speak- was approved at this session, and Honecker have no alternative but to appeal for help ing with Olszowski, Honecker left no doubt was given general plenipotentiary authority. from their allies. We, too, will have no about the aggressive stance of the SED: “We (ZPA J IV 2/2/1896, Bl. 2.) alternative, neither they nor we. . . .” (Ibid.) do not favor bloodshed. That is only a last Before the meeting of the leaders of the In his Moscow speech Erich Honecker resort. But even this last resort must be Warsaw Pact states on 5 December in Mos- reaffirmed the SED’s willingness to cooper- applied at certain times. . . . That was our cow, the situation in and around Poland had ate in crushing the independent trade union experience in 1953, and it was also the case come to a dramatic head. Western observers and democratic movement in Poland: “. . . during the 1956 crisis in Hungary and again expected that an intervention by the Soviet We also have a responsibility to our own in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. Our point of Union or by the whole Warsaw Pact would people and to our friends all over the world. departure is that . . . we cannot be indifferent take place on 8 December 1980. Massive They count on us to give help to the Polish to the fate of the People’s Republic of Po- troop movements and concentrations could comrades in prevailing over the counter- land. We will act accordingly. You can be observed all around Poland. U.S. Presi- revolution.” (Ibid.) In addition, he recom- 128 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN mended the violent suppression of the Pol- ish opposition analogous to the crises of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL 1953, 1956, and 1968. HISTORY PROJECT Referring to economic and military in- PUBLICATIONS terests, Brezhnev emphasized in his sum- mary report that “the situation in Poland and the danger hanging over Poland are not Publications of the Cold War International COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT just Polish concerns. They are the concern History Project are available free of charge WORKING PAPERS of us all.” In accord with the doctrine named upon request. Requests can be sent to CWIHP, after him, he further declared that neither Woodrow Wilson Center, 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW, Washington, DC 20560; faxed to CWIHP Poland’s own communists nor the friends at (202) 357-4439; or e-mailed to #1 Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alli- and allies of Poland would permit Poland to [email protected] ance and China’s Entry into the Korean be torn from the socialist community. “Po- War” land was and will remain an inviolable mem- Contents of back issues of the CWIHP ber of the . . . system of socialism.” (Ibid.) Bulletin include: #2 P.J. Simmons, “Archival Research The decision of the Warsaw Pact states on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague and Warsaw” not to intervene in Poland in December * Issue 1 (Spring 1992), 32 pages: 1980 was of course accepted by the SED Reports on Soviet and East European #3 James Richter, “Reexamining So- leadership, but this decision did not corre- archives, Chinese sources, and Havana viet Policy Towards Germany during the spond with the SED’s appraisal of the situ- conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis; Beria Interregnum” ation in Poland. As is evident from docu- reviews of memoirs of Novikov and ments that have been uncovered, the SED Molotov; #4 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Soviet Intel- Politburo mistrusted the Polish communists ligence and the Cold War: The ‘Small’ Committee of Information, 1952-53” and no longer believed the Polish leaders * Issue 2 (Fall 1992), 40 pages: Csaba were capable of a forcible solution to the Bekes presents new evidence on the 1956 #5 Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and Polish crisis. The SED leaders favored a Hungarian revolution and Mark Kramer the Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evi- solution analogous to what was done in asseses new sources on the 1968 Soviet dence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East Czechoslovakia in 1968, and they did ev- invasion of Czechoslovakia; the FRG German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, erything they could to gain support for that reports from the East German military 1958-1961” option in the CPSU, which retained final archives, Hope Harrison’s diary from the decision-making authority on whether to SED archives, and William Burr on newly- #6 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)” pursue such a step. The option of having the declassified evidence on the Berlin Crisis; Warsaw Pact states violently suppress the Polish opposition was what appealed to the #7 Mark Bradley and Robert K. * Issue 3 (Fall 1993), 80 pages: Mark Brigham, “Vietnamese Archives and SED leadership, who kept the option alive. Kramer reports on the Russian archives Scholarship on the Cold War Period: Along with materials on the SED and new findings on the 1968 Soviet Two Reports” Politburo’s position vis-a-vis the “Polish crushing of the Prague Spring; Kathryn crisis,” the documentation also contains ex- Weathersby offers new Russian evidence #8 Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims tensive archives on intra-German relations, on the Korean War; Mark Kramer and in Korea and the Origins of the Korean on the SED’s policy toward the church, and James G. Blight et al. debate Soviet War, 1945-1950: New Evidence From Russian Archives” on the mounting economic problems in the tactical nuclear weapons and the Cuban GDR. Missile Crisis; and a selection of translated The publication of corresponding docu- #9 Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. documents from the Russian archives; Narinsky, “New Evidence on the Soviet ments from the years 1981/82 is currently Rejection of the , 1947: being prepared by scholars from the “SED- * Issue 4 (Fall 1994), 100 pages: Two Reports” State Research Group.” Reports on Soviet nuclear history, includ- ing David Holloway on sources for Stalin #10 Norman M. Naimark, “‘To Know and the Bomb, Yuri Smirnov and Everything and To Report Everything Vladislav Zubok on nuclear weapons after Worth Knowing’: Building the East Ger- man Police State, 1945-1949” Stalin’s death, and William Burr on using declassified history, plus evidence on Niels #11 Christian F. Ostermann, “The United Bohr and the Sudoplatov controversy; States, the East German Uprising of 1953, Zubok goes inside the covert Cold War; and the Limits of Rollback” reports on new Eastern evidence on Germany and the Cold War; and more #12 Brian Murray, “Stalin, the Cold translated Russian documents. War, and the Division of China: A Multi-Archival Mystery” COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 129

SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON POLAND mittee as soon as possible in order to work out a strengthening of the socialist legal order. continued from page 117 detailed, positive program specifying the main —Pay greater attention to the army and country. The complexity of the struggle against policy directions. The program must, in particu- devote special attention to the military-political it stems, in particular, from the fact that the lar, undercut the significance of the demands of preparation of soldiers. Use the opportunity to members of the opposition disguise themselves the strike committees in Gdansk and Szczecin as attract army command personnel to perform party- as defenders of the working class and as laborers. much as possible in the eyes of the workers. In economic work as well. The agreement does not eliminate the un- accordance with materials from the CC plenum, —Adopt necessary measures to expose the derlying causes of the crisis events; and what is convene expanded plenary sessions of PZPR political nature and designs of the ringleaders of more, the urgent problems of the Polish economy provincial, city, and county committees, sessions the opposition. and Polish society are now becoming more com- of the party aktiv [core members and activists— plicated. ed.], and party meetings at enterprises. 6. In the sphere of the mass media and Because the opposition intends to continue —Consider the possibility of convening a propaganda, concentrate efforts on the further the struggle to achieve its aims, and the healthy party congress, at which a full-scale program of strengthening of party leadership and supervi- forces of the party and society cannot acquiesce action for the party would be worked out, new sion over these organs. This is especially neces- in regressive movement by Polish society, the directives for the five-year plan would be af- sary when in practice the question has arisen of compromise that has been achieved will be only firmed, and necessary changes in the leading the “limitation of censorship” and the expansion temporary in nature. One must bear in mind that organs would be introduced. of access for the anti-socialist forces and the the opposition is expecting, not without reason, —An increase in the combativeness of the Church to the mass media. that help will be forthcoming from outside. party in rural locations will require the compre- —In these circumstances it is necessary to hensive organizational strengthening of the PZPR provide an elaborate definition of what is permis- 2. Under the pressure of anti-socialist forces, county committees, which since the administra- sible, having openly declared that the law on the who have succeeded in leading astray a signifi- tive reforms of 1975 have been serving in the role press forbids any statements against socialism. cant portion of the working class, the PZPR had of regional committees. —Adopt necessary measures to put an end to go on the defensive. Now the problem is how —Consider the direction for the leading to the wide circulation of anti-Communist publi- to prepare a counterattack and reclaim the posi- work in party organs carried out by experienced cations, films, and television productions in the tions that have been lost among the working class political workers of the Polish Army. PPR, and to maintain strict control over the sources and the people. of information emanating from Poland, including In launching this counterattack, it would be 4. The reestablishment of the severed link the activity of bourgeois journalists. advisable to use all the capabilities afforded by between the party and the working class will Strengthen party control over the work of the ruling party and its strong, healthy core, by require a fundamental renewal of the activity of the central and local press, over the leaders of the state apparatus, and by mass social organiza- the trade unions. Do everything necessary to editorial collectives, and above all over the tele- tions, while showing political flexibility. These prevent the or disintegration of the vision and radio. institutions will provide necessary support to the existing trade unions (CRZZ) and their organiza- Using the mass media, show that the events vanguard ranks of the working class. In the event tions. Convene as soon as possible the regular 9th in Poland have been caused not by any shortcom- of necessity, it would be advisable to use the Congress of the trade unions of Poland, where the ings of the socialist system per se, but by mistakes contemplated administrative means. foremost task will be to move the trade unions as and oversights, and also by some objective fac- The party must give a principled political close as possible to the workers and to earn their tors (natural calamities, etc.). Through the mass evaluation of the August events and must also full confidence. media, actively and broadly counteract the anti- accelerate the formulation of its own program of —Put up a defense of the basic principles of Polish and anti-Soviet attacks of hostile propa- action, which will include steps to improve the the trade union movement in the conditions of a ganda. life of workers. socialist society. Abide by certain provisions in Objectively depict the economic advantages the agreement with the ZKS and at the same time Poland derives from broad cooperation with the 3. It is necessary to give overriding signifi- adopt all measures to limit and neutralize the USSR and other fraternal countries. Refute the cance to the consolidation of the leading role of effect of the most dangerous articles in the agree- widely circulated slander that one of the reasons the party in society. ment. Come forward with bold initiatives of a for the current difficulties in supplying the popu- social character, which would bolster the author- lation of the PPR with consumer goods is the The current political crisis has sharply weak- ity of the trade unions. shipment of such goods to the countries of social- ened the influence and authority of the party —Raise the quality of personnel in trade ism. among the working class. In such circumstances union organizations by bringing in advanced, * * * * * one must adopt all necessary measures for its trustworthy workers. Carry out elections of trade After expressing a number of points about organizational and ideological cohesion and for union activists before this is done in the so-called the critical situation that has emerged in the PPR, the reestablishment of its influence and author- “self-managed” trade unions. we would like once again to draw the attention of ity. —Seek to limit the activity and influence of our Polish friends to the recommendations and Among some concrete recommendations, the so-called “self-managed” trade unions among suggestions that were offered by Comrade L. I. one might list the following: the masses, a task that will be accomplished Brezhnev during the discussions in the —On an urgent basis, carry out measures to predominantly by mobilizing public opinion. with E. Gierek both in 1979 and especially on 31 raise the combativeness of all party organiza- Move actively in infiltrating the so-called “self- July 1980, as well as to the letter of 21 August tions, taking account of the lessons of the politi- managed” trade unions with people devoted to 1980 addressed to the PZPR CC. cal crisis. Act decisively in removing people the party. Of particular importance in today’s situa- who are clearly alien to the party, while conform- tion are the following suggestions offered by ing with the specific conditions existing right 5. In light of the danger created by the Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on 31 July 1980: now in the country. activity of the anti-socialist forces, use state struc- —carry out, along a wide front, work aimed —Convene a plenum of the Central Com- tures to carry out necessary measures for the at fostering socialist internationalism, while de- 130 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN cisively rebuffing all attempts to use nationalism zational and ideological strengthening of the party “Solidarity” as a whole and its separate links in the propagation of anti-socialist and anti-So- (see attached). are preparing their next attempt to blackmail the viet sentiments, as well as all attempts to misrep- authorities by setting forth various demands of an resent the history of Soviet-Polish relations and CC SECRETARY overwhelmingly political nature. Signs of a strati- the nature of cooperation between the USSR and fication in the leadership of this trade union the PPR; On point VII of Prot. No. 7 organization do not yet provide any basis for —launch relentless counterpropaganda expecting fundamental changes in its general against the efforts to water down the class content Top Secret orientation. Even if there were to be a schism of under the slogan of “All SPECIAL DOSSIER between Walesa and the extremists from KOR- Poles in the world are brothers,” as well as the To the CPSU CC KOS, Walesa himself and the Catholic clergy efforts to idealize the pre-revolutionary past of who back him have not the slightest intention of Poland; and On the Development of the Situation in Poland easing the pressure on the PZPR. One also cannot —in the political struggle against anti-so- and Certain Steps on Our Part exclude the possibility that the extremists will cialist elements, carry out the appropriate attacks seize control over “Solidarity,” with all the con- against them, rather than merely going on the The internal political crisis in Poland is of a sequences that would ensue. defensive. prolonged nature. To a significant degree the Recently, a new tactical arrangement has PZPR has lost control over the processes under been emerging ever more clearly, around which 3 September 1980 way in society. At the same time, “Solidarity” has the diverse opposition forces are uniting. Despite been transformed into an organized political force, realizing that Poland’s geopolitical situation de- * * * * * which is able to paralyze the activity of the party prives them of the opportunity to obstruct the and state organs and take de facto power into its country’s participation in the Warsaw Treaty CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract), 23 own hands. If the opposition has not yet done that, Organization or to encroach on the principle of April 1981; CPSU CC Politburo Commission then that is primarily because of its fear that Soviet the leading role of the Communist party, these Report, “On the Development of the Situation troops would be introduced and because of its forces have clearly decided to undermine the in Poland and Certain Steps on Our Part,” 16 hopes that it can achieve its aims without blood- PZPR from within, to bring about the party’s April 1981; and CPSU CC-Approved Plan of shed and by means of a creeping counterrevolu- rebirth, and thus to seize power “on a legal basis.” “Measures to Assist the PZPR [Polish United tion.1 As the work of the IX plenum of the PZPR Workers’ Party] in the Organization and Ideo- At the session of the Sejm [Parliament—ed.] CC showed, the opportunistic elements have al- logical Strengthening of the Party” on 10 April, the Polish leadership did not dare to ready succeeded in taking control of local party raise the matter of decisive actions against the organizations of the PZPR and, with their help, To be returned within 3 days to the CPSU CC anti-socialist forces. The leadership clearly is beginning to apply pressure on the leadership of (General Department, 1st sector) unable and does not want to depart from the line the party. They will undoubtedly be continuing Proletarians of all countries, unite! adopted to overcome the crisis with the aid of this subversive work, having sought to transform political means. the upcoming IX Congress into a central arena for Communist Party of the Soviet Union True, in the report to the Sejm by Comrade their struggle for power. CENTRAL COMMITTEE Jaruzelski there were a number of provisions in In these circumstances, the need has arisen the spirit of the recommendations continually once again to assess our view of the Polish TOP SECRET expressed to the Polish comrades by our side. leadership’s policy and to determine more pre- SPECIAL DOSSIER However, they were put forth not in the form of cisely which forces we can rely on in the end to orders, but merely as appeals and suggestions. safeguard the gains of socialism in Poland. No. P7/VII The compromise nature of the report is also abun- On the right flank in the PZPR CC are dantly evident from the fact that it was received officials of a revisionist bent: Fiszbach, Werblan, To: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, calmly and did not provoke a confrontation of the Rakowski, Jablonski, etc. Ideologically, they are Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, sort that our friends had feared. close to some of the leaders of “Solidarity” in Chernenko, Ponomarev, Zimyanin, Kapitonov, Looking upon the results of the Sejm as a their support for a transformation of the socioeco- Rusakov, Arkhipov, Zamyatin, and Rakhmanin modest but initial success, Comrade Kania and his nomic structure of Poland along the lines of the — whole package; Afanas’ev, V., Lapin, Losev, colleagues now are somewhat stepping up their Yugoslav model. In the political sphere they Pastukhov, Shibaev, Pegov, Tyazhel’nikov, and actions to bolster the authority of the party. They support a “partnership” of various political forces, Shauro — pt. 2 have given speeches at a number of large indus- a position coinciding with the “Eurocommunists” trial enterprises and have held a meeting with and the social-democratic ideas of pluralism. Extract from Protocol No. 7 of the session of the workers and peasants and members of the PZPR These officials rely on the support of the CPSU CC Politburo CC. On 25 April a regular plenum of the CC is to party organizations that have fallen under the on 23 April 1981 be held. The preparation of documents is under influence of “Solidarity.” One cannot exclude ______way for the IX Congress of the PZPR, which must the possibility that under present conditions they be held by 20 July of this year. Certain steps are will be able to bring many of their supporters into On the development of the situation in Poland and being taken by the government with the aim of the PZPR Congress and exert fundamental influ- certain steps on our part. somehow rectifying the situation in the economy. ence on the formation of the leading organs of the Despite this it is obvious to everyone that the party. They, apparently, are trying to achieve 1. To approve the ideas put forth in the note lull following the session of the Sejm is ephem- conspicuous changes in the PZPR leadership of the CPSU CC Politburo Commission on the eral. The opponent has gone along with it purely even as soon as the PZPR CC plenum. Polish question (see attached). out of tactical considerations, while continuing to The left flank is represented by such Com- 2. To affirm a plan of measures to lend mount his forces for the infliction of new strikes munists as Grabski, Zabinski, Olszowski, assistance to the PZPR leadership in the organi- against the party. Kociolek, and others. The positions adopted by COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 131 these comrades in the ideological sphere are decisive actions to overcome the crisis and pre- additional measures to assist the PZPR leader- closest to our own. They express the sentiments serve Poland as a socialist country friendly to the ship in strengthening the party both organization- of the members of the party who consistently Soviet Union. ally and ideologically. support socialism and friendship with the Soviet —Strongly recommend to our friends that in Union, and who oppose revisionist excesses and the first instance they must achieve unity and K. Chernenko demand resolute action against “Solidarity.” stability in the leadership of the PZPR, defending Yu. Andropov Overall they are backed by the old members of the comrades who have become the main targets A. Gromyko the party, who were brought up in the school of of attack by the opposition and by the enemies of D. Ustinov war and in the class struggle that marked the first socialism (Grabski, Zabinski, Olszowski, K. Rusakov stages of the establishment of People’s Poland. Kociolek, et al.). In turn, help these comrades I. Arkhipov Unfortunately, representatives of this point recognize the necessity of supporting Comrades L. Zamyatin of view are now far from a majority. One gets the Kania and Jaruzelski, of behaving more flexibly, impression that they believe the solution to the and of not openly opposing slogans of “socialist 16 April 1981 crisis will come only through a frontal attack on renewal.” It is important that they strike at the “Solidarity,” without taking account of the cur- enemies of socialism without implying that “Soli- ______rent correlation of forces. In espousing this view, darity” as a whole is identical to the hostile forces they do not believe there is a possibility of that exist within the organization. Regarding point VII of Prot. No. 7 rectifying the situation without the introduction —Direct the attention of Polish leaders to of Soviet troops. Such a position is objectively the necessity of carefully preparing for the IX Top Secret leading them to become more and more isolated PZPR Congress. Get them to struggle for an in both the party and the country. Substantial ample contingent of healthy forces at the Con- SET OF MEASURES TO ASSIST THE PZPR efforts will be required (if indeed they are still gress and to take an active role in this regard with LEADERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL possible) to get them elected to the Congress and the party organizations of large state enterprises. AND IDEOLOGICAL STRENGTHENING have them join the leading organs. —Recommend to the Polish comrades that OF THE PARTY In effect, Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski they bind “Solidarity” in every way possible to occupy a centrist position. In the difficult situa- the resolution of productive matters, while limit- Dispatch a working group from the CPSU tion that emerged after August of last year, they ing its political activity. To this end, they should CC Department for Organizational-Party Work turned out to be proponents of the sentiments that accelerate the adoption of laws on economic to the PPR in May and June 1981 for consulta- gained sway in the party and the country in favor reform and trade unions. tions on matters concerning preparations for the of resolving the ongoing acute problems by means —Actively exploit the discernible fragmen- Extraordinary IX Congress of the PZPR. of dialogue and an agreement with “Solidarity.” tation among the leaders of “Solidarity,” disrupt The CPSU CC Department, and the depart- The subsequent period showed that Kania and the anti-socialist and anti-national activity of ments for organizational-party work, propaganda, Jaruzelski, while referring to the necessity of KOS-KOR and its leaders, and bring about the and foreign policy propaganda of the CPSU CC, protecting the gains of socialism in Poland, pur- isolation of these counterrevolutionaries. Adopt are to analyze the draft theses for the PZPR sued this course passively and hesitantly, mak- decisive measures against attempts to stir up a Congress, the draft PZPR statutes, and the drafts ing numerous concessions in favor of “Solidar- wave of anti-Sovietism in the country. of other documents, as well as the status of ity.” They have displayed insufficient firmness Induce the Polish leadership to maintain organizational preparations for the Congress, and and steadfastness in the struggle against the constant watch over the state of the army and should relay appropriate recommendations to the counterrevolutionary forces. In their view, de- Internal Affairs Ministry organs, including their CPSU CC. votion to socialism is compatible with the na- morale, political stability, and readiness to fulfill Receive a delegation from the PZPR CC tionalist idea that was circulated during Gierek’s their duty in defense of socialism. It is essential Organizational Department in April-May 1981, time, namely, that “a Pole can always reach to support the Internal Affairs Ministry leader- as provided for under the plan for interparty ties agreement with other Poles.” This has led not ship, and Milewski personally, and to avoid any in 1981. only to an unjustified policy of concessions to the let-up in the actions carried out by the police to Prepare invitations to working groups of top demands of “Solidarity,” but also to a panic- preserve public order. officials from PZPR CC departments to come to ridden fear of confronting “Solidarity” and a —As a deterrent to counterrevolution, maxi- the USSR for consultations, which the Polish deep-rooted anxiety that Soviet troops will be mally exploit the fears of internal reactionaries comrades are very interested in holding. sent in. and international imperialism that the Soviet In accordance with the desire of the Polish At the same time, Kania and Jaruzelski Union might send its troops into Poland. In leadership, party officials representing local party want to maintain friendship with the Soviet Union foreign policy statements, emphasize what was organs will be sent to Poland in May and June and to uphold Poland’s obligations to the War- said by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the XXVI 1981. The initial delegations will be sent from the saw Pact. Both of them, especially Jaruzelski, CPSU Congress about our resolve to stick up for Leningrad, Ivanovo, , , enjoy authority in the country. At present, there Poland and not to leave it in the lurch. Zaporozhe, Lvov, Kharkov, Cherkassk, are in fact no other officials who might take over —Given the exceptionally difficult eco- Grodnensk, and Mogilev oblast party commit- the party and state leadership. nomic situation in the PPR, continue to extend tees. In light of all that has just been said, it is timely assistance while simultaneously doing In the event of confirmation of an appropri- imperative to pursue the following course of everything possible to step up propaganda about ate request from the PZPR CC, give further action in the immediate future: this matter so that every Pole will know how consideration to the question of accepting middle- —Continue to offer political support to much his country depends on Soviet help and and lower-ranking PZPR officials (up to 500 of Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski, who, despite support. them) at the CPSU CC Academy of Social Sci- their well-known waffling, are in favor of de- Along with these general recommendations, ences and also at the Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, fending socialism. At the same time, constantly we are, in accordance with our instructions (P1/ and higher party schools. demand that they pursue more significant and VIII from 12 March 1981), presenting a plan of The CPSU CC Department for organiza- 132 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN tional-party work and the CPSU CC Department October of this year. believed so. We long ago spoke about this to our are to hold a conference in May-June 1981 for friends. representatives from corresponding oblast and L. BREZHNEV W. JARUZELSKI. And for that reason I municipal committees of the CPSU to discuss consented. I will do all I can, Leonid Ilyich, both urgent questions of ties between local party or- 19 October 1981 as a Communist and as a soldier, to improve gans of the CPSU and PZPR. things and to achieve a turnaround in the situation By agreement with the PZPR CC, send to ______in the country and in our party. I understand and Poland in May-June 1981 a group of senior fully agree with you that one of the crucial things officials from the central council of the branch Secret right now is the selection of leadership both in the trade unions headed by the secretary of the All- party and in the government. And for that reason Union Central Trade Union Council, who will NOTES FROM A TELEPHONE I deferred any final resolution of personnel mat- familiarize themselves with the state of affairs in CONVERSATION ters until the next plenum, which we will be the Polish trade union movement and make on- between Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and Comrade holding within several days. This way, I can site studies of the opportunities for political sup- W. Jaruzelski think carefully about these matters and consult port of the branch trade unions and for increased with others, ending up with a comprehensive cooperation between them and the Soviet trade 19 October 1981 decision and not simply scattered personnel unions. changes. Instruct the CPSU Komsomol CC to present The Kremlin L. I. BREZHNEV. Personnel matters are a set of measures by 5 May 1981 on ways to very important both at the center and in the strengthen our influence within the youth move- L. I. BREZHNEV. Hello, Wojciech. outlying regions. ment in Poland. W. JARUZELSKI. Hello, my dear, deeply W. JARUZELSKI. This issue will be re- The Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship esteemed Leonid Ilyich. solved in the outlying regions as well. Of course and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, the L. I. BREZHNEV. Dear Wojciech, we al- this must occur in parallel with the strengthening Soviet Veterans’ Committee, and the Committee ready sent you an official greeting, but I wanted to of the party in the spirit of a stepped-up struggle. of Soviet Women are to continue pursuing the set congratulate you personally on your election to In the appropriate situation we must apply deci- of measures agreed on with the native Polish the post of First Secretary of the PZPR CC. sive actions in order to wage battle where we are organizations and to offer them the necessary It was appropriate of you to give your con- confident of achieving success. help. sent to such a decision. In the PZPR right now I’m now heading over to a session of the Taking account of the complex situation in there is no other individual whose authority is Military Council of the Armed Forces at the the creative unions of the PPR, the Unions of equal to yours; this is evident from the results of Ministry of Defense. There I will also be putting Writers, Journalists, Composers, Artists, and Film- the vote at the plenum. We understand that very forth appropriate tasks. We will broadly include makers of the USSR are to carry out exchanges difficult tasks now stand before you. But we are the army in all spheres of the life of the country. with them via party organizations. convinced that you will cope with them and will Yesterday, after the plenum, I held a meet- Send a group from the USSR State Commit- do everything to overcome the severe ailments ing with the first secretaries of the provincial tee on Television and Radio (headed by the chair- afflicting your country. committees and said that they should not take man of the committee, Comrade Lapin) to the I think, right now, as it seems to me, the most umbrage at the fact that we will be including PPR in May 1981 for consultations regarding important thing is for you to gather around your- people from the armed forces in the implementa- Soviet broadcasts to the PPR and the refinement self some reliable assistants from the ranks of tion of certain processes and will be expanding of plans for cooperation in 1981. committed and worthy Communists and to rally meetings between the officer corps and the work- In April-May 1981 the editors of the news- them, spurring the whole party into action and ing class in order to exert direct influence on the papers “Pravda,” “Izvestiya,” and “Trud” are to instilling it with the spirit of struggle. This, in the workers and shield them from the influence of send a group of publicists (1 or more) to Poland literal sense of the word, is the key to success. “Solidarity.” Of course, we are not changing our to prepare materials, including exposés and de- And, of course, it is important, without wast- general direction in the sense that we are strug- nunciations, about the activity of anti-socialist ing time, to take the decisive measures you intend gling to win back to our side the healthy forces of forces. to use against the counterrevolution. We hope the nation who have gone astray and joined “Soli- that everyone now, both in Poland and abroad, darity,” and simultaneously we will be combat- * * * * * will sense that things in your country will move ting the adversary and, of course, doing so in such along differently. a way that it will produce results. Brezhnev-Jaruzelski Telephone We wish you good health and success! Today I am meeting with your ambassador. Conversation, 19 October 1981 W. JARUZELSKI. Thank you very much, I will try to go over certain questions with him in dear Leonid Ilyich, for the greeting and above all greater detail and will be asking for your sugges- To be returned Distributed to the members for the confidence you have in me. I want to tell tions on some questions which he, no doubt, will to the CPSU CC of the CPSU CC Politburo, you frankly that I had some inner misgivings convey to you.2 (General Depart- members of the CPSU CC about accepting this post and agreed to do so only In keeping you informed of all the decisions ment, 1st sector) Politburo, and CPSU CC because I knew that you support me and that you we reach, we will simultaneously let you know No. P1942 secretaries were in favor of this decision. If this had not been what has motivated our decision-making in par- so, I never would have agreed to it. This is a very ticular cases. ______burdensome and very difficult task in such a Right now the greatest complications in our complicated situation in the country, in which I country arise from the situation at the market. In To the CPSU CC now find myself both as prime minister and as connection with this we have been experiencing minister of defense. But I understand that this is many strikes and protests, some organized by I am conveying notes from a telephone con- proper and necessary if you personally believe so. “Solidarity” and others that are simply elemental. versation with Comrade W. Jaruzelski on 19 L. I. BREZHNEV. Wojciech, we long ago This very much complicates efforts to carry out COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 133 measures that must be implemented and compli- The CPSU CC Department and the USSR you agreed that you needed to choose reliable cates our work, since the mood in society is Foreign Ministry are to set forth recommenda- assistants from among the ranks of staunch and indifferent. But we will be trying to do every- tions concerning organizational measures con- devoted Communists and to spur the whole party thing possible to improve the situation. nected with the reception of a Polish delegation in into motion, having instilled it with the spirit of This is what I wanted initially to convey to the USSR. struggle and then, without losing any time, resort- you and to keep you informed about. ing to against the counterrevolu- Once again I want to thank you very much CC SECRETARY tion. for your kind words. ______“It’s obvious that the fundamental question L. I. BREZHNEV. I again wish you, now is the struggle for the hearts and minds of the Wojciech, the best of health and the best of Regarding point 21 of Prot. No. 37 masses. However, one gets the impression that a success. turnaround on this matter has so far not been W. JARUZELSKI. Thank you. Good-bye. Secret achieved. The anti-socialist forces not only are gaining sway in many large industrial enter- * * * * * WARSAW prises, but are also continuing to spread their influence among ever wider segments of the CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract) and SOVIET AMBASSADOR population. Worse yet, the leaders of ‘Solidarity’ Text of Oral Message from Brezhnev to and the counterrevolutionaries are still appearing Jaruzelski, 21 November 1981 Pay a visit to Comrade W. Jaruzelski and, before various audiences and making openly in- citing your instructions, transmit to him the fol- flammatory speeches aimed at stirring up nation- To be returned within 3 days to the lowing oral message from Comrade L. I. alist passions and directed against the PZPR and CPSU CC (General Department, 1st sector) Brezhnev: against socialism. The direct consequence of this Proletarians of all countries, unite! “Esteemed Comrade Jaruzelski! hostile activity is the dangerous growth of anti- “We have attentively considered your pro- Sovietism in Poland. Communist Party of the Soviet Union posal to visit Moscow at the head of a party-state “It seems to us that you now must mobilize CENTRAL COMMITTEE delegation that would include the heads of the the entire party in the struggle to win the hearts TOP SECRET parties allied with the PZPR, and we agree with it. and minds of people by coming forth with a No. P37/21 As far as the timeframe is concerned, the visit precise and clear program for resolving the crisis, might take place on 14-15 December, assuming a program that will convince everyone of its To: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, of course that this is suitable for you. appropriateness. In other words, you must seek Andropov, Gromykov, Suslov, Ustinov, “In the meantime, because several weeks anew to gain the confidence of ordinary workers, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Arkhipov, Baibakov, still remain before the meeting, I decided to as was done by the Communists during the years Zamyatin, and Smirtyukov. transmit to you through Comrade Aristov some of the founding of popular rule. Of great impor- thoughts about urgent matters pertaining to the tance in this effort will be regular meetings by Extract from Protocol No. 37 of the session of the situation in Poland, which remains a cause of leading officials from the PZPR aktiv with labor CPSU CC Politburo serious anxiety for us. collectives, especially collectives at large state on 21 November 1981 “I am revealing no secrets when I say that we enterprises, which the enemy has succeeded in ______greeted your election as PZPR CC First Secretary transforming into its bastions. This is so not just with great hopes. We were aware that earlier in in the capital. And, of course, the struggle for the On the reception in the USSR of a party-state the struggle against the anti-socialist forces you, hearts and minds of the masses will not achieve delegation from the PPR and an oral message as the chairman of the Council of Ministers, were the necessary results if the current party leader- from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to Comrade W. inhibited by the political indecisiveness of the ship is not supported by the mass media and if the Jaruzelski. party leadership. Now this obstacle has been adversary, as before, is given unhindered oppor- eliminated. The 4th plenum of the PZPR CC tunity to disseminate his hostile propaganda. 1. To affirm the text of an oral message directly linked the decision to change the First “I’d now like to broach another matter. from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, who instructed the Secretary with the necessity for urgent measures Recently in Poland a lot has been written about Soviet ambassador in Poland to transmit it to to salvage socialism in Poland. your meeting with Glemp and Walesa. Some call Comrade W. Jaruzelski (see attached). “When I congratulated you over the phone, it historic and see in it the beginning of a turn 2. To acknowledge the desirability of re- I was pleased to hear that one of the reasons you away from chaos toward social tranquility. As ceiving in the USSR a party-state delegation had agreed to take on the responsible post of we know, the results of the meeting were posi- from the PPR headed by Comrade W. Jaruzelski PZPR leader at such a critical juncture was the tively evaluated by the Politburo and the PPR on 14-15 December 1981. confidence you felt we had in you. I mentioned government.3 To affirm the composition of the Soviet this to my comrades, and our hope strengthened “We understand, of course, that by propos- delegation at the talks with the Polish delegation: even more that in you we had finally found ing at this meeting, in the form of a critical Comrades L. I. Brezhnev (head of the delega- someone who thinks as we do and who will be an question, the creation of a ‘Front of National tion), M. A. Suslov, Yu. V. Andropov, A. A. ally in one of the most trying phases of the Accord,’ you are pursuing a number of tactical Gromyko, N. A. Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. struggle against imperialism, as is now occurring objectives, above all the widening of public sup- Chernenko, and K. V. Rusakov. in Poland. port for the regime and the fragmentation of the 3. By 1 December the CPSU CC Depart- “You’ll recall that during the phone conver- top levels of ‘Solidarity.’ But how far can one ment, the USSR Foreign Ministry, the Defense sation I expressed my hope that people now, both really go with such agreements without the threat Ministry, the USSR KGB, and USSR in Poland and abroad, would sense that things in of losing control over the situation? Indeed, are to prepare all necessary materials for the talks your country were finally headed on a different aren’t the class enemies trying to instill the ‘Front with the Polish party-state delegations, includ- course. We spoke then about the essential pre- of National Accord’ with political content that ing a draft communiqué for the press. conditions for a turnabout in the situation, and would bolster their idea of, at a minimum, attain- 134 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN ing a division of power among the PZPR, ‘Soli- places openly, preparing for a decisive onslaught, personnel. I am convinced that by working with darity,’ and the church, with the result that social- are now seeking to time it for the moment when your comrades who are oriented toward the “left- ism would collapse. It is also clear that they are they will have an overwhelming advantage. In ists,” and by giving them your support, you will exploiting their current influence among the particular, they are placing great stakes on the fact find that it is precisely these people who provide masses to establish a huge advantage in the up- that a new group of recruits will be entering the a sound basis for the struggle to overcome the coming elections for the national councils, thus army who have been worked on by ‘Solidarity.’5 crisis. continuing their path toward the legal seizure of Doesn’t this suggest to you that a failure to take “Esteemed Wojciech Wladyslawovich! power in the country. harsh measures against the counterrevolution right Having raised, for your benefit, several matters “This, it seems to me, implies that it will be away will cost you invaluable time? that are troubling us, and having offered you my fundamentally important for the leading role of “The key question is how to isolate the sworn views, I naturally have left aside a number of the PZPR to be greatly strengthened in the ‘Front enemies of socialism. Until that is done, nothing problems that can be considered during a face-to- of National Accord,’ as well as for the partici- will change. Moreover, such an overtly counter- face meeting.6 pants in the Front to recognize the PPR Constitu- revolutionary organization as the ‘Confederation tion, socialism, and Poland’s international alli- for an Independent Poland’ (KPN) is enlisting L. BREZHNEV” ances. Will these things be done in the Statutes new supporters and is able to function legally. It’s and other documents of the Front, and more obvious that this has been possible because the Confirm transmittal by telegram. important will they be guaranteed in practice? party is in fact losing control over the judicial What do you propose to do about the elections for organs, as is evident from the whole episode with * * * * * local organs of power, bearing in mind the risk of the trial of Moczulski and the other leaders of the party’s destruction? KPN. CPSU CC Politburo transcript, “In this connection another urgent matter “I want to share with you some thoughts 10 December 1981 arises. During many of our discussions we have about one further matter of great urgency. It’s emphasized the same theme over and over: We obvious that any actions in defense of socialism Top Secret are not opposed to agreements. But such agree- demand in the first instance a vigorous struggle Single Copy ments must not make concessions to the enemies for the Marxist-Leninist character of the PZPR (Working Notes) of socialism. And the key thing is that the and an increase in its combat readiness. After the agreements must not become ends in themselves. 4th plenum of the PZPR CC, signs began to SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO Along with measures you take to gain support appear that the party organizations were springing among the popular masses and the different po- back to life. It is important to step up this work and 10 December 1981 litical forces, you must also take decisive actions to prevent the local Communists from falling against the sworn enemies of the popular order. back into their state of passivity and hopelessness. Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV. You agreed with this way of framing the question And for this what is needed most of all is for the and spoke yourself about your intention of strug- members of the party to be able to believe that Also taking part: Comrades Yu. V. Andropov, V. gling for the hearts and minds of the workers words and deeds will no longer diverge, and that V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, A. P. Kirilenko, A. while at the same time attacking the class enemy. the leadership is intent on firmly and consistently Ya. Pel’she, M. A. Suslov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. “But now the impression emerges that you’re implementing decisions that have been adopted. Chernenko, P. N. Demichev, B. N. Ponomarev, focusing only on the first part of this two-part “The strengthening of the PZPR depends M. S. Solomentsev, I. V. Kapitonov, V. I. Dolgikh, formula. We know that there are still people in also on a clear-cut line with regard to different K. V. Rusakov. the leadership of your party who are still pinning currents of thought among its ranks. In your all their hopes on a continuation of the bankrupt country some have argued that there now exist I. On the question of the situation in Poland course of Kania. It would be dangerous to suc- three basic directions in the party—the left, the cumb to their entreaties. It is now absolutely clear right, and the center—and they have recommended BREZHNEV. This question is not listed on that without a resolute struggle against the class the severance of all ties with the leftists and our agenda. But I think that the session of the enemy, it will be impossible to save socialism in rightists, leaving them completely isolated by the Politburo should begin with this matter, since we Poland. The essential question is not whether force of the blows. This is a dangerous recom- have specially dispatched Comrades [Head of there will be a confrontation or not, but who will mendation. Who is it, after all, that is being Gosplan Nikolai] Baibakov and [Warsaw Pact begin it and by what means it will be carried out, branded “leftists” or “hardliners”? Why, the Commander-in-Chief Marshal Viktor] Kulikov as well as who will seize the initiative. Communists who have long been supportive of to Poland to meet with the Polish comrades and “I’d like to emphasize that when we speak Marxist-Leninist positions, while in no way dis- go over certain matters of the utmost urgency. On about a confrontation, we believe it is contingent missing the need to rectify mistakes and distor- 8 December, Comrade Kulikov provided us with on a struggle to lure back to the side of the PZPR tions that have been committed. And who are the information about the discussions he held in the workers and toiling masses who have fallen so-called rightists? These are the people who Warsaw, and yesterday, 9 December, Comrade under the influence of ‘Solidarity’ and who now espouse revisionist views and ultimately become Baibakov communicated from Warsaw that he occupy a passive position and bide their time, members of ‘Solidarity.’ It is clear that any sort of had held a discussion with Comrade Jaruzelski. waiting for things to sort themselves out at the actions against staunch Communists would be From these meetings and subsequent discussions top.4 suicide for the PZPR as a Communist party. And held by Comrade Baibakov, it is apparent that the “You and I, Wojciech Wladyslawovich, have it is just as clear that until you get rid of the Polish comrades hope to receive roughly 1.5 both experienced war and we know that the revisionists, including the ones in the party lead- billion dollars’ worth of additional supplies and strategy of fighting is crucially dependent on the ership who are trying to uphold the previous materials from the USSR and other socialist coun- question of time. This is directly related to the capitulationist line, they will weigh on you like a tries in the first quarter of the coming year.7 This adverse situation that has now emerged in Po- heavy burden. will include iron ore, non-ferrous metals, fertil- land. The leaders of the anti-socialist forces, who “I believe these considerations provide the izer, oil, tires, grain, etc. long ago were already gradually, and in some key to a solution of the mounting problems with In making this request, as you see, the Polish COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 135 comrades have in mind that shipments of goods farm produce.8 rectly described the situation regarding the Polish from the USSR to Poland in 1982 will be main- If we speak, for example, about reserves of economy. What, then, should we be doing now? tained at the level of 1981. Comrade Baibakov grain, then Poland this year has accumulated It seems to me that we should deliver to Poland assured his interlocutors that all their requests more than 2 million tons. The population is not the goods provided for under the economic agree- would be considered in Moscow. going hungry. Urban dwellers ride out to the ments, but that these deliveries should not exceed Perhaps it would behoove us now to instruct markets and buy up all they products they need. the quantity of goods we delivered in the first Comrades Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, And there are ample supplies of them. quarter of last year. Skachkov, and Arkhipov to continue studying As is known, by the Politburo’s decision and this matter, taking account of the exchange of at the request of the Polish comrades, we are BREZHNEV. And are we able to give this opinions, but without waiting for a final agree- providing Poland with an aid shipment of 30 much now? ment. thousand tons of meat. Of these promised 30 And now let’s hear what Comrade Baibakov thousand tons, 15 thousand have already been BAIBAKOV. Leonid Ilyich, it can be given has to say. shipped abroad. It should be added that the only by drawing on state reserves or at the ex- produce, in this case meat, is being delivered in pense of deliveries to the internal market. BAIBAKOV. In accordance with the dirty, unsanitary freight cars normally used to Politburo’s instructions, I traveled to Warsaw. I transport iron ore, making for an unpleasant sight. RUSAKOV. The day before yesterday they met there with all the comrades whom it was During the transport of this produce to the Polish had a conference of secretaries from the provin- necessary for me to see about the matters speci- stations, genuine sabotage has been taking place. cial committees. As Comrade Aristov9 reported, fied in my instructions. Poles have been expressing highly obscene com- the secretaries of the provincial committees are First of all I had a discussion with the deputy ments about the Soviet Union and the Soviet completely baffled by Jaruzelski’s speech, which chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade people, have refused to clean out the freight cars, did not present a clear, straightforward line. No Obodowski. During this discussion, the Polish etc. One couldn’t even begin to keep count of all one knows what will happen over the next few comrades raised the question of economic assis- the insults that have been directed against us. days. There was a conversation about “Operation tance. I sent an encrypted cable back here outlin- Viewing the situation from the standpoint of X.” At first, they said it would be on the night of ing the Polish request. the balance of payments, the Poles want to intro- 11-12 December, and then this was changed to One must say that the list of goods included duce a moratorium on the payment of their debt to the night of 12-13. And now they’re already in the assistance from us to the PPR comes to 350 Western countries. If they declare a moratorium, saying it won’t be until around the 20th. What is items worth some 1.4 billion rubles. This in- then all Polish vessels in the waters of other states envisaged is that the chairman of the State Coun- cludes such goods as 2 million tons of grains, 25 or in harbor, and all other Polish property in the cil, Jablonski, will appear on radio and television thousand tons of meat, 625 thousand tons of iron countries to which Poland owes debts, will be and declare the introduction of martial law. At ore, and many other goods. The requests made seized. For this reason the Poles have given the same time, Jaruzelski said that the law on the by the Polish comrades, combined with what we instructions to the captains of ships to refrain introduction of martial law can be implemented had already been thinking about giving Poland in from entering ports and to stay in neutral waters. only after it is considered by the Sejm, and the 1982, means that the total assistance to the Polish Now I will offer several words about my next session of the Sejm is not scheduled until 15 People’s Republic will be approximately 4.4 discussion with Comrade Jaruzelski. He reaf- December. Thus, everything has become very billion rubles. firmed the request made earlier by Obodowski complicated. The agenda of the Sejm has already The time is now approaching when Poland regarding the delivery of goods. Then in the been published, and it makes no mention of the will have to pay for its credits from West Euro- evening I again went to Jaruzelski’s office, ac- introduction of martial law. But even if the pean countries. For this, Poland will be required companied by our ambassador and Comrade government does intend to introduce martial law, to pay a minimum of 2.8 million rubles’ worth of Kulikov. Also taking part in this discussion were “Solidarity” knows this very well and, for its part, hard currency. When I was told by the Polish Obodowski and the PZPR CC secretary who has been preparing all necessary measures to comrades that they are requesting the amount handles these matters. Jaruzelski was in a highly cope with that. that all this assistance comes to, I raised the agitated state. It seemed that he had been deeply Jaruzelski himself says that he intends to question of how to establish mutual economic disturbed by the letter from the head of the Polish deliver an address to the Polish nation. But in his ties on a balanced basis. Moreover, I noticed that Catholic Church, Archbishop Glemp, who, as is address he won’t be speaking about the party. Polish industry is not even coming close to known, promised to declare a holy war against Instead he will appeal to Polish nationalist senti- fulfilling its plan. The coal industry, which is the the Polish authorities. True, Jaruzelski promptly ments. Jaruzelski has talked about the need to country’s basic means of earning hard currency, responded that in the event of untoward activities proclaim a military dictatorship, of the sort that has been severely disrupted, and remedial mea- by “Solidarity,” they will detain all hostile ele- existed under Pilsudski.10 He indicated that the sures have not been implemented as strikes con- ments. Poles will accept this more readily than some- tinue. And even now, when there are no strikes, As far as the party organizations are con- thing else. the mining of coal remains at a very low level. cerned, they are ruined and inactive in the outly- As far as officials like Olszowski are con- Or, for example, let’s say that production is ing regions. And with regard to the party as a cerned, they recently have begun to act more going on among the peasantry, with grain, meat whole, Jaruzelski said that in essence it no longer decisively; and one might add that at the session products, vegetables, etc. But they aren’t giving exists. The country is being destroyed, and the of the Politburo where the decision was made to any of it to the state; they’re just playing a waiting outlying regions are not receiving any sort of introduce martial law and adopt more resolute game. At the private markets the level of agricul- reinforcement, because the Central Committee measures against extremist figures in “Solidar- tural trade is sufficiently high and is being car- and government are not giving firm and clear-cut ity,” the vote was unanimous and no one ex- ried out at very inflated prices. instructions. Jaruzelski himself has been trans- pressed a word of opposition.11 At the same time, I said directly to the Polish comrades that formed into a man who is extremely neurotic and Jaruzelski intends to keep in close touch about they must adopt more decisive measures if such diffident about his abilities. this matter with his allies. He says that if the a situation has arisen. Perhaps they can launch Polish forces are unable to cope with the resis- something in the nature of a requisitioning of RUSAKOV. Comrade Baibakov has cor- tance put up by “Solidarity,” the Polish comrades 136 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN hope to receive assistance from other countries, would say even more than that, he is raising the ited review of the situation in Poland. You might up to and including the introduction of armed question, albeit indirectly, of receiving military even say this review was more spirited than any forces on the territory of Poland. Jaruzelski is assistance as well. we’ve had before. This is because at the moment basing this hope on the speech by Comrade Now, if you look at the list of goods we are we ourselves don’t know what direction the events Kulikov, who reportedly said that the USSR and providing to the Polish comrades, we can can- in Poland will take. The Polish leadership itself other socialist countries would indeed give assis- didly say that serious doubts arise about the senses that power is slipping from its grasp. tance to Poland with their armed forces. How- necessity of supplying these products. For ex- Kania and Jaruzelski, you know, counted on their ever, as far as I know, Comrade Kulikov did not ample, what is the connection between the suc- ability to rely on the neutrals. But now there is no say this directly, but merely repeated the words cess of “Operation X” and the delivery of fertil- such opportunity, there are no longer any neutrals. voiced earlier by L. I. Brezhnev about our deter- izer and certain other goods? In connection with The position is defined sufficiently clearly: “Soli- mination not to leave Poland in the lurch. this I would say that our position, as it was darity” has proven to be a patently counterrevo- If we consider what is going on in the prov- formulated earlier during the previous session of lutionary organization which aspires to come to inces, one must candidly say that the strength of the Politburo and was expressed even earlier on power and which has openly declared its inten- the party organizations there has been completely several occasions by Leonid Ilyich, is entirely tion to seize power. The Polish leadership must dissipated. To a certain degree the administrative correct, and we must not depart from it at all.12 In decide the question: Either it relinquishes its apparatus there is still functioning, but in effect other words, we support the position of interna- positions by failing to adopt decisive measures, all power has now been transferred to the hands of tionalist assistance, and we are alarmed by the or it adopts decisive measures by introducing “Solidarity.” In his recent statements, Jaruzelski situation unfolding in Poland; but as far as “Op- martial law, isolating the extremists of “Solidar- is apparently trying to pull the wool over our eyes, eration X” is concerned, that must entirely and ity,” and restoring public order. There is no other because his words fail to reflect a proper analysis. unequivocally be decided by the Polish comrades alternative. If the Polish comrades don’t quickly get orga- themselves. Whatever they decide is what will What should our position be toward the nized, prepare themselves, and resist the on- be. We will not insist on any specific course, and Polish events? I fully agree with what was slaught of “Solidarity,” they will have no success we will not dissuade them from pursuing what already said here by the comrades. We can say to at all in improving the situation in Poland. they decide. the Poles that we view the Polish events with As far as economic assistance is concerned, understanding. There is no basis whatsoever for ANDROPOV. From the discussions with it will of course be difficult for us to undertake us to alter this measured formulation in any way. Jaruzelski it’s clear that they have not yet reached anything of the scale and nature of what has been At the same time we must somehow try to dispel a firm consensus about the introduction of martial proposed. No doubt, something will have to give. the notions that Jaruzelski and other leaders in law. Despite the unanimous vote by the PZPR But again I want to say that the mere posing of the Poland have about the introduction of troops. CC Politburo on the need to introduce martial question of the apportionment of goods supplied There cannot be any introduction of troops into law, we still haven’t seen concrete measures on as economic assistance is an insolent way to Poland. I think we can give instructions about the part of the leadership. The extremists in approach things, and it is being done purely so this to our ambassador, asking him to visit “Solidarity” are attacking the Polish leadership that if we refrain from delivering something or Jaruzelski and communicate this to him. by the throat. The Church in recent days has also other, they’ll be able to lay all the blame on us. If Despite the sufficiently unanimous vote of clearly expressed its position, which in essence is Comrade Kulikov actually did speak about the the PZPR CC Politburo with regard to the intro- now completely supportive of “Solidarity.” introduction of troops, then I believe he did this duction of martial law, Jaruzelski is now back to Of course in these circumstances the Polish incorrectly. We can’t risk such a step. We don’t his vacillating position. At first he had somewhat comrades must act swiftly in launching “Opera- intend to introduce troops into Poland. That is the stiffened his spine, but now, once again, he’s tion X” and carrying it out. At the same time, proper position, and we must adhere to it until the begun to soften. Everything is still in force that Jaruzelski declares that we will resort to “Opera- end. I don’t know how things will turn out in was said to them previously. If in the struggle tion X” when “Solidarity” forces us to do so. This Poland, but even if Poland falls under the control against counterrevolution and afterwards they is a very disturbing sign, particularly because the of “Solidarity,” that’s the way it will be. And if show any sign of wavering, nothing of socialist latest session of the PZPR CC Politburo and the the capitalist countries pounce on the Soviet Poland will remain. The introduction of martial decision it adopted to introduce martial law had Union, and you know they have already reached law, of course, would be the best way to convey suggested that the Politburo was beginning to act agreement on a variety of economic and political the steadfastness of the Polish leadership to the more decisively. All the members of the Polit- sanctions, that will be very burdensome for us. counterrevolutionaries. And if the measures they buro expressed support for decisive action. This We must be concerned above all with our own intend to carry out are indeed implemented, then decision put pressure on Jaruzelski, and he is now country and about the strengthening of the Soviet I think we could expect positive results. compelled to find some way of extricating him- Union. That is our main line. Now, with regard to the creation of a new self. Yesterday I spoke with Milewski and asked In general, it seems to me that our position party, as Jaruzelski proposed, I think we must him what measures they intended and when it on the situation in Poland was formulated by directly say to Jaruzelski that there is no need to would be done. He replied that he simply doesn’t Leonid Ilyich in several of his speeches and in the create any sort of new party, since this would know about “Operation X” and about the con- resolutions adopted earlier. Today, a very thor- merely signal a retreat on the part of the Polish crete timeframe in which it would be carried out. ough exchange of opinions has taken place dur- leadership and an acknowledgment that the PZPR Thus, it would seem that either Jaruzelski is ing the session of the Politburo. All of this must is in fact not a militant political organization, but concealing from his comrades the plan of con- serve as the basis of the policy we must uphold simply an organization that has committed mis- crete action, or he is simply abandoning the idea vis-a-vis Poland. takes. It would underscore the very weakness of of carrying out this step. As concerns the lines of communication the party and would play into the hands of the I’d now like to mention that Jaruzelski has between the Soviet Union and the GDR that run “Solidarity” extremists. Then even the popula- been more than persistent in setting forth eco- through Poland, then we of course must do some- tion of Poland, which retains definite sympathy nomic demands from us and has made the imple- thing to provide for their safekeeping. for the PZPR as a guiding force, would be com- mentation of “Operation X” contingent on our pletely disabused of such sentiments. willingness to offer economic assistance; and I GROMYKO. Today we’ve had a very spir- I believe that we must not now permit any COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 137 sort of harsh instructions, which would force prolonged stretch of events in Poland, we have them to adopt one course or another. I think we displayed steadfastness and composure. Leonid SUSLOV. In the press we must expose the have chosen the correct position here: The Ilyich Brezhnev spoke about this at the plenum. intrigues of “Solidarity” and other counterrevo- restoration of order in Poland is a matter for the We said this in public to our people, and our lutionary forces. Polish United Workers’ Party, its Central Com- people supported the policy of the Communist mittee, and its Politburo. We already said to our Party. CHERNENKO. I fully agree with what the Polish friends and will say again in the future that We’ve done a great deal of work for peace, comrades have said here. It is clear that the line they must pursue a steadfast course without and it is now impossible for us to change our of our party and of the CC Politburo vis-a-vis the slackening in the least. position. World public opinion will not permit us Polish events, as formulated in the speeches of Of course, if the Poles deliver a blow to to do so. We have carried out via the UN such Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and in the decisions of “Solidarity,” the West in all likelihood will not momentous diplomatic actions to consolidate the Politburo, is entirely correct and in no need of give them credits and will not offer any other peace. What a great effect we have had from the change. kind of help. They are aware of this, and this visit of L. I. Brezhnev to the FRG and from many I believe that today we could adopt the obviously is something that we, too, have to bear other peaceful actions we have undertaken. This following decision: in mind. For this reason, Leonid Ilyich was has enabled all peace-loving countries to under- 1. Take under advisement the information pro- correct in proposing that we instruct a group of stand that the Soviet Union staunchly and consis- vided by Comrade Baibakov. comrades to examine this question, taking ac- tently upholds a policy of peace. That is why it is 2. In our relations with the PPR in the future, count of our capabilities to extend substantial now impossible for us to change the position we abide by the general political line on this matter economic assistance to the PPR. have adopted vis-a-vis Poland since the very start laid down by the CPSU CC, and also abide by the of the Polish events. Let the Polish comrades instructions from the CPSU CC Politburo on 8 USTINOV. The situation in the PPR, of themselves determine what actions they must December 1981 and the exchange of opinions course, is very bad. The situation is worsening pursue. It would be inappropriate for us to push that occurred at the CC Politburo’s session on 10 day by day. Among the leadership, especially in them toward more decisive actions. But we will, December 1981. the Politburo, there is no firmness or unity. And as earlier, tell the Poles that we regard their 3. Instruct Comrades Tikhonov, Kirilenko, all of this has taken its toll on the state of affairs. actions with understanding. Dolgikh, Arkhipov, and Baibakov to continue Only at the last session of the [Polish] Politburo As it seems to me, Jaruzelski is displaying a studying questions of economic assistance to was a decision unanimously approved to intro- certain degree of slyness. He wants to make Poland, taking account of the exchange of opin- duce martial law. And now all hopes are riding excuses for himself by coming forth with re- ions at the session of the CC Politburo. on Jaruzelski. How will he succeed in carrying quests, which he presents to the Soviet Union. out this decision? As yet, no one can openly These requests, naturally, are beyond our physi- BREZHNEV. How do the comrades feel speak about the actions of Jaruzelski. We just cal capacity to fulfill, and Jaruzelski then says: about this? don’t know. I had a conversation with Siwicki. well, look here, I turned to the Soviet Union and He candidly said that even we [the Poles] don’t requested help, but didn’t receive it. EVERYONE. Comrade Chernenko has very know what the general is thinking. Thus, the man At the same time, the Poles say directly that properly formulated all the proposals, and now it who has been effectively responsible for dis- they are opposed to the introduction of troops. If is time to adopt them. charging the duties of the Polish defense minister troops are introduced, that will mean a catastro- doesn’t know what will happen and what sort of phe. I think we have reached a unanimous view The decree is adopted. actions will be taken by the chairman of the here on this matter, and there can be no consider- Council of Ministers and minister. ation at all of introducing troops. * * * * * With regard to what Comrade Kulikov al- As far as the provision of assistance to legedly said about the introduction of troops into Poland is concerned, we have given that country CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract), Poland, I can say in full responsbility that Kulikov more than a billion rubles. Not long ago we “On Information about the Polish question never said this. He simply repeated what was adopted a decision to ship 30 thousand tons of for the leaders of the fraternal countries,” said by us and by Leonid Ilyich that we would not meat to Poland, of which 16 thousand tons have 13 December 1981 leave Poland in the lurch. And he perfectly well already been delivered. I don’t know whether knows that the Poles themselves requested us not we’ll be able to ship the full 30 thousand tons, but Proletarians of all countries, unite! to introduce troops. in any event we apparently are obliged by this As far as our garrisons in Poland are con- decision to give a further definite number of tons Communist Party of the Soviet Union cerned, we are fortifying them. I myself am also of meat as assistance. CENTRAL COMMITTEE inclined to think that the Poles will not embark on With regard to the PZPR and the creation of TOP SECRET a confrontation and only if, perhaps, “Solidarity” a new party to replace it, I believe it would be seizes them by the throat will they come forth. inappropriate to disband the PZPR. Those who No. P40/26 The problem is that the Polish leaders do not spoke here were correct in arguing that this would appear resolute. As was rightly said here by the be a completely unhelpful action. TO: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, comrades, we must not force them to adopt any Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, specific decisions; we will simply carry out the GRISHIN. The situation in Poland is get- Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamyatin policy on which we have agreed. For our part, we ting steadily worse. The line of our party toward must be ready ourselves and must not display any the Polish events is entirely correct. With respect Extract from Protocol No. 40 of the session of the sort of actions not provided for by our decisions. to the proposal by Jaruzelski to disband the PZPR CPSU CC Politburo and create a new party, one cannot agree with on 13 December 1981 SUSLOV. I believe, as is evident from the that. There can be no talk at all of introducing ______other comrades’ speeches, we all have the same troops. We will have to look at economic ques- view of the situation in Poland. During the whole tions and at what can be given to the Poles. On Information about the Polish question for the economic assistance. The Soviet leadership, as experience in struggling against counterrevolu- leaders of the fraternal countries. previously, will act on the Polish question in close tion. contact with the fraternal countries.” All of us clearly understand that the decisive To affirm the draft instructions to the Soviet Confirm transmittal by telegram. precondition for the full stabilization of things in ambassadors in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland is a revival of the economy. In Czechoslo- , Czechoslovakia, the Republic of Cuba, * * * * * vakia after 1968 political efforts made headway Vietnam, and Laos (see attached). precisely because the counterrevolution had not CPSU CC Politburo transcript (excerpt), affected the economic sphere. In Poland just the CC SECRETARY 14 January 1982 opposite is true. In this connection a difficult question stands Regarding point 26 of Prot. No. 40 SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO before us. We already are stretched to the limit in ______14 January 1982 our capacity to help the Poles, and they are making still more requests. Perhaps we can do a Secret Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV. bit more, but we certainly can’t give a lot more. Still, we must of course answer SOFIA, BUDAPEST, BERLIN, ULAN-BATOR, Also taking part: C[omra]des. Yu. V. Andropov, Jaruzelski’s letter,15 explaining in a comradely PRAGUE, HAVANA, HANOI, VIENTIANE M. S. Gorbachev, V. V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, way what we can and cannot do. By all means we A. P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel’she, M. A. Suslov, N. must precisely carry out our agreed deliveries in SOVIET AMBASSADOR A. Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, P. the first quarter, which for the Poles will be the N. Demichev, V. V. Kuznetsov, B. N. Ponomarev, most difficult winter months. CC: WARSAW — SOVIET AMBASSADOR V. I. Dolgikh, M. V. Zimyanin, K. V. Rusakov Quite another matter are projects for political prestige, which should not impose great Pay a call on T. Zhivkov (J. Kadar, E. 2. On the Results of the Negotiations with the strains on our economy. For example, we can Honecker, Yu. Tsedenbal, G. Husak, F. Castro, PZPR CC Politburo Member and Minister of lend assistance in building the Warsaw subway. Li Duan, K. Phomvihan) and, referring to the Foreign Affairs of the Polish People’s Republic We should meet this request, having made our CPSU CC’s instructions, transmit the following: Cde. J. Czyrek participation a matter of public knowledge. “As our friends know, the Polish leadership Incidentally, the food situation in Poland is has introduced martial law in the country, an- BREZHNEV. I think we all agree that not so bad. There is enough bread in the country, nounced the formation of a Military Council of Mikhail Andreevich [Suslov]’s and Andrei and they must find a way to motivate the peasasntry National Salvation, and detained the most ex- Andreevich [Gromyko]’s discussions with Cde. and to get them to work, arranging, as we some- tremist elements of ‘Solidarity,’ the ‘Confedera- Czyrek were useful. Western officials, especially times say, a merger of the city and village. tion for an Independent Poland,’ and other anti- the Americans, are exerting enormous pressure The Polish leadership continues to count on socialist groups. on Poland. In such circumstances, it is important help from the West. Well, in principle we can’t “A good impression has been created by W. to offer constant political support for our friends be against that, although, to be honest, it’s doubt- Jaruzelski’s address to the people, in which, in and to bolster their spirits. One cannot permit ful that Western countries are about to start pro- our view, all the basic questions were given their spirits to sag or to allow them to relinquish viding material assistance to a military regime. appropriate emphasis. In particular, what is espe- what they have achieved with such difficulty. They undoubtedly will try to extract concessions, cially important is that the address reaffirmed the Martial law in the PPR has already lasted a which means we must be especially vigilant. leading role of the PZPR and the commitment of month. As Jaruzelski says, the counterrevolution Jaruzelski is raising another question, of the PPR to the socialist obligations stipulated by is now crushed. However, the tasks ahead are whether he should accept help from the Chinese. the Warsaw Pact. more complicated. Well, why not? In the process China will be “To ensure the success of the operation, the After introducing relative stability in the disassociating itself from the USA and its eco- Polish comrades observed strict secrecy. Only a country, the Polish comrades must now, one might nomic sanctions. narrow circle around Jaruzelski knew about the say, resolve the strategic problems of what to do In conclusion, one might say that the Polish action.13 Thanks to this our friends have suc- with the trade unions, how to revive the economy, question will be at the center of international ceeded in catching the enemy completely un- how to change the consciousness of the masses, politics for a long time to come. That is why our awares, and the operation so far has been imple- etc. Polish commission has continued to work as mented satisfactorily. The most important question is the situation actively as it has been up to now. “On the very eve of implementation of the in the PZPR. Our friends are trying to find a projected operation, W. Jaruzelski communicated solution. No doubt, Jaruzelski does not intend to * * * * * about it to Moscow.14 We informed him that the disband the party or to change its name, but he can Soviet leadership looked with understanding upon exploit martial law to carry out a sweeping purge. CPSU CC Report on Economic Aid to the decision of the Polish comrades. In so doing This might yield good results. Poland (1980-81), 23 September 1982 we ensured that the Polish comrades would re- In general one gets the impression that the solve these matters solely by internal means. general as a political actor is very strong and is SPECIAL DOSSIER “In our preliminary evaluation, the mea- able, on most occasions, to find proper solutions. Secret16 sures taken by the Polish friends are an active step Sometimes it seems that he is too cautious and acts to repulse counterrevolution, and in this sense more often than necessary with an eye to the West I N F O R M A T I O N they correspond with the general line of all the and the Church. But in the current situation such fraternal countries. gestures will only ruin things. Along with firm, about Soviet assistance to Poland in freely con- “In these circumstances the question arises hardline measures on matters of principle, one vertible currency in 1980-1981* about offering political and moral support to the also needs flexibility and circumspection. It’s Polish friends and also about giving additional good that Jaruzelski is studying the Hungarian I. Credits Provided Millions of $ CMEA countries. surname as Arestov. The error was corrected in Decision of the CPSU CC on the Polish translation. 1. For the purchase of sugar 30 28 November 1980 10. Translator’s Note: Marshal Josef By order of the USSR Council No. P227/21 Pilsudski was the military ruler of Poland during of Ministers on 1 August 1980 ______the interwar period, presiding over a regime that No. 1518 rs (P207 from 1.8.1980) Total 2,934 became increasingly tyrannical. 2. For the settlement of accounts 250 ______11. Translator’s Note: The Russian word with capitalist countries. *) According to data from USSR Gosplan Rusakov uses to describe a unanimous vote, By order of the USSR Council of edinoglasno, is stronger than another word, Ministers on 23 August 1980, No. TRANSLATOR’S NOTES edinodushno, which also is translated as “unani- 1192-rs (P201/30 from 23.VI.80) 1. Translator’s Note: The notion of a “creep- mous.” Rusakov’s statement indicates that no 3. For the establishment of a consor- 70 ing counterrevolution” was first devised by East abstentions or dissenting votes were cast. It tium of banks to help the PPR. German and Soviet officials during the 1968 should be noted, however, that most subsequent Decision of the CPSU CC on 6 June crisis over the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia. speakers (Andropov, Gromyko, etc.) used the 1980. No. P199/2 2. Translator’s Note: Notes from this meet- word edinodushno when referring to the PZPR 4. For the settlement of accounts 150 ing are available in both Russian and Polish Politburo vote, though Ustinov used edinoglasno. with capitalist countries archives; see, e.g., Fond (F.) No. 5, Opis’ (Op.) 12. Translator’s Note: The transcript of By order of the USSR Council of No. 84, Delo (D.) No. 596, Listy (Ll.) 33-35, “the previous session of the Politburo” (appar- Ministers on 11 November 1980 Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii ently of 8 December) has not yet been released. No. 1019-247 (P224/70 (TsKhSD). 13. Translator’s Note: This statement is from 11.XI.1980) 3. Translator’s Note: Brezhnev presumably confirmed by the lack of concrete discussion of 5. For the purchase of grain 190 refers here to the PZPR Politburo. the matter at PZPR Politburo meetings through- and food stuffs. 4. Translator’s Note: A page was missing at out the crisis; see the transcripts in Zbigniew By order of the USSR Council this point in the documents originally supplied to Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura of Ministers the Polish government and published in Politycznego: PZPR a “Solidarnosc,” 1980-1981 No. 1019-347 (P224/70 Rzeczpospolita. Fortunately, the missing page (London: Aneks, 1992). The extreme secrecy of from 11.XI.1980) (no. 5 in the document) was included in the copy the planning also is emphasized in the interview ______of the document stored in the Moscow archives. with Ryszard Kuklinski, “Wojna z narodem Total 690 5. Translator’s Note: Misgivings about the widziana od srodka,” Kultura (Paris) 4/475 (April influence of Solidarity on the new group of Polish 1987), esp. 11-13, 33-35. II. Deferred Payments army draftees were expressed frequently in 1981 14. Translator’s Note: The text of this in top-secret Soviet assessments of the reliability communication (by most accountsa phone con- 1. Deferral of payments to 219 of the Polish army. See, e.g., “O nastroeniyakh versation Jaruzelski had with Suslov and/or Soviet banks. Decision of the sredi soldat i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Brezhnev) reportedly exists in the Russian Presi- CPSU CC on 6 June 1980 Pol’skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya dential Archive, but has not yet been released. (P199/II from 6.6.1980) na Gdan’skom poberezh’e,” Cable No. 183 (Top 15. Translator’s Note: Brezhnev later in the 2. Deferral of payments to 280 Secret), 14 June 1981, from V. Zelenov, Soviet meeting described Jaruzelski’s letter of 3 January Soviet banks. By order of the consul-general in Gdansk, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 1982: “...Jaruzelski expresses deep gratitude for USSR Council of Ministers on 84, D. 611, Ll. 17-19; and also “O politicheskoi the fraternal help provided by the Soviet Union to 11 September 1980 situatsii i nastroeniyakh v voevodstvakh yuzhnogo the Polish People’s Republic. At the same time, No. 1840 rs (P214/XI regiona PNR (Politpis’mo),” Cable No. 179 (TOP he requests that the Soviet side reaffirm the vol- from 11.XI.1980) SECRET), 12 November 1981, from G. Rudov, ume of deliveries for 1982 contained in the draft 3. Deferral of payments to 280 Soviet consul-general in Krakow, to the CPSU protocol on the coordination of both sides’ plans Soviet banks. By order of the Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. for 1981-1985 for oil, gasoline, and oil products. USSR Council of Ministers on 13-22. The volume of oil deliveries in 1982 are being 11 November 1980 6. Translator’s Note: It is not wholly clear kept at the level of 13 million tons, and oil No. 1019-347 (P224/70 what Brezhnev had in mind here, but he may have products at 2.94 million tons; and deliveries of from 11.XI.1980) been alluding to some of the preparations for combustibles are being retained at the maximum 4. Deferral of payments on the basic debt martial law. level in the first quarter of 1982. up to 1,000 7. Translator’s Note: It is curious why in “Further on Cde. Jaruzelski informs us from all credits extended previously. this secret forum Brezhnev used dollars (instead that he appealed to the General Secretaries of By order of the USSR Council of Ministers of, say, transferable rubles) as the unit for mea- the Communist Party Central Committees of on 16 August 1981. suring the size of Poland’s request. Hungary, the GDR, Bulgaria, Romania, and No. 1630 rs (P23/14 from 16.8.81) 8. Translator’s Note: The term Baibakov Czechoslovakia with a request to provide ______uses here, prodrazverstka (a contraction of Poland with basic agricultural and industrial Total 1,779 prodovol’stvennaya razverstka), refers to the goods.” policy introduced by Lenin during the period of 16. Translator’s Note: The classification III. Grant Aid “” to force peasants to turn over was upgraded to “top secret” (sovershenno their produce to the state. The policy led to great sekretno) by a handwritten notation of sov. next 1. Joint grant aid from the USSR, 465 bloodshed, upheaval, and starvation. to the original sekretno. A stamped imprint just Hungary, Bulgaria, the GDR, 9. Translator’s Note: Either because of a under the classification said that this was CPSU and Czechoslovakia supplied via a mistake by Rusakov or because of a typographi- CC Document No. 2931, prepared on 23 Septem- reduction of oil deliveries to the cal error, the Russian text gives Boris Aristov’s ber 1982, and that it should be returned to the CPSU CC General Department. 140 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN THE CARTER-

THE CARTER-BREZHNEV PROJECT retary of State Cyrus Vance, former National Security previously declassified in Moscow), all belong to a U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Collapse of Detente Adviser , former Secretary of De- group specially declassified by the Russian Foreign in the Late 1970s: What Went Wrong? fense Harold Brown, and former Director of Central Ministry in early 1994 for use at the Musgrove confer- Intelligence Stansfield Turner, and on the Soviet/Rus- ence, which centered on the distrust and acrimony Ed. note: With this issue, the CWIHP Bulletin sian side, former First Deputy Foreign Ministry Georgy surrounding the March 1977 visit to Moscow of Secre- begins to publish findings from the Carter-Brezhnev M. Kornienko, former ambassadors Anatoly Dobrynin tary of State Vance. They include a complete set of the Project, an exploration of U.S.-Soviet relations and the and , and former Warsaw Pact com- correspondence between President Carter and Gen- collapse of superpower detente in the late 1970s. The mander Gen. Anatoly Gribkov. Project activities so far eral Secretary Brezhnev from the time of Carter’s project gathers former government officials, scholars, have included a planning meeting, held at Pocantico, inauguration on 20 January 1977 until shortly before and newly-declassified documents at a series of con- New York, in October 1992; a conference on “SALT II Vance’s departure; cables from Dobrynin describing ferences intended to produce a deeper understanding and the Growth of Mistrust,” on 6-9 May 1994 at the two important conversations, a 1 December 1976 meet- of the troubles that bedeviled relations between Wash- Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island, ; a ing during the transition period with unofficial Carter ington and Moscow between 1976 and 1981, in the small oral history session on Soviet Policy in the Third emissary Averell Harriman and a 21 March 1977 hope that the results will enhance public and scholarly World, in which Kornienko and former CPSU Central discussion with Vance in which the U.S. proposals at analyses of those historical events and at the same time Committee (CC) International Department official Karen Moscow were previewed (unfortunately, Dobrynin’s contribute to present and future U.S.-Russian rela- N. Brutents participated, held at Lysebu, Norway, in record of his first conversation with Carter, on 1 tions. It has been organized by an international col- October 1994; and a conference on “Global Competi- February 1977, which appears to have had an impor- laboration of institutions and individuals spearheaded tion and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations, tant influence on Soviet perceptions of the new presi- by Dr. James G. Blight of the Center for Foreign Policy 1977-1980,” on 23-26 March 1995 in Ft. Lauderdale, dent, has not yet been made available); also included is Development (CFPD) of the Thomas J. Watson Insti- Florida; an additional conference, focussing on the the aforementioned CPSU CC Politburo directive as an tute for International Studies, Brown University. (Blight Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and the collapse of illustration of the rising tensions between Washington and his collaborators previously organized the series detente in 1979-80, is planned for , Norway. (A and Moscow during this period on the of five oral history conferences on the Cuban Missile related workshop on the Polish Crisis, 1980-81, is being issue. Crisis between 1987 and 1992 that brought together organized by NSA and CWIHP in conjunction with the Georgy Markovich Kornienko, the former senior U.S., Soviet (and then Russian), and Cuban former Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sci- Soviet diplomat and CPSU CC Politburo member, officials and scholars and resulted in a series of pub- ences, Warsaw.) contributes an introduction to and interpretation of the lications.) Other supporting institutions include the For each conference, an effort is made to open and documents and the issues they illuminate, adapted and Carter Center of Emory University, the National Secu- declassify new U.S. and Russian archival documents for translated from his Russian-langauge memoirs, which rity Archive (NSA), the Cold War International History the dual purpose of contributing to the conference have not as yet appeared in English. Introducing Project (CWIHP), the Norwegian Nobel Institute, and discussion--which is subsequently transcribed and pub- Kornienko’s analysis, in turn, is Mark Garrison, who several Russian archival organizations, including lished--and to scholarly research and publications. The during the Carter Administration served as deputy Rosarkhiv, the Center for the Storage of Contemporary declassified documents are generally available at the chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and Documentation, and the Foreign Ministry archives. appropriate archival repository, and are also available who, based at CFPD, has been actively involved in the In the effort to support this historical enterprise and at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. Carter-Brezhnev Project. to open up new sources, former President Carter has In the case of the Russian documents printed below The CWIHP Bulletin plans to publish additional lent his support to the project, as have such prominent beginning on page 144 (with one exception, the 18 materials emerging from the Carter-Brezhnev Project former officials as, on the American side, former Sec- February 1977 CPSU CC directive, which had been and related research in future issues.

Hopes Raised and Dashed— tion, came in February and March 1977. Watson Institute). It is possible to see how the Carter, Brezhnev, and SALT II: Brezhnev felt strongly that negotiations on Soviets convinced themselves that Carter was An Introduction to G.M. Kornienko’s SALT II should proceed within the framework signaling, without actually saying so, that he Commentary he had agreed with Ford at in late was willing to start from Vladivostok, and why 1974; he had overridden opposition from his they were therefore incensed by his February by Mark Garrison own military to achieve that framework, and 14 letter that did not even mention Vladivostok For the last decade or more of the Brezhnev considered it a personal achievement. Early but urged moving on immediately to a grander era, Georgy Markovich Kornienko was the signals from Carter, conveyed through Averell vision. The stage was thus set for a rude rebuff principal Americanist in the Soviet Foreign Harriman prior to the inauguration, led the to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance when he Ministry (not counting Gromyko, who con- Soviet side to expect that Carter was prepared came to Moscow at the end of March bearing sidered himself an expert in dealing with to start with Vladivostok before moving on to Carter’s deep-cuts proposal. Although SALT Americans), rising to the rank of First Deputy deeper cuts. (Contrary to the charge by some II was completed and signed over two years Minister and membership in the Party’s Cen- Carter Administration officials that the Soviets later, the hope on both sides that rapid progress tral Committee. Korniyenko’s recollections should have known better than to listen to an on strategic arms might lead to a new era in about the hopes for U.S.-Soviet relations gen- allegedly self-appointed intermediary, U.S.-Soviet relations was frustrated. erated in Moscow by ’s election Harriman’s papers in the Korniyenko believes a deep-cuts SALT III in 1976, and about the dashing of those hopes, contain clear evidence that prior to the election could have been worked out by the end of explains the title of his article (and the chapter he was acting on explicit instructions from Carter’s term absent the opening contretemps of the book from which it is drawn). Although Carter.) Soviet hopes were encouraged by over Vladivostok. Korniyenko places the blame not a document from the archives, it provides Carter’s first letter to Brezhnev after taking squarely on the Carter administration; without an insight into Soviet thinking, or at least office, dated January 26, 1977. But Carter’s saying so (he is not given to psychological thinking in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, not next letter, dated February 14, was a rude interpretations), he implies that Brezhnev’s available in documents. awakening in Moscow. attachment to Vladivostok was emotional as What mattered most in the U.S.-Soviet Korniyenko’s commentary illuminates the well as political and that the U.S. side should relationship, in Korniyenko’s view, was the dry texts of exchanges between the govern- have taken that into account. He acknowl- negotiation of a strategic nuclear arms treaty. ments at the time, including the Carter-Brezhnev edges no misgivings that at the crucial point in He believes that the defining moments on that correspondence (which Russian Foreign Min- early 1977 the Soviet side did not summon up issue, and for relations between the two coun- istry released in 1994 for the Carter-Brezhnev even that degree of flexibility that eventually tries during the rest of the Carter Administra- project, organized by Brown University’s led to the conclusion of SALT II. BREZHNEV PROJECT COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 141

A “MISSED OPPORTUNITY”—CARTER, BREZHNEV, SALT II, AND THE VANCE , NOVEMBER 1976-MARCH 1977 by G.M. Korniyenko

The fact that, toward the end of the Ford and also thought it useful to organize in the nuclear first strike; presidency, Soviet-American relations future such meetings “on a regular basis, —the aim of the Soviet Union is only seemed to have been set back, meant that the perhaps once a year.” Carter stipulated that the creation of a defensive capability Soviet leadership would be particularly in- he had also had requests from the leaders of sufficient to deter aggression against it terested in his opponent in the 1976 elec- England, the FRG and , and expressed by any potential opponent. tions, Jimmy Carter. And although he was the hope that it would be understood in In other words, in Brezhnev’s speech at a political figure who was completely un- Moscow that a Soviet-American summit Tula in January 1977 the principle of mili- known in the USSR, and although his meeting would take place after his meeting tary sufficiency, which was further devel- pre-election statements, as Moscow fully with his allies.2 oped ten years later, was formulated for the realized, did not necessarily reflect his real After a short time, on November 17, first time. views, many of his statements favorably Harriman (whom Carter authorized to act as These positions were formulated by rep- influenced the mood of the Soviet leader- an unofficial channel between him and resentatives of the USSR Ministry of For- ship. These included his critical view of Brezhnev in the period before he took of- eign Affairs (specifically by me and L.I. Ford’s refusal to use the term “détente,” his fice), conveyed Carter’s readiness for an Mendelevich) in a group that prepared the criticism of Ford for putting on ice the exchange of views on matters of mutual draft Brezhnev speech. I cleared them with negotiations to conclude SALT-2 on the interest even during the transition period. It the then Chief of the General Staff of the basis of the 1974 Vladivostok accords, and was also stated that he could not yet enter USSR armed forces, V.G. Kulikov, without his statements in favor of non-proliferation into specific discussions. First, because he any difficulty, since these positions reflected of nuclear weapons and a complete ban on could not undercut the sitting President, and the actual state of affairs, although the lan- testing, and supporting a reductions in second, because he did not yet have his staff guage sounded a little “American.” For that nuclear weapons and their abolition. A of advisers and he did not consider it pos- reason alone, and not because of disagree- positive impression on the Soviet leader- sible to “improvise.”3 Nevertheless, the ment over their content, they evoked doubt, ship was produced by the fact that Carter not exchange of several oral communications at a certain stage of work on the draft speech, only publicly but also privately, through A. between Brezhnev and Carter before 20 Janu- on the part of the party internationalists Harriman during a visit to Moscow in Sep- ary 1977 promised a constructive develop- headed by , but their doubts tember 1976,1 gave assurances that if elected ment of the Soviet-American dialogue—at disappeared after the draft was read to President he would take steps toward the least on questions of limitations on strategic Brezhnev, who accepted them without hesi- rapid conclusion and signing of the SALT-2 weapons—after Carter took office. It is true tation. They did not evoke any opposition by Treaty, and then would be ready to continue that we in Moscow were a little put on guard other members of the Politburo, including negotiations on an agreement on substantial by the remark in Carter’s message of 1 Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, to whom reductions in strategic weapons. December 1976 that he “could not, of course, the draft speech was sent for review in accor- Of course, not everything Carter said in be bound by previous negotiations on limit- dance with established procedure. the election campaign pleased Moscow, in ing strategic weapons”; this was a bad omen, Since it was important that Washington particular the stress he put on human rights which was, unfortunately, soon to be more correctly understand the signal from Mos- internationally, first of all regarding the than borne out.4 But at that time we wanted cow contained in Brezhnev’s Tula speech, Soviet Union. But with regard to his state- to hope for the best. Mendelevich and I supplied TASS and APN ments on arms control and disarmament, I The Soviet side did not simply hope for in advance with an accurate English transla- repeat, they gave cause for hope. the best, but for its part tried to create condi- tion of the relevant section of the speech. In any case, there were no regrets in tions as favorable as possible for the suc- The first letter from President Carter Moscow over Ford’s defeat and Carter’s cessful development of a dialogue with Presi- after assuming office, dated 26 January 1977, victory in the elections on 2 November dent Carter after his taking office. One of the was taken in Moscow as reinforcement of 1976. In congratulating the latter on his important steps in this regard was the inclu- the hope for successful development of a victory, L.I. Brezhnev immediately ex- sion of a series of important formulations Soviet-American dialogue on disarmament pressed the hope for an early meeting. Carter regarding Soviet military policy in a speech issues. [This letter, and the rest of the Carter- was not slow in replying. Already on No- in Tula, on the occasion of its designation as Brezhnev correspondence described here, vember 4, Harriman sent through the Soviet Hero-city, given by Brezhnev on 18 January are printed beginning on page 144--ed.] Ambassador in Washington an oral com- 1977, two days before Carter’s inaugura- Carter first of all noted as extremely impor- munication for Brezhnev from Carter, say- tion. The essence was the following: tant Brezhnev’s speech in Tula and specifi- ing that the newly elected President consid- —there is no basis whatsoever for cally the position that the USSR does not ered it important to have a personal meeting attributing to the Soviet Union a striving strive for superiority in armaments and that with Brezhnev “with the aim of preserving for superiority in armaments with the it only needs defenses sufficient to deter any and supporting peace throughout the world,” aim of achieving the capability for a potential opponent. Reaffirming his cam- 142 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN paign statements that the final aim in disar- only because of the unacceptable nature of Therefore it could be foreseen that the mament must be the abolition of all nuclear the new American proposals but also as an Vance mission to Moscow at the end of weapons on our planet, Carter characterized antagonistic act toward him personally. Con- March, as regards the SALT-2 Treaty, was as a “critically important first step” on the sequently, Brezhnev’s response was marked destined for failure. And in fact the new road to this aim the “achievement of the by a hard, and in places sharp, tone. American proposals presented by Vance sig- SALT-2 Treaty without delay” and agree- A similar tone was maintained in Carter’s naled an obvious retreat from everything ment after that on movement toward further message to Brezhnev of March 4, which achieved in negotiations on SALT-2 under limitations and reductions of strategic weap- arrived in Moscow not through the usual Nixon and Ford and were immediately re- ons. In the context of previous public and diplomatic channels but via the “hot line” jected by the Soviet side without discussion private statements by Carter, these formula- between the White House and the Kremlin, and without putting forward counterpropos- tions were understood in Moscow as signi- which was reserved for use in emergency als; our previous positions, based on the fying his readiness first to quickly conclude situations. As Carter’s national security ad- Vladivostok accords, were simply reaf- and sign the SALT-2 Treaty, based on the viser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, wrote in his mem- firmed. Vladivostok accords of 1974 and made con- oirs,5 this was done at his initiative, in order It should be noted that, unlike many crete in subsequent negotiations still under that the President’s message would go im- other occasions, this time there was com- Ford. Such an approach was fully in accord mediately to Brezhnev, bypassing the For- plete unanimity regarding the new Ameri- with the intentions of the Soviet leadership, eign Ministry. But the result turned out can proposals not only at “the top” in the as was the proposal of the President to send worse, since at the Moscow end of the “hot Soviet leadership, but also among profes- Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Moscow line,” maintained by the KGB, translators sionals working on these problems. And not at an early date to discuss these questions. were on duty who were far from highly because we were all against significant re- Consequently, Brezhnev’s reply of Febru- qualified, and were moreover unfamiliar with ductions in offensive strategic weapons. Not ary 4 to Carter maintained an extremely the subject matter of the strategic arms nego- at all. But we considered it absolutely illogi- positive tone. tiations. Therefore their translation of Carter’s cal, lacking any common sense, to throw out But the following letter from Carter message was marred by many inaccuracies the results of five years of joint work in a dated February 14 not only puzzled Brezhnev and rough spots, which did not exactly facili- substantially already finished SALT-2 and his colleagues but aroused their indig- tate its good reception by Soviet leaders. Treaty, and to begin what amounted to new nation. In his letter, while as before calling Brezhnev’s response of March 15 was negotiations requiring new conceptual deci- for the rapid conclusion of work on the formulated in calmer tones. But the posi- sions and prolonged working out of many SALT-2 Treaty, Carter at the same time tions of the sides before Vance’s visit to practical, including technical, questions. The made it clear that he did not at all have in Moscow scheduled for the end of March illogic of such a mode of action seemed so mind that treaty whose framework was were basically divergent. While the Soviet obvious that even if Carter’s proposals for worked out at Vladivostok and in subse- side firmly maintained the necessity of com- “deep cuts” were in their content more bal- quent negotiations. In the first place, Carter pleting work on the SALT-2 Treaty on the anced and in the final analysis acceptable to proposed to anticipate already in this treaty, basis of the Vladivostok accords, the Ameri- the USSR, at that moment I nevertheless rather than in the next one, a “significant can side was attempting to transform the think they would not have met a positive reduction” in strategic weapons, and sec- Vladivostok accords into something com- response. The operating principle would ondly he proposed (also contrary to the pletely different, unacceptable to the Soviet have been “better a titmouse in hand than a Vladivostok accords) to leave out of the leadership from the purely military-strategic crane in the sky.” If you take into account SALT-2 Treaty, for later negotiations, long- as well as the political and psychological that the new American proposals were clearly range cruise missiles, that is to give a free point of view. And as the time for the Vance directed at attaining unilateral advantage for hand to a strategic in those direc- visit approached, it became more and more the USA, then they could not be accepted by tions where the USA, as in most other cases, clear—from Carter’s public statements, from the Soviet leadership as a serious initiative, was at that time ahead of the USSR. controlled “leaks” in the American press, and called for a sharply negative reaction. In Carter’s letter there were also other and then in Vance’s conversations with So- It should be said that for Vance and Paul elements that caused irritation among So- viet Ambassador to Washington Dobrynin— Warnke, the director of the U.S. Arms Con- viet leaders, in particular his declared intent that Vance was coming to Moscow with trol and Disarmament Agency who accom- to take a public position on human rights in positions having nothing in common with panied him, such a reaction by the Soviet the USSR. Added to this was the public Vladivostok, but instead with so-called “com- side likewise appeared to be not unexpected. letter from Carter to A.D. Sakharov. But prehensive proposals” envisaging “deep cuts” It was felt that they themselves were not these irritating elements were not the main in offensive strategic weapons, with reduc- convinced of the reasonableness of those things that concerned Moscow. The princi- tions advantageous for the USA. The very positions with which they arrived in Mos- pal disappointment was the clear departure fact of publicizing the basic content of the cow. This feeling was fully confirmed sub- by the new President from Vladivostok. In American proposals before Vance presented sequently, with the appearance of the mem- view of the internal collisions that Brezhnev them to the Soviet leadership was taken in oirs of Carter, Vance and Brzezinski and had had to endure to achieve agreement Moscow as an indication that Carter’s inten- monographs of American scholars of this with Ford in Vladivostok, such a turn by tions were not serious, that he was merely period, from which it is clear that inside the Carter was extremely painful to him not trying to achieve a propaganda victory. Administration including between Vance COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 143 and Brzezinski, there were noticeable differ- Incidentally, knowing well the mood of would have been quicker and simpler. There- ences regarding the American position on the Soviet leaders at that time, I can with fore if you consider that the main motive of strategic offensive weapons. The transfor- confidence say that if Carter, as he originally Carter in the rash decision in March 1977 mation of Carter’s position—from willing- promised, had in March 1977 shown a will- was his sincere desire for quicker and more ness to conclude the SALT-2 Treaty on the ingness to conclude the SALT-2 Treaty on radical steps in disarmament, then this is one basis of the Vladivostok accords to ambi- the basis of Vladivostok, and his proposal of those cases to which applies the Russian tious “deep cuts”—can be explained by a regarding “deep cuts” had been presented as saying “the best is the enemy of the good.” A series of factors. First, a sincere desire of the an aim for subsequent negotiations, then the good impulse led to an opposite result. President himself to move as rapidly as SALT-2 Treaty, with approximately the same possible to radical reductions in strategic content as was signed in 1979, could have 1. [Ed. note: Documentation of Harriman’s 20 Septem- weapons. Second, a desire by the Pentagon, been completed at the end of 1977 or begin- ber 1976 conversation with Brezhnev can be found in supported by Brzezinski, to utilize this ro- ning of 1978. And it is not excluded that the the Harriman Papers, Library of Congress (LC), Wash- ington, D.C.] mantic breakthrough by Carter to signifi- following SALT-3 Treaty, encompassing 2. [Ed. note: For Harriman’s version of this meeting, cantly alter what was done in strategic arms significant reductions in strategic weapons, see “Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador limitations under Nixon and Ford, that is, to could have been worked out already before Dobrynin at my House in Washington on the Evening alter it for the unilateral advantage of the the end of Carter’s term as President. How- of November 4, 1976,” Harriman Papers, LC.] 3. [Ed. note: See “Memorandum of Telephone Conver- USA. Third, the influence on the President ever, the possibility for such a favorable sation—WAH and President-Elect Jimmy Carter, Tues- of Senator Henry Jackson and those who development of events was lost and the day, November 16, 1976,” Harriman, LC]. shared his views, who conditioned their sup- process of preparing the SALT-2 Treaty was 4. [Ed. note: Additional documentation on Carter- port for a possible SALT-2 Treaty with much longer and more difficult. Brezhnev oral communications during the transition period can be found in the Harriman Papers, LC, includ- demands regarding its content such that put- For Carter’s March 1977 initiative on ing Harriman’s record of the 1 December 1976 conver- ting such demands forward by the American “deep cuts” meant not only the loss of two or sation. A translation of Dobrynin’s declassified report side could prevent the attainment of a treaty, three months in a mechanical sense. After of the meeting is reprinted below.] which in fact is what they wanted. Fourth, the propaganda noise accompanying the 5. [Ed. note: See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, although Vance, Warnke and those who March initiative, returning to the 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), shared their views considered it preferable “Vladivostok track” for Carter himself was 161.] to conclude the SALT-2 Treaty on the basis a very difficult matter because of prestige of the Vladivostok accords, they apparently and political considerations, since it looked did not fully realize, and in any case did not like a defeat and retreat. This caused many Georgiy M. Kornienko was First Deputy Foreign Min- ister of the Soviet Union; this article is drawn from a succeed in making Carter aware, what a additional difficulties in the subsequent ne- chapter of his Russian-language memoirs, The Cold psychological shock for Brezhnev was his gotiations, without which the process of War: Testimony of a Participant (Moscow: Interna- [Carter’s] rejection of Vladivostok. working out the SALT-2 Treaty probably tional Relations, 1994).

CLINTON SIGNS FIRST POST-COLD classification of historical materials are reprinted be- Sec. 3.4. Automatic Declassification. (a) Subject WAR EXECUTIVE ORDER ON DE- low:] to paragraph (b), below, within 5 years from the date of CLASSIFICATION this order, all classified information contained in records EXECUTIVE ORDER that (1) are more than 25 years old, and (2) have been [Ed. note: On 17 April 1995, after two years of 12958 determined to have permanent historical value under public hearings, private lobbying, interagency wran- CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY title 44, United States Code, shall be automatically gling, and several revised (and leaked) drafts, U.S. INFORMATION declassified whether or not the records have been re- President signed the first post-Cold War viewed. Subsequently, all classified information in presidential executive ordering modifying the country’s such records shall be automatically declassified no This order prescribes a uniform system for classi- declassification system. longer than 25 yeras from the date of its original fying, safeguarding, and declassifying national secu- Amid concerns by scholars that the order would classification, except as provided in paragraph (b), rity information. Our democratic principles require be too restrictive and fears in some government quarters below. that the American people be informed of the activities that the rules would be too lax, Clinton’s order, replac- (b) An agency may exempt from automatic de- of their Government. Also, our Nation’s progress ing one signed by in April 1982 (E.O. classification under paragraph (a), above, specific in- depends on the free flow of information. Nevertheless, 12356), stretched in an effort to satisfy both constituen- formation, the release of which should be expected to: throughout our history, the national interest has re- cies. The order pleased historians by instituting for the (1) reveal the identity of a confidential human quired that certain information be maintained in confi- first time a system of bulk (rather than expensive and source, or reveal information about the application of dence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic time-consuming page-by-page) declassification of most an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity institutions, and our participation within the commu- historical records more than 25 years old, and by of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized nity of nations. Protecting information critical to our mandating a mere ten-year classification status for most disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstra- Nation’s security remains a priority. In recent years, newly-created documents. But at the same time, the bly damage the national security interests of the United however, dramatic changes have altered, though not order responded to the concerns of secrecy-conscious States; eliminated, the national security threats that we con- government agencies by including a broad range of (2) reveal information that would assist in the front. These changes provide a greater opportunity to exemptions and grace periods through which informa- development or use of weapons of mass destruction; emphasize our commitment to open Government.... tion can be kept secret. (3) reveal information that would impair U.S. The full text of Executive Order (EO) 12958, cryptologic systems or activities; “Classified National Security Information,” runs 39 [omitted sections concern legal definitions and (4) reveal information that would impair the appli- procedures for classification and declassification of legal-sized, double-spaced pages. Excerpts from the continued on page 160 introduction and some of the sections dealing with de- current and future government-generated materials] 144 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

THE PATH TO DISAGREEMENT: U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS LEADING TO VANCE’S MARCH 1977 TRIP TO MOSCOW

Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin’s Conversation areas to which Mr. Brezhnev had referred. With tions, I inquired of Harriman whether he could with Averell Harriman, , 1976 good will on both sides, President-elect Carter not in a more detailed way set forth Carter’s believes, progress can be made in the matter of position on that question. In particular, I asked Embassy of the USSR in the USA cooperation between the USA and the USSR, him what, concretely, did Carter have in mind Washington, D.C. which will strengthen peace in the whole world. when he publicly offered a proposal for a “freeze” Top secret Harriman said further—continuing to read— in strategic weapons: within what temporal, quan- Copy No. 1 that Carter is very satisfied with the tone of the titative, or qualitative framework was he operat- General Secretary’s message. Noting that before ing. From the Journal he assumes the post of President he is not in a Harriman said that he had asked that type of of DOBRYNIN, A.F. position to conduct negotiations, Carter at the question in his conversation with Carter. How- same time declared that when he receives the ever, Carter had answered him that for the time RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION authority, he will quickly and insistently act to being he had on that issue only ideas and convic- achieve an agreement on the limitation of strate- tions of a general character which seemed impor- with A. HARRIMAN gic weapons. Carter added that he would like to tant to him, but he still had not precisely formu- be sure that limitations will be mutually advanta- lated comprehensive, integrated positions. December 1, 1976 geous and that the relative power of the two sides He intends to formulate such a position will not be changed during the process of reduc- when he names his chosen candidates to the posts On December 1 Harriman came to visit me. tions. In addition he stressed that a means must be of Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and I. He said that he had met with J. Carter on found to assure our peoples that the agreement Aide to the President for National Security Af- Monday, November 29, at his (i.e. Carter’s) will be fulfilled. fairs, whom he would, as one of his highest home in the city of Plains (state of Georgia). As The current problems in the negotiations on priorities, instruct to work out this position, which had been agreed, he, Harriman, had brought to the limitation of nuclear weapons are too techni- would encompass the complex political and tech- Carter’s attention the messages which had been cal for him to comment on at the present time, and nical aspects of the entire problem. brought from Moscow on behalf of L.I. he, Carter, cannot, it goes without saying, be I directed Harriman’s attention to that point Brezhnev,1 as well as other messages which the bound by the past negotiations. At the same time in the thoughts of Carter which he had transmitted Soviet Ambassador had expressed to him, he fully will take into account the work that has today where (Carter) had said that he could not be Harriman, in accordance with the instruction to been done over the past two years. bound by past strategic arms limitation negotia- bring this information to Carter’s attention. Further Harriman said that Carter hopes that tions. I said that an approach like that is incom- The “President-elect” (Carter’s current title) the negotiations on limiting strategic weapons prehensible, if it is fraught with serious complica- has authorized Harriman to convey the following will be concluded at a summit meeting, i.e. at a tions for future negotiations. All previous nego- answer for transmission to L.I. Brezhnev personal meeting between him, Carter, and L.I. tiations had been conducted on behalf of the (Harriman read further from the text which he Brezhnev. United States, of the country as a whole and the was holding): Carter thinks that the negotiations which arrival of a new President should not mean break- Carter received the message from General will begin after he assumes the post of President ing off everything positive that had been achieved Secretary L.I. Brezhnev and was grateful for the would be accelerated if it would be possible to before him. I reminded Harriman that I had sentiments expressed in it. Personally, he highly maintain the practice, which had justified itself in pointed this out to him at our previous meeting, values the fact that he received an expression of the past, of dispatching at the decisive moment in when, in accordance with instructions certain the views of the General Secretary. Although he the negotiations a special trusted representative considerations from Moscow had been expounded does not have the possibility to conduct negotia- of the President to set forth the President’s pro- to him for transmittal to Carter. tions before assuming his position, he would like posals and thoughts personally to General Secre- Harriman said that he had recalled this when to declare that he shares the aspiration of the tary L.I. Brezhnev. he was speaking to Carter, and had specially General Secretary for an improvement in rela- Harriman further reported in confidence that directed his attention to that circumstance. tions between our two countries. He also recog- Carter had asked him whether L.I. Brezhnev Carter had answered him, Harriman, that he nizes the importance of mutual limitations in would accept an invitation if he, Carter, invites understands this point, and that he had therefore nuclear weapons and of bringing the arms race to the General Secretary to come to the United included in his responding thoughts to L.I. a halt. States for the final stage of the negotiations and Brezhnev the comment that he will take the work Mr. Carter often expressed these sentiments the conclusion of an agreement on the limitation that has been done at the SALT negotiations over during the recent presidential election campaign, of strategic weapons. the last two years fully into account. However, at and he thinks that the majority of Americans Harriman, in his words, had expressed to the same time, he, Carter, would like to reserve agree with his desire to limit the nuclear weapons Carter his own opinion to the effect that he hopes for himself the right to express certain possible in our two countries and to stop further prolifera- that L.I. Brezhnev will accept such an invitation, new thoughts or correctives which might occur to tion of nuclear capability among other countries. insofar as there is already established a definite him in the context of finishing up a final agree- He notes with satisfaction that Mr. Brezhnev order of visits of the countries’ leaders to each ment, especially if they might promote the reso- shares his point of view on the importance of other for summit meetings, and it was now the lution of the remaining disputed issues. In prin- cooperation between our two countries in the President’s turn to invite the General Secretary to ciple he wants to reserve for himself such a matter of taking measures against the prolifera- the United States. possibility. tion of nuclear weapons. 2. During the conversation with Harriman, 3. During the conversation Harriman under- President-elect Carter expects as well the in relation to his comments about J. Carter’s lined that Carter is very interested in the question establishment of constructive relations in other attitude about strategic arms limitation negotia- of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 145 along with the question of limitation of strategic I want to express my gratitude for the unof- greater and greater extent demands collective arms will be a priority in his plans regarding ficial letters which I recieved from you, and in answers to the main human questions, and I hope negotiations with the Soviet Union after he as- this connection I want to confirm that my aim is that our countries can cooperate more closely in sumes the post of President. to improve relations with the Soviet Union on the order to promote the development, better diet and He, Carter, is very worried by the spread of basis of reciprocity, mutual respect and advan- more substantive life for less advantaged part of nuclear technology around the world. And al- tage. I will pay close personal attention to this mankind. though many chances had already over the past goal, as will Secretary of State Vance. I look forward to a meeting with you and to years been missed, there is still, in his opinion, I read your public statements with great discussing at this meeting both our different and time to take certain joint measures to put a brake interest and they make me believe that we share our common interests. In the mean time I suggest on this process. As on the question of limitation a common aspiration for strengthening and pre- both of us should do everything in our power to of strategic weapons, so far Carter has no more serving the perspectives for stable peace. promote Soviet-American relations. I suggested concrete thoughts on this issue. In Harriman’s As I understand your highly important speech to Secretary of State Vance to prepare for a words, Carter himself said that the details of his in Tula, the Soviet Union will not strive for meeting with you in the spring, if you wish, for a position still need to be worked out. superiority in arms, it will stand against such a review of the progress we have made and to conception, and that it will require only a defense discuss the key problems which remain unsolved. Ambassador of the USSR in the USA which is strong enough to deter any potential Both of us at that time also would like to exchange [signature] enemy. The United States does not want any- opinions about the next meeting between you and thing less or more for itself either. Therefore, our me. /A. DOBRYNIN/ two countries, with consistency and wisdom, Any concrete ideas, on these or any other should be able to avoid a new arms race. I questions, which you might like to relate to me [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, declared to the American people that the elimina- will be very welcomed and thoroughly studied. Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] tion of all nuclear weapons is my firm goal. There are three areas in which progress can With best regards, * * * * * be made on the way to this goal. The most Sincerely, President Carter’s Letter to General important first step must be the urgent achieve- Secretary Brezhnev, January 26, 1977 ment of an agreement on the second stage strate- Jimmy Carter gic weapons limitation, and also an agreement to Top secret move on in the direction of additional limitations January 26, 1977 Copy 1 and reductions in the sphere of strategic weapons. White House Moreover, I hope that we will soon be able to Washington, D.C. [...] Embassy of the USSR in the USA conclude a properly verifiable agreement on the Washington, D.C. universal banning of all nuclear tests, and that we The Ambassador of the USSR in the USA also will strive to achieve more openness regard- From the diary ing the strategic policy of our countries. It is also [signature] A. Dobrynin of DOBRYNIN A.F. important to renew the efforts to make progress at the negotiations on balanced reduction of mili- /A. DOBRYNIN/ RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION tary forces in Central Europe. We also have a responsibility to carry out a [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, with the USA Secretary of State policy directed at preventing explosions, which Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] could lead to dangerous conflicts, in tense re- C. VANCE gions of the world. The United States will work * * * * * to support a peaceful settlement in the Near East January 26, 1977 on the basis of the applicable resolutions of the Brezhnev’s Letter to Carter, United Nations. In the same way, in the South of February 4, 1977 Secretary of State Vance today transmitted the Africa we encourage all sides to start negotiations following letter of President Carter to L.I. toward a peaceful settlement which could lead to TOP SECRET Brezhnev: security and justice for all. Copy No. 1 I believe that the USSR can assist in the “Confidential achievement of progress toward peace in both of The USSR Embassy in the USA these critical regions. Washington, D.C. To His Excellency My Administration gives much importance Leonid I. Brezhnev to improving of our bilateral economic relations From the journal The General Secretary on the basis of mutual and equal advantage for the of DOBRYNIN A.F. of the Central Committee peoples of both our two great countries. At the of the Communist Party same time we can not be indifferent to the fate of RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION of the Soviet Union freedom and individual human rights. Moscow, Kremlin We represent different social systems, and with the U.S. Secretary of State our countries differ from each other in their C. VANCE Dear Mr. General Secretary, history and experience. A competition in ideals and ideas is inevitable between our societies. Yet February 4, 1977 Having assumed the position of President this must not interfere with common efforts to- of the United States, I want to share with you my wards formation of a more peaceful, just and I visited Secretary of State Vance and refer- views about relations between our two countries. humane world. We live in the world, which to a ring to my delegated task, handed him the text of 146 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the following letter from L.I. Brezhnev to Presi- development of Soviet-American relations in Moreover, we are convinced that if in our dent J. Carter: general. approach to the Near East problem we soberly We believe that it is these questions of and objectively take into account all the lawful “To His Excellency limitation of strategic weapons that will occupy rights and interests of all sides—both , James E. Carter the main place in the conversations with Secre- including the Palestinians, and —then the The President of the United States of America tary of State C. Vance when he comes to Mos- reliable elimination of this permanent source of cow. international conflicts is quite possible. Finding Dear Mister President, In our opinion, without further delay we the necessary understanding between the USA have to put into practice Soviet-American Trea- and the USSR on this question, in particular I want on my own behalf and on behalf of my ties on limitation of underground tests of nuclear relating to the reconvening of the Geneva confer- colleagues in the leadership to congratulate you weapons and on explosions for peaceful pur- ence, will undoubtedly make success possible on once more on your assumption of the position of poses. At the same time we have to—and we are the great matter of achieving a political settle- the President of the United States. ready to cooperate with the USA on this issue— ment in the Near East. I attentively familiarized myself with your intensify our efforts directed at a total and univer- Cooperation between our two countries letter of January 26, and find it in general con- sal ban on nuclear weapons tests and at preven- would also be vitally important, we believe, on structive and hope inspiring. We accepted with tion of nuclear proliferation. other international questions—whether it is fur- satisfaction confirmation of the fact that the goal We want to bring about a shift in the Vienna ther steps toward strengthening European secu- of your policy is improvement of relations with negotiations on reduction of armed forces and rity on the basis of decisions adopted in Helsinki, the Soviet Union, and also your intention to pay weapons in Central Europe. We would like the strict observance of the Four-Power treaty on attention to this. This coincides with our basic new American government to treat with attention Western Berlin, or, say, a settlement on Cyprus. approach, which I expressed again in public not the proposals which were introduced there by the In your letter you, Mr. President, mention long ago. I want to stress now that we are ready countries of the Warsaw Treaty last year. the problem of the south of Africa. Our prin- to realize by mutual efforts a new major shift in There are other questions of limitation of cipled position on this question is very well the relations between two our countries. weapons and of disarmament which are waiting known: we are united with the struggle of the As far as I understand we are establishing to be solved. The Soviet Union has put forward South African peoples for their freedom and with you a business-like, trustful dialogue. concrete proposals on many of them, and we hope independence. We recognize the right of nobody It is important, of course, that from the very that your government approach this review con- but these peoples themselves to determine their beginning of our contact we have clarity and structively. fate. Despite what is sometimes said about this, mutual understanding of principle questions. Of course, under conditions when it is still the USSR does not look for any benefits for itself The most important thing here—and it is not possible yet to achieve a halt to the arms race in this region, and the rivalry with the United confirmed by past experience—is the necessity in the world, we can not but take care about States there does not interest it either. to strictly observe the basic principles of equality, security of our country and our allies. Our defen- Noting the great significance, which you, mutual consideration of lawful interests, mutual sive potential must be sufficient so that nobody Mr. President, give to improving trade-economic benefit and non-interference into the internal will risk to attack us or threaten us with attack. In relations, on my own behalf I would like to stress affairs of the other side. With this, and only this this respect, using your expression, we do not that we did and still do want our relations in this approach from both sides, in complete accord want anything more or less for ourselves. sphere to develop consistently and to acquire a with the “Fundamentals of Mutual Relations” Yet I want to stress once more with all more and more broad-scale character, leading to between our countries signed in 1972, can a determination that the Soviet Union does not mutual—I stress, mutual benefit for both sides. stable, progressive development of relations be- strive for superiority in weapons. We are deeply But it is necessary for this that they be freed of all tween the USSR and the USA, and the potential convinced that genuine security for all countries kinds of discriminatory limitations and artifi- to find mutually acceptable solutions to emerging and for each of them in particular is based not on cially created obstacles. Without this, without issues, be provided. competition in the sphere of weapons, but in the rejection of attempts to somehow or other link For objective reasons, at the present time the sphere of disarmament, and in the elimination of trade with questions relating to the domestic central sphere of relations between the USA and the material foundation for war. Our future competence of governments, not only will eco- USSR really is to ensure cooperation between our efforts also will be directed at achieving this goal. nomic contacts suffer, but overall relations be- two countries with the goal of stopping the arms I will touch briefly on some other questions. tween our countries will also suffer a blow. race and of disarmament. Only in this way can the An important direction of joint or parallel I hope, Mr. President, that with good will main task of our peoples, as well as that of all efforts of our countries, because of their objective and sincere readiness for constructive coopera- other peoples—elimination of the threat of war, role and responsibility in world affairs, is assis- tion between us you and I will be able to make a first of all, of course, nuclear-missile war—be tance in solution of problems, which cause inter- good contribution towards solving the problems completed. national tension. In our opinion the task here is to that we have. Some of these, including the As you also recognize, we have to finish the remove the original reasons which cause these problem of strategic weapons limitation, appar- development of a new agreement on limitation of problems. ently will be the subject of an exchange of opin- strategic offensive weapons without delays. We The primary meaning in this respect, as you, ions soon during Mr. Vance’s visit to Moscow. believe that this task is completely manageable. Mr. President correctly note too, is the establish- In conclusion, I want to stress that I, like Because the main parameters of the agreement ment of a strong and just peace in the Near East. you, place special emphasis on our personal meet- are, in fact, already determined on the basis of the Almost 10 years has passed since the war of 1967. ing. I will be ready to consider questions relating agreement which was reached in Vladivostok. This “jubilee” with all its sharpness reminds us to the conduct of such a meeting with Mr. Vance, The successful conduct of this exclusively im- not only of the time we have simply lost in the who you wrote, will be entrusted with this task. portant and necessary affair to its conclusion matter of settling the Near East conflict, but also would allow us to start hard work on more far- of a possibility of new dangerous explosions—as With my best wishes and respect. going measures in this area and, undoubtedly, happened in October 1973 and just recently in would give a new impulse for a constructive Lebanon. L. BREZHNEV COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 147

consideration of the central questions of univer- tions on cruise missiles and “Backfire” from the February 4, 1977 sal peace. Our two great countries share a special second stage of the SALT negotiations. We responsibility not only for doing everything pos- could return to these questions right away during In Vance’s own opinion, it is a good letter. It will sible for the lessening of tension, but also for the following negotiations. If we have ambitious be given to the President today. working out a series of mutual understandings enough aims and in particular if we want to which can lead to a more reliable and less danger- achieve real disarmament leaving only the mini- Ambassador of the USSR in the USA ous political climate in the world. mum level of armaments sufficient to provide [signature] I know the history of your country and security to both sides, then, it evidently would be admire it. As a child I developed my literary taste easier for us to deal with the technical problems, /A. DOBRYNIN/ reading your classics. I also know how much which now seem very significant and compli- suffering your people endure very recently, dur- cated, later. [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, ing the last war. I know about your own role in I hope that our additional private exchanges Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] this war and about the losses suffered by each of opinion and the negotiations of Secretary of Soviet family. That is why I believe that we both State Vance in Moscow will cover the broadest * * * * * are sincere in our declarations about our devotion possible range of possibilities. I can assure you to peace, and that gives me hope for the future. that in the analysis of our arms control policy Carter’s Letter to Brezhnev, The question is how we can turn this devo- which I am carrying out at the present time, all February 14, 1977 tion into reality. How can we start a process applicable proposals will be considered. As I said which could widen our cooperation and simulta- during a conversation with your Ambassador, I TOP SECRET neously restrain and finally limit our rivalry. This hope that we can consider not only the question of Copy No. 1 rivalry—it is real, extremely expensive, and un- possible sharp reductions of the total quantity of deniable—can at any moment become very dan- nuclear weapons, i.e. the question of the mini- THE USSR EMBASSY IN THE USA gerous, which is why we must not allow it to mum number of missiles which would allow Washington, D.C. develop without restraint. In my opinion, this every country to feel secure from a first blow, but demands, at least, first, work to widen where also the question of restrictions on throw weights, From the journal possible our coordinated efforts, especially in the of the possibility of a ban on all mobile missiles, of DOBRYNIN, A.F. area of limitation of nuclear weapons; and sec- of refusal to take any long-term preparatory mea- ond, to demonstrate highly deliberate restraint sures in the field of civil defense, and also of such RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION towards those unstable regions of the world where additional confidence building measures as pre- direct confrontation could arise between us. liminary warning of all missile tests and achiev- with Assistant to the President I especially welcome your desire to develop ing an agreement on the non-arming of satellites Z. Brzezinski cooperation with the idea of stopping the arms and an agreement to reject development of capa- race, and to achieve without delay concrete agree- bility to destroy observation satellites. We also February 15, 1977 ments on disarmament. have to study practical means to satisfy our mu- It is precisely in the sphere of arms limita- tual desire that our agreements be observed. Such Today Brzezinski, Assistant to the Presi- tion that we must, in my opinion, put the main measures as on-site inspection and uninterrupted dent, called me. He said that President Carter had emphasis. I will as always give it my personal observation from space must the subject of incor- just written a letter in response to L.I. Brezhnev. attention and I can assure you that the officials in rect interpretation. These are the means, which Since the White House is preoccupied with my administration who are responsible for these can be used to achieve progress, and to win meetings with the President of Mexico, he, matters will consider any and all of your propos- society’s support and understanding of our ef- Brzezinski, asked acting Secretary of State [War- als in the most careful way and with the most forts. ren] Christopher, who was with him at the mo- positive attitude. In all these areas our final goal must be to do ment, to give me that letter. It goes without saying that we must have more than that, as our specialists in technology Brzezinski said that he would be ready, mutual security from successful attack, and we say, which is perhaps expedient now. If we bear should I have any questions, to discuss various have to use our role as the most mighty states to this very far-reaching aim in mind, we will be aspects of this letter in a couple of days during start a significant reduction of the level of con- able to change significantly the level of threat for our next unofficial meeting (we had a previous ventional and nuclear arms. We have no definite us and for the rest of the world. arrangement with Brzezinski to meet for break- time limits as such, but it is really necessary for us An attempt of one side to gain an advantage fast this coming Friday, i.e. on February 18). to achieve some maximum progress without de- over the other during negotiations will yield the An hour later Christopher handed me a lay. opposite result. We will be striving to carry out letter to L.I. Brezhnev, signed by President Carter: I agree that in our exchanges of opinion and consultations without tricks or unnecessary de- in the conversations which Secretary of State lays, but also without pressure and unjustifiable “To his Excellency Vance will have in Moscow at the end of March haste. Leonid I. Brezhnev, we must concentrate mainly on the question of I welcome your readiness to direct your the General Secretary of the Central achieving an agreement on the second stage of efforts at achieving the agreement on a universal Committee of the Communist Party strategic arms limitation, possibly including some test ban. I realize that problems remain regarding of the Soviet Union significant reductions of the level of forces. Maybe other countries which continue to conduct testing Moscow, Kremlin we could bring these negotiations to a successful programs and the possible use of peaceful nuclear conclusion if we agree that this is only the first explosions in mining industry or construction, Dear Mr. General Secretary, step in the process which could lead to bigger but I believe that there are satisfactory ways to reductions in our respective nuclear arsenals. consider these problems. I intend to ask the I am very pleased to note that our first Regarding this, I wonder if it wouldn’t be useful Congress to ratify two agreements which have exchange of letters has brought us at once to to study the possibility of separating the ques- already been concluded between our two govern- 148 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN ments, but I treat them only as steps on the way to ments reached in Helsinki relating to human White House the common goal of bringing a total halt to rights. As I said to Ambassador Dobrynin, we Washington nuclear testing. Until then our government will hope that all aspects of these agreements can be February 14, 1977” observe these unratified agreements. realized. It is not our intention to interfere in the As far as I know there were proposals in the internal affairs of other countries. We do not wish past to demilitarize the Indian Ocean, and these to create problems with the Soviet Union, but it Christopher could not comment on this let- proposals were not seriously studied. I asked my will be necessary for our Administration from ter at all, referring to the fact that it was prepared colleagues to study the the Indian Ocean question time to time to publicly express the sincere and in the White House by the President himself. thoroughly, so that we will be ready to speak deep feelings which our people and I feel. Our more specifically about the possibility of reach- obligation to help promote human rights will not Ambassador of the USSR in the USA ing an agreement, which could promote universal be expressed in an extreme form or by means not peace. I ask you to inform me of your concrete proportional to achieving reasonable results. We (signature) ideas on this matter. I presume that in such a would also welcome, of course, personal, confi- A. Dobrynin situation it makes sense to pay particular atten- dential exchanges of views on these delicate tion to the military activity of both countries in questions. /A. Dobrynin/ this region. This, as it seems, is that obvious case I noted your response to my previous obser- where mutual profit calls for a balanced agree- vations relating to the importance of improving [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, ment leading to a general reduction of military trade and economic relations. Your open re- Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] efforts in the whole region. marks on this issue correspond to a spirit of As you know from my public statements, I directness which I admire, but we have to do * * * * * intend energetically to continue attempts to re- something practical in order to remove barriers. duce the sale and transfer of conventional weap- From my side, I intend to do everything that I can CPSU Central Committee Politbuto ons to countries of the third world and I hope that to achieve mutually beneficial trade, but you are Decision “About the instruction to the Soviet you will join these efforts. It seems to me a aware of certain restrictions improsed by Con- Ambassador in Washington for his conver- senseless competition and we, as the main suppli- gress, which I must take into account. sation with Vance on the question of ‘human ers, are particularly responsible for placing a Permit me to say a few words about our rights’” and text of instruction, limit to such transfers. Obviously other providers efforts to improve the situation in other areas, February 18, 1977 should also be involved in these efforts, and we where there exists disagreements and potential will widen the discussion of the question to conflicts. In the Near East, we intend to begin of the World unite! include them. direct negotiations with the sides in that region, I also welcome your aspiration to move the and I hope to energetically develop a process of COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET Vienna negotiations on reduction of armed forces achieving a fair and solid settlement. Mr. Vance UNION and weapons in Central Europe forward more will be happy to have the opportunity in his CENTRAL COMMITTEE energetically until they are at the minimum ac- conversations at the end of March to learn your ceptable levels. We are very concerned about view on this question, including aspects which Top secret what seems to be an extreme increase of your reflect our direct interest as co-sponsors of the military power in East Europe. At the present Geneva conference. No P46/X time we are reviewing our positions on this issue In southern Africa, we believe that the Afri- and at the same time are instructing our delega- cans should solve their problems without outside To: comrades Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin, tion to continue to study the data which have been interference. It is with this goal in mind that we Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, presented by both sides. support a peaceful solution, which corresponds to Ponomarev, Zamiatin. These are the questions, which, I hope, Mr. the will of the majority, and have limited actions Vance will be able to discuss in more detail after whch could increase the potential for violence. Extract from protocol No 46 of the meeting of CC we complete our own analysis. We will, of We took steps toward opening a dialogue CPSU Politburo course, consult with our NATO allies about ev- with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with the on February 18, 1977 erything while we conduct this concrete analysis. goal of creating the foundation for normal rela- ______I would like to make one observation re- tions with that country. In other regions as well garding the four-power agreement. As you know, we will be guided by our devotion to genuine About the instructions to the Soviet Ambassador we think that this agreement applies to all of freedom, self-determination, and economic in Washington for his conversation with Vance Berlin, and not just to West Berlin. For us, the progress. on the question of “human rights”. observation of both the letter and the spirit of this I hope that we can continue these exchanges agreement is very important. We make every of letters in order to have a clear statement of our The draft of the instructions to the Soviet Ambas- effort to avoid sensitive issues, but we must insist views and to undertake the broadest possible sador in Washington this question is to be ap- that this agreement, which is so vital to our ability review of issues which have such fundamental proved. (The draft is attached.) to develop peaceful relations in Europe, is ob- importance for our two peoples and for peace on served in full. Recently, it seems, there has been earth. From these candid letters we can build a observed a growing inclination to create new clear and precise basis for the preparation of our SECRETARY OF THE CC aggravations and limits in Berlin, which could personal meeting, which I anticipate with great upset the delicate political balance which exists hopes. [Along left-hand margin] there. I hope that you will cooperate in eliminat- With the best personal wishes and respect, Must be returned within 7 days to the ing these tense situations. CC CPSU (General Department, 1st sector) We expect cooperation in the realization of Jimmy Carter further steps toward the fulfillment of the agree- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 149

moral principles, had tried to link the develop- And when, for the violation of the law by the ment of our inter-state relations with the USA or USSR citizen, the Soviet authorities take actions On the point X of the protocol No 46 other capitalist countries with such actually exist- in accordance with the Soviet law, actions which ing problems in these countries as multi-million are the prerogative of any state, then this is used Secret unemployment, deprivation of rights of ethnic by the American side thereby harming our mutual minorities, race discrimination, unequal rights relations. WASHINGTON for women, the violation of citizens rights by the Besides, it is known that the representatives state organs, the persecution of people with pro- of the American Embassy in Moscow secretly TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR gressive convictions and so on. meet with [Andrei] Sakharov, who knows the By the way, if one speaks about the concerns state secrets related to the national defence. The FIRST. Meet with Vance and tell him that regarding human rights, how should one view the last such meeting by the Embassy’s initiative you have instructions to inform President Carter systematic support by the USA of dictatorial, took place on February 8. This is an extremely and his Secretary of State of the following: anti-populist regimes in some countries, where unusual fact and no reference to the human rights Raising by the Americans in Moscow of the constantly and violently the most basic human cannot hide that this is a direct act of the Ameri- question of freeing [Aleksandr] Ginzburg, a So- rights and are violated. can intelligence services against the USSR and viet citizen, convicted for his actions punishable If we had begun to raise all these questions against the Soviet social system. As for the by law in accordance with our criminal code, as a part of our inter-state relations then, appar- references to American public opinion, the senti- aroused the utmost bewilderment.2 ently, the result would have been the aggravation ments in the USA Congress, etc., one should not The fact that such an interference into our of all the relations between ourselves and other forget that in the Soviet Union there also is its domestic affairs is being done in the name of countries. It would have detracted us from the own public opinion, and it decisively rejects all concern over “human rights” does not change the solution of those problems, which could and attempts to impose on us the values which are essence of the matter. should be the goals of interactions and coopera- incongruent with and legality. Obviously, everybody has a right to have tion of our states. All the efforts for guaranteeing one’s own view on different issues including the the rights of human beings to live in a world free SECOND. After the conversation the following liberties and rights of people in any country. And from wars and burden of arms race, to live in the kind of announcement should be sent to Moscow we too have our own view of these problems and environment of security and friendly relations via the TASS channel: their current situation in the USA. between the peoples would also have been jeop- “On February” “ the USSR Ambassador in But it is another matter to bring these views ardized. the USA A.F. Dobrynin visited Secretary of State into the sphere of inter-state relations and thereby We firmly believe, therefore, that the ques- S. Vance and drew his attention to some state- to complicate them. How else can one see the tions of domestic development that reflect the ments and actions of the American side, which position of the representatives of the USA ad- differences in and social political sys- are in disagreement with the goals of positive ministration, when they are trying to make the tems should not be the subject of inter-state development of the Soviet-American relations. questions, thoroughly under the jurisdiction of relations. In this regard it has been emphasized that the the Soviet state, a matter of discussion? It touches It is not accidental that precisely this prin- Soviet side resolutely rejects all the attempts to upon the basic principles of our mutual relations. ciple, together with other fundamental principles, interfere in the Soviet domestic affairs, into the It must be a complete clarity on this problem was clearly expressed in the “Fundamentals of problems related to the prerogatives of other from the very beginning. Such a position of the mutual relations between the USSR and the USA” governments, using the pretext of “the protection USA is categorically unacceptable to us. signed in 1972. One also should be reminded that of human rights.” You and we are aware that we have differ- during the establishment of diplomatic relations The Soviet side could have also said - and it ent ideologies and social political systems. Cer- in 1933 our countries obliged to absolutely has firm grounds for it—some things regarding tainly, due to this fact we have different ap- respect unquestionable right of each other to the guarantee of human rights in the USA, like proaches to different questions. build its own life as they see fit and refrain in any unemployment of millions of people, race dis- We, in the Soviet Union, are proud that the way from interference into the domestic affairs of crimination, unequal rights for women, violation socialist revolution and our system not only the other partner. of personal liberties of citizens, the rising wave of proclaimed but also provided in reality the right Not always, however, and not in all respects crimes, etc. It must be clear, however, that all the for work, education, social security, free medical are American statements and actions in agree- attempts to impose one’s own views upon the assistance, and retirement to all Soviet citizens. ment with this. In actuality, the statements about other side, to bring such questions into inter-state And we really guarantee these rights. “concern” over “human rights in the USSR” relations, would only aggravate and make more At the same time the Soviet laws guard our serve the purpose of the support and even out- difficult to resolve those problems which should people from antisocial tendencies such as the right instigation for some persons, who separate be the subject of interaction and cooperation of propaganda of war in any form, the dissemina- themselves from the Soviet society. It is not just both countries. tion of the ideas of race inequality and national a demonstrative approving attitude of the (USA) The relations of peaceful co-existence and divisiveness or from the attempts of moral cor- administration toward the activity in the Soviet constructive cooperation between the USSR and ruption of people. In our country nobody has the Union of some American journalists, whose only the USA in the interests of both peoples can right to break the law that is equally obligatory to interest is to find and publicize the so-called fruitfully develop only when they are guided by everybody. “dissidents.” Some people from the USA Em- the mutual respect of principles of sovereignty We do not try to impose our understanding bassy personnel in Moscow are directly involved and non-interference into the domestic affairs of of rights and liberties of man on anybody, al- in it. We could specifically name who we have in each other, as it is stated in the basic though much of what is going on under the mind. Soviet-American documents.” conditions of another social system seems unac- Telegraph the fulfillment. ceptable to our people. (For the Soviet Ambassador: If the inter- It is not difficult to imagine what would locutor asks who exactly we are talking about, [Source: Fond 89, Perechen 25, Dokument 44, have happened if we, proceeding from our own you could name the First secretary Pressel [sic]) Center for the Storage of Contemporary Docu- 150 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN mentation (TsKhSD), Moscow; translation by which was agreed in Vladivostok. The basic on in Vladivostok, I would like to remind you that Mark H. Doctoroff.] parameters of the agreement which were fixed we also did and do stand for stopping of the arms there, as well as additional explanatory state- race, including the reduction of strategic forces. * * * * * ments which were agreed on during subsequent This can be proved by the agreement achieved in negotiations, were the result of tremendous work. Vladivostok, which implies for the USSR a uni- Brezhnev’s Letter to Carter, In many cases it was necessary to make difficult lateral reduction of strategic delivery vehicles. February 25, 1977 decisions in order to find mutually acceptable This, not only in words by also in fact actually is solutions to an apparently deadlocked situation. a striving for arms reduction. Embassy of the USSR in the USA And to the extent that this agreement has already We are in favor of the results which were TOP SECRET been worked out, it is all interconnected—you achieved in Vladivostok being consolidated in an Copy No. 1 can not withdraw one important element without agreement without further delays, and that we Washington, D.C destroying the whole foundation. want to move further ahead. As already men- For example, it is enough to recall that—and tioned, we are ready to start negotiations on next From the Journal you, Mr. President should know this from the steps, including the question of possible future of DOBRYNIN, A.F. documents from the negotiations—that the reductions, straight after the current agreement method of counting MIRVed missiles was pre- will be concluded. cisely determined by the achievement of agree- Yet, we want to make it clear: any steps of RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION ment on the whole complex of cruise missiles. this kind must first of all completely satisfy the The American side not only agreed to this in principle of equality and equal security of the with the USA Secretary of State principle, but in January of last year a concrete sides. It seems to us, Mr. President, that nobody formula for counting ALCM (trans. “air to can argue with our right to pose the question this C. VANCE ground”) cruise missiles within the ceilings for way. strategic weapons was practically agreed. All How does the idea of a dramatic reduction in February 26, 1977 that was left was to agree on concrete formulas the nuclear-missile forces of the USA and the for sea- and land-based cruise missiles. True, the USSR look in this light? In your letter it is put American side later tried to propose the removal forward in isolation from all other aspects of the I met with Secretary of State Vance and asked of the issue of sea- and land-based cruise missiles present situation. At the same time it is evident him to pass on as directed the letter of L.I. from the main agreement, [but] we categorically that in this case the following factors would have Brezhnev of February 25, 1977 to President Carter. rejected such an attempt to break from an already- immeasurably grown in importance to the unilat- achieved agreement. eral advantage of the USA: the difference in “Dear Mr. President, Now it is proposed to us to withdraw the geographic positions of the sides, the presence of whole question of cruise missiles from the agree- American nuclear means of forward basing and I attentively studied your letter of February ment. How should we understand this return to a missile-carrying aviation near the territory of the 14 of this year. I want to talk sincerely about the stage which we moved beyond long ago, and USSR, the fact that the USA NATO allies possess impression and the ideas which it provoked here being forced to face this absolutely hopeless nuclear weapons and other circumstances, which in our country. As I understand, you welcome proposal? To agree to this proposal would have can not but be taken into consideration. such direct conversation. meant that blocking one channel of the strategic The fact that it is impossible to ignore all The general remarks in favor of peace and arms race we open another channel at the same these facts while considering the question of curtailment of the arms race which were con- time. And does it really matter to people the type reduction of nuclear-missile forces of the USSR tained in the letter, of course, coincide with our of missile by which they will perish—a cruise or and the USA is so obvious that we can not but ask own aspirations. We are definitely for the ulti- a non-cruise one? Nor are there grounds to a question: what is the real purpose of putting mate liquidation of nuclear weapons and, more- believe that it will be easier to solve the question forward such proposals, which may be superfi- over, for universal and total disarmament under on cruise missiles later, when the sides start to cially attractive to uninformed people, but in fact effective international control. deploy them, than now, while they are still being is directed at gaining unilateral advantages. You However, advancement forward toward developed. We know from experience that it is yourself justly pointed out that attempts of one these elevated goals will not be accelerated, but, not so. side to gain advantage over the other can produce on the contrary, will be slowed down, if we first The aspiration to maintain artificial urgency only negative results. of all do not value what we already managed to about the issue of the Soviet intermediate bomber The same one-sidedness reveals itself in accomplish in this area over the last few years, called “Backfire” in the USA (which is still the proposals on banning of all mobile missiles ( i.e. and, second, if we abandon a responsible, realis- case as we understand from your letter), is in no including intermediate range missiles, which have tic approach to determining further concrete steps way consistent with an agreement. Let there be nothing to do with the subject of Soviet-Ameri- in favor of introducing proposals which are known no doubts in this respect: we firmly reject such an can negotiation), limits on throw weights, on-site to be unacceptable. approach as being inconsistent with the subject of inspection. Reviewing the ideas which you expressed the negotiations and having only one goal—to You of course know better why all these from this particular angle, we unfortunately did make the conclusion of the agreement more com- questions are put in such an unconstructive man- not find in many of them a desire for a construc- plicated or maybe even impossible. ner. We want to conduct the conversation in a tive approach, or readiness to look for mutually Does the United States really have less of an business-like manner from the very beginning, to acceptable solutions to the problems which are interest in this agreement than the Soviet Union? search for mutually acceptable—I stress, mutu- the subject of exchanges of opinions between us. We do not believe so, and if someone has a ally acceptable agreements. The Soviet Union As I already wrote to you, we firmly believe different opinion—it is a serious mistake. will continue to firmly protect its interests; at the that in the first place it is necessary to complete In connection with the question you raised same time a constructive and realistic approach the drafting of a new agreement on limitation of about the possibility of a significant reduction of of the American side will always find on our side strategic offensive weapons, on the basis of that the levels of strategic forces, which were agreed support and readiness to achieve an agreement. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 151

We hope to see exactly this kind of a responsible believe that the Four-power treaty should be speaking language of the General Secretary. Our approach when the Secretary of State Vance strictly and faultlessly observed by all interested President still approaches certain international comes to Moscow. sides, and we will in every way strive to avoid problems too lightly. For example, I told him This refers to the problem of strategic weap- returning to the period when Western Berlin was several times, referring to the conversation with ons limitation as well as to other questions, a constant source of dangerous friction and con- you (the Soviet Ambassador) and to the history of connected with stopping the arms race. We flicts. negotiations on the whole, that the Soviet govern- definitely are counting on the American side Without going into details, I will say that ment gives very much importance to solving of supporting our proposals, including the proposal your letter does not indicate any changes in the the question on cruise missiles. He doesn’t pay to ban creation of new kinds and systems of USA approach to such questions as settlement in much attention, in his striving to conclude an weapons of mass destruction, to ban chemical the Near East or improvement in the sphere of agreement without long negotiations on remain- weapons, and to conclude a world treaty on non- trade-economic relations between our countries, ing contradictory questions, thinking that these use of force. Our proposals on this and some which could bear witness to an intention to move questions can be put off for “later.” I told him that other questions, including that of the Indian to their successful settlement. it is not so, but... (Vance waved his hands to Ocean, were presented many times and con- And finally. In the letter the question of so indicate that he did not manage to persuade the cretely, in particular, in the United Nations. called “human rights” is raised again. Our quali- President that he was right). Keeping in mind the interests of international fication of the essence of this matter and of the I hope that the direct letter from L.I. security and strengthening of peace, we could behavior of American Administration in this re- Brezhnev, Vance went on, will make the Presi- also discuss questions raised in your letter, such spect has just been reported through our Ambas- dent look at the situation in a somewhat different as: warning of missile launch tests, reduction of sador. This is our principle position. We have no way. selling and supply of conventional weapons to intention to enforce our customs on your country I, of course, do not fully agree with what is the “third world” countries, and others. or other countries, but we will not allow interfer- written in the letter, but I hope that it is this kind We give much importance to the agreement ence in our internal affairs, no matter what kind of of letter that the President needs to receive on reduction of armed forces and weapons in pseudo-humane pretence is used for the purpose. now.”4(...) Central Europe without prejudice to the security We will firmly react to any attempts of this kind. of any of the sides. And how should we treat such a situation, The Ambassador of the USSR in the USA Yet a one-sided approach is evident as far as when the President of the USA sends a letter to (signature) your letter and negotiations in Vienna are con- the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and at the cerned. This is the only way to treat, for example, same time starts the correspondence with a ren- /A. Dobrynin/ the statements that the American side views its egade, who proclaimed himself to be an enemy of positions in regard to the Vienna negotiations the Soviet State and who stands against normal, [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, with the air of some kind of “concern with good relations between the USSR and the USA?3 Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] excessive increase” of military power in East We would not like our patience to be tested while Europe. Not only is an objective evaluation of dealing with any matters of foreign policy, in- * * * * * the real situation missing here, but also the con- cluding the questions of Soviet-American rela- structive proposals, which were put forward by tions. The Soviet Union must not be dealt with Carter’s Letter to Brezhnev, March 4, 1977 the USSR and other countries-participants in the like that. negotiations and directed at achieving progress These are the thoughts, Mr.President, which Embassy of the USSR in the USA at the Vienna negotiations, are completely ig- my colleagues and I had in connection with your Top secret nored. We are ready now and in the future for a letter. I did not choose smooth phrases, though Copy No. 1 search for solutions and outcomes, a search which they might have been more pleasant. The things Washington, D.C. does not imply that someone will receive unilat- we talk about are too serious to leave space for eral advantages. But if we are expected to any kind of ambiguity or reticence. From the Journal unilaterally reduce our defensive capabilities My letter is a product of sincere concern of DOBRYNIN, A.F. and thus put ourselves and our allies into an about the present and future of our relations, and unequal position, such expectations will lead it is this main idea that I want with all directness nowhere. and trust to bring to you. RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION It is impossible to agree with the evaluation I hope that with an understanding of the of the situation relating to fulfillment of the Four- elevated responsibility which is placed on the with Z. BRZEZINSKI power agreement which is given in the letter. leadership of our two countries we will be able to The USSR never encroached and does not en- provide the forward development of Soviet- croach now on the special status of Western American relations along the way of peace, in the March 5, 1977 Berlin, and the appeal for support in lifting ten- interests of our and all other people. sion in that region is directed to the wrong This morning Brzezinski handed me (Vance was address. The fact that complications still arise With respect, away) the text of President Carter’s letter to L.I. there is connected with the completely definite Brezhnev of March 4, 1977. policy carried out by the FRG with the conniv- L. Brezhnev ance of three western states, and is which is “To His Excellency practically directed at dissolving the Four-pow- February 25, 1977” Leonid I. Brezhnev ers treaty and its cornerstone resolution—that General Secretary West Berlin does not belong to the FRG and Vance read the text of the letter attentively of the Central Committee cannot be governed by it. But the attempts to twice and then said the following. of the Communist Party break this resolution are a very slippery path of the Soviet Union leading to aggravation of the situation. We “Personally I welcome such direct, plain- Moscow, Kremlin 152 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

c) a resolution on mutually satisfactory verifica- letter to be “positive.” “Is it not?”—he asked. Dear Mr. General Secretary, tion; I answered, speaking for myself, that the d) advance warning of missile tests; first impression after a brief reading of such a Your letter of February 25 raised in me some e) a universal test ban, including a temporary letter is that it does not much move us forward concern because of its moderately sharp tone, resolution regarding the completion of the cur- towards solving that question, which, as L.I. because in it there was no recognition of my own rent peaceful programs; Brezhnev has written to the President recently, is good intentions, and because it did not contain f) an agreement not to arm satellites and not to of primary significance, namely—concluding the any positive answer to the concrete proposals develop a capability to eliminate or damage the working out of a new agreement on strategic which were set forth in my previous letter. Dif- satellites; offensive weapons limitation on the basis of ferences between our countries are deep enough g) demilitarization of the Indian ocean; Vladivostok agreement. In the President’s letter, and I hope that you and I will never aggravate h) a limitation on civil defense measures; in fact, our positions on “Backfire” and on cruise them with doubts regarding our respective per- i) mutual restraint in selling weapons to third missiles are left out; as far as the latter are sonal motives. world countries; concerned, the impression is that the USA wants The fact is that neither in Vladivostok, nor j) a ban on mobile intercontinental ballistic mis- to have a free hand in both their production and during the subsequent negotiations, was any final siles. deployment, instead of making them a part of agreement achieved on the question of cruise agreement. At the same time some issues are missiles and the bomber “Backfire”. I am sure Of course, the above list is not a complete raised, which, though perhaps important, have no that such agreements can be achieved in the one, and other relatively non-controversial ques- direct connection to the mentioned agreement, future, and I am committed to achieving them. I tions could easily be added to it. The main thing which thus acquires—in the President’s letter— understand your concern about postponing these is to move forward without delay on those ques- a vague outline, willfully or not leading away questions until future negotiations, yet I believe tions on which we can reach an agreement, thus from the essence of the issue which is key at the that we will gain a definite benefit in that we will creating the impulse necessary to get down to present stage. I can not but mention also that a give an impulse toward a quicker resolution of an work on the more intractable issues straight after number of Soviet proposals in the sphere of agreement, and I want to stress that postpone- that. disarmament are avoided by silence in the ment of these two controversial questions would We are working on these problems with President’s answer, as are some other questions be aimed only at expediting a quicker agreement, maximum energy, preparing for Secretary of which were raised in the letter of the General with all its positive political consequences. I am State Vance’s talks with you in Moscow. Secretary of the CC CPSU. also sure that with a mutual demonstration of I hope that you will not base our next corre- Brzezinski said in this regard that he was not good will we should be able to reach an agree- spondence on the mistaken belief that we lack ready at that moment to concretely consider the ment on such questions as conventional weapons, sincerity, honesty or the willpower needed to various proposals in the President’s letter. [...] tactical nuclear arms and throw weight. achieve quick progress towards mutually benefi- Not for a minute do I allow myself to under- cial agreements. I do not underestimate the Ambassador of the USSR in the USA estimate the difficulties which stand in our way. difficulties connected with substantive problems Solving these problems will demand determina- or technical details, but I am firmly committed to (signature) A. Dobrynin tion, patience and decisiveness. Keeping pre- achieving success in the process of creating a cisely this in mind, I wanted to make two more foundation for stable and peaceful relations be- suggestions, and both of which aim at resolving tween our two countries. We do not seek any sort /A. DOBRYNIN/ the disagreements between us. of unilateral advantages. First of all, I think it would be extremely I do not see our letters as official documents [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, useful, if you shared with us your own views on of negotiation, but if we exchange them in private Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] a significant reduction of strategic forces levels and on a strictly confidential basis, they can very which we could achieve in the next four or five well help us both to gain the necessary under- * * * * * years. During previous negotiations on strategic standing of the direction of historic development. weapons limitation, we were inclined to take It was in this spirit that this correspondence was Brezhnev’s Letter to Carter, March 15, 1977 small steps in the direction of a vague future; I started and I want you to know that adherence to propose that instead of this we now strive to weapons reduction is the matter of personal faith Embassy of the USSR in the USA define a concrete, longer-term goal, towards which for me, which at the same time reflects the aspi- Secret we later could advance step by step with a greater rations of the people of my country. I hope and Copy No. 1 guarantee of success. believe that you and your people are devoted to Washington, D.C. Second, the quick conclusion of official the same idea. agreement between us regarding the problems on From the Journal which, as it seems, both sides are inclined to agree Sincerely, of DOBRYNIN, A.F. would facilitate our search for stable mutual understanding. We should use the fact that we Jimmy Carter have an agreement, or could achieve quick agree- RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION ment on such questions as: White House Washington, D.C. with the USA Secretary of State C. VANCE a) limiting the number of strategic delivery March 4, 1977". vehicles to 2400 items (or a mutually acceptable lower level); Brzezinski said that the letter had been trans- March 16, 1977 b) limiting the number of launchers equipped mitted to Moscow at night over a direct line so with MIRV to the level of 1320 items (or a that it would be received there during the day.5 I. I visited Vance and transmitted through mutually acceptable lower level); Brzezinski remarked that they consider the him to President Carter the following letter from COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 153

L.I. Brezhnev. of more than 2500 km. will be banned com- out on those questions where we note a chance of pletely; the equipping with cruise missiles with a finding a mutually acceptable solution. Should Dear Mr. President, range of between 600 km. and 2500 km. of other we make some progress, corresponding agree- types of flying apparatus besides heavy bombers ments could be signed simultaneously with the Having become acquainted with your letter will likewise be forbidden. agreement on strategic weapons limitation. of March 4, I would like once again to set forth —all cruise missiles based at sea or on land In conclusion, I would like to point out, Mr. the essence of our understanding of the situation with a range of more than 600 km. also should be President, that I do not quite understand the regarding the preparation of the agreement (for entirely banned. meaning of your statement about the tone of my the period until 1985) on limitation of offensive letter of February 25. Its tone is usual —business- strategic weapons and in more detail to explain Once again, I would like also to remind you like and respectful. If you mean the directness our position on the concrete questions which so that our agreement to count under the ceiling for and openness, with which our views are ex- far remain unresolved. MIRVed missiles (1320 items) all missiles of pressed in it, my reasons were and are that this Let me start with several general consider- those types, of which at least one missile was very character of our dialogue coincides with the ations. We, it goes without saying, are in favor tested with MIRV, was and remains conditional interests of the matter. But if you mean our of concluding an agreement as quickly as pos- on achieving final agreement on the issues related principle attitude to the attempts to raise ques- sible, without delay. But an effort to do that on to cruise missiles. tions which go beyond the limits of interstate the basis of some sort of artificial, simplified As for the Soviet intermediate bomber which relations,—there can be no different reaction variant will hardly accelerate the matter, if we you call “Backfire,” we provided official data from our side. have in mind the goal which we have posed for about the range of this plane (2200 km.) and I believe that our private correspondence ourselves, that is: to genuinely limit strategic expressed readiness to reflect in the negotiating will serve the interests of constructive develop- weapons, guided by the principle of not inflicting record this data as well as our intention not to ment of relations between our countries. any loss on either of the contracting sides. In provide this plane with the capability to cover exactly the same way, the preparation of an intercontinental distances—all this under the con- With respect, L. Brezhnev, March 15, 1977". agreement would not be accelerated if while dition that the question of “Backfire” once and for setting aside those questions on which a lot of ever will be completely withdrawn from further Vance said that it [the letter] will be reported work had been done, we took up some sort of new negotiations. We continue to maintain this posi- to the President. questions, particularly those which have no di- tion. rect relation to the subject of the given agree- The question of mobile launchers for ballis- The Ambassador of the USSR in the USA ment. tic missiles of intercontinental range, naturally, (signature) The conclusion of a new strategic arms must find its solution in the current agreement. limitation agreement between our countries, of Earlier we proposed an agreement by which dur- /A. DOBRYNIN/ course, would have great political significance ing the period covered by this agreement the sides both for Soviet-American relations and in a wider should restrain from deployment of mobile launch- [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, context. However, this will become possible ers for ground-based ICBMs. Our approach to Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff] only in the event that the agreement represents a the question of possible further strategic forces genuine step towards limiting strategic weapons. reductions by the USSR and the USA is laid out * * * * * In the contrary event, there would be an opposite in my letter of February 25 of this year. I repeat, effect. we will be ready to start discussing this question Dobrynin’s Conversation with Secretary of And so it would be if the issue of cruise immediately following the signing of the agree- State Cyrus Vance, March 21, 1977 missiles was left outside the agreement. This ment. Yet in that case we must take into consid- question is not only tied to the heart of a new eration factors about which I have already written Top Secret agreement, but, and this is vitally important, to you on February 25, such as: the difference in Copy No. 1 much has already been worked out. Even certain the geographic positions of the sides, presence of concrete formulas have already been agreed. To American means of nuclear forward basing and Embassy of the USSR in the USA propose now to leave cruise missiles outside the an operation of air-based delivery vehicles near Washington framework of the agreement would not only the territory of the USSR, the fact that the USA mean returning to initial positions but would also NATO allies nuclear weapons and other circum- From the Journal of leave open the path for the development of the stances, which must not be ignored. Dobrynin, A.F. arms race in a new and dangerous direction. Taking into consideration the facts and ideas I don’t think that this is in any way conso- laid out above regarding cruise missiles, it could RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION nant with the goals of a quick conclusion of a be possible for the sides not only to limit the level with the Secretary of State of the USA strategic arms limitation agreement. Therefore of strategic nuclear means delivery vehicles (2400 C. Vance we confirm our concrete proposals on the whole and 1320), but also to discuss the number of such complex of cruise missiles, including: vehicles, which are subject to reduction even March 21, 1977 before expiration date of the current agreement. —to view heavy bombers equipped with Ideas, expressed above, represent our offi- cruise missiles with a range of 600 km. to 2500 cial position, which we intend to maintain during I met with Vance on his invitation. km. as delivery vehicles equipped with MIRV the coming negotiations with Secretary of State The Secretary of State said that in view of with individual placements, and accordingly to Vance. It goes without saying that the additional my forthcoming departure for Moscow on the eve count them under the ceiling (depending on the questions, which you, Mr. President, mentioned of his arrival there he would like in the most type of heavy bomber) established for that type in your letter also demand attention. We will be general terms to describe their approach to a new of delivery vehicle—1320 items; cruise missiles ready to set forth our preliminary ideas on these agreement with the Soviet Union on the limita- ALCM (trans. i.e. “Air to Ground”) with a range questions. Special negotiations would be carried tion of strategic weapons. In this regard he 154 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN underlined several times that the observations the cruise missiles and “Backfire”) to the next, the new administration does not consider itself which he would make continue to be subject to third stage of SALT negotiations—could serve. completely committed to the approach of the review by the President, that they are still not set, After I heard what Vance had to say, I told former administration and that the Carter govern- and that they may be susceptible to certain changes. him that if I may speak frankly, none of these ment strives toward a real, and not just a superfi- This applies also to numerical data, which also American proposals give a real basis for achiev- cial reduction in strategic weapons. does not reflect the final position of the USA. ing a mutually acceptable agreement in Moscow. I noted in this regard in conducting such Vance said that in their opinion, two vari- I said further that upon first consideration important negotiations we start from the fact that ants of an agreement on the second stage of SALT the “comprehensive” variant actually looks even we are dealing with the government of the USA, are possible: one is comprehensive, which they worse than the limited variant, the shortcoming and that the reevaluation by every new adminis- prefer, another is more limited and will be intro- of which was convincingly shown in L.I. tration of agreements reached by its predecessor duced in case the first one is not agreed on. Brezhnev’s last letter to the President. The fact does not strengthen the basis for international The first variant—the more complete agree- that American side is striving, judging by the agreements. ment, according to Vance—could consist of the expressed considerations, toward a one-sided Overall, I said, in my personal opinion both following parts. advantage, is completely obvious. I asked Vance, of the proposed variants are not only not directed what, in the opinion of the administration, the toward achieving a mutually advantageous SALT 1. The American side believes that it would Soviet Union would get in exchange for all that. agreement, but to the contrary significantly be good already at this stage to agree on certain If I may summarize, in the subsequent dis- weaken the chances for a quick conclusion of the reductions from the levels of strategic arms estab- cussion Vance, justified the American position second stage of negotiations. I appealed to Vance lished in Vladivostok. This would reflect the with the following: to take into account everything that had already intention of the sides to begin real arms reduction, A decrease in the overall level of been said by the Soviet side, especially the points instead of merely adapting to the approximate delivery vehicles from 2400 to 2000 made in the letters from the General Secretary of actual levels of weapons which [the sides] have or would impact, in his words, not only the the CC CPSU about the possible paths to resolu- plan to have. In this context, in their opinion, the Soviet Union, but also the USA, which tion of the problems of strategic arms limitation, limitation of the levels could have the following currently has 2150 strategic delivery during the final review of their positions. character: vehicles. Although he had to recognize Vance said that the position he had ex- — up to 2000 total strategic delivery vehicles; that the reduction would have a stronger pressed is not final, but that their position “also — up to 1200 MIRVed launchers. impact on the Soviet side, he added that must be understood”—the USA cannot consider a reduction in MIRVed launchers would accepting in full a Soviet approach according to 2. The Soviet side, taking into consideration have more of an impact on the USA than which, in his words, the American side should its advantage in throw weight, must agree to a on the USSR, since the USA had moved accept in full the Soviet position on remaining certain limit on launchers for heavy interconti- far ahead in the MIRVing of rockets. questions instead of a search for mutual compro- nental ballistic missiles (ICBM), which it is build- mise. ing or reequipping to accommodate the kind of The inclusion of their suggested limits on our I repeated to Vance that in my view the missiles called “SS-18” in the USA. (He com- heavy rockets—as a reflection of the problem of considerations he had expressed in no way can mented in this regard that it would be desirable to the Soviet advantage in throw-weight which has serve as a basis for the compromise he had men- have, say, 150 missiles of this kind instead of long worried them—Vance argued that the USA, tioned. 300.) in its turn will be prepared not to develop and not Vance said that most probably the President 3. Both sides agree to a freeze in the creation to manufacture M-X, its own new heavy mobile will convene two more sessions of the National and deployment of new types of ICBM, with a ICBM with increased accuracy. This, in his Security Council to work out the final American corresponding limit on the number of atmospheric opinion, would be, from the point of view of the position for the negotiations in Moscow. tests of missiles. future, sufficient compensation for the Soviet In conclusion, Vance requested that I con- 4. Creation and deployment of mobile side in the context of a compromise decision on vey to the Soviet leadership that he is coming to ICBMs are prohibited. In this regard the United the problem of throw-weight. Moscow with a serious task from President Carter States would take an obligation to stop develop- Speaking about the elimination of cruise to try and come to an agreement on the central ment and deployment of its mighty mobile ICBM missiles with a range of more than 2500 km, issue of his trips, and that if necessary he will be “M-X”. Vance asserted that the remaining missiles (i.e. prepared, to stay over for a day or two to finish a 5. All cruise missiles with a range of more those with a range of less than 2.5 thousand km) detailed consideration of possibilities for the than 2500 km are banned. are medium range rather than intercontinental. In quickest conclusion of a new agreement on the In the event that the Soviet side agrees to this this regard, he tried to make an analogy with our limitation of strategic weapons. proposal the American side will be ready to Backfire, which has a range of 2200 km and is accept the Soviet position concerning the “Back- therefore characterized by the Soviet side as a Ambassador of the USSR in the USA fire” bomber, by agreeing not to ascribe intercon- tactical, rather than strategic type of weapon. tinental capability to this plane. The USA will be I made points consistent with our proposed (signature) also ready to take into consideration Soviet data agreement on the second stage of SALT, using /A. Dobrynin/ about the radius of operation of this bomber. arguments contained in the communications of This, said Vance, is, in general, the structure L.I. Brezhnev and our position in previous nego- [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, of the possible first variant of the agreement. tiations with the Americans. Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] As an alternative to this agreement (if it is In reply to my observation that the prepara- not achieved), Vance continued, President Carter’s tion of an agreement cannot be accelerated if we * * * * * already well-known proposal—to conclude a lim- set aside issues which had already been jointly ited Vladivostok agreement, including into it all worked out, and begin to consider some new [Ed. note: Despite Dobrynin’s clear warn- items on which the sides had reached agreement, questions which hinder the achievement of an ing of the chilly reception it would receive, Vance but deferring unresolved questions (i.e. first of all agreement, Vance characteristically retorted that continued on page 160 R E S P O NC OLDS W EAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 155

THE SUDOPLATOV CONTROVERSY:

The Authors of SPECIAL TASKS Respond to Critics

[Ed. note: The previous issue of the Sudoplatov’s character are not substantive dismissal of the Bohr documents without an CWIHP Bulletin (Issue 4, Fall 1994) con- rebuttal. It is rather curious that David equal side-by-side explanation from physi- tained several articles that expressed criti- Holloway, who at great length explains the cists who have affirmed the intelligence cisms of a book by former KGB officer Pavel difficulties of meshing the sources of his value of the answers Bohr gave to the ques- Sudoplatov—Special Tasks: The Memoirs scholarship, refuses to listen to the one liv- tions prepared by Soviet intelligence in No- of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet ing participant who, because of the senior vember 1945. Holloway’s contention that , by Pavel and Anatolii Sudoplatov role he played, has a unique perspective on Bohr did not go beyond the Smythe report in with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter (Bos- how the parts of the story fit together. his replies to Terletsky has been seriously ton: Little, Brown, and Co., 1994)—par- The publication of SPECIAL TASKS contested by physicists who examined the ticularly its assertion that several leading brought forth a latent and angry battle in documents (See Sunday Times [London], scientists involved in the Manhattan Project, Moscow over who should take credit for the , 1994). The claim that Bohr was including Enrico Fermi, J. Robert success of the Soviet atomic bomb. Lining only a and could not have com- Oppenheimer, Leo Szilard, and Niels Bohr, up against Sudoplatov and his co-workers mented on engineering problems is belied knowingly and improperly provided secret were scientists who feared that they would by Margaret Gowing, an author who wrote atomic information to Soviet espionage. At lose the honors and credit they received for about the British bomb program and who is the time, the Bulletin invited Sudoplatov or their contribution. Yuri Smirnov is the leader highly praised by Holloway. his co-authors to respond in the next issue, of this group. Standing beside them are Smirnov and Zubok can hardly be and they do so below, in letters from the present day Russian intelligence officers, counted disinterested critics, since each is Schecters, from (for the successors to the KGB, who had their own transmitting the position of his constitu- paperback edition of Special Tasks), and publishing contract to tell the atomic espio- ency. from Stanford University professor Robert nage story and were under pressure to pro- A few of the recent affirmations of Conquest, who contributed the foreward to duce documentation on their alleged super- Sudoplatov’s story are worthy of note: Special Tasks. As before, the Bulletin wel- spy . On Sudoplatov’s side, able to # According to Yuri I. Drozdov, former comes contributions from anyone wishing verify pieces of the story, were elderly intel- chief of KGB Illegal Operations 1980 to to contribute evidence to the debate, or to ligence veterans, fearful of coming forward 1991, and who served in the New York respond to statements contained in the let- because of threats to their pensions. residency of the KGB from 1975 to 1979, ters below, in future issues.] This angry debate spilled over into the “Sudoplatov’s information on the coopera- American media. Writers like Holloway tion of outstanding American physicists with April 21, 1995 and Richard Rhodes, who had done signifi- Soviet intelligence is quite reliable.” cant research among scientists, but were Drozdov’s statement was solicited and TO THE EDITOR: unable to come up with primary sources on quoted by the editorial board of Juridical Soviet atomic espionage, acted as surro- Gazette, a Moscow publication, in a foot- A year after the publication of SPE- gates for the scientists and attacked note to a book review of “Special Tasks” in CIAL TASKS by Pavel A. Sudoplatov, and Sudoplatov. Holloway relies heavily on the March, 1995. the media uproar it evoked, not one of point of view of surviving scientist Yuli The review, written by Leonid Sudoplatov’s critics has shown him to be Khariton, whose interest is not to give credit Vladimirovich Shebarshin, head of the First mistaken in any significant aspect of his to the contributions of the hated Soviet intel- Chief Directorate (foreign operations) of the revelation of how Soviet atomic espionage ligence apparatus. Sudoplatov, contrary to KGB from 1988 to 1991, reads in part: was conducted. claims by Smirnov and Zubok, has been “The book SPECIAL TASKS is very In the CWIHP Bulletin, fall 1994, three evenhanded in giving credit to both scien- attractive and in its totality appears to be critics were given extensive space to attack tists and intelligence officers. reliable. If there were legends in the intelli- the validity of Sudoplatov’s account with- We helped Sudoplatov tell his story by gence service Pavel A. Sudoplatov would out providing any opportunity for opposing organizing the chronology and translating have been the hero, but the traditions of the views to be stated examining the validity of his words into readable English. We did not intelligence service are not to reminisce. their criticisms. There was no presentation alter accounts of poisoning, , es- The more important the case the narrower from those who consider Sudoplatov’s oral pionage and perversions of ideology that the list of people who know about it, and history a major contribution to understand- made him an unwanted witness in Russia these people are accustomed to keep silence. ing the Stalin period and atomic espionage. and an NKVD monster in the West. He “Now (fifty years later) the archives are David Holloway, Yuri Smirnov and Vlad remains a Stalinist with few regrets. We did stolen and the enemies of Russia exploit the Zubok, each with their own unstated agenda, not soften his tone nor did we enhance his secrets of the country in their interests. Here dismiss both Sudoplatov’s account of So- account. comes a remarkable and surprising event in viet atomic espionage and the Bohr docu- It was professionally irresponsible for the midst of these unjust judgments, where ments that verify a part of it. Attacks on the Bulletin to print Smirnov’s and Zubok’s false witnesses dominate the scene and where 156 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the judges pursue their own goals. Here Oppenheimer’s circle, was Zoya Zarubin’s One, the intelligence arm of the Council of comes a witness who is alive and tries to stepmother. Ministers, which I formally headed from speak the truth about the events of many In his own letter, which will appear in 1945 to 1946, had direct close cooperation years ago.” the forthcoming paperback edition of SPE- with Academicians Kurchatov, Kapitsa, # The director of the Russian State CIAL TASKS, Pavel Sudoplatov offers more Kikoin, Alikhanov and Ioffe and contrib- Archives, Sergei Vladimirovich Mironenko, details on Soviet atomic espionage opera- uted substantial material to speed up the affirmed that Sudoplatov’s account of So- tions. He has requested that the Bulletin solution of the atomic problem in the USSR. viet atomic espionage was “correct in essen- publish his letter. Some journalists (Sergei Leskov and tial points” according to documents of the Vladimir Nadeine of Izvestia) and historians NKVD from 1944 to 1953, which were Sincerely yours, of science in Russia (Yuri Smirnov of the released in June 1994. (See Moscow News Jerrold L. Schecter Kurchatov Institute) who, I was told by my #23, 1994). They include the documents on Leona P. Schecter former colleagues, rose in their careers Terletsky’s mission to Niels Bohr and the through KGB connections, strongly sup- formal establishment of the committee ported those in the Russian scientific and headed by Sudoplatov to coordinate atomic The following letter will appear in the pa- intelligence establishment who found rev- espionage. “The main sensation is not this perback edition of SPECIAL TASKS to be elations in SPECIAL TASKS detrimental to but what we learned about the system. We published by Little, Brown and Company on their prestige. They deliberately distorted therefore are confronted with the necessity June 1, 1995 the material I presented. For example, I of looking into other documents,” said never wrote that Oppenheimer, Fermi, Mironenko, who urged that the Presidential Writing memoirs, especially for the un- Szilard and Bohr were agents of Soviet intel- archives and the security ministry archives wanted witness, is always risky. The events ligence. They cooperated, but we never open their files. one describes have already been interpreted recruited them. It is noteworthy that Klaus # Former KGB officer Vladimir by interests in power whose version influ- Fuchs and Bruno Pontecorvo never signed Barkovsky (who handled agents in England) ences prominent historians and scientists any formal recruitment obligations despite has affirmed Sudoplatov’s account that and becomes “history.” I am reminded that their regular clandestine contacts with Rus- was the first to warn the Tacitus began his Annals by writing that sian intelligence officers and agents in the Soviets that the British were seriously in- “The histories of Tiberius, Caligula and Nero, USA and Britain. vestigating the possibility of constructing while they were in power, were falsified One has to remember that all scientific an atomic weapon. British critics of through terror and after their death were giants had a different perspective in the Sudoplatov were in error in attributing the written under a fresh hatred.” 1930s, 1940s and 1950s before the Cold War early report to . The tragic events of the period from the hardened their views. At the end of the # The presence of intelligence officer 1930s to 1953 covered in my book SPE- 1930s and from 1940 to 1945, leading scien- Kosoy, a TASS correspondent under cover CIAL TASKS, including the beginning of tists of the international scientific commu- in Sweden, confirmed a triangular link the Cold War and the myth of as nity agreed to informally share nuclear se- among Sweden, the U.S. and the Soviet the principal figure who passed atomic se- crets among all anti-fascist scientists. Ini- Union as a path for espionage information. crets to Soviet Intelligence, had already been tially they were driven by fear that Nazi # Soviet intelligence officer Arkady told and established as the framework ac- Germany would get the bomb first; later Rylov, who handled incoming espionage cepted by all interested parties. In fact, there they believed that sharing secrets would be documents for Sudoplatov, stated on Rus- were many more sources of atomic secrets the means of controlling nuclear weapons. sian TV that Semyon (Sam) Semyonov, a besides Fuchs. Our intelligence officers in the United States, Soviet intelligence officer instrumental in Harsh attacks on me and my book— Gregory Kheifitz and Elizabeth Zarubin, acquiring atomic secrets in the United States, without debating the principal facts—were encouraged this attitude of sharing in their told him the sources of the material were concentrated in one direction: to discredit contacts with Oppenheimer; Pontecorvo Oppenheimer, Fermi and Szilard. me by calling me a terrorist and to hide from worked on Fermi. # Zoya Zarubin, who was a young trans- public knowledge that two independent in- Reluctantly, the Russian military news- lator working for Sudoplatov in the early telligence centers in which I worked—the paper, Red Star, on April 28, 1994 admitted 1940s, stated in a videotaped interview that Administration of Special Tasks and the that “Soviet intelligence agents took advan- she worked closely with Foreign Intelligence Directorate—existed in tage of an international plot of scientists to (director of the Soviet atomic bomb pro- the Soviet state security system. The public share nuclear secrets with each other.” The gram) to translate the first espionage docu- relations office of the Russian Foreign Intel- Western press, especially the American press, ments into workable Russian. She said that ligence Service has alleged that there was no neglected to notice this statement by KGB Soviet intelligence officer Zoya Rybkina, direct cooperation between intelligence and historian E. Sharapov and R. Mustafin, which for whom she also worked, proudly told her senior Soviet scientists in developing our for the first time acknowledged the exist- that she was in contact with Niels Bohr on first atomic bomb. This statement is incor- ence of the “atomic team headed by important information. Elizabeth Zarubin, rect and was made with the ulterior motive Sudoplatov” and its role in the Soviet Union’s the intelligence officer whom Sudoplatov of discrediting my account. Department S of war effort. said was successful in penetrating the Special Committee on Problem Number Since my memoirs appeared I have met COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 157 with former colleagues who worked with me in reward for their services to the Soviet Ribkina, received the cooperation of Niels and they reminded me that in 1949 top level Union while abroad. Bohr. Back in Moscow she told Zoya American nuclear scientists turned down the The other line was traditional espionage Zarubina, who translated atomic documents, approach of our illegals in the United States, tradecraft, handled from 1944 to 1946 by that “this is a very important enterprise we’re led by Colonel , to resume coop- officers such as Anatoli Yatskov and doing together with the biggest scientists in eration “with the international anti-fascist Aleksandr Feklisov. America and the world. We are trying to be scientific community.” By that time the The recently published documents of as strong as any other country would be. I Cold War was on and the Americans knew the meeting of Professor Yakov Terletsky am happy I am instrumental in putting this we had our own bomb. with Neils Bohr in November 1945 not only together with Europe, with Niels Bohr.” Certainly, I do not pretend to know confirm my account, but provide additional Ribkina spoke freely with Zoya because she everything about Soviet intelligence opera- details. There were three meetings with is the stepdaughter of Liza Zarubina, the tions during the period 1930 to 1953, but as Bohr in November 1945. Contrary to at- intelligence officer who performed so well chief of one of the main intelligence services tacks by historians, Bohr did comment on for us in America working with I must stress that from 1941 atomic issues the drawings (graphs) in the Smythe report. Oppenheimer’s wife. Zoya met in her office were discussed in my presence at the regular The operation was top secret and even the a number of times with Academician meetings of the four chiefs of Russian mili- director of NKVD Foreign Intelligence Pavel Kurchatov to clarify the meaning of the new tary and NKVD intelligence headed by Beria. M. Fitin was not informed. The British vocabulary of atomic physics. Kurchatov At first the purpose was to assess the possi- physicist Dr. John Hassard, of London’s urged her to probe the possible variants of bility that the Germans might develop a Imperial College confirmed the importance meaning in the documents; he barely con- weapon similar to the British-American of the secret information revealed to trolled his excitement over the new informa- project. In 1944 I was assigned coordinating Terletsky by Bohr (Sunday Times [London], tion. “Come on girl,” Kurchatov told Zoya, functions to gather atomic intelligence and June 26, 1994). This was not reported by then 25, “try that sentence another way. in 1945 I took all formal responsibility for either the American or Russian press. Bohr Remember your physics. Is there any other atomic intelligence in the USSR when I was confirmed the validity of the Smythe report meaning we missed?” appointed director of the second (intelli- and resolved stormy debates among Russian The information that Enrico Fermi had gence) bureau of the special committee of scientists over how to approach construction put into operation the first nuclear reactor in the Soviet Union Council of Ministers. I am of a nuclear reactor (whether to use heavy December 1942 was initially provided in a the only living witness from the Center to water or graphite) and the test of samples of very general form to Kurchatov in January know how all top secret information was uranium and plutonium provided by Soviet 1943. Fermi’s success was at first not fully received and processed in 1941-46 from the intelligence. Bohr’s answers to Terletsky’s understood by our scientists. Therefore it USA, Great Britain and Canada. carefully prepared questions helped to verify triggered Kurchatov’s letter of March 22, We received top secret information on scientific papers of Oppenheimer, Szilard 1943 to deputy prime minister Pervukhin the atomic bomb from two directions. One and Fermi and others which were obtained asking him “to instruct intelligence bodies to line was to indoctrinate scientists to cooper- by our intelligence and made available for find out about what has been done in America ate in open discussions and the other was to our scientists. In fact, before the State Archive in regard to the direction in question,” and bring in top secret documents and informa- of the Russian Federation released the Bohr naming seven American laboratories as tar- tion on the atomic bomb. Elizabeth (Liza) documents, the Federal Intelligence Service gets. Several months later, in July 1943, Zarubina and Sam Semyonov were the first asked me to help reconstruct the mission Kurchatov again asked for clarification of to establish friendly contacts with the Ameri- because it did not have the documents in its the data in his memorandum. can scientific community and influence them files. Our scientists were at first skeptical of to cooperate with anti-fascist scientists. Liza We were aware of Bohr’s contacts with Fermi’s accomplishment, and until Febru- Zarubina and her colleague, the Soviet vice- British intelligence, but he played both with ary 1945, when full mobilization was or- counsel in New York, Pastelniak, (whose us and the Western special services. My dered, only a few in influential scientific and code name was Mikheev) handled our vet- colleagues reminded me that when Bohr government circles believed that the cre- eran agent Margareta Konenkova, (code escaped to Sweden in 1943 he asked the ation of a new super weapon was realistic. name Lukas), the wife of the famous Rus- Swedish physicist H.Anfeld to approach The progress of the atomic project was sian sculptor Sergei Konenkov, who was Soviet representatives and inform them that retarded by the lack of resources during the working in Princeton on a bust of Einstein, to the possibility of making an atomic bomb early war years. In 1941 it was the intelli- influence Oppenheimer and other promi- was being discussed in the German scien- gence reports from Donald Maclean of nent American scientists whom she fre- tific community. Anfeld met the TASS progress in the British program, recently quently met in Princeton from 1943-1945. correspondent in Sweden, M. Kosoy, a So- confirmed by Vladimir Barkovsky, that There are photographs of Margareta with viet intelligence officer, who promptly in- pushed us to initiate our efforts in 1942. Oppenheimer and Einstein in the Konenkov’s formed Moscow. On the basis of this news Both the Soviet and the American gov- family museum in Moscow. When they the NKVD initiated the famous letter from ernments did not fully believe in the possi- returned from the USA to Russia in Decem- Kapitsa to Bohr, inviting him to come and bility of nuclear weapons before the first ber 1945 the Konenkovs were granted spe- work in the Soviet Union. explosive test in July 1945. My colleagues cial privileges by a government enactment In Sweden our intelligence officer, Zoya reminded me recently that apart from scien- 158 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN tific information provided by senior scien- Special Tasks I have described can be denied Bohr’s providing of information, Sudoplatov tific personnel of the Manhattan Project we simply because they have never before been was already on record in July 1982. Again, also channeled to our government reports revealed. That something has not been told one comment, by Smirnov, faults Sudoplatov about security rules in Los Alamos and code before does not mean it is not true. for “shoddy research” in getting wrong a names used in internal U.S. government highly peripheral detail (on the dates and correspondence on the matter of atomic signed/ Pavel A.Sudoplatov reasons for Bohr’s trip to Russia). But research. My colleagues recalled that in “research” is not the point of such memoirs. 1946, under direct orders from Beria and * * * * * Look at, for example, Khrushchev Remem- Vannikov, I transferred from Lefortovo and bers, where the “original material” (Strobe Lubyanka all technical intelligence infor- 6 February 1995 Talbott tells us in his Editor-Translator’s mation on the atomic problem to the admin- note) was “quite disorganized” when it came istration of the Special Government Com- To the Editor: into his hands; and which is full of mittee on Atomic Energy. The sources of misremembered (and uncorrected) detail— that information were very closely held un- Your treatment of the Bohr document muddling up different plenums, confusing der Beria’s direct personal control and when [in CWIHP Bulletin #4], highly interesting Lominadze’s suicide with that of he was arrested in 1953 his files were moved in many respects, nevertheless is peculiar in Ordzhonikidze three years later, etc., etc., to the Kremlin under Malenkov’s orders. others. Most of your contributors are con- while remaining, in Talbott’s words “devas- Beria’s intelligence records, which contain cerned to defend Niels Bohr’s moral integ- tating and authoritative.” (As to such dis- the names of sources of secret atomic bomb rity. But this is not at issue, though his crepancies, we may note them in highly information, have not been released and political attitudes may be. Whatever infor- reputable or accepted sources: for example, their location remains uncertain. Beria’s mation he did or did not give was certainly in the very venue of the wartime Bohr- atomic intelligence materials are not in the accord with his principles. The question is Heisenberg meeting is disputed. And inci- Enormous File of the Federal Intelligence merely a factual one. Some of your con- dentally it seems odd that the Bohr-Terletsky Service. Perhaps the most secret parts of the tributors say he did not have any secrets, so meeting is not referred to all at in Abraham Enormous file are in Beria’s personal file in could not give any to the Soviets; others that Pais’ massive biography of Bohr.) the Ministry of Security archives from that he had some, but would not have given them. With all its errors it seems clear that on period. The Bohr documents were not found And did he only say what was already in the the substance of the Bohr incident—the fact in the Enormous File, which contains the Smythe Report? Yuri Smirnov puts it that of and the organization of the physicist’s atomic espionage materials, but in the Rus- “practically” everything he told was in the meetings and discourse with a Soviet repre- sian State Archives files of the Interior Min- Report. Kurchatov’s comment says that two sentative—Sudoplatov’s previously much- istry. points were of use. A British and an Ameri- challenged account has been confirmed by My story is based on what I remember. can physicist are lately on record to the the document. There is more to be said. I had no direct access to archives which in effect that his replies were clearly helpful. A And, given a reasonably critical attitude, small details may be more or less correct layman, while thus noting that professional more remains to be discovered in support or than my memory. However, the thrust and opinion is by no means as one-sided as refutation of our present imperfect under- important facts of my story are irrefutable implied in your pages, is not in a position to standing of this and similar matters. and it was my duty to reveal the hidden judge. (Even a layman can indeed note Your “update” (p. 93) is also unsatisfac- motives of tragic events in Soviet history. I remarks—for example on the vast number tory, citing some but omitting other letters am glad that my explanation of the death of of spectrographs—which are not in the Re- on the subject in leading U.S. journals, and in Special Tasks will be port, though perhaps not of great use.) In any failing to mention major reviews in Le included in the proceedings of the Russian- case, the NKVD feared it was being misled Monde, The (London) Times, etc. Swedish Commission on the Wallenberg by the Smythe Report, as Feklisov (as quoted Affair, which met in Moscow in 1994. by Zubok) noted: so at least from an intelli- Yours sincerely, There are those in the former KGB and gence point of view, even mere confirma- the scientific community who want to direct tion was welcome. The question remains far the public not to believe me because my less clear cut than your contributors imply. story interferes with their book contracts or The other concern of most of these detracts from their scientific honors. Some contributors is to attack Sudoplatov. March 19, 1995 would like to erase the record of combat and Sudoplatov certainly misunderstood, terrorist operations in the Stalin years. To- misremembered, or exaggerated, much of To the Editor: day Russian and Western clandestine spe- the significance of the Bohr interview. But cial operations continue in the Middle East some of the criticisms make no sense. David In the CWIHP Bulletin, Issue #4, 1994, against Syria, Iraq and Iran, described as Holloway doubtless wrote in jest when he one of the Soviet-era documents caught my criminal and terrorist governments, and said that since Sudoplatov had co-authors it eye because it appears to be an example of against nationalities seeking their indepen- was impossible to know which wrote what. and raises questions about a more general dence from Russia. These facts of interna- There are dozens of books of the same type. issue that has been suggested in the writings tional life still exist. Neither they nor the In any case, on the main point at issue, of several former Soviet officials on other COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 159 occasions. one had been in operation, and had contrib- MIKOYAN-CUBAN TALKS The document is the record of the Polit- uted to the death of a president of a neighbor- continued from page 109 buro meeting of October 22, 1986, which ing country. still a poor country. There will come a time when appears on page 85. The second item on the There is of course no way to reconcile we will show our enemies. But we do not want to agenda of that meeting deals with the 1986 the assessment of the Mozambican Board of die beautifully. Socialism must live. Excuse the crash in South African territory of the air- Inquiry with Gorbachev’s statement to the rhetoric. If you are not against it, let us continue craft, piloted by Soviet military personnel, Soviet Politburo that the aircraft was “...shot our conversation tomorrow. carrying the Mozambican President Samora down.” The latter now appears in an official Machel. While sitting as Chairman, General Soviet document and becomes recorded for DORTICOS. We can meet, but we would Secretary Gorbachev states: “The last report posterity in that form. If one accepts the like to know the opinion of the Soviet govern- of our pilot was: ‘We have been shot down.’” conclusion of the Mozambican panel, then ment and Comrade Mikoyan about what we will The event in question is certainly not a Gorbachev’s statement in the text of an do about the agreement on military assistance. major one in Cold War political history, but official Soviet document raises all the prob- A.I. MIKOYAN. Let’s consider that. Think the Gorbachev quotation raises the problem lems indicated above, either regarding the about a program of future work. I am free. I am of the accuracy of Soviet documents, and in nature and accuracy of information that prepared to visit you. this case, at the very highest level: Was reached the Politburo’s staff or its presenta- information that reached the most senior tion to the Politburo’s members, or some DORTICOS. Thank you. Tomorrow we Soviet leadership “doctored” in some cases combination of both. will set the conditions with the ambassador. in advance? If so, at what level? By intelli- gence or administrative agencies? If it was Sincerely yours, A.I. MIKOYAN. I agree. not, was the Politburo nevertheless purpose- Ambassador A. Alekseev attended the conversa- fully misinformed on certain occasions? Milton Leitenberg tion. Following the aircraft crash which re- sulted in their President’s death, the Recorded by: [signature] V. Tikhmenev Mozambican government established a * * * * * Board of Inquiry, which carried out an in- Com. Mikoyan A.I. has not looked over the vestigation of the crash. The possibility that January 9, 1995 transcript of the conversation. the aircraft was shot down was eliminated in the very early days of their investigation. To the Editor: [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, copy There was no mention of the plane being provided by National Security Archive, Washing- ton, D.C.; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] “shot down” on the tape of the aircraft’s In the Fall 1994 issue of the Bulletin cockpit voice recorder. Instead, there was there is an exchange of letters between Adam * * * * * substantial evidence that the crash was acci- Ulam and Kathryn Weathersby. Ulam’s dental. The basic cause of the accident was views, as an experienced Cold War Warrior, [Ed. note: For an English translation of the a laxity in routine operational precautions at evince no surprise but Ms. Weathersby’s meeting between Mikoyan and Castro on 12 several points. In particular, the aircraft had comment, “This distinction does not negate November 1962, in which the Soviet envoy con- taken off for a return flight to the Mozambican Soviet responsibility for the bloodshed that veyed Moscow’s decision to acquiesce to capital with the minimum fuel needed to followed,” certainly does. Just whose army Kennedy’s demand to withdraw the Soviet IL-28 reach its destination. It therefore had no was it that napalm bombed the Koreans, or bombers from Cuba (provoking an angry re- sponse from Castro), see the Soviet minutes of the leeway for any unexpected contingency. The used delayed fused bombs and further, re- meeting (and Mikoyan’s ciphered telegram re- aircraft was off-course at nighttime when sorted to bombing the dams in order to starve porting on it to the CC CPSU) in appendices to fuel ran out, which the flight crew perceived, the people? Was Stalin to be held respon- Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. and it crashed when the fuel was exhausted. sible for the atomic bomb threats and plans Smith, OPERATION ANADYR: U.S. and So- It was impossible to resolve the ques- directed against the Korean people by viet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis tion of whether a South African decoy bea- Truman, MacArthur, Ridgeway, and last but (Chicago: edition q, inc., 1994), 189-99. con had contributed to the plane being off not least by Eisenhower? Shortly before this issue of the CWIHP Bul- course, since the South African government Now that the Cold War is over (al- letin went to press, the Cuban government de- did not make the records of its military, though one would never know it looking at classified several of its memoranda of the Mikoyan -Cuban negotiations. A report on these materi- intelligence or air traffic control agencies the current military budget and the plans to als, and the divergences between them and the available to Mozambique. The South Afri- increase it) it is time we get back to History, Soviet records, will appear in a future issue.] can government instituted a National Board not as propaganda, not as political expedi- of Inquiry of its own, and closed it with a ency. declaration that the cause of the crash was accidental. However, given the date— Sincerely yours, 1986—substantial skepticism can be per- mitted as to whether South Africa would Ephraim Schulman have disclosed the operation of a beacon if 160 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

WARSAW PACT “LESSONS” CLINTON EXECUTIVE ORDER CARTER-BREZHNEV continued from page 115 continued from page 143 continued from page 154 Stenografische Niederschrift,” February 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, IV 27/208/85. cation of state of the art technology within a presented the dual American proposal in his talks 42. “Oplot mira i sotsializma,” Krasnaya zvezda, 14 U.S. weapon system; in Moscow with Soviet leaders, in particular May 1966, 5. (5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, on 28-30 43. “La Roumanie n’a formule aucune demande en ce that remain in effect; March 1977. The Soviet side flatly rejected both qui concerne le Pacte de Varsovie: Mise au Point du (6) reveal information that would seriously variants in the American initiative, insisting on ministere des Affaires etrangeres a Bucarest,” strict adherence to the Vladivostok framework L’Humanite (Paris), 19 May 1966, 3. and demonstrably impair relations between the 44. “Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender United States and a foreign government, or and refusing to table a counter-proposal. Reprasentanten der Bruderstaaten des Warschauer seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing The dispute quickly broke into public view in Vertrages,” July 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, diplomatic activities of the United States; a series of dueling press conferences. On March IV 2/202/431. (7) reveal information that would clearly 30, Vance told reporters in Moscow that “the 45. “Komplexny material: Cvicenie ‘VLTAVA’,” in and demonstrably impair the current ability of Soviets told us they had examined our two pro- VHA Praha, F. HPS, 1966, HPS 30/2; and United States Government officials to protect posals and did not find either acceptable. They “Vyhodnotenie cvicenia ‘VLTAVA’.” VHA Praha, F. the President, Vice President, or other officials proposed nothing new on their side.” In Wash- Sekretariat MNO, 1966, OS/GS, 4/2. ington the same day, Carter defended the propos- 46. Maksimov et al., eds., Raketnye voiska for whom protections services, in the interest of strategicheskogo naznacheniya, 125-126. national security, are authorized; als as a “fair, balanced” route to a “substantial 47. See, e.g., ibid., 125-126. See also “Razvitie voennogo (8) reveal information that would seriously reduction” in nuclear arms. Next, in his own, iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny and demonstrably impair current national unusual press conference, Gromyko angrily de- po sovremennym predstavleniyam,” pp. 325-334. security emergency preparedness plans; or nounced the proposals Vance delivered as a 48. See ibid., 330-336 and passim. (9) violate a statute, treaty, or international “cheap and shady maneuver” to seek U.S. nuclear agreement. superiority, described as “basically false” Mark Kramer is a research associate at Brown Carter’s claim that Vance had presented a “broad University’s Center for Foreign Policy Development [Ed. note: For the full text of E.O. 12958, see disarmament program,” and complained, “One and Harvard University’s Russian Research Center. the Federal Register, 20 April 1995 (60 cannot talk about stability when a new leadership An earlier version of this article was presented at a Federal Register, pp. 19825-19843).] conference on “The Cuban Missile Crisis in Light of arrives and crosses out all that has been achieved New Archival Documents,” co-sponsored by the Rus- before.” sian State Archival Service and the U.S. Naval Acad- Those interested in additional information emy, in Moscow, 27-29 September 1994. on this acrimonious episode in U.S.-Soviet rela- tions and the SALT II negotiations may wish to COLD WAR consult, in addition to the memoirs of former INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT officials (including Carter, Vance, Brzezinski, Kornienko, et al.), the accounts by Strobe Talbott, The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson Interna- Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II (New tional Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. York: Harper & Row, 1979; Raymond L. Garthoff, MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Wash- on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “ the other side”—the former ington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), esp. Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The 883-94; and forthcoming publications emerging project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst C.) and from the Carter-Brezhnev Project.] consisting of ; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (U. of Maryland/Baltimore); Prof. (Ohio U./Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington U.). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Dr. Robert S. Litwak, 1. [Ed. note: The texts of those messages, as well as and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readers are invited to submit articles, letters, and Update Harriman’s related records of conversation with Carter, items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP’s endorsement of authors’ can be found in the Harriman Papers, Library of Con- gress, Washington, D.C.] views. Copies are available free upon request. 2. [Ed. note: The State Department had protested the arrest on February 3 of Aleksandr Ginzburg, a promi- Cold War International History Project Bulletin nent dissident, for alleged currency violations.] Issue 5 (Spring 1995) 3. [Ed. note: Evidently an allusion to Carter’s support- Woodrow Wilson Center ive letter to , disclosed on February 17, 1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W. 1977.] Washington, D.C. 20560 4. [Ed. note: When shown this translation by the editor Tel.: (202) 357-2967; Fax: (202) 357-4439 of the CWIHP Bulletin during an informal discussion at the May 1977 Carter-Brezhnev conference in Georgia, e- (editorial inquiries): [email protected] Vance denied the accuracy of the comments attributed e-mail (requests for copies ONLY): [email protected] to him here by Dobrynin, saying that perhaps the Soviet Ambassador had exaggerated his response.] Editor: James G. Hershberg 5. [Ed. note: Evidently a reference to the use of the “hot Associate Editors: P.J. Simmons, Bonnie Terrell line” for this letter noted by G. M. Kornienko in his Researchers: Mark Doctoroff, Michelle King, Stephen Connors, Helen Christakos, Daniel Rozas introduction.]

“CWIHP: Helping to Change the Objective Correlation of Sources.”