New Documents on Mongolia and the Cold War

Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16 New Documents on Mongolia and the Cold War Translation and Introduction by Sergey Radchenko1 n a freezing November afternoon in Ulaanbaatar China and Russia fell under the Mongolian sword. However, (Ulan Bator), I climbed the Zaisan hill on the south- after being conquered in the 17th century by the Manchus, Oern end of town to survey the bleak landscape below. the land of the Mongols was divided into two parts—called Black smoke from gers—Mongolian felt houses—blanketed “Outer” and “Inner” Mongolia—and reduced to provincial sta- the valley; very little could be discerned beyond the frozen tus. The inhabitants of Outer Mongolia enjoyed much greater Tuul River. Chilling wind reminded me of the cold, harsh autonomy than their compatriots across the border, and after winter ahead. I thought I should have stayed at home after all the collapse of the Qing dynasty, Outer Mongolia asserted its because my pen froze solid, and I could not scribble a thing right to nationhood. Weak and disorganized, the Mongolian on the documents I carried up with me. These were records religious leadership appealed for help from foreign countries, of Mongolia’s perilous moves on the chessboard of giants: including the United States. But the first foreign troops to its strategy of survival between China and the Soviet Union, appear were Russian soldiers under the command of the noto- and its still poorly understood role in Asia’s Cold War. These riously cruel Baron Ungern who rode past the Zaisan hill in the documents were collected from archival depositories and pri- winter of 1921. The “bloody baron” wore a Mongolian robe, vate collections in Ulaanbaatar and beyond, and were publicly practiced Buddhism, and perhaps planned to use Mongolia as presented for the first time at the Mongolia and the Cold War his base for anti-Bolshevik pursuits. He soon engaged in battle conference in March 2004.2 with Chinese regular forces stationed in the capital and, while Now I wanted to read through these materials once again he defeated them, his triumph was short-lived, as he was pur- and put them into a proper context. Zaisan offered an almost sued by Red Army regiments. In the process, the Bolshevik perfect place for contemplation. The only sound structure here Red Army helped “liberate” Outer Mongolia from the “yoke of was a socialist-era monument paying tribute to the Red Army. feudalism” and clear its path to socialism. This circular structure, vandalized by the inevitable autographs The first years of the Mongolian People’s Republic (as of visitors, features a mosaic portraying the heroic history of Outer Mongolia now called itself) proved tragic and tumul- Soviet-Mongolian friendship from the Russian revolution to tuous. Religious reforms were marked by the curtailment the space age. A Russian soldier towers over the structure, of Buddhism, demolition of temples, and mass execution of glaring towards Ulaanbaatar with the blank but resolute coun- lamas. Expropriationist state policies undermined the livestock tenance demanded by socialist realist sculpture. Not even economy. Prosecution of mostly imagined “enemies of the the thick smog from the ger district could shield the Chinese state” and “Japanese spies” silenced all opposition. Mongolia embassy from his stern gaze. The other side of the monument followed closely in Soviet footsteps, and political initiative was has been appropriated by the Mongolian mountain god - the severely constrained. Prime Ministers Peljidiin Genden and ovoo, a tall pile of stones with blue Buddhist scarves tied here Anandiin Amar, who dared to oppose Stalin and criticize, if and there. This ovoo grows from year to year. He might after implicitly, Soviet policies, discovered the limits of Mongolia’s all prove to be the real ruler of Zaisan. I sat down near the ovoo independence: they were arrested and executed in Moscow in and pulled out the documents. 1937 and 1941, respectively.3 By the 1940s, political power These documents (printed below in translation) represent a was in the hands of Soviet-supported Marshall Khorloogiin small glimpse into Mongolia’s complicated foreign relations Choibalsan, Mongolia’s “Stalin.” during the last century. In earlier times, Mongolia was con- Despite his Soviet connection, Choibalsan did not lose sight sidered a menace to its neighbors: in the 13th century, both of Mongolia’s national purpose. He hoped to wrestle Inner Sergey S. Radchenko is a visiting professor at Pittsburg State University. He received a PhD in history from the University of London in 2005, with a dissertation on “The China Puzzle: Soviet Policy Towards the People’s Republic of China, 1962-67,” to be published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press & Stanford University Press later this year. He is the author of “The Soviets’ Best Friend in Asia: The Mongolian Dimension of the Sino-Soviet Split,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 42; and “The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 47. 341 Inside China’s Cold War Mongolia from China’s control. He also sabotaged efforts by policy towards Mongolia paralleled its policies towards a number of Mongolian intellectuals and political figures to Chinese non-Han nationalities. In all cases, the government accede to the Soviet Union.4 Choibalsan wanted a strong, unit- sought to “repay debts” incurred through the years of Qing ed Mongolia on friendly terms with the Soviets. He reasoned exploitation of minorities: “We not only do so with you [repay that a closer relationship with the Soviet Union was a better “debts”], but with all national minorities inside the country” option for Mongolia than being a Chinese province, since the [my italics]. In this respect, Mongolia was hardly different, in Soviets supposedly did not pose a threat to the existence of the Mao’s view, from the peoples of Tibet and Xinjiang. In the new Mongolian nation. China, these nationalities had nothing to fear, for the commu- China, on the other hand, posed a very real threat in the nist party undertook to root out “Great Han nationalist think- eyes of the Mongolian leadership. Indeed, were it not for the ing” and promote “equality of nationalities.” Mao suggested help of Russian bayonets, Mongolia might not have escaped that the Mongols should “educate” those Chinese workers who the embrace of its southern neighbor. The Mongolian leaders’ had not reconciled themselves to the official policy and still suspicions of China’s designs were not erased by the creation tried to “ride roughshod” (literally, pretend to be “kings and of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the fall of 1949 overlords”) over their Mongolian hosts. the two countries established diplomatic relations, officially Mao also dwelled extensively on the historical links that inaugurating a ‘new era’ in their relations. But their friendly connected the ancient Chinese and Mongolian peoples. Weren’t public statements barely obscured underlying mistrust on both Mongolians descendants of the Gaoche tribe long noted in sides. China for their “tall carts,” Mao asked? Damba’s only recourse Sino-Mongolian relations developed intensively in the was to comment that historical records in Mongolia were still 1950s, helped by the growth and strengthening of cooperation being studied with Soviet help. Significantly, Mao circulated between Beijing and Moscow.5 The Chinese supplied labor- this important record of conversation as a policy document to strapped Mongolia with construction workers and credits and all provincial, city, and district party committees because all helped build factories, apartment buildings, and even a power provinces, cities, and districts had their own nationality prob- station.6 When Mao Zedong received a Mongolian delegation lems, which were to be resolved in the spirit demonstrated by in September 1956, he claimed that it was China’s duty to aid Mao in his approach to the Mongolian nationality. Mongolia: “Our ancestors exploited you for three hundred A few words should be added here about the acquisition years” [Document #2]. China thus had to “repay the debt.” of this record of conversation. I knew for some time that an Mao said he was “ashamed” of the insignificance of Chinese important meeting between Mao and Damba took place in aid to Mongolia and promised much more once the PRC September 1956, but the Mongolian Foreign Ministry flatly overcame its own economic difficulties. Mao’s explanations refused persistent requests to provide me with the memoranda apparently made a strong impression on his Mongolian visi- of conversation. By accident, I located a summary of this con- tors; Dashiin Damba, first secretary of the Mongolian People’s versation in the Government Archive in Ulaanbaatar, as tele- Revolutionary Party (MPRP), felt the need to repeat at least graphed by Ambassador Ochirbat to Foreign Minister Dashiin three times during the conversation that Mongolia was grateful Adilbish on 26 September 1956. Marked “mash nuuts” (top for Chinese aid and in no way considered it a historical “debt.” secret), Ochirbat’s report highlights important points of the But Mao insisted: “In the past we oppressed you, but now you conversation, although it clearly overlooks the national minor- don’t even have a word of complaint. The aid we are giving ity subtext and claims that Mao offered to send at most 200,000 you is small. It is repayment of debt and not aid.” In due time workers to Mongolia.7 Then it occurred to me to check the he promised to send between 100,000 and 300,000 Chinese Internet for information on the history of Sino-Mongolian rela- workers to Mongolia. tions written in the Chinese language. In ten seconds, I was The prospect of having so many Chinese workers was reading the Chinese version of the conversation on my lap- daunting to the Mongolian leadership.

Load more