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HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAM and the INTELLIGENCE POLICY CENTER THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Homeland Security Program RAND Intelligence Policy Center View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States Lessons from the Experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom BRIAN A. JACKSON, EDITOR Contributors: Peter Chalk, Richard Warnes, Lindsay Clutterbuck, Aidan Kirby Prepared for the Department of Homeland Security HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAM and the INTELLIGENCE POLICY CENTER This research was sponsored by the United States Department of Homeland Security and was conducted jointly under the auspices of the Homeland Security Program within RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment and the Intelligence Policy Center of the National Security Research Division. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Considering the creation of a domestic intelligence agency in the United States : lessons from the experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom / Brian A. Jackson, editor. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4617-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Intelligence service—United States. 2. Intelligence service—Western countries. 3. Terrorism—United States—Prevention. 4. Terrorism—Government policy— United States. I. Jackson, Brian A. JK468.I6C66 2009 363.28—dc22 2008046790 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover photo courtesy of AP Photo/Mary Altaffer. © Copyright 2009 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2009 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface With terrorism still prominent on the U.S. national agenda, whether the country’s prevention efforts match the threat it faces continues to be central in policy debate. One element of this debate is questioning whether the United States, like some other countries, needs a dedi- cated domestic intelligence agency. To examine this question, Con- gress directed that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis perform “an independent study on the fea- sibility of creating a counter terrorism intelligence agency” (U.S. Con- gress, 2006, p. 122). The results of this study are presented in three volumes: t This volume contains case studies of other nations’ domestic intel- ligence organizations and activities. t An additional volume, published separately, The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society: A Multidisciplinary Look at the Creation of a U.S. Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence Agency (Jackson, 2009), presents a series of papers examining the U.S. context for domestic intelligence, current activities, and varied approaches for assessing options. t The overarching policy results of the assessment, including a discussion of the pros and cons of creating a new intelligence organization, are included in a companion volume to this work: Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options (Tr everton, 2008). iii iv Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States This volume should be of interest to homeland security policymakers, state and local governments, law enforcement orga- nizations, civil rights and civil liberties organizations, and private- sector organizations with interests in homeland security. This study is part of a larger body of RAND research related to homeland security, intelligence, and terrorism. Related RAND publications include the following: t Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, Confronting the “Enemy Within”: Security Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies, MG-100-RC, 2004 t K. Jack Riley, Gregory F. Treverton, Jeremy M. Wilson, and Lois M. Davis, State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism, MG-394-RC, 2005 t Brian A. Jackson, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Bruce Newsome, John V. Parachini, William Rosenau, Erin M. Simpson, Melanie Sisson, and Donald Temple, Breaching the Fortress Wall: Under- standing Terrorist Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies, MG- 481-DHS, 2007. The RAND Homeland Security Program This research was conducted jointly under the auspices of the Home- land Security Program within RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Envi- ronment and the Intelligence Policy Center of the National Security Research Division. The mission of RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment is to improve the development, operation, use, and pro- tection of society’s essential physical assets and natural resources and to enhance the related social assets of safety and security of individuals in transit and in their workplaces and communities. Homeland Secu- rity Program research supports the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies charged with preventing and mitigating the effects of terrorist activity within U.S. borders. Projects address critical infra- structure protection, emergency management, terrorism risk man- Preface v agement, border control, first responders and preparedness, domestic threat assessments, domestic intelligence, and workforce and training. Information about the Homeland Security Program is available online (http://www.rand.org/ise/security/). Inquiries about homeland security research projects should be addressed to Andrew Morral, Director Homeland Security Program, ISE RAND Corporation 1200 South Hayes Street Arlington, VA 22202-5050 703-413-1100, x5119 [email protected] The RAND Intelligence Policy Center The Intelligence Policy Center is part of the RAND National Secu- rity Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the defense agencies, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations. For more information on RAND’s Intelligence Policy Center, address queries to John Parachini, Director Intelligence Policy Center RAND Corporation 1200 South Hayes Street Arlington, VA 22202-5050 703-413-1100, x5579 [email protected] More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figure and Tables ................................................................ xi Acknowledgments ..............................................................xiii Abbreviations .....................................................................xv CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Defining Domestic Intelligence .................................................. 3 Arguments for Change in Current Domestic Intelligence Policies ........... 6 About This Study .................................................................. 8 Examining Other Nations’ Experiences with Domestic Intelligence ...... 9 About This Volume and Companion Volumes from the Study ...........11 CHAPTER TWO Australia ...........................................................................13 Peter Chalk Creation and Relevant History ..................................................14
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