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Improving Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Cooperation Between the United States and the Arab Gulf States

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Improving Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Cooperation Between the United States and the Arab Gulf States Improving Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Cooperation between the United States and the Arab Gulf States Thomas Warrick and Joze Pelayo Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative honors the legacy of Brent Scowcroft and his tireless efforts to build a new security architecture for the region. Our work in this area addresses the full range of security threats and challenges including the danger of interstate warfare, the role of terrorist groups and other nonstate actors, and the underlying security threats facing countries in the region. Through all of the Council’s Middle East programming, we work with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region. You can read more about our programs at www.atlanticcouncil.org/ programs/middle-east-programs/. Task Force on Mideast Counterterrorism – Law Enforcement Cooperation ■ Javed Ali, Towsley Policymaker in Residence, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan ■ Kirsten Fontenrose, Director, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Atlantic Council ■ Daniel L. Glaser, Principal, Financial Integrity Network ■ Bernard Hudson, Nonresident Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs ■ Michael McGarrity, Vice President Global Risk Services, Global Guardian ■ Pamela G. Quanrud, Former Director, C-ISIL Coalition, US Department of State ■ Todd Rosenblum, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council ■ Thomas Warrick, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council ■ William F. Wechsler, Director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council Improving Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Cooperation between the United States and the Arab Gulf States Thomas Warrick and Joze Pelayo ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-131-4 Cover photo: Former United States Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff and Bahraini officials (not in the photo) observing a demonstration of shipboarding skills in Manama, Bahrain, Nov. 11, 2007. Source: Thomas Warrick/ Department of Homeland Security. This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not deter- mine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this issue brief’s conclusions. A list of all of the Atlantic Council’s donors can be found in our annual report and on our website. This report is made possible by general support to the Atlantic Council and from the Embassy of Bahrain to the US to the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. The views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of the government of Bahrain, which has neither put limitations on the findings of this research nor reviewed the study prior to publication. October 2020 Improving Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Cooperation between the United States and the Arab Gulf States Table of Contents Executive Summary 1 Scope of This Report 2 I. Introduction 3 The international fight against terrorism needs to change. 3 Change is coming to the US military presence in the Middle East. 4 The challenges from the Gulf side. 5 The challenge of Iran. 7 Responding to the Iranian challenge. 11 The challenge of building up non-military, non-intelligence security cooperation. 11 II. A Very Brief History of CT-LE Cooperation Between the United States and the Arab Gulf 2 Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 and 2003-2004 attacks unify the counterterrorism world. 15 The October 2010 laser printer toner cartridge bomb plot. 17 The rise of ISIS. 19 Pensacola Naval Air Station shooting. 20 Why publicly acknowledged success stories of counterterrorism cooperation are relatively rare. 21 III. Survey of the Current Landscape 22 Future counterterrorism threats. 22 Table: Selected US government offices, programs, and international agreements to support international counterterrorism cooperation. 26 IV. Key Findings and Recommendations 29 Key findings. 29 Recommendations for joint action by the United States executive branch and Arab Gulf governments. 31 For US policymakers and opinion leaders generally. 43 For the United States government - executive branch. 44 For the United States Congress. 52 For the Countries of the region. 52 Annex 1: Alignment of Security Services of the United States and the Countries of the Arab Gulf 56 About the Authors 66 II ATLANTIC COUNCIL Improving Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Cooperation between the United States and the Arab Gulf States Executive Summary n the past fifteen-plus years, the United States and the to stay just below the level of provoking a major US mili- countries of the Arab Gulf—Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, tary response, but that very fact calls out for the need to Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates find other, non-military ways other than (or in addition to) (UAE)—have responded to security threats from the ter- economic sanctions to protect the United States and its Irorists of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham Arab Gulf allies from Iran’s destabilizing efforts. The tools (ISIS), and those directed, enabled, or inspired by them. of civilian counterterrorism and law enforcement can help. These terrorists have posed a major threat to the security of the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, This report recommends that the United States and the and Australia. During those years, the United States and countries of the Arab Gulf should work together to develop its allies, including the countries of the Arab Gulf, have de- the desired end-state for ISIS and al-Qaeda’s style of ter- veloped robust cooperation in the military, diplomatic, and rorism. This should involve the goal of reducing terrorist intelligence domains. However, another important area of groups to the level that their threat can be addressed by cooperation has been less-well developed: civilian security local law enforcement and security services, without the cooperation in areas of aviation security, border security, need for extensive military operations or international law enforcement, and maritime security. deployments. Today, the United States is contemplating whether to re- In order to achieve the desired end-state, the United States duce its military footprint in the Middle East—with President and the Arab Gulf should also increase efforts to disrupt Trump and many Democrats calling for the partial with- terrorists’ ability to move operatives, money, materiel, and drawal of US military forces from the region. During the information across international borders. The governments relative lull in the terrorist threat from al-Qaeda and ISIS, should increase efforts to prevent terrorists from estab- the United States and the countries of the Arab Gulf should lishing safe havens from which they could otherwise plan look at whether it is to their mutual security advantage to and organize attacks. The United States and several of the increase non-military, non-intelligence security coopera- Arab Gulf governments are among the most advanced in tion in the civilian domain. using airline passenger information, biometric screening, and watchlist management, and they should help other Whether to ramp up civilian, non-military, non-intelligence countries in Africa (such as Sudan), the Middle East, and cooperation in the next few years is a matter of some South Asia to comply with United Nations Security Council urgency. Most counterterrorism experts warn that while Resolution 2396 (December 2017) to develop and use ISIS has been knocked back on its feet, it is working to- these capabilities to protect international civil aviation. wards a comeback. Its mid-2020 efforts are on a par with its activities in Syria and Iraq in 2012, two years before it Recent experience has shown a number of successful emerged in mid-2014 to take over territory comparable in models for enhancing counterterrorism cooperation be- size to the United Kingdom. Al-Qaeda still has affiliates tween the United States and the Gulf, including in areas that pose a danger to international aviation and continue of terrorist finance and countering radicalization. Another to inspire terrorism in the United States—most recently in model that deserves closer attention for capacity build- a shooting in Pensacola, Florida, on December 6, 2019, ing programs is the joint US-Saudi Office of Program that killed three and wounded eight. The much sought-af- Management-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI), under which ter end of the civil war in Yemen—however important and the two governments cooperate on a government-to-gov- desirable it will be to alleviate human suffering there—will ernment basis to enable Saudi Arabia to benefit from both paradoxically increase the threat from terrorists who will US private sector and US governmental security capabili- try to benefit from the resumption of civilian flights in and ties when the two governments agree that the cooperation out of Yemen. is in their mutual benefit. Some other Arab Gulf countries could benefit from setting up a similar program. Iran is also posing an increasing threat to many of the countries of the Middle East and to the United States. Many of these civilian security sector tools developed to Leaving aside the nuclear issue, Iran is currently carrying stop terrorists can also be effective
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