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Download the PDF File S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 20310825 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CI,IBA APO AE 09360 JTF-GTMO-CC 25 August2006 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander,United StatesSouthern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue. Miami. FL33172 SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP(S) JTF-GTMODetainee Assessment 1. (S/NF) PersonalInformation: o JDIMSAIDRC ReferenceName: Hamud Dakhil Hamud o Aliases and Current/True Name: Talut al-Jeddawi. Humud Dakhil Humud Said al-Jadani.Hamud Sultan.Nag Mohammad. Safwan the Afghan o Placeof Birth: Jeddah.Saudi Arabia (SA) o Dateof Birth: 22May 1973 o Citizenship: SaudiArabia o InternmentSerial Number (ISN): US9SA-000230DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detaineeis in goodhealth. 3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMOAssessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMOrecommends this detaineefor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control(CD). JTF-GTMOpreviously assessed detainee as Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control(CD) on 5 September2005. b. (S/NF) Executive Summary: Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaidawith an extensivehistory of militantjihad. Detaineeis an admittedleader of armedfighters in ToraBora duringhostilities against US forcesand associated with severalsenior al-Qaida members.He receivedbasic and advanced training in Chechnyaand Afghanistan (AF) CLASSIFIEDBY: MULTIPLESOURCES REASON:E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFYON: 203108 1 I S E C RE T // NOFORNI I 20310825 S E C R E T // NOFORNI I 20310825 JTF-GTMO-CC SUBJECT:Recommendation for ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control(CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP (S) includingtraining on smallarns, explosives,mortars, and anti-aircraft weaponry. JTF- GTMO determinedthis detaineeto be: o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to posea threatto the US, its interestsand allies. o A MEDIUM threatfrom a detentionperspective. o Of HIGH intellisencevalue. 4. (S//NF)Detainee's Account of Events: Thefollowing section is based,unless othenruise indicated, on detainee'sown account.These statements are includedwithout consideration of veracity, accuracy,or reliability. a. (S/NF) Prior History: Detaineeis a Sunni Muslim who left schoolafter the tenth grade. From approximately1997 to 1999,detainee was employedas a flight attendantfor SaudiArabian Airlines. Prior to 1999, detaineefrequently used illegal drugs. Turning to religion, detaineefreed himself from the influenceof drugsand felt financially secureenough to participatein his first militant jihad.' After detainee'sbrother, Ismat Hammud al- Juddawi,"returned from the fighting in Ethiopia,he showeddetainee videotapes depicting attacksagainst Muslim women,,children,and the elderly in Bosniaand Herzegovina(BK) and Chechnya. Ismat convinceddetainee to accompanyhim to Chechnya.' In Septemberor October1999, detaineeand his brothertraveled from SaudiArabia, to SerzhenYurt, Chechnyavia Istanbul,Turkey (TU) and T'bilisi, Georgia(GG).4 When detaineeand his brother arrived in Chechnya,they both attendedan unidentihed camp in SerzhenYurt for training in physicalfitness, weapons and guenilla operations.5Detainee left the campin June2000, after nine monthsin the Chechenregion and returnedto SaudiArabia via an unknown route.6 ' IIR 6 03+0160 05 2 Analyst Note: Ismat Hammud al-Juddawivariant Esmath Hamud al-Jedaniaka (Abu Yasir variant Abu Zasser), Ismat Hammud al-Juddawivariant. Ismat is a jihad fighter, and as of May 2006 was in Chechnya,was not married and was 27 yearsold. (NFI) '_ IIR 6 034 I I I I 04, IIR 6 0340222 05 o IIR 6 034 144503, IIR 6 034 0222 05, TD-3 14127540-02,Analyst Note: According to the SaudiMinistry of Interior,General Directorate of Investigations(Mabahith), the SaudiGovernment issued detainee a passporton l4 September1999. This confirms the detainee'sclaimed travel periodto Chechnya,indicating detainee probably _obtainedhis passportspecifically to undertakethis travel. 'IIR6o340222os u rrR6 0340604 02, , IrR6 0340878 03, nR 6 0341445 03, rrR 6 034022205 1 L S E C R E T //NOFORN//20310825 S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 20310825 JTF-GTMO-CC SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP(S) b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detaineelistened to SheikhHamad al-Aqla speak at the al-Aqla Mosquein Riyadh, SA.7 Al-Aqla issueda fatwa (religiousruling) encouraging young men to travel to Afghanistan and fight againstMassoud (the Northern Alliance commander),who al-Aqla claimedwas killing Muslims. Al-Aqla told his audiencethat if they did not follow this fatwa, they would go to hell.8 Around July 2000,edetainee traveled from Jeddahto Kandahar,AF via Damascus,Syria (SY) and Tehran, Iran (IR).10 c. (S/NF) Tra.ining and Activities: Detaineetraveled from Kandaharto the al-Faruq Training Camp." At the camp, detaineereceived two weeks of small arms training; one week of explosive training; ten days of camouflage,movement and tactics; eight to nine days of topography,map and compasstraining; and physical fitness training.12 After an unspecifiedperiod of time, detaineedeparted Afghanistan and returned to Saudi Arabia. On 28 March 200I, detaineeagain left Jeddahand returned to Kandaharvia Kuwait (KU), Lahore,Pakistan (PK); Quetta,PK; and Spin Buldak, AI1.r3 In approximatelyJune 2001, he traveled to the M.alik Training Camp where he received three weeks of anti-aircraft and mortar training.ra Detaineethen went to the secondfighting line near Bagram, AF and remainedthere until the month of Ramadan2001.'' Detaineethen traveledto Jalalabad,AF, and then to Tora Bora, AF wherehe held a position as a cook.l6 Detaineeadmitted that after the deathof his Tora Bora camp leader,Abu Mahjin, detaineeassumed the leadership position.lT ' Analyst note: SeeReasons for Continued Detention for additional information on Shaykh al-Aqla. o IIR 6 034 026802, 000230302 31-MAy-02. ' IIR 6 034 0160 05, IIR 6 034 0250 05, Analyst Note: Detainee also statedthat he went in either Septemberor October 2000. The conflict in time frames could be due to confusion between the Gregorian and Islamic Hijri calendars. 'o IIR 6 034 026802, IIR 6 034 ooo5 06 " IIR 6 034 0268 02, IIR 6 034 t0t7 03, IIR 6 034 0160 05 " IIR 6 034 026902, IIR 6 034 101703 13 IIR 6 034 0160 05, IIR 6 034 0005 O6,TD-31412754}-O2,AnalystNote: In TD-314127540-02,the Mabahith statesthat detaineeleft Saudi Arabia on 28 March 2001. A variant of Spin Buldak is Spin Boldak. toIIR2 340623102,IIR6034016005,IIR 6034026902,AnalystNote: AvariantofMalikisMalek. TheMalik Training Camp is aka (Malik Military Center) aka (Sabr/Sabir Camp). '' IIR 6 034 0160 05. Analyst Note: Ramadan200I occurredfrom l7 November2001 to 16 December2001. 'o IrR 6 0340160 05 17 IIR 6 034 0564 03, Analyst Note: Variants of Mahjin include Mehjin, Mahgen, and Mehjen. Abu Mahjin, is assessedto be Abu Mahjin al-Taifi aka (Salih Husayn Ali Ahmad) aka (Marwan Muhammad Naman Mujahid). Abu Mahjin was a known al-Qaida leader who died during hostilities in Tora Bora as reported in TD-314/33185-03, and possibly the individual identified as a close associateand bodyguard for UBL as reported in IIR 6 034 0412 04 and CIR 316107159-04.Abu Mahjin probably died prior to the attack on the 65 which occurred on approximately 15 December2001. 3 S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 20310825 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20310825 JTF-GTMO-CC SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP(S) 5. (S//NF) Gapture lnformation: a. (S/A{F) In an attempt to escapeTora Bora, detaineeclaimed he paid an unknown Afghan guide to take him to Pakistan. Detainee statedhe arrived in Pakistan,after severaldays, where Pakistani authorities arrestedhim.18 While basically accurate,the detaineeomitted key details of his capture. Detainee's departurefrom Afghanistan was, in fact, orchestrated by UsamaBin Laden (UBl)-appointed commanderIbn al-Shaykhal-Libi. During a cease fire, al-Libi directed a group of approximately 65 fighters to depart Tora Bora. US military helicoptersare believed to have attackedthe group killing many of them. Ibn al-Shaykh al- Libi then led the remainder of the group and the other fighters in Tora Bora,.numbering about 150,to Pakistanwhere they were subsequentlyarrested by Pakistaniforces.'' Lists of those capturedwith Ibn al-Shaykhal-Libi includethe detainee'sname or alias.2oPakistani authoritiestransferred detainee to US custodv on 2 Januarv 2002.21 b. (S) PropertyHeld: o F-91W Casiowatch o Money: o 59,500Afghanis o 12,200Pakistani Rupees o 1,000Saudi Riyals O S21USD . Other personalitems including a piece of paper with Arabic writing, a Saudi Arabian driver's license,and a set of Toyota vehiclekeys22 c. (S) Transferredto JTF-GTMO:11 February 2002. d. (S/NF) Reasonsfor Transferto JTF-GTMO:To provide information on the following: o Terrorism related facilities, training conducted,methods of training and trainers 18IIR 6 034o27o 02 tn Withdra*al from Tora BoraAnalysis (DAB analysispaper), IIR 2 340 624402,TD-314114605-04, IIR 6 0340l 1804 20 AnalystNote: Detaineeis identifiedas Talout in IIR 7 739 339602. Detaineeis identifiedas Mehmood Bin Dakhilin TD-3l4150490-01. 21tn-3 t+/oo845-oz 22 IIR 6 034 125504, AnalystNote: Referencedocument notes thatMO-244 was in chargeof five to six pickup trucksfull of weaponsand people who wereretreating. It is possiblethat sincedetainee was directly subordinate toMO-244 thatthe setof Toyotakeys were to oneof thesevehicles. 4 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20310825 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I 20310825 JTF-GTMO-CC SIIBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued Detention
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