DOCSLIB.ORG

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment S E C R E T // NOFORNI I 20320415 DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS,JOINT TASK FORCEGUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION,GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360 JTF-GTMO-CDR i5 Apri12007 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander,United StatesSouthem Command, 3511 NW 91stAvenue, Miami,FL33172 SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN US9SA-000053DP(S) JTF-GTMO DetaineeAssessment l. (S//NF) Personal Information: o JDIMSA{DRC ReferenceName: Saud D Dakhil Allah o Aliases and CurrentlTrue Name: SaudDakhilallah al- Jihni. SaudDakhil Allah Muslih al-Mahayawi. Abu Shakir. SaudDakheel al-Hareth. Abu al-Harith al- Jadawi.Jaafar al-Ta'efi. Shakr o Placeof Birth: Jeddah.Saudi Arabia (SA) o Dateof Birth: 21 Aueust 1976 . Citizenship: Saudi Arabia o IntemmentSerial Number (ISN): US9SA-000053DP ) (U//FOUO) Health: Detaineeis in good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommendsthis detaineefor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previouslyassessed detainee as ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) with Transfer Languageon 27 February 2006. b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detaineeis a memberof al-Qaidawho was activein Kandahar and engagedUS and Coalition forces in combat action at Tora Bora, Afghanistan (Af'). Detaineepossibly arrangedtravel for mujahideenfor personalvisits to UBL. A1- Qaidadocuments included detainee's name and aliasesamong lists of al-Qaidaoperatives. Detaineeis associatedwith al-Qaida members,including IIBL bodyguards. The Saudi CLASSIFIEDBY: MULTIPLESOURCES REASON:E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFYON: 20320415 S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 20320415 S E C RE T // NOFORN I I 20320415 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN US9SA-000053DP(S) Ministry of Interior, GeneralDirectorate of Investigations(Mabahith) identified detaineeas a high priority target who has been watchlisted for his travel to Chechnyaand jihadist activities in Ethiopia. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.I JTF-GTMO determinedthis detaineeto be: o A MEDIUM risk, ashe may posea threatto the US, its interests,and allies. o A HIGH threat from a detentionperspective. o Of MEDIUM intelligencevalue. c. (U) Summary of Changes: The following outlineschanges to detainee'sassessment sincethe last JTF-GTMO recommendation.(Changes in this assessmentwill be annotatedby F next to the footnote.) . (S/AIF) Positively identified detaineeas having engagedCoalition forcesin combat action at Tora Bora. o (S/A{F) Upon reassessment,determined that detaineewas almost certainly not a UBL bodyguard,based on new reportingfrom multiple sources.Detainee was previously assessedas a possibleUBL bodyguard. o (S/A{F) Incorporatednew reportingdetailing detainee's associations to known UBL bodyguardsand al-Qaidaoperatives. o (S/A{F) Incorporatednew information aboutdetainee's associations to former JTF- GTMO detainees. o (S/A{F) Revised capture information to more accuratelyreflect the circumstancesof detainee'scapture. 4. (U) Detainee'sAccount of Events: The following sectionis based,unless otherwise indicated, on detainee'sown account. Thesestatements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S/NF) Prior History: Detaineedropped out of high schoolin 1998after one year and beganselling datesat a local marketin Jeddahuntil2001. During Ramadan2000, detainee made the Umra to Mecca. SA.l b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: While in Mecca,detainee met a Pakistaninamed Abdul Rahman. Rahman told detaineeabout the incorrect method many Afghans were using ' 000053KB 05-FEB-2002,000053 MFR 17-MAR-2002,Analyst Note: The Umrais a smallerscale pilgrimage to Meccamade outside of Hajj season.This doesnot counttowards the Pillar of Islarrl which dictatesthat a Hajj is to be completedat sometime during a Muslim'slife. 1 L S E C R E T // NOFORNI I 20320415 s E c RE T //NOFORN I I 20320415 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN US9SA-000053DP(S) to practice Islam and suggesteddetainee travel to Afghanistan to help teach them correctly. Sometimein early September2001, detaineedeparted Jeddah and traveled to Karachi, Pakistan(PK), where he contactedAbdul Rahman. Detaineespent the night in the airport and traveled to Peshawar,PK. Abdul Rahmanmet detaineeand took him to Torkham, AF, a village outsideKhowst, AF. Detaineewas carrying 8,000to 10,000Saudi riyals (SAR) at the time.' c. (S/NF) Training and Activities: In Torkham,detainee resided with Abdul Rahmanin a houseowned by a man namedAbdullah (NFD. During this time, detaineewould teach poor and disadvantagedMuslims to read the Koran in Arabic and how to properly perform Islamic rituals. After approximatelyone month, Abdul Rahmanstole approximately5,000 SAR from detaineeand disappeared.Detainee used his remainingmoney to purchasecold weather clothes for himself and the children. After three months, the violence in Afghanistan increasedand detaineedecided to leave Afghanistan to avoid death or injury.' 5. (U) Capture Information: ^. (S/A{F) Detaineetraveled to the Afghanistan-Pakistaniborder with 30 other Arabs and surrenderedto the Pakistani border patrol on 15 December 2001. Detaineewas captured "Dirty with the 30," who areidentified asbeing a mix of UBL bodyguards,al-Qaida members,and Taliban fighters who attemptedto flee Afghanistan during the al-Qaida withdrawal from Tora Bora. Detaineehad no identification,documents, weapons, or equipmentin his possessionat the time of his capture. Detaineewas transferredto US forces on27 December2001 from Peshawar." b. (U) Property Held: None c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 16 January2002 d. (S/NF) Reasonsfor Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: o Recruitment of clergy from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan ' 000053MFR 17-MAR-2002,TD-314-06932-02, 000053 KB 05-FEB-2002.Analyst Note: In September2001, 8,000to 10,000SAR converted to approximately$2,080 - $2,600US. ' 000053KB 05-FEB-2002,000053 MFR r7-MAR-2002. o to-:t+/oog45-02,US9SA-000053DP FUSION Circumstances of capture 3 S E C R E T // NOFORN/ I 20320415 S E C R E T / / NOFORN I I 20320415 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN US9SA-000053DP(S) 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee'sAccount: Detaineeprovides a consistenttimeline of activities;however; he fails to explainhis presencein Kandaharand his positive identificationas a fighter at Tora Bora. Detaineeremains elusive when questionedabout his associationto known al-Qaida members. Detaineeclaims there was not enoughtime to collect his passportand personalbelongings before departing for the border of Afghanistan; however, detainee'sname appearson severalal-Qaida associated documents indicating detainee stayed in at leastone guesthouseand probably a militant training camp. Detaineemaintains his cover story of teachingthe Koran, an accountthat two other JTF-GTMO detaineeshave identified as a cover story.s Detainee's account omits his travels to Chechnyaand his arrestby the Saudi Government for attempting to establisha jihadist organization in Ethiopia. 7. (U) DetaineeThreat: a. (S) Assessment: Detaineeis assessedto be a MEDIUM risk as he may posea threatto the US, its interests,and allies. (S//NF) Reasonsfor Continued Detention: Detaineeis a memberof al-Qaidawho was active in Kandahar and engagedUS and Coalition forces in combat action at Tora Bora. Detaineepossibly arranged travel for mujahideenfor personalvisits to UBL. Al-Qaida documentsincluded detainee's name and aliasesamong lists of al-Qaidaoperatives. Detaineeis associatedwith al-Qaidamembers, to includeUBL bodyguards.The Saudi Mabahith identified detaineeas a high priority targetwho has been watchlisted for his travel to Chechnyaand jihadist activitiesin Ethiopia. o (S/A{F) Detaineeis a member of al-Qaida who was active in Kandahar and participatedin hostilitiesagainst US and Coalition forcesin Tora Bora. o (S/A{F) According to Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah,ISN US9YM- 000252DP(YM-252), detaineeis Saudal-Juhuni aka (Shakir),who was an al-Qaida trained fighter at a guard post in the valley between Tora Bora and Jalalabad,AF during the al-Qaida defenseof Tora Bora againstUS and Coalition forces in early to mid-December2001 . YM-252 stateddetainee was armedwith an AK-47 and fired his weapon when detaineecame under fire from Afghans in the valley.6 (Analyst Note: "Afghans" here almost certainly refers to Northem Alliance Afghans who were fighting aspart of the US-led Coalition force at Tora Bora.) t >0000+t 3022t-Aug-2002, IIR 6 034O7O4 02, IIR 6 034 0'78002 'IIR 6 0340993 03 4 S E C RE T // NOFORN I I 20320415 S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 20320415 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT:Recommendation for ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control(CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN US9SA-000053DP(S) o (S/AID YM-252 also statedthat detaineeclaimed an affiliation with Jarna'at Tablighi (JT),t was a fighter at Tora Bora, and had unidentified problems with the Saudi authorities.u o (S/A{F) Muhammad Mani Ahmed al-Shal Lan al-Qahtani, ISN US9SA- 000063DP(5A-063), met detaineein Kandaharand Tora Bora. 5,{-063 knew detaineeas Shakir,a muhajid from Jeddah.elenatyst Note: Detaineedenies staying in Kandahar.) o (S/A{F) MuhammadYahya Muhsin al-Zayla|ISN US9SA-000055DP(SA-055, transferred)identified detaineeas an individual that traveled from Khowst to the Pakistanborder with him.ro o (S/A{F) Detainee'sname
Load more

Recommended publications
  • JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment
    S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20320619 DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS,JOINT TASK FORCEGUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION,GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09350 JTF-GTMO-CDR 19June 2007 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander,United StatesSouthem Command. 3511 NW 9lst Avenue. Miami,FL33172. SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000079DP(S) JTF-GTMO DetaineeAssessment 1. (S//NF) Personal Information: o JDIMSAIDRC ReferenceName: FahedA al-Harasi o Aliases and Current/True Name: Fahd Atiyah Hamza Hamid al-Harazi" Hassanal-Makki. FahedFahad" Khalid. Abu Hassan. al-Sharif. Abu Barak o Placeof Birth: Mecca. SaudiArabia (SA) o Date of Birth: 18 November 1978 o Citizenship: SaudiArabia o InternmentSerial Number (ISN): US9SA-000079DP 2. (U//T'OUO) Health: Detaineeis in good health. 3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommendsthis detaineefor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previouslyassessed detainee for Continued Detentionwith TransferLanguage on 26May 2006. b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detaineeis reportedto be a memberof al-Qaida. He was identified as having attendedmilitant training and was an instructor at the al-Qaida al- Faruq Training Camp. Detaineewas in Afghanistan (AF) since 1999 during which he is assessedto have participated in hostilities againstUS and Coalition forces as a member of Classifiedby: MultipleSources REASON:E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED,Section 1.4(C) Declassi$on:20320619 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20320619 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20320619 JTF-GTMO.CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000079DP(S) UsamaBin Laden's (UBL) 55th Arab Brigade.l Detainee'sname and aliaswere listed in recovereddocuments associated with al-Qaida, and the Saudi Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Investigations(Mabahith) identified him as a high priority detainee.
    [Show full text]
  • Inside Russia's Intelligence Agencies
    EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN BRIEF POLICY RELATIONS ecfr.eu PUTIN’S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA’S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES Mark Galeotti For his birthday in 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin was treated to an exhibition of faux Greek friezes showing SUMMARY him in the guise of Hercules. In one, he was slaying the • Russia’s intelligence agencies are engaged in an “hydra of sanctions”.1 active and aggressive campaign in support of the Kremlin’s wider geopolitical agenda. The image of the hydra – a voracious and vicious multi- headed beast, guided by a single mind, and which grows • As well as espionage, Moscow’s “special services” new heads as soon as one is lopped off – crops up frequently conduct active measures aimed at subverting in discussions of Russia’s intelligence and security services. and destabilising European governments, Murdered dissident Alexander Litvinenko and his co-author operations in support of Russian economic Yuri Felshtinsky wrote of the way “the old KGB, like some interests, and attacks on political enemies. multi-headed hydra, split into four new structures” after 1991.2 More recently, a British counterintelligence officer • Moscow has developed an array of overlapping described Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) as and competitive security and spy services. The a hydra because of the way that, for every plot foiled or aim is to encourage risk-taking and multiple operative expelled, more quickly appear. sources, but it also leads to turf wars and a tendency to play to Kremlin prejudices. The West finds itself in a new “hot peace” in which many consider Russia not just as an irritant or challenge, but • While much useful intelligence is collected, as an outright threat.
    [Show full text]
  • CIA Best Practices in Counterinsurgency
    CIA Best Practices in Counterinsurgency WikiLeaks release: December 18, 2014 Keywords: CIA, counterinsurgency, HVT, HVD, Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel, Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan, Thailand,HAMAS, FARC, PULO, AQI, FLN, IRA, PLO, LTTE, al-Qa‘ida, Taliban, drone, assassination Restraint: SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals) Title: Best Practices in Counterinsurgency: Making High-Value Targeting Operations an Effective Counterinsurgency Tool Date: July 07, 2009 Organisation: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Author: CIA Office of Transnational Issues; Conflict, Governance, and Society Group Link: http://wikileaks.org/cia-hvt-counterinsurgency Pages: 21 Description This is a secret CIA document assessing high-value targeting (HVT) programs world-wide for their impact on insurgencies. The document is classified SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals) and is for internal use to review the positive and negative implications of targeted assassinations on these groups for the strength of the group post the attack. The document assesses attacks on insurgent groups by the United States and other countries within Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel, Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan and Thailand. The document, which is "pro-assassination", was completed in July 2009 and coincides with the first year of the Obama administration and Leon Panetta's directorship of the CIA during which the United States very significantly increased its CIA assassination program at the
    [Show full text]
  • Downloaded from the Internet and Distributed Inflammatory Speeches and Images Including Beheadings Carried out by Iraqi Insurgents
    HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2006 EVENTS OF 2005 Copyright © 2006 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Co-published by Human Rights Watch and Seven Stories Press Printed in the United States of America ISBN-10: 1-58322-715-6 · ISBN-13: 978-1-58322-715-2 Front cover photo: Oiparcha Mirzamatova and her daughter-in-law hold photographs of family members imprisoned on religion-related charges. Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan. © 2003 Jason Eskenazi Back cover photo: A child soldier rides back to his base in Ituri Province, northeastern Congo. © 2003 Marcus Bleasdale Cover design by Rafael Jiménez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] Rue Van Campenhout 15, 1000 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 732 2009, Fax: +32 2 732 0471 [email protected] 9 rue Cornavin 1201 Geneva Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] Markgrafenstrasse 15 D-10969 Berlin, Germany Tel.:+49 30 259 3060, Fax: +49 30 259 30629 [email protected] www.hrw.org Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice.
    [Show full text]
  • Wikileaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security Disclosures
    THE YALE LAW JOURNAL PATRICIA L. BELLIA WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security Disclosures ABSTRACT. WikiLeaks' successive disclosures of classified U.S. documents throughout 2010 and 2011 invite comparison to publishers' decisions forty years ago to release portions of the Pentagon Papers, the classified analytic history of U.S. policy in Vietnam. The analogy is a powerful weapon for WikiLeaks' defenders. The Supreme Court's decision in the Pentagon Papers case signaled that the task of weighing whether to publicly disclose leaked national security information would fall to publishers, not the executive or the courts, at least in the absence of an exceedingly grave threat of harm. The lessons of the PentagonPapers case for WikiLeaks, however, are more complicated than they may first appear. The Court's per curiam opinion masks areas of substantial disagreement as well as a number of shared assumptions among the Court's members. Specifically, the Pentagon Papers case reflects an institutional framework for downstream disclosure of leaked national security information, under which publishers within the reach of U.S. law would weigh the potential harms and benefits of disclosure against the backdrop of potential criminal penalties and recognized journalistic norms. The WikiLeaks disclosures show the instability of this framework by revealing new challenges for controlling the downstream disclosure of leaked information and the corresponding likelihood of "unintermediated" disclosure by an insider; the risks of non-media intermediaries attempting to curtail such disclosures, in response to government pressure or otherwise; and the pressing need to prevent and respond to leaks at the source. AUTHOR.
    [Show full text]
  • Offensive Capabilities
    GCHQ and UK Mass Surveillance Chapter 5 5 Beyond signals intelligence: Offensive capabilities 5.1 Introduction Documents released by German magazine Der Spiegel provide a much richer picture of the offensive activities of the NSA and its allies, including the UK’s GCHQ.i The global surveillance infrastructure and hacking tools described in the previous chapters are not only used for obtaining information to be fed into intelligence reports and tracking terrorists. The agencies are also developing cyber-warfare capabilities, with the NSA taking the lead within the US armed forces. This militarisation of the internet saw U.S. intelligence services carried out 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011ii. The UK's National Strategic Defence and Security Review from 2010 made hostile attacks upon UK cyberspace a major priorityiii. It is fair to assume that many countries are following suit and building cyber-warfare capabilities. Der Spiegel terms the development of these aggressive hacking tools as Digital Weapons. In their view D weapons which should join the ABC (Atomic, Biological and Chemical) weapons of the 20th century because of their indiscriminate nature. Here lies a fundamental problem. The modern world with connected global communications networks means that non-state actors such as civilians and businesses are now affected by the agencies’ activities much more frequently than before. The internet is used by everyone – cyberspace is mainly a civilian space – and the opportunity for collateral damage is huge. The papers leaked to Der Spiegel appear to show that signal agencies have little regard for the security and wellbeing of anyone who gets caught in the path of their operations.
    [Show full text]
  • Works’ (Just Not in Moderation)
    Repression ‘Works’ (just not in moderation) Yuri M. Zhukov University of Michigan Abstract Why does government violence deter political challengers in one con- text, but inflame them in the next? This paper argues that repression increases opposition activity at low and moderate levels, but decreases it in the extreme. There is a threshold level of violence, where the op- position becomes unable to recruit new members, and the rebellion unravels – even if the government kills more innocents. We show this result logically, with a mathematical model of coercion, and empir- ically, with micro-level data from Chechnya and a meta-analysis of sub-national conflict dynamics in 156 countries. The data suggest that a threshold exists, but the level of violence needed to reach it varies. Many governments, thankfully, are unable or unwilling to go that far. We explore conditions under which this threshold may be higher or lower, and highlight a fundamental trade-off between reducing gov- ernment violence and preserving civil liberties. Keywords: repression, political violence, mass killing, conflict, meta-analysis, threshold effect Word count: 11,869 DRAFT This version: November, 2018 1 Repression is violence that governments use to stay in power. When confronting behavioral challenges to their authority, governments often respond by threatening, detaining and killing suspected dissidents and rebels. The coercive purpose of these actions is to compel challengers to stop their fight, and to deter others from joining it. The intensity of repres- sion can vary greatly. To reestablish control in Chechnya after 1999, for example, the Russian government used a range of methods, from targeted killings to shelling and indiscriminate sweeps.
    [Show full text]
  • Mass Surveillance
    Mass Surveillance Mass Surveillance What are the risks for the citizens and the opportunities for the European Information Society? What are the possible mitigation strategies? Part 1 - Risks and opportunities raised by the current generation of network services and applications Study IP/G/STOA/FWC-2013-1/LOT 9/C5/SC1 January 2015 PE 527.409 STOA - Science and Technology Options Assessment The STOA project “Mass Surveillance Part 1 – Risks, Opportunities and Mitigation Strategies” was carried out by TECNALIA Research and Investigation in Spain. AUTHORS Arkaitz Gamino Garcia Concepción Cortes Velasco Eider Iturbe Zamalloa Erkuden Rios Velasco Iñaki Eguía Elejabarrieta Javier Herrera Lotero Jason Mansell (Linguistic Review) José Javier Larrañeta Ibañez Stefan Schuster (Editor) The authors acknowledge and would like to thank the following experts for their contributions to this report: Prof. Nigel Smart, University of Bristol; Matteo E. Bonfanti PhD, Research Fellow in International Law and Security, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna Pisa; Prof. Fred Piper, University of London; Caspar Bowden, independent privacy researcher; Maria Pilar Torres Bruna, Head of Cybersecurity, Everis Aerospace, Defense and Security; Prof. Kenny Paterson, University of London; Agustín Martin and Luis Hernández Encinas, Tenured Scientists, Department of Information Processing and Cryptography (Cryptology and Information Security Group), CSIC; Alessandro Zanasi, Zanasi & Partners; Fernando Acero, Expert on Open Source Software; Luigi Coppolino,Università degli Studi di Napoli; Marcello Antonucci, EZNESS srl; Rachel Oldroyd, Managing Editor of The Bureau of Investigative Journalism; Peter Kruse, Founder of CSIS Security Group A/S; Ryan Gallagher, investigative Reporter of The Intercept; Capitán Alberto Redondo, Guardia Civil; Prof. Bart Preneel, KU Leuven; Raoul Chiesa, Security Brokers SCpA, CyberDefcon Ltd.; Prof.
    [Show full text]
  • Improving Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Cooperation Between the United States and the Arab Gulf States
    Improving Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Cooperation between the United States and the Arab Gulf States Thomas Warrick and Joze Pelayo Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative honors the legacy of Brent Scowcroft and his tireless efforts to build a new security architecture for the region. Our work in this area addresses the full range of security threats and challenges including the danger of interstate warfare, the role of terrorist groups and other nonstate actors, and the underlying security threats facing countries in the region. Through all of the Council’s Middle East programming, we work with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region. You can read more about our programs at www.atlanticcouncil.org/ programs/middle-east-programs/. Task Force on Mideast Counterterrorism – Law Enforcement Cooperation ■ Javed Ali, Towsley Policymaker in Residence, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan ■ Kirsten Fontenrose, Director, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Atlantic Council ■ Daniel L. Glaser, Principal, Financial Integrity Network ■ Bernard Hudson, Nonresident Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs ■ Michael McGarrity, Vice President Global Risk Services, Global Guardian ■ Pamela G. Quanrud, Former Director, C-ISIL Coalition, US Department of State ■ Todd Rosenblum, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Center
    [Show full text]
  • Download the PDF File
    S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 20310825 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CI,IBA APO AE 09360 JTF-GTMO-CC 25 August2006 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander,United StatesSouthern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue. Miami. FL33172 SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP(S) JTF-GTMODetainee Assessment 1. (S/NF) PersonalInformation: o JDIMSAIDRC ReferenceName: Hamud Dakhil Hamud o Aliases and Current/True Name: Talut al-Jeddawi. Humud Dakhil Humud Said al-Jadani.Hamud Sultan.Nag Mohammad. Safwan the Afghan o Placeof Birth: Jeddah.Saudi Arabia (SA) o Dateof Birth: 22May 1973 o Citizenship: SaudiArabia o InternmentSerial Number (ISN): US9SA-000230DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detaineeis in goodhealth. 3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMOAssessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMOrecommends this detaineefor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control(CD). JTF-GTMOpreviously assessed detainee as Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control(CD) on 5 September2005. b. (S/NF) Executive Summary: Detaineeis assessedto be a memberof al-Qaidawith an extensivehistory of militantjihad. Detaineeis an admittedleader of armedfighters in ToraBora duringhostilities against US forcesand associated with severalsenior al-Qaida members.He receivedbasic and advanced training in Chechnyaand Afghanistan (AF) CLASSIFIEDBY: MULTIPLESOURCES REASON:E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFYON: 203108 1 I S E C RE T // NOFORNI I 20310825 S E C R E T // NOFORNI I 20310825 JTF-GTMO-CC SUBJECT:Recommendation for ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control(CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000230DP (S) includingtraining on smallarns, explosives,mortars, and anti-aircraft weaponry. JTF- GTMO determinedthis detaineeto be: o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to posea threatto the US, its interestsand allies.
    [Show full text]
  • Wikileaks.Org
    U.S. Intelligence planned to destroy WikiLeaks WikiLeaks release: March 15, 2010 keywords: WikiLeaks, U.S. intelligence, U.S. Army, National Ground Intelligence Center, NGIC, classified, SE- CRET, NOFORN restraint: Classified SECRET/NOFORN (US) title: Wikileaks.org - An Online Reference to Foreign Intelligence Services, Insurgents, Or Terrorist Groups? date: March 18, 2008 group: United States Army Counterintelligence Center, Cyber Counterintelligence Assessments Branch; De- partment of Defence Intelligence Analysis Program author: Michael D. Horvath link: http://wikileaks.org/file/us-intel-wikileaks.pdf pages: 32 Description By Julian Assange ([email protected]) This document is a classifed (SECRET/NOFORN) 32 page U.S. counterintelligence investigation into WikiLeaks. “The possibility that current employees or moles within DoD or elsewhere in the U.S. government are providing sensitive or classified information to Wikileaks.org cannot be ruled out”. It concocts a plan to fatally marginalize the organization. Since WikiLeaks uses “trust as a center of gravity by protecting the anonymity and identity of the insiders, leakers or whisteblowers”, the report recommends “The identification, exposure, termination of employment, criminal prosecution, legal action against current or former insiders, leakers, or whistlblowers could potentially damage or destroy this center of gravity and deter others considering similar actions from using the Wikileaks.org Web site”. [As two years have passed since the date of the report, with no WikiLeaks’ source exposed, it appears that this plan was ineffective]. As an odd justificaton for the plan, the report claims that “Several foreign countries including China, Israel, North Kora, Russia, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe have denounced or blocked access to the Wikileaks.org website”.
    [Show full text]
  • A/HRC/WGEID/118/1 Advance Edited Version
    A/HRC/WGEID/118/1 Advance Edited Version Distr.: General 30 July 2019 Original: English Human Rights Council Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances Communications transmitted, cases examined, observations made and other activities conducted by the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances* 118th session (13–22 May 2019) I. Communications 1. Between its 117th and 118th sessions, the Working Group transmitted 50 cases under its urgent action procedure, to: Bangladesh (3), Burundi (3), Egypt (19), India (1), Libya (1), Pakistan (11), Russian Federation (1), Saudi Arabia (1), Sudan (1), Syrian Arab Republic (2), Turkey (6) and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (1). 2. At its 118th session, the Working Group decided to transmit 172 newly reported cases of enforced disappearance to 19 States: Algeria (5), Burundi (31), Cameroon (1), China (20), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (14), Egypt (2), Eritrea (1), India (17), Iran (Islamic Republic of) (4), Libya (2), Mexico (2), Pakistan (12), Republic of Korea (1), Saudi Arabia (2), Sri Lanka (45), Syrian Arab Republic (10), Tunisia (1) United Arab Emirates (1) and Yemen (1). 3. The Working Group clarified 62 cases, in: Azerbaijan (1), Bangladesh (2), China (1), Egypt (39), Morocco (4), Nigeria (2), Pakistan (3), Saudi Arabia (3), Syrian Arab Republic (1), Thailand (1) Turkey (4) and Ukraine (1). A total of 50 cases were clarified on the basis of information provided by the Governments and 12 on the basis of information provided by sources. 4. Between its 117th
    [Show full text]