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JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

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S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20320619 DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS,JOINT TASK FORCEGUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION,GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09350 JTF-GTMO-CDR 19June 2007 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander,United StatesSouthem Command. 3511 NW 9lst Avenue. Miami,FL33172. SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000079DP(S) JTF-GTMO DetaineeAssessment 1. (S//NF) Personal Information: o JDIMSAIDRC ReferenceName: FahedA al-Harasi o Aliases and Current/True Name: Fahd Atiyah Hamza Hamid al-Harazi" Hassanal-Makki. FahedFahad" Khalid. Abu Hassan. al-Sharif. Abu Barak o Placeof Birth: Mecca. SaudiArabia (SA) o Date of Birth: 18 November 1978 o Citizenship: SaudiArabia o InternmentSerial Number (ISN): US9SA-000079DP 2. (U//T'OUO) Health: Detaineeis in good health. 3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommendsthis detaineefor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previouslyassessed detainee for Continued Detentionwith TransferLanguage on 26May 2006. b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detaineeis reportedto be a memberof al-Qaida. He was identified as having attendedmilitant training and was an instructor at the al-Qaida al- Faruq Training Camp. Detaineewas in Afghanistan (AF) since 1999 during which he is assessedto have participated in hostilities againstUS and Coalition forces as a member of Classifiedby: MultipleSources REASON:E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED,Section 1.4(C) Declassi$on:20320619 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20320619 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20320619 JTF-GTMO.CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000079DP(S) UsamaBin Laden's (UBL) 55th Arab Brigade.l Detainee'sname and aliaswere listed in recovereddocuments associated with al-Qaida, and the Saudi Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Investigations(Mabahith) identified him as a high priority detainee. JTF- GTMO determinedthis detaineeto be: o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to posea threatto the US, its interestsand allies o A HIGH threat from a detention perspective o Of MEDIUM intelligencevalue c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outline changesto detainee'sassessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changesin this assessmentwill be annotated by F next to the footnote.) o Identified detaineeas being a trainer in a camp in Kabul and possibly a poisons trainer o Identified detaineein additional al-Qaida affiliated guesthouses o Added aliasesfor detainee 4. (S//NF) Detainee'sAccount of Events: The following sectionis based,unless otherwise indicated, on detainee'sown account. Thesestatements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. ^. (S/A[F) Prior History: Detaineecompleted at least 15 yearsof school. During that time, he attendeda mosquenext door to his residencein Mecca. Detaineeheld no jobs after "non-religious" graduation,but spenthis time with friends.2 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: While attendingthe mosque,detainee met a Pakistani named Abdul Jalil who told detaineehe neededto go and fight in jihad. An individual namedMajid told detaineethat they both could go to Afghanistan and then retum to Saudi Arabia after only a short time. Majid ananged their travel, obtained Pakistani visas, and paid for all travel expenses. In March 2001, detaineeand Majid traveled to Karachi, Pakistan(PK), via Damascus,Syria. In Karachi, they were met by an unidentified Pakistani, t AnalystNote: The 55thArab Brigadeserved as UBL's primarybattle formation supporting Taliban objectives, with UBL participatingclosely in the commandand control of the brigade.Nashwan Abd al-PrazzaqAbd al-Baqi aka(Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), US9IZ-O10026DP (12-10026), had primary operational command of the55th Arab Brigade,serving as UBL's military commanderin the field. ' 000079302 t7 - APR-2002 .| S E C R E T //NOFORN I / 20320619 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20320619 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000079DP(S) and then traveled to Quetta, PK. In Quetta,an Afghan named Muhammad met detaineeand Majid and took them to Kandahar,AF.i c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: In Kandahar,they were met by Muthanna and taken to Kabul, AF. In Kabul, detaineeand Majid attendedtwo weeks of military training, which consistedof instruction on small arms and grenades. Upon completion of the training, Nassir, who was in chargeof the camp>told detainee,Muthanna and Majid to go to Kunduz, AF. They anived at a Taliban guesthousein Kunduz the first week in May 2001. Between five and 20 Taliban soldiers were resting at this guesthouseat various times. After one week at the guesthouse,detainee and his two associatestraveled to the secondline, about three miles to the rear of the Taliban front lines. Detaineeclaimed he went to the front lines on five or six occasionswith his AK-47 but never fired his weapon nor did he seeany fighting. Detaineeremained on the lines until late August200l. In late August 2001, detaineewas instructedto retreat to Kunduz. After approximately I or 2 days, detaineearrived back at the guesthousein Kunduz. He remainedthere for two weeks until the Taliban surrenderedto the Northem Alliance. Detaineewas told they.could surrenderand were guaranteedsafe travel through Mazar-e-Sharif,AF, to Herat, AF.* 5. (S//NF) Capture Information: a. (S/AIF) Northem Alliance forces captureddetainee along with other Taliban and al- Qaidafighters approximately 24 November2001. Dostum's forcestook the prisonersto the Qala-i-Jangiprison located outside Mazar-e-Sharif. After one night in captivity, the prisonersrevolted leading to tle deathsof membersof the Northern Alliance forces and CIA "Mike" officer Johnny Spann.' Detaineewas shot in the arm during the uprising. Detainee and severalother JTF-GTMO detaineesthat survived the assaultshid in the basementuntil they were re-capturedabout a week later.6 Detaineewas turned over to US control on approximately28 December2001. b. (S) Property Held: o Miscellaneouspills c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 7 February2002 ' OO00Z9302 l7-APR-2002, Analyst Note: It ispossible that Majid is Majid al-Barayan, ISN US9SA-00051DP (sA-051). ooooo79 302 17-APR-2002 t VariousISNs OPERATION ENDUzuNG FREEDOM - Part 3 - November2001, Analyst Note: Multiple detaineesdiscussed the uprising that occurred at the Qala-i-Jangi Prison. " Deceptionat Qala-i-JangiPrison - USSOC- May 2005, 00007930217-APR-2002 3 S E C R E T i / NOFORN I I 20320619 S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 20320619 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000079DP(S) d. (S//NF) Reasonsfor Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide informationon the following: o Taliban training capabilities o Training Course for Trainers at al-Faruq Training Camp o Routesof ingressand egressfrom Afghanistan 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee'sAccount: Detainee'stimeline and accountare inconsistentwith historical events,information provided by other detainees,and recovered documents. For instance,detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan in March 2001, but he is reportedin an al-Qaidadocument as travelingin 1999. Also, detaineeclaimed he was orderedto refeat from the front lines in August 2007, but the Taliban and 55th Arab Brigade retreat occurredin November2001. He has omitted information abouthis timeline, including training, travel, activitiesand associatesin order to limit his involvementand protectothers. For the majority of his detention at JTF-GTMO, detaineehas not been forthcoming with interrogators and typically refusesto answer any questionspertaining to his activities. 7. (S//NF) DetaineeThreat: a. (S) Assessment: Detaineeis assessedto be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to posea threat to the US, its interestsand allies. b. (S//Nf) Reasonsfor Continued Detention: Detaineeis reportedto be a memberof al- Qaida. Detaineeserved as an instructor at al-Qaida's al-Faruq Training Camp. He attended militant training and is assessedto have fought on the front lines near Kunduz with the 55th Arab Brigadeagainst US and Coalition forces. Detainee'sname and aliaswere listed in recovereddocuments associated with al-Qaida. Detaineewas listed by Mabahith as a high priority detainee. o (S/AIF) Detaineeis a reported al-Qaida trainer. o (S/AIF) Senior al-Qaida facilitator Abdu Ali al-Haji Sharqawi,aka ("Riyadh the Facilitator"),ISN PK9YM-0001457DP(YM-1457), identified detaineeas Hassanal- Makki, who attendedthe class at al-Faruq Training Camp to becomean instructor.T . (S/AIF) YM-1457's statementis corroboratedby a recoveredal-Qaida document. Detainee's alias, Hassanal-Makki, was found on a list of participants for a course entitled "Training Coursefor Trainers," held at al-Faruq from Septemberto December2000. This listing statesdetainee traveled to Afghanistan t IIR 6 034oo59 05 + s E c R E T //NOFORN I I 20320619 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I 20320619 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT:Recommendation for ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control(CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000079DP(S) in 1999,attended the trainer's course,and worked as a trainer at al-Faruq. He then traveledto Mazar-e-Sharifbefore the I 1 September2001 attacks.UThe list indicated detaineewas residing in the airport complex for the duration of training.e (Analyst Note: The airport complex probably refers to the al-Qaida guesthouselocated at Kandahar airport.) o (S/AID David Michael Hicks, ISN US9AS-000002DP(AS-002, transferred), stateddetainee went by the name Khalid and
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