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UK Eyes Alpha by the Same Author UK Eyes Alpha Big Boys' Rules: the SAS and the Secret Struggle Against the IRA Lnside British Lntelligence

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UK Eyes Alpha by the Same Author UK Eyes Alpha Big Boys' Rules: the SAS and the Secret Struggle Against the IRA Lnside British Lntelligence UK Eyes Alpha By the same author UK Eyes Alpha Big Boys' Rules: The SAS and the secret struggle against the IRA lnside British lntelligence Mark Urban tr firhrr anr/ fulrr' ft For Ruth and Edwin Contents lntroduction Part One The First published in I996 1 Coming Earthquake 3 and Faber Limited by Faber 2 A Dark and Curious Shadow 13 3 Queen Square London vcrN JAU 3 The Charm Offensive 26 Typeset by Faber and Faber Ltd Printed in England by Clays Ltd, St Ives plc 4 Most Ridiculed Service 42 All rights reserved 5 ZIRCON 56 O Mark Urban, 1996 6 Springtime for Sceptics 70 Mark Urbar-r is hereby identified as author of 7 A Brilliant Intelligence Operation 84 this work in accordance with Section 77 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 8 The \7all Comes Tumbling Down 101 A CIP rccord for this book is available from the Part Two British Library 9 Supergun LL7 tsnN o-57r-r7689-5 10 Black Death on the Nevsky Prospekt L29 ll Assault on Kuwait L43 12 Desert Shield 153 13 Desert Storm 165 14 Moscow Endgame LA2 Part Three l5 An Accidcnt of History L97 l(r Irrlo thc ll:rllirrn 2LO tt),)B / (,1,1 l, I Qulgrnirc 17 Time for Revenge 22L lntroduction 18 Intelligence, Power and Economic Hegemony 232 19 Very Huge Bills 245 How good is British intelligence? What kind of a return do ministers and officials get 20 The Axe Falls 2il for the hundreds of millions of pounds spent on espionage each year? How does this secret establishment find direction and purpose 2l Irish Intrigues 269 in an age when old certainties have evaporated? Very few people, even in Conclusion 286 Whitehall, would feel confident enough to answer these questions. So the time is riSht, I think, to explore the matter publicly. Glossary 300 The aim of this book is firstlyto examine the performance of the British intelligence services during the last years of the cold war, as they finally lndex 306 came to terms with the fact that this historic clash of ideologies was over, and secondly to examine the relevance of those services in the 19gos and beyond. ln researching this book, I have had many revelations: about the effectiveness of those agencies, about their relationship with the USA, about how much government ministers knew, and many other matters. This book takes the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1gg5 as its starting point. The publication in February 1996 of the Scott Report on the 'arms to lraq' affair marks its conclusion. lt is not a study of the broad sweep of world events during those tumultuous years, but rather an exam- ination of how well British intellisence understood them, whether its prod- uct was particularly useful to those in power or to Britain's allies, and how the agencies are now trying to remain relevant in an age where many no longer believe there is any direct threat to the security of the United King- dom. I have tried to provide just enough information about events to answer these questions, but by necessity this is not a history book. ln trying to address these questions, I have been helped by the change of climate brought about by John Major's premiership, which has allowed a freer discussion of intelligence issues. Several years ago I was tempted to start a similar book, but the idea soon ran aground because so few peo- pln wo.re prepared to talk. ln writing this one, I was able to interview key vll officials and politicians: I therefore believe it is the first account of the sub- provided prevent me from referring to them in any specific way. Although ject to draw on a truly authoritative cast of players. Another sign of the they formed part of my general background knowledge, these interviews changed climate is that access to many key people is not dependent on an did not play a major role in this study. Even when available, such inter- unquestioning or 'sympathetic' journalistic approach - so I have also sought views tend to be governed by strict briefing terms, so I sought my own inter- to scrutinize areas that people in power or those giving Whitehall briefings views with individuals who had been involved with these three organizations; often prefer not to discuss. it was something of a relief not to be bound by any deals with the agen- It might be argued that now is too early to look at such recent history. But cies. About twenty people who had worked for MlS, Ml6 or GCHQ helped there are important differences between the examination of intelligence mat- on condition that I did not use their names; for this reason they do not ters and the wider business of government. Despite changes in the proce appear in the list of interviewees below. About the same number of peo- dures for declassifying government papers, those concerning the sources of ple in the Foreign Office, other government departments, the armed forces secret intelligence are likely to remain hidden from public view for decades, and industry also provided non-attributable information. perhaps for as long as a hundred years. Given the present willingness of so I would like to thank the following people who have helped me with this many people who have been involved in this field to talk, my imperative was study: Julian Loose, my editor; Nick Menzies, for valuable research help; to interview them as soon as possible, before memories fade. Jean-Claude Racape who kindly allowed me to live in seclusion at the Many in the intelli$ence agencies would still like to cloak everything Manoir des Mauvaises Lignes while writing the book; Jonathan Lloyd, my they do in secrecy: this may be necessary to protect the life of an agent, agenu Peter Horrocks, editor of Newsnight, for putting up with a corre- or it may simply be useful to those who are guilty of overspending. Even spondent distracted by book production; and most of all, my wife Hilary for in the changed atmosphere of the mid-199os, the writer on intelligence her patience in supporting me through the project. matters must respect certain requirements of secrecy. I do not reveal the The list of source interviews uses titles or ranks current at the time of names of serving intelligence officers (unless already publicly identified)' publication. ln the interests of brevity, I have avoided mentioning knight- the identity of any current agent, the precise location of buildings where hoods or peerages in the text. ln a couple of cases, quotations in the text not previously publicized, or the specific signals intelligence techniques have come from previously unpublished sections of BBC interviews that I used against any current target. conducted during the production of reports on intelligence matters. How- ln addressing the effectiveness of British intelligence collection, I tar- ever, the great majority of the people listed below were interviewed specif- geted the two principal centres of analysis: the Cabinet Office Joint lntel- ically for this book. ligence Committee staff and the Defence lntelligence Staff. These compile the assessments sentto ministers, using publicly-available information as Morton Abramowitz Assistant Secretary for lntelligence and Research well as that produced by British and allied agencies. They usually know (lNR), US State Department, 1985-9 how good signal intelligence or agent reports were on any given subject Alr Chlef Marshal Sir Michael Armitage Chief of Defence lntelligence, and how great a role British collectors of intelligence played. ln examining 1982-5 the work of the analysts themselves, I have asked the ministers or offi- Denlck Averre University of Birmingham cials who received such reports to say whether they were useful or not. Davld Blckford Legal Adviser to DG of the Security Service, 1987-95 Despite the atmosphere of greater openness, those in the principal coF Oeneral Slr Peter de la Bllli6re Commander of British Forces lection agencies - Ml6, Ml5 and GCHQ - remain very reluctant to be Middle East, 1990-1 quoted. I have however had many briefings from intelligence officials since LlcutenantGeneral Slr Derek Boorman Chief of Defence lntelligence 1985-8 1990, although the terms of strict non;rttributability on which they were th Rodrlc Bralthwalte, Chairman Joint lntelligence Committee 1992-3 viii lx Ylgal Carmon Director of Counter Terrorism (lsrael), 1988-92 George Churchill Goleman Commander of the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Unit, 1985-92 Cafiain Jonathan Gooke Director of lntelligence for Eurasia, DlS, 19915 Sir Percy Cradock Chairman of Joint lntelligence Committee, 1985-92 Gary Crocker US State Department (lNR) Part One Sir Brian Cubbon Permanent Under Secretary, Home Office, 1979-88 Dwayne Day, George Washington University, USA Sir Anthony Duff Chairman of JlC, 1982-5, Director General of Security Service 1985-7 Robert Gates Director of the ClA, 1991-3 Mikhai! Gorbachev General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1985*91 Oleg Gordievsky KGB, 1962-85 John Gordon Head of Nuclear Energy Department, FCO, 1986-8 Michael Herman, GCHQ, 7952-87 Mark Higson lraq Desk, FCO, 1988-90 Lord Howe of Aberavon Foreign Secretary, 1-983-9 Oleg Kalugin KGB, 1957*89 Richard Kellaway Chief lnvestigating Officer, HM Customs and Excise Tom Klng MP Defence Secretary 1989-92 Owen Lewls formerly Ministry of Defence (Army) Pierre Marion, Head of DGSE (France), 1981-5 David Mellor Minister of State at Home and Foreign Offices, 1986-90 Martin Morland Chief of Assessments Staff, JlC, 1984-6 Lieutenant-General William Odom Director of US National Security Agency, 1985-8 Peter Pigden Deputy Chief lnvestigating Officer, HM Customs and Excise, 1989-95 Sir Chafles Powell Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 7984-gL Julian Perry Robinson University of Sussex William Taylor Assistant Commissioner for Special Operations, Metropolitan Police, 1991-5 Air Marshal Sir John Walker Chief of Defence lntelligence, t99L-4 Lleutenant-General Norman Wood director of US intelligence community programmes, L99O-2 x tfr.
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