Boris Yeltsin's Ascent to Power: Personae and the Rhetoric of Revolution

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Boris Yeltsin's Ascent to Power: Personae and the Rhetoric of Revolution Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School 1997 Boris Yeltsin's Ascent to Power: Personae and the Rhetoric of Revolution. Matthew Thomas Althouse Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses Recommended Citation Althouse, Matthew Thomas, "Boris Yeltsin's Ascent to Power: Personae and the Rhetoric of Revolution." (1997). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 6463. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/6463 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely afreet reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BORIS YELTSIN'S ASCENT TO POWER: PERSONAE AND THE RHETORIC OF REVOLUTION A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana state University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of Speech Communication by Matthew Thomas Althouse B.A., Hiram College, 1991 M.A., Bowling Green state University, 1993 August 1997 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 9808720 UMI Microform 9808720 Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The successful completion of this study hinged on the participation of a dedicated committee. To this group, I owe my gratitude. Dr. Ken Zagacki served as an exemplary advisor. When I labored productively, he was a laissez- faire (but always vigilant) mentor. When I labored ineffectually, he was an insistent (but never ruthless) taskmaster. Dr. Zagacki blended these roles well to nurture my efforts. The rest of the committee performed their duties with equal mastery. Dr. Andrew King, Dr. Harold Mixon, Dr. William A. Clark, and Dr. William Demastes made invaluable contributions to this study. Moreover, they always provided assistance freely and enthusiastically. Appreciation must also go to those who aided my personal well-being during the composition of this document. For their persistent encouragement, I thank my parents, Rod Gabel, Heidi Brough, Dr. Dan Heaton, Dr. Sharon Croft, [email protected], David and Karen Weber, and my fellow graduate students. For their editorial and job-hunting assistance, I thank Mark Williams and Ted Reilly. And for their spiritual guidance, I thank Bruce Broberg and the body of believers at Quail Ridge Bible Church. • • 11 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...................................... ii ABSTRACT.............................................. v CHAPTER 1. A RHETORICAL EXPLORATION OF THE SECOND RUSSIAN REVOLUTION......................... 1 Introduction................................ l Rhetoric and Revolution.................... 4 Research Questions......................... 10 Justification of Study..................... 11 Review of Literature....................... 17 Social Movements...................... 18 Charisma............................... 23 The Psycho-Analytic Approach.......... 28 Conclusion.................................. 32 2. METHOD....................................... 34 Rhetorical Personae........................ 34 Persona..................................... 41 Application................................. 48 3. YELTSIN AND EARLY PERESTROIKA............... 54 Introduction................................ 54 A Politician Without Tact.................. 55 Yeltsin's Fall.............................. 68 Yeltsin's Rebirth.......................... 78 Conclusion.................................. 90 4. THE END OF PROGRESSIVE PERESTROIKA.......... 93 Introduction................................ 93 A Year of Strain: 1989..................... 94 The Economy............................ 95 Labor Unrest........................... 98 Nationalities.......................... 100 Summary................................ 103 The Party vs. Yeltsin...................... 104 The Rise and Fall of Conciliation.......... 112 Conclusion.................................. 121 5. THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENCY...................... 122 Introduction................................ 122 Prelude to the Presidency.................. 123 The Race.................................... 130 Election Aftermath......................... 139 Conclusion.................................. 143 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6. THE END OF AN EMPIRE......................... 145 Introduction................................ 145 Conception of a Coup....................... 146 The Yeltsin Factor.................... 146 The G7 Plan............................ 148 A New Union Treaty.................... 150 The Coup............................... 152 Yeltsin's Reaction......................... 156 The End..................................... 162 Conclusion.................................. 169 7. CONCLUSION................................... 171 Review of Study............................. 171 Research Findings.......................... 174 Implications................................ 182 Future Research............................. 187 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY................................. 190 VITA.................................................. 199 iv Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT This study is an examination of the rhetorical strategies utilized by Boris Yeltsin during his rise to prominence and his role in the second Russian revolution. By borrowing concepts from the study of revolutions in science, the author contends that Yeltsin used three distinct rhetorical personae, or modes of public presentation, to forward his discourse between 1985 and 1991. These personae include the revolutionary, the conciliatory, and the conservative. With this critical vocabulary, the author argues that Yeltsin's successes and failures hinged on his fitting use of rhetorical personae in relation to four exigencies during the late-Soviet era: the evolution of perestroika, the decline of progressive perestroika, the emergence of the Russian presidency, and the unfolding of the August coup of 1991. This study serves to supplement revolutionary theory which needs further investigations concerning the ways radical leadership negotiates the course of a revolutionary movement. v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I I CHAPTER ONE A RHETORICAL EXPLORATION OF THE SECOND RUSSIAN REVOLUTION INTRODUCTION The second Russian revolution was a remarkable event. For over seventy years, the fathers and descendants of the Bolshevik uprising fought to establish the Soviet Union as the spearhead of communism's march to global dominance. This aspiration to build a distinct society apart from capitalism's international influence created a myriad of geo-political alliances which shaped the course of twentieth-century history. The advance of Marxism, however, halted as the USSR failed to sustain itself. Out of the remains of this dead empire emerged an assortment of newborn countries struggling to establish stable, sovereign governments. And for the world's eminent nations, the Soviet challenge to liberal democracy and capitalism quickly perished.
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