Running head: SHOW NO WEAKNESS 1
Show No Weakness: An Ideological Analysis of China Daily News Coverage of the 2019
Hong Kong Protests
By Elena Dumm
In partial fulfillment of the degree
Bachelor of Arts with Honors in Communication
Wittenberg University
30 April 2020
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 2
Show No Weakness: An Ideological Analysis of China Daily News Coverage of the 2019
Hong Kong Protests
The 2019 Hong Kong protests began in April of 2019 in response to an extradition bill
China planned to pass that allowed Hong Kong to detain and transfer people who were wanted in other countries and had fled to Hong Kong, even if Hong Kong had no official extradition agreement with that nation (Ives, 2019). The protestors against the bill were largely young adults born at or around the handover of Hong Kong from British rule to Chinese in 1997. The protests continued throughout April and May, with the protestors creating a list of demands by June of
2019. In their demands the protesters insisted on amnesty for arrested protestors; the removal of the label of ‘riot’ on the protests; an inquiry into alleged police brutality; the implementation of universal suffrage in Hong Kong, and the withdrawal of the extradition bill. The bill was officially withdrawn in September of 2019, but the protests continued, morphing into cries against the lack of effort to meet the remaining listed demands on the part of the Chinese and
Hong Kong governments, particularly the investigation of police brutality (“The Hong Kong protests explained”).
Hong Kong, as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, has experienced protests and fights for democracy since the 1997 handover. Hong Kong had come under English rule as a result of the Opium War in the 19th century (Tsang, 2004), a war that humiliated the
Chinese nation and give it a victimhood complex that it would publicly maintain until Hong
Kong’s return to the nation and afterwards (Qing, 2000). Under British rule, Hong Kong evolved into a capitalist and democratic region, reluctant to rejoin the authoritarian government of China during the 1997 handover (Tsang, 2004). Today there are still many who believe that the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), is the greatest threat to “Hong Kong’s freedom of speech and [the]
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 3 main obstacle to their pursuit of democracy” (Du, 2017, p. 1483). The goal of this study is to examine the coverage of the 2019 Hong Kong protests by state-owned news media organizations, specifically the newspaper China Daily. In this study, I am interested in whether and how Chinese journalists use language to construct a coherent ideological framework for
English-speaking audiences to understand the protests in Hong Kong.
There is an unavoidable congruence in ideological presentation between the media and news organizations of a nation and that nation’s political system, whether it be democratic or authoritarian (Kobland, Du, and Kwon, 1992). Even in a free press, the extent to which diversity or opposing viewpoints are portrayed in media is limited (Rachlin, 1988). However, the role of the Chinese media like China Daily is widely referred to as the “mouthpiece of the Party”
(Cockain, 2012; Zhao, 2004). The Party, in turn, intends to govern according to the best interests of the people (Zhao, 2012). This leads to a strong influence by the Chinese state on how the news is told, a situation that is not unique to the nation, but is more blatant in China than in Western countries and can lead to conflicting reports between Chinese papers and foreign papers. This is likely due to the authoritarian government of China, which has far greater control over the nation’s market and press than a democratic government like the U.S. or U.K. would. Chinese journalists work by the phrase “swat flies, but don’t beat tigers” (Zhao, 2004, p. 58), choosing to cover the “flies” of individual government corruption and avoiding critiquing the “tiger” of the legitimacy of the CCP itself to protect their jobs or even their livelihood (Zhao, 2004). This method of journalism presents the Chinese government as competent to the audience both at home and abroad. But when the stories being told by Chinese news organizations conflict with the stories being told by foreign news, this presents a threat to that image; part of the reason for
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 4 this study is to learn how Chinese state media handle this type of image threat that internationally covered protest brings.
In situations of crises like the Hong Kong protests, the Chinese government has often perceived, and subsequently framed, these crises as “potential threats of the status quo” or chances for foreign powers to undermine the Chinese state (Liu & Chan, 2017). Crisis management is often delayed, due to the disconnect between the government and the people that results in an authoritarian state. A clear example of this is seen in the contemporary coronavirus epidemic, which originated in Wuhan, a city in Hubei province. Chinese authorities silenced concerns from doctors about early symptoms of the virus during the first weeks of the outbreak rather than warning citizens. The government denies suppression of information, and some health experts say that “Beijing took decisive action given the information available” (Rasheed,
2020), and began to make information public. But this transparency began only once the virus began to spread beyond China’s borders, not after hundreds of Chinese in Wuhan were hospitalized. The government’s desire to hide the issue to avoid criticism from foreign nations until it was inevitable outweighed the need to inform their own nation so they protect themselves and caused the nation to lose a critical opportunity to curb the virus at its beginning (Buckley &
Myers, 2020).
State-sponsored media are effective tools for international agenda-setting and influencing news coverage of protests in other countries, and the news media work as part of a long-term process of identity formation for a nation (Cottle, 2008; Dahlgren, Shehata, & Stromback, 2019
Steinhardt, 2015; Zhang, Khalitova, Myslik, Mohr, Kim, & Kiousis, 2017). News media also act as a valuable tool for mediated public diplomacy and managing relations with foreign nations. In the wake of the 2019 Hong Kong protests, global powers like the United States and Britain have
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 5 regarded China’s anti-democracy efforts with increasing skepticism, questioning the strength and integrity of the Chinese state. The Chinese state uses news media to counter what foreign news media are saying, both for themselves and for the rest of the world.
Journalism in China
It is impossible for media to present an event that is entirely free of a subjective interpretation of that event (Fang, 1994). Media, intentionally or not, inevitably influence their audience’s perception of a story. The role of the journalist in China has been to intentionally persuade its readership that the Chinese state always acts in the best interests of the Chinese people (Fang, 1994). The journalist also acts as a watchdog, selecting what is considered newsworthy and within the interests of the Chinese state. Journalism in the 90s evolved radically in China with the commercialization of the press and pervasive economic reforms, becoming a conflicting and difficult position. The increase in marketization in the 90s came with an increase in journalistic autonomy, and many news organizations began moving away from their previous roles as mechanisms of disseminating Party propaganda and towards the development of their own professional, independent identities. But there also came an increase in “the state’s capacity to control information” (Lin, 2012, p. 427) and threat of state punishment, ranging from probations or leadership changes to the entire news organization being shut down overnight (Lin,
2012; Steinhardt, 2015; Zhao, 2004). Journalists also had to simultaneously maintain their own personal ideologies and present the communist ideology that the State insists on maintaining, in a global context where communism had essentially collapsed (Feng, 2013). This leads to a strong disparity between the reality created by the news and the reality understood in social life, that journalists must adapt to (Zhou, 2000).
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Market incentives also led to the rise of the mass appeal urban “evening papers” in the
1990s that appealed to middle class families and competed with the “elite” papers that were targeted to wealthy urban elites and intellectuals (Zhao, 2000; Zhao 2004). China Daily, the newspaper being analyzed for this study, describes itself as a “high-end” paper (“China Daily’s
Print Edition”), targeting businessmen and intellectuals and focusing on topics relating to economics, politics or world news (Zhao, 2004).
Chinese foreign relations
Agenda building and media framing play a powerful role in the image management of the
CCP, particularly in improving its reputation on the global stage. The Chinese government paid dearly in its foreign status for its decision to violently suppress the people’s call for reform in
1989. China is still recovering today from the negative impact the protest had on their foreign relations with major powers like the U.S. The government has also had to adjust to the fall of communism, which had been developing for decades and, some argue, came about fully in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown (Feng, 2013; Zhou, 2000). Having a positive relationship with a first world nation like the U.S. is an important proven criterion for proving effectiveness as a nation in the global context (Kiousis, 2008). This has caused the government to employ many efforts at improving relations with other nations, such as focusing on the effectiveness of persuasion and transparency rather than coercion (Ki, 2006; Zhao, 2012) when communicating with foreign agents. Chinese officials’ completeness, courtesy, and assurance towards foreign reporters increased over time from 2001-2009, as part of an effort by the state to improve relationships with foreign reporters and, subsequently, foreign nations (Zhao, 2012). In addition, an increase in openness on the part of Chinese officials led to a reduction of the influence foreign reporters’ pre-formulated attitudes about Chinese government had on their
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 7 coverage of China (Ki, 2006). There has also been an increase in social media use by the Chinese government to communicate with and inform citizens. Government use of microblogs like Sina
Weibo improve citizen perceptions about the government, though the government cannot rely on social media alone to achieve trust (Lu, Zhang, and Fan, 2016).
These efforts demonstrate the Chinese state has been working on foreign relations strategies and improving relationships with foreign reporters and subsequently foreign nations.
But efforts in improving cultivations strategies with foreign reporters do not guarantee improved public relations, or an improved perception of China by foreign nations. Cheng, Golan, and
Kiousis (2016) found that Chinese media outlets’ portrayals of China’s leaders, for example, do not affect the news agendas of foreign papers like The New York Times, a paper more likely to influence American outlets’ coverage of China than a Chinese news organization. This suggests that:
“while government-sponsored news outlets often serve as a key source of information regarding internal politics in close regimes, their content may not be as relevant to foreign news media who may provide their readers with their own distinct attribute agendas” (Cheng et al., 2016, p. 756).
In addition, a study of a public relations campaign carried out by China in the U.S. in
2000 revealed that despite the large amount of work put into the campaign by China, it did little to improve American perceptions of the foreign nation. This is in part because of the political disparity between the nations, and because it has been seen that efforts to improve a foreign nation’s negative perception of another nation are often rejected by the press and people of that foreign nation alike (Zhang & Cameron, 2003).
Protest and coverage in China
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Hong Kong citizens have used protests in the last 22 years since the handover as a way to air their grievances towards China’s oppressive control. The government, in turn, selectively allows certain protests to be carried out to give citizens a chance to blow off steam. Those protests which attack the legitimacy of the state itself are suppressed or framed in a negative light to strip it of its credibility (Man Chan, 1984). The rise of social media meant that the state had to accommodate the increase in information in order to maintain its legitimacy and stability (Lin,
2012). The state employed strategies of censoring citizens and online collective activism, which included deleting online accounts and blacklisting sensitive keywords relating to protests, like
“Occupy,” on social media (Zhao, 2017).
When a debate about an event or issue is determined to be a threat to an established social order in any nation, that debate is censored in journalist conversations (Rachlin, 1988). Media coverage is essential to the life and effectiveness of a protest movement (Jennings & Saunders,
2019). The CCP is notorious for its strong censorship and suppression of organized opposition, the suppression of information about the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, and the dismissal of the Hong Kong protests in 2019 standing out as examples. The extent of the violence of the protests are common knowledge in the rest of the world, but the CCP still prohibits any comprehensive coverage of the event beyond official statements (“Tiananmen Square Protests,”
2019). In the aftermath of the 1989 crackdown, the preservation of stability, along with economic and political reform, has been the greatest concern of the CCP, more so than human rights protection (Feng, 2013). But to avoid losing credibility as a government who listens to the concerns of its people, the CCP purposefully differentiates between direct challenges to the state itself and challenges to the performance of individuals (Shao, 2018). The CCP also allows and encourages soft approaches to human rights. In 2003, a rights defense movement was created by
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Chinese civil rights lawyers and intellectuals with the intention of seeking legal protection for individual citizens against abuses by the Chinese states. Because of the movement’s approach to achieving strides through legal defense, rather than the harder approach of organized protest, the
CCP tolerates the changes made by the movement (Feng, 2013), allowing it to be covered by journalists rather than suppressed.
Social media platforms have received the brunt of state censorship, as the state makes efforts to curtail any negative representation of China or collective action against the Chinese state to the outside world. Social media platforms act as tools for individuals and organizations to communicate with their audience instantaneously and without regard to physical boundaries
(boyd, 2010). Social media can be a powerful online tool for extending a movement’s reach in enacting collective action and social change, as well as bringing both global and local attention to events that would have otherwise been obscured or covered (Eltantawy & Weist, 2011). The state uses social media platforms to gauge the public’s mood, social media on its own is not powerful enough to influence national policymaking (Luo, 2014). However, the increased relevance of online news has led to an influence of the perception of events that is bottom-up as well as top-down, suggesting that it is the users as well as the news organizations that determine what is newsworthy (Chen et al., 2019; Hermida, 2012). Future research can be done to explore the effects of offline and online media coverage in constructing the public’s perception of major events like protests.
Social movements seek out media coverage for a wider reach and dissemination of their cause (Cottle, 2008), so the CCP has also had to develop new strategies of censorship and news selection to restrict these movements. This includes the censorship of protest topics that correspond with offline collective action (Cairns & Carlson, 2016). The Chinese state uses the
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 10 news media to selectively censor those stories which critique the legitimacy of the Chinese state, while allowing stories that expose corrupt government individuals to be covered. This selective coverage by Chinese journalists acts as a safety valve for the middle and lower class in China to feel listened to by their government and helps maintain the dominance and legitimacy of the
Chinese state (Cairns & Carlson, 2016; Lin et al., 2015). Newspapers like China Daily, whose audience extends to an international audience, similarly select media content to shape international perspectives on events as well as the perspectives of those living in China.
Media Framing
Framing is the process of making certain aspects of a story more or less important than others to create an overall narrative or perception of an event. News frames are constructed from and embedded in the various linguistic strategies chosen and employed by journalists and reflect the ideology that informs perceptions of events. A reader who encounters one journalist’s account of an event will be influenced by the way that journalist frames the event, and all subsequent news seen by the reader will be affected by that initial account (Entman, 1991). Because of this, by examining the linguistic strategies like word choices or metaphors, one can discover the perceptions and assumptions inherent in the news piece. The repetition of certain language or symbols can serve to emphasize and make invisible various interpretations or perceptions of a story. Framing is used by government systems to exert political influence over the public, promoting one interpretation of an event over another (cf. Riker, 1986, as cited by Entman,
2003). Interpretations can include the assignment of blame to individuals or other events, identifying the cause of the event, and identifying possible solutions or responses to that event
(Entman, 2003).
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Media and news organizations choose how to frame newsworthy events and influence the public’s perception of that event (Chen et al., 2019; West & Turner, 2018). In nations where news organizations are controlled by the state, as in China, news are used to align the public’s agenda with that of the ruling power. The government has the greatest power in deciding what events are considered newsworthy. To be clear, this power is not specific to authoritarian nations, but is present in nations like the U.S. as well (Entman, 2003). The Chinese government uses the news to assert various narratives that define the identity of China to the Chinese people. For example, nationalism and patriotism are key components of the Chinese state agenda, and often framed in news through the narrative of victimization by other major world powers. The narrative of victimization, and examples of how China has been dominated or wounded by
Western powers like Britain or the U.S., to unite the Chinese against the common enemy of the
West. For example, the Opium Wars and the resulting loss of Hong Kong to Britain have been used to paint China as a victim of brutal and cruel conquest by the West. China maintains the determination that it has been beaten down in the past by the West, but will rise up and surpass them soon as a united and powerful nation (Woods & Dickson, 2017). Those in China who value stability and authority, and have benefitted economically from the state’s economic reforms, are more likely to buy into the victimization narrative. Nationalism in China is also found to be more prevalent among older generations than China’s younger generations (Woods & Dickson, 2017), which is a factor that may play a role in the Hong Kong protests. The Chinese government has long used news media to set their agenda and selectively censor those stories which critique the legitimacy of the Chinese state, while allowing stories that expose corrupt government individuals to be covered (Cairns & Carlson, 2016; Luo, 2014).
Methods
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Texts
China Daily is China’s first major English-language newspaper that acts as “a voice of
China on the global stage” (“About China Daily Group”) to over 20 million readers in 63 countries across the globe. China Daily’s audience, according to the newspaper’s website, consists of “high-end readers” like diplomats, international journalists and tourists who are also
English-speaking. (“China Daily’s Print Edition”). In addition to its mainland and global editions, China Daily also has a Hong Kong Edition, which concentrates on Hong Kong affairs and distributes specifically to “local governments, embassies…and high-income readers”
(“China Daily’s Print Media”), among others, within Hong Kong. A Communist paper in origin,
China Daily’s main goal is to present news that “the [Chinese Communist Party] decides the people should know” (Fang, 1994),“people” being the audience of China Daily: mainland and abroad English-speaking readers. China Daily caters to an English-speaking audience and conveys information that the newspaper sees as newsworthy and important for that audience.
And because, like many Chinese newspapers, China Daily’s main goal is to act as the mouthpiece of the Chinese government, it is a valuable outlet to study the ideological identity presented by Chinese news organizations and, by extension, the Chinese government to an international audience.
This study utilized a total of 167 articles collected from the China Daily online database.
Articles were collected from a specific week during the months of June, August, October and
December of 2019. 21 articles were collected from the month of June, 89 articles from the month of August, 31 articles from the month of October, and 23 articles from the month of December.
The anti-extradition protests begin to pick up significant speed beginning in June, with documented protests happening almost daily. June was also the month in which the 5 demands
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 13 listed by protestors was created and presented (Human Rights in China, 2020). For this reason,
June was selected as the first month of the period of study. Because of this, the study alternated months and selected single weeks of those months from which articles were collected. The specific weeks were determined using a timeline of the Hong Kong protests created by Reuters, which includes important dates relating to the anti-extradition protests from February of 2019 and continuing through November 2019. Because most event timelines were composed in the fall of 2019 and exclude December, and there was, as some articles mentioned, a “one-month-long lull” (Ruinan, 2019), the last week of the month of December was chosen.
Only articles from China Daily that were published during this time period in either the
HK Edition or HK Macao Taiwan section were selected. This in part because many of the events and articles written in the HK Edition are duplicated and published in other editions and because the number of articles composed specifically for the HK Edition is greater than in the mainland edition. There is also a greater number of opinion and news pieces in the HK edition or HK
Macao Taiwan edition than in the mainland edition. This alone shows the amount of control the state media have over what information the mainland receives, as well as the type of information
China Daily is willing to share with those who have a stake in Hong Kong affairs and would regularly read the Hong Kong edition of the paper. 25 of the 167 articles written during the time period of June to December are opinion pieces, tagged in the category “Comment HK” of the
Hong Kong edition. An American journalist who briefly worked for China Daily wrote about his experience there that most of the opinion pieces written by journalists working for the newspaper
“weren't so much arguments supported by fact, but rants supported by nothing. Many violated everything I had ever learned about journalistic ethics, including China Daily's own code:
"Factual, Honest, Fair, Complete."” (Moxley, 2013). The news pieces written in the Hong Kong
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Edition are marked by the tag “Hong Kong,” or “HK Macao.” The news pieces are very similarly lacking in the tenets of factuality, honesty, fairness and completion, and are difficult to tell apart from the opinion pieces without the tags to differentiate them.
This study of Chinese news media during the Hong Kong protests will be analyzed using ideological criticism. In conducting a study using ideological criticism, the researcher first identifies the presented elements that are clearly seen in the artifact. In this case, the presented elements are the language used by journalists as they describe the protestors, the protests, the
Hong Kong police and government, Western nations, and China itself. After identifying the presented elements, the researcher then identifies suggested elements, drawing conclusions about the ideology being enforced the presented elements, in this case the language used in the articles
(Foss, 2009). Approaching communication from an ideological scholarly perspective acknowledges that multiple ideologies exist in any culture and will become manifest in rhetorical artifacts. Rhetorical artifacts like opinion pieces and news are used to construct people’s understanding of the events around them (Foss, 2009; Sillars & Gronbeck, 2001). Ideological criticism is particularly concerned with power relations within a culture and how they are maintained over time (Sillars & Gronbeck, 2001). In a culture, certain ideologies become more privileged over others, becoming the dominant, or hegemonic, ideology. The hegemonic ideology then serves as a form of social control that the dominant groups use over groups with less power.
Media organizations, regardless of the state influence, typically align closely with the ideology of their ruling government and so are more likely to portray anti-government protests in a hostile manner (Kobland et al., 1992; Shahin, Zheng, Sturm, & Fadnis, 2016). At the same time, consumers of online news content are more like to seek out news that is ideologically
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 15 consistent with their beliefs (Dahlgren et al., 2019). The CCP, then, has the task of convincing readers both at home and abroad that the ideology deliberately presented by the Chinese state is congruent with the ideologies of those readers through selective censorship of protests of any collective action that does not conform to state’s hegemonic ideology (Lin, Chang, & Zhang,
2015; Shao, 2018). Foss (2009) argues that “To maintain a position of dominance, a hegemonic ideology must be renewed, reinforced, and defended continually through the use of rhetorical strategies and practices,” (p. 210), and we can see this in Chinese State news media. The media
“perpetuates particular ideologies” (Foss, 2009, p. 211) through various narrative constructions that reinforce the sovereignty of the state (Sillars & Gronbeck, 2001). China’s press specifically acts as a mouthpiece for the Party, a propaganda technique to directly enforce its ideology of power. This perpetuation convinces the dominated parties that they are supposed to be dominated, that this is the “natural” way of things (Sillars & Gronbeck, 2001, p. 264). The dominant power of the state rules China and its administrative regions of Taiwan, Macao and
Hong Kong with its authoritarian rule. The political power of the Chinese state gives the government the ability to influence the thoughts and actions of others through laws. However,
Chinese nationalism also possesses a great amount of social power, which influences people’s perceptions of reality (Sillars & Gronbeck, 2001). The amount of emphasis in Chinese culture on the family as a single unit, and the value of stability and harmony above all else, certainly play a role in the way people will perceive social disruption and protest.
Analysis
The articles written in China Daily enforce an overall hegemonic ideology of rightful ownership; it attempts to convince its readership that Hong Kong is a part of China, and any effort of the part of foreign governments or protestors to separate Hong Kong from the “one
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 16 country, two systems” principle will be in vain. The protestors are undermined and framed as, at times, irrational children who don’t understand what they’re protesting, and at other times as a dangerous inconvenience to the lives of ordinary Hong Kong citizens, particularly because what they are fighting for is not, in the eyes of the journalists working at China Daily, what Hong
Kong needs. In addition, this ideology depicts the protestors as acting under the authority of foreign governments like the US, who interfere ultimately to undermine China. The journalists of
China Daily use these four separate frames to strip the protestors of their credibility and shame them into ending their opposition of the extradition bill. In doing so, the journalists enforce the overall hegemonic ideology of the legitimate authority of the Chinese government.
East vs. West
China Daily chooses to focus on foreign intervention in the protests, assigning most of the blame to West, specifically the U.S. The organization believes the US and UK (and even
Germany a bit) are plotting to undermine China. Because of Hong Kong’s Western connections, the organization warns its readership “not to underestimate” (Bajun, “Xi’s leadership”) Western influence. This is a sentiment that quickly grows stronger as the protests persist. By the end of
December 2019, it becomes essentially a fact that it is Western powers that are behind the protests and need to remove their “black hands” (Bajun, 2019). Several articles condemn both the UK and US for their foreign involvement and demand them to remove their interference. The word “foreign” is used 14 times in June and 15 times in August to refer negatively to Western governments or international coverage of the protests. One article refers to “some foreign power” that is “playing a role in stirring this confliction over the fugitive rendition bill” (Kwok, 2019).
Another article explicitly claims that foreign governments are “controlling” the opposition camp and telling “insidious lies” about the extradition bill because they “just cannot stand...the
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 17 mainland as a whole” (Staff Writer, 2019). Journalists accuse Western governments of manipulating the minds of Hong Kong youths to “topple” (“US only shooting,” 2019) the
HKSAR government, and by extension, China. This association between the West and hostility or victimization is commonly employed by Chinese news to further cement Chinese nationality
(Chen et al., 2019). The US wants “to separate Hong Kong from China” (Han, 2019). Any support that is offered to the protestors from foreign countries, whether amnesty or calls to provide support, is interpreted as an attempt to “destabilize” the People’s Republic of China
(Vitchek, 2019). The ‘West’ is specifically blamed as the enemy of China; one article blames
“certain Western governments led by Washington” (Bajun, 2019) as a source of discord and misinformation in Hong Kong. Another article asks Western countries to stop supporting the protests and attempting to intervene in “Hong Kong affairs of any form” (“Violent, disruptive protests,” 2019). If a Western nation is specified, it is usually the U.S.
Accusations are also made towards foreign journalists for spreading misinformation about the reality of the protests. These accusations are not just reserved for Western media power, as an international newspaper in Singapore is accused of “misrepresenting” the state of the protests by portraying the protestors as “freedom fighters” and the police as “oppressive.” In the view of China Daily, the opposite is the true, and the protestors are wild radicals with inconsistent views and irrationality.
These presented elements create a feeling of animosity toward Western powers who have been viewed by China as either inferior to China or in opposition to China’s development as a nation. Western powers like the U.S. are evil-minded, willing to infiltrate and corrupt the lives of the youth of Hong Kong to ultimately topple China. This is a narrative of possessiveness, of “us against them;” no other nation knows how to handle Hong Kong and the protestors there except
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 18 the Hong Kong government and, ultimately, China. This frame creates an inconsistency in how
China Daily appears to perceive its international, English-speaking audiences. The newspaper takes great pride in its wide circulation to foreign businesspeople, but it is hard to see how this defamation of Western powers would be perceived by Western readers of the newspaper. There are foreign individuals who occasionally write opinion pieces for China Daily who support
China and the HKSAR, and similarly condemn the actions of the U.S. or U.K. government.
There is the possibility that the international audience of China Daily all support the Hong Kong government, but not enough information about the audience demographics are available to know for certain.
Rational vs. Irrational: Representations of Protestors
China Daily attempts to humiliate protestors by representing them as an irrational and dangerous group who is initially unaware of the havoc they are wrecking on their city, but as the protests progress become aware and so are putting the lives of ordinary Hong Kong citizens in danger purposefully. Most of the protestors are high school or college-aged, and the protestors are urged to recognize that the decisions they make today will affect the Hong Kong they live in as adults. At the outset of the protests, the protestors are commended for being “noble and altruistic” (“Youngsters Need to Consider,” 2019). But they are advised to take a more practical or reasonable stance, learning to express their discontent in a calmer manner. One journalist warns that the youths who are currently “waging war on [Hong Kong] society” will “themselves be the ultimate victims” or the “real losers” (Cross, 2019). As the protests continued into August, the protestors were portrayed as increasingly irrational, dangerous and unwilling to listen to sense. The longer the protests continued, the worse the consequences for everyone in Hong Kong will be. One article explained that the protests “have dented tourist sentiment, Hong Kong's
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 19 economy and the city's international image,” (Li, 2019) and because the protestors would not win public support, all they were doing was making the situation worse.
In April, the initial protests of the amendments to the extradition bill were seen as
“merely trying to spread ‘political panic’” (Shusi, 2019). The word “disrupt,” or some variation, was used 62 times throughout the study time frame to refer to the protestors and their actions.
The protestors were painted as entities disturbing the lives of ordinary Hong Kong residents who didn’t want to take part. The road blockades, airport sit-ins, and train delays caused by the protestors are mentioned frequently. In addition to the more general inconveniences, China Daily focuses on the disruption to the economy the “opposition camp” (Lok-Sang, 2019) was causing.
Hong Kong’s economy did see a sharp decline in tourism and retail growth, and relief measures were instilled by the HKSAR to support small or medium-sized businesses who struggled as tourists and citizens alike avoided going out during the unrest. There are some articles that acknowledge that the root of these economic troubles may lie in the economic disparity in Hong
Kong rather than solely on the shoulders of the protestors, but these are few and far between, outnumbered by those who directly and solely assign blame to the “troublemakers.”
Protestors are simultaneously framed as irrational young children, who couldn’t possibly know what was best for them and Hong Kong the way China does, and dangerous and violent enemies who seek only to ruin Hong Kong’s prosperity. These narratives attempt to demoralize the protestors and shame them into giving up, and to rally the non-protesting Hong Kong citizens against the protestors. It enforces the ideology of rightful ownership by denouncing any other claims that Hong Kong does not rightfully belong to China as a result of foolishness or a misunderstanding of the Basic Law. Those who claim that Hong Kong ought to be independent
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 20 are stripped of their credibility by the journalists at China Daily, enhancing the credibility of the
Chinese government.
Inconvenience: Representations of Protests
Protests were increasingly referred to as “violent demonstrations,” that had deviated from the “peaceful demonstrations” at the outset. More frequently used was the term ‘riot’ to reference the protests and reflect the increasing violence on both sides. Some journalists took pleading tones to appeal to the emotions of their readers. One article cites an individual who wishes the protests would end and hopes that “the violent behavior will stop, dialogue will resume, peace and quiet will return” (Dun, Leshao, & Mingjie, 2019). Other journalists admonished the protestors, citing the HKSAR’s central government’s condemnation of the protests, as well as that of specific organizations like the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of
Hong Kong (DAB), who stated that the protests “seriously threatened the safety of Hong Kong people and disrupted law and order” (Zimo & Shusi, 2019) at the protestors, asserting that the only way to truly end the conflict was for the protestors to end their violence and listen to the
HKSAR. The only thing they were accomplishing was inconveniencing the daily lives of Hong
Kong citizens.
Journalists again appeal to their readers’ emotions by sharing stories of individuals or families whose livelihood has suffered because of the protestors, and who are now failing to make ends meet. One article shares the story of a family of tourists from Taiwan whose flights were rescheduled because of the August protests that had briefly shut down the Hong Kong
International Airport. The family was eager to return home to those who were “worried about their safety.” The same article also tells the story of an individual who worked at a retail shop that had to close due to safety concerns, and said that it is “not easy for ordinary people to make
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 21 a living” (Yan, 2019) when their jobs are forced to close because of the protests. If only the protestors would “return to reason…to avoid further negative impact on people’s livelihood and
Hong Kong’s economy” (“Hong Kong’s airport implements,” 2019). The focus on how the protests disrupt the daily lives of ordinary Hong Kong citizens attempts to convince readers that the protestors ultimately do not have Hong Kong people’s best interests in mind.
The use of emotion and stories of the endangerment of individuals’ livelihood further serves the narrative of the danger and ultimate futility of the protestors’ actions. While the protestors view this change as a necessary evolution to keep pace with the rest of the world, the
Chinese government frames the change as an unnecessary evil. The journalists highlight the negative impact the protests have on the lives of Hong Kong citizens to convince readers that the opposition does not truly have the best interests of Hong Kong at heart. China, on the other hand, does have Hong Kong’s best interests at heart, and if the protests ended, Hong Kong would return to a state of unity and stability under the rightful ownership of the Chinese state.
Authority: The Rule of Law
Finally, China Daily focuses on the necessity to always submit to the authority of the ruling government. The “rule of law” is mentioned a total of 59 times throughout the period of analysis. The most important thing for Hong Kong’s society is to “restore law and order” (Li,
2019), and the biggest crime the protestors/demonstrators/rioters were committing was standing in the HKSAR’s way and preventing this law and order from returning to full force. There is the assurance, though, that despite all the violence and inconvenience from the protestors, and all the interference and help from foreign nations, the protestors will never separate Hong Kong from
China.
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 22
There is a three-tiered structure of authority present in the protests. At the bottom is the police, who are lauded as calm and rational as they “battle” violent and radical protestors
(Vitchek, 2019). Any violence the police use against the protestors is considered justified and mild in comparison to the acts of police brutality towards people in other countries. One article condemns those who criticize the police for using tear gas or rubber bullets to stop the protestors, saying that “these are precisely the right equipment that would beat back a charging mob without causing any real harm. Their humane tactics deserve praise and public support.” The article describes the police as demonstrating “the highest professionalism, while operating in extremely difficult circumstances” (Kwok, 2019). Another article states that “the police actions are in response to serious public order challenges and violent crimes” (Xiao, 2019). Because the actions are justifiable, they should not be qualified as violence or brutality, regardless of the demands the protestors make about police brutality. In addition, the actions taken by the Hong
Kong police are compared with the actions taken by law enforcement before the 1997 handover.
The current police are described in one article as possessing great restraint “for fear of violent clashes - compare that treatment with the hundreds killed in protests under British rule” (“Hong
Kong’s ignorant protestors,” 2019). This comparison is another intentional dig at Western powers who are depicted as hypocritical by China Daily for criticizing the Hong Kong police while they themselves have examples of police violence as a response to protests.
The second tier of power is the HKSAR government. The people of Hong Kong are called to give unwavering support of the HKSAR, who is stated as acting only in the best interests of the people of Hong Kong. For example, when Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced the suspension of the extradition bill in June, an article specified that the “SAR government had carefully evaluated the situation for the greatest interests of Hong Kong” (Wu &
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 23
Desheng, 2019). The original amendments to the extradition bill were brought forth to “plug legal loopholes” (Zhong & Bingcun, 2019) in the city’s extradition laws to uphold lawfulness and justice. The region’s government sought to act only “in accordance with the law,” (Zimo &
Shusi, 2019). One article emphasizes that “the HKSAR government attaches great importance to human rights and freedoms and is determined to safeguard them” (Shusi, 2019) within Hong
Kong. Another article tells of the HKSAR setting up a Crisis Management Committee ahead of the October 2019 elections to determine how to best protect people at polling stations in case of a
“riot, violence or any form of risk that might endanger public safety on polling day” (DC polls session, 2019).
The final tier of authority within the context of the protests is China itself. Hong Kong ultimately belongs to China: “any country, entity and individual should not be allowed to destroy the sovereignty and security of China and 'one country, two systems' as Hong Kong is Hong
Kong of China” (Xiao, 2019). The situation surrounding the protests and the bill itself were described by journalists as “purely China’s internal affairs that brook no interference from any country, organization or individual” (Wu & Desheng, 2019). Any interference is then interpreted as a denial of the ability of China to handle its own internal affairs, and attack on the Chinese government. This is the reason that any foreign interference in the protests is forbidden, and the reason that the protests themselves are fundamentally “anti-China” (van Scheltinga, 2019). China is also portrayed by an article as “firmly committed to defending national sovereignty, security and development interests (“Commissioner’s Office,” 2019). In all the articles written about the
Hong Kong protests, none of them mention China’s role in handling in protests in a negative or critical manner. Some articles call to Hong Kong citizens as well as foreigners to band together to “promote reconciliation, dialogue and social peace” (Flores, 2019). Some critique the amount
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 24 of influence the “opposition” has in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, stating that the Hong
Kong government should take measure to keep the opposition at bay and elect members of the
Council “who will [focus on Hong Kong] society's interests instead of their own” (Li, 2019). Li’s article, which criticizes the HKSAR and urges them to act differently to prevent oppositional influence, carries a disclaimer at its end stating that Li’s views “do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily” (Li, 2019). A criticism of just the Hong Kong government requires a careful disclaimer; there is no hint of a criticism of the Chinese government in any article.
China Daily uses the hegemonic ideology that China ultimately has ownership of Hong
Kong, and nothing that the protestors – or any foreign powers – do will change that. Hong Kong is not simply a special administrative region of China; it belongs to China and is a part of China.
Like a possessive parent who refuses to acknowledge the rebellious demands for independence of her young teenager, China denies Hong Kong’s desire for independence and universal suffrage. But in order to enforce this ideology, China Daily must completely deny or ignore all other information being reported by foreign newspapers, regardless of any incongruities that arise from a denial of other reports.
Conclusion
China Daily uses news coverage of the Hong Kong protests to reinforce the hegemonic ideology of the ultimate and infallible authority of the Chinese government. To do this, the paper uses language that strips the protestors of their credibility and asserts the dominance of the Hong
Kong and Chinese authority. The protestors are considered irrational, ignorant and inconvenient, acting under the influence of Western powers, who are also identified as ignorant and labeled as an enemy to the success of China. Hong Kong citizens, according to China Daily, would never consider criticizing the Hong Kong government – and by extension, the Chinese government –
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 25 unless being manipulated by Western powers like the US to think so. These ideas are not stated as opinion; they are stated as an irrefutable fact by the entire China Daily newspaper. The ideology the paper maintains is so black and white, however, that it ignores fact and rational arguments made by others that come to conclusions that differ with what China Daily presents.
For example, it is unclear whether universal suffrage was included in the Basic Law written for the Chinese handover. Some articles insist that it wasn’t included, so there’s no point in trying to fight for it, while others claim that it was included, so protestors shouldn’t be protesting for something they already have. There is also no acknowledgment of foreign reporters’ accounts and accusations of police brutality beyond an immediate decertification of that account. In order to make their case, China Daily refuses to engage in any tenets of rational logic or discussion, choosing instead to block out any opposing arguments.
This ideology ultimately serves to strengthen the Chinese government’s authority in the eyes of China Daily’s audience. Presenting the government as the rightful owners of Hong Kong furthers its image as competent and in control of their internal affairs, rather than showing weakness in admitting that the Chinese government does not have a proper grasp on its territory.
It is this same reason that caused the delay in communication about the coronavirus, and the same reason that Chinese authorities still censor most conversations about the Tiananmen Square massacre: if China is seen to have any weakness, then they are not fit to be considered a major world power like the U.K. or the U.S. When faced with an event that threatens China’s image of competency like an anti-government protest in Hong Kong, the Chinese government –and state- controlled newspapers like China Daily – must preserve China’s authority by enforcing the hegemonic ideology that China rightfully owns Hong Kong and is capable of managing its problems. Further, it reinforces the idea that the people of Hong Kong believe this ideology as
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 26 well. Anyone who doesn’t believe that Hong Kong belongs to China is simply misinformed or acting under the influence of an evil foreign power set on toppling China.
The 2019 Hong Kong protests are not the first protests held over the freedom of Hong
Kong, and they likely will not be the last. Because the Chinese government is willing to do just about anything, from presenting stories that blatantly conflict with information from other sources to shutting down individuals or organizations who say anything they don’t like, to protect their image, it is unlikely that these protests will have a significant impact on the freedom of Hong Kong. As long as the CCP has anything to say about it, Hong Kong is and will remain a true and complete part of the Chinese nation.
Whether this ideology is enforced in other circumstances of protest in China or its administrative regions is uncertain. Future study should be conducted to find whether this ideology is regularly enforced to undermine protestors. Similarly, it would be useful to study the linguistic strategies that state-controlled newspapers in authoritarian nations like China employ during protests or other crises.
SHOW NO WEAKNESS 27
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