Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power
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Internet Surveillance in China
The Architecture of Control: Internet Su rveillance in China James A. Lewis , Center for Strategic and International Studies July 200 6 Security concerns shape China’s official internet and information technology strateg ies . Th ese include concerns shared by many cou nt ries: promoting a strong and growing economy , providing information assurance , and defending against foreign intrusions into China’s information space . Most importantly for the Chinese, information security include s a political element not foun d in many other nations – c ontrol by the party and the state over communications and the flow of informa tion . The rapid spread of internet access and mobile communications pose a serious challenge to this goal. In response, China’s security apparatus is reorienting its informational defenses. In the past, the emphasi s was on blocking access - the “great firewall.” In the future, the emphasis will be on the monitoring and surveillance of online activities. China’s primary objective in internet securi ty is political – preventing IT from eroding the regime’s authority. Information security is defined in China as “a comprehensive concept understood in a broad sense, and it involves political, economic, cultural, ideological, media, social and military l evel or field. ” It includes “data, system, network, infrastructure .”1 Chin ese officials worry about the potential of the Internet to contribute to the loss of state secrets , offer new avenues for organizing dissent and opposition , and spread “harmful inf ormation. ” This makes controlling access to "harmful network information” and the ability to monitor and intercept communications top priorities .2 For China’s leadership, one particular set of event s demonstrated the risks of not securing networks. -
China, Encryption Policy, and International Influence 3
A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY China, Encryption Policy, and International Influence ADAM SEGAL Series Paper No. 1610 Hanging over the stand-off between the FBI and Apple over access to an encrypted iPhone used by one of the San Bernardino attackers was the question: What would China do?1 If Apple created unique software that allowed Washington access to the phone, would that open the door for Beijing to make similar demands on the company and all other foreign technology firms operating in China? As Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon argued, “This move by the FBI could snowball around the world. Why in the world would our government want to give repressive regimes in Russia and China a blueprint for forcing American companies to create a backdoor?”2 There was, at least at the rhetorical level, interaction between Chinese and US policymakers on the question of encryption. An early draft of China’s counterterrorism Law and Technology, Security, National law, for example, included provisions requiring the installation of backdoors and the reporting of encryption keys. President Barack Obama criticized these provisions in a March 2015 interview with Reuters, claiming they “would essentially force all foreign companies, including US companies, to turn over to the Chinese government mechanisms where they could snoop and keep track of all the users of those services.” He added, “We’ve made very clear to them [the Chinese government] that this is something they’re going to have to change if they expect to do business with the United States.”3 A few days -
Who Set the Narrative? Assessing the Influence of Chinese Media in News Coverage of COVID-19 in 30 African Countries the Size Of
Who Set the Narrative? Assessing the Influence of Chinese Media in News Coverage of COVID-19 in 30 African Countries The size of China’s State-owned media’s operations in Africa has grown significantly since the early 2000s. Previous research on the impact of increased Sino-African mediated engagements has been inconclusive. Some researchers hold that public opinion towards China in African nations has been improving because of the increased media presence. Others argue that the impact is rather limited, particularly when it comes to affecting how African media cover China- related stories. This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by exploring the extent to which news media in 30 African countries relied on Chinese news sources to cover China and the COVID-19 outbreak during the first half of 2020. By computationally analyzing a corpus of 500,000 news stories, I show that, compared to other major global players (e.g. Reuters, AFP), content distributed by Chinese media (e.g. Xinhua, China Daily, People’s Daily) is much less likely to be used by African news organizations, both in English and French speaking countries. The analysis also reveals a gap in the prevailing themes in Chinese and African media’s coverage of the pandemic. The implications of these findings for the sub-field of Sino-African media relations, and the study of global news flows is discussed. Keywords: China-Africa, Xinhua, news agencies, computational text analysis, big data, intermedia agenda setting Beginning in the mid-2010s, Chinese media began to substantially increase their presence in many African countries, as part of China’s ambitious going out strategy that covered a myriad of economic activities, including entertainment, telecommunications and news content (Keane, 2016). -
Internet Freedom in China: U.S. Government Activity, Private Sector Initiatives, and Issues of Congressional Interest
Internet Freedom in China: U.S. Government Activity, Private Sector Initiatives, and Issues of Congressional Interest Patricia Moloney Figliola Specialist in Internet and Telecommunications Policy May 18, 2018 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R45200 Internet Freedom in China: U.S. Government and Private Sector Activity Summary By the end of 2017, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had the world’s largest number of internet users, estimated at over 750 million people. At the same time, the country has one of the most sophisticated and aggressive internet censorship and control regimes in the world. PRC officials have argued that internet controls are necessary for social stability, and intended to protect and strengthen Chinese culture. However, in its 2017 Annual Report, Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontières, RSF) called China the “world’s biggest prison for journalists” and warned that the country “continues to improve its arsenal of measures for persecuting journalists and bloggers.” China ranks 176th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index, surpassed only by Turkmenistan, Eritrea, and North Korea in the lack of press freedom. At the end of 2017, RSF asserted that China was holding 52 journalists and bloggers in prison. The PRC government employs a variety of methods to control online content and expression, including website blocking and keyword filtering; regulating and monitoring internet service providers; censoring social media; and arresting “cyber dissidents” and bloggers who broach sensitive social or political issues. The government also monitors the popular mobile app WeChat. WeChat began as a secure messaging app, similar to WhatsApp, but it is now used for much more than just messaging and calling, such as mobile payments, and all the data shared through the app is also shared with the Chinese government. -
Retweeting Through the Great Firewall a Persistent and Undeterred Threat Actor
Retweeting through the great firewall A persistent and undeterred threat actor Dr Jake Wallis, Tom Uren, Elise Thomas, Albert Zhang, Dr Samantha Hoffman, Lin Li, Alex Pascoe and Danielle Cave Policy Brief Report No. 33/2020 About the authors Dr Jacob Wallis is a Senior Analyst working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Tom Uren is a Senior Analyst working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Elise Thomas is a Researcher working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Albert Zhang is a Research Intern working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Dr Samanthan Hoffman is an Analyst working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Lin Li is a Researcher working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Alex Pascoe is a Research Intern working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Danielle Cave is Deputy Director of the International Cyber Policy Centre. Acknowledgements ASPI would like to thank Twitter for advanced access to the takedown dataset that formed a significant component of this investigation. The authors would also like to thank ASPI colleagues who worked on this report. What is ASPI? The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber and emerging technologies and their impact on broader strategic policy. -
Xi Jinping's Address to the Central Conference On
Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major- Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics Michael D. Swaine* Xi Jinping’s speech before the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs—held November 28–29, 2014, in Beijing—marks the most comprehensive expression yet of the current Chinese leadership’s more activist and security-oriented approach to PRC diplomacy. Through this speech and others, Xi has taken many long-standing Chinese assessments of the international and regional order, as well as the increased influence on and exposure of China to that order, and redefined and expanded the function of Chinese diplomacy. Xi, along with many authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese observers, presents diplomacy as an instrument for the effective application of Chinese power in support of an ambitious, long-term, and more strategic foreign policy agenda. Ultimately, this suggests that Beijing will increasingly attempt to alter some of the foreign policy processes and power relationships that have defined the political, military, and economic environment in the Asia- Pacific region. How the United States chooses to respond to this challenge will determine the Asian strategic landscape for decades to come. On November 28 and 29, 2014, the Central Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership convened its fourth Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs (中央外事工作会)—the first since August 2006.1 The meeting, presided over by Premier Li Keqiang, included the entire Politburo Standing Committee, an unprecedented number of central and local Chinese civilian and military officials, nearly every Chinese ambassador and consul-general with ambassadorial rank posted overseas, and commissioners of the Foreign Ministry to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative Region. -
The Limits of Commercialized Censorship in China
The Limits of Commercialized Censorship in China Blake Miller∗ September 27, 2018 Abstract Despite massive investment in China's censorship program, internet platforms in China are rife with criticisms of the government and content that seeks to organize opposition to the ruling Communist Party. Past works have attributed this \open- ness" to deliberate government strategy or lack of capacity. Most, however, do not consider the role of private social media companies, to whom the state delegates information controls. I suggest that the apparent incompleteness of censorship is largely a result of principal-agent problems that arise due to misaligned incentives of government principals and private media company agents. Using a custom dataset of annotated leaked documents from a social media company, Sina Weibo, I find that 16% of directives from the government are disobeyed by Sina Weibo and that disobedience is driven by Sina's concerns about censoring more strictly than com- petitor Tencent. I also find that the fragmentation inherent in the Chinese political system exacerbates this principal agent problem. I demonstrate this by retrieving actual censored content from large databases of hundreds of millions of Sina Weibo posts and measuring the performance of Sina Weibo's censorship employees across a range of events. This paper contributes to our understanding of media control in China by uncovering how market competition can lead media companies to push back against state directives and increase space for counterhegemonic discourse. ∗Postdoctoral Fellow, Program in Quantitative Social Science, Dartmouth College, Silsby Hall, Hanover, NH 03755 (E-mail: [email protected]). 1 Introduction Why do scathing criticisms, allegations of government corruption, and content about collective action make it past the censors in China? Past works have theorized that regime strategies or state-society conflicts are the reason for incomplete censorship. -
Chen Man Fearless & Fabulous 9 December–4 March 2018
Press release 1/2 Chen Man Fearless & Fabulous 9 December–4 March 2018 The title says it all: Fearless & Fabulous. It takes both courage and magnetic For images, please contact attraction to achieve the position held by Chinese photographer Chen Man. And Fotografiska’s Head of Communications Margita Ingwall +46 (0)70 456 14 61 her success is a significant (Chinese) sign of the time. Chen Man is undoubtedly [email protected] the pioneer of China’s fashion photographer. Throughout the years, Chen Man has firmly established herself as the most sought-after and certainly the highest paid fashion and portrait photographer in China. Her works have featured across a range of leading publications, including Vogue, Elle, Harper’s Bazaar, Cosmopolitan and i.D. Her vigorously retouched images comprise several layers of narrative and in her pictorial world the current image of China is interpreted and reinterpreted. In a country in convulsions between the old and the new, Chen Man may be regarded as a representative of her generation – the Generation Y, as in »why«. In her photographs, Chen Man stages fusions between the past and the present, east and west, tradition and renewal, questioning and reformulating norms and beauty ideals. Film stars and captains of industry all want to be photographed by her. Her megastar status defies description, as she moves in the most varied of social circles of the Chinese elite. China’s No.1 leading actress Fan Bingbing will only be photographed by Chen Man, international superstars such as Rihanna, Keanu Reeves and Nicole Kidman come to China to be portrayed by Chen Man. -
Effective Censorship: Maintaining Control in China
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons CUREJ - College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal College of Arts and Sciences 2010 Effective Censorship: Maintaining Control In China Michelle (Qian) Yang University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/curej Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Yang, Michelle (Qian), "Effective Censorship: Maintaining Control In China" 01 January 2010. CUREJ: College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, University of Pennsylvania, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/118. This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/118 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Effective Censorship: Maintaining Control In China Keywords censorship, china, incentives, Social Sciences, Political Science, Devesh Kapur, Kapur, Devesh Disciplines Political Science This article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/118 Effective Censorship: Maintaining Control in China Michelle Yang April 09, 2010 Acknowledgments My initial interest in this thesis topic was generated during the summer of 2009 when I was interning in Beijing. There, I had found myself unable to access a large portion of the websites I’ve grown so accustomed to in my everyday life. I knew from then that I wanted to write about censorship in China. Since that summer, the scope of the topic has changed greatly under the careful guidance of Professor Devesh Kapur. I am incredibly grateful for all the support he has given me during this entire process. This final thesis wouldn’t be what it is today without his guidance. Professor Kapur, thank you for believing in me and for pushing me to complete this thesis! I would also like to extend my gratitude to both Professor Doherty-Sil and Professor Goldstein for taking time out of their busy schedules to meet with me and for providing me with indispensible advice. -
Donnie Yen's Kung Fu Persona in Hypermedia
Studies in Media and Communication Vol. 4, No. 2; December 2016 ISSN 2325-8071 E-ISSN 2325-808X Published by Redfame Publishing URL: http://smc.redfame.com Remediating the Star Body: Donnie Yen’s Kung Fu Persona in Hypermedia Dorothy Wai-sim Lau1 113/F, Hong Kong Baptist University Shek Mun Campus, 8 On Muk Street, Shek Mun, Shatin, Hong Kong Correspondence: Dorothy Wai-sim Lau, 13/F, Hong Kong Baptist University Shek Mun Campus, 8 On Muk Street, Shek Mun, Shatin, Hong Kong. Received: September 18, 2016 Accepted: October 7, 2016 Online Published: October 24, 2016 doi:10.11114/smc.v4i2.1943 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.11114/smc.v4i2.1943 Abstract Latest decades have witnessed the proliferation of digital media in Hong Kong action-based genre films, elevating the graphical display of screen action to new levels. While digital effects are tools to assist the action performance of non-kung fu actors, Dragon Tiger Gate (2006), a comic-turned movie, becomes a case-in-point that it applies digitality to Yen, a celebrated kung fu star who is famed by his genuine martial dexterity. In the framework of remediation, this essay will explore how the digital media intervene of the star construction of Donnie Yen. As Dragon Tiger Gate reveals, technological effects work to refashion and repurpose Yen’s persona by combining digital effects and the kung fu body. While the narrative of pain and injury reveals the attempt of visual immediacy, the hybridized bodily representation evokes awareness more to the act of representing kung fu than to the kung fu itself. -
1St China Onscreen Biennial
2012 1st China Onscreen Biennial LOS ANGELES 10.13 ~ 10.31 WASHINGTON, DC 10.26 ~ 11.11 Presented by CONTENTS Welcome 2 UCLA Confucius Institute in partnership with Features 4 Los Angeles 1st China Onscreen UCLA Film & Television Archive All Apologies Biennial Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Are We Really So Far from the Madhouse? Film at REDCAT Pomona College 2012 Beijing Flickers — Pop-Up Photography Exhibition and Film Seeding cross-cultural The Cremator dialogue through the The Ditch art of film Double Xposure Washington, DC Feng Shui Freer and Sackler Galleries of the Smithsonian Institution Confucius Institute at George Mason University Lacuna — Opening Night Confucius Institute at the University of Maryland The Monkey King: Uproar in Heaven 3D Confucius Institute Painted Skin: The Resurrection at Mason 乔治梅森大学 孔子学院 Sauna on Moon Three Sisters The 2012 inaugural COB has been made possible with Shorts 17 generous support from the following Program Sponsors Stephen Lesser The People’s Secretary UCLA Center for Chinese Studies Shanghai Strangers — Opening Night UCLA Center for Global Management (CGM) UCLA Center for Management of Enterprise in Media, Entertainment and Sports (MEMES) Some Actions Which Haven’t Been Defined Yet in the Revolution Shanghai Jiao Tong University Chinatown Business Improvement District Mandarin Plaza Panel Discussion 18 Lois Lambert of the Lois Lambert Gallery Film As Culture | Culture in Film Queer China Onscreen 19 Our Story: 10 Years of Guerrilla Warfare of the Beijing Queer Film Festival and -
Planet China
1 Talking Point 6 Week in 60 Seconds 7 Banking and Finance Week in China 8 Economy 9 Auto Industry 11 Internet and Tech 13 Energy and Resources 14 Society and Culture 2 October 2015 17 And Finally Issue 298 18 The Back Page www.weekinchina.com Red guest at the White House m o c . n i e t s p e a t i n e b . w w w Xi visits Obama in Washington, but was his US trip overshadowed by the Pope’s? Brought to you by Week in China Talking Point 2 October 2015 Pontiff pips president Xi Jinping plays second fiddle to Pope Francis on American tour China’s president grabs his moment in the spotlight with tech executives in California last week oth hold sway over more than Catholic: “We have the propaganda The Pope’s trip to the US was Ba billion people. And both got department and you have the evan - rare – it was only the tenth Papal the top job after closed-door elec - gelicals. We have the organisation visit. Even rarer was a speech in tions that remain well nigh impos - department and you have the Col - Congress, as well as another on the sible for outsiders to figure out. lege of Cardinals. What’s the differ - White House lawn (delivered in They are, of course, Xi Jinping and ence, then?” English, and ending with the crowd- Pope Francis. Adding to the sense of mystery pleasing line “God Bless America”). Some of the similarities in the or - surrounding the two organisations Inevitably this raises the ques - ganisations that the two men lead was a new one last week.