Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power

SHANTHI KALATHIL

March 2017 Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power ABOUT CIMA MARCH 2017 The Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA), at the National Endowment for Democracy, works to strengthen the support, raise the visibility, and improve the effectiveness of independent Contents media development throughout the world. The center provides information, builds networks, Introduction: Going Global ...... 1 conducts research, and highlights the indispensable role independent media play in the creation and Context: Managing Internally, Projecting Externally . . . 4 development of sustainable democracies. An important aspect of CIMA’s work is to research ways Shaping International News: to attract additional US private sector interest in and A Multi-Pronged Approach...... 7 support for international media development. In Its Own Image: CIMA convenes working groups, discussions, and A Chinese-Influenced Global Internet ...... 15 panels on a variety of topics in the field of media development and assistance. The center also issues Building Friendly Feelings: Hollywood ...... 23 reports and recommendations based on working group discussions and other investigations. These Conclusion: An Information Age Power ...... 35 reports aim to provide policymakers, as well as donors and practitioners, with ideas for bolstering Endnotes ...... 38 the effectiveness of media assistance.

Center for International Media Assistance National Endowment for Democracy 1025 F STREET, N.W., 8TH FLOOR WASHINGTON, DC 20004 PHONE: (202) 378-9700 FAX: (202) 378-9407 ABOUT THE AUTHOR EMAIL: [email protected] Shanthi Kalathil is Director of the International URL: http://cima.ned.org Forum for Democratic Studies. Previously a Senior Mark Nelson Democracy Fellow at the U.S. Agency for International SENIOR DIRECTOR Development and a regular consultant for the World Bank, the Aspen Institute, and others, she has Nicholas Benequista PUBLICATION EDITOR authored or edited numerous policy and scholarly publications, including the edited volume Diplomacy, Development and Security in the Information Age (Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy) and Developing ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR THE CENTER FOR Independent Media as an Institution of Accountable Governance (The INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE World Bank). She also co-authored Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule, a widely cited work Stephen Fuzesi, Jr. Craig LaMay that examined the Internet and authoritarian regimes. A former William A. Galston William Orme Hong Kong-based staff reporter for The Wall Street Journal Asia, Suzanne Garment Dale Peskin Ellen Hume Adam Clayton Powell III Kalathil is a member of CIMA’s Advisory Council, and also lectures Jerry Hyman Monroe E. Price on international relations in the information age at Georgetown Alex S. Jones Rep. Adam Schiff University. Kalathil holds degrees from the University of California at Shanthi Kalathil Marguerite Sullivan Berkeley and the London School of Economics and Political Science. Susan King Richard Winfield

Cover: San Francisco Chinese New Year Parade, 2013, by Shawn Clover © CC BY 2.0 Generic Introduction: Going Global

or years, China’s adaptive and largely successful system of domestic Internet censorship, known colloquially as the “Great Firewall of China,” has F been held up as an example of how authoritarian regimes might—against all expectations—successfully manage the political impact of information and communication technology.1 Now well over a decade old and still evolving, the Great Firewall has largely contained politically significant information and collective action, while still allowing the vast majority of Chinese Internet users to access their own social networks, entertainment, and some forms of news.

But China is no longer content to simply manage the information space within its borders. Without much fanfare, it has turned its focus outward, seeking to take its influence over the information environment global. Through a combination of market-oriented mechanisms, propaganda, pressure tactics, and action in international arenas, China is attempting to harness the global information ecosystem in unprecedented ways. It has focused primarily on three avenues: shaping international news media, guiding the evolution of the global Internet, and influencing global culture through Hollywood. The cumulative effect of this global reach has yet to be fully dissected or understood. China’s multifaceted effort reflects a modern, nuanced comprehension China is attempting to of what constitutes power in the information age. In utilizing the global harness the global information information ecosystem, China is certainly not alone among authoritarian governments—Russia’s disinformation campaigns have certainly ecosystem in unprecedented dominated more recent news cycles. But China now represents the ways. It has focused primarily most comprehensively successful authoritarian power in this respect, on three avenues: shaping and serves as an example to others that might emulate its efforts. While international news media, Beijing claims it does not seek to promote its own political system, its successes can encourage other authoritarian regimes through the guiding the evolution of power of example, which in turn can help roll back existing democratic the global Internet, and institutions and ensure international institutions are not weighted in influencing global culture favor of democracy.2 Such efforts can have important and long-lasting through Hollywood. effects on democracy worldwide and on the current structure of the international order.

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 1 How China 1 Influences the Global International Information News Reporting System Pressuring and influencing reporting by foreign media

Promoting outward facing news media

Evolution of the Supporting “constructive 2 Global Internet journalism” Advocating for “Internet sovereignty”

Promoting China’s largest Internet industries (“Internet Power”)

Engaging in cyber-espionage and attacks, including use of the Great Cannon

Shaping Global Culture and Opinion

Partnering with Hollywood studios on co-productions

Using its market power to influence Hollywood content

Bolstering its own entertainment 3 industry capacity Supporting festivals, sports, and cultural and language institutes

2 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG This paper seeks to shed light on this effort, looking specifically at China’s strategies to influence three aspects of the global information sphere.

1. International news reporting. China’s efforts to promote international news coverage favorable to its interests can be divided broadly into three main categories: pressuring and influencing reporting by foreign media; promulgating its own outward-facing news media to foreign audiences; and influencing the structure and values of the media in countries where it has particular influence.

2. The evolution of the global Internet. China, along with other authoritarian countries such as Russia, has been a proponent of “Internet sovereignty,” which favors authoritarian tactics to control information. It has developed sophisticated cyber capabilities, and has promoted the interests of its largest Internet companies overseas, known loosely as “Internet Power.” This approach is likely to undermine trust in the global Internet and limit the free flow of information worldwide. 3. Global culture and opinion, most significantly through Hollywood. Words like “censorship” and Although China is engaged in a number of efforts to boost its cultural “propaganda” no longer soft power, such as through sports, festivals, cultural and language institutes, and other venues, its engagement with Hollywood has the convey the breadth and largest potential reach. Because China is an increasingly important ambition of such endeavors. market for the global film industry, entertainment firms have been Rather, China is directly striking deals that help give them access to that market, but put manipulating elements of them at the mercy of Chinese censors. This leads to content either the information ecosystem edited to fit the Chinese market, or proactively shaped to exclude anything the Chinese government might consider sensitive in the first at their source. place. Chinese co-productions are also more likely to feature positive depictions of China.

What emerges is an altered understanding of the ways in which authoritarian regimes like China can wield power in the global information arena. Words like “censorship” and “propaganda” no longer convey the breadth and ambition of such endeavors. Rather, China is directly manipulating elements of the information ecosystem at their source, whether in the conceptual stage of Hollywood films or at the editorial level of news reporting. The CCP has long used multiple methods—including leverage of the private sector—to proactively harness information resources within China’s borders. Increasingly, those methods are being used to amplify China’s power beyond them.

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 3 Context: Managing Internally, Projecting Externally

History of Controlling Information Resources Much of the current discourse on China’s information-shaping capabilities revolves around how it largely contains the political impact of information vis-à-vis challenges to the ruling Communist Party. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, when optimism surrounding technology companies surged and the spread of communication technology in particular seemed inextricably linked to the spread of freedom, it seemed inconceivable that Beijing could ever hope to manage the political impact of information, particularly conveyed through what was then viewed as the unstoppable force of the Internet. Indeed, the dominant metaphors of the time—putting the “genie back in the bottle”—prevented serious consideration of how authoritarian states might still be able to control information in a digital environment. 3

In truth, control of information has been central to the Party’s strategy since it first came to power. Persuasion and information management have always been top priorities, worthy of extensive bureaucratic and financial resources.4 Under Mao, for instance, the media served the state Popular state-owned through reinforcing ideological hegemony, while telecommunications Internet media platforms were centralized under a powerful ministry. Since the Internet began such as Pengpai show that to spread within China, the state has maintained control of both infrastructure and content. Notably, it has done so through cooperation this landscape can deliver with (or cooptation of) the private sector, allowing enough freedom vital, interesting, and to innovate and capture market share while ensuring that political even political news to an discourse does not prove destabilizing. 5 ever more sophisticated This does not mean that any and all politically sensitive discourse is readership—while automatically censored or redirected. Rather, censorship is localized keeping its audience (usually within the corporate platforms that deliver content), within the bounds of internalized (so that the public has a general sense of which topics are off limits), and distributed (within different bureaucracies and acceptable discourse. organizations), so that management and containment mechanisms are built into every feature of China’s information landscape, from Internet content to book publishing. 6 Indeed, popular state-owned Internet media platforms such as Pengpai show that this landscape can deliver vital, interesting, and even political news to an ever more sophisticated readership—while keeping its audience within the bounds of acceptable discourse.7 These and other examples demonstrate that China’s current information management techniques, even domestically, do not fit neatly within the realm of “censorship” as traditionally defined.

4 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG Beyond Soft Power Nearly all states seek to extend their influence through “soft power,” generally thought of as power through persuasion and attraction rather than power through military force. The United States, through its media, culture, economy, political system, and numerous other attributes, wields immense soft power. China, which is now the world’s second largest economy and boasts over 700 million Internet users as well as several of the world’s largest Internet companies by market value, has been significantly—and deliberately—expanding its soft power. Indeed, it has learned from watching the United States, and has, over the years, rolled out a strategy to significantly increase its soft power as a way to carefully position China as a formidable though nonthreatening global power.8 As soft power scholar Craig Hayden notes, “China represents the most comprehensive utilization of resources to cultivate soft power by an international actor other than the United States.” 9 © pcruciatti / Shutterstock This soft power strategy, championed perhaps most loudly under former China, which is now the president Hu Jintao, continues today. Previous five-year plans have world’s second largest included a “going global” strategy of cultural promotion, emphasizing the need to “form public opinion powers commensurate with China’s economy and boasts over international status.”10 More importantly, perhaps, the strategy features 700 million Internet users buy-in from China’s leading entrepreneurs. In a Q&A at the time of his as well as several of the purchase of the leading English-language Hong Kong newspaper, the world’s largest Internet South China Morning Post, Jack Ma, the head of Chinese Internet giant companies by market value, Alibaba, also emphasized the need for China to build its soft power: “For eight centuries or more, China was a world-leading civilization with has been significantly— the largest gross domestic product. Because of our isolation policy, we and deliberately— fell behind. China opened up again over the last three to four decades, expanding its soft power. trying to change its system and embrace the world. The country has made great strides in growing its soft power and cultural influence.” 11

While a component of China’s soft power strategy has long been straightforward propaganda, or “thought work” as it has traditionally been known, this official line has now been overshadowed by a wide variety of more sophisticated media, communication and culture elements. More importantly, there is a strong component of market- based allure and logic implicit within China’s long-term soft power strategy. (As some scholars note, soft power is based on perception and inferences; thus, the mere perception that China may form an important trading partner in the future may extend its influence in certain regions or sectors. 12)

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 5 Certainly, Chinese leaders have recognized that market-driven communication elements can be far more effective than state- owned organs issuing stiff proclamations. With the Party setting overall guidelines, private companies and more market-oriented state institutions have, over the past several years, developed a degree of freedom to innovate and produce products that are in line with what global consumers of information and culture desire.

But to describe China’s marshaling of information resources as simply soft power does not go far enough. While not the primary focus of this paper, China has also deployed its cyber capabilities quite effectively as hard-power tools. The idea of “smart power,” a combination of both hard and soft power, might get closer to Beijing’s execution of its information strategy. 13 Essentially, China understands the idea that power is comprehensive, integrative, and multidimensional—what China scholar David Shambaugh calls “comprehensive power.” 14 Shambaugh has examined China’s efforts in several spheres, including perceptual, diplomatic, global governance, economic, cultural, and security. 15 However power in the Notably, the global information ecosystem both undergirds and information age is amplifies many of these spheres. However power in the information age is ultimately conceptualized, China seems to have devised a long-term ultimately conceptualized, plan for accumulating and deploying it. China seems to have devised a long-term Despite fluctuations in emphasis, this overarching framework has continued throughout the last several iterations of Chinese leadership, plan for accumulating and does so even now, at a time when domestic Chinese media and civil and deploying it. society are under more severe constraints than they have been in the recent past. President Xi Jinping has assertively moved to centralize and consolidate his power, partly through a tighter crackdown on dissent, targeting civil society and the media in particular. 16 The Party’s own propaganda department has not escaped scrutiny: after a two-month investigation into propaganda operations, in September 2016 the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection criticized the department for its news operations (which were found to be not targeted or effective) and for insufficient leadership in ideological work. 17 At the same time, Xi has also explicitly endorsed the long-term approach: he has elevated concepts such as Internet sovereignty, and has said he wants Chinese media to “tell China’s story” to the world, a sentiment echoed by prominent Chinese entrepreneurs like Jack Ma. 18

6 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG Shaping International News: A Multi-Pronged Approach

hina has long restricted its own journalists from reporting freely on news within the country. While it has focused in the past on monitoring foreign news Ccorrespondents within China, it has more recently beefed up its proactive efforts to shape international media coverage of China and the issues it considers vital to its national interests. It has also worked closely with news organizations in some developing countries, particularly in Africa, to instill its own brand of journalism values. Here, we look at how China seeks to influence international news in three main ways: influencing foreign reporting on China; promulgating its own viewpoint internationally through its international broadcasting and publication arms; and influencing the structure of news organizations through training and cooperation.

Foreign Reporting: Pressures at the Source China has always monitored and at times harassed foreign reporters operating within its borders. Under Xi Jinping, this practice has expanded. A recent PEN America report asserts that foreign journalists in China now face more restrictions than at any other time in recent history (although opinions vary on how severely working conditions for foreign journalists have deteriorated compared to past years). 19 PEN’s report also points out that Xi’s campaign to stifle dissent has made sources more reluctant to speak with foreign journalists, and that Chinese officials perceive foreign media as biased against China. 20 Partly because of these sensitivities and perceptions of bias, the A recent PEN America government has widened its focus from monitoring foreign journalists report asserts that foreign to broadly influencing international reporting on China (or issues that China considers vital to its security). As former minister of the journalists in China now face Information Office of the State Council Zhao Qizhang has said, “It is more restrictions than at any especially important for us to give high priority to offering explanations other time in recent history. to the international community about matters such as the human rights issue, the Tibetan and Taiwanese questions, the issue of religion, the Falun Gong cult question, and the theory of a ‘China threat.’” 21

Hence, Beijing seeks to influence international reporting through a combination of direct action, economic pressure to induce self- censorship by media owners, indirect pressure applied via proxies such as advertisers, and cyberattacks and physical assaults. 22 Moreover, China uses its own system of domestic censorship as a coercion tactic,

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 7 by threatening to block access to foreign news websites as a form of retaliation.

Two prominent examples from the recent past illustrate some of these measures. In 2012, the Chinese government blocked the entire websites (as opposed to single pages) of both the New York Times and Bloomberg in China as a consequence of those organizations reporting on financial holdings of relatives of current president Xi Jinping and former premier Wen Jiabao. As a report by Sarah Cook notes, the blocking of the Times’ newly launched Chinese website resulted in financial losses for the Times, while the website blocking plus intimidation measures (such as tailing employees) seem to have deterred some of Bloomberg’s potential business partners. Both media outlets were also subject to strong pre‑publication pressure from the Chinese government, while Bloomberg reportedly chose not to release an accompanying video segment to the Xi Jinping article after the Chinese government expressed displeasure. 23

© Bildagentur-online / Schoening / Alamy Stock Photo Stock Alamy / / Schoening © Bildagentur-online Although it is unclear to what degree the Chinese government’s overall efforts to influence coverage in this way have succeeded, the PEN report In 2012, the Chinese points out that Beijing has successfully exploited the division between government blocked the entire international media organizations’ (typically firewalled) business and websites (as opposed to single news-gathering divisions, capitalizing on companies’ desire to continue to do business in China. 24 pages) of both the New York Times and Bloomberg in Beijing also pressures foreign media operating outside of China entirely. Since Xi came to power in November 2012, Freedom House estimates China as a consequence of that China has negatively affected freedom of expression outside China those organizations reporting over 40 times in 17 different countries and institutions. 25 Beijing has on financial holdings of particularly targeted overseas Chinese language media, focusing on relatives of current president neutralizing antagonism, increasing antipathy toward anti-government 26 Xi Jinping and former forces, and encouraging investment. After publishing a column critical of Chinese diplomat Wang Yi, a prominent columnist for the Global premier Wen Jiabao. Chinese Press (a Canadian Chinese language outlet) was told that his column was being dropped because “some people don’t want to see your name in the paper.” 27 China has also extended its influence over the formerly lively Australian Chinese language media space. As one analyst wrote, “topics on which press discussion is forbidden in China have vanished also from the Chinese language media in our own country,” with two large pro-China media groups now controlling much of the Chinese language media there. 28

Hong Kong Chinese language and English language media—meant to be free from political influence after the 1997 handover of the territory from the United Kingdom to China—have long been seen as a test case. The Hong Kong media sector has been under pressure to toe the line in recent years, with many experts noticing a rise in self-censorship or less critical

8 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG discourse on politically sensitive issues. The Hong Kong Journalists’ Association issued a warning in 2016 that Hong Kong autonomy was “seriously threatened by a spillover to Hong Kong of Chinese ideological control.”29 Cook and others note that influential Hong Kong newspapers have been bought by businesses with interests in China or close ties to mainland officials, resulting in, for instance, toning down critical rhetoric and prioritizing soft news over investigative journalism. 30

In December 2015, the English-language S outh China Morning Post (SCMP) was bought by Jack Ma, the founder and executive chairman of AliBaba Group, China’s (and the world’s) largest e-commerce conglomerate. At the time, Ma promised that Alibaba’s management would not be involved in the SCMP’s newsroom operations, and that “the paper’s China coverage should be objective, reasonable and impartial.” 31 However, since then, media analysts have raised questions about the paper’s continuing independence, a concern that was highlighted during an incident in which the SCMP somehow gained access to just-released, Photo Stock Alamy Xinhua / © formerly imprisoned Chinese legal activist Zhao Wei, obtaining a self- In December 2015, denunciation of her former activities, before even her husband and lawyer had been able to contact her. 32 This was not the only such incident: a the English-language month later, prominent Chinese human rights lawyer Wang Yu, who had South China Morning been similarly detained, re-emerged in an interview affiliated with Hong Post was bought by Kong newspaper Oriental Daily, renouncing her legal work and accusing Jack Ma, the founder and foreign forces of attempting to smear the Chinese government. While executive chairman of such “confessions” by activists denouncing their former activities are not uncommon in Chinese state media, it was unusual to see Hong Kong AliBaba Group, China’s media organizations play such a prominent role. 33 (and the world’s) largest e-commerce conglomerate. Chinese Media: Projecting Ambitiously if not Seamlessly But pressuring foreign news outlets is only one piece of the puzzle. Broadly, Party propaganda seeks to cultivate the image of China’s benevolence, as a civilization and international partner. 34 China scholar Andrew Nathan notes that an important secondary theme of such propaganda is “the upholding of the Chinese style of rule, via polemics touting the benefits of Chinese-style socialism, identifying CCP rule with traditional Confucian values like social harmony, and explaining the suitability of China’s political system to China’s ‘national conditions’ (guoqing) .” 35

Thus, Beijing has also focused on amplifying China’s own voice in the global media landscape. In doing so, it has relied on “borrowing foreign newspapers,” (jieyong haiwai baokan), which has expanded from cultivating relationships with foreign journalists thought to be

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 9 sympathetic to China, to placing stories directly within foreign media, often through supplements.36 Beyond outlets owned outright by the Chinese government, it can also count on the cooperation of Chinese media investors who share interests with Beijing. According to Reporters Without Borders, this fits with a worldwide trend of oligarchs—usually with friendly, and sometimes official, ties to their authoritarian governments— buying up media outlets to enrich their business interests and further curry political favor by slanting coverage in favor of the government. 37 In the early 2000s, the China’s propaganda strategies have now evolved in an attempt to keep Party began to more directly up with the times. Previously stodgy and peppered with official-sounding language, overseas propaganda began to transform in the 1990s: the focus on creating globally Overseas Propaganda Department was renamed the “External Publicity competitive Chinese media Department” (a semantic, but telling, change). New institutions were organizations, through “charged with ‘publicizing China in an authentic, colorful, lively, and a program of zuoqiang timely way’ to effectively deal with growing fears of China’s rise in power in the 1990s,” writes Hayden. 38 Propaganda operations have now been zuoda (“Making media big consolidated within the State Council Information Office. 39 and strong”), intended to create competitive global In the early 2000s, the Party began to more directly focus on creating globally competitive Chinese media organizations, through a program media organizations. of zuoqiang zuoda (“Making media big and strong”), intended to create competitive global media organizations.40 Beyond simply seeking to reach a global audience, Beijing also sought to target specific audiences relevant to its foreign policy concerns (such as in its establishment in 2008 of a television channel for the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States).41 According to Hayden, China spent nearly $9 billion for international broadcasting and publicity in 2009–2010, with most of this going to China Radio International (CRI), China Central Television (CCTV), the official Xinhua news agency, and the English- language China Daily newspaper. Brady points out that many available figures include only subsidies to media targeting foreigners, so the entire amount may be significantly larger. 42

© dpa picture alliance / Alamy Stock Photo Stock Alamy / alliance picture © dpa These efforts vary in the extent to which they seamlessly blend into the global media landscape. The English language China Daily for the US market, for instance, has opted to place paid supplements, called “China Watch,” in mainstream US newspapers like the Washington Post. China Watch itself contains a fairly standard mix of sanitized content designed to reflect official Chinese positions and extoll the cultural virtues of China, unlikely to be confused, except by the most casual reader, with genuine reporting by the Washington Post (recent headlines included “Belt and Road ‘beyond expectations’”—referring to China’s ambitious Central Asian economic development initiative—and “Foreign Eyes Offer New View of the Long March”). 43

10 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG Yet, although the physical inserts in the Washington Post are clearly marked as advertising supplements that do not involve the editorial department of the newspaper, some have argued that the online versions might easily be mistaken for special reporting or blogging by Washington Post staff on China, as the URL is nested within the “real” Washington Post site (the current online version of China Watch can be found at http://chinawatch.washingtonpost.com/).44 China Daily inserts are also available in Europe, Asia, and Africa. 45 When the paper signed MOUs to enter the Australian market this year, it raised general worries about Chinese influence in both English language and Chinese language media,46 signifying that its efforts to not appear as propaganda may have been unsuccessful.

The expansion and professionalization of CCTV has garnered more widespread praise and acceptance globally. At the end of 2016, CCTV rebranded its international broadcasting and digital operations as China Global Television Network (CGTN), consolidating global operations and launching new mobile apps in various languages. Henceforth, all foreign / Shutterstock Jinrong © Lu language channels, digital and video content will fall under the new CCTV has significantly group, as part of a plan to adapt to media convergence. 47 expanded China’s global CCTV has significantly expanded China’s global broadcasting footprint, broadcasting footprint, opening major global offices in Beijing, Washington and Nairobi, and dozens of international bureaus, during a time when many media outlets opening major global offices worldwide are retrenching and scaling back on coverage of foreign news. in Beijing, Washington Analyst Anne Nelson notes that CCTV now produces sophisticated long- and Nairobi, and dozens form reports on complex international issues such as climate change, of international bureaus, hires world-class international journalists, and encourages independent during a time when many reporting—as long as such reporting does not cross Party red lines. 48 In this, CCTV appears to be explicitly modeling itself after Al Jazeera, which media outlets worldwide are has gained a reputation for independence and credibility in the Middle retrenching and scaling back East while being careful not to offend the sensibilities of its backer, on coverage of foreign news. the government of Qatar. Because of this, it is unlikely that norms of independent journalism are likely to become established as part of CCTV’s domestic coverage. Moreover, in countries in Africa, where CCTV has long had a presence, it is increasingly not viewed as propaganda, but as journalism with a “constructive” focus. 49

That said, the example of China Radio International (CRI), China’s state-owned international network of radio broadcasters, points to the opportunities and challenges inherent in the ambitious global expansion of Chinese state media. China Radio International’s global ambitions have not exactly been hidden, particularly after the creation of the China International Broadcasting Network, and establishment of transmission capabilities in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. 50

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 11 Yet a Reuters investigation in 2015 sparked an FCC investigation, when Reuters reported that CRI’s local US partners were three Chinese expatriate businessmen who ran the international network and in some cases owned stakes in the stations. US and Chinese corporate records showed that a Beijing-based subsidiary of CRI owned 60 percent of an American company leasing almost all the station’s airtime (US law prohibits foreign governments or their representatives from holding radio licenses for US broadcast stations). 51

State-owned media’s attempts at utilizing social media and memes to appeal to a global, information-saturated audience have met with mixed success. On one hand, even conservative state organs like the People’s Daily are experimenting with clickbait, as evidenced by such headlines as “Chairman Xi Discussed These Eight Things With Americans. We Should Definitely Listen.” 52 But the English-language Twitter feeds of Xinhua and China Daily, explicitly designed for consumption by foreign audiences, remain somewhat clunky and propagandistic in their look and feel, qualities anathema to acceptance by a global public on social media more used to ironic, snappy wit. State-owned media’s attempts at utilizing Changing The Fundamentals: Shaping Communication in Developing Countries social media and memes to appeal to a global, Like other countries, China is involved in supporting the media and communication sectors of developing countries, providing resources and information-saturated training. Unlike most other international donors in this space, however, audience have met China does not support the typical goals of such assistance, such as with mixed success. freedom of expression, editorial independence, neutral protocols, and the capacity of journalists to hold the government or other powerful actors to account.

Instead, as Douglas Farah and Andy Mosher point out, China’s primary purpose is to ensure a China-friendly media and communication sector in these countries, one that will portray China as a reliable partner. Ideally, this media sector will also support China’s policy positions on everything from opposing US policies to isolating Taiwan. 53 In turn, this forms part of Beijing’s larger aim to “fundamentally reshape much of the world’s media in its own image, away from a watchdog stance toward the government to one where the government’s interests are the paramount concern in deciding what to disseminate,” according to Farah and Mosher. 54 This also helps authoritarian governments maintain or expand control of local media. Despite China’s stated interest in not promoting its own system of government, its policies in this arena are indeed helping to do just that.

12 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG For its part, China maintains that it is simply engaging in the same type of diplomatic engagement and influence practiced by any number of Western countries. Certainly, many Western industrialized democracies seek to foster independent media sectors in developing countries in an effort to support more democratic governance. But where the development assistance community’s independent media development model would allow for journalism critical of the national government or the supporting donor’s policies, China’s model allows little room for independent criticism, and explicitly seeks to present a positive view of China. Indeed, China seeks to foster a different kind of journalism altogether, which it dubs “constructive journalism.” 55 In this model, journalism should seek to emphasize solutions and de-emphasize bad news about national governments—and China.

Apart from prominently positioning its own state-owned media in local countries, China relies on a variety of methods for helping to develop the media and communication sectors of developing countries. These include provision of direct government aid to local state-run media, for the purchase of radio transmitters and national satellites; provision of content and new technology; memorandums of understanding on news sharing (particularly in Southeast Asia); and training programs and Apart from prominently expense-paid trips to China for journalists. 56 positioning its own state-

This approach has been the subject of much discussion in Africa, owned media in local where China has long fostered diplomatic relations. The Forum on countries, China relies on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), whose fifth meeting in December a variety of methods for 2015 was attended by Xi Jinping and other heads of state, cemented helping to develop the media the continent’s continuing diplomatic importance to China. FOCAC and communication sectors action plans from the current and previous periods contain specific references to China’s active media programs on the continent, including of developing countries. the China-Africa Press Exchange Center Program’s continuing training and exchanges, China’s provision of training for 1000 African media practitioners per year, support for radio and TV digitalization, a role for Chinese company StarTimes in migrating analogue to digital television, cooperation in film and TV production, and the institutionalization of the Forum on China-Africa Media Cooperation as an official sub- forum of FOCAC. 57

China’s funding to various countries’ media and communication sectors is vast and can take many forms, not all of them easily categorized as political. Yet the net effect of such funding is to support either the state or China’s priorities, or both. In Ethiopia, for instance, Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE helped fund the expansion of Ethiopia’s homegrown WoredaNet, a state-oriented intranet. Rather than allowing individuals to independently seek and receive information, however,

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 13 In Zambia, China provided WoredaNet prioritizes communication between central government 58 significant support to officials and local districts. In Zambia, China provided significant support to ostensible public service broadcaster Zambia National ostensible public service Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), helping to extend ZNBC’s FM broadcaster Zambia signal across the country. Yet independent analysis of ZNBC’s National Broadcasting coverage found clear bias for the ruling party in its coverage. 59 Corporation (ZNBC), Arguments regarding the Chinese media and communications helping to extend ZNBC’s presence in Africa frequently focus on China’s state-owned platforms FM signal across the and their evolution from straightforward propaganda organs to country. Yet independent news organizations that are not afraid to present some hard-hitting issues. Yet the more interesting effect of Chinese state-owned media analysis of ZNBC’s coverage in Africa is in their long-term promotion of China’s “constructive found clear bias for the journalism” model, which encourages some degree of self-censorship ruling party in its coverage. and generally frames the activities of the Chinese and national governments in a positive light. 60

14 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG In Its Own Image: A Chinese-Influenced Global Internet

s noted, China has long managed information within its borders, and has generally managed the Internet’s impact domestically. But its approach A has turned outward in recent years, focusing now on influencing the institutions that govern the Internet, the norms that guide its use, and the infrastructure and corporations powering its platforms.

Such an approach is contained within a concept known in English as “Internet Power” (wangluo qiangguo, which translates directly into “Internet strong country”), promoted as part of the run-up to China’s 13th Five Year Plan (2016–2020). While not explicitly defined, official publications describe it as stepping up efforts to “encourage technological innovation, build a healthy cyber culture, strengthen infrastructure and cyber security, increase the use of information technology, and expand international cooperation.” 61 Generally, the term is seen as encompassing four major themes: cybersecurity, economic development, soft-power, and cyber-sovereignty. 62 Domestically, “Internet Power” seems to function as shorthand for more Domestically, promotion of homegrown technological innovation and growth amidst “Internet Power” seems a decline in traditional industries. On the international level, though, it appears to manifest itself in China’s actions in two key ways: 1) through to function as shorthand advocating for an Internet subject to national sovereignty, an approach for more promotion of which also merges cybersecurity with policies of domestic censorship; homegrown technological and 2) through actively promoting a more active global presence for innovation and growth Chinese Internet companies. amidst a decline in traditional industries. Internet Sovereignty— A Theoretical and Practical Concept In seeking to affect the international institutions, regulations and norms governing the global Internet, China’s approach is relatively consistent with its historic trajectory in issues of global governance. China scholar Shambaugh argues that since 2008 Beijing has sought to “selectively alter rules, actors, and the ‘balance of influence’ largely from within existing institutions—while simultaneously trying to establish alternative institutions and norms of global governance” within the international system.63

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 15 With respect to Internet governance, China is indeed seeking to do just that: work within existing institutions, such the United Nations, and utilize existing concepts, such as multilateralism. In doing so, it hopes to alter the locus of Internet governance, or perhaps more importantly, to get other countries to buy into alternative norms regarding how the Internet is conceptualized and governed. China, along with Russia, has championed the concept of Internet, or cyber, sovereignty, which embraces the right of countries to assert their own national control over the Internet. Such a concept would contribute to the fragmentation of the global Internet, and, in its framing by authoritarian regimes, conflates concepts of cybersecurity with stifling domestic protest. 64

FRAMING INTERNET SOVEREIGNTY The idea of national sovereignty in communications is not necessarily new. As communications scholars point out, for centuries governments crafted policies and regimes to promote sovereign control over their portions of cross-border information flows. 65 The advent of the Internet proved different, however. Nearly since inception, the Internet has been governed in an almost ad hoc fashion by a variety of actors, including civil society, technical bodies and private companies, who have acted as China has been reinforcing network operators, information intermediaries and technical experts. As its conception of Internet a result, states have largely been uninvolved, with Internet governance 66 sovereignty, which calls decisions being driven by technical or market considerations. for a government-centric China has sought to use prior history of state involvement in global regulatory approach communications to support its own position regarding what the Internet should evolve to look like. Over the past few years, China has been to the Internet, with reinforcing its conception of Internet sovereignty, which calls for a national governments government-centric regulatory approach to the Internet, with national determining the content and governments determining the content and structure of the Internet structure of the Internet within their borders (unsurprisingly, this describes China’s current within their borders. approach). In an op-ed entitled “Cyber Sovereignty Must Rule Global Internet,” the former director of China’s Cyberspace Administration, Lu Wei, emphasized the need for mutual understanding on such issues between the United States and China, highlighting the difference between the US position advocating multistakeholder governance. 67

The distinction seems minor, but it is important. The United States and its allies favor the multistakeholder model of governance because, in its ideal form, it involves a bottom-up process that incorporates civil society (including technical experts, NGOs, and users), government, and the private sector. Civil society actors have sought to make the process transparent and participatory, with events such as the Internet Governance Forum designed explicitly to highlight current issues and seek

16 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG collaborative solutions. The process is meant to correspond to the global Internet’s decentralized and nonhierarchical structure, which was originally conceptualized as immune to control by any single government. 68

China and other authoritarian countries advocate a multilateral process because it inherently privileges the position of states, thus putting the responsibility for governance at the feet of state-based institutions such as the United Nations and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (For the first time in history, the current head of the ITU is also a Chinese national, who some say favors greater government involvement in the development of the Internet. 69) The latter approach also finds supporters within some developing countries who may lack the private sector and civil society capacity to influence the multistakeholder process and thus feel they may carry more weight in a state-centered multilateral process.70

Developing countries may also be sympathetic to some of China’s arguments regarding US corporate influence over the Internet. In his remarks at a recent “Safe Internet Forum” organized by China and Russia, the man credited as the architect of the Great Firewall, Fan Binxing, argued that since American hosting companies control the Internet (and since these companies are controlled by the US China and other authoritarian government), the Internet was already under US sovereignty, so the only question was whether such sovereignty would be shared. 71 countries advocate a Global distrust of US government motives, fueled by the surveillance multilateral process because revelations of Edward Snowden, has helped contribute to skepticism it inherently privileges the over US support of the current, multistakeholder model. That said, position of states, thus developing countries were instrumental in creating and putting into putting the responsibility effect the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance (the NETMundial initiative), which some called a rebuttal of for governance at the feet the idea of Internet sovereignty. 72 of state‑based institutions such as the United Nations ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARENAS and the International China has streamlined its bureaucracy to better elevate Internet policy Telecommunication and consolidate domestic and international interests. In 2013, under Union (ITU). president Xi Jinping, the CCP created a Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization, meant to develop broad Internet policy. The State Internet Information Office was elevated to become the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), in charge of regulating online content.73 (The CAC’s former powerful head, Lu Wei, was instrumental in recent years in promoting China’s domestic Internet clampdown and conception of Internet sovereignty; 74 his successor, Xu Lin, thought to be closer to Xi Jinping, has imposed tightened controls over the Internet since his accession.) 75

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 17 In recent years, China has acted ever more boldly in international forums to bolster its point about Internet sovereignty and recruit potential allies. At the 2012 World Conference on Information Technology (WCIT), the United States argued that the Internet was outside the mandate of the ITU and that aspects of its governance did not belong in rewritten International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs), a 1980s treaty designed to foster global interconnection and interoperability. 76 Yet China mobilized its allies to counter this position, and in the end eighty-nine countries signed the rewritten ITRs while only fifty-five countries (including the United States) rejected them. (The ITRs only bind states that sign the treaty.) 77

But China experienced only mixed success in pressing its agenda during the Ten-Year Review of the World Summit on the Information Society, which produced a non-binding outcome document at the end of 2015. While Beijing did succeed in securing inclusion of the word

© Xinhua / Alamy Stock Photo Stock Alamy Xinhua / © “multilateral,” Beijing failed to get some of its other proposed changes Chinese Vice Premier Ma Kai speaks (such as deleting “freedom of expression and “democratic”) into the at the opening ceremony of the World document, and the document on the whole was supportive of the Internet Conference in Wuzhen. multistakeholder model of governance endorsed by the United States and is allies.78 (Earlier, China refused to endorse 2014’s NetMundial China organized its own summit resolution due to its failure to include the word multilateral in international conference, the the final document.) 79

World Internet Conference To seize momentum and assert its own agenda, China organized in Wuzhen. The purpose of its own international conference, the World Internet Conference in Wuzhen is simple, argue Wuzhen. The purpose of Wuzhen is simple, argue some: “to promote some: “to promote the Chinese the Chinese Communist Party’s vision of Internet governance to an Communist Party’s vision of international audience and to gain allies against the perceived Western encroachment upon China’s cyber sovereignty.” 80 In its inaugural year, Internet governance to an the conference was marred by bizarre and heavy-handed maneuvering: international audience and to for instance, on the last evening, a draft declaration was slipped under gain allies against the perceived participants’ doors in an effort to rush through last-minute approval Western encroachment upon of what was intended to be a consensus document. 81 But the following year not only ran more smoothly, but featured high profile head of state China’s cyber sovereignty.” attendance, including an in-person address by president Xi Jinping on the importance of respecting cyber sovereignty and rethinking the multistakeholder model. China continues to court Silicon Valley at these and other, private events. 82

The emphasis on sovereignty extends beyond the current popular conception of the Internet, which is still viewed primarily as a people- to-people communications platform, and is likely to encompass future iterations, such as the so-called “Internet of Things,” or the proposed connectivity of everyday objects, allowing them to send and receive

18 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG data. For instance, in the lead-up to the World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA) in October 2016, China advocated for a system called Digital Object Architecture, which could enable real-time surveillance of devices and individuals, to be the mandatory addressing system for the Internet of Things, and put under the mandate of the ITU.83 While DOA was ultimately sidetracked at the WTSA, China has signaled its intentions with respect to the emerging Internet of Things.

China is likely to continue its campaign to influence Internet norms and standards internationally in a variety of international arenas. That said, it has already implemented the concept of Internet sovereignty domestically—in essence, changing the facts on the ground until, as one expert puts it, “it will just present people with a fait accompli.” 84

CYBERSECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY Beijing considers both China has also wrapped cybersecurity (or “information security”) offensive and defensive issues into its definition of Internet sovereignty. For China, international cyber capabilities key to cybersecurity issues, offensive cyber capabilities, and domestic censorship are all closely linked conceptually. Beijing considers both national security, just as it offensive and defensive cyber capabilities key to national security, just considers certain content— as it considers certain content—domestic criticism and mobilization domestic criticism and against the government—a threat to national security. For instance, in mobilization against the April 2016, China and Russia co-sponsored the “Safe Internet Forum,” government—a threat to featuring officials from both countries: panels included “Cyber Security: Security of Internet communications and governance of infrastructures,” national security. “Countering the new religious movements in the Web,” and “Defending Value and Meaning: Quality of Internet Content.” 85

China’s international efforts in the “cyber” realm (in quotes to denote that such terminology usually refers to military and military-related deployment of information and technological capabilities) are simply too large to be discussed within the scope of this paper. But it is worth noting that China’s offensive capabilities—what Ron Diebert calls “third generation controls”—are, among authoritarian countries, the most advanced.86 These offensive capabilities are deployed internationally against a wide range of actors, with human rights, pro‑democracy and independence movements outside China suffering the same digital attacks as foreign governments and Fortune 500 companies. A new attack tool, “The Great Cannon,” can even redirect website requests of foreign users into denial-of-service attacks, or launch malicious software.87

In framing domestic and international speech, assembly, surveillance and privacy issues as issues of cybersecurity, China hopes to situate the international discussion of cybersecurity principles within a

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 19 conceptual framework of Internet sovereignty. Doing so would allow it to use cybersecurity to justify internal crackdowns: for instance, 2015’s anti-terrorism law required companies to assist terrorist investigations by providing “technical interfaces,” “technical means of support,” and encryption keys for any data located on private computer servers. 88 Other Chinese cybersecurity rules require technology companies doing business with banks to demonstrate that their products are secure by making source code available to the Chinese government, providing the government with hardware and software backdoors, and localizing foreign intellectual property in China. The United States and its allies argue that such regulations are inconsistent with international cybersecurity best practices and may constitute trade barriers. 89

Here, again, the choice of terms is significant. While “cybersecurity” tends to be used within policy circles in the United States, China and Russia have traditionally preferred the term “information security,” which means something very different than its usage in Silicon Valley to refer to basic principles of network security. China and Russia China and Russia have have called for a code of conduct for “information security”, requiring called for a code of conduct international cooperation to curb “the dissemination of information that incites terrorism, secessionism or extremism or that undermines for “information security”, other countries’ political, economic and social stability, as well as their requiring international spiritual and cultural environment”—i.e., restricting content that is cooperation to curb “the thought to undermine stability. 90 While such efforts have not yet met dissemination of information with success, it is the concept that is key—the idea that cybersecurity that incites terrorism, includes restrictions on political organizing, political speech, and other activities generally protected under international human secessionism or extremism rights covenants. or that undermines other countries’ political, economic Internet Power— and social stability, as China’s Tech Companies Going Global well as their spiritual and Amidst all its rhetorical posturing and international maneuvering, China cultural environment.” understands a simple fact: its homegrown companies represent the most successful case for the Chinese Internet. China leads the world in e-commerce, accounting for 40 percent of global sales, and has four of the top 10 Internet companies in the world by market capitalization (including the aforementioned Alibaba and Tencent). 91

Thus, China’s “Internet Power” strategy, promoted in last year’s Five Year Plan, embraces this success. Five Year Plans in China are no longer regarded as gospel, but still constitute a significant way for the Party to signal its priorities to China’s vast array of local banks, officials, companies, and others seek the approval and favor of the central authorities.92 Inherent in China’s newest Five Year Plan is an

20 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG emphasis on innovation, and in positioning China at the forefront of the global information economy. This Plan marks the first in which Internet businesses (including mobile) form an integral part of the strategy. “Currently, China’s economy has entered the “new normal” phase, where Internet-based new industries enter the spotlight and form a sustained driving force within the 13th Five-Year Plan period (2016– 2020),” notes one official publication. 93

“Internet Power” sits at the heart of this strategy. Included in its emphasis on powering the innovation economy is the idea of “Internet Plus,” which incorporates big data and cloud computing into traditional enterprises in an attempt to make them competitive. Alongside a major upgrade of backbone infrastructure, the Internet Power strategy suggests a potent combination of state funding and incentives. 94 It also suggests a more prominent role for China’s companies overseas.

This is a role they are already beginning to play. Low-cost Chinese mobile phones featuring China-based cloud services are popping up all over Asia. Chinese social networking apps such as WeChat and Sina Weibo started by imitating popular global platforms such as WhatsApp and Twitter © dolphfyn / Shutterstock (which are blocked in China), but have built on their censorship-driven Low-cost Chinese 95 market edge by innovating and producing new features. mobile phones featuring Chinese Internet giant Tencent’s WeChat is used by 100 million global China‑based cloud mobile customers, counting among its users not only the global Chinese services are popping diaspora, but (somewhat surprisingly) the Tibetan exile diaspora. In an inversion of the usual metaphor, writes technology analyst Nathan up all over Asia. Freitas, “instead of Chinese users scaling the wall to get out, people around the world are walking up to the front gate, knocking on the door, and asking to be let in.” 96

Indeed, as companies spread overseas, they are bringing features of the Chinese Internet with them. As Freitas notes, all messages on WeChat are routed by Tencent’s centralized servers, located mainly in Shanghai- based data centers, and all subject to Chinese law, regulations, surveillance, and censorship. The app uses real phone numbers and SIM cards and is able to address users’ full address books and photos and copy all data to Tencent’s servers. Chinese citizens or not, all users of the service may potentially have their communications monitored and logged. And, like most apps, WeChat has permission to activate microphones and cameras and track location data, leaving users open to potential extraction of data and insertion of malware. 97

This is not to imply that Chinese Internet companies have inherently malicious intent toward their customers; that would be poor business strategy, at the very least. But implicit within China’s current

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 21 information economy is an understanding that state and corporate interests are cozily (and at times threateningly) entwined, and have been since the very beginning. Despite its willingness to champion its domestic Internet companies, Beijing doesn’t hesitate to exert authority when needed. Former CAC head Lu Wei, widely credited with reinvigorating the Chinese government’s control over the Internet, was well known for bringing China’s largest Internet companies into closer cooperation with Beijing. 98

As China’s companies move overseas, they are likely to continue this overall pattern. In a way, this represents an inversion of China’s original strategy with respect to the Internet: in the beginning, it sought to coopt overseas Internet companies so that they either conformed to domestic censorship and surveillance rules or did not get market access. Now Now that Chinese that Chinese Internet companies have benefited from the absence of Internet companies foreign competition in the domestic market, they are ready to head overseas, having internalized China’s norms around Internet sovereignty, have benefited from censorship and surveillance. the absence of foreign competition in the This is not likely to be uncomplicated for either the companies or the Chinese government. Global users—who in some cases may domestic market, be accustomed to guarantees of privacy and safeguards against they are ready to surveillance—are not as likely to be comfortable with having all their head overseas, having data potentially within the reach of the Chinese government. As internalized China’s cybersecurity analyst Tim Maurer notes, “this notion of technological sovereignty implies certain changes to the Internet at several norms around Internet layers—whether it’s physical infrastructure, applications or control of sovereignty, censorship content—that will increase the cost of doing business globally ​through and surveillance. the Internet.”99 At some point, Beijing may have to choose between the continued global market success of Chinese companies and its emphasis on sovereignty (and all it implies).

22 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG Building Friendly Feelings: Hollywood

ne thing that Beijing has learned from its propaganda efforts is that presentation of overtly political messages, even ones framed in as O sophisticated a manner as possible, is rarely enough to truly change opinion. China has also seen America derive tremendous soft power from its culture and entertainment. As one Chinese communications scholar notes, “What good is communication if people won’t accept it? … that strict political approach will not win the people of the world over to a more positive view of China. Entertainment … without a strong political message won’t achieve an overnight effect. But over the long term it will build friendly feelings toward China.” 100

In previous years, discussion of China’s soft power placed emphasis on the transmission of Chinese culture to the outside world. In the recent past, this emphasis has shifted, with the government committing to support Chinese investment in global entertainment. Wharton professor Z. John Zhang explains that “aside from being good business, it is a way to protect China’s influence in the world.” 101 This blending of smart business with soft power explains why China’s involvement in Hollywood—one of the most dominant means of cultural transmission in the world—has proved such a potent mix in recent years. China has realized a powerful truth: that through Hollywood, in a form of market- based judo, it can use the soft power strength of the United States for its own purposes.

While the entertainment and cultural element of soft power is an China has realized a important part of the Chinese government’s discourse, its method powerful truth: that for achieving this has been entirely market-based. With Hollywood through Hollywood, blockbusters falling short in the domestic market but exploding in China, in a form of market- major studios have sought to appease Chinese censors in exchange based judo, it can use for a foothold in China’s extremely limited release market. Meanwhile, Chinese firms are buying up big pieces of the US entertainment industry the soft power strength and entering into co-productions, changing the face of Hollywood of the United States moviemaking. The international film industry is in the process of a giant for its own purposes. shift, one that will see China and the United States operating “as one symbiotic industry.”102

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 23 The Chinese Market: Important, but Difficult to Enter There is no secret to why Hollywood is anxious to toe Beijing’s line: it’s all about the domestic market. The entertainment industry is booming in China, unlike other traditional industries. For the five years preceding 2016, it grew at a rate of 17 percent per year, and is thought to be worth $180 billion. 103 McKinsey and Co. has predicted that China’s film audience (with ticket sales second only to the United States) will exceed that of the United States in four years. China’s box office revenue hit $6.8 billion in 2015, 104 and the country’s multiplexes are thought to be multiplying by a rate of twenty screens per day. 105 Growth in 2016, however, slowed, with movie ticket revenue rising just 3.7 percent—a respectable number for mature markets but a significant drop for China. Even amidst the drop, however, imported international films (mostly from Hollywood) accounted for 41.7 percent of total box office in 2016, a rise from 38.4 percent the year before. 106

The entertainment industry Indeed, Hollywood tentpoles—regardless of how well they do in the is booming in China, United States—continue to smash records in China. Fast and Furious 7 earned $63.1 million on its opening day in 2015, nearly doubling the unlike other traditional previous record of Transformers 4: Age of Extinction , and took in more industries. For the five years than $390 million in its run. Both films did better in China than in the preceding 2016, it grew United States, making the Chinese market at least as important as the at a rate of 17 percent per US for these types of films. 107 In fact, Pacific Rim 2 became the first year, and is thought to be Hollywood sequel to be approved due entirely to international (and significantly Chinese) audiences. 108 worth $180 billion. But even given these impressive numbers, it is not easy for foreign companies to actually make money in China. Hollywood can only access the Chinese market in three ways: through revenue-sharing films (which allow foreign studios to take 25 percent of the box office, or half the norm for other parts of the world), flat-fee movies (which are unprofitable and therefore unpopular), and co-productions with a Chinese company (which do not count as foreign films, and allow foreign studios to receive 50 percent of total box office receipts). 109 Quotas hammered out under the WTO restricted foreign revenue-sharing films to 20 per year before 2012, and 34 per year since then. 110 The annual import quota and state monopoly on distribution of quota films will come up for discussion in February 2017, 111 and if consultations fail to produce an agreement by January 1, 2018, the United States can pursue procedural action in the WTO. 112

To be approved for distribution, movies must pass the Film Bureau, part of the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT), which reports directly to the State Council and enforces censorship guidelines that ban, inter alia, content that harms

24 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG China’s national honor, disrupts social stability, endangers the unity and sovereignty of China, or disparages the government and political figures.113 In addition, there are restrictions on depictions of sex, religion, superstition, and a host of other sensitive topics.

Forbidden content according to Article 3 of the 1994 Audiovisual Product Management Regulations, repeated in more recent regulations:

1 Content that endangers the unity 4 Content that propagates obscenity and and territorial integrity of the nation superstition or glorifies violence and sovereignty of the State 5 Content that slanders or insults others 2 Content that incites the division of the ethnicities and undermines national solidarity 6 Other content for which publication and dissemination are prohibited 3 Content that divulges State secrets by State provisions114

On top of the official regulations, there are somewhat hazy measures designed to ensure that domestic films gain at least 50 percent of the market, including reducing the number of 3D screens and releasing Hollywood blockbusters against each other to reduce the competition with domestic productions. 115 Traditionally, foreign films are also restricted from showing during certain parts of the year, known colloquially as a “domestic movie protection period” because it gives local films less competition during summer school break and during Chinese New Year and other holidays. 116 Last year, after a slow second quarter, the blackout periods appeared to be suspended over the summer—although without any official announcement. 117 This lack of transparency is par for the course. As one executive described the The fear of censorship— lack of clarity regarding the summer film blackout season, “Nothing is and attendant fear of absolute, clear-cut… it will always be subject to adjustments, revisions not being allowed access and interpretations.”118 to the China market— Xi Jinping’s crackdown on media and civil society has permeated sits at the heart of the culture and entertainment as well. “Lately, members of the censorship board seem uncertain, fearful and overly careful,” 119 wrote a Sony China various strategies around executive in a leaked email from 2014. The fear of censorship—and co-production, acquisition, attendant fear of not being allowed access to the China market—sits at and content management. the heart of the various strategies around co-production, acquisition, and content management discussed here.

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 25 Co-Productions: Getting Market Access Given the difficulty of getting a film approved as part of the official quota, many studios are choosing the co-production route. Co-production has become popular because the Chinese studio can be directly involved in production, while foreign studios can take advantage of cheaper costs by filming there. 120 However, while many films have collaborated with China by using some type of Chinese talent, financing or locations (including Looper, X-Men: Days of Future Past, Skyfall, Resident Evil: Retribution, and Iron Man 3), to be considered an official Co-production has co-production (and thus not subject to the import quota), films are become popular because required to have at least one scene shot in China, cast at least one lead Chinese actor, receive a minimum one-third of total investment from the Chinese studio can Chinese companies, and illustrate “positive Chinese elements.” 121 be directly involved The recent example of Warcraft: The Beginning, has served as a sort of in production, while test case for the allure of coproduction (in this case, between Universal foreign studios can take and Legendary, which was acquired by Chinese conglomerate Wanda advantage of cheaper Media Group).122 Intended to be a US summer blockbuster, Warcraft costs by filming there. tanked with audiences and critics, opening at just $24 million (against a $160 million budget). But Warcraft opened in China to a five-day total of $156 million, the highest ever debut for a foreign movie. 123 Analysts attribute its success to a specific strategy engineered toward China, with Legendary enlisting Chinese financial partners like Tencent and Huayi Brothers Media, crafting brand sponsorship deals and promotional partnerships along the way. 124

Box Office Receipts in China and the United States, 2007–2016

$12

$10

$8

$6

$4 US$ Billions US$

$2

$0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

China U.S.

SOURCE: Box Office Mojo, www.boxofficemojo.com

26 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG © Sarah Stewart / Alamy Stock Photo Stock Alamy / Stewart © Sarah

Director Zhang Yimou, actors Pedro Pascal, Jing Tian & Matt Damon at the premiere for “The Great Wall”

Now those partners have embarked on the most prominent US–China Partners have embarked co-production to date, the $150 million film The Great Wall, directed on the most prominent by famed director Zhang Yimou and starring Chinese stars alongside US stars such as Matt Damon. Partners include Legendary, Universal US-China co-production to pictures, the state-owned China Film Group, and Le Vision Pictures. 125 date, the $150 million film Great Wall is seen as the first attempt at a genuine homegrown, English- The Great Wall, directed language crossover;126 on its first day in China, it grossed a respectable by famed director Zhang 127 if not overwhelming $24.3 million, and garnered mixed reviews online. Yimou and starring Chinese And other major US entertainment firms are gearing up to enter the market as well: Walt Disney is readying a major push into China, stars alongside US stars entering a multi-year partnership with the state-owned Shanghai Media such as Matt Damon. Group Pictures in 2014 to make Disney-branded films in China. 128

Yet co-productions, while gaining access to the Chinese market, are hardly safe from the censors. They are subject to the same approval as all other domestic productions, and must abide by Chinese laws and “aim to promote China’s economic and cultural prosperity.” 129

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 27 Acquisitions: Synergy on Both Sides Even as co-productions have stepped up, so has the Chinese presence in the infrastructure of Hollywood itself. In the last two years, both state and private Chinese media and Internet firms have been on a buying spree, acquiring studios, talent agencies, and top human resources themselves. For these firms, it is a way to diversify their businesses and acquire expertise; for Hollywood studios and other entertainment companies, it is potentially another route into the China market.

And the deals often cross the artificial boundaries separating Internet businesses from moviemaking and other forms of content production, creating the possibility for Chinese-owned, global, multimedia platforms. STX Entertainment, the studio behind the recent Free State of Jones and Bad Moms, announced earlier this year that it had secured financing to the tune of nearly $700 million in new capital from Chinese Internet giant Tencent Holdings (owner of China’s top social media platform, WeChat) and Hong Kong’s PCCW. (Existing investors included China’s Hony Capital and TPG Growth.) 130 STX executives, drawn from traditional Hollywood studios, are aiming to bridge the gap between American and Chinese entertainment industries across multiple forms of media, In the last two years, both including television, apps, video games, social media, and film. 131 state and private Chinese Other deals have been equally high profile. Tang Media Partners (backed media and Internet firms by Tencent) recently purchased IM Global (a film financing and sales have been on a buying spree, agency), Studio 8 (started by a former Warner Brothers executive) is being backed by Chinese conglomerate Fosun International, while Hunan acquiring studios, talent Television and Broadcast has invested in Lions Gate Entertainment agencies, and top human (behind The Hunger Games and Mad Men).132 Tencent has also joined with resources themselves. Sequoia Capital China to form a joint venture with well-known Hollywood agency William Morris Endeavor (WME_IMG). 133 The latter joint venture also speaks to the emphasis on human resource acquisition: Le Vision (a Chinese co-producer of Great Wall) announced in September 2016 that it had acquired former Paramount president Adam Goodman’s Dichotomy Creative Group and named him president of Le Vision Entertainment. 134

Perhaps the splashiest recent move was made by Wanda Media Group, a former Dalian real estate developer-turned-entertainment-giant, run by a man widely acknowledged to be China’s richest, Wang Jianlin. After buying a controlling stake in Legendary in January 2016, Wang made a highly publicized but unsuccessful play for Paramount. He subsequently noted that his next target would be a so-called Big Six movie studio, telling Reuters that his goal was “to buy Hollywood companies and bring their technology and capability to China.” 135

28 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG Wanda already owns theater chain AMC, London-based ODEON and UCI Cinemas Group, and is targeting 20 percent of global box office revenues; its existing theater footprint across four continents means it could distribute its own movies and guarantee a world-wide release. 136 The company, which was added to the Fortune Global 500 list in 2015, also intends to triple revenue from its cultural division (entertainment, sports and tourism) to $22.6 billion by 2020. 137 It is building in the city of Qingdao what is thought to be the biggest studio and entertainment complex in the world, with 30 sound stages, a water tank, and a permanent copy of a New York Street, which will enable filming to take place entirely within China. 138

Wang has also had ties with China’s ruling elite. After reviewing several years of corporate records, The New York Times reported in 2015 that relatives of the country’s politicians and their business associates have at times owned stakes in Wanda, including the elder sister of Xi Jinping, a business partner of the daughter of Wen Jiabao, and relatives of other members of the Politburo at the time. 139 While there is no evidence—and indeed, seems unlikely—that Wanda’s acquisitions are explicitly directed by the state, it is something of a truism that the state and China’s private sector have evolved a compatible set of aims, obviating the need for the state to dictate terms or inject ideology into the business strategies of China’s media and communications firms. Wang is clearly aware of the significance of the US cultural industry. “Why did Wanda go into the cultural industry and sports industry?” Wang asked last year. “The cultural industry in the US accounts for 24 percent of GDP. US top exports are not weapons and passenger planes, but cultural products, which include

movies, music, comics and book copyrights, etc. Currently, the cultural News Live Alamy Xinhua / © 140 industry in China accounts for just 3 percent of GDP.” Chairman of Wanda Group Wang Jianlin speaks during an agreement signing International tie-ups signify more than the usual corporate mergers. ceremony in Beijing in 2015. They are changing the very way movies get made. Significantly, they are also changing the character of Hollywood itself, as film content moves from awkwardly embracing certain Chinese elements to being organically conceived and pitched to appeal to the Chinese market. 141

Wanda Media Group, run by a man widely acknowledged to be China’s richest, Wang Jianlin, owns theater chain AMC, London-based ODEON and UCI Cinemas Group, and is targeting 20 percent of global box office revenues; its existing theater footprint across four continents means it could distribute its own movies and guarantee a world‑wide release.

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 29 “Recommend Not To Do It”: Altering Content from the Greenlight Hollywood’s direct interest in tapping the Chinese market—and its increasingly intricate ties with Chinese companies—has led to a variety of self-censoring mechanisms with respect to content. As scholar Aynne Kokas has said, “No Hollywood producer that wants to take advantage of the Chinese market would at this point include a film that includes anything about Taiwan, about Tibet, about Tiananmen.” 142

While in the past, Hollywood studios were chiefly concerned about how to excise material from the finished film in order to get it past the censors to access the Chinese market, now decisions about content are made straight at the source: when movies are conceptualized and made. This affects not just the movie’s Chinese version, but the final version of the film for all markets. Leaked emails from Sony executives about the rebooted RoboCop make this clear: “Recommendation is to change all versions as if we only change the China version, we set ourselves up for the press to call us out for this when bloggers invariably compare

© REUTERS / Alamy Stock Photo Stock Alamy / © REUTERS the versions and realize we changed the China setting just to pacify Robert Downey Jr. poses for a photo that market.”143 during a promotional event of the movie “Iron Man 3” before its release in China at Content alterations to please China chiefly take four forms: product the Imperial Ancestral Temple of Beijing’s placement, casting decisions, excising content in order to not offend Forbidden City in April, 2013. China’s sensibilities, and placement of pro-China content.

While in the past, PRODUCT PLACEMENT Hollywood studios were At the most basic level, films include placement of Chinese products chiefly concerned about how intended mainly to appeal to the Chinese audience. Transformers 4 features a debit card from the Chinese Construction Bank, while to excise material from the Stanley Tucci is later seen in Hong Kong drinking a Chinese milk finished film in order to get brand.144 In Captain America: Civil War, Tony Stark and other Avengers it past the censors to access use Vivo phones, a relatively cheap Chinese brand. 145

the Chinese market, now In Independence Day: Resurgence, characters drink the Chinese milk decisions about content brand Mengniu and use the QQ instant messaging service created by are made straight at the Tencent.146 (Tencent was so pleased, it issued its own press release 147 source: when movies are about the placement at the time. ) But at times, these efforts can backfire, with Chinese moviegoers criticizing the clunky product conceptualized and made. placement. “When getting revenge on evil aliens, everyone should take two boxes of MengNiu Moon Milk with them,” snarked one Sina Weibo user, according to the state-owned Global Times.148

30 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG CASTING DECISIONS Casting decisions that include Chinese stars are often driven by the need to satisfy co-production criteria and to appeal to the Chinese audience. Superstar Angelababy was featured in Independence Day: Resurgence, while Iron Man 3 included popular actor Fan Bingbing in the Chinese version. 149 Star Wars: The Force Awakens was a global hit but did poorly in China; spin-off Rogue One features Chinese stars Donnie Yen and Jiang Wen. 150 Indeed, the trend in recent years of casting well-known Chinese actors in minor roles to appeal to the Chinese audience became so pronounced that jaded Chinese moviegoers came up with a term for such cameos: “flower vases.” 151

EXCISING SENSITIVE MATERIAL The trend in recent years In the past, Hollywood studios chiefly cared about getting movies of casting well‑known past Chinese censors, with films altered for the Chinese market. For Chinese actors in instance, the Chinese pirate played by Chow Yun-fat was edited out of minor roles to appeal the Chinese market version of Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s End.152 to the Chinese audience The remake of the Karate Kid, in which an American expat fought became so pronounced Chinese bullies, was so altered for the Chinese market that it became an entirely different story. 153 Despite this, some films will nonetheless that jaded Chinese never make it: Deadpool was denied a release due to violence, nudity moviegoers came up and language, while Crimson Peak was prohibited for its supernatural with a term for such content (rules prohibit films that “promote cults or superstition”).154 cameos: “flower vases.” © REUTERS / Alamy Stock Photo Stock Alamy / © REUTERS Chinese actress Jing Tian stretches to shake hands with fans during a red carpet event promoting Dalian Wanda Group’s Oriental Movie Metropolis project in Qingdao, Shandong province in September 2013.

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 31 While specific editing for the China market still happens, it is increasingly the case that content likely to offend China never makes it into the film in the first place—a decision that’s made from the moment a film gets the green light. 155 As some put it, Chinese bad guys are literally vanishing from movies, with Hollywood studios completely excising negative references to China and its sensitivities. 156

For instance, Marvel’s Doctor Strange changed one character’s origin story from Tibetan to Celtic; the screenwriter acknowledged that offending China’s sensibilities was a concern. 157 The remake of Red Dawn digitally altered images of an invading army to change its identity from Chinese to North Korean in postproduction. A film executive not connected to the production says Chinese diplomats, who objected to the portrayal of China as a hostile power, asked him to arrange a conversation with the film’s makers, but at that point the decision to alter the identity of the enemies was already made. 158

Leaked emails from Sony executives demonstrate how the process of self-censorship takes place. In the original script for the 2013 As some put it, Chinese movie Pixels, aliens destroy the Great Wall. “Even though breaking a bad guys are literally hole on the Great Wall may not be a problem as long as it is part of a vanishing from movies, worldwide phenomenon, it is actually unnecessary because it will not benefit the China release at all. I would then, recommend not to do it,” with Hollywood studios wrote the chief representative of Sony Pictures in China to senior Sony completely excising negative executives in 2013. 159 The representative also recommended altering a references to China scene in which US government officials speculate that “a communist- and its sensitivities. conspiracy brother” might be behind some form of technological attack: “… in view of recent news on China hacking into government servers, they may object to ‘a communist-conspiracy brother hacked into the mail server,’” the executive wrote. In the final version of the film, there is no attack on the Great Wall, and the US officials speculate that Russia, Iran or Google might be behind the attack. 160

POSITIVE IMAGES OF CHINA As an interview with Chinese production company TwilightStar Entertainment makes clear, aspiring screenwriters need to proactively consider Chinese elements.

“Interestingly, American movies are sometimes made with Chinese audience in mind, knowing they’ll be subject to Chinese government censors. That leads to strategic creative picks … to prepare content for this shift, screenwriters should consider including Chinese elements, characters, location, and themes when applicable.” 161

32 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG © Dan Nguyen / CC BY SA Generic 2.0 SA BY / CC Nguyen © Dan

Not only are these elements unlikely to include depictions of China “Interestingly, American that offend Beijing’s sensibilities, they often show China in ways movies are sometimes made that are likely to please film censors (who are under the ultimate jurisdiction of the State Council). For instance, 2015’s Best Picture with Chinese audience nominee The Martian (in which Chinese studio Bona Film Group in mind, knowing they’ll had an investment), 162 contained a subplot featuring a positive be subject to Chinese depiction of the China National Space Administration. Expert Chinese government censors. That engineers were written into Salmon Fishing in the Yemen , although the characters did not exist in the book, while Chinese scientists leads to strategic creative were praised as visionaries by the US president’s chief of staff in picks … to prepare content the movie 2012.163 for this shift, screenwriters

“Because of the special situation in China’s market, we prefer should consider including to choose films with positive energy,” the chief content officer of Chinese elements, Hunan TV & Broadcast told the Wall Street Journal. 164 Hunan TV & characters, location, and Broadcast has co-invested in a series of films with Lions Gate. “When themes when applicable.” we choose to invest in a film,” said the executive, “our priority is to assess the film’s political and policy risks, and then its commercial prospects.”165 Overall, this approach has caused some media scholars to characterize China as the “world film police.” 166

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 33 Sustained Success? Identifying Chinese influence in Hollywood should not be confused with criticism of industry trends toward diverse talent, settings and storylines. It is not a negative thing to see Chinese and other international actors make appearances in global blockbusters. And Hollywood certainly has no perfect history when it comes to accepting or even welcoming content interference of all kinds, whether in longstanding traditions of product placement or in shaping storylines to please constituencies.

What makes this trend different is the fact that never before has a foreign power exercised such control over the content of US popular culture. Certainly, overseas investors have attempted to buy into the power of Hollywood in the past. In the late 1980s and 1990s, Japanese companies like Sony and Matsushita bought Hollywood properties, while Indian and French investors have made forays in the more recent past. But these efforts, which pale in comparison to the current number of US–China tie-ups, demonstrated only a mixed

© Giovanni Cardillo / Shutterstock Cardillo © Giovanni record of success. Moreover, some financial analysts think this wave of investment could be different, with Chinese investors in the United The lack of a bona fide States “earning a reputation in Hollywood for being strategic, analytic homegrown Chinese hit and long‑term focused.”167 worries officials: they recently That said, this does not necessarily guarantee future success. Concerns announced that any local about an uneven playing field in China, lack of market transparency, film to earn over $150,000 and unclear—and shifting—regulations could threaten continued 168 overseas will receive a cash Hollywood-China partnership. The lack of a bona fide homegrown Chinese hit worries officials: they recently announced that any local film reward equivalent to at to earn over $150,000 overseas will receive a cash reward equivalent least 1 percent of the film’s to at least 1 percent of the film’s international box office. 169 Finally, the international box office. recent slowdown in the Chinese box office has some sector analysts concerned.170 If the Chinese domestic box office no longer looks as alluring, market logic dictates that Hollywood will abandon it for greener—and more flexible—pastures elsewhere.

34 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG Conclusion: An Information Age Power

any of the trends examined in this essay have been underway for at least a few years. There has been considerable analysis of China’s M propaganda efforts, of its growing clout in Hollywood, of its influence on the shape of the global Internet.

But the cumulative impact turns out to be somewhat greater than the sum of its parts. Seen in isolation, any individual piece might be taken for yet another effort by China to burnish its image or tweak US sensibilities on a particular policy. When the dots are connected, however, they are indicative of an authoritarian government that has mobilized global information resources like none other in the modern age.

The multi-pronged nature of China’s information-based strategy also ensures it remains adaptive in the face of future challenges. The ability to shift emphasis among multiple moving pieces builds resilience, thus providing a hedging mechanism against market or political uncertainty (for instance, stemming from possible fluctuations in the trade relationship between China and the United States). Moreover, because the Chinese government fundamentally grasps the connection between But the cumulative impact information and power in a holistic, long-term way, it is able to utilize this turns out to be somewhat as a strategic advantage. greater than the sum of its Analyzed together, China’s efforts across multiple sectors give rise to parts. Seen in isolation, some crosscutting observations: any individual piece might ■■ China’s strategy increasingly targets the information ecosystem be taken for yet another at its source. Rather than simply trying to censor unfavorable stories effort by China to burnish or burnish its image, China is increasingly going after the infrastructure of the information ecosystem—whether through Hollywood its image or tweak US acquisitions, the global media that informs international opinion and sensibilities on a particular policy, or the norms, standards and corporate platforms powering policy. When the dots are the medium through which an ever-growing number of people in the connected, however, they are world communicate and organize their daily lives. In doing so, China indicative of an authoritarian is affecting more than simply information products; it is altering the mechanisms that determine what kinds of products are produced in government that has the first place. (This sets it apart from other governments, such as mobilized global information Russia, which have focused chiefly on using information-based tools resources like none other in to achieve influence.) The results may be anything from a global the modern age. entertainment system weighted toward positive images of China to an Internet that inherently incorporates device-based surveillance and preferences the role of states.

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 35 ■■ Leveraging market power can have ideological benefits. Propaganda chief Liu Qibao has noted that rather than “borrowing a boat to go out onto the ocean,” as the Chinese saying goes, he recommends “buying the boat.” 171 And China is, indeed, buying many boats. Around the world, Beijing—or tycoons sympathetic to Beijing’s interests—are amassing stakes in various media companies, letting the market work in their favor. In addition, several of the world’s largest Internet companies are now Chinese, and these companies are also acquiring assets and diversifying vertically, on their way to becoming multimedia global conglomerates. For Chinese companies, acquisitions and diversification are ways to grow the business and compete; for potential targets, teaming up with a Chinese company represents opportunities in the China market. Yet while individual acquisitions may depend on the logic of the market, the net result is more likely to be favorable to Beijing’s preferred ideological line than not.

■■ Beijing now outsources “thought work” globally by using tactics of cooptation honed domestically. Beijing has found that its long-favored strategy of carrots and sticks to keep the private sector in line works just as well in the international arena as it does domestically. While this example can be seen perhaps most vividly in the case of Hollywood, it occurs across the board in a variety of media and communication markets. By keeping regulations vague (but the threat of retribution real), China also encourages self-censorship and self-restraint by numerous otherwise powerful entities.

© testing / Shutterstock © testing ■■ Official propaganda remains clunky but is now less important. Because of its holistic information strategy, Beijing’s official propaganda apparatus is now complemented by the more organic spin produced by a willing host of global actors. Thus, it matters less that China Daily, CRI and other official propaganda organs are still somewhat ill at ease in the age of memes and listicles. While resources continue to be devoted to polishing up state-owned media directed overseas, Beijing appears to have learned important lessons about soft power: credibility, authenticity, and the identity of the messenger carry a great deal of weight. If these can be accomplished without the state being explicitly involved, even better. Moreover, as the global media landscape continues to evolve and traditional values of independent journalism give way to blurred lines between advertising, opinion and news, even greater opportunities for influence may emerge.

36 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG ■■ As Chinese companies increasingly compete globally, there may be more tension between the demands of the market and ideological directives. What remains to be seen is whether Beijing can continue to maintain ideological discipline when global consumers are driving. The global “market” generally—audiences, policymakers, civil society, consumers—is informed and savvy, and it tends to have greater expectations of trust, privacy and transparency than do domestic Chinese consumers. What happens when Chinese corporations are forced to choose between giving global consumers what they want and giving the Party what it wants? The answer is not as straightforward as it might seem, particularly if growth opportunities for some information industries lie in overseas markets. As one As Chinese companies analyst says, “While [companies] are very aware of the ambitions of the Chinese government, they are absolutely looking to make increasingly compete investments that will earn an attractive return for them.” 172 On the globally, there may be other hand, the Hollywood example has shown that, to date, Chinese more tension between the corporations have not had to choose between the two (although demands of the market alterations to the film quota system may have an impact at some and ideological directives. point in the future). What is certain is that Beijing continues to learn (if sometimes in non-linear fashion) from its past missteps.

The Chinese government argues that it does not seek to overtly promote its own political system, unlike democracies engaging in democracy promotion overseas. Yet China’s growing command of the global information ecosystem is likely to result in the institutionalization of norms and standards unfavorable to democratic institutions. When the protocols of the global Internet favor device-based surveillance by states, when self-censorship by major media companies leads to a global chilling of expression, when the basic principles underlying journalism in many parts of the world preference cooperation with authority, it adds up to something like the enshrinement of authoritarian practices worldwide. That this is all happening at a time when authoritarianism is enjoying a global resurgence, even as democracies have pulled back from support for democratic institutions, gives this phenomenon added weight. If current trends continue, future historians may look back on this era as the dawning of the authoritarian information age.

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 37 Endnotes

1 Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: 22 Sarah Cook, The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule. (Washington, DC: the Communist Party’s Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). Around the World Washington DC: Center for International Media Assistance, 2013), 6. 2 Andrew Nathan, “China’s Challenge,” in Authoritarianism Goes Global, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Chris Walker (Baltimore: 23 Cook, Long Shadow, 19 Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 27 24 Johnson, “Foreign Reporters.” 3 Kalathil and Boas, Open Networks. 25 Sarah Cook, “Resisting Beijing’s Global Media Influence.” The 4 Anne-Marie Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” in Diplomat, December 10, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/ Authoritarianism Goes Global, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, resisting-beijings-global-media-influence/ Christopher Walker (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 26 Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” 189 2016), 187. 27 Craig Offman and Nathan Vanderklippe, “Columnist’s firing 5 Kalathil and Boas, Open Networks, 17–18. at B.C.-based Chinese paper stirs press-freedom concerns.” 6 In 2015, twelve American publishers signed a pledge to work The Globe and Mail, June 20, 2016. http://www.theglobeandmail. against the censorship of foreign authors’ works in China, which com/news/national/columnists-firing-at-bc-based-chinese-paper- is now the second-largest publishing market, behind the United stirs-press-freedom-concerns/article30533263/ States. See Amy Qin, “American Publishers Take a Stand Against 28 Paul Monk, “China’s propaganda infiltrating our shores,” The Censorship in China,” The New York Times, October 15, 2015. Sydney Morning Herald, July 10, 2014. http://www.smh.com. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/china-books- au/comment/chinas-propaganda-infiltrating-our-shores- censorship-publishers/?_r=0 20140709-zt122.html 7 Maria Repnikova and Kecheng Fang, “China’s New Media: 29 One Country, Two Nightmares: Hong Kong Media Caught in Pushing Political Boundaries Without Being Political,” Foreign Ideological Background. 2016 Annual Report, Hong Kong Affairs, October 12, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ Journalists Association, July 2016. http://www.hkja.org.hk/site/ china/2016-10-12/chinas-new-media Host/hkja/UserFiles/file/annualreport/Annual_report_2016_ 8 Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Final%20V.pdf Global Contexts. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 174-175. 30 Cook, Long Shadow, 25 9 Hayden, Rhetoric, 171. 31 Chow, “Alibaba’s Jack Ma.” 10 Hayden, Rhetoric, 175. 32 Tom Phillips, “Mysterious confession fuels fears of Beijing’s 11 Chung-yan Chow, “Alibaba’s Jack Ma on China’s economy, Hong influence on Hong Kong’s top newspaper,” The Guardian, July 25, Kong and the South China Morning Post: full Q&A,” South China 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/25/south- Morning Post, April 21, 2016. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/ china-morning-post-china-influence-hong-kong-newspaper- economy/article/1937278/alibabas-jack-ma-chinas-economy- confession hong-kong-and-south-china-morning 33 Yaqiu Wang. “As Beijing tightens grip on Hong Kong media, 12 R. Evan Ellis, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study ,” mainland journalists suffer,” Committee to Protect Journalists, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 60 (2011): 86. August 15, 2016. https://cpj.org/blog/2016/08/as-beijing-tightens- grip-on-hong-kong-media-mainla.php 13 Joseph Nye Jr., “Get Smart,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-07-01/get-smart 34 Nathan, “China’s Challenge,” 28. 14 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power . (New 35 Ibid. York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 5-6. 36 Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” 190. 15 Shambaugh, China Goes Global. 37 Media Oligarchs Go Shopping, Reporters Without Borders, July 16. Orville Schell, “Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse.” The New 2016. https://rsf.org/en/reports/media-when-oligarchs-go- York Review of Books, April 21, 2016. http://www.nybooks.com/ shopping-rsfs-latest-report articles/2016/04/21/crackdown-in-china-worse-and-worse/ 38 Hayden, Rhetoric, 192. 17 “Chinese government attacks own propaganda department,” 39 Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” 188. Deutsche Welle, Sept. 6, 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/chinese- government-attacks-own-propaganda-department/a-19318157 40 Hayden, Rhetoric, 180. 18 Chung-yan Chow, “Alibaba’s Jack Ma.” 41 Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” 200. 19 Ian Johnson, “Foreign Reporters in China Face More Restrictions 42 Ibid., 188 Now, Report Says,” The New York Times, September 22, 2016. 43 China Watch, China Daily, October 26, 2016. http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/business/china-foreign- 44 media-pen-america.html?_r=0&referer=https://t.co/4dHwyBJM9j James Fallows, “Official Chinese Propaganda: Now Online From the WaPo!” The Atlantic, February 3, 2011. http://www.theatlantic. 20 Darkened Screen: Constraints on Foreign Journalists in China . 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38 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG 46 Helen Clark, “China’s confusing media ties with Australia,” 67 Lu, Wei. “Cyber Sovereignty Must Rule Global Internet,” February Deutsche Welle, August 22, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/chinas- 14, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lu-wei/china-cyber- confusing-media-ties-with-australia/a-19492831 sovereignty_b_6324060.html 47 “China state broadcaster rebrands in international push,” CNBC, 68 Farhad Manjoo, “Why the World Is Drawing Battle Lines Against December 31, 2016. http://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/31/china- American Tech Giants,” The New York Times, June 1, 2016. http:// state-broadcaster-rebrands-in-international-push.html www.nytimes.com/2016/06/02/technology/why-the-world-is- drawing-battle-lines-against-american-tech-giants.html?smid=tw- 48 Anne Nelson, CCTV’s International Expansion: China’s Grand share Strategy for Media? (Washington, DC: Center for International Media Assistance, 2013). 69 Shai Oster, “Whose Internet Is It Anyway? China Wields More Influence,” Bloomberg, November 20, 2014. https://www. 49 “Propaganda or proper journalism? China’s media expansion bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-21/whose-internet-is-it- in Africa,” African Arguments, August 18, 2015. http:// anyway-china-wields-more-influence?hootPostID=f8cf8a806dec1d africanarguments.org/2015/08/18/propaganda-or-proper- 20b0399cfcd248fe66 journalism-chinas-media-expansion-in-africa/ 70 Adam Segal, “Holding the Multistakeholder Line at the ITU,” 50 Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” 199. Council on Foreign Relations, Oct. 21, 2014. http://www.cfr.org/ 51 Koh Gui Qing and John Shiffman, “Beijing’s covert radio network internet-policy/holding-multistakeholder-line-itu/p33644 airs China-friendly news across Washington, and the world,” 71 Scott Malcolmson, “How Russia and China Are Cooperating Reuters, November 2, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/investigates/ to Dismantle America’s Dominance of the Internet,” The special-report/china-radio/ World Post, May 5, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 52 Scott D. 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Post, October 21, 2016. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/ 55 “China’s Media Challenges Western Narratives of Africa,” ChinaFile, policies-politics/article/2024316/chinas-former-internet-tsar-lu- October 5, 2016. http://www.chinafile.com/china-africa-project/ wei-comes-out-shadows chinas-media-challenges-western-narratives-of-africa 75 China Media Bulletin Issue No. 116 , Freedom House, September 56 Farah and Mosher, Winds From the East, 4. 2016. https://freedomhouse.org/china-media/china-media- 57 Fei Jiang, Shubo Li, Helge Rønning, Elling Tjønneland. “The voice bulletin-issue-no-116-september-2016 of China in Africa: media, communication technologies and image- 76 Segal, “Holding the Multistakeholder Line.” building,” Chinese Journal of Communication 9, no. 1 (2016): 1–7 77 Ibid. 58 Iginio Gagliardone, “China and the Shaping of African Information 78 Dan Levin, “At U.N., China Tries to Influence Fight Over Internet Societies,” in Aleksandra W. Gadzala, ed., Africa and China: How Control,” The New York Times, December 16, 2015. http://www. Africans and Their Governments are Shaping Relations with China nytimes.com/2015/12/17/technology/china-wins-battle-with-un- (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 48 over-word-in-internet-control-document.html 59 Farah and Mosher, Winds From the East, 16. 79 Franz-Stefan Gady, The Wuzhen Summit and the Battle over 60 “Propaganda or proper journalism? China’s media expansion in Internet Governance,” The Diplomat, January 14, 2016. http:// Africa,” African Arguments, Aug. 18, 2015. http://africanarguments. thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-wuzhen-summit-and-the-battle- org/2015/08/18/propaganda-or-proper-journalism-chinas-media- over-internet-governance/ expansion-in-africa/ 80 Ibid. 61 Beijing Review, “Understanding China Through Keywords,” 81 Paul Mozur and Jane Perlez, “Gregarious and Direct: China’s Web Sept. 15, 2016. http://www.bjreview.com/Lifestyle/201609/ Doorkeeper,” The New York Times, December 1, 2014. http://www. t20160912_800067471.html nytimes.com/2014/12/02/world/asia/gregarious-and-direct- 62 Livingston, “Assessing China’s Plan.” chinas-web-doorkeeper.html 63 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 125 82 Adam Segal, “China’s Internet Conference: Xi Jinping’s Message 64 Paul R. Burgman Jr., “Securing Cyberspace: China Leading the to Washington,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 16, 2015. Way in Cyber Sovereignty,” The Diplomat, May 18, 2016. http:// http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/12/16/chinas-internet-conference- thediplomat.com/2016/05/securing-cyberspace-china-leading- xi-jinpings-message-to-washington/ the-way-in-cyber-sovereignty/ 83 Robert M. McDowell and Gordon M. Goldstein, “The Authoritarian 65 William J. Drake, Vinton G. Cerf, and Wolfgang Kleinwächter, Internet Power Grab,” The Wall Street Journal, October 25, 2016. “Internet Fragmentation: An Overview,” Future of the Internet http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-authoritarian-internet-power- Initiative White Paper (World Economic Forum, 2016), 31. grab-1477436573 66 Mark Raymond and Laura DeNardis. Multi-stakeholderism: Anatomy of an Inchoate Global Institution, Paper Series: no. 41 (Global Commission on Internet Governance, 2016). https://www. cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig_no.41web.pdf

Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 39 84 Simon Denyer, “China’s scary lesson to the world: Censoring 106 Patrick Brzeski, “China Box-Office Growth Slowed to 3.7 Percent the Internet works,” The Washington Post, May 23, 2016. in 2016, Official Data Shows,” The Hollywood Reporter, January 1, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/ 2 0 17. http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/china-box-office- chinas-scary-lesson-to-the-world-censoring-the-internet- growth-slows-37-percent-2016-official-data-shows-960217 works/2016/05/23/413afe78-fff3-11e5-8bb1-f124a43f84dc_story. 107 Stanley Rosen, “Hollywood in China: Selling Out or Cashing In?,” html?postshare=8371464052176221&tid=ss_tw The Diplomat, May 26, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/ 85 Safe Internet Forum Program. http://safeinternetforum.ru/en/ hollywood-in-china-selling-out-or-cashing-in/ programma/ 108 Bryan Bishop,“Warcraft’s record-breaking opening in China may 86 Ron Diebert, “Cyberspace Under Siege,” in Diamond, et al., eds., be the future of Hollywood blockbusters,” The Verge, June 13, Authoritarianism Goes Global, 203. 2016. http://www.theverge.com/2016/6/13/11924774/warcraft- movie-box-office-record-debut-china-sequel-hollywood-future 87 Ibid. 109 Sean O’Connor and Nicholas Armstrong, “Directed by Hollywood, 88 Livingston, Scott D. “Assessing China’s Plan.” Edited by China: How China’s Censorship and Influence Affect 89 J. Michael Daniel, Robert Holleyman, Robert, and Alex Niejelow, Films Worldwide,” US-China Economic and Security Review Alex. “China’s Undermining an Open Internet,” Politico, February 4, Commission, October 28, 2015, p.4. 2015. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/china- 110 Rosen, “Hollywood in China.” cybersecurity-114875#.VNJDa8bov4k 111 Patrick Frater,“Chinese Regulators to Allow Hollywood Films 90 Tim Maurer and Robert Morgus, “‘Cybersecurity’ and Why in Summer,” Variety, July 8, 2016. http://variety.com/2016/ Definitions Are Risky,” Center for Security Studies, November 10, film/asia/chinese-regulators-to-allow-hollywood-films-in- 2014. http://isnblog.ethz.ch/intelligence/cybersecurity-and-the- summer-1201810624/ problem-of-definitions 112 O’Connor, Sean et al., “Directed by Hollywood.” 91 Denyer, “China’s scary lesson.” 113 Clare Baldwin and Kristina Cooke, “How Sony sanitized the new 92 “China’s 13th Five-Year Plan: Q&A with Scott Kennedy and Adam Sandler movie to please Chinese censors,” Reuters, July Christopher K. Johnson,” The Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2016. 24, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/05/23/chinas-13th-five- china-film/ year-plan-qa-with-scott-kennedy-and-christopher-k-johnson/ 114 Eric Priest, “Copyright and Free Expression in China’s 93 Yue Hu. “Internet Plus Sets the Trend,” China Today, May 11, Film Industry,” in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and 2016. http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/english/report/2016-05/11/ Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 26 Issue 1, 2015. content_720462.htm 115 Dominick Suzanne-Mayer, “China, Hollywood, and the Global 94 Livingston, “Assessing China’s Plan.” Future of Film Production,” Consequence of Sound, August 5, 95 Quan Yuan, Qiao Han, Xu Chao. “China Headlines: A decade in two 2016. http://consequenceofsound.net/2016/08/china-hollywood- 5-year plans,” Xinhua, March 16, 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/ and-the-global-future-of-film-production/ english/2016-03/16/c_135194648.htm 116 Ibid. 96 Nathan Freitas, “People Around the World Are Voluntarily 117 Frater, “Chinese Regulators.” Submitting to China’s Great Firewall. Why?” Slate, January 6, 2015. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/01/06/tencent_s_ 118 Ibid. wechat_worldwide_internet_users_are_voluntarily_submitting_ 119 Baldwin, et al. “How Sony sanitized.” to.html 120 Priest, “Copyright and Free Expression.” 97 Ibid. 121 O’Connor, Sean et al., “Directed by Hollywood.” 98 Jane Perlez and Paul Mozur, “Lu Wei, China’s Internet Czar, Will Step Down From Post,” The New York Times, June 29, 2016. 122 Benjamin Lee, “Eastern promise: the Hollywood films http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/business/international/ making their money in China,” The Guardian, June 14, 2016. china-internet-lu-wei.html https://www.theguardian.com/film/filmblog/2016/jun/14/ hollywood-films-in-china-asia-market-warcraft-the-beginning 99 Tim Maurer, “What’s Next for the US and China in Cybersecurity,” The Wall Street Journal, July 5, 2016. http://carnegieendowment. 123 Bishop, “Warcraft’s record-breaking opening.” org/2016/07/05/what-s-next-for-US-and-china-in-cybersecurity- 124 Ibid. pub-64144 125 Jun Wang, “Beijing’s Hollywood Debut.” Beijing Review, Feb. 25, 100 Hayden, Rhetoric, p. 196 2016. 101 “China’s Film Industry: A Blockbuster in the Making,” 126 Matt Pressberg, “Chinese Studio Exec Lays Out Everything Knowledge@Wharton, Feb. 17, 2016. http://knowledge.wharton. Hollywood Does Wrong,” The Wrap, September 15, 2016. http:// upenn.edu/article/lights-china-action-how-china-is-getting-into- www.thewrap.com/chinese-le-vision-exec-lays-out-everything- the-global-entertainment-business/ hollywood-does-wrong/ 102 “Hollywood and Chinese Cinema: The Future of Movies, 127 Nancy Tartaglione, “‘The Great Wall’ Scales $24.3M In First The Huffington Post, July 5, 2016. Day Of China Release,” Deadline.com, December 16, 2016. 103 “China’s Film Industry,” Knowledge@Wharton. http://deadline.com/2016/12/the-great-wall-china-opening-box- office-matt-damon-1201872165/ 104 Ibid. 128 “Coming to a Theater Near You: Made-in-China Disney Movies,” 105 “Hollywood and Chinese Cinema,” The Huffington Post. Bloomberg News, June 9, 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2016-06-09/coming-soon-to-a-theater-near-you-made-in- china-disney-movies

40 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG 129 Priest, “Copyright and Free Expression.” 151 Amy Qin, “Pander or Diversify? Hollywood Courts China With ‘The Great Wall’,” The New York Times, January 19, 2017. 130 Brooks Barnes, “STX, Hollywood Start-Up Behind ‘Bad Moms,’ https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/movies/the-great-wall- Gains Chinese Investors,” The New York Times, Aug 11, 2016. matt-damon-chinese-box-office.html http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/business/media/stx-an- entertainment-start-up-gains-chinese-investors.html 152 McDonald, Mark. “Beijing’s Censors Could Test the Mettle of Iron Man,” The International Herald Times, July 17, 2012. http:// 131 Ibid. rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/17/beijings-censors- 132 Matthew Garrahan and Henny Sender, “Chinese Investors Flood could-test-the-mettle-of-iron-man/ Into Hollywood,” Financial Times, June 7, 2016. https://www.ft.com/ 153 Lubin, “18 Hollywood Movies.” content/2cb93908-2c65-11e6-bf8d-26294ad519fc 154 Lee, “Eastern promise.” 133 Rebecca Fannin, “Tencent’s Hollywood Deal With STX Extends China Reach Beyond Tech,” Forbes, August 12, 2016. 155 Williams, Holly. “Rising in the East,” 60 Minutes, April 10, 2016. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccafannin/2016/08/12/ http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-china-film-industry- tencents-hollywood-deal-with-stx-extends-china-reach-beyond- booming/ tech/#86a6d6b1ca1d 156 McDonald, “Beijing’s Censors.” 134 Pressberg, “Chinese Studio Exec.” 157 Lubin, “18 Hollywood Movies.” 135 Scott Cendrowski, “China’s Richest Man Is Going After Hollywood 158 Langfitt, Frank. “How China’s Censors Influence Hollywood,” Studio Paramount,” Fortune, July 14, 2016. http://fortune. NPR, May 18, 2015. http://www.npr.org/sections/ com/2016/07/14/dalian-wanda-hollywood-paramount/ parallels/2015/05/18/407619652/how-chinas-censors-influence- 136 Erich Schwartzel and Kathy Chu, “China’s Influence on Hollywood hollywood Grows,” The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/ 159 Baldwin, et al. “How Sony sanitized.” articles/chinas-influence-on-hollywood-grows-1468519130 160 Ibid. 137 “The Man Who Wants to Take Hollywood to China,” Reuters, August 23, 2016. http://nypost.com/2016/08/23/the-man-who- 161 “Hollywood and Chinese Cinema,” The Huffington Post. wants-to-take-hollywood-to-china/ 162 Ibid. 138 Stephen Evans, “China’s Hollywood studio buy-up begs questions,” 163 McDonald, “Beijing’s Censors.” BBC, Jan. 12, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia- 164 china-35290404 Schwartzel, et al. “China’s Influence.” 165 139 Michael Forsythe, “Wang Jianlin, a Billionaire at the Intersection of Ibid. Business and Power in China,” The New York Times, April 28, 2015. 166 Langfitt, “How China’s Censors Influence.” http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/asia/wang-jianlin- 167 abillionaire-at-the-intersection-of-business-and-power-in-china. Garrahan, et al. “Chinese Investors Flood.” html?_r=0 168 Tartaglione, Nancy. “Is ‘Warcraft’s Outsized China Box Office 140 Cendrowski, “China’s Richest Man.” A Game-Changer For Hollywood?” Deadline Hollywood, June 15, 2016. http://deadline.com/2016/06/warcraft-box-office-analysis- 141 Joanna Robinson, “Did You Catch All the Ways Hollywood china-future-1201772400/ Pandered to China This Year?” Vanity Fair, August 5, 2016. 169 http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2016/08/did-you-catch-the- Stout, Kristie Lu. “Blockbuster battle: Is China’s movie industry ways-hollywood-pandered-to-china-this-year the new Hollywood?” CNN, June 23, 2016. http://www.cnn. com/2016/06/23/asia/china-entertainment-movie-industry/ 142 Gus Lubin, “18 Hollywood Movies That Pandered to China’s 170 Giant Box Office,” Business Insider, October 14, 2016. Brzeski, Patrick. “What’s Behind China’s Sudden http://www.businessinsider.com/hollywood-movies-in- Box‑Office Slump?” The Hollywood Reporter, July 20, 2016. china-2016-10 http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/whats-behind-chinas- sudden-box-912718 143 Baldwin, et al. “How Sony sanitized.” 171 Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” 194. 144 Rosen, “Hollywood in China.” 172 China’s Film Industry, Knowledge@Wharton. 145 Robinson, “Did You Catch.” 146 Schwartzel, et al. “China’s Influence.” 147 “Independence Day: Resurgence Main Characters Use QQ IM Service for Video Call between the Earth and the Moon,” PR Newswire, June 27, 2016. http://www.prnewswire.com/ news-releases/independence-day-resurgence-main-characters- use-qq-im-service-for-video-call-between-the-earth-and-the- moon-300290395.html 148 Xi Wei, “Chinese audiences unhappy with clumsy product placement,” Global Times, June 29, 2016. http://www.globaltimes. cn/content/991371.shtml 149 Lee, “Eastern promise.” 150 Ibid.

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