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Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power

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Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power SHANTHI KALATHIL March 2017 Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power ABOUT CIMA MARCH 2017 The Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA), at the National Endowment for Democracy, works to strengthen the support, raise the visibility, and improve the effectiveness of independent Contents media development throughout the world. The center provides information, builds networks, Introduction: Going Global . 1 conducts research, and highlights the indispensable role independent media play in the creation and Context: Managing Internally, Projecting Externally . 4 development of sustainable democracies. An important aspect of CIMA’s work is to research ways Shaping International News: to attract additional US private sector interest in and A Multi-Pronged Approach. 7 support for international media development. In Its Own Image: CIMA convenes working groups, discussions, and A Chinese-Influenced Global Internet . 15 panels on a variety of topics in the field of media development and assistance. The center also issues Building Friendly Feelings: Hollywood . 23 reports and recommendations based on working group discussions and other investigations. These Conclusion: An Information Age Power . 35 reports aim to provide policymakers, as well as donors and practitioners, with ideas for bolstering Endnotes . 38 the effectiveness of media assistance. Center for International Media Assistance National Endowment for Democracy 1025 F STREET, N.W., 8TH FLOOR WASHINGTON, DC 20004 PHONE: (202) 378-9700 FAX: (202) 378-9407 ABOUT THE AUTHOR EMAIL: [email protected] Shanthi Kalathil is Director of the International URL: http://cima.ned.org Forum for Democratic Studies. Previously a Senior Mark Nelson Democracy Fellow at the U.S. Agency for International SENIOR DIRECTOR Development and a regular consultant for the World Bank, the Aspen Institute, and others, she has Nicholas Benequista PUBLICATION EDITOR authored or edited numerous policy and scholarly publications, including the edited volume Diplomacy, Development and Security in the Information Age (Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy) and Developing ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR THE CENTER FOR Independent Media as an Institution of Accountable Governance (The INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE World Bank). She also co-authored Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule, a widely cited work Stephen Fuzesi, Jr. Craig LaMay that examined the Internet and authoritarian regimes. A former William A. Galston William Orme Hong Kong-based staff reporter for The Wall Street Journal Asia, Suzanne Garment Dale Peskin Ellen Hume Adam Clayton Powell III Kalathil is a member of CIMA’s Advisory Council, and also lectures Jerry Hyman Monroe E. Price on international relations in the information age at Georgetown Alex S. Jones Rep. Adam Schiff University. Kalathil holds degrees from the University of California at Shanthi Kalathil Marguerite Sullivan Berkeley and the London School of Economics and Political Science. Susan King Richard Winfield Cover: San Francisco Chinese New Year Parade, 2013, by Shawn Clover © CC BY 2.0 Generic Introduction: Going Global or years, China’s adaptive and largely successful system of domestic Internet censorship, known colloquially as the “Great Firewall of China,” has F been held up as an example of how authoritarian regimes might—against all expectations—successfully manage the political impact of information and communication technology.1 Now well over a decade old and still evolving, the Great Firewall has largely contained politically significant information and collective action, while still allowing the vast majority of Chinese Internet users to access their own social networks, entertainment, and some forms of news. But China is no longer content to simply manage the information space within its borders. Without much fanfare, it has turned its focus outward, seeking to take its influence over the information environment global. Through a combination of market-oriented mechanisms, propaganda, pressure tactics, and action in international arenas, China is attempting to harness the global information ecosystem in unprecedented ways. It has focused primarily on three avenues: shaping international news media, guiding the evolution of the global Internet, and influencing global culture through Hollywood. The cumulative effect of this global reach has yet to be fully dissected or understood. China’s multifaceted effort reflects a modern, nuanced comprehension China is attempting to of what constitutes power in the information age. In utilizing the global harness the global information information ecosystem, China is certainly not alone among authoritarian governments—Russia’s disinformation campaigns have certainly ecosystem in unprecedented dominated more recent news cycles. But China now represents the ways. It has focused primarily most comprehensively successful authoritarian power in this respect, on three avenues: shaping and serves as an example to others that might emulate its efforts. While international news media, Beijing claims it does not seek to promote its own political system, its successes can encourage other authoritarian regimes through the guiding the evolution of power of example, which in turn can help roll back existing democratic the global Internet, and institutions and ensure international institutions are not weighted in influencing global culture favor of democracy.2 Such efforts can have important and long-lasting through Hollywood. effects on democracy worldwide and on the current structure of the international order. Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 1 How China 1 Influences the Global International Information News Reporting System Pressuring and influencing reporting by foreign media Promoting outward facing news media Evolution of the Supporting “constructive 2 Global Internet journalism” Advocating for “Internet sovereignty” Promoting China’s largest Internet industries (“Internet Power”) Engaging in cyber-espionage and attacks, including use of the Great Cannon Shaping Global Culture and Opinion Partnering with Hollywood studios on co-productions Using its market power to influence Hollywood content Bolstering its own entertainment 3 industry capacity Supporting festivals, sports, and cultural and language institutes 2 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ASSISTANCE CIMA.NED.ORG This paper seeks to shed light on this effort, looking specifically at China’s strategies to influence three aspects of the global information sphere. 1. International news reporting. China’s efforts to promote international news coverage favorable to its interests can be divided broadly into three main categories: pressuring and influencing reporting by foreign media; promulgating its own outward-facing news media to foreign audiences; and influencing the structure and values of the media in countries where it has particular influence. 2. The evolution of the global Internet. China, along with other authoritarian countries such as Russia, has been a proponent of “Internet sovereignty,” which favors authoritarian tactics to control information. It has developed sophisticated cyber capabilities, and has promoted the interests of its largest Internet companies overseas, known loosely as “Internet Power.” This approach is likely to undermine trust in the global Internet and limit the free flow of information worldwide. 3. Global culture and opinion, most significantly through Hollywood. Words like “censorship” and Although China is engaged in a number of efforts to boost its cultural “propaganda” no longer soft power, such as through sports, festivals, cultural and language institutes, and other venues, its engagement with Hollywood has the convey the breadth and largest potential reach. Because China is an increasingly important ambition of such endeavors. market for the global film industry, entertainment firms have been Rather, China is directly striking deals that help give them access to that market, but put manipulating elements of them at the mercy of Chinese censors. This leads to content either the information ecosystem edited to fit the Chinese market, or proactively shaped to exclude anything the Chinese government might consider sensitive in the first at their source. place. Chinese co-productions are also more likely to feature positive depictions of China. What emerges is an altered understanding of the ways in which authoritarian regimes like China can wield power in the global information arena. Words like “censorship” and “propaganda” no longer convey the breadth and ambition of such endeavors. Rather, China is directly manipulating elements of the information ecosystem at their source, whether in the conceptual stage of Hollywood films or at the editorial level of news reporting. The CCP has long used multiple methods—including leverage of the private sector—to proactively harness information resources within China’s borders. Increasingly, those methods are being used to amplify China’s power beyond them. Beyond the Great Firewall: How China Became a Global Information Power #mediadev 3 Context: Managing Internally, Projecting Externally History of Controlling Information Resources Much of the current discourse on China’s information-shaping capabilities revolves around how it largely contains the political impact of information vis-à-vis challenges to the ruling
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