DOCSLIB.ORG

Achieving Comprehensive Hukou Reform in China

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Achieving Comprehensive Hukou Reform in China Paulson Policy Memorandum Achieving Comprehensive Hukou Reform in China Kam Wing Chan December 2014 Paulson Policy Memorandum About the Author Kam Wing Chan Kam Wing Chan is Professor of Geography at the University of Washington. His main research program focuses on China’s cities, migration, employment, the household registration system, and related statistics. In recent years, he has served as a consultant for the World Bank, United Nations, Asian Development Bank, and McKinsey & Company on a number of policy projects related to China’s cities and economy. He is the author of Cities with Invisible Walls: Reinterpreting Urbanization in Post-1949 China, and some 60 journal articles and book chapters. His recent commentaries and interviews have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Economist, China Daily, South China Morning Post, BBC, China Radio International, CBC Radio, Caixin, and other media. His webpage is http://faculty.washington.edu/kwchan/. Cover Photo: Reuters/Jianan Yu Paulson Policy Memorandum Introduction he reform of China’s household At present, China’s urban population registration system—orhukou in includes 230 million of so-called TChinese—is a major issue for the “floating population”: residents of cities country’s future development. China who lack a local urban hukou. Among has less arable land than the United these, more than 10 million are college States, yet more than 200 million graduates, including junior college.2 Chinese still depend on agriculture for their livelihood and more than 800 The floating population is growing million citizens are registered with the rapidly. Indeed, while the urban floating government as having a rural hukou.1 population in 2000 was only 130 million, For China to further develop, it is this category increased by 100 million inevitable that it will need to pursue people in just 12 years. As illustrated systematic urbanization. in Figure 1 below, the And in doing so, the In effect, China’s migrants need gap between the de facto government will also to become full urban residents. urban population and the have to allow migrant urban hukou population— workers who have left rural areas for that is, the floating population—has cities to become genuine urban citizens. widened since the 1980s, a trend that is far from ideal. If this trend continues, Such a policy change will involve much it would not be a surprise if China’s more than simply altering a citizen’s floating population reaches as high as hukou category from rural to urban 300 million in ten years.3 And the fact in the registration record. Rather, it is, “second-class” citizenship of such means allowing migrant workers to magnitude will be a big threat to social gain permanent residency in Chinese stability in China. cities, and thus to be covered by the urban public service system in The challenge for China’s policymakers, their place of work. In effect, China’s therefore, is to “reverse” the problem: migrants need to become full urban if, instead, only one-third of the floating residents. population of more than 300 million gains middle-class spending power, this Of course, such a major transformation will increase the middle-class consumer cannot be achieved overnight. Instead, group in China by 100 million, almost a workable plan that promotes half of the country’s current middle- incremental and comprehensive hukou class population of more than 200 reform, with some breakthroughs, million. Since China’s policymakers needs to be designed. are determined to increase the share Achieving Comprehensive Hukou Reform in China 1 Paulson Policy Memorandum of consumption in the economy, the the next six years, about 17 million power of a new class of spenders of people will be granted a local urban this magnitude cannot be ignored. hukou each year, among which the number from the floating population Since the natural urban population granted an urban hukou will see a growth rate in large cities,4 among substantial increase, reaching perhaps households with urban hukou 10 to 12 million annually. The Plan status, is currently very low (and envisages that by 2020 the floating has even been negative in some population as a percentage of China’s years),5 it is difficult to imagine how total population will decline by two China can achieve a substantial percentage points, from the current increase in the urban middle class 17 percent down to 15 percent.6 population by relying solely on that part of the population that is At the end of July 2014, the State currently—and legally—registered Council released its “Opinions on with an urban hukou. So to promote Further Promoting the Reform of domestic demand as a growth driver, the hukou System” (hereafter “the China must principally rely on the Opinions”), which proposes an all- urbanization of rural migrant workers, out opening of hukou restrictions in thus expanding the country’s middle- towns and small cities, the opening class population. of hukou restrictions in an orderly fashion in medium-sized cities, How can such hukou reforms be reasonably determining conditions implemented? for hukou registration in large cities, and the strict control of population In March 2014, China’s central sizes in very large cities. Differentiated government released its “New policies for urban hukou registration National Urbanization Plan” (hereafter were also specified.7 “the Plan”), which proposes “granting approximately 100 million rural The Plan and the Opinions represent migrant workers and other long-term an important first step in hukou residents a local urban hukou” by reform, and exemplify the Chinese 2020 (see Figure 1). The priority group central government’s resolve to alter is migrant workers with stable work the current system. The Opinions in urban areas, but other groups are offer more clearly defined principles included: graduates of universities for how citizens who leave their and vocational and technical schools, permanent hukou residence to live workers from other cities, and local in a city for half a year can gradually population with a rural, rather than attain rights to basic public services in urban, hukou. This means that over the city. Achieving Comprehensive Hukou Reform in China 2 Paulson Policy Memorandum Yet the Plan is merely a six-year This policy memorandum recommends program, and according to the rate of that hukou reform move more quickly change outlined in the Plan, completely and be opened more widely. The resolving the floating population issue— memo presents a plan that builds on that is, bringing down the floating the central government’s Plan and population percentage to zero—will Opinions. It proposes comprehensive probably require the work of another reform objectives, timetables, and three or four decades. concrete measures. Moreover, it attempts to take a longer term Another problem with the Opinions perspective, offering a vision of how is that it envisages little opening various aspects of reform might of hukou registration in very large fit together, and also how to give cities, and thus does not really meet members of the floating population the longstanding earnest desire of expectations and hope to plan for university graduates, professionals, a potential future. Such faster and and entrepreneurs who do not have deeper reforms will, in fact, be the local urban hukou to obtain one. beneficial for social stability. Figure 1. Urban Population Growth Trends and Projections, 1980-2030 Sources: China Statistical Yearbooks; China Population Statistical Yearbooks; figures for 2013-2020 are from National New-Type Urbanization Plan; those after 2020 are the author’s. Achieving Comprehensive Hukou Reform in China 3 Paulson Policy Memorandum Costs and Dividends of Hukou Reform n considering how hukou reform an astronomical figure that China is to be achieved, some believe obviously could not afford. Ithat the urbanization of migrant workers will involve costs that the But that arithmetic is flawed because public—or more precisely, the it simply multiplies 100,000 yuan government—cannot bear. In fact, this by 230 million. The 100,000 yuan point of view is comprised of various in services for granting an urban misconceptions and blind spots. hukou to one member of the floating population would not be spent in In recent years, some relatively a year, but rather over a lifetime comprehensive estimates have (approximately 40 years). That is, concluded that the 100,000 yuan granting an urban will be distributed hukou to a typical over 40 years, migrant worker which, based on a (including his or linear distribution, her dependents) amounts to an will incur lifetime average of 2,500 public expenditures yuan ($400) of approximately annually (in 2010 100,000 yuan constant prices).9 ($16,287) based on 2010 constant Photo: World Bank So if, on average, 20 prices.8 This includes the major million people are given urban hukou public welfare benefits and services: each year, the total cost would be 50 compulsory education, cooperative billion yuan (in 2010 constant prices) medical care, pension insurance, per year, or 0.1 percent of China’s and other social security (such as current GDP. This ratio would increase subsistence allowance), as well as incrementally each year—by the costs for city management and social fifteenth year, the cost would amount housing. to 1.5 percent of GDP—but these are costs that China should be able to bear. Some media reports state that if the entire existing urban floating However, these costs represent only population of 230 million were the public expenditures, and thus do assigned urban hukou, the total cost not account for the public revenue would be 23 trillion yuan ($4 trillion), that would be generated by the Achieving Comprehensive Hukou Reform in China 4 Paulson Policy Memorandum floating population through taxes you-go system for pensions and healthcare, and other channels of contribution.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Internet Surveillance in China
    The Architecture of Control: Internet Su rveillance in China James A. Lewis , Center for Strategic and International Studies July 200 6 Security concerns shape China’s official internet and information technology strateg ies . Th ese include concerns shared by many cou nt ries: promoting a strong and growing economy , providing information assurance , and defending against foreign intrusions into China’s information space . Most importantly for the Chinese, information security include s a political element not foun d in many other nations – c ontrol by the party and the state over communications and the flow of informa tion . The rapid spread of internet access and mobile communications pose a serious challenge to this goal. In response, China’s security apparatus is reorienting its informational defenses. In the past, the emphasi s was on blocking access - the “great firewall.” In the future, the emphasis will be on the monitoring and surveillance of online activities. China’s primary objective in internet securi ty is political – preventing IT from eroding the regime’s authority. Information security is defined in China as “a comprehensive concept understood in a broad sense, and it involves political, economic, cultural, ideological, media, social and military l evel or field. ” It includes “data, system, network, infrastructure .”1 Chin ese officials worry about the potential of the Internet to contribute to the loss of state secrets , offer new avenues for organizing dissent and opposition , and spread “harmful inf ormation. ” This makes controlling access to "harmful network information” and the ability to monitor and intercept communications top priorities .2 For China’s leadership, one particular set of event s demonstrated the risks of not securing networks.
    [Show full text]
  • Ant Tribe Yan Zhao University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
    University of Arkansas, Fayetteville ScholarWorks@UARK Theses and Dissertations 8-2012 Ant Tribe Yan Zhao University of Arkansas, Fayetteville Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Fine Arts Commons, and the Interactive Arts Commons Recommended Citation Zhao, Yan, "Ant Tribe" (2012). Theses and Dissertations. 433. http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/433 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. ANT TRIBE ANT TRIBE A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Fine Arts in Art By Yan Zhao Shenyang Aerospace University Bachelor of Engineering in Industrial Design, 2005 August 2012 University of Arkansas ABSTRACT “Ant Tribe” describes the post-80s generation university graduates who live together in poor conditions without social security in communities around China's major metropolises. They dream of a better life in big cities but struggle with low–paying jobs. These struggling “elites” have become the fourth weak social group, after peasants, migrant workers and unemployed people. The reason why these college graduates are compared to ants is that they are like ants: clever, hardworking, politically weak and living in groups. The real world is always different from the ideal world of the “Ant Tribe” in China. They often lose their purposes in a complex society. It is more important for them to recognize the distance between the real and imaginary in order to rethink whether it is a right choice to stay in a big city and try to realize their dreams.
    [Show full text]
  • Of the People's Liberation Army
    Understanding the “People” of the People’s Liberation Army A Study of Marriage, Family, Housing, and Benefits Marcus Clay, Ph.D. Printed in the United States of America by the China Aerospace Studies Institute ISBN-13: 978-1724626929 ISBN-10: 1724626922 To request additional copies, please direct inquiries to Director, China Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, 55 Lemay Plaza, Montgomery, AL 36112 Cover art is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license. E-mail: [email protected] Web: http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/CASI https://twitter.com/CASI_Research @CASI_Research https://www.facebook.com/CASI.Research.Org https://www.linkedin.com/company/11049011 Disclaimer The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, Intellectual Property, Patents, Patent Related Matters, Trademarks and Copyrights; this work is the property of the US Government. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States. This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This publication is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal, academic, or governmental use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete however, it is requested that reproductions credit the author and China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI). Permission is required from the China Aerospace Studies Institute to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use.
    [Show full text]
  • 'New Era' Should Have Ended US Debate on Beijing's Ambitions
    Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards” March 13, 2020 “How Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ Should Have Ended U.S. Debate on Beijing’s Ambitions” Daniel Tobin Faculty Member, China Studies, National Intelligence University and Senior Associate (Non-resident), Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies Senator Talent, Senator Goodwin, Honorable Commissioners, thank you for inviting me to testify on China’s promotion of alternative global norms and standards. I am grateful for the opportunity to submit the following statement for the record. Since I teach at National Intelligence University (NIU) which is part of the Department of Defense (DoD), I need to begin by making clear that all statements of fact and opinion below are wholly my own and do not represent the views of NIU, DoD, any of its components, or of the U.S. government. You have asked me to discuss whether China seeks an alternative global order, what that order would look like and aim to achieve, how Beijing sees its future role as differing from the role the United States enjoys today, and also to address the parts played respectively by the Party’s ideology and by its invocation of “Chinese culture” when talking about its ambitions to lead the reform of global governance.1 I want to approach these questions by dissecting the meaning of the “new era for socialism with Chinese characteristics” Xi Jinping proclaimed at the Communist Party of China’s 19th National Congress (afterwards “19th Party Congress”) in October 2017.
    [Show full text]
  • Shanghai, China's Capital of Modernity
    SHANGHAI, CHINA’S CAPITAL OF MODERNITY: THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE AND URBAN EXPERIENCE OF WORLD EXPO 2010 by GARY PUI FUNG WONG A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOHPY School of Government and Society Department of Political Science and International Studies The University of Birmingham February 2014 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This thesis examines Shanghai’s urbanisation by applying Henri Lefebvre’s theories of the production of space and everyday life. A review of Lefebvre’s theories indicates that each mode of production produces its own space. Capitalism is perpetuated by producing new space and commodifying everyday life. Applying Lefebvre’s regressive-progressive method as a methodological framework, this thesis periodises Shanghai’s history to the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial era’, ‘socialist reform era’ and ‘post-socialist reform era’. The Shanghai World Exposition 2010 was chosen as a case study to exemplify how urbanisation shaped urban experience. Empirical data was collected through semi-structured interviews. This thesis argues that Shanghai developed a ‘state-led/-participation mode of production’.
    [Show full text]
  • August 10, 2016 the Honorable Li Keqiang Premier Beijing People's
    August 10, 2016 The Honorable Li Keqiang Premier Beijing People’s Republic of China Respected Premier Li: Our organizations, representing a broad array of industries and companies of all sizes, are writing to express our hope that China fully embraces the goals of the upcoming G20 Leaders Meeting to promote an “innovative, invigorated, interconnected, and inclusive world economy,” by taking steps to address concerns regarding the direction of China’s information communications technology (ICT) policies. These include the draft Cybersecurity Law (“The Law”) and pending China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) Provisions on Insurance System Informatization (“The Provisions”). We appreciate that China has published drafts of The Law and The Provisions for public comment. This level of transparency is very important in drafting technical regulations of this significance. However, the current drafts, if implemented, would weaken security and separate China from the global digital economy. Specific concerns with The Law and The Provisions include: Broad data residency requirements, which have no additional security benefits, but would impede economic growth, and create barriers to entry for both foreign and Chinese companies; Trade-inhibiting security reviews and requirements for ICT products and services, which may weaken security and constitute technical barriers to trade as defined by the World Trade Organization; and Data retention and sharing, and law enforcement assistance requirements, which would weaken technical security measures
    [Show full text]
  • Who Set the Narrative? Assessing the Influence of Chinese Media in News Coverage of COVID-19 in 30 African Countries the Size Of
    Who Set the Narrative? Assessing the Influence of Chinese Media in News Coverage of COVID-19 in 30 African Countries The size of China’s State-owned media’s operations in Africa has grown significantly since the early 2000s. Previous research on the impact of increased Sino-African mediated engagements has been inconclusive. Some researchers hold that public opinion towards China in African nations has been improving because of the increased media presence. Others argue that the impact is rather limited, particularly when it comes to affecting how African media cover China- related stories. This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by exploring the extent to which news media in 30 African countries relied on Chinese news sources to cover China and the COVID-19 outbreak during the first half of 2020. By computationally analyzing a corpus of 500,000 news stories, I show that, compared to other major global players (e.g. Reuters, AFP), content distributed by Chinese media (e.g. Xinhua, China Daily, People’s Daily) is much less likely to be used by African news organizations, both in English and French speaking countries. The analysis also reveals a gap in the prevailing themes in Chinese and African media’s coverage of the pandemic. The implications of these findings for the sub-field of Sino-African media relations, and the study of global news flows is discussed. Keywords: China-Africa, Xinhua, news agencies, computational text analysis, big data, intermedia agenda setting Beginning in the mid-2010s, Chinese media began to substantially increase their presence in many African countries, as part of China’s ambitious going out strategy that covered a myriad of economic activities, including entertainment, telecommunications and news content (Keane, 2016).
    [Show full text]
  • Rural-Urban Migration in China
    Internal Labor Migration in China: Trends, Geographical Distribution and Policies Kam Wing Chan Department of Geography University of Washington Seattle [email protected] January 2008 Wuhan: Share of Migrant Workers (Non-Hukou) (2000 Census Data) Industry % of employment in that industry Manufacturing 43 Construction 56 Social Services 50 Real Estate and Housing 40 Wuhan City (7 city districts) 46 Urban recreation consumption rose at 14% p.a in 1995-2005 Topics • Hukou System and Migration Statistics • Migration Trends • Geography •Policies (The Household Registration System, 户口制度) • Formally set up in 1958 • Divided population/society into two major types of households: rural and urban • Differential treatments of rural and urban residents • Controlled by the police and other govt departments • Basically an “internal passport system” • Currently, the system serves as a benefit eligibility system; a tool of institutional exclusion than controlling geographical mobility • The population of a city is divided into “local” and “outside” population. Ad MIGRANT CHILDREN FALL THROUGH THE CRACKS An unlicensed school in Beijing Two types of internal migrants • Hukou Migrants: migrants with local residency rights • Non-hukou Migrant: migrants without local residency rights – also called: non-hukou population, or more generally, “floating population” Wuhan: Share of Non-Hukou Migrant Workers (2000 Census Data) Industry % of Employment Manufacturing 43 Construction 56 Social Services 50 Real Estate and Housing 40 Wuhan City (7 city districts)
    [Show full text]
  • Social Parasitism in Ant and Human Societies
    POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY POL358 Social Parasitism in Ant and Human Societies Joseph Marcel Virassamy 4/10/2013 Contents Introduction 1. Types of Parasitic Life History: Emery’s Rule 2. Temporary Parasitism: Concept of Power 3. Permanent Inquilines: Free Rider 4. Slave-making: Work Force 5. Recommendations and conclusion 6. Research Question: In what ways and for what reasons do social parasites manipulate their host? 7. Hypotheses: I would argue that social parasitism, whether in humans or ants societies, is based partly on self-interest and nature. Introduction This paper will attempt to bring to light a new study proposed by Professor Anil Hira in the field of bioeconomics studies. Though other nonhuman social societies, such as honeybees, can be used to draw parallels to human societies, in this paper I will focus specifically on ant social societies that are more “than a hundred million years older than humans” (Gordon, 2010, p.1). The reason I have decided to study ants and human societies is because both societies are the two most successful social organizations on the planet. Ants are one of the “most highly social of all organisms” (Wilson, 1991, p. 14) and dominate the insect world. Furthermore, like humans, ants succeed because they communicate effectively and efficiently (Hölldobler & Wilson, 1994). There is abundant literature on biological studies of ants; in the research for this literature review, I have selected some noteworthy literature on ant behaviour that I believe will 1 help to initiate a discussion on ant behaviour. The literature review includes the work of Hölldobler & Wilson, 1994, 2011; Gordon, 1999, 2010; Sudd, 1967; Moffett, 2010; Bourke & Franks, 1995; Hugh, 1967; Abbott, Lach & Parr, 2010; Gotwald, 1995 and Deslippe, 2010.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Urbanization, Social Restructure and Public
    Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 9:1 (2014) 55-77 Articles China’s Urbanization, Social Restructure and Public Administration Reforms: An Overview Xiaoyuan Wan University of Sheffield [email protected] Abstract This paper provides a review of the broad process of China’s urbanization and the urban public administration reform since the 1978 reforms, with a focus on the changing public policies in the realms of employment, housing, social insurance and the devolution of government authority. It suggests that the main government rationale of the public administration system reforms was to hand over a part of public services which used to be delivered by the central government and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), to local governments and to devolve a part of responsibility to the private sector, the social sector and individuals. According to these reforms, most of the social services, which could only be enjoyed by the employees of the SOEs were handed over to grassroots governments and aimed to cover more urban population. But at the same time, individuals had to take on more responsibilities of their careers choice and fund part of their own social welfare. This paper concludes by suggesting that with proliferating literature on China’s social and economic transition, further study should be carried out to explore the implementation of the reformed urban public policies by local governments and special concern should be given to the participation of non-government actors in China’s public administration. Introduction SINCE THE LATE 1970S, a series of economic reforms have been driving China to step away from a rigid socialism to a more open and diverse society, in which the urban economy developed at a tremendous speed and played an increasingly important role in the national economy.
    [Show full text]
  • Xi Jinping's Address to the Central Conference On
    Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major- Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics Michael D. Swaine* Xi Jinping’s speech before the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs—held November 28–29, 2014, in Beijing—marks the most comprehensive expression yet of the current Chinese leadership’s more activist and security-oriented approach to PRC diplomacy. Through this speech and others, Xi has taken many long-standing Chinese assessments of the international and regional order, as well as the increased influence on and exposure of China to that order, and redefined and expanded the function of Chinese diplomacy. Xi, along with many authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese observers, presents diplomacy as an instrument for the effective application of Chinese power in support of an ambitious, long-term, and more strategic foreign policy agenda. Ultimately, this suggests that Beijing will increasingly attempt to alter some of the foreign policy processes and power relationships that have defined the political, military, and economic environment in the Asia- Pacific region. How the United States chooses to respond to this challenge will determine the Asian strategic landscape for decades to come. On November 28 and 29, 2014, the Central Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership convened its fourth Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs (中央外事工作会)—the first since August 2006.1 The meeting, presided over by Premier Li Keqiang, included the entire Politburo Standing Committee, an unprecedented number of central and local Chinese civilian and military officials, nearly every Chinese ambassador and consul-general with ambassadorial rank posted overseas, and commissioners of the Foreign Ministry to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative Region.
    [Show full text]
  • Police Increase Crackdown to Prevent Human Trafficking
    4 | Thursday, May 6, 2021 HONG KONG EDITION | CHINA DAILY CHINA Grow together Courier service ZTO Farmers lay out rice slammed for inhumane seedling beds to raise them collectively in Lujiang county, Hefei, Anhui prov- delivery of dogs, cats ince, on Wednesday. The practice can By LI LEI save labor costs and [email protected] reduce pests and other crop diseases. The courier giant ZTO Express The healthy ZUO XUEZHANG / was recently put under fire after development of FOR CHINA DAILY one of its business outlets in Chengdu, Sichuan province, was courier companies is found to have transported puppies reliant on … a proper and kittens as part of the contro- versial pet blind box sales on value toward life.” e-commerce sites. A statement from courier com- In a statement late on Tuesday, pany ZTO Express ZTO apologized for collecting live animals from e-retailers for ship- ment, which it said breached rules. postal services, and courier com- The New York listed firm said it panies shall not violate the rules has shut the outlet in question for knowingly,” it said on its Weibo rectification. account. A worker overseeing safety The online crusade came after affairs in the province has also volunteers from Chengdu Aizhijia been suspended from work with Animal Rescue Center, a local ani- the year’s performance-based sala- mal welfare group, late on Monday ry deducted, it added. intercepted about 160 packages “The healthy development of containing such pets at the ZTO courier companies is reliant on the outlet. Police increase crackdown strict application of industrial Videos posted on the group’s standards and safety manage- Weibo account showed cube cages ment, as well as a proper value muffled with braided cloth being toward life,” the statement said.
    [Show full text]