An Interpretation of Xi's Taiwan Policy and Taiwan's Response

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in Taiwan,”2 which proposed the ter- An mination of cross-Strait military con- frontation and called for peaceful reu- Interpretation nification. Since then, direct transpor- 6 of Xi’s Taiwan tation, postal services, and business ties have allowed for substantial en- Policy—and gagement between both sides of the Strait. Other Chinese leaders since Taiwan’s Deng have proposed their own Taiwan Response policies, but the specific content has never shifted substantially. However, Dr. Hsiao-chuan Liao on the 40th anniversary of the Mes- sage, Xi Jinping announced his “Five Points” policy, which positions China away from the opposition of an independent Taiwan to active promotion of reunification.3 In the wider context of the PRC’s more assertive diplomacy under Xi, this shift in emphasis gives cause for pessimism when considering the future of cross-Strait relations and East Asia’s broader stability. Continuation and Adjustment of China’s Taiwan Policy When Xi assumed office in 2012, his hina’s policy toward Taiwan policy toward Taiwan matched that of has remained fairly consistent his predecessor, Hu Jintao. However, since Deng Xiaoping turned it at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi C revealed his “China Dream,”4 which from the position of “fight” to that of “negotiation” in 1978.1 Specifically, showed his ambitions to revive peaceful reunification remains the ul- China’s historical glory. Specifically, timate goal of the People’s Republic of Xi predicted that China would become China (PRC). Still, reunification by a well-off society and realize the mod- force is regarded as a possible outcome ernization of socialism before 2035. He if a peaceful resolution is unattaina- further set up a goal to establish ble. In 1979, the Standing Committee China as a country with leading na- of the fifth National People’s Congress tional capabilities and international adopted its “Message to Compatriots influence by the mid-21st century. As Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 25

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for cross-Strait relations, Xi insisted constituted a consensus between the on “One Country, Two Systems” and PRC and Taiwan. In return, Beijing “the 1992 Consensus.”5 Yet, Xi’s sought to shrink Taiwan’s diplomatic speech to the 19th Party Congress representation overseas by pressuring paid more attention to the consolida- countries to cut ties with Taiwan and tion of the party and the economic sit- working to restrict Taiwan’s participa- uation in mainland China than it did tion in World Health Assembly meet- cross-Strait relations.6 When he did ings. The PRC also suspended the offi- address the Taiwanese government cial communications across the Strait. and people, Xi sought to appeal to It is in this context that Xi chose to them rather than use the language of update his policy toward Taiwan in compulsion. Given that then-President 2019, the 40th anniversary of the Na- of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou, recognized tional People’s Congress’ Message to reunification as the ultimate goal, Compatriots in Taiwan. It is likely cross-Strait relations did undergo a that Xi was trying to influence Tai- relatively positive and intimate phase. wan’s presidential election, which An historic meeting between Xi and were held in January 2020. The main Ma was held in November 2015, the shift detailed Xi’s renewed emphasis first such meeting between mainland on unification instead of bilateral co- China and Taiwan since the end of the operation. This updated policy has be- Chinese Civil War. come an essential part of the PRC’s However, in the 2016 presidential approach to Taiwan. But three subse- election, Taiwan elected Tsai Ing-wen. quent updates are also worth noting. Tsai, a Democratic Progress Party The First Adjustment: The Con- member, supports an independent Tai- tent of the 1992 Consensus wan, divorced from Xi’s One Country, Two Systems. At least at first, Tsai In his speech to the 19th Party Con- tried not to irritate China – for exam- gress, Xi portrayed the 1992 Consen- ple, by not publicly announcing Tai- sus as referring to the One China prin- wan’s independence – and used the ciple, which describes mutual recogni- diplomatic language of “the two sides tion of both sides belonging to one of the Strait” to define Taiwan and China. This mutual recognition is the China. Indeed, Tsai agreed with Xi traditional understanding in mainland that, in 1992, both sides across the China. However, in the updated ver- Strait had jointly acknowledged that sion, Xi redefined the 1992 Consensus they could set aside differences to seek as an understanding that “both sides common ground.7 But Tsai refused to of the Taiwan Straits belong to one China and will work together toward promise that the One China principle national reunification.”8 This Indo-Pacific Perspective │26

Taiwan’s Security

statement marked a departure from percent of Taiwan’s population— past understandings of the 1992 Con- stayed in China for business, family sensus by conflating the One China reasons, or schooling in 2018 alone. principle with the goal of reunifica- China further pushed Taiwan to con- tion. sider political negotiations and to set This conceptual reformulation led the up concrete steps for reunification. Tsai government to clarify—for the While most Taiwanese prefer the sta- first time—that Taiwan cannot accept tus quo, Xi has argued that “One the 1992 Consensus.9 Taiwan’s version Country, Two Systems” can be custom- of the 1992 Consensus is that both ized to accommodate Taiwan. He fur- sides recognize there is only one China ther explained that Taiwan’s socio-eco- but agree to differ on its definition. nomic system will be fully respected, This concept is different from Xi’s in- along with private property, freedom terpretation, which does not admit of religion, and other lawful rights. that the definition of “One China” may From this viewpoint, different ap- differ. Since Xi has further added the proaches should not be an excuse to phrase “to achieve national reunifica- suspend progress toward reunification” to the 1992 Consensus, there are tion. However, the reliability of “One fears the PRC may continue to add or Country, Two Systems” has come un- delete content from the concept as der scrutiny given the conspicuous re- they wish. Hence, a 1992 Consensus cent events in Hong Kong. For Tsai, based on mutual agreement does not the model used to incorporate Hong exist now—if it ever did. Kong into the PRC cannot be ac- cepted—calling instead for a “Taiwan The Second Adjustment: Custom- consensus.”10 ized “One Country, Two Systems” for Taiwan Subsequent events in Hong Kong—es- pecially the mass protests against ex- In his 2017 speech, Xi’s Taiwan policy tradition and national security laws— was consistent with tradition. He used have reinforced the perception in Tai- the formulation of “One Country, Two wan that incorporation into the PRC is Systems” when mentioning Hong unacceptable. Beijing insists the ulti- Kong and Macau. According to PRC mate right of interpreting laws in propaganda, this framework for gov- Hong Kong belongs to the central gov- ernance is conducted perfectly in Hong ernment. Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s Kong and Macau. As such, there is no own government appears to be too reason that Taiwan cannot be next. weak to defend its legislation and has After 2012, China and Taiwan have dealt with the prodemocracy protes- had more and more substantial en- tors strictly and violently. These gagements. Two million Taiwanese—9 Indo-Pacific Perspective │27

Liao events have revealed the problems security, and a standardized democ- with trying to preserve a democratic racy monitoring mechanism to prevent system under Chinese autocratic rule. extreme penetration from the PRC.11 In this situation, “One Country, Two Conclusion: Hot Spot of East Asia Systems” is a dead-end for Taiwan. Tsai’s decision to rebuff Xi has made The three adjustments detailed above her the only politician with the confi- demonstrate that Xi appears to have dence to say “no” to the PRC, a status become more urgent in his appeal for that likely contributed to Tsai winning reunification. He has shifted away a second term as the President of Tai- from cooperation by both sides of the Strait to an emphasis of reunification wan. as a premise. Some scholars even ar- The Third Adjustment: Gradually gue that Xi will try to accomplish reu- Unlinking “Reunification” from nification while leader of the PRC. “Peaceful” While reunification is undoubtedly im- In his 2017 speech, Xi mentioned “reu- portant to Xi, his clear priority is to nification” only three times and linked achieve the “China Dream”—some- two of them with the term “peaceful.” thing that Xi has explicitly invited The implication at hand is while reu- Taiwanese to share in but regarded as nification remained a core concern, a separate and higher-order goal than “peaceful reunification” was the pre- political reunification. Since Xi has so ferred means for achieving that goal. far declined to present reunification as However, in his 2019 speech, Xi used part of his “China Dream” concept, he “reunification” 46 times but only in- is unlikely to consider the use of force cluded the word “peaceful” as a quali- to absorb Taiwan into the PRC. fier 18 times. It appears the overall Finally, it is worth remembering that significance of reunification has in- three structural factors influence creased for Xi—but the importance China’s Taiwan policy: trilateral rela- that reunification shall be peaceful tions among the United States, Tai- has declined. wan, and China; the bilateral interac- In response to Xi’s perceived shift in tions between China and Taiwan; and emphasis on this point, Tsai has re-as- domestic politics in China and Tai- serted the Taiwanese view that inter- wan. Each of these factors is dynamic actions between both sides of the but is moving in the direction of a Strait must be peaceful and equal, not hardened, more hostile policy. For ex- characterized by force or threats. Tsai ample, China now faces serious com- has also proposed a security network petition from the United States. Sup- for cross-Strait exchanges: security for port for an independent Taiwan has people’s livelihoods, information increased—alongside more negative Indo-Pacific Perspective │28

Taiwan’s Security feelings toward mainland China. Addi- be viewed with optimism, as there are tionally, Xi’s suspension of cross-Strait grave implications for the wider East cooperation has led Taiwan to lean Asian region. ■ more heavily on the United States. In Washington, leaders such as Pres. Dr. Hsiao-chuan Liao Donald Trump have viewed closeness with Taiwan as a tool for containing— Dr. Liao is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the National Taiwan University. or at least irritating—China. This hostile climate is perhaps why Xi’s “Mes- sage” to Taiwan is full of anxiety, ea- Disclaimer gerness, and appeals to the Taiwanese The views and opinions expressed or implied people but not the Taiwanese govern- in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanc- ment. On the contrary, China has in- tion of the Department of Defense, Depart- tensified military maneuvers against ment of the Air Force, Air Education and Taiwan by violating Taiwan’s air Training Command, Air University, or other space with its fighter jets. Together, agencies or departments of the US govern- these trends mean that developments ment or their international equivalents. in cross-Strait relations cannot easily

Notes 6 Nathaniel Taplin, “China’s Xi to World: Party First, Reform Second,” Wall Street Journal, 18 October 1 Jiann-fa Yan, “The Likely Framework and Contents 2017, https://www.wsj.com/. of Xi Jin Ping’s Taiwan Policy, Taiwan International 7 “Inaugural address,” Central News Agency, 20 May Studies Quarterly 9, no. 4 (2020): 39–61. 2016, https://www.cna.com.tw/. 2 “Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the 8 “Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reuni- Chinese Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reuni- fication,” Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council fication.” (People’s Republic of China), 2 January 2019, 9 Chris Horton, “Taiwan’s President, Defying Xi http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/. Jinping, Calls Unification Offer ‘Impossible’,” New 3 See: “Xinhua Headlines: Xi says ‘China must be, York Times, 5 January 2019, https://www.ny- will be reunified’ as key anniversary marked,” times.com/. Xinhua News Agency, 2 January 2019, 10 Horton, “Taiwan’s President.” http://www.xinhuanet.com/. 11 “President Tsai issues statement on China's Presi- 4 “Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC Na- dent Xi's ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan’,” Office tional Congress,” China Daily Website, 4 November of the President of the Republic of China, 2 January 2017, https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/. 2019, https://english.president.gov.tw/. 5 “Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC Na- tional Congress.”

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