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military advantages. Asymmetrically, ’s the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has expanded the arsenal of standoff Security firepower with ballistic missiles, rock- 5 ets, cruise missiles, and air-to-surface An Intertwined Knot missiles in the last three decades. Dr. Wu Shang- Therefore, the whole of Taiwan is vulnerable to missile strikes from .1 Combined with other capabili- ties—such as surveillance and submarines—these standoff weap- ons underpin the PLA’s antiaccess/aer- ial-denial (A2/AD) strategy to counter US military deployments in the re- gion. Symmetrically, has substan- tially modernized its conventional mil- itary assets; the PLA Navy (PLAN) boats new surface and underwater fleets could be used to block maritime access to Taiwan and establish sea control, an indispensable condition for amphibious invasion.2 The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the PLAN Air Force have each strengthened their ince 1949, the fighter wings with new indigenous and has been a potential flashpoint Russian models, backed by aerial for conflict —something espe- S warning and command system and cially true in the last decade due to aerial refueling platforms to achieve the shifting balance of the forces be- the air superiority necessary for air- tween the militaries on either side. strikes and air cover for a possible in- Traditionally, Taiwan relies on the ge- vasion of Taiwan.3 Finally, both the ographic barrier of the Strait and sup- PLAAF and PLAN have enlarged their from the —through airborne and amphibious capacities arms sales and the latent threat of for projecting forces across the Strait.4 potential military intervention—to balance against strategic pressure In contrast, Taiwan’s defenses have from China. However, Beijing enjoys fallen into inferiority. Air defense, sea both asymmetrical and symmetrical denial, and antilanding measures Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 19

Wu

have been the core of ’s island firepower and not have much ca- defense strategy for decades. Still, re- pacity left for sea denial.9 Antilanding lated capabilities undermine the de- may be realistic to achieve be- velopments on the other side of the cause of Taiwan’s possible quantita- Strait.5 Taiwan’s fighters and surface- tive superiority in terms of conven- to-air missiles (SAM), and related sur- tional forces (although the PLAN’s veillance facilitates are the backbones amphibious capacity is increasing, for to prevent airstrikes from China. But the foreseeable future, it will be lim- Taipei’s airbases, radars, SAM batter- ited). However, Taiwan’s antilanding ies, and other air defense facilities capability significantly relies on con- have become the main targets of scription, which is how the island can standoff firepower from the . assemble a large reserve of soldiers. Consequently, the loss of Taiwan’s air Yet has been cut to four defense capacity could be demolished months of basic training without being in the first wave of Chinese attacks.6 deployed to regular units, raising If Chinese Special Forces penetrated questions about whether such inexpe- Taiwan in advance of an attack, then rienced reserves could form the ade- this would represent another serious quate mobilized units to accomplish threat to Taiwan’s air defense. Tai- antilanding missions. Regular units wan’s air defense capabilities—espe- also face a shortage of soldiers due to cially the fighters—have come to oc- the lack of conscripts.10 Sabotage by cupy a significant portion of the coun- Chinese Special Forces could further try’s defense budget. There are severe disrupt antilanding forces’ prepara- doubts about the wisdom of military tion, or even paralyze the chain of spending priorities.7 command. Regarding sea denial, Taiwan’s fast Since 2016, the Tsai Ing-wen admin- attack craft and onshore launchers of istration has pursued a military build- antiship cruise missiles are the main- up, with a focus on defensive capabili- stays to deter the PLAN’s surface ves- ties. For air defense, Taipei has pro- sels, which would be essential for an cured 66 F-16C/B Block 70 fighters, amphibious invasion to capture the is- Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and land.8 However, these defenses may FIM-92 SAMs, and other equipment also become the targets of China’s from Washington, along with indige- standoff firepower, and airstrikes after nous funding projects such as the the neutralization of Taiwan’s air de- Tien-Kung series SAMs and AT-5 ad- fenses. Taipei possesses four destroy- vanced trainers/light fighters.11 Such ers and 22 frigates, but these assets investment certainly strengthens the could be vulnerable to Beijing’s A2/AD capacity and capabilities of air

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Taiwan’s Security

defense. Additionally, the introduction result in a missed opportunity to use of the indigenous Wan-Chien, Ameri- offensive capabilities to relieve pres- can air-to-ground (AGM) missiles such sure on Taiwan’s air defenses. as the AGM-154 and AGM-88, AGM- Taiwan’s naval modernization pro- 84 land-attack missiles, land-based gram is ambitious. It covers a broad Hsiung-Fung 2E cruise missiles, the spectrum of vessels, including Tuo Army Tactical Missiles, and other Chiang-class stealth corvettes, subma- standoff munitions allow Taiwan to at- rines, frigates, landing platform docks, tack targets (whether standoff fire- high-speed minelayers, submarine res- power airbases or other military facili- cue , and mine countermeasure ties) in and even far- vessels. These various projects reflect 12 ther inland. Such offensive opera- the Tsai administration’s intention of tions lower the pressure on Taiwan’s developing the indigenous defense in- air defense. dustry with a balanced naval strategy However, the airbases’ vulnerability of aimed at both sea control and sea de- Taiwan is unchanged, meaning that nial.13 Although sea control-oriented Taiwanese fighters may not have a assets, such as frigates and amphibi- chance to take off or return to bases ous transport docks, are valuable in after flying their first sorties. Putting peacetime, their prospects for survival fighters in the shelters in Eastern Tai- in the face of the Chinese A2/AD fire- wan has been a solution for three dec- power are doubtable. As for the sea de- ades, but it comes at the cost of reduc- nial-oriented vessels, their survival ing air defenses and limiting other during wartime would be better but aerial operations. There is also a risk far from guaranteed. The limited that China may develop bunker-buster length of the Taiwanese coastlines munitions. Taipei’s offensive capabili- could be studied by the PLAN in ad- ties thus present a dilemma: a vance to know the “hideouts” of Tai- preemptive strike is militarily ideal wanese vessels, which would be vul- for the most significant impact, but it nerable to Chinese antiship cruise may cause a “troublemaker” label by missiles (ASCM) and other weapons.14 the international community with a The submarines with the highest risk of losing the support of third par- stealth level constitute Taiwan’s stra- ties, especially the United States. Sup- tegic reserve, but China’s active de- pose Beijing launches the first salvo of ployment of underwater sensors may attacks. In that case, most of Taiwan’s create constraints on their opera- fighters will be occupied with mere tions.15 Besides, transforming an in- survival and air defense— if not en- digenous project of defense manufac- tirely neutralized— which would turing into a credible fighting force is

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Wu

expensive, time-consuming, and an voluntary soldiers will adversely im- uncertain endeavor. Considering the pact Taiwan’s ability to repel amphibi- fast pace of PLAN naval construction, ous landings if not adequately ad- time is not on Taipei’s side when it dressed. comes to maritime projects. Although Taiwan’s military moderni- On land, various new procurements zation in recent years has not entirely have added multiple layers of defense. removed the weaknesses in its na- These include M1A2T main battle tional defenses, it is essential to re- tanks (MBT), onshore and member that security dynamics in the Hsiung-Fung series ASCMs, indige- Strait are not just a question of bilat- nous infantry fighting vehicles, multi- eral relations. Given Taipei’s geo- launch rocket systems, AH-64E and graphic location on Taiwan’s island, AH-1W attack helicopters, FGM-148 operations at the north end of the is- and BGM-71 antitank missiles, and land are unavoidable. Yet US military UH-60M utility and CH-47D transport bases in Okinawa would face the north helicopters.16 The ASCMs, rockets, flank of any Chinese military opera- and other munitions can directly sink tions against Taiwan in this . If the PLAN amphibious transport Beijing decides to control the conflict docks. The attack helicopters would scale, this exposed northern flank engage remaining landing vehicles would be a potential vulnerability. On and vessels approaching coastlines the other hand, if China attempted to and any Chinese airborne troops. The neutralize the threat from Okinawa M1A2T MBTs have better armor and with the A2/AD firepower, warfare firepower than the old M-48Hs and M- will naturally go beyond the Strait. In 60A3s. Along with the infantry and ar- such a scenario, Taiwan’s enhanced tillery firepower, these units would defenses would pose a problem for Bei- thwart attempts to form beachheads jing by prolonging the island’s military by Chinese amphibious forces.17 Util- resistance and allowing a longer time ity and transport helicopters could for Beijing to succumb to its exposed rapidly deploy troops for reinforce- northern flank. Economic, political, ment. Tactically, warfare in this stage and other nonmilitary policy tools of fighting would take place under con- from would be more ditions of one side enjoying air superi- effective in dealing with Taiwan and ority, which means that the outcome less likely to provoke an intervention of antilanding operations depend on from the United States. Threats of the how many Taiwanese SAMs and other use of force are likely to remain useful air defenses remained intact. The is- only insofar as they can help set a “red sues of conscription and recruitment of line” to deter Taiwan from declaring

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Taiwan’s Security de jure . In this sense, threats of military force can be used to Dr. Wu Shang-su coerce but not compel. As long as Bei- Dr. Wu is a research fellow in the S. Raja- jing does not feel desperate, at least, a ratnam School of International Studies high-cost military option - even with (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. some chance of victory – must be judged unfavorable in contrast to al- Disclaimer ternatives such as economic pressure. The views and opinions expressed or implied If viewed in this wider context, one in JIPA are those of the authors and should can see that Taiwan’s enhanced mili- not be construed as carrying the official sanc- tion of the Department of Defense, Depart- tary defenses have increased its capac- ment of the Air Force, Air and ity and capabilities to resist Chinese Training Command, Air University, or other military threats, despite some draw- agencies or departments of the US govern- backs, and has thus contributed to the ment or their international equivalents. cross-Strait security’s stability. ■

Notes 9 “Military Balance 2020,” 312. 10 , “Taiwan’s Military Is a Hollow Shell,” 1 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Se- Foreign Policy, 15 2020, https://foreignpol- curity Developments Involving the People’s icy.com/. of China 2020 (Washington, DC: US Department of 11 “-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2019,” Defense, 2020), 51, 55–59, https://media.defense.gov/. 55; “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative 2 Robert S. Ross, “The Rise of the Chinese Navy: Office in the United States (TECRO) – Repair and From Regional Naval Power to Global Naval Power?” Recertification of PATRIOT Advanced Capablity-3 Mis- in China’s Global Engagement, ed. Jacques Delisle silse,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 9 July and Avery Goldstein (Washington, DC: Brookings In- 2020, https://www.dsca.mil/; “Taipei Economic and stitution Press, 2017), 215–18, 222. Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in the United 3 Andreas Rupprecht, Flashpoint China: Chinese Air States - Block I-92F MANPAD Stinger Missiles and Power and Regional Security (Houston: Harpia, Related Equipment and Support,” Defense Security 2016), 33–40; and “The Military Balance 2020,” IISS, Cooperation Agency, 16 December 2015, 232–33, 266, https://www.iiss.org/. https://www.dsca.mil/; and “TK Ⅲ Air Defense 4 “Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2019,” Weapon System,” National -Shan Institute of IISS, 193–94, https://www.iiss.org/; and Military Bal- Science and Technology, 10 July 2020, ance 2020, 263–65. https://www.ncsist.org.tw/. 5 “National Defense Report 2017” (Taipei: Ministry of 12 “Missiles of Taiwan,” CSIS Missile Threat, 14 National Defense, 2017), 67. 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/; Masao Dahlgren 6 Michael J. Lostumbo, David R. Frelinger, James and Shaan Shaikh, “US Approves Taiwan ATACMS, Williams, and Barry Wilson, Air Defense Options for SLAM-ER, Harpoon Missile Sales,” CSIS Missile Taiwan: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Opera- Threat, 27 2020, https://mis- tional Benefits (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), 1– silethreat.csis.org/; “Taipei Economic and Cultural 20. Representative Office (TECRO) in the United States - 7 Lostumbo et al., Air Defense Options for Taiwan, AGM-154C Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) Missiles,” 23–25. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 29 June 2017, 8 “Military Balance 2020,” 312. https://www.dsca.mil/; and “Taipei Economic and Indo-Pacific Perspective │23

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http://thediplomat.com/. Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in the United 15 H.I. Sutton, “China Builds Surveillance Network States - AGM-88B High-Speed Anti-Radiation Mis- In ,” Forbes, 5 2020, siles (HARM),” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, https://www.forbes.com/. 29 June 2017, https://www.dsca.mil/. 16 “Military Balance 2020,” 312; and SIPRI Arms 13 Xavier Vavasseur, “Taiwan Starts Construction of Transfers Database, Stockholm International Peace New IDS Submarine for ROC Navy,” Naval News, 24 Research Institute, 1 February 2021, https://arm- 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/; and strade.sipri.org/. “National Defense Report 2019,” 106–07. 17 “Military Balance 2020,” 311–12. 14 Shang-Su Wu, “No, Stealth Missile Corvettes Won’t Help Taiwan,” The Diplomat, 9 January 2015,

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