sides of the Taiwan Strait will have to Introduction recognize that they belong to a single jurisdiction. The Past, Present, and Future of Cross–Taiwan However, in Taiwan there is little ap- 1 petite for unification if this means ab- Strait Relations sorption into the PRC. Even Taiwan- Dr. Peter Harris, editor ese politicians who have long believed in the principle of “One China” cannot accept their island becoming just an- other province of an authoritarian hegemon. For Taiwanese who oppose unification altogether, the prospect of a union with China is nothing less than an existential threat to their na- tional identity and democratic system. Given the intractability of the Taiwan Question, it makes sense that US for- eign policy is not ordered toward the end of encouraging a permanent politi- cal settlement between Beijing and Taipei—at least not in any meaningful sense. Instead, Washington’s priority is simply to deter the PRC from using military force to impose a settlement rom the vantage point of the on its terms. To be sure, the im- United States, it is difficult to portance of this goal should not be di- envisage a long-term solution minished. America’s political and mili- F tary power has helped foster stability to the problem of cross–Taiwan Strait relations. Beijing is adamant that Tai- across the Taiwan Strait for decades— wan must one day be incorporated into arguably averting a military confron- the People’s Republic of China tation of catastrophic proportions. (PRC)—ideally through a peaceful pro- Nevertheless, there are some serious cess of reconciliation, but via force if questions about the durability of US necessary. According to Chinese lead- policy toward Taiwan that demand ers, this is a fundamental question of consideration. Can the PRC be de- national sovereignty and territorial in- terred forever, or will leaders in Bei- tegrity and so there can be no compro- jing one day calculate that taking Tai- mise on the idea that, ultimately, both wan by force is preferable to a never- Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 1 Harris ending standoff across the Strait? If when describing their geopolitical en- push comes to shove, is the United vironment. The Indo-Pacific regional States truly committed to the military construct seems to be rooted in the defense of Taiwan against a Chinese idea that states from India to Japan invasion? What about military actions share a common set of interests in the short of a full-scale invasion? Is there shadow of China’s rise. Most im- any prospect for a peaceful resolution? portantly, Hashmi argues, Indo-Pacific In this second Indo-Pacific Perspec- states share an interest in preserving tives roundtable, a distinguished a rules-based order. Given that Tai- group of experts suggest some answers wan is a democracy and a reliable fol- to these and related questions. lower of international rules, why is The roundtable begins with two as- Taiwan so often excluded from imagi- sessments of what Taiwan’s current nations of the Indo-Pacific? Giving political status means for the United Taiwan a formal role in the emerging States and the wider region. First, Mi- Indo-Pacific order would not be well chael Mazza provides a forceful justifi- received in Beijing, but Hashmi ar- cation for America’s continued com- gues that the benefits of including Tai- mitments to Taiwan. Mazza makes a wan as a responsible Indo-Pacific two-pronged argument: (1) Taiwan’s stakeholder should not be overlooked. political independence generates sub- Zuo Xiying provides a methodical stantial material benefits for the analysis of how the issue of cross- United States in terms of both secu- Strait relations is viewed from Beijing. rity and economics; and (2) the sur- While Mazza argues that Taiwan vival of democracy on at least one side should be considered a core issue by of the Taiwan Strait ought to be con- the United States, Zuo points out that sidered a moral imperative. Mazza’s Taiwan already is treated as a core arguments are clear and compelling, concern by PRC leaders. This will not an uncompromising rejection of the change. While Hashmi argues that idea that America’s self-interest can Taiwan can contribute to a free and be secured via retrenchment and re- open Indo-Pacific, Zuo cautions war in straint in East Asia. the Taiwan Strait could easily bring Sana Hashmi goes beyond the US- the regional security architecture China-Taiwan trilateral relationship crashing down. These are sober obser- to highlight the importance of Tai- vations about PRC strategic thinking wan’s political status in a regional that demand contemplation in the context. She notes that a growing United States and elsewhere. Zuo number of states now invoke the con- maintains that the United States can cept of a unified “Indo-Pacific” region have a positive role to play in Indo-Pacific Perspective │2 Introduction resolving the dispute between Beijing time. Xi would be an unlikely peace- and Taipei, but he provides a frame maker, to say the least. But in Liao’s for viewing cross-Strait relations that analysis, Xi’s focus remains on achiev- will be uncomfortable for many US- ing the so-called “China Dream”—that based analysts. is, a strong and confident PRC. Xi’s in- Turning to the question of the military terest in unification is not so urgent balance across the Taiwan Strait, Wu that he would sacrifice his domestic Shang-su gives a masterful overview agenda for a costly war over Taiwan. of Taiwan’s ability to withstand mili- Finally, Jessica Drun returns the fo- tary pressure from the PRC. Could cus to the Taiwanese side of the Strait. Taiwan retain control of its airspace in She points out that political actors in- the event of a Chinese assault? For side Taiwan have divergent views over how long could the island resist a full- the existing cross-Strait relationship, scale invasion? Wu gives a clear-eyed let alone the future political status of technical assessment of the military Taiwan. The concept of a “status quo” situation as it currently exists. He is important, given that parties to the makes several conclusions, including dispute often cry foul—and, on occa- the argument that Taipei’s defenses sion, have even threatened war— are currently deficient in some key ar- whenever the prevailing political set- eas, and that the prospect of US in- tlement between Beijing and Taipei is volvement in a cross-Strait confronta- placed in jeopardy. But what if there tion—which, he points out, would is no agreement over how to describe transform such a conflict into a much the status quo? According to Drun, the wider conflagration—is likely critical absence of an intersubjective agree- to deterring China from attempting a ment over how to interpret the cross- direct assault. Strait status quo has wide-ranging po- How likely is a military invasion of litical and diplomatic consequences. Taiwan? Based on her analysis of pub- Drun’s contribution is a fitting conclu- lic pronouncements by Xi Jinping, sion to the roundtable, encapsulating Hsiao-chuan Liao offers some reasons just how complex cross-Strait relations to be skeptical Beijing would resort to are—and just how difficult it will be a military “solution” in the imminent for Beijing and Taipei to resolve their future. Liao is pessimistic about the differences through negotiations. current and future state of cross-Strait What advice do the contributors have relations. She notes that Xi is commit- for Taiwan, China, the United States, ted to the idea of unification between and other regional powers? None the PRC and Taiwan and that his would disagree with Winston Church- rhetoric has become more forceful over ill that “meeting jaw-to-jaw is better Indo-Pacific Perspective │3 Harris than war,” but they each have differ- ent views on how diplomacy can be re- turned to center stage. All are some- what pessimistic about the future, even if they support the basic idea that war can be avoided through adroit political leadership and strate- gic thinking on all sides. That, at least, is something for far-sighted and peaceable leaders to build upon. Not much, but not nothing. ■ Dr. Peter Harris Dr. Harris is an assistant professor of politi- cal science at Colorado State University, where his teaching and research focus on in- ternational security, international relations theory, and US foreign policy. He serves as the editor for the Journal of Indo-Pacific Af- fairs’ new “Indo-Pacific Perspectives” series. Disclaimer The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanc- tion of the Department of Defense, Depart- ment of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US govern- ment or their international equivalents. Indo-Pacific Perspective │4 .