Breaking with the Past: the Kuomintang Central Reform

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Breaking with the Past: the Kuomintang Central Reform BREAKING WITH THE PAST The Kuomintang Central Reform Committee on Taiwan, 1950–52 Ramon H. Myers and Hsiao-ting Lin BREAKING WITH THE PAST The Kuomintang Central Reform Committee on Taiwan, 1950–52 Ramon H. Myers Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution Hsiao-ting Lin Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS Stanford University Stanford, California The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, founded at Stan- ford University in 1919 by Herbert Hoover, who went on to become the thirty-first president of the United States, is an interdisciplinary research center for advanced study on domestic and international affairs. The views expressed in its publications are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution. www.hoover.org Hoover Institution Press Publication Copyright © 2007 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University Photos from the Modern China Archives and Special Collections, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission of the publisher. First printing, 2007 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Manufactured in the United States of America Design by Tobi Designs Contents About the Authors iv Foreword by Ramon H. Myers v Introduction 1 Reinventing a New Political Party 2 Building a Strong Party and Leadership 6 Expanding the Party’s Social Foundation 8 Local-level Political Reforms 13 Promoting a Grand Vision: Toward a Prosperous Economy with Equity 17 Concluding Remarks 21 B R E A K I N G W I T H T H E P A S T iv About the Authors RAMON H. MYERS is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He is the coauthor, with Linda Chao, of The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan and has written numerous articles about Taiwan’s political and economic history. His most recent work, with Jialin Zhang, is The Struggle Across the Taiwan Strait: The Divided China Problem published by Hoover Institution Press in 2006. HSIAO-TING LIN is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution who received his D.Phil. from Oxford University in 2003. He is the author of Tibet and Nationalist China’s Frontier: Intrigues and Ethnopolitics, 1928–49, T. V. Soong in Modern Chinese History: A Look at His Role in Sino-American Relations in World War II (with Tai-chun Kuo), and more than 30 essays, journal articles and book reviews. His academic interests include ethnopolitics in greater China, the political history of modern China, and the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party) in post-1949 Taiwan. B R E A K I N G W I T H T H E P A S T Foreword v In March 2005 the Hoover Institution Archives announced a new initiative, the Modern China Archives and Special Collections, which includes archival and other special materials concerning the Republic of China from 1911 to 1949, Taiwan from 1949 to the present, and the evolution of mainland China from 1949 to the present. The Hoover Institution undertook this initiative because, for many decades, its archives has collected and preserved a rich collection of Chinese, Japanese, and Western documents—including the private papers of individuals as well as the personal documents and official records of leaders and statesmen, government officials, missionaries, and engineers—related to the above periods. In 2003 some of the rare materials describing the rise of the Communist and Nationalist Parties in mainland China and the rise of an opposition party in Taiwan were transferred from the Hoover Institution’s former East Asian Col- lection to the Hoover Institution Archives. Few, if any, copies of those materials exist in the public domain. Those materials have now been accessioned, placed on the Hoover website, and preserved for researchers to use in the Hoover Insti- tution Archives. In April 2004, the Hoover Institution opened the restricted nineteen boxes (from the original fifty-nine boxes received in 1976) of the personal papers of B R E A K I N G W I T H T H E P A S T T. V. Soong, a leading official in the Nationalist government from the late 1920s to 1949, along with two thousand documents donated by the Soong family. At the same time the Hoover Institution and the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) agreed to preserve those records and make them available for researchers. By late 2007, more than 900,000 microfilm frames of Kuomintang documents had been completed. In late 2005 Chiang Kai-shek’s family placed, on deposit, his diaries and those of his son Chiang Ching-kuo in the Hoover Archives. Hoover archivists have opened the Chiang Kai-shek diaries from 1917 to 1945 to read- ers. In August 2006, K’ung Hsiang-hsi family members donated his papers to the Hoover Institution. To encourage researchers to use these new materials, we have established a new essay series of which this is the third monograph (the first isThe Modern China Archives and Special Collections, and the second is T.V. Soong in Modern Chinese History). The series introduces new documents from our collections and suggests interpretations of events that may differ from those advanced ear- lier, especially as they relate to major turning points and significant historical changes in China’s recent history. (The essays reflect only the opinions of the vi authors.) The essays also identify and discuss special materials that users might find of interest and assistance and provide an impetus for researchers to consult the Hoover Institution’s expanding Chinese archives and special collections. Ramon H. Myers Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution B R E A K I N G W I T H T H E P A S T Introduction FEW DEFEATED POLITICAL PArtIES in wartime have the opportunity to 1 make a fresh start in a new location. Even fewer can leave their failures behind and go on to succeed. The Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) was such an exception. In late 1949, having been almost destroyed by the Chinese Communists, the KMT relocated to Taiwan and reinvented itself. Not only did the KMT leadership build a new party that has endured for five decades, but it built a new polity on Taiwan that created economic prosperity and China’s first democracy. How did this defeated party reinvent itself? New microfilmed materials on the KMT Central Reform Committee—now in the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University—shed new light on this unusual phenomenon. From August 1950 to October 1952, more than four hundred working meetings were held almost four times a week to discuss how to build a new political party and implement Nationalist government policies. Chiang Kai-shek began the reforms by establishing the Central Reform Committee (CRC) to replace the inept Central Standing Committee and Central Executive Committee, the party’s two most powerful agencies on the mainland. Unlike its predecessors, the CRC recruited young, highly educated party members, who, encouraged by Chiang Kai-shek, revitalized the KMT by introducing new institutions that would build a society based on the principles of Sun Yat-sen, one of the party’s founders. B R E A K I N G W I T H T H E P A S T Reinventing a New Political Party IN MID-1945, PArtY FACTIONAL StrUGGLES, corruption, and low morale were on the increase within the KMT. The Central Club faction (C.C. clique), headed by the Chen brothers (Guofu and Lifu) had become so powerful that it threatened to divide the Nationalist government, pitting the KMT party against the government bureaucracy and the military.1 Support for the KMT was on the decline, and KMT leaders were unable to mobilize either citizens or soldiers to support the party. Chiang tried but failed to strengthen the KMT with the back- ing of the Three Principles of the People Youth Corps, a powerful organization then dominated by the Chen brothers’ Central Club.2 In the summer of 1947, Chiang still hoped to reform the KMT, but he had no support. Moreover, remnants of the party and state were now confronted by the communist insurgency, the military forces of which had expanded and become stronger, in contrast to those of the Nationalist government, which had become corrupt and lacking in legitimate authority. Writing in his diary in January 1949, after retiring from the presidency of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek wrote: 2 The biggest reason for our defeat was that we never have been able to establish a new, solid organizational system. The old one had long deteriorated and collapsed. In the current, crucial phase between the old and the new, we have lost the basic means to rebuild and save our country. This is why we have been defeated.3 In early 1949, President Chiang stepped down when military support for his party and government collapsed. Vice President Li Zongren succeeded him but presided over a defeated Nationalist regime. Chiang, who retained his posi- tions as KMT chairman and commander in chief of the Nationalist armed force, still believed he could launch party reform. On July 18, 1949, Chiang revealed his plan to the remaining Central Standing Committee members, who had 1 See: Bruce J. Dickson, “The Lessons of Defeat: The Reorganization of the Kuomintang on Taiwan, 1950–52,” China Quarterly, no. 133 (1993): 58–59; Xu Fuming, Zhongguo Guomindang de Gaizao, 1950–1952 (The reform of the KMT, 1950–1952) (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1986), pp.
Recommended publications
  • Writing Taiwan History: Interpreting the Past in the Global Present
    EATS III Paris, 2006 Writing Taiwan History: Interpreting the Past in the Global Present Ann Heylen Research Unit on Taiwanese Culture and Literature, Ruhr University Bochum [email protected] Do not cite, work in progress Introduction Concurrent with nation building is the construction of a national history to assure national cohesion. Hence, the collective memory is elevated to the standard of national myth and most often expressed in the master narrative. I may refer here to Michael Robinson’s observation that “the state constructs and maintains a ‘master narrative’ of nation which acts as an official ‘story of the nation’. This master narrative legitimates the existence of the state and nation internally; it is also projected externally, to legitimate a nations’ existence in the world community”.1 But in as much as memory is selective, so also is the state-sanctioned official narrative, and it has become commonplace that changes in the political order enhance and result in ideologically motivated re-writing of that history in spite of its claims at objectivity and truth. The study of the contemporary formation of Taiwan history and its historiography is no exception. In fact, the current activity in rewriting the history is compounded by an additional element, and one which is crucial to understanding the complexity of the issue. What makes Taiwanese historiography as a separate entity interesting, intriguing and complex is that the master-narrative is treated as a part of and embedded in Chinese history, and at the same time conditioned by the transition from a perceived to a real pressure from a larger nation, China, that lays claim on its territory, ethnicity, and past.
    [Show full text]
  • Greater China: the Next Economic Superpower?
    Washington University in St. Louis Washington University Open Scholarship Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Murray Weidenbaum Publications Government, and Public Policy Contemporary Issues Series 57 2-1-1993 Greater China: The Next Economic Superpower? Murray L. Weidenbaum Washington University in St Louis Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/mlw_papers Part of the Economics Commons, and the Public Policy Commons Recommended Citation Weidenbaum, Murray L., "Greater China: The Next Economic Superpower?", Contemporary Issues Series 57, 1993, doi:10.7936/K7DB7ZZ6. Murray Weidenbaum Publications, https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/mlw_papers/25. Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy — Washington University in St. Louis Campus Box 1027, St. Louis, MO 63130. Other titles available in this series: 46. The Seeds ofEntrepreneurship, Dwight Lee Greater China: The 47. Capital Mobility: Challenges for Next Economic Superpower? Business and Government, Richard B. McKenzie and Dwight Lee Murray Weidenbaum 48. Business Responsibility in a World of Global Competition, I James B. Burnham 49. Small Wars, Big Defense: Living in a World ofLower Tensions, Murray Weidenbaum 50. "Earth Summit": UN Spectacle with a Cast of Thousands, Murray Weidenbaum Contemporary 51. Fiscal Pollution and the Case Issues Series 57 for Congressional Term Limits, Dwight Lee February 1993 53. Global Warming Research: Learning from NAPAP 's Mistakes, Edward S. Rubin 54. The Case for Taxing Consumption, Murray Weidenbaum 55. Japan's Growing Influence in Asia: Implications for U.S. Business, Steven B. Schlossstein 56. The Mirage of Sustainable Development, Thomas J. DiLorenzo Additional copies are available from: i Center for the Study of American Business Washington University CS1- Campus Box 1208 One Brookings Drive Center for the Study of St.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chinese Civil War (1927–37 and 1946–49)
    13 CIVIL WAR CASE STUDY 2: THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR (1927–37 AND 1946–49) As you read this chapter you need to focus on the following essay questions: • Analyze the causes of the Chinese Civil War. • To what extent was the communist victory in China due to the use of guerrilla warfare? • In what ways was the Chinese Civil War a revolutionary war? For the first half of the 20th century, China faced political chaos. Following a revolution in 1911, which overthrew the Manchu dynasty, the new Republic failed to take hold and China continued to be exploited by foreign powers, lacking any strong central government. The Chinese Civil War was an attempt by two ideologically opposed forces – the nationalists and the communists – to see who would ultimately be able to restore order and regain central control over China. The struggle between these two forces, which officially started in 1927, was interrupted by the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, but started again in 1946 once the war with Japan was over. The results of this war were to have a major effect not just on China itself, but also on the international stage. Mao Zedong, the communist Timeline of events – 1911–27 victor of the Chinese Civil War. 1911 Double Tenth Revolution and establishment of the Chinese Republic 1912 Dr Sun Yixian becomes Provisional President of the Republic. Guomindang (GMD) formed and wins majority in parliament. Sun resigns and Yuan Shikai declared provisional president 1915 Japan’s Twenty-One Demands. Yuan attempts to become Emperor 1916 Yuan dies/warlord era begins 1917 Sun attempts to set up republic in Guangzhou.
    [Show full text]
  • Taiwan and China's Cross-Strait Relations" (2018)
    The University of San Francisco USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center Master's Projects and Capstones Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects Spring 5-18-2018 Contending Identities: Taiwan and China's Cross- Strait Relations Jing Feng [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.usfca.edu/capstone Recommended Citation Feng, Jing, "Contending Identities: Taiwan and China's Cross-Strait Relations" (2018). Master's Projects and Capstones. 777. https://repository.usfca.edu/capstone/777 This Project/Capstone is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Projects and Capstones by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1 Contending Identities: Taiwan and ​ China’s Cross-Strait Relationship Jing Feng Capstone Project APS 650 Professor Brian Komei Dempster May 15, 2018 2 Abstract Taiwan’s strategic geopolitical position—along with domestic political developments—have put the country in turmoil ever since the post-Chinese civil war. In particular, its antagonistic, cross-strait relationship with China has led to various negative consequences and cast a spotlight on the country on the international diplomatic front for close to over six decades. After the end of the Cold War, the democratization of Taiwan altered her political identity and released a nation-building process that was seemingly irreversible. Taiwan’s nation-building efforts have moved the nation further away from reunification with China.
    [Show full text]
  • February 04, 1949 Memorandum of Conversation Between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong
    Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified February 04, 1949 Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong Citation: “Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong,” February 04, 1949, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF: F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 54-62. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 2, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), pp. 66-72. Translated by Sergey Radchenko. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113318 Summary: Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong discuss the independence of Mongolia, the independence movement in Xinjiang, the construction of a railroad in Xinjiang, CCP contacts with the VKP(b), the candidate for Chinese ambassador to the USSR, aid from the USSR to China, CCP negotiations with the Guomindang, the preparatory commisssion for convening the PCM, the character of future rule in China, Chinese treaties with foreign powers, and the Sino-Soviet treaty. Original Language: Russian Contents: English Translation On 4 February 1949 another meeting with Mao Zedong took place in the presence of CCP CC Politburo members Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, Zhu De and the interpreter Shi Zhe. From our side Kovalev I[van]. V. and Kovalev E.F. were present. THE NATIONAL QUESTION I conveyed to Mao Zedong that our CC does not advise the Chinese Com[munist] Party to go overboard in the national question by means of providing independence to national minorities and thereby reducing the territory of the Chinese state in connection with the communists' take-over of power.
    [Show full text]
  • Guangdong-Guangxi War & Sun Yat-Sen's Return to Canton
    Sun Yat-sen's Return To Canton After Expelling Gui-xi by Ah Xiang Excerpts from “Tragedy of Chinese Revolution” at http://www.republicanchina.org/revolution.html For updates and related articles, check http://www.republicanchina.org/RepublicanChina-pdf.htm In Southern Chinese Province of Guangdong, Sun Yat-sen and Chen Jiongming would be entangled in the power struggles. (Liu Xiaobo mistakenly eulogized Chen Jiongming's support for so-called "allying multiple provinces for self-determination" as heralding China's forerunner federationist movement.) Yue-jun (i.e., Guangdong native army), headed by Chen Jiongming, was organized on basis of Zhu Qinglan's police/guard battalions in Dec of 1917. To make Chen Jiongming into a real military support, Sun Yat-sen originally dispatched Hu Hanmin and Wang Zhaoming to Governor Zhu Qinglan for making Chen Jiongming into the so-called "commander of governor's bodyguard column". Governor Zhu Qinglan was forced into resignation by Governor-general Chen Bingkun of Gui-xi faction (i.e., Guangxi Province native army that stationed in Guangdong after the republic restoration war). Sun Yat-sen asked Cheng Biguang negotiate with Lu Rongding for relocation of Chen Bingkun and assignment of twenty battalions of Zhu Qinglan's police/guard army into 'marines' under the command of Cheng Biguang's navy. On Dec 2nd of 1917, Chen Jiongming was conferred the post of "commander of Guangdong army for aiding Fujian Province" and was ordered to lead 4000-5000 'marine' army towards neighboring Fujian Province where he expanded his army and developed it into his private warlord or militarist forces.
    [Show full text]
  • Greater China Beef & Sheepmeat Market Snapshot
    MARKET SNAPSHOT l BEEF & SHEEPMEAT Despite being the most populous country in the world, the proportion of Chinese consumers who can regularly afford to buy Greater China high quality imported meat is relatively small in comparison to more developed markets such as the US and Japan. However, (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) continued strong import demand for premium red meat will be driven by a significant increase in the number of wealthy households. Focusing on targeted opportunities with a differentiated product will help to build preference in what is a large, complex and competitive market. Taiwan and Hong Kong are smaller by comparison but still important markets for Australian red meat, underpinned by a high proportion of affluent households. China meat consumption 1 2 Population Household number by disposable income per capita3 US$35,000+ US$75,000+ 1,444 13% million 94.3 23% 8% 50 kg 56% 44.8 China grocery spend4 10.6 24.2 3.3 5.9 million million 333 26 3.0 51 16.1 Australia A$ Australia Korea China Korea Australia China US US China US Korea 1,573 per person 1,455 million by 2024 5% of total households 0.7% of total households (+1% from 2021) (9% by 2024) (1% by 2024) Australian beef exports to China have grown rapidly, increasing 70-fold over the past 10 years, with the country becoming Australia’s largest market in 2019. Australian beef Australian beef Australia’s share of Australian beef/veal exports – volume5 exports – value6 direct beef imports7 offal cuts exports8 4% 3% 6% 6% 3% Tripe 21% 16% Chilled grass Heart 9% A$ Chilled grain Chilled Australia Tendon Other Frozen grass Frozen 10% 65 71% Tail 17% countries million Frozen grain 84% Kidney 67% Other Total 303,283 tonnes swt Total A$2.83 billion Total 29,687 tonnes swt China has rapidly become Australia’s single largest export destination for both lamb and mutton.
    [Show full text]
  • 2019 International Religious Freedom Report
    CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, XINJIANG, HONG KONG, AND MACAU) 2019 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT Executive Summary Reports on Hong Kong, Macau, Tibet, and Xinjiang are appended at the end of this report. The constitution, which cites the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, states that citizens have freedom of religious belief but limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities” and does not define “normal.” Despite Chairman Xi Jinping’s decree that all members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) must be “unyielding Marxist atheists,” the government continued to exercise control over religion and restrict the activities and personal freedom of religious adherents that it perceived as threatening state or CCP interests, according to religious groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international media reports. The government recognizes five official religions – Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism. Only religious groups belonging to the five state- sanctioned “patriotic religious associations” representing these religions are permitted to register with the government and officially permitted to hold worship services. There continued to be reports of deaths in custody and that the government tortured, physically abused, arrested, detained, sentenced to prison, subjected to forced indoctrination in CCP ideology, or harassed adherents of both registered and unregistered religious groups for activities related to their religious beliefs and practices. There were several reports of individuals committing suicide in detention, or, according to sources, as a result of being threatened and surveilled. In December Pastor Wang Yi was tried in secret and sentenced to nine years in prison by a court in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, in connection to his peaceful advocacy for religious freedom.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Place in Philology: an Attempt to Show That the Languages of Europe and Asia Have a Common Origin
    CHARLES WILLIAM WASON COLLECTION CHINA AND THE CHINESE THE GIFT Of CHARLES WILLIAM WASON CLASS OF IB76 1918 Cornell University Library P 201.E23 China's place in phiiologyian attempt toI iPii 3 1924 023 345 758 CHmi'S PLACE m PHILOLOGY. Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924023345758 PLACE IN PHILOLOGY; AN ATTEMPT' TO SHOW THAT THE LANGUAGES OP EUROPE AND ASIA HAVE A COMMON OKIGIIS". BY JOSEPH EDKINS, B.A., of the London Missionary Society, Peking; Honorary Member of the Asiatic Societies of London and Shanghai, and of the Ethnological Society of France, LONDON: TRtJBNEE & CO., 8 aito 60, PATEENOSTER ROV. 1871. All rights reserved. ft WftSffVv PlOl "aitd the whole eaeth was op one langtta&e, and of ONE SPEECH."—Genesis xi. 1. "god hath made of one blood axl nations of men foe to dwell on all the face of the eaeth, and hath detee- MINED the ITMTIS BEFOEE APPOINTED, AND THE BOUNDS OP THEIS HABITATION." ^Acts Xvil. 26. *AW* & ju€V AiQionas fiereKlaOe tij\(J6* i6j/ras, AiOioiras, rol Si^^a SeSafarat effxarot av8p&Vf Ol fiiv ivffofievov Tireplovos, oi S' avdv-rof. Horn. Od. A. 22. TO THE DIRECTORS OF THE LONDON MISSIONAEY SOCIETY, IN EECOGNITION OP THE AID THEY HAVE RENDERED TO EELIGION AND USEFUL LEAENINO, BY THE RESEARCHES OP THEIR MISSIONARIES INTO THE LANGUAOES, PHILOSOPHY, CUSTOMS, AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, OP VARIOUS HEATHEN NATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN AFRICA, POLYNESIA, INDIA, AND CHINA, t THIS WORK IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan Independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010)
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2012 The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010) Dalei Jie University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Jie, Dalei, "The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010)" (2012). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 524. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/524 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/524 For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010) Abstract How to explain the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy? As the Taiwan Strait is still the only conceivable scenario where a major power war can break out and Taiwan's words and deeds can significantly affect the prospect of a cross-strait military conflict, ot answer this question is not just a scholarly inquiry. I define the aiwanT independence policy as internal political moves by the Taiwanese government to establish Taiwan as a separate and sovereign political entity on the world stage. Although two existing prevailing explanations--electoral politics and shifting identity--have some merits, they are inadequate to explain policy change over the past twenty years. Instead, I argue that there is strategic rationale for Taiwan to assert a separate sovereignty. Sovereignty assertions are attempts to substitute normative power--the international consensus on the sanctity of sovereignty--for a shortfall in military- economic-diplomatic assets.
    [Show full text]
  • New Documents on Mongolia and the Cold War
    Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16 New Documents on Mongolia and the Cold War Translation and Introduction by Sergey Radchenko1 n a freezing November afternoon in Ulaanbaatar China and Russia fell under the Mongolian sword. However, (Ulan Bator), I climbed the Zaisan hill on the south- after being conquered in the 17th century by the Manchus, Oern end of town to survey the bleak landscape below. the land of the Mongols was divided into two parts—called Black smoke from gers—Mongolian felt houses—blanketed “Outer” and “Inner” Mongolia—and reduced to provincial sta- the valley; very little could be discerned beyond the frozen tus. The inhabitants of Outer Mongolia enjoyed much greater Tuul River. Chilling wind reminded me of the cold, harsh autonomy than their compatriots across the border, and after winter ahead. I thought I should have stayed at home after all the collapse of the Qing dynasty, Outer Mongolia asserted its because my pen froze solid, and I could not scribble a thing right to nationhood. Weak and disorganized, the Mongolian on the documents I carried up with me. These were records religious leadership appealed for help from foreign countries, of Mongolia’s perilous moves on the chessboard of giants: including the United States. But the first foreign troops to its strategy of survival between China and the Soviet Union, appear were Russian soldiers under the command of the noto- and its still poorly understood role in Asia’s Cold War. These riously cruel Baron Ungern who rode past the Zaisan hill in the documents were collected from archival depositories and pri- winter of 1921.
    [Show full text]
  • Part II Chapter 1 How China Became a Communist Country
    Page 64 Part II Chapter 1 How China Became a Communist Country s we have seen the containment doctrine worked well in western Europe. Indeed, after 1945, the Soviet Union did not take over any country where it did not already have troops. Soviet attempts Ato detach Berlin from the West, to infiltrate into Greece, to capture control of Italy and France through communist party victories at the polls, all failed. The Marshall Plan put Europe back on its feet economically; the Truman Doctrine gave Greece and Turkey the help they needed to resist Soviet advances; the airlift saved Berlin; and NATO provided a guarantee of American military aid if needed. Americans had good reasons to be proud of their successes in this vitally important area of the globe. Unfortunately, success among the relatively established industrialized states of Europe could not be duplicated in the shifting, agricultural societies of Asia. Here, and most particularly in China, Americans were confronted with a far more complex situation than in Europe -and it is to this part of the globe that our attention now must turn. Forty Years of Revolution in China There is an old saying known to people who knew Chinese history and culture that no revolution could succeed there without the support of its scholars and its peasants. Unfortunately, most Americans who evaluated policy decisions about China knew little about either its history or its culture. Chinese civilization has a recorded history of some 4,000 years. These can be divided into a series of dynasties or empires, one following another as internal collapse was triggered by strong pressure from the outside.
    [Show full text]