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Imaginary War With China: Is The 1992 Consensus an Essential Element in Promoting Peace Across Taiwan Strait? Ching-Hsin Yu,* Ching-Hsing Wang,† and Dennis Lu-Chung Weng‡ Abstract This study aims to examine the relationship between individuals’ attitudes toward the 1992 consensus and their support for Taiwan in the name of the Republic of China (R.O.C) without declaring independence. Given President Tsai Ing-wen’s refusal to recognize the existence of the 1992 consensus that provides the basis for dialogue between Taiwan and China, there is a pressing need to understand the role of the 1992 consensus in Taiwanese people’s support for Taiwan under the R.O.C constitutional framework. By using data from the 2017 Taiwan National Security Survey, this study finds that people with higher levels of support for the 1992 consensus are more likely to support Taiwan in the name of the R.O.C without declaring independence. This implies that from the public’s perspective, the acknowledgement of the 1992 consensus is a required condition to maintain the status quo for Taiwan. Consequently, President Tsai and her administration might need to rethink about their policy of denying the existence of the 1992 consensus. Keywords: 1992 consensus, Taiwan, R.O.C., Taiwan independence, presidential approval. * Distinguished Research Fellow, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, email: [email protected]. † Postdoctoral Fellow, Hobby School of Public Affairs, University of Houston, email: [email protected]. ‡ Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Sam Houston State University, email: [email protected]. 1 Introduction The independence-unification issue has been the most salient political issue in Taiwan that has played an important role in domestic political competition as well as the development of cross-strait relations. On the one hand, every time when presidential elections are held in Taiwan, the independence-unification issue must be the focus of debate between competing presidential candidates and Taiwanese people have been concerned about how the elected president will handle the issue. On the other hand, the Chinese government has viewed Taiwan as part of its territory, and has consistently adhered to the One-China principle and resolutely opposed any attempt to separate Taiwan from China. In the face of various threats from China, Taiwanese people have difficulty in deciding the future of Taiwan at their own free will and thus it is observed that the majority of Taiwanese people prefer to maintain the status quo. According to data from the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University (see Figure 1), the percentage of Taiwanese people who want to maintain the status quo indefinitely has increased from 9.8% in 1994, peaked at 27.7% in 2012, and then slightly decreased to 25.1% in 2017. Furthermore, the percentage of Taiwanese people who prefer to maintain the status quo and decide at later date has been more than 30% except for the year of 1995. It peaked at 38.7% in 2006 and then has gradually decreased to 33.2% in 2017. In a nutshell, the majority of Taiwanese people support maintaining the status quo at the present time. [Figure 1 about here] However, what does maintaining the status quo mean? The former president, Ma Ying-jeou, proclaimed a “three noes” policy – no unification, no independence and no use of force – to endorse the status quo and said that Taiwan has been an independent sovereign country and there 2 is no reason to declare independence twice.1 In order to win the 2016 presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen was cautious about the independence-unification issue and moved toward the status quo, instead of clinging to the pro-independence stance of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Since taking office, President Tsai has sought to maintain the status quo in cross-strait ties, her status quo position does not really satisfy the Chinese government due to her refusal to recognize the 1992 consensus. The 1992 consensus, whereby each side acknowledges the existence of “one China” but maintains its own interpretation of what that means, has been seen as the basis for dialogue between Taiwan and China and even a tacit agreement that could lead to eventual unification for China. No wonder China threats to suspend talks with Taiwan until President Tsai acknowledges the 1992 consensus (Chung 2016). While President Tsai’s denial of the existence of the 1992 consensus has seemed to keep a window open for future independence, which might appease diehard pro-independence supporters, Premier Lai Ching-te appointed by President Tsai said at the Legislature on September 26, 2017 that “We are already an independent sovereign state and don’t bother to declare independence” (Yang 2017). Although some might interpret Premier Lai’s claim as support for independence, it is still not the same as what pro- independence supporters pursue, that is, formal independence of Taiwan. Therefore, from the perspective of Tsai administration, Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country under the constitutional framework of the Republic of China (R.O.C). In particular, President Tsai and her administration adopt a policy of recognizing the R.O.C constitutional framework without outright accepting the concept of one China represented by the 1992 consensus. Then the question is whether President Tsai’s refusal to acknowledge the 1992 consensus would increase the public’s support for the status quo, that is, Taiwan in the name of 1 More detailed information can be found at https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/3313. 3 the R.O.C without declaring independence. In this study, we aims to unveil the relationship between individuals’ attitudes toward the 1992 consensus and their support for Taiwan under the R.O.C constitutional framework. Given the difficulty of Taiwan independence, there might be only two feasible alternatives for Taiwanese people – either unification with China or maintaining the status quo. Since unification with China is the least preferred choice for the majority of Taiwanese people, the best choice should be to maintain the status quo. Then how do we maintain the status quo? Is the acknowledgement of the 1992 consensus a required condition to maintain the status quo? We attempt to address this question from the perspective of public opinion and expect to provide new insights into the role of the 1992 consensus in cross strait relations. The reminder of this study is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce the background of the 1992 consensus. Then we provide the theoretical framework for the relationship between individuals’ attitudes toward the 1992 consensus and their support for Taiwan under the R.O.C constitutional framework. In Section 3, we discuss our data, operationalization of variables and model specification. In Section 4, we report the empirical results for the relationships between the variables of interest. In the conclusion section, we summarize the key findings of this study and provide policy implications for cross-strait relations. Cross Straits Relations and The 1992 Consensus Looking back to the history of Cross-Strait relations, between 1949 to the late 80s’ in particular, the major struggle between the two sides revolved around the question of which side represented China was the key obstacle that hindered any exchange across the Taiwan Strait. From Republic of China’s (ROC) perspective, as ROC in Taiwan led by President Chiang Kai-Shek still held the position in the United Nations as one of the five founding members, ROC was evidently the only 4 China’s representative in the world. However, Taiwan’s leverage declined as the People Republic of China (PRC) attempted to open up its market to the world in the early 70s’. Given the potential business opportunity that was hidden in China’s domestic market and population, PRC started to have more leverage to the pursuit of formally representing all of China in the world. Yet, PRC’s attempt was not considered as a serious challenge to ROC’s representation of the China seat in the UN before it could gather enough support. The historical turning point occurred in 1971, whether one considers ROC withdrawal from the UN as a voluntary pull out or an expulsion, Taiwan’s loss of the China seat at the UN was the result of PRC’s continuous attempts. Not surprisingly, a subsequent break of diplomatic relations with other countries and isolation from the international political system followed, including losing the official diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979. When the United States established formal diplomatic relations with Beijing (PRC) and tacitly agreed the “One China Policy” which recognized PRC as the only government of China, most people were convinced that Taiwan (ROC) government would be losing its leverage and reunified with the mainland soon, if not immediately. However, in response to the international concern and the PRC’s attempts to have a negotiation on the issue of reunification, President Chiang Ching-Kuo not only refused, but also reiterated that ROC had no intention to talk to PRC anytime soon. President Chiang even claimed that there were to be “no contact, no compromise, and no negotiation” with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The so-called “Three-No’s Policy” established by President Chiang and the rationale behind it was obviously in the effect of the continuation of China’s civil war. Most Kuomintang (KMT) political elites at the time had the similar mindset and firmly believed that with the opposite political ideology, KMT and the CCP could not live under the same sky (漢賊不兩立). Despite the resource, population, and military 5 disparities between Taiwan and China, relying on its postwar economic miracle, Taiwan was able to maintain the “Three No’s Policy” and managed the pressures without been forced to unify with PRC.
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