Imaginary War with China: Is the 1992 Consensus an Essential Element In

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Imaginary War With China: Is The 1992 Consensus an Essential Element in

Promoting Peace Across Taiwan Strait?

Ching-Hsin Yu,* Ching-Hsing Wang,† and Dennis Lu-Chung Weng‡

Abstract

This study aims to examine the relationship between individuals’ attitudes toward the

1992 consensus and their support for Taiwan in the name of the Republic of China

(R.O.C) without declaring independence. Given President Tsai Ing-wen’s refusal to

recognize the existence of the 1992 consensus that provides the basis for dialogue

between Taiwan and China, there is a pressing need to understand the role of the 1992

consensus in Taiwanese people’s support for Taiwan under the R.O.C constitutional

framework. By using data from the 2017 Taiwan National Security Survey, this study

finds that people with higher levels of support for the 1992 consensus are more likely to

support Taiwan in the name of the R.O.C without declaring independence. This implies

that from the public’s perspective, the acknowledgement of the 1992 consensus is a

required condition to maintain the status quo for Taiwan. Consequently, President Tsai

and her administration might need to rethink about their policy of denying the existence

of the 1992 consensus.

Keywords: 1992 consensus, Taiwan, R.O.C., Taiwan independence, presidential approval.

* Distinguished Research Fellow, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, email: [email protected]. † Postdoctoral Fellow, Hobby School of Public Affairs, University of Houston, email: [email protected]. ‡ Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Sam Houston State University, email: [email protected].

Introduction

The independence-unification issue has been the most salient political issue in Taiwan that has played an important role in domestic political competition as well as the development of cross-strait relations. On the one hand, every time when presidential elections are held in Taiwan, the independence-unification issue must be the focus of debate between competing presidential candidates and Taiwanese people have been concerned about how the elected president will handle the issue. On the other hand, the Chinese government has viewed Taiwan as part of its territory, and has consistently adhered to the One-China principle and resolutely opposed any attempt to separate Taiwan from China. In the face of various threats from China, Taiwanese people have difficulty in deciding the future of Taiwan at their own free will and thus it is observed that the majority of Taiwanese people prefer to maintain the status quo. According to data from the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University (see Figure 1), the percentage of Taiwanese people who want to maintain the status quo indefinitely has increased from 9.8% in 1994, peaked at 27.7% in 2012, and then slightly decreased to 25.1% in 2017.

Furthermore, the percentage of Taiwanese people who prefer to maintain the status quo and decide at later date has been more than 30% except for the year of 1995. It peaked at 38.7% in

2006 and then has gradually decreased to 33.2% in 2017. In a nutshell, the majority of

Taiwanese people support maintaining the status quo at the present time.

[Figure 1 about here]

However, what does maintaining the status quo mean? The former president, Ma Ying-jeou, proclaimed a “three noes” policy – no unification, no independence and no use of force – to endorse the status quo and said that Taiwan has been an independent sovereign country and there

2 is no reason to declare independence twice.1 In order to win the 2016 presidential election, Tsai

Ing-wen was cautious about the independence-unification issue and moved toward the status quo, instead of clinging to the pro-independence stance of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

Since taking office, President Tsai has sought to maintain the status quo in cross-strait ties, her status quo position does not really satisfy the Chinese government due to her refusal to recognize the 1992 consensus. The 1992 consensus, whereby each side acknowledges the existence of “one

China” but maintains its own interpretation of what that means, has been seen as the basis for dialogue between Taiwan and China and even a tacit agreement that could lead to eventual unification for China. No wonder China threats to suspend talks with Taiwan until President Tsai acknowledges the 1992 consensus (Chung 2016). While President Tsai’s denial of the existence of the 1992 consensus has seemed to keep a window open for future independence, which might appease diehard pro-independence supporters, Premier Lai Ching-te appointed by President Tsai said at the Legislature on September 26, 2017 that “We are already an independent sovereign state and don’t bother to declare independence” (Yang 2017). Although some might interpret

Premier Lai’s claim as support for independence, it is still not the same as what pro- independence supporters pursue, that is, formal independence of Taiwan.

Therefore, from the perspective of Tsai administration, Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country under the constitutional framework of the Republic of China (R.O.C). In particular, President Tsai and her administration adopt a policy of recognizing the R.O.C constitutional framework without outright accepting the concept of one China represented by the

1992 consensus. Then the question is whether President Tsai’s refusal to acknowledge the 1992 consensus would increase the public’s support for the status quo, that is, Taiwan in the name of

1 More detailed information can be found at https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/3313.

3 the R.O.C without declaring independence. In this study, we aims to unveil the relationship between individuals’ attitudes toward the 1992 consensus and their support for Taiwan under the

R.O.C constitutional framework. Given the difficulty of Taiwan independence, there might be only two feasible alternatives for Taiwanese people – either unification with China or maintaining the status quo. Since unification with China is the least preferred choice for the majority of Taiwanese people, the best choice should be to maintain the status quo. Then how do we maintain the status quo? Is the acknowledgement of the 1992 consensus a required condition to maintain the status quo? We attempt to address this question from the perspective of public opinion and expect to provide new insights into the role of the 1992 consensus in cross strait relations.

The reminder of this study is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce the background of the 1992 consensus. Then we provide the theoretical framework for the relationship between individuals’ attitudes toward the 1992 consensus and their support for

Taiwan under the R.O.C constitutional framework. In Section 3, we discuss our data, operationalization of variables and model specification. In Section 4, we report the empirical results for the relationships between the variables of interest. In the conclusion section, we summarize the key findings of this study and provide policy implications for cross-strait relations.

Cross Straits Relations and The 1992 Consensus

Looking back to the history of Cross-Strait relations, between 1949 to the late 80s’ in particular, the major struggle between the two sides revolved around the question of which side represented

China was the key obstacle that hindered any exchange across the Taiwan Strait. From Republic of China’s (ROC) perspective, as ROC in Taiwan led by President Chiang Kai-Shek still held the position in the United Nations as one of the five founding members, ROC was evidently the only

China’s representative in the world. However, Taiwan’s leverage declined as the People

Republic of China (PRC) attempted to open up its market to the world in the early 70s’. Given the potential business opportunity that was hidden in China’s domestic market and population,

PRC started to have more leverage to the pursuit of formally representing all of China in the world. Yet, PRC’s attempt was not considered as a serious challenge to ROC’s representation of the China seat in the UN before it could gather enough support. The historical turning point occurred in 1971, whether one considers ROC withdrawal from the UN as a voluntary pull out or an expulsion, Taiwan’s loss of the China seat at the UN was the result of PRC’s continuous attempts. Not surprisingly, a subsequent break of diplomatic relations with other countries and isolation from the international political system followed, including losing the official diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979.

When the United States established formal diplomatic relations with Beijing (PRC) and tacitly agreed the “One China Policy” which recognized PRC as the only government of China, most people were convinced that Taiwan (ROC) government would be losing its leverage and reunified with the mainland soon, if not immediately. However, in response to the international concern and the PRC’s attempts to have a negotiation on the issue of reunification, President

Chiang Ching-Kuo not only refused, but also reiterated that ROC had no intention to talk to PRC anytime soon. President Chiang even claimed that there were to be “no contact, no compromise, and no negotiation” with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The so-called “Three-No’s Policy” established by President Chiang and the rationale behind it was obviously in the effect of the continuation of China’s civil war. Most Kuomintang (KMT) political elites at the time had the similar mindset and firmly believed that with the opposite political ideology, KMT and the CCP could not live under the same sky (漢賊不兩立). Despite the resource, population, and military

5 disparities between Taiwan and China, relying on its postwar economic miracle, Taiwan was able to maintain the “Three No’s Policy” and managed the pressures without been forced to unify with PRC.

However, there were various domestic forces that pushed President Chiang and his KMT government to re-approach their enemy across the Taiwan Strait. While the KMT politicians vigorously against any contact due to the difference in political ideology between the two sides, the exchange across the strait was always in demand. Among all the requests, the mainland

China-born veterans who retreated from China to Taiwan with KMT piled on the most substantial emotional burden on President Chiang and his KMT administration. Since the growing international recognition of the government in Beijing as the only representative of

China and the break of diplomatic relations with major alliances, the two million China-born military personals who initially clung to the hope of returning the mainland under the banner of the KMT began losing their confidence. After three decades of hoping and waiting, the aging veterans started to worry that they would lose their final chance to see their family in mainland again before they die. Thus, they began to press the KMT government to allow family reunions between the two sides since the goal of recovering the mainland became an impossible mission.

On November 2nd, 1987, the KMT government finally allowed visits to China for the humanitarian reason.

In addition to individual demands, the economic factor was another driving force that moved the

Taiwan government’s attitude toward PRC. As Taiwan’s economy was stabilized earlier than

PRC and the rapid industrialization and economic growth took place in the early 80s’, Taiwan became one of the Four Asian Tigers as a dynamic capitalist economy in Asia. With the rapid economic development, Taiwan embarked on a plan to shift the economy away from reliance on

6 labor-intensive industries toward the development of technology-intensive products and industries in the 80s’. The labor-intensive industries in Taiwan, therefore, started seeking opportunities into mainland’s low-cost labor force, and more importantly, its market. Around the same time, PRC gradually recovered from the disasters of the Great Leap Forward and the

Cultural Revolution under Deng Xiaoping, China began its radical economic reform in the late

1970s. China’s development strategy under Deng Xiaoping was very pragmatic, and it had a clear focus on making China prosper. Deng Xiaoping famously said that “It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice.” While Deng did not claim to reject communism or Mao Zedong’s thought, his willingness to put political ideology after economic development provided the opportunity for a better Cross-Strait relation.

Given Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform in China and the demand derived from both the individual and macroeconomic level, a mechanism that allows Beijing and Taipei to start talking to each other became necessary and attainable in the early 90s’. While the KMT administration did not want to abandon the “Three No’s Policy" immediately, they decided to create a nongovernmental unit to resolve issues that they could not handle directly from the government role. On November 21st, 1992, a nongovernment organization, “Straits Exchange Foundation,”

(SEF), was established in Taipei to deal with the problems that were associated with the contacts between the two sides since the family visits were allowed in 1987. The contact window to the

SEF at the mainland side was the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS).

The ARATS was established in December 1991, and its key mission was to promote ties between the two sides, develop Cross-Strait relations, and bring about the peaceful reunification of the motherland. The establishment of the two nongovernment organizations indicated that both sides need to have a more formal discussion on how to deal with the proliferation of cross-

7 strait contacts and visits. The 1992 Consensus was the outcome of serious consultations and mutual compromises between the ARATS and SEF. Both sides jointly concluded the discussion in a 1992 meeting, which was held in Hong Kong between the SEF and ARATS.

The Implication of 1992 Consensus: From Emotional to Practical While the 1992 Consensus never exists in any official document, the “One China, respective interpretations” is at the center of any national elections in Taiwan. Undoubtedly, the

1992 Consensus is a very important milestone that affects relations between PRC and Taiwan.

But there was one part in it which was very important, and which most observers miss: While both sides continuing to disagree on which China they refer to, the 1992 Consensus actually provided very limited common ground for future discussion. In other words, the 1992 Consensus simply implied that both sides agreed on the existence of disagreement. If the interpretation of the one China at both sides was different in 1992, as time passed, there would be two possible situations. One is that Taiwan’s interpretation of China would be further apart from the understanding in the mainland, whereas the other situation may occur in which the understanding of China would be gradually converged with what PRC expected to see. Apparently, the first scenario may be the case in today’s cross-strait relations. This brings us to the following questions: What does the 1992 Consensus mean to Taiwan? What is the implication that the

1992 Consensus may bring to our understanding about Taiwan’s future?

The short answer to the questions is that the 1992 Consensus is related to how Taiwan people identify themselves and their expectation about Taiwan’s future. As most observers of

Taiwan politics would agree, by asking Taiwan citizens whether they would agree with the 1992

Consensus, one could gauge individual’s political attitude toward the relations between China and Taiwan. Before Taiwan democratization, it may not be very difficult to believe that most

8 people in Taiwan would agree that Taiwan represented the only “good” China in the world.

Despite there were several military confrontations and numerous serious crises between the two sides, Taiwan citizens in the past believed that both side of Taiwan Straits would always maintain a one-China stance. During the longest martial law period in the world, there was only one firm national identity allowed to exist in Taiwan society and Taiwan citizens were educated that Taiwan is a province of China. Accordingly, the one-China principle was not a problem to most Taiwan citizens prior to Taiwan democratization in which they began to revisit their national and ethnic identity. In the sense, while the one-China principle remains as the cornerstone of the People Republic of China’s (PRC) policy toward Taiwan, it was challenged due to the wake of Taiwan democracy.

After the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo (Chiang Kai-shek's son) in 1988, the first native Taiwanese politician, Lee Teng-huei, became ROC’s president. As a native Taiwanese who had never visited mainland, he had no connection to mainland China, let alone feeling any emotional attachment to the motherland. More importantly, Lee was the first directly elected president of Taiwan in 1996 and that made him more responsible to reflect what Taiwan people want instead of the KMT’s political ideology. Since then, the national identity in Taiwan began to have different directions and it thus made the one-China principle no longer convincing in

Taiwan. In the 2000 presidential election, when Chen Shui-Bian was elected as the first

Democratic Progress Party (DPP) president, it was clear that the Taiwan democratization and the rise of pro-Taiwan independence party broke to KMT’s pro-unification discourse. However, it was Chen Shui-Bian reelection in March 2004 confirmed that the emotional attachment between

Taiwan citizens and the motherland was increasingly drifting apart.

Despite the one-China principle no longer appealing to Taiwan society as the emotional attachment diminished overtime, the 1992 Consensus remains critical in Taiwan politics. As

Beijing strongly rejects Taiwan independence and has repeatedly threatened the use of force, most Taiwan people now view the 1992 Consensus as an “amulet” which could keep Taiwan away from conflict. To KMT politicians, since the 1992 Consensus was reached under KMT administration and thus KMT stresses that KMT was the only party that could establish peaceful condition to Taiwan. On the contrary, DPP argues that the key element addressed in the 1992

Consensus was to be able to give Taiwan’s own interpretation of China, and DPP is the only party which would put the Taiwan dignity and interest into consideration.

Given the discussion above, in this paper, we would like to dig into the relationship between public opinion and the 1992 Consensus. We contend that support 1992 Consensus in

Taiwan becomes a rational decision for Taiwan people who concern about the security. Also, we believe that support the 1992 Consensus is no longer a partisan issue, but a Taiwan Consensus.

Data, Measurement of Variables and Model Specification

To estimate the relationship between individuals’ attitudes toward the 1992 consensus and their support for Taiwan as the R.O.C without declaring independence, we use data from the

2017 National Taiwan Security Survey.2 This RDD telephone survey was conducted between

November 29 and December 5, 2017 using the probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling design by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University. Furthermore, this survey was carried out among 1,244 people over the age of 20 in 20 cities and counties in Taiwan, excluding Kinmen and Lienchiang counties. Due to missing values, the resulting number of observations for empirical analysis is reduced to 761 in this study. The weights from the raking

2 The principal investigator of National Taiwan Security Survey is Professor Emerson M. S. Niou. We appreciate Professor Niou for providing data to us. We are alone responsible for views expressed herein.

10 process according to population distribution of sex, age, education, and residence area are used in estimation and analysis. We explain operationalization of variables used in the empirical analysis as follows.

In this study, we aim to account for individual attitude toward Taiwan in the name of the

R.O.C without the need to declare independence. To measure the dependent variable, we use a single question asking respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree with the following statement: “Some people think that Taiwan is a sovereign independent country. Its name is the

Republic of China and there is no need to declare independence.” The respondents are asked to express their views using a four-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”

Accordingly, this variable is treated as an ordinal variable. On the other hand, the key independent variable in this study is individual support for the 1992 consensus. We assess individual support for the 1992 consensus using one single question that requires respondents to identify the extent to which they support the following argument: “Some people advocate that

Taiwan and China should engage in exchanges according to the ‘One China, different interpretations’ principle” Similarly, the respondents are asked to express their preferences using a four-point scale ranging from “strongly dissupport” to “strongly support.”

In order to ensure that the relationship between the variables of interest is not spurious, we control for some variables that might influence individual attitude toward Taiwan as the R.O.C without declaring independence. First of all, we contend that if people are more satisfied with

President Tsai’s performance, then they should tend to support Taiwan as the R.O.C. without declaring independence, the argument endorsed by Tsai administration. We measure presidential approval using one single question asking respondents to express their satisfaction with President

Tsai’s performance using a four-point scale (1 = very dissatisfied, 4 = very satisfied). Second, we

11 argue that when people think that Taiwan is going to either declare independence or unify with

China in the future, they will be more likely to oppose Taiwan as the R.O.C. without declaring independence. We use two questions respectively to evaluate individuals’ perceived likelihoods of Taiwan independence and unification with China in the future and the respondents answer both questions using an eleven-point scale from 0 to 10, 0 being “very unlikely” and 10 being

“very likely.” Third, we argue that if people worry about war between Taiwan and China due to the independence-unification issue, they should be more likely to support Taiwan as the R.O.C. without declaring independence because it represents the status quo that can be accepted by

China. The respondents are required to express their worry over the war between Taiwan and

China using a four-point scale and a higher value denotes a higher level of worry. On the other hand, if people think that the majority of Taiwanese people will fight when there is a war between Taiwan and China, they will be inclined to oppose Taiwan as the R.O.C. without declaring independence because they have more confidence that Taiwanese people will guard

Taiwan even though Taiwan decides to declare independence in the future. The respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which they think that the majority of Taiwan people will fight if the war happens between Taiwan and China on a four-point scale and a higher value means a higher level of willingness to fight.

Finally, we control for some conventional variables in the model when it comes to cross- strait relations, including attitude toward the independence-unification issue, national identity, partisanship, and demographic characteristics, such as education, age and gender. We divide individuals’ attitudes toward the independence-unification issue into three categories: (1) support for maintaining the status quo, (2) support for unification with China, and (3) support for Taiwan independence and use the respondents who support the status quo as the reference group while

12 performing data analysis. In terms of national identity, we classify people into dual identity,

Chinese identity and Taiwan identity and treat people with dual identity as the reference group.

Furthermore, we generate two dummy variables respectively for the pan-blue and pan-green coalitions where the former prefers unification with China and latter prefers Taiwan independence and treat the independents as the reference group. With regard to demographic characteristics, we create one dummy variable – college degree or higher – to measure respondents’ educational level with 1 for those who are in the relevant categories and 0 otherwise. Age is measured by the number of years since birth, whereas gender is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the respondent is female and 0 if the respondent is male. Tables 1 reports descriptive statistics of all variable used for empirical analysis.

[Table 1 about here]

In terms of model specification, since the dependent variable in this study is ordinal, we estimate the ordered logistic regression model to examine the effect of support for the 1992 consensus on individual attitude toward Taiwan as the R.O.C without the need to declare independence. The general form of the model can be presented as the following equation:

�� ℎ� �. �. � ��ℎ�� = � 1992 ��

+� �� + � ��ℎ��

+� ��ℎ�� ℎ �ℎ�� + � ��

+� �� ℎ� + � �� ℎ �ℎ��

+� �� + � �ℎ�� + � ��

+� �� + � �� + � �� ℎ��ℎ��

+� �� + � �� + �

Empirical Results

We first take a look at the change in Taiwanese people’s opinion about Taiwan in the name of the R.O.C without the need to declare independence. According to data from the Taiwan

National Security Survey, it is know that overall the absolute majority of Taiwanese people agree with the statement that “Taiwan is a sovereign independent country. Its name is the Republic of

China and there is no need to declare independence” (see Figure 2). In particular, since 2011, at least 70% of Taiwanese people have either strongly agreed or agreed with Taiwan as the R.O.C without the need to declare independence. While the percentage of people who strongly agree that Taiwan named as the R.O.C is a sovereign independent country without the need to declare independence has decreased from 40.5% in 2012 to 31.8% in 2017, the percentage of people who agree with this statement has increased from 36.1% in 2012 to 43.1% in 2017. By contrast, the percentage of people who either strongly disagree or disagree with Taiwan as the R.O.C without the need to declare independence has alternated between 23% and 30% from 2011 to 2017. In

2017, about one-fourth (25.1%) of Taiwanese people either strongly disagree or disagree with this statement. In general, Taiwanese people’s opinion about Taiwan named as the R.O.C without the need to declare independence has been stable and the great majority of Taiwanese people accept Taiwan as a sovereign independent country in the name of the R.O.C without the requirement for declaration of independence. As a result, it might not be so surprising when

Premier Lai Ching-te proclaimed that Taiwan is an independent sovereign country and there is no need to declare independence because he just follows the mainstream opinion of the public, although it might be annoying and unpleasant for pro-independence fundamentalists.

[Figure 2 about here]

On the other hand, although President Tsai has stubbornly insisted on denying the existence of the 1992 consensus, the majority of Taiwanese people appear to have different opinions from

President Tsai. As displayed in Figure 3, at least 60% of Taiwanese people have welcomed exchanges between Taiwan and China under the principle of “one China, different interpretations.” Specifically, the percentage of people who either strongly support or support the

1992 consensus has increased since 2011 and peaked at 68.2% in 2017. From the perspective of public opinion, it seems that there is no public support for President Tsai’s refusal to recognize the existence of the 1992 consensus. President Tsai might worry that the acceptance of the 1992 consensus will lead Taiwan to unify with China and that is not what the majority of Taiwanese people want. Perhaps President Tsai’s rejection of the 1992 consensus can be viewed as a strategy to make Taiwan maintain the status quo.

[Figure 3 about here]

Then we would like to ask whether the 1992 consensus influences individual attitude toward

Taiwan as a sovereign independent country in the name of the R.O.C without the need to declare independence. Table 2 reports the results from the ordered logistic regression analysis and shows a significant positive relationship between individual support for the 1992 consensus and the attitude toward Taiwan as the R.O.C without declaring independence. That is, people with higher levels of support for the 1992 consensus are more likely to agree that Taiwan is a sovereign independent country in the name of the R.O.C without requirement for declaration of independence. To evaluate the substantive effect of individual support for the 1992 consensus, we compute predicted probability of individual attitude toward Taiwan as the R.O.C without the need to declare independence. As demonstrated in Figure 4, the probability that people strongly agree on Taiwan as a sovereign independent country in the name of the R.O.C without

15 requirement for declaration of independence increases with the increase of individual support for the 1992 consensus. Specifically, the predicted probability significantly increases from 19.3% to

44.7%. By contrast, predicted probabilities of strong disagreement and agreement decreases respectively from 18.6% to 6.1% and from 24.4% to 12.2%. On the whole, individual support for the 1992 consensus has a consequential effect on individual attitude toward Taiwan as the R.O.C without the need to declare independence. The result implies that from the public’s perspective, the 1992 consensus might play a pivotal role in whether Taiwan can maintain the status quo, that is, Taiwan in the name of the R.O.C without the need to declare independence.

[Table 2 about here]

[Figure 4 about here]

In addition, we also find that some variables are significantly associated with individual attitude toward Taiwan as the R.O.C without the need to declare independence. First of all, as expected, presidential approval exerts a positive influence on individual attitude toward Taiwan as the R.O.C without declaring independence. That is, people who are more satisfied with

President Tsai’s performance are more likely to agree that Taiwan is a sovereign independent country in the name of the R.O.C without the need to declare independence. Given that President

Tsai and her administration endorse this argument about the political status of Taiwan, it makes sense to observe a positive relationship between both variables. Second, while there is no relationship between perceived likelihood of unification with China and individual attitude toward Taiwan as the R.O.C without declaring independence, people who think of Taiwan as being more likely to successfully declare independence in the future are less likely to agree on

Taiwan in the name of the R.O.C without the need to declare independence. In other words, people with high expectation of Taiwan independence tend to oppose Taiwan in the name of the

R.O.C without declaring independence. Third, people who are more worried about war between

Taiwan and China due to the independence-unification issue are more likely to support Taiwan as the R.O.C without declaring independence; by contrast, those who think that Taiwanese people will fight against China if there is a war between Taiwan and China are less likely to support that argument. Accordingly, the results imply that when people worry about war between

Taiwan and China and think that Taiwanese people are not willing to guard Taiwan, they will prefer to maintain the status quo by endorsing Taiwan as the R.O.C without declaring independence. We further compute predicted probability of individual attitude toward Taiwan as the R.O.C without the need to declare independence varying by the above variables. Specifically, as presidential approval increases, the probability of strong agreement increases from 30.1% to

44.5%, whereas the probability of strong agreement decreases from 38.6% to 26.7% with the increase of perceived likelihood of Taiwan independence (see Figures 5 and 6). Furthermore, as the level of worry over war increases, the probability of strong agreement increases from 28.6% to 39.6% (see Figure 7). By contrast, as the level of willingness to fight increases, the probability of strong agreement decreases from 40.8% to 30.5% (see Figure 8). To sum up, these variables exert substantial effects on individual attitude toward Taiwan as the R.O.C without declaring independence.

[Figures 5 through 8 about here]

On the other hand, it is surprising that individual position on the independence-unification issue has no influence on the attitude toward Taiwan as the R.O.C without the need to declare independence. This might be because the above mentioned variables dilute the influence of individual position on the independence-unification issue. While Chinese identity has no relationship with individual attitude toward Taiwan as the R.O.C without the need to declaring

17 independence, people who possess Taiwanese identity are less likely to support Taiwan as the

R.O.C without requirement for declaration of independence compared to those with dual identity.

Lastly, compared to independents, people who identity with the pan-blue coalition are more likely to favor Taiwan as the R.O.C without the need to declare independence, whereas those who support the pan-green coalition are less likely to agree with that argument.

Conclusion

President Tsai reiterated during her presidential campaign that her China policy is to maintain the status quo. Moreover, in her victory speech, President Tsai proclaimed that she would “maintain the status quo for peace and stability across that Taiwan Strait” (Lin 2016).

Although President Tsai did not clearly define the status quo at that time, now it seems clear that in President Tsai’s mind, the status quo means that Taiwan is currently a sovereign and independent country and there is no need to declare independence. Moreover, President Tsai promises to push for the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people and the existing R.O.C constitutional order. Simply speaking, as far as President Tsai concerned, the status quo means that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country in the name of the R.O.C without the need to declare independence. As demonstrated by this study, the great majority of Taiwanese people support this argument and it might be the best strategy of President Tsai and her administration to define the political status of

Taiwan at the present time.

However, it is also noted that President Tsai refuses to recognize the existence of the 1992 consensus that has been the cornerstone to peaceful developments between Taiwan and China.

Our finding demonstrates that the 1992 consensus comes into play in individual attitude toward

18 the status quo preferred by Tsai administration. In particular, when people are in favor of the

1992 consensus, they are more likely to support Taiwan as a sovereign independent country in the name of Taiwan without requirement for declaration of independence. This result might be contrary to President Tsai’s expectation and delivers a message to President Tsai to rethink about her position on the 1992 consensus. From the public’s perspective, it seems that acceptance of the 1992 consensus is a required condition to maintain the status quo.

Due to military threat from China and the reality of international politics, it is most unlikely that Taiwan would successfully declare independence in the foreseeable future. Accordingly,

Taiwanese people only have two feasible choices – either unify with China or maintain the status quo. There is no doubt that the absolute majority of Taiwanese people are not willing to make

Taiwan be part of China and thus the Taiwanese government should come up with some strategies to enable Taiwan to maintain the status quo. President Tsai has said she wants to maintain the status quo with China and is committed to ensuring peace between Taiwan and

China. Consequently, it is worthwhile for President Tsai and her administration to reflect on whether the 1992 consensus is an integral part of the status quo in terms of cross-strait relations.

References

Chung, Lawrence. 2016. “Beijing Threatens to Suspend Talks with Taipei until Tsai Ing-wen

Acknowledges ‘1992 Consensus’.” South China Morning Post Retrieved March 29, 2018

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1949425/beijing-threatens-

suspend-talks-taipei-until-tsai-ing.

Lin, Wen-cheng. 2016. “Taiwan Enters the Tsai Ing-wen Ear and the Impact on Cross-Straits

Relations.” Analysis 293 Retrieved April 3, 2018

http://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/analisi293_wen-

cheng_lin_18.01.2016.pdf.

Yang, Sophia. 2017. “Taiwan Premier Reaffirms Support for Independence.” Taiwan News

Retrieved March 29, 2018 https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3262576.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Mean S.D. Min. Max. Taiwan in the name of R.O.C without declaring independence 2.97 0.97 1 4 1992 consensus 2.81 1.01 1 4 Presidential approval 2.04 0.86 1 4 Perceived likelihood of Taiwan independence 3.44 2.82 0 10 Perceived likelihood of unification with China 4.84 2.87 0 10 Worry about war 2.65 0.99 1 4 Willingness to fight 2.80 1.00 1 4 Attitude toward the independence-unification issue Unification with China 0.20 0.40 0 1 Taiwan independence 0.20 0.40 0 1 National identity

Chinese 0.05 0.21 0 1 Taiwanese 0.53 0.50 0 1 Party identification

Pan blue 0.30 0.46 0 1 Pan green 0.32 0.47 0 1 College degree or higher 0.37 0.48 0 1 Female 0.48 0.50 0 1 Age 45.24 14.82 20 90 N 761

Table 2. Ordered Logistic Analysis of Individual Attitude toward Taiwan in the Name of Republic of China without the Need to Declare Independence Coef. (S.E.) 1992 consensus 0.435 *** (0.090) Presidential approval 0.241 * (0.110) Perceived likelihood of Taiwan independence -0.061 * (0.031) Perceived likelihood of unification with China -0.037 (0.029)

Worry about war 0.187 * (0.077) Willingness to fight -0.172 * (0.083) Attitude toward the independence-unification issue Unification with China -0.330 (0.200)

Taiwan independence -0.107 (0.222)

National identity

Chinese -0.033 (0.370)

Taiwanese -0.417 * (0.175) Party identification

Pan blue 0.529 ** (0.182) Pan green -0.323 $ (0.195) College degree or higher -0.298 $ (0.158) Female -0.128 (0.144)

Age 0.001 (0.005) -1.404 (0.531) Cutpoint 1 -0.123 (0.527) Cutpoint 2 Cutpoint 3 1.719 (0.531) 761 N Likelihood ratio test 141.44 *** 2 0.08 Pseudo R -2 × Log likelihood 1698.985 Note: ***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; $: p < 0.10.

Figure 1. Taiwanese People’s Attitudes toward the Unification-Independence Issue from 1994 to 2017

Source: Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., important political attitude trend distribution.

Figure 2. Taiwanese People’s Attitude toward Taiwan in the Name of Republic of China without the Need to Declare Independence 50 43.1 40.9 40.5 40.1 40.1 38.1 40 34.3 35.5 30.6 31.8 36.1 34.5 30 33.6 34.4

16.9

Percent (%)Percent 20 16.4 15.9 15.6 15.0 12.9 12.0

10 14.1 11.9 11.3 12.7 12.5 9.1 10.1

0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree

Data source: Taiwan National Security Survey, 2011-2017.

Figure 3. Taiwanese People’s Attitude toward the 1992 Consensus 60

47.9 50 45.0 44.1 43.6 42.9 40.9 40

30 24 25.3 22.2 23.0 22.8 21.8 Percent (%)Percent 19.6 17.6 20 16.6 14.9 19.5 19.5 16.1 15.6 15.1 10 13.4 14.5 14.2

0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Strongly dissupport Dissupport Support Strongly support

Data source: Taiwan National Security Survey, 2011-2017. Note: Taiwan National Security Survey does not ask the question about the 1992 consensus in 2012.

Figure 4. The Effect of the 1992 Consensus on Individual Attitude toward Taiwan in the Name of Republic of China without the Need to Declare Independence

Figure 5. The Effect of Presidential Approval on Individual Attitude toward Taiwan in the Name of Republic of China without the Need to Declare Independence

Figure 6. The Effect of Perceived Likelihood of Taiwan Independence on Individual toward Attitude Taiwan in the Name of Republic of China without the Need to Declare Independence

Figure 7. The Effect of Worry about War on Individual Attitude toward Taiwan in the Name of Republic of China without the Need to Declare Independence

Figure 8. The Effect of Willingness to Fight on Individual Attitude toward Taiwan in the Name of Republic of China without the Need to Declare Independence