Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 Global Taiwan Brief Vol 5. Issue1 17 Fortnightly Review Russell Hsiao Guatemala’s Role in Taiwan’s Diplomatc Strategy in Central American I-wei Jennifer Chang Propaganda Drives “Massive” PLA Exercises in the Taiwan Strait J. Michael Cole Knock-on Efects of Acceleratng Demographic Changes in Taiwan Michael Mazza

Fortnightly Review The Global Taiwan Brief is a bi-weekly publicaton released ev- By: Russell Hsiao ery other Wednesday and provides insight into the latest news on Russell Hsiao is the executve director of the Global Taiwan Insttute (GTI) and editor-in-chief of the Taiwan. Global Taiwan Brief. Editor-in-Chief Democratc Party’s Platorm Omits “One-China Policy” in Reference to Taiwan Russell Hsiao Staf Editor In a sign of the changing politcal winds in Washington, DC, the Democratc Party’s 2020 Katherine Schultz platorm made a not so subtle and signifcant adjustment in the party’s policy towards Copy Editor Marshall Reid Taiwan—bringing it more into alignment with the Republican Party’s positon on the is- land-democracy. A party platorm encapsulates the view of mainstream members of the The views and opinions expressed party’s principles, goals, and positons on domestc and foreign afairs. In the paragraph in these artcles are those of the authors and do not necessarily underscoring the “China challenge” facing the United States, the Democratc Party’s 2020 refect the ofcial policy or positon platorm, adopted on August 18, states: of the Global Taiwan Insttute.

“Democrats believe the China challenge is not primarily a military one, but we will To view web sources cited in the deter and respond to aggression. We will underscore our global commitment to free- published papers (underlined in printed text), visit dom of navigaton and resist the Chinese military’s intmidaton in the South China htp://globaltaiwan.org/2020/08/ Sea. Democrats are commited to the Taiwan Relatons Act and will contnue to sup- vol-5-issue-17/ port a peaceful resoluton of cross-Strait issues consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan.” Global Taiwan Insttute 1836 Jeferson Place NW, For the frst tme since 1996—at the height of cross-Strait tension during the 1995-96 Third Washington DC 20036 [email protected] Taiwan Strait Crisis—the Democratc Party conspicuously omited reference to a “One-Chi- na Policy” in reference to Taiwan in its party platorm. Indeed, in all the platorms adopted To subscribe, visit between 1996 and 2016 (2012, 2008, 2004, 2000), the party’s platorm included reference htp://globaltaiwan.org/sub- scribe/. to a “One-China Policy” in sectons referring to its approach to China and Taiwan. For ex- ample, the 2016 platorm stated: © 2020 · Global Taiwan Insttute “We are commited to a “One China” policy and the Taiwan Relatons Act and will contnue to support a peaceful resoluton of Cross-Strait issues that is consistent with Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 2

the wishes and best interests of the people of Tai- from the party’s platorm could also result in some wan.” politcal costs for the elected president. This is espe- cially true in the case of Taiwan policy, as the prevail- As noted earlier, this shif in the Democratc Party’s ing views of both major politcal partes seem to align platorm brings it more in line with mainstream Re- on the issue. As noted earlier, the platorms do refect publican views on Taiwan policy. As the Republican broader sentments within the party towards these is- Party’s 2020 platorm—which is identcal to the 2016 sues. It is worth notng how, afer being elected into of- platorm—states: fce in 2000, then-President George W. Bush said that “We salute the people of Taiwan, with whom we the United States would do “whatever it took to help share the values of democracy, human rights, a Taiwan defend herself” in the event of atack by China. free market economy, and the rule of law. Our This was very much in line with the strong language relatons will contnue to be based upon the pro- used in the 2000 Republican Party platorm. visions of the Taiwan Relatons Act, and we af- These changes to the party’s platorm do not occur in frm the Six Assurances given to Taiwan in 1982 isolaton; indeed, they also seem refectve of deeper by President Reagan.” changes in American society, which have been accel- Like the Democratc Party’s 2020 platorm, there was no erated by the COVID-19 crisis. While the change in the menton of a “One-China Policy.” The closest a Repub- party’s platorm may only refect a certain segment lican Party platorm has come to implying a “One-Chi- of the broader populaton, the shif is also consistent na Policy” was in its 2004 platorm, which stated: “The with a deeper souring of American attudes toward United States government’s policy is that there is one China. In an April 2020 survey of public attudes in the China, as refected in the Three Communiqués and the United States toward China conducted by the Pew Re- Taiwan Relatons Act.” On the contrary, in perhaps the search Center, the number of people with unfavorable strongest language adopted by the Republican Party, views toward China reached a new high of 66 percent, the 2000 platorm stated: “If China violates these prin- increasing six points from 60 percent just the year ciples and atacks Taiwan, then the United States will before. This marks the second consecutve year of in- respond appropriately in accordance with the Taiwan creases in the percentage of people who see China as Relatons Act. America will help Taiwan defend itself.” unfavorable, rising from 47 percent in 2018. Simulta- neously, the proporton of those with favorable views While party platorms are largely symbolic and of China dropped from 38 percent in 2018 to 26 per- non-binding for whoever is elected to hold the top ex- cent in 2020. ecutve ofce in the world’s most powerful democracy, they nevertheless infuence the framing of the issues To be fair, the US “One-China Policy” is not codifed in that are addressed during presidental debates. Al- law, nor has it ever been clearly defned. Furthermore, though foreign policy is generally not a priority issue in it wouldn’t be precisely clear what it would mean in most presidental electons, the focus on Russian inter- terms of both the substance and conduct of US infor- ference over the past four years, the ongoing US-China mal relatons with Taiwan if an administraton were to trade war, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic dispense with a “One-China Policy” while stll main- could all help to positon China policy as an issue in taining the Taiwan Relatons Act (TRA)—which legally the natonal dialogue. In turn, this could—and perhaps governs relatons with Taiwan in the absence of diplo- should—make Taiwan policy a mater of presidental matc recogniton. debate. As the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal It is perhaps worth remembering how then-Presi- argued: “The candidates should be pressed to explain dent-elect Donald Trump strred a hornet’s nest in De- their views on Taiwan beyond plattudes about warm cember 2016 when he stated: “I don’t know why we feelings. The island is at the center of a great-power [the United States] have to be bound by a ‘One-China rivalry, and voters deserve to hear how the next presi- Policy’ unless we make a deal with China having to do dent would handle it.” with other things, including trade.” Similar to reactons Despite its non-binding functon, a radical departure to the president-elect’s brief phone conversaton with Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 3 the democratcally elected president of Taiwan, most Former Senior US Natonal Security Ofcials Imagine responses to this statement ranged from fear, to dis- a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan in 2021 belief, to contempt. Some observers were shocked As the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chi- that President Trump had the audacity to queston the nese Communist Party (CCP) approaches in July 2021, seemingly sacrosanct “One-China Policy.” a cautonary tale penned by two former top American This is to say that, in spite of the Democratc Party’s intelligence and defense ofcials has re-ignited an on- subtle but signifcant adjustment of its policy towards going debate among Taiwan watchers about the possi- Taiwan, this does not mean that the Democratc pres- ble tmeline for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. In a think idental nominee, Joseph Biden, would discard the piece for the US Naval Insttute imagining a hypothet- “One-China Policy” if he were to win the presidency. cal confict scenario ttled “The War that Never Was?”, Indeed, such an event is very unlikely. And, to be clear, former Actng Director of the Central Intelligence Agen- President Donald Trump, a Republican, did not discard cy (CIA) Michael Morell and former Vice-Chairman of the “One-China Policy,” even afer winning the presi- the Joint Chiefs of Staf Admiral (ret.) James Winnefeld dency running on a pro-Taiwan Republican platorm. imagined how a Chinese invasion of Taiwan that could take place as early as in January 2021 could unfold. While hyper-partsanship contnues to consume the broader policy ecosystem in the United States, Tai- Morrell and Winnefeld envision a Chinese invasion of wan policy remains a bright spot, allowing for a strong Taiwan that exploits the distracton caused by the tur- demonstraton of bipartsanship. This politcal con- moil of a disruptve politcal transiton in the United sensus appears to be growing stronger as Beijing in- States in January 2021, quickly resultng in a success- tensifes its pressure on the island-democracy. This ful Chinese conquest (due in large part to the non-re- bipartsanship was clearly refected when Congress sponse of the United States) of the island. The piece os- unanimously passed legislaton in support of Taiwan, tensibly serves to underscore the United States’ lack of such as the Taiwan Travel Act and the TAIPEI Act. It will politcal and military preparedness as well as readiness become increasingly difcult for Beijing to defne the to respond to a surprise crisis scenario in the Taiwan US’ “One-China Policy” as closely aligned with its own Strait. A summaton of the authors’ warning to current anachronistc “One-China Principle.” policymakers can be found in the artcle’s closing line: “In the end, the confict for which the United States, There is politcs and then there is policy—the two are and in partcular the American military, prepared for diferent but not mutually exclusive. Especially during so long and for which it provided billions of dollars in an electon year, politcs are not always refectve of military hardware to Taiwan, had been lost before it policy, while politcs are a necessary but insufcient started.” component of policy change. The two are hard to align, and rarely do, especially across the politcal aisle. But Setng aside the glaring assumptons that the two now, for once in a long tme—at least since the last Tai- former ofcials made in the efcacy of the People’s wan Strait Crisis in 1996—the politcal and policy stars Liberaton Army’s (PLA) ability to execute a complex seem to be aligning between the two major politcal amphibious invasion of Taiwan, the willingness of Tai- partes on US policy towards Taiwan. wanese forces and populaton to grind out the fght, and the United States and other allies’ (lack of) resolve The main point: In the frst tme since 1996, the Dem- to become involved in the confict, the authors essen- ocratc Party conspicuously omited reference to a tally imagine a scenario in which a surprise Chinese “One-China Policy” in reference to Taiwan in its party atack catches everyone politcally and militarily of- platorm, making it more aligned with the Republican guard—thus creatng a fait accompli. Party’s platorm. The imaginaton that went into creatng the whole sce- nario of course begs another queston: Why would Chi- na want to invade Taiwan in 2021? “It’s tough to make predictons, especially about the Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 4 future,” once said American professional baseball play- very high without a guarantee of success.” er Yogi Berra. So why 2021? Interestngly, this is not the Taking a forgiving view of Morrell’s and Winnefeld’s frst tme that the year has been put forward as a pos- underlying motvatons for writng the artcle, as well sibility. Besides Chinese propagandists, Ambassador as the tming of its publicaton, it is possible that the (ret.) Chas Freeman, who served as the principal inter- two former senior natonal security ofcials are trying preter during the late President Nixon’s visit to China in to warn the US government about the dangers of com- 1972, wrote as recently as 2017: placency. Specifcally, they seem concerned about pos- “President Xi has not publicly set a deadline for sibility of a fait accompli—a done deal in the Taiwan formalizing Taiwan’s reunifcaton [sic] with the Strait—should elected leaders and military planners rest of China. It’s doubtul that he will. But vani- take their eyes of the ball. For all their warnings about ty, in the form of the search for a historical lega- the possibility of an imminent confict in the Taiwan cy, and natonal pride, in the ramp up to the July Strait, the former ofcials suggested that, given the 1, 2021, hundredth anniversary of the founding current level of politcal turmoil, the US government of the Chinese Communist Party, provide am- may fnd itself in a state of paralysis, impairing its abil- ple motvaton for China’s current leadership to ity to respond to the crisis. From a more cynical view, adopt this as a goal.” the authors are inadvertently signaling what they read as a lack of US resolve to come to the defense of Tai- To be clear, the PLA’s principal objectve is to conquer wan should the Chinese invade in 2021, which could Taiwan while deterring, delaying, or destroying US mil- invite the adventurism by China that they seem to be itary actons to assist in the defense of the island-na- warning about. ton. This is what China refers to as its “Main Strategic Directon” (主要戰略方向). And, indeed, even General While it seems unlikely that China would take on the Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平) has sounded the alarm enormous costs and risks of initatng a full-scale con- about the need to bring Taiwan into the fold of the fict in the near term, as Dr. Kaufman argues, that is People’s Republic of China (PRC)—sooner rather than not to say of course that consideraton of the possibil- later. However, while the Chinese leadership has had ity is not warranted. The failure to imagine unreason- the motvaton to subdue Taiwan since as far back as able risks would be a strategic mistake. Indeed, China 1949, an actual decision to use military force would re- has been ratchetng up tensions in the Taiwan Strait quire far more than the mere existence of motvatons in recent years, while members of Congress have pro- to act. Rather, any such decision must include consid- posed several pieces of legislaton that seek to address eraton of the enormous risks involved—as Ian Easton, this behavior vis-à-vis Taiwan and improve the ability senior director at the Project 2049 Insttute, metcu- of the US to respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, lously documented in his namesake book “The Chinese as GTI Senior Non-Resident Fellow Mike Mazza argued Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strat- in his Global Taiwan Brief piece “Congressional Inita- egy in Asia.” [1] tves Shifing US Towards Strategic Clarity.” Motvatons tell us nothing about the decision-mak- To be sure, the Chinese military will want to have the ing process that the CCP would have to necessarily go element of surprise during a Taiwan contngency. How- through prior to launching an invasion. Chinese leaders ever, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance would need to consider whether they think they have capabilites that Taiwan and the United States have the capability to succeed under current conditons, penetratng China’s land, air, and coastal borders have and whether a failure would increase the probability ensured that this is a critcal advantage that the PLA of an accelerated collapse of the CCP, as well as many does not currently enjoy. Moreover, barring a dramatc other politcal-military variables. As Allison Kaufman, turn of events acceleratng Beijing’s tmeline for unif- the principal research scientst at the federally funded caton, there will be likely more (non-military) signals CNA, testfying before the US-China Security and Eco- to come before China decides to act on its desire to nomic Review Commission, stated: “[…] at present, the take Taiwan. Most likely—and perhaps in the near fu- potental costs to China of setng of such a confict are ture—there will probably be a tghtening of the 2005 Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 5

Ant-Secession Law (反分裂國家法) that Chinese GCTF partners will organize several virtual seminars leaders could use as a legal pretext for the invasion on the digital economy for the Latn American and of Taiwan. Indeed, as recently as the 2020 Natonal Caribbean region in hopes of extending the forum—a People’s Congress, there were murmurs of a revision US-Taiwan cooperaton platorm established in 2015— to the language of the law to more precisely capture to a region where Taiwan stll enjoys signifcant diplo- what China sees as Taiwanese moves toward de jure matc support. In a video remark, Taiwan’s Vice Foreign independence. Indeed, Beijing may think that it could Minister Miguel Tsao (曹立傑) called Latn America deter such behavior by adding specifc language to the and the Caribbean “an important region of Taiwan’s in- legislaton. ternatonal relatons as [it is where] the majority of Tai- wan’s diplomatc allies are located.” “We hope to en- Although a full-scale war between China and Taiwan hance cooperaton among Taiwan, the US, Japan, and seems unlikely in the near future despite the scenario our diplomatc allies in the region to create a closer cir- presented by the two former senior natonal securi- cle of friendship,” Tsao added. Afer Panama switched ty ofcials, the possibility of a more limited confict is diplomatc recogniton to the People’s Republic of Chi- growing. Ultmately, Beijing does seem to have a dead- na (PRC) in 2017, Guatemala has become the Republic line for the unifcaton of Taiwan. However, it is like- of China’s (ROC)—the formal name of Taiwan—most ly not 2021, as Ambassador Freeman suggested, but enduring and consequental diplomatc-ally in Central sometme before 2049, the centennial of the found- America. Currently, Taiwan’s relatons with Guatema- ing of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and, more la are characterized by mutual support for each side’s importantly, the year that Xi has set as his deadline natonal interests, solid economic and trade tes, and for the great rejuvenaton of the Chinese naton—for joint resistance against Chinese pressure. which the unifcaton of Taiwan with China is a neces- sary prerequisite. Guatemala’s Importance for Taiwan The main point: The artcle by two former senior na- The ROC and Guatemala established diplomatc rela- tonal security ofcials presentng a hypothetcal sce- tons in 1933. Guatemala is now the ROC’s longest-last- nario in which China invades Taiwan as soon as in Jan- ing ally in Central America, afer Panama—which had uary 2021 should be read as a cautonary tale rather previously maintained relatons with the ROC since than a forecast of things to come. 1912—switched recogniton to the PRC in June 2017 following a long-running contest between Beijing and [1] Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Taipei. Guatemala is also one of the ROC’s 15 remain- Defense and American Strategy in Asia (United King- ing diplomatc allies worldwide, as well as one of its dom: Eastbridge Books, 2019) fve diplomatc partners in Central America, along with Honduras, Paraguay, Belize, and Nicaragua. Former Taiwan leaders Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), and Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), as well as President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), have all visit- Guatemala’s Role in Taiwan’s Diplo- ed Guatemala during their tenures in ofce. During his matic Strategy in Central America state visits to Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, and Hon- duras in 2001, former president Chen Shui-bian urged By: I-wei Jennifer Chang these diplomatc allies to support Taiwan’s member- I-wei Jennifer Chang is a research fellow at the Global ship into the United Natons (UN). Furthermore, in his Taiwan Insttute. 2016 farewell tour of Central America prior to leaving ofce, Ma Ying-jeou delivered a speech thanking re- Taiwan, the United States, and Japan announced in gional allies for their support of Taiwan at the Central mid-July their plan to host the next workshop of the American Parliament (Parlamento Centroamericano, Global Cooperaton and Training Framework (GCTF, 全 PARLACEN), the parliamentary body of the Central 球合作暨訓練架構) in Guatemala. The three formal American Integraton System (SICA), headquartered in Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 6

Guatemala City. Taiwan’s permanent observer status in The Guatemalan government has also supported pre- PARLACEN, which was established in 1991, has helped vious Taiwanese campaigns to join the WHA meetngs. deepen strategic cooperaton with regional countries. Economic and Trade Relatons PARLACEN has passed resolutons supportng Taiwan’s partcipaton in the World Health Associaton (WHA), The Taiwan-Guatemala Free Trade Agreement (中華民 Internatonal Civil Aviaton Organizaton (ICAO), and 國台灣 – 瓜地馬拉自由貿易協定) went into force the UN Framework Conventon on Climate Change. in 2006, enhancing trade and economic exchanges between the two sides. Taiwan also signed FTAs with President Tsai has also visited Central American allies other regional countries, including El Salvador, Hon- since she took ofce in 2016. In January 2017, she de- duras, Nicaragua, and Panama (prior to the severance livered an address at Guatemala’s Congress, statng of relatons). The Taiwan-Guatemala FTA slashed tar- that “For many years, Guatemala has spoken up on ifs on Taiwanese exports of industrial and agricultural Taiwan’s behalf in the internatonal community. On products to Guatemala, as well as Guatemalan exports behalf of the government of the Republic of China, I of agricultural goods to Taiwan, in additon to more thank Guatemala.” Her address was broadcast on Gua- than 7,000 items traded between the two sides. Fol- temala’s congressional channel on a new broadcast- lowing the implementaton of the FTA, bilateral trade ing system that Taiwan had helped to set up. During increased to more than USD $150 million annually and Tsai’s visit, Guatemala’s then-president Jimmy Morales reached a height of USD $241 million in 2015. Last asked the Taiwan government for more aid to help year, two-way trade stood at USD $208 million. Taiwan fund a major highway project connectng Guatemala mainly imports sugar cane, cofee beans, and recycled City to the Atlantc Ocean. In her public remarks, Tsai copper from Guatemala, while exportng auto parts to said Taiwan was pleased to have partcipated in the its Central American ally. previous three stages of the highway project and in- dicated that Taipei would also provide assistance for In April, both sides expanded the scope of the FTA by future projects. During Morales’ visit to Taipei in April eliminatng tarifs on additonal items, including Tai- 2019, Tsai maintained that both sides have had robust wanese bicycle and motorcycle exports and select Gua- cooperaton in areas including infrastructure, public temalan agricultural goods. MOFA has encouraged Tai- health, educaton, commerce, and technology. wanese businesses to invest more in Central American countries, which boast low labor and land costs and Following the outbreak of the novel coronavirus could help to butress the United States in its ongoing (COVID-19), Taiwan has provided related assistance to trade war with China. Taiwan’s government plans to Guatemala and other Central American allies. Earlier expand cooperaton with the United States, Japan, and this year, Taipei sent 180,000 surgical masks, along with other friendly countries, including Guatemala, and will other medical equipment, to Guatemalan President explore new commercial opportunites in Guatemala Alejandro Giammatei, who assumed the presidency in in 2020, said Phoebe Yeh (葉非比), director-general of January. Additonally, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Af- MOFA’s Department of Internatonal Cooperaton and fairs (MOFA) said in June that it will be donatng 10,000 Economic Afairs, late last year. COVID-19 test kits to Guatemala and Belize as part of its broader coronavirus assistance to its allies in Latn However, Guatemala’s trade with China, which climbed America and the Caribbean. to nearly USD $2.6 billion in 2019, has grown exponen- tally faster than its bilateral trade with Taiwan. At the Guatemala, in return, has been one of several of Tai- end of 2018, China signed a total of USD $600 million wan’s staunchest diplomatc allies and friends that in contracts for projects in Guatemala and completed have publicly expressed support for Taipei’s most re- a turnover of USD $450 million in investment. Despite cent bid to partcipate in the WHA meetng in Geneva these trade disparites, the Central American country this past May. A representatve from Guatemala also has remained a steadfast ally to Taiwan. Furthermore, spoke up on Taiwan’s behalf at a World Health Organi- Guatemala has purchased arms from the United States zaton (WHO) meetng in February, arguing that Taiwan and to a lesser extent from Taiwan—but not from Chi- is an important public health partner for his country. Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 7 na. According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Afairs Joseph Wu (吳釗 Taiwan exported USD $2 million in arms to Guatemala 燮), Actng US Secretary of Homeland Security Chad in both 1996 and 2012. The United States is by far the Wolf, the US Internatonal Development Finance Cor- leading supplier of arms to Guatemala, while the SIPRI poraton’s Chief Executve Ofcer Adam Boehler, and database does not list any Chinese arms sales to Gua- the presidents and foreign ministers of Guatemala and temala. Honduras. Taiwan and the United States discussed building partnerships with the two Central American China’s Pressure Campaign on Guatemala countries in multple areas, such as trade, infrastruc- Beijing has pressured Guatemala to renounce its tes ture, and investment, as well as the creaton of a mul- to the ROC for several decades. In the late 1990s, Chi- tlateral cooperaton mechanism. Taiwan’s MOFA sub- na used its permanent seat on the UN Security Coun- sequently released a statement saying that Taiwan will cil to veto a resoluton on sending UN peacekeeping “contnue to boost the prosperity and development of missions to monitor Guatemala’s peace accords, which Central America.” ended 36 years of civil war. Beijing was reportedly Central America is a key strategic region for the Donald furious with Guatemala’s decision to invite Taiwan’s J. Trump administraton’s eforts to end illegal immi- then-Foreign Minister John Chiang (蔣孝嚴) to witness graton into the United States, while the region con- the historic signing of the accords on December 29, sttutes a baston of diplomatc support for Taiwan. 1996. China has also used its veto-wielding power on Washington has provided assistance to improve gov- Security Council resolutons regarding other countries, ernance and economic growth in Guatemala as part of such as Hait, that recognize the ROC. its eforts to deter illegal immigraton into the United More recently, Beijing has been stepping up pressure States and to mitgate transnatonal criminal actvity. on the Guatemalan government to relinquish formal Given Taiwan’s close tes and foreign assistance to Gua- relatons with the ROC. Guatemala has been under temala and other Central American countries, Wash- tremendous pressure from China to de-recognize the ington, Taipei, and other like-minded partners could ROC, according to US Senator Cory Gardner (R-CO), jointly enhance collaboraton on promotng regional chairman of the US Senate Foreign Afairs Subcom- development and cooperaton. As Washington and mitee on East Asia, the Pacifc, and Internatonal Cy- Taipei extend the GCTF to Central America, both sides bersecurity Policy. Gardner, who made these remarks could not only work to improve the internal conditons following a March 2019 meetng with the Guatemalan within Central American countries, but also shore up ambassador to the United States, said that Guatema- Taiwan’s diplomatc alliances to protect against Bei- la has resisted China’s demands and that the United jing’s encroachment into the region. States should commend Taiwan’s allies and partners The main point: Following the loss of Panama to Bei- who have made the right decision. There were signif- jing, Guatemala has become the Republic of China’s icant concerns that the loss of Panama, a major dip- most enduring and consequental Central American lomatc setback for Taiwan, would lead to a domino diplomatc ally. Taiwan and the United States can ut- efect in other Central American countries including lize the GCTF to further enhance bilateral and multlat- Guatemala. Thus far, however, Guatemala has reject- eral cooperaton in Central America. ed China’s ofer to switch recogniton, but both Tai- wan and the United States remain concerned about Beijing’s intensifying pressure campaign targetng the ROC’s diplomatc allies, as well as China’s rising polit- cal and economic infuence in Latn America. US-Taiwan Collaboraton in Central America Early this year, the frst quadrilateral talks between Tai- wan, the United States, Guatemala, and Honduras con- vened in Guatemala. In atendance at the talks were Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 8

Propaganda Drives “Massive” PLA Ex- ity of the claims by Beijing and its propagandists that military exercises were undertaken in direct response ercises in the Taiwan Strait to a specifc “provocaton” by either Taipei or “certain By: J. Michael Cole large countries.” Given the logistcs involved in prepa- ratons for major military maneuvers, it is highly unlike- J. Michael Cole is a senior non-resident fellow at the ly that large-scale exercises involving various services Global Taiwan Insttute. within the PLA could be mobilized quickly enough to On August 13, the Chinese military announced that respond purposefully to a visit by a US ofcial that it had conducted military exercises “near” Taiwan had been announced only weeks prior (in Azar’s case, “to safeguard natonal sovereignty” in response to a the announcement was made on August 4, only fve visit to Taiwan by US Health Secretary Alex Azar, the days prior to the visit). In such instances, two alterna- most senior ranking US ofcial to visit Taiwan since tve—and likelier—scenarios present themselves: (1) if 1979. Referring to eforts by “certain large countries” the drills were indeed in response to a specifc recent that are “incessantly making negatve moves regard- development, then they almost certainly were small- ing the Taiwan issue and sending wrong signals to the scale and at the command post-level; (2) conversely, if ‘Taiwan independence’ forces,” Zhang Chunhui (張春 the military exercises occurred on a larger scale, then 暉), spokesman of the People’s Liberaton Army’s (PLA) they were inevitably planned months ahead of tme Eastern Theater Command (東部戰區), said the exer- and therefore could not have been prompted by a sud- cises occurred in the Taiwan Strait, as well as in areas den external stmulus. north and south of Taiwan. A similar series of events occurred in April 2018, when As is always the case when analyzing Chinese military the usual set of actors—the TAO, Global Times, hawk- drills “near” Taiwan, analysts and observers should ish Chinese commentators, and foreign media—turned be careful to distnguish between operatons that are a relatvely small and scheduled series of exercises in primarily exercises in psychological warfare and those waters of Quanzhou, Fujian Province, into “the frst which signal genuine preparedness for use of force live-fre exercise in the Strait” since the 1995-1996 Tai- against the island naton. Unfortunately, internaton- wan Strait Missile Crisis, undertaken “to check ‘Taiwan al media will ofen uncritcally report Chinese state- independence.’” (The Global Times’ subhead to its ar- ments—as well as reports in pro-Beijing outlets like tcle read, “Provocatons by Taiwan’s leaders, others the Global Times and South China Morning Post—as result in mainland’s stern warning.”) Back then, the ex- facts, which inadvertently amplifes the propagandistc ercises were ostensibly tmed to coincide with a visit to 蔡英文 elements of the Chinese maneuvers. Swaziland by President Tsai Ing-wen ( ). Just as ofen, these outlets will quote “unnamed mil- On cue, the aforementoned Song Zhongping, quoted itary analysts” or retred PLA ofcers-turned-mili- in a dispatch by Agence France-Presse, warned that tary-commentators, such as Phoenix TV’s Song Zhong- “The drill comes as the Taiwan authority has been ping (宋忠平). These analysts have a track record of obstnately promotng ‘Taiwan independence,’ espe- distortng the facts surrounding military exercises, cially considering that Taiwan leader [President] Tsai while exacerbatng, through their commentary, psy- Ing-wen and the island’s [Taiwan] administratve head 賴清德 chological pressure on the Taiwanese people. Hawkish [then-premier] Lai Ching-te [ ] keep spread- commentators like Song or Lü Cuncheng, a research ing the idea.” “The mainland [China],” he contnued, fellow at the Insttute of Taiwan Studies of the Chinese “needs this targeted drill to punish the two; […] the fo- Academy of Social Sciences (CASS, 中國社會科學院), cus of the upcoming drill will be long-distance atacks will frequently echo messaging by the State Council’s and amphibious landing operatons, which worries Taiwan Afairs Ofce (TAO, 國務院台灣事務辦公室) Taiwan the most.” Lef unsaid in the reports was the or “fll the blanks” if ofcial remarks are not sufcient- fact that the small-scale drills did not, as Song claimed, ly threatening. involve “long-distance atacks and amphibious landing operatons.” Additonally, despite the allegedly unprec- What is ofen ignored in such reportng is the credibil- Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 9 edented nature of the exercises, such military maneu- Taiwan by depictng US eforts to defend the embat- vers actually occur on an annual basis. In most cases, tled democracy as both unnecessarily infammatory such local exercises involve artllery fring as well as and ultmately fruitless given the scale of the threat computerized simulatons. During that same incident, against the island-naton. We should add, as well, that Song also succeeded in putng China’s aircraf carrier, Beijing’s propaganda also maintains that it remains the Liaoning, at two diferent locatons simultaneous- commited to “peaceful unifcaton,” and that any use ly—in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait. of force would therefore only be “defensive” and re- sultng from provocaton. One good way to assess the veracity of claims by state- run Chinese media and propagandists is to peruse of- In another editorial published on August 16 in re- cial PLA publicatons, which regularly release imagery sponse to a recent report by former Deputy Director of recent military maneuvers. Sure enough, Song’s of the Central Intelligence Agency Michael Morell and claims of exercises simulatng “long-distance atacks retred US Admiral James Winnefeld for the US Naval and amphibious landing operatons” in April 2018 Insttute (USNI), the Global Times stated that “If there were not supported by imagery on the ofcial PLA is any serious tension or even a military clash in the Tai- website. At this writng, no imagery stemming from wan Straits, it could only be triggered by the separatst the August 2020 exercises has surfaced. Certainly, no authority on the island and the US. The mainland will evidence has emerged that supports the noton that not unilaterally create tensions over the Taiwan ques- the operatons were “unprecedented” “massive mili- ton, which would be a distracton from its own devel- tary drills in the Taiwan Straits” that—as unnamed mil- opment.” Thus, the propaganda aimed at the United itary analysts stated in the Global Times said—“must States and other allies vis-à-vis Taiwan contends that be of a large scale and could have involved warplanes, the PLA is ready and willing to use force against Tai- warships, amphibious troops, artllery, and missiles.” wan, but nevertheless remains commited to fnding a [italics added.] Nothing demonstratng, as the Global “peaceful” opton—unlike what people like Morell and Times claimed, “that the PLA is capable of launching Winnefeld might claim. Only “unacceptable” US med- a general ofensive from all directons in the Taiwan dling and support to “secessionists” would compel the Straits, and seize the island in hours.” PLA to act on its threat. The US, therefore, had beter stay out. Propagandistc reports on large-scale PLA ma- We must nevertheless acknowledge that this type of neuvers in the Taiwan Strait serve as a reminder of this. messaging has the imprimatur of the Chinese Commu- nist Party (CCP), which must give approval before any- A frst step toward countering these narratves would thing is printed in the Global Times, and with whom entail recognizing that the more the CCP and its usu- propagandists like Song must most assuredly coordi- al propagandists, like Song, seek to portray a military nate their commentary. Furthermore, the signaling has exercise as “unprecedented” and directly linked to a undoubtedly become harsher, with commentary in the specifc “provocaton” by “Taiwan secessionists” and same report indicatng that “The PLA has more optons their foreign allies, the less credibility internatonal to impose military pressure, including fghter jets fy- media outlets should give to inital reports and ofcial ing around the island, passing the ‘middle line’ of the statements coming out of the TAO and PRC’s Ministry Straits and even fying over Taiwan Island, testng bal- of Foreign Afairs. Highly publicized military drills are listc missiles over the Taiwan Island, and carrying out propaganda and should be treated as such. More ofen military exercises in the eastern waters of Taiwan.” than not, the truly threatening actons on the part of the PLA, such as intrusions into Taiwan’s ADIZ or across More responsible journalism on the part of interna- the median line in the Taiwan Strait, are much less tonal outlets would arguably reduce the incentve for publicized by Beijing. However, it is precisely such ac- Beijing to resort to such threatening propaganda and tvity that should be receiving greater atenton within help limit its potental coercive efect on the popula- internatonal media. ton of Taiwan. Reducing foreign coverage of such pro- paganda by practcing more skeptcal reportng would Since the electon of Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, the military also curtail Beijing’s ability to guide the narratve on component of Beijing’s strategy toward Taiwan has Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 10 become more prevalent as its “sof power” initatves term designs on the country, is unlikely to calm nerves have largely failed. This latest militarizaton of Beijing’s on the island. Such demographic trends have negatve posture comprises two main vectors—increased PLA implicatons for Taiwan’s contnuing ability to defend actvity and preparedness in the vicinity of Taiwan, itself and maintain its economic growth. A shrinking combined with a sustained campaign of psychological populaton also raises questons about Taiwanese so- warfare against the Taiwanese government and pub- ciety’s (very) long-term viability and its ability to adapt lic. Although the threat of possible use of force against to changing demographic conditons. Yet even as Tai- Taiwan should not be taken lightly—and appropriate wan looks for ways to adapt to this new demographic measures should be taken accordingly by both Taipei reality, it might discover that there are silver linings to and its allies—we must be careful to distnguish be- the NDC’s new statstcal forecast. tween the real and the illusory, if only to ensure that China’s Reacton responses to the Chinese threat are commensurate and focused on the right set of variables. Speaking to reporters last month, Taiwan Foreign Min- ister Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) freted, “if we look at the Propaganda is both meant to confuse and to create contested issues around China’s periphery, we see that a sense of embatlement and inevitability. The more for China, Taiwan would be an extremely convenient we understand the ratonales, channels, and targets of sacrifcial lamb.” Although there are good reasons to this propaganda, the beter equipped we will be to see worry that the Chinese threat to Taiwan may have through the fog and defend ourselves if and when a grown more imminent, Xi Jinping (習近平) may not real blow is imminent and aimed at us. yet be eager to resort to aggression across the Taiwan The main point: Highly publicized claims of large-scale Strait. If that is the case, the new reminder of Taiwan’s military exercises by the PLA in response to specifc demographic decline may encourage greater patence “provocatons” by Taipei and its allies should be recog- from the Chinese leader. nized for what they are: exercises in propaganda aim- A shrinking, aging populaton is a signifcant challenge ing to confuse, deter, and isolate the Taiwanese public. for the Republic of China (Taiwan) Armed Forces, es- pecially as Taiwan has shifed to an all-volunteer force. Taiwan already faces a labor shortage. The deepening of that shortage spells trouble. Knock-on Efects of Acceleratng Demo- Taiwan’s populaton aged 15-64 has been shrinking graphic Changes in Taiwan since 2015, while its share of the overall populaton has been shrinking since 2012, when it peaked at 74.22 By: Michael Mazza percent. Competton for labor is likely to increase as both numbers contnue their downward trends and as J. Michael Cole is a senior non-resident fellow at the the elder care burden that falls on that age bracket in- Global Taiwan Insttute, a visitng fellow with the Amer- creases. Fewer job applicants will demand beter pay ican Enterprise Insttute, and a nonresident fellow at and perks, and military recruitment and retenton will the German Marshall Fund of the United States. sufer for it. The result may well be a military that is un- Taiwan’s populaton will start shrinking this year. That dermanned and that does not include among its ranks contracton coincides with the populaton’s contnued Taiwan’s best and brightest. aging, as reported by Focus Taiwan, citng ofcial data If that is the future that leaders in Beijing are projectng from the country’s Natonal Development Council: for Taiwan, they have good reason to contnue delay- “Taiwan will become a super-aged society by 2025, ing any move towards forceful unifcaton. What would meaning that one in fve citzens will be aged over likely be a very tough fght for the People’s Liberaton 65, due mainly to a falling birth rate and a fast-aging Army (PLA) today might be a slightly easier one years populaton.” This news, coming amidst the COVID-19 down the road. pandemic and intensifed concerns about China’s near- Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 11

Adaptaton and Follow-on Efects: The Economy ic growth. […] In additon, the drop in corporate profts and growing labor costs may force more Of course, Taiwan is unlikely to stand pat in the face industries to raise prices and lead to a higher of these demographic challenges. Indeed, adaptng overall infaton rate.” to demographic decline, if not arrestng it, could have follow-on efects, leading to a stronger, more secure Put simply, it is important to fll empty jobs, and immi- Taiwan. graton is an efectve way to do so. Perhaps the easiest way for Taiwan to address its de- But beyond addressing the labor shortage, more im- mographic changes is to permit and encourage greater migraton could give the Taiwanese economy a helpful immigraton. In her second inaugural address, Presi- jolt. In “Assuring Taiwan’s Innovaton Future,” a Carne- dent Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) suggested she would take a gie Endowment report, Evan A. Feigenbaum addresses step in this directon, promising to “bring in the world’s challenges to Taiwan’s “innovaton ecosystem.” One top technical, R&D, and management talents to help problem? globalize Taiwan’s workforce, widen our industries’ “Bluntly put, a new generaton of Taiwan-based horizons, and give them the ability to compete in the technology startups has yet to emerge. Indeed, internatonal arena.” Indeed, the New Economic Immi- while Taiwan now has a vibrant and fourishing graton Act (新經濟移民法), debated in the Legislatve startup scene, few of these frms have agglom- Yuan earlier this year, would seek to do just that. erated around new or fast-growing areas of sci- Taiwan should consider going further by opening the ence, technology, engineering, and mathematcs doors to a larger infux of immigrants. The domestc (STEM).” resistance to such a move may be less ferce than in One potental reason for this defciency is that Taiwan’s places like Japan and South Korea, where oppositon aspiring entrepreneurs are more isolated than in past to acceptng more immigrants appears to be rooted, decades. As Feigenbaum explains: at least in part, in strong natonal identtes based on a shared ethnicity. This is less true for Taiwan, as Sheena “With the United States, meanwhile, Taiwan saw Chestnut Greitens and Aram Hur argued recently for diminished connectons to Silicon Valley in the Foreign Policy. They describe a “civic basis” for Taiwan- 2000s for two reasons: frst, with more oppor- ese identty: “rather than taking an ethnic or pan-Chi- tunites at home, fewer students from Taiwan nese approach, as it once did, Taiwan sees itself as a came to the United States to study; second, Sili- democratc naton, frst and foremost.” In theory, such con Valley frms like Apple increasingly partnered a civic identty should make it easier for current cit- with lower cost Chinese, not Taiwan, frms for zens to embrace would-be natonals as long as the lat- their manufacturing needs.” ter embrace Taiwan’s democracy. Immigraton may provide one soluton to this defcien- Greater immigraton to Taiwan would, in turn, have cy. Peter Vandor and Nikolaus Franke of the Vienna positve economic efects. Most obviously, more sub- University of Economics and Business, in seeking to stantal immigraton could solve Taiwan’s labor short- explain why immigrants ofen account for an outsized age problem. Without mitgaton, Taiwan will fore- share of entrepreneurial actvity, found evidence that go opportunites for economic growth (on a global “cross-cultural experiences may increase individuals’ scale, the Boston Consultng Group has assessed that capabilites to identfy promising business ideas” and projected labor shortages over the next 20 years will that such experiences “may also stmulate creatvity.” result in USD $10 trillion of “GDP not created”). As a report from The Conference Board on US labor short- Recognizing that Taiwan would beneft from more for- ages described, higher wages put downward pressure eign entrepreneurs, the country insttuted the Taiwan on company profts: Entrepreneur Visa in 2015. The qualifcatons for the program, however, are narrow and the visa requires “Lower profts make companies more reluctant that grantees hit the ground running. Taiwan’s immi- to spend, a trend that may slow down econom- graton policy should ensure immigrants have the op- Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 12 portunity to become entrepreneurs, rather than solely sharing, track 1 security dialogues, combined military seek to import established ones. exercises, and even coordinated military operatons. A formal alliance, per Sciubba, may remain a bridge Taiwan’s high-tech ecosystem is not evolving on its too far for both countries, but burden sharing (in the own. But immigrants permited entry due to growing pursuit of efciency) in patrolling and monitoring lito- labor shortages could end up giving that critcal ecosys- ral waters and skies may not be. Importantly, if Tokyo tem—and the economy writ large—the boost it sorely follows such a course, it may make it easier for other needs. interested US treaty allies and security partners to do Adaptaton and Knock-on Efects: Natonal Security so in the future. Shrinking populatons in Taiwan and Japan (the later’s Contrary to expectatons, then, Taiwan’s demogra- populaton decline began in 2010) should provide add- phy-induced security challenges could lead to a more ed impetus for the two to cooperate more closely in secure Taiwan—one with stronger internatonal secu- the natonal security realm. Tokyo has long had a deep rity partnerships that contribute to deterring Beijing. and abiding interest in Taiwan’s contnuing de facto in- Taiwan’s demographic trends do not amount to a bless- dependence, but it has also tended to hold Taipei at ing in disguise. The country would be beter served by arm’s length for fear of upsetng its tes with Beijing. a healthy demographic profle marked by a younger, With demographic trends placing similar constraints growing populaton. But if Taipei meets the challenge on both countries, over tme squeezing both human head on, it can stll ensure itself a bright future—one and material resources and thus compounding the in which it maintains its independent, democratc, and threat both face from China, a less cautous embrace prosperous existence. may now be in order. The main point: As Taiwan looks for ways to adapt to Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, in her book The Future Faces of its shrinking and aging populaton, it might discover War: Populaton and Natonal Security, identfes three that there are silver linings to its new demographic re- ways in which countries might compensate for military ality. manpower shortages: by pursuing technological supe- riority (“technology can, to some degree, replace lost [1] Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, The Future Faces of War: manpower”), alliances (“as part of strong alliances, Populaton and Natonal Security (Denver, CO: Praeger, states have strength in numbers, even if they are indi- 2011), 46-50. vidually weakened by aging”), and military efciency (“aging EU members states have been working to com- bine their military resources and reduce redundancy to improve efciency,” which “can reduce reliance on military manpower and relieve pressure on budgets”). [1] In all three pursuits, Taipei and Tokyo may fnd rea- son to work together. Given the ROC military’s impending challenges with recruitment and retenton, it is likely to look to tech- nological solutons to overcome manpower shortalls. Japan, with its expertse in robotcs and automaton, may have some answers and, given concerns regarding Taiwan’s ability to defend itself going forward, may be willing to share them. Beyond tech cooperaton, Japan may be more willing in the future to pursue the type of security cooperaton that has thus far made it nervous: robust intelligence